Jaźwiński J., Kowalczyk G., Smalko G., Żurek J. The follow-up the follow-up safety systems and the occurrence of unpredictable hazardous events.

THE FOLLOW-UP SAFETY SYSTEMS

AND THE OCCURRENCE OF

UNPREDICTABLE HAZARDOUS EVENTS

Jaźwiński J., Kowalczyk G., Smalko Z., Żurek J.

Air Force Institute of Technology, Warsaw

Abstract: The intended aim of the paper is to make an effort to analyse several methods of

building safety systems from the standpoint of probability of occurrence of an unpredictable hazardous critical accidents (crisis situation). Such being the case, there arises a necessity to build safety systems in the course of the critically circumstances (crisis situation). To satisfy this objective, the already existing safety systems are used and enriched with new components introduced to supplement them. Some conclusions in this field have been reached in the paper. The problem has been included with such events like the flood in Poland, Tsunami, Katrina hurricane and the terrorist attack in New York and Washington.

1. Unpredicables hazardous events and safety systems

Unpredictable hazardous events is such events as:

- catastrophes :air, sea, road, railway, nuclear, etc. ones, - disasters: floods, fires, earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.,

- ecological disasters: epidemics, insects’ invasions, water, air pollution, etc., - invasion on the other states’ territories: air, sea, and land border conflicts. The above-presented list of crisis situations should be supplemented with unpredictable, tendentiously assumed to occur, change of safe components of the ‘man-machine-environment’ system into hazardous components. Occurrences of the crisis situations stimulate the need to build safety systems aimed at:

- preventing the unpredictable hazardous events, - counteracting the unpredictable hazardous events,

- counteracting the effects of unpredictable hazardous events. The following types of safety systems can be mentioned:

1. Intercontinental and continental safety systems, 2. State safety systems,

3. Local safety systems: As instances of such systems one can mention the following ones: those in different enterprises, airports, harbours, railway and bus stations, hotels, shopping centres, etc.,

4. Individual safety systems: Instances thereof: those attributed to persons, devices/systems, work stands. Here are plenty of safeguards to be mentioned, e.g. a pilot’s parachute, safety devices, catches, fuses, air-operated valves, etc.

All those exemplary safety systems have been designed to perform specific functions or sets of functions. For instance, individual safety systems such as a cut-out/fuse or a parachute serve to protect individual objects. A fire extinguisher is used to extinguish fire of different objects although its is attributed to a specific object, i.e. a vehicle or a building.

A cellular phone with its basic function to ensure communication between people can -under some specific circumstances and if the need be - perform a function of a safeguard/safety system but at the same time can also be a medium introducing a hazardous situation. Similar situation may arise in case of a rescue system.

Components of this safety system perform their individual functions but under hazardous circumstances they become activated and ready to counteract the unpredictable hazardous events situation.

In practice, none of the above mentioned safety systems has proved effective enough to withstand effects of the unpredictable behaviour of operators. Therefore, a question can be put forward whether there are any symptoms which may facilitate such effects to be predicted. It is scarcely possible to answer this question. However, there are at least two things indispensable to start any counteraction, i.e. experience and imagination.

It is recommended that any follow-up safety system is featured with the following stages:

Mobilisation of the professional circles to initiate and develop means and techniques of coping with tendentious unpredictable hazards;

Starting all safety systems available at the moment to perform rescue actions and protection against the increasing tendencies of the hazards to become unpredictable;

Generation of special kinds of organisational and engineered protectives against unpredictable, dangerous actions.

2. A model of a follow-up safety system

Analysing the above stated examples of safety systems, it becomes evident that they consist of a set of both objective components (e.g. systems, devices, staff, etc.) and non-objective components (e.g. methods, procedures, etc.). The components of the endangered technological sphere are: man-machine-environment.

In practice, we are unable to specify all components of a safety system both on micro and macro scales. There are multiple consistent and contradictory relationships taking place between the components of a safety system. Therefore, many and various relations can be found within a safety system in the course of a decision-making process. What can be stated in general is that, apart from the set of components of a safety system, the structure thereof is a category in itself and may even be the most important one, since it defines relations between the components of the system.

Characteristics (system’s parameters) build up the third category within a safety system. The following are to be mentioned among them:

NZS - frequency of occurrence of hazardous situations of a given type (or time

TSB - time of the safety system’s functioning until the instant of moving into the

‘unfit-for-use’ (unserviceable) state;

TW - time indispensable to activate (‘switch on’) the safety system (time of

informing the safety system that a hazardous situation has occurred);

TGSB - time indispensable for the safety system to reach the level of readiness to start

counteracting the hazardous accidents situation;

TOB - time of counteracting the hazardous accidents situation;

TD - available time for the safety system to effectively counteract the hazardous

accidents situation;

CSB - cost of maintaining the safety system,

COB - cost of intervention in the hazardous situation;

CD - cost of tardily counteracting the hazardous accidents situation.

Fig. 1 shows a fundamental model of the ’’safeguarded system - activating (‘switch-on’) system - safeguarding system’’ arrangement. The display represented in Fig. 1 refers to one hazardous event.

Safeguarded system ZS ZS N T , Activating (‘switch-on’) system T_W Safeguarding system SB GSB SBT C T , , OB OBC T , D D C T ,

Fig. 1. Fundamental model of the ’’safeguarded system - activating (‘switch-on’) system - safeguarding system’’ arrangement

The above-mentioned system’s parameters feature some selected, well-organised safety systems. Fig. 2 offers a model of a safety system created in the course of a crisis situation taking place at the moment. Such being the case, we have to do with sets WSZ, WW, WSB, WOB, WD of system’s parameters instead of the system’s parameters

individually.

Let us consider some examples of the follow-up safety systems.

Example 1. Crisis situation – flood in the south-west area of Poland.

Activation of the follow-up system of safety was presented. A theoretical algorithm of full and partial activation of local subsystems in the country was given in order to combat the effects of flood (fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Flood in the south-west area of Poland - activation of the follow-up

system of safety

The follow-up system of rescue consists

of province subsystems of Poland. The system includes: - Governement and Ministries;

- Civilian Authorities; - Fire-alarm system services; - Health Services;

- Military – Forces; - Police;

- Social organizations. The system’s task is:

- Counteracting the flood spreading; - Water and property protection; - Animal rescue service;

- Counteracting epidemics occurrence; - Supplying drinking water food and clothes; - Medical and psychological protection.

TD - time at disposal, time when is exceeded the rescue operation has no sense;

TK - time for the activation of the province subsystems;

P(TD > TK) - probability of the rescue operation success.

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Example 2. Crisis situation – tsunami occurred and afflicted Asian, Oceania and African countries (fig. 4).

The follow-up system of safety was formed on global scale.

Fig. 4. Tsunami, December 2004. The aim of the follow-up system is:

- searching for the missing people; - corps identification;

- prevention of the epidemics; - removing destruction.

There were 286.800 lives lost, 125.000 wounded and about 109.078 missing.

Financial help was declared by the following countries, total (in USD milion):

Australia 1.322; Austria 91.42; Belgium 65.37; Canada 743.68; China > 95.07; Czech Republic 19; Denmark 110; Finland 89.5; France > 54.84; Germany > 1,300; Greece 26.5; Hong Kong 57.5; India > 183; Republic of Ireland 117.94; Italy > 120.13; Japan > 500; Kuwait > 100; Netherlands 509.1; New Zealand > 60.4; Norway 265.1; Portugal 10.45; Qatar > 25; Spain > 73.13; Saudi Arabia > 97.4; Sweden 177.2; Switzerland 200.9; Taiwan 110; United Arab Emirates 20; United States 1939; European Union 615 and World Bank 250. Total sum of about 10 bilion USD was declared.

Example 3. Crisis situation – Katrina hurricane in New Orlean which was in 80% flooded (fig. 5).

The follow-up system of safety spread all over the U.S.A. It appeared also in various areas of the world. Many countries rushed with help.

Fig. 5. Delta Missisipi and New Orlean

Example 4. Crisis situation – terrorist attack against U.S.A. (New York, Washington) (fig. 6).

The follow-up system of safety spread over the U.S.A. and caused military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Terrorist attacks in Madrid and London were the consequences of the intervention.

- New Orlean (present area spreading from the river to the lake);

Fig. 6. Terrorist attack against U.S.A.: a) New York; b) Washington.

a) 1.

1. 12.45. Flight 11 interrupted. Boeing 767 of American Airlines flying from Boston to Los Angeles with 92 passengers on deck impacts into the north Tower.

2.

2. 13.03. Flight number 77 interrupted. Boeing 757 of American Airlines flying from Washington to Los Angeles with 64 people on deck impacts into the south Tower.

b) Pentagon - the wing of 5 storey building, in which were the Marines offices located,

impacted by an airplane collapsed and burnt out.

Conclusions

1. The ‘safety system’ is a term of very wide comprehension. It includes man-made devices/systems/structures as well as systems/structures resulting from the living beings’ evolution.

2. One of the conditions of originating the science of the follow-up safety systems is the knowledge of and competence in formulating functional, mathematical, simulation, etc. models of the arrangements of the type ‘safeguarding system -safeguarded system’.

3. Numerous facts observed quite recently suggest there is a real need and necessity to search for a different approach to the problem of building safety systems both on the macro- and the micro-technological scales.

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