A C T A
U N I V E R S I T A T I S
L O D Z I E N S I S
__ _______ FOLIA PHILOSOPHIC A_____ 7, 1 9 9 0 ___________
Marek Rosiak
WHAT 00 NEGATIVE SENTENCES SAY? On fu n c tio n s of s e n t e n t ia l n eg ation
Whenever a p h ilo so p h e r asks a lo g ic ia n about the meaning at s e n t e n t ia l n eg ation f u n c to r , he i s the most l i k e l y to le a rn th a t the on ly r ig h t answer i s d e liv e r e d by c l a s s i c a l p r e p o s it io n a l l o g ic . This re s p e c ta b le theory p ro v id e s ve ry sim ple and sh o rt so lu t io n : n eg atio n is a tru th - fu n c tio n d e fin e d by tho m a trix :
p not p . 1 0
0 I
This answer, which i s b e liv e d to o r ig in a t e w ith P e ir c e , a l though e a si ly accep ted by common sen se, can be u n s a t is fa c t o r y fo r a p h ilo so p h e r who search es fo r le s s la c o n ic in t e r p r e t a t io n s of n e g a tio n , and having found any he would wonder why n eg a tio n tre a te d as a tru th - fu n c tio n is the on ly one v a l i d in c l a s s i c a l l o g ic . I s the f a c i l i t y of fo rm a liz a tio n the o n ly reason fo r t h a t ? The aim of t h is paper i s to show th a t those reasons a re more im p o rta n t.
The problem concerning proper in t e r p r e t a t io n of n e g a tiv e sen ten ces (in c lu d in g the r o le o f n e g a tio n ) can be found in e a r ly p h ilo s o p h ic a l thought. The members of the E l e a t i c School were pro b ab ly the f i r s t to c la im th at the a b s o lu te ly p o s it iv e being can be spoken about on ly in a f f ir m a t iv e way. Parm enides, the founder of the s c h o o l, emphasized th e t n othin g can be s a id about not-being, thereupon n e g a tiv e sentences were b e liv e d to have no s e n s e 1. This
1 W. K n e a i e , M. K n e a 1 e , The Development of L o g ic , Uxford 1962, pp. 21 f . ; F . C o p 1 e s t o n, A H is to r y of P h ilo s o p h y , London 1956, v o l. I , p . 49.
stan d p o in t im p lie s the assignment of d e s t r u c t iv e r o le to negation fu n c to r which added to a f f ir m a t iv e statem ent forms a nonsense.
The conception developed by S o p h ists is not le s s p a ra d o x ic a l then E l e a t i c s . For example, P ro ta g o ra s , assuming th a t the r e a l i t y is c o n tra d ic to r y regarded both n e g a tiv e and a f f ir m a t iv e sentences which s ta t e something to be t r u e 2. When such a p o in t of view is adhered to , the f u t i l i t y of c h a r a c t e r iz a t io n of n eg ation (and o th er s e n t e n t ia l c o n n e c tiv e s ) by means of t ru th - ta b le s seems to be ob vious. T o tal co n fusion which reigned in contem porary op inio ns on negation m a n ifests i t s e l f in the f a c t th a t another s o p h is t, Gor- g ia s , having a s c e rta in e d th a t nothinQ e x is t s concludes th a t every u tte ra n c e i s f a l s e , s in c e th e re i s nothing r e a l i t can r e f e r to 5. The con cep tions mentioned above f a i l e d , s in c e they turned out to be too w ild and erroneous in com parision to in t u i t i o n connected w ith a p p l i c a b i l i t y of n eg ation in everyday language.
The f i r s t p h ilo so p h e r to base th is problem on more firm ground was P la t o . In the d ia lo g u e " S o p h is t" he r e je c t s the prem ise of Parmenides th a t n othing can be s a id about n ot-b eing . As a m atter of fa c t P la t o d id n 't work out h is own co n ce p tio n , but he rushes to a p r o v is io n a l statem ent th a t not-being e x is ts and there a ls o e x is t s e n s ib le n e g a tiv e sen te n ces, and thus negation se rv e s ju s t to s ta t e the n ot-b eing . Pa ra p h ra sin g the words of P la t o : n e g a t i ve sentence says about not-being as not b eing 4 .
A r i s t o t l e took up and developed P l a t o 's idea of n e g a tiv e sen ten ce. According to him n e g a tiv e sentences r e f e r to not-being which is not co m p letely undeterm ined; i t i s n onexistence of some th in g d e f i n i t e . In the o p inio n of A r i s t o t l e what does e x i s t , un dergoes changes which g e n e ra lly speaking c o n s is t in jo in in g and s e p a ra tin g of elem ents, q u a l i t i e s and f a c t o r s . A sentence exp res ses these unions or la c k of them, as i t is in the case of n e g a t i ve sentence . For in s ta n c e , the sentence "S o c ra te s is not run nin g " s ta te s the absence of co n n ection between a substance i . e . S o c ra te s
2 г*, „ o ą e n e s L a e r t i u s , L iv e s of the Philosophers, ÍX , d, 51; F . C o p 1 e s t o n, op. c i t . , p. 93. , F. C o p 1 e s t o n, op. c i t . , p. 93. P l a t o , S o p h ie t, 237 f f . , 250C f f . 260B f f . , 2630 f f . A r i s t o t l e , M e ta p h ysics, IX , 1051b.
and an a c t i v i t y i . e . a run ( l e t us n o tic e h e re , th a t t h is v e ry ab sence does not presume the a c tu a l e x is te n c e of n e it h e r S o c r a te s , nor a run , esp. when the l a t t e r i s sep arated o f f the a c tin g su b j e c t ) . Mere the q u estio n r a i s e s : Do n e g a tiv e sentences in A r i s t o t l e in t e r p r e t a t io n speak about the r e a l i t y , or d i f f e r e n t l y : 13
n e g a tiv e s it u a t io n as r e a l as p o s it iv e one? A r i s t o t l e 's answer seems to be a f f ir m a t iv e , namely he c la im s th a t c o n t r a d ic t o r y sen ten ces d e s c r ib le o p p o site s it u a t io n s 6 . So th a t not on ly the sen tence "S o c ra te s i s run nin g " d e s c rib e s c e r t a in c o n d itio n , but so does the sentence "S o c ra te s i s not ru n n in g ". I t i s so because buth s it u a t io n s re p re se n t d if f e r e n t s ta t e s of m atter which i s fo r him c e r t a in p o s s i b i l i t y : something e x is t in g - however " p o t e n t i a l l y " 7 . He a ls o d is p la y s new approach to n e g a tiv e se n te n ce s, the o n ly one accepted by most of p o s t e r io r p h ilo s o p h e rs . According to t h is a p proach s t a t in g n e g a tio n of sentence stands fo r s t a t in g i s t falsity^ ,
fhe apparent advantage of t h is co n ce p tio n l i e s in the f a c t th a t i s avo id s adducing r e a l c o u n te rp a rts of n e g a tiv e sen ten ces l i k e e .g . HI a to 'з " e x i s t in g n o n e n t it ie s " . Meanwhile i t is worth men t io n in g , th a t the d iscu ssed in t e r p r e t a t io n i s not id e n t i c a l w ith the in t e r p r e t e t io n of n eg ation tre a te d as t r u th - f u n c tio n ; the l a t te r o ie does not decidt? on whether n e g a tiv e sentence is about: ne gated sentence or r e a l i t y ,
io t a i u is s e n i in o p in io n s about s e n t e n t ia l n eg a tio n was s t i l l a l i v e in the M iddle Agus «nd a f t e r . N e v e rth e le s s no new id e a s em erged fo r q u ite a long tim e. Ё о я е , not very rem arkable m o d ific a t io n s of a n c ie n t co n cep tio n s can be found in Kant and H e g e l's work3. Kant regardsd n e g a tiv e sentences as being d e p rive d of any d ir e c t re fe re n c e to r e a l i t y (o f course what he means by r e a l i t y i s the w orld of appearance s in cfi n othin g can be s a id about th in g s in them s e l v e s ) . In h is op iniu ri the r o le of n e g a tio n i s m erely prophy l a c t i c , fu r n e g a tiv e p ro p o s itio n s cannot e n r ic h our knowledge but they fu n c tio n as a kin d of warning a g a in s t f a l s e th in k in g s in c e n e g a tiv e p ro p o s itio n s ta t e s the f a l s i t y of the p ro p o s itio n which -.c , ! * r í & t o t 1 e , De In t e r p r e t a t io n ® , IX , I9 a 2 5 f ., V I I I , I B a l J f . , A r i s t o t l e , C a te g o rie s , X, l? a 3 5 f.
1087b * Г * 3 * U X 1 e ’ Metaphy s i c s > I V » 1009a, X I I , 1069b, X IV , fl Ib id em , V, 1017a.
has been negated^. C e r t a in ly i t ia tho rem in iscen ce of the A r i s t o t l e ' s con cep tion mentioned above. Whereas Hegel r e je c t s the o p in io n th a t n e g a tiv e p ro p o s itio n s have no o b je c t iv e c o r r e la t e s end, arguing w ith K ant, he demands fo r p ro p o s itio n s to en la rg e our knowledge. In ab stru se manner t y p i c a l of him, he soems to a s s e rt th a t n e g a tiv e and a f f ir m a t iv e p ro p o s itio n s are both tru e , as they
10 d e s c rib e soma not s e lf- c o n ta in e d moments or asp ects of r e a l i t y .
In the 20th c e n tu ry ph ilosop h y the d is p u te concerning the proper understanding of n eg ation becomes more v i v i d ; not only r e v iv e o ld p o in ts of view but new approaches emerges as w e ll. At the ve ry beginning of the ce n tu ry Bergson a n a ly se s the problem of nothingness and n e g a tiv e sen te n ces. Having assumed th a t the c h a r a c te r of r e a l i t y is a b s o lu te ly p o s i t i v e , he concludes th a t n e g a tiv e sentences cannot have any d ir e c t lin k w ith i t . This is why he puts forw ard a h yp o th e sis th a t such a sentence i s a "s e n tence about s e n te n c e ", namely about sentence which i s negated. In t h is p o in t he r e f e r s to K ant, although in f a c t i t i s a r e feren ce to A r i s t o t l e . Sayin g "S o c ra te s d id n 't e a t hot dog s", we on ly s t a t e , accord in g to Bergson, th a t the sentence "S o c ra te s ate hot dogs" i s f a l s e . T h e re fo re every n e g a tiv e sentence is a me t a l i n g u i s t i c statem ent or a statem ent of a "second o rd e r" as Bergson used to c a l l i t (e x a c t ly jone order h ig h e r then the order of negated s e n te n c e ). P resen ted approach i s combined w ith two other p r a c t i c a l fu n c tio n s . F i r s t , Bergson borrows K a n t's o p in io n th at n e g a tiv e p ro p o s itio n i s a warning th a t negated p ro p o s itio n i s false. Seco n d ly, t h is p ro p o s itio n expresses a 3 ta te of c e r t a in te n sio n - by n eg atin g something we express (maybe u n c o n s c io u s ly ) kind of re g r e t or disappointm ent th a t something is gone, o r a kind of hope th a t i t i s going to happen. Such a ten sio n between something th a t is and something th a t could be i s the m a n ife s ta tio n of g e n e ral
11 tendency of every a c t iv e s u b je c t to tran sform the r e a l i t y .
S h o r t ly a fte rw a rd s appeared the d is s e r t a t io n of German pheno- m e n o lc g ist, Adolf R e in a ch , devoted e n t r i r e l y to the q u estio n of
9 I . K a n t , K r i t i k der Reinen V e rn u n ft, L e ip z ig 1924, В1 737.
10 G. W. H. H e g e 1, W isse n sch a ft der L o g ik , I I A u f l . , Leip zig 1951, Buch I I , I A b t., Kap. I I C, Anm. 3.
n e g a tiv e p r o p o s itio n . The author r e j e c t s the A r i s t o t e l i a n id ea th a t a f f ir m a t iv e and n e g a tiv e p ro p o s itio n s express r e s p e c t iv e ly con n ectio n and d is c o n n e c tio n of elem ents as too a r t i f i c i a l and p ri m it iv e . In s te a d he forms a h yp o th e sis th a t an o b je c t iv e c o u n te r p a rt of a p ro p o s itio n c o n s tit u t e s so c a lle d s ta t e of a f f a i r s : p o s it iv e or n e g a tiv e . S ta t e o f a f f a i r s i s something p e c u lia r and d i f f e r e n t from both o b je c t and r e l a t i o n . This d if f e r e n c e i s e s p e c i a l l y w e ll o b se rva b le in the case of n e g a tiv e s t a t e . The f a c t th a t S o c ra te s is not running i s n e it h e r the s e p a ra tio n of S o c ra te s from a run, nor a la c k in S o c ra te s h im s e lf, nor a r e la t io n between S o c ra te s and a run, but i t i s a s t a t e in which S o c ra te s can fin d h im s e lf. For every s t a t e of a f f a i r s th e re can be in d ic a te d another s t a t e which bears a r e la t io n c f " c o n tr a d ic to r y in c o m p a t ib i lit y " to the i n i t i a l one. A s t a t e o ccurs i f and o n ly i f the o th e r d o e s n 't. Reinach says th a t n eg a tio n can be used in sentence to express ne g a tiv e 3 ta te of a f f a i r s , however i t i s not i t s unique r o le . I t s another fu n c tio n i s to express the r e je c t in g a c t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c fo r n e g a tiv e p r o p o s itio n s , which occurs fo r in s ta n c e in the sen te n ce: " I t i s not the case th a t S o c ra te s i s ru n n in g ". Reinach warns a g a in s t id e n t if y i n g meanings o f p r o p o s itio n s : "S o c ra te s i s not ru n n in g " and " I t I s n ' t the case th a t S o c ra te s ia ru n n in g "; the form er s ta t e s n e g a tiv e s t a t e of a f f a i r s , w h ile the l a t t e r exp resses r e p u d ia tio n of p o s it iv e s t a t e . Of course one can in v e n t a p r o p o s itio n in which i t i s the n e g a tiv e s t a t e of a f f a i r s which ie rep u d ia te d e . g . : " I t i:> not the case th a t S o c ra te s i s not ru n n in g "; two n eg a tio n s
oc-1 2 c u rin g in t h is sentence p la y each d i f f e r e n t r o le s .
Roman Ingarden argues w ith R e in a c h 's approach. He a cce p ts the t h e s is th a t n e g a tiv e p r o p o s itio n re p re s e n ts c e r t a in s ta t e of a f f a i r s but he d i f f e r s in o p in io n th a t p o s it iv e and n e g a tiv e s ta t e s of a f f a i r s are e x i s t e n t i a l l y on a p a r. A ccording to him the mode of e x is te n c e o f n e g a tiv e s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s "w eaker" than th a t one of p o s it iv e s t a t e , in f a c t , i t i s p la ce d between p u re ly in te n t io n a l b eing (o f something im agined) and the r e a l one. N e g a tive s t a t e s of a f f a i r s are determ ined on the one hand by p o s it iv e s ta t e s th a t r e l l y occur and on the o th e r by knowing s u b je c t, and what i s more, n e g a tiv e s t a t e s c o u ld n 't e x is t w ith o u t knowing s u b je c t whose A. R e i n a c h , Zur T h eo rie des n e g a tiv e n U r t e i l s , [ i n : ] Gesammelte S c h r if t e n , H a lle a .d . S a a le 1921, T e i l 2.
e x p e c ta tio n s turn out to be d if f e r e n t from what he see s; in the r e s u lt of such a c o g n it iv e d is illu s io n m e n t n e g a tiv e s t a t e s of a f f a i r s are formed eg. when fin d in g empty pocket one r e a liz e s th a t ho has no money, Than .p o s it iv e s ta t e s of a f f a i r s ere "re a d " d i r e c t l y out of r e a l i t y . On the o th er hand however n e g a tiv e s ta t e s of a f f a i r s e x is t "s tro n g e r " then mere imagined ones, fo r they are f a c t s , although n e g a tiv e . D if f e r e n t ways of re co g n iz in g of p o s i t i v e and n e g a tiv e s ta t e s of a f f a i r s do not compel us to acknowledge the d if fe r e n c e of t h e ir e x is te n c e . They can r a th e r b e tra y s p e c i f ic s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of knowing s u b je c t to p o s it iv e s id e of r e a l i t y . In garden employs one argument more to support the th e s is of weaker e x is te n c e of n e g a tiv e s ta t e s of a f f a i r s : they cannot cause r e a l e f f e c t s . He c la im s th a t changes of r e a l i t y are due e n t i r e l y to p o s it iv e s ta t e s of a f f a i r s . This reason seems to be more c o n v in c in g but i t i s not u n lik e ly th a t ju s t th a t fe a tu re of n e g a tiv e s ta t e s of a f f a i r s makes them hide behind the p o s it iv e s t a t e s 1\
Some years a f t e r Reinach Ludwig W ittg e n s te in wrote h is "Tcac- ta tu s lo g ic o - p h ilo s o p h ic u s " where o b je c t iv e co u n erp a rts of p ro p o s itio n s are a ls o c a lle d s ta t e s of a f f a i r s , but t h is time they mean something d i f f e r e n t . W ittg e n s te in p o s tu la te s the e x is te n c e of p e rp e tu a l, unchanging and a b s o lu te ly sim ple elem ents c a lle d objects or th in g s . He a ls o assumes th a t they can form c e r t a in c o n fig u r a
tio n s , m u tu ally independent us f a r as t h e i r e x is te n c e is c o n ce r ned. A p o s s ib le c o n fig u r a tio n of o b je c ts is a s ta t e of a f f a i r s . A p r o p o s itio n re p re s e n tin g the e x is te n c e of s in g le s ta t e o f a f f a i r s i s an elem entary p r o p o s itio n ; i t is tru e when the a p p ro p ria te sta te o f a f f a i r s e x is t s and f a l s e i f n ot. The n eg ation of an e l e m e n
t a r y p ro p o s itio n i s a tru th - fu n c tio n ; i t s lo g ic a l va lu e i s d e te r mined by the va lu e of the i n i t i a l p ro p o s itio n so th a t one can say th a t the negation of an elem entary p ro p o s itio n re p re se n ts non e x is te n c e of a given s t a t e of a f f a i r s . I f i t is so, the r e p re s e n ta tio n cannot be taken l i t e r a l l y , fo r v e r a c it y of a p ro p o s i tio n means on ly th a t a g ive n s ta t e of a f f a i r s does not o cc u r. Here the q u estio n can be asked whether the p ro p o s itio n s so in te r p r e te d r e f e r at a l l to r e a l i t y , or d i f f e r e n t l y i f they d e sc rib e the w orld . W ittg e n s te in c o n sid e rs the w orld to be u t o t a l i t y of facts.' 15 R. I n g a r d e n , Spór o i s t n i e n i e ś w ia ta , Warszawa 1961, t . 2, X I I , § 51, pp. 121 f f .
I t i s a s e t of a l l the e x is t in g s t a t e s of a f f a i r s . In o rd er to d e s c rib e i t s u f f i c i e n t l y i t i s not enough, as i t seems, to s t a t e a l l the tru e elem entary p ro p o s itio n s s in c e one more remark should be added, namely ih a t th e re are no more tru e elem entary p ro p o s i t io n s . N e v e rth e le s s W ittg e n s te in c la im s th a t each s e n s ib le p ro p o s it io n i s (a p p a ren t or l a t e n t ) the tru th - fu n c tio n of some e l e mentary p r o p o s itio n s , e .g . p ro p o s itio n "These are a l l the tru e elem entary p r o p o s itio n s " when a n alysed tu rn s out to be a co n ju n c tio n of a l l the f a l s e elem entary p r o p o s itio n s n e g a tio n s . Thus, these n eg atio n s are as im portant in the d e s c r ip t io n of the world as elem entary p r o p o s itio n s a lo n e . N egation p ro v id e s in fo rm a tio n about what i s not a f a c t , although what i s not a f a c t d o e s n 't con s t i t u t e i t s sem antic c o r r e la t e sim ply because i t does not e x is t . W itt g e n s te in , showing th a t n e g a tiv e p r o p o s itio n s are tru th - fu n - c t io n s and not sim ple co p ies of a p o s s ib le r e a l i t y , managed to sol ve long-stand ing problem con cern ing v e r a c it y of n e g a tiv e p ro p o s i tio n s which have no r e a l c o r r e l a t e s 14. T h e re a fte r in " P h ilo s o p h i c a l In v e s t ig a t io n s " where W ittg e n s te in seems to break w ith the o p in io n s expressed in " T r a ę t a tu s " he t r e a t s language as a s e t of l i n g u i s t i c games. He t e n t a t i v e l y o u t lin e s v a rio u s id eas of nega t i v e p r o p o s itio n s ; among the o th e rs m entioning i t s m e t a lin g u is t ic in t e r p r e t a t io n and those which have the o n ly th in g in common w ith i t , i . e . "some e x clu d in g n e g a tiv e g e s t u r e " 1^.
B r i t i s h - A n a l y t i c a l Ph ilo so p h y made p ro g ram atic s tu d ie s of fu n c t io n in g of n a t u r a l language in which n eg a tio n was one of the to u ched problem s. J . L . A u s tin , fo r in s ta n c e , ob serves th a t the con cep t of n eg atio n which fu n c tio n s in n a tu r a l languages has no con cern fo r tru th and f a l s i t y , th e r e f o r e , d e f in in g •n eg a tio n as tru th - - fg n c tio n i s not adequate, fo r n e g a tio n 's b a s ic r o le i s d i f f e r e n t . According to A u stin the a c t of n eg a tio n i s not b u ild e d on the a c t of a ff ir m a t io n (a c c e p t a t io n of n e g a tiv e f a c t ) , but i t i s an a ct opposed to i t . N eg a tive p r o p o s itio n s r e f e r d i r e c t l y to r e a l i t y aa a f f ir m a t iv e p r o p o s itio n s do; the form ers s t a t e what i t i s not l i k e . However i t does not im ply th a t n e g a tiv e f a c t s must be
ac-14 L . W i t t g e n s t e i n , T ra c ta tu s Lo g ico -P h ilo so p h icu s, London 1947, 3 e d ., I . I , 1.12, 2.05-2.063, 4.0 1, 4 .1 , 5, 5.2341,
5 .3 . .
l ^ L . W i t t g e n s t e i n , P h ilo s o p h ic a l In v e s t i g a t io n s , Oxford 1953, p a rt 1, § 136, §§ 548-557.
cepted s in c e n e g a tiv e p ro p o s itio n s r e f e r to the same p a rt o f ima gined r e a l i t y as do negated p ro p o s itio n s ; tho o p p o s itio n between them l i e s in the d if fe r e n c e of a t t it u d e s a speaker posseses w h ile u tt e r in g a f f ir m a t iv e p ro p o s itio n (a f f ir m a t io n ) or nega t i v e one ( r e p u d ia t io n ). In t h is p o in t the co n cep tio n of A u stin resem bles th a t o f Reinach but t h e ir in t e r p r e t a t io n s of n e g a t i ve p ro p o s itio n v a ry : A u stin having r e je c te d n e g a tiv e s ta t e s of a f f a i r s , in t e r p r e t s i t as a n e g a tiv e judgement about p o s i t i v e s ta t e of a f f a i r s , w h ile Reinach as a f f ir m a t iv e one about, n e g a tiv e s t a t e 16.
Another r e p r e s e n t a tiv e of B r i t i s h A n a ly t ic a l P h ilo s o p h y , A. J . Ayer a ls o a n a ly s e s the p e c u l i a r i t y of n e g a tiv e sta tem e n ts. Lo oking a t p r e v a ilin g d iv is io n of statem ents in to n e g a tiv e s and a f f ir m a t iv e s , he a r r iv e s at paradox: such a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i& in f a c t a r b i t r a r y and cannot be s a t is f a c t o r y j u s t i f i e d . Ayer takes fo r granted th a t the c r i t e r i o n of t h is d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n cannot be m erely s y n t a c t ic a l ( e . g . the presence Of the word "n o t" or i t s d e r iv a t iv e s ir> the s e n te n c e ) because what mat t e r s in p h ilo s o p h ic a l study i s the d if fe r e n c e of meaning and not o f gram m atical s t r u c t u r e s . S t i l l another c r i t e r i o n i s de liv e r e d by the theory defended by Bergson; here n e g a tiv e sen tence i s tre a te d as a sentence about sentence which i s nega ted (c o n s id e re d to be f a l s e ) . U n lik e A u s tin , Ayer a llo w s such an in t e r p r e t a t io n of n eg atio n but he d enies th a t i t con be the b a s is of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g n e g a tiv e and a f f ir m a t iv e s t a t e ments. In h is o p in io n the a lik e in t e r p r e t a t io n can c h a ra c t e r iz e a f f ir m a t iv e sta tem e n ts, e .g . the sentence " I lo ve Mary" can be tre a te d as n eg atio n o f the sentence " I do not lo v e Ma r y " and v ic e v e rs a . ( L e t us i n c id e n t a lly n o tic e th a t t h is kind of in t e r p r e t a t io n le a d s to the c o n c lu s io n th a t every sen tence c o n s t it u t e s an i n f i n i t e s e r ie s of n e g a tio n s, which is a consequence d i f f i c u l t to a c c e p t). The next way of d i s tin g u is h in g n e g a tiv e statem ents proposed by Ayer i s the attem pt to enumerate a l l p o s s ib le types of a f f ir m a t iv e s t a tements and then to determ ine the s e t of n e g a tiv e sen te n ces' as those which have not been s p e c if ie d . The problem th a t a r i
-J . L . A u s t i n , P h ilo s o p h ic a l P ap e rs, Oxford 1961, pp. 91, 192.
ses here i s o p p o site to th a t we have d iscu ssed e a r l i e r ; i t aims a t d e s c r ip t io n of a f f ir m a t iv e se n te n ce s. I t i s g e n e r a lly assumed th a t a f f ir m a t iv e sen ten ces can have s u b je c t - p re d ic a t e form as fo r example "The rose i s r e d " . Ayer sees no r e ason fo r ex clu d in g the sentence "The rose i s not re d " from t h i s c a th e g o ry . Both p r e d ic a te s (r e d , n o t- re d ) d e s c rib e to some e x ten t the s u b je c t and they do not d i f f e r from each o th e r in re s p e c t of gender; both correspond to some subrange o f the term " c o l o u r f u l " . Hence, acco rd in g to A yer, a ls o t h i s attem pt to draw the l in e between a f f ir m a t iv e and n e g a tiv e s ta te -
17
ments f a i l s . Taking no account of any p o s s ib le c r i t i c i s m o f h is arg u m en tation , l e t us n o tic e th a t kind of o n t o lo g ic a l o p tio n can be found in h is assumption th a t the e x is te n c e of a s e t of ob j e c t s having c e r t a in a t t r i b u t e i s a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d itio n in order
to accep t t h is a t t r ib u t e as p o s it iv e .
F i n a l l y we s h a ll p rese n t M a rtin H e id e g g e r's o p in io n s about ne g a tio n . In h is d is s e r t a t io n "What i s M e ta p h y s ic s ?" he b rin g s up the q u e s tio n con cern ing the fundam ental r e la t io n s h ip between the lo g ic a l n eg atio n and n othingness. S e a rc h in g fo r an answer he r e a ches the coots of being and s ta t e s th a t th e re e x is t s some p r i mary and r a r e e x p e rie n ce which u n v e ils n o th in g n e ss. Nothingness d o e s n 't appear as a kind o f being nor a n yth in g a p a rt but i t i a a c o n d itio n which enab les a man to encounter being as such. On a c count of the tra n s c e n d e n ta l c h a r a c te r of n o th in g n e ss, we are not a b le to say an yth in g about i t , and, t h e r e f o r e i t cannot be the th in g n e g a tiv e sen ten ces r e f e r to , n e v e rth e le s s i t ren d ers nega tio n p o s s ib le . N egation is an evid e n ce of n o th in g n e ss, i t emerges from nothingness and could not appear w ith o u t i t s p rim ary m a n ife s t a t i o n 18.
The p re s e n ta tio n of d i f f e r e n t c o n ce p tio n s of n eg atio n shows th a t most of them depend on d e c is io n s of o n t o lo g ic a l n a tu re . C i tin g H e id eg g e r: “ The interpretation of notjungness r e v e a ls the fundamen t a l way of comprehension of b e in g ". In such an environm ent the in-17 A. 3. A y e r , N eg ation , "The Jo u r n a l of P h ilo s o p h y " 1952. v o l. 44, No. 26, pp. /97 f f . K
1ti
M. H e i d e g g e r M. Was i s t M e ta p h y sik ?, [ i n : ] Wegmar- ken, F r a n k fu r t a. M a in .1967, passim .
13*_____________ ____ ____ М.згйк_ Rosiak
t e r p r e t a t io n of negation as tru th - fu n c tio n may seem mode3t and u n s u f f ic i e n t . However i t has one rem arkable fe a t u r e : i t can be e a s i l y a s s im ila te d w ith most, o f them. The c h a r a c t e r iz a t io n o f ne g a tio n fu n c to r in terms of tru th d o e s n 't in flu e n c e n e it h e r the s e m a n tic a l c o r r e la t e of n e g a tiv e p ro p o s itio n s nor the way in which t h i s c o r r e la t e e x is t s . Q n to lo g ic a lly i t i s the most n e u tra l con c e p tio n and i t c a n 't be adopted on ly to extrem ely n o n in t m t iv e view s of Parm enides, S o p h is ts and H eg el. Such a g e n e ral a d a p ta b i l i t y of the d iscussed in t e r p r e t a t io n is the b est p roof of i t s a c c u ra c y . Th erefo re the f a c t th a t t h is in t e r p r e t a t io n i s used to
fo rm a liz e the n o tio n of n eg ation seems to be w ell-fou nd ed .
U n iv e r s it y of Łódź Poland
Marek Rosiak
CO MÓWIĄ ZDANIA PRZECZĄCE?
0 fu n k cja ch p ełn io n ych przez negację zdaniowy
Klasyczn y rachunek zdań w u ję c iu semantycznym, uważany n ie k ie d y za id e a liz a c j ę opisow ej c z ę ś c i jęz yka n atu ra ln eg o czy też za t e o r ię spójników zdaniowych, t r a k t u je n eg ację jak o c z y 3 tą fu n k ćję prawdziwościowy. Przyzw ycz aje n i do ta k ie g o u ję c ia , uważamy je za adekwatne, ś c i ś l e oddające sens, j a k i ma ten fu n k to r w zdaniach opisowych. Tymczasem okazuje s i ę , że w r e f l e k s j i f i l o z o f i c z n e j przypisyw ano n e g a c ji i inne, bardzo różnorodne r o le . Na p r z y k ła d zie tego, co o n e g a c ji i zdaniach p rzeczących mówią: Parm enides, s o f i ś c i , P la to n , A r y s t o t e le s , a z filo z o fó w nowożytnych i w spół czesnych Kant, H e g el, Bergson, fenomenologowie Reinach i In g a r den, Ludwig W ittg e n s te in , p r z e d s ta w ic ie le b r y t y j s k i e j f i l o z o f i i a- n a lit y c z n e j J . L . A u stin i A. 3. Ayer czy w resz cie M a rtin Heideg g e r, można zauważyć zależność f u n k c ji semantycznych przypisyw anych n e g a c ji od ta k ic h czy innych ro z s trz y g n ię ć o n to lo g iczn yc h dokonywa nych przez tych m y ś l i c i e l i . P a m ię ta ją c o tym, warto jednak wyróż n ić in t e r p r e t a c ję n e g a c ji jako f u n k c ji praw dziw ościow ej - n ie d la tego, żeby b y ła ona je d y n ie poprawna, le c z ze względu na to , że in t e r p r e t a c ja taka jako n ajm n ie j zaangażowana o n to lo g ic z n ie daje się uzgodnić z w ię k szo ścią innych tu wym ienionych. W tym i ty lk o tym znaczeniu może ona być uważana za u przyw ilejow aną w stosunku der
