R O C Z N IK I F IL O Z O F IC Z N E T o m X L V II, z esz y t 2 - 1999
P IO T R G U T O W S K I Lublin
JOHN DEWEY AND RICHARD RORTY
ON THEISM AND RELIGION
Jude P. Dougherty, who wrote short but instructive article about D e w e y ’s conception o f religion thinks that „D ew ey is one of those philosophers where the difference between the maturę thinker and the youthful apprentice is almost the difference betw een men. It is the diffe ren c e betw een tw o men b ecause it is the difference between two schools o f thought, an idealism in early years and materialistic naturalism in the later” 1. A lthough this o p inion seems to be naturally p lau sib le - after ail Dew ey changed his views from H egelian into pragmatic and from theistic to naturalistic (or from theism to n aturalistic the- ism) - it does not do justice to a very surprising continuity o f D ew eyan views in generał and his views about theism in particular.
In the early stage o f his philosophical d evelopm ent (before 1892) D ew ey who was raised in a Christian family seemed to be quite sympathetic to theism and religion. The title o f his lecture (or rather homily) delivered at the Univer- sity of Michigan in 1884 as a faculty advisor to the Student Christian Associa- tion was „The O bligation to Know ledge o f G o d ” . He wrote: ,,[t]here is an obligation to know God, and to fail to meet this obligation is not to err intel- lectually, but to sin morally. B elief is not a privilege, but a duty [...]”2. There is, however, something which Jude Doughtery did not notice, or maybe did not take it as significant factor, namely that Dew ey c onc eived God as w holly im- manent to humanity:
[...] God is n e ith e r far-aw ay B ein g , n o r a m er e p h ilo s o p h ie c o n ce p tio n by w h ic h to e x p la in ihe w or ld. H e is th e bo n d o f the family, th e b o n d o f society. He is love, th e s ource o f all g ro w th , all s acrifi ce, and all unity. He h as t o u c h e d h isto ry , not fro m
1 „ D ew ey on R e lig io n " , p. 174.
w i t h o u t b u t ha s m a d e H i m s e lf s u b j e c t e d to all l im ita tio n s a n d s u ffe rin g s o f h istory; i d e n t i f ie d H i m s e l f a b s o l u te l y with h u m a n i t y , so th at th e lo v e o f h u m a n i t y is h e n c e f o r e w a r d n o t for s o m e t e r m o f years, but fo rev er, th e L ife o f G o d 3.
E ven those w ho m ight ą u e stio n the im m a nentist reading o f this passage should at ieast ac c e p t the conclusion that the early D ew ey had a strong ten- dency to identify God and humanity. That is why he emphasized the social, and not the individual, dim ension o f religion - in his case, Christianity. The main role o f C hristia n ity was, ac cording to D ew ey, in stressing „union with hum a nity, and h u m a n ity ’s interests, and surre nder o f individual d e s ire ”4. This led him to put in the first p lace the m orał dim ension and to criticize the eschato- logical and institutional aspects o f religion sharply.
In effect, even in his early views he conceived religion as totally „worldly” p h e n o m e n o n and as som ething instrum ental to the aims of humanity: „The c h ie f d an g e r after all, in our practical religious life, is the tendency for the religious life to b e c o m e sphere by itself, apart from the intere sts o f life and hum anity” 5. There is no sign here that D ew ey thought o f religion as contribu- ting to m odify in g o f the interests of life .and hum anity. If religion is to fulfill its role it has to be subordinated to those aims o f life and humanity. From this persp ectiv e we can interpret w hat J. D ougherty tends to see as a second and totally different phase o f D ew ey’s development as a natural conseąuence of his early views.
A ro u n d 1892 in a lecture C h ristia n ity a n d D em ocracy, D ew ey identifies cultural c o n ditions o f religion w hich m ake it exclusively an expression of attitudes and custom s o f various peoples^. His criticism , however, is directed to institutional religion and to supernaturalism , and so to those dimensions of religion w hich w ere eith er absent or exp ressis verb is rejected in his earlier views. T his process going in the direction o f total naturalization o f God and religion o cc u rre d gradually, but it was already co m pleted in D e w e y ’s works before 1900.
O ne c o u ld expect, then, that u ltim ately D ew ey should accept an atheistic and anti-religious attitude (similarily to M arx or Comte). But, if we take purely
3 Ib id ., vol. 17, p. 5 3 1 . T h e title o f th e a r ti cle is T he V a lu e o f H is to r ic a l C h r is tia n ity and it w as first p u b l i s h e d in M o n th ly B u lle tin 11 (N o v . 1889), pp. 3 1 -3 6 .
4 I b id e m , p. 532.
5 I b i d e m , p. 5 3 3 .
JOHN DEW EY AND RIC H A R D ROR TY ON TH EISM AN D RELIGION 1 2 3
terminological declarations into account, nothing like this ever happened in the case of Dewey. In the address Som e T houg hts co n c ern in g R elig io n deliv ered to the P hilosophical Club at C olum bia U niversity in 1910 D e w ey wrote:
T h e root o f the relig io u s a tt i tu d e o f th e f u tu r ę m ay lie i m m e n s l y m o r e in an im- p r o v e d State o f sc ie n c e a n d o f po litics th an in w h a t h a v e b e e n t e r m e d re lig io n s. D oubtles s there are certain co n stan ts, r o u g h l y s p e a k in g , in h u m an naturę. D o u b tles s th es e c o n s t a n t s in th eir i n te r a c t io n with the n atu ral a n d so cial e n v ir o n t n e n t s h a v e na tu rall y p r o d u c e d , a m o n g o t h e r t h in g s , relig ions. B ut it w o u ld se e m as if th e „uni- v e r s a l” wa s to b e s o u g h t in th es e in te r a c t io n s r a th e r th an in a n y o f th e i s o la te d strain, p s y c h o lo g ic al o r m e ta p h y s ic a l. I f so, d e m o c r a c y a n d th e s c ien c e, th e art o f t o - d a y m ay b e i m m e n s e ly m o r e p r o p h e tic o f th e r e lig io n w h ic h w e w o u l d h a v e sp read in the fu tu rę th an a n y p h e n o m e n a w e se e k to is o l a t e u n d e r th e c a p t i o n o f relig io u s p h e n o m e n a . O b v io u s ly , w h a t I h a v e sa id is n ot a c o n f e s s i o n o f re li g i o u s faith. But it m ay p r o p e rly be a d d ed th at it is n o t n e c e s s a r i ly a c o n f e s s i o n o f irreli- g i o n 7.
Also in later works e.g. in his most com p re h en siv e b o o k about religion A C ommon Faith (1934) D ew ey tries to preserve som e balanc e b etw e en re li gious faith and a confession o f irreligion. H e excludes religious exp e rien ce from his criticism but at the same time he gives it radically different interpreta- tion than in traditional theism or in religion (e.g. C hristianity). T he o bject o f this exp e rien ce is not God but ideals: „Faith in the co n tinued disclo sin g of truth through directed cooperative human endevour is more religious in ąuality than is any faith in a com pleted re v elatio n ” 8. B esides the ideał o f d isclosing truth there can be also other ideals w hich deserve to be nam ed religious, e.g. a com m itm ent to the worth and dignity o f the hum an person, co m m itm e n t to science, or faith in intelligence9. In D e w e y ’s c onc eption they do no t re fer to any being other than hum anity itself: they are sim ply aim s and ideals o f hu- manity designed by hum anity itself (or rather by their e n lig h ten ed elites).
Why does Dewey not want to give up the term „ G o d ” or „religious expe- rience” and why does he wants to balance a religious with an irreligious a tti tude? Is n ’t it simply a m anifestation o f irrational a tta c h m e n t to the language game o f his parents? This certainly could have som e significance. It seems, however, that there was a m uch more im portant „ p rag m atic” elem e n t in it: Dewey saw clearly the important social role religion has p layed th roughout
The C o lle c te d W orks o f J o h n D ew ey, vol. 17, p. 379.
8 Ib id em , vol. 9, p. 18.
history, and he knew also that this role is associated with certain specific no- tions, e.g. „ G o d ” .
It is th is a c tiv e re la tio n b e tw e e n ideał a n d act ual to w h ic h I w o u l d g iv e th e nam e „ G o d ” . I w o u ld not insist that th e n a m e m u s t be given. There are those who hołd that th e associations o f the term with the supernatural are so n u m ero u s and close that any u s e o f th e w o r d „ G o d ” is su re to g iv e rise to m is c o n c e p t i o n and be taken as a c o n c e s s i o n o f trad itio n a l ideas.
T h e y m ay be corre ct in this view. But the facts to whic h 1 referred are there, and th e y n e e d to be b r o u g h t o u t with all p o s s ib le c le a r n e s s and force. T h ere exis t con- c r e te ly a n d e x p e r i m e n t a l l y g o o d s - th e values o f art in all its form s, o f k n o w le d g e , o f e ffo rt a n d o f rest afte r striv in g , o f e d u c a ti o n and f e ll o w s h ip , o f f rien d s h ip and love, o f g r o w t h in m in d a n d b o d y A e le ar a n d in te n s e c o n c e p ti o n o f u n io n of ideał ends with actual c o n d it io n s is cap a b le o f arousing steady emotion [.,.]. Whether o n e g iv e s th e n a m e o f „ G o d ” to th is u n io n , o p e r a tiv e in t h o u g h t and action, is a mat ter o f individual decision. But th s fu n c tio n o f such a w o rk in g un ion o f the ideał a n d a ctu al s e e m s to m e to be identica l with the fo rce th at has in fact b een attached to th e c o n c e p ti o n o f G o d in all th e r e lig io n s th at h a v e a s piritu al c o n t e n t 10.
A nd so D ew ey thought that the essential role played by the notion o f God is the role o f unification o f ideał ends with actual conditions in order to pro- duce in p eople steady em otion for c o n tin u o u s action. W h a t is the reason for calling it G od? W eil, one can say that D e w e y ’s association o f the function p layed by such a union with the function played by the traditional notion of G od is a good enough reason.
I would, however, ask if D e w e y ’s association is h isto rically justified in our W estern culture, i.e. if it is in agreem ent with the dom inant tradition o f using this term ? I think it is not. Religious people, especially within Christianity (but also in Ju d a ism and Islam ie tradition) m eant and mean by ‘G o d ’ something separate (tra n scen d e n t) from us and the world: personal, living, creator of heaven and earth, who loves people and takes care o f them. They believe also that G od is w orthy o f their total love and devotion. They want to realize what they believe are G o d ’s aims revealed in Holy Scriptures. Obviously, we have also our own ideals, as individuais, nations, cultures, or hum anity in generał, S om e o f them may be even exactly the same as what we believe G o d ’s ideals for us are. B ut usually we do n o t give the nam e of G od to o ur ideals or to the union o f those ideals with actual conditions o f life. The term ‘ideology’ seems to be m ore appropriate here than ‘religion’. (Religious people sometimes apply
10 T he C o llected W orks o f Jo h n D ew ey, vol. 9, p. 34-35. This ą u o ta tio n co m es from his best k n o w n b o o k on relig io n A C o m m o n F a ith .
JO HN DEW EY AND RICHA RD RORTY ON TH EISM AND RELIGION 1 2 5
the term God to the ideals o f various ideologies but they m ake im p ortant re- striction by saying that they are „false” gods).
Now somebody may object here by ąu e stio n in g two things: my interpreta- tion of D e w ey’s intentions as hostile to theism and religion, and my interpreta- tion of his philosophy as ideology. But I am not ąu e stio n in g here that Dew ey may have honestly believed that the true religion is a religion w ithout G o d as a transcendent being, and that true object of religion is Humanity. W hat I claim here is that Dewey designed a theory which cannot be a c cep ted by any theist or religious person in my (and I believe not only my) sense. As for the second thing, in many cases the border betw een philosophy and ideology is difficult to note. That was the case with M arx and Com te, who fulfilled both roles: o f philosophers and of ideologues. I claim here only that D e w e y ’s philosophy has a visible ideological side. He acted in the direction o f dim in ish in g th eism and religion while at the same time projecting a new atheistic vision (w hich he him self called religion).
Nevertheless, Dewey is seen by many as som ebody w ho tried to preserve the remains o f religious worłdview from, especially som e parts o f m orality (usually associated with religion), a process o f inevitable secularization. He him self seemed to see his role in ju s t this way. In 1947 in a short article R e li gion in H a rva rd , he wrote:
O u r d a n g e r in h a v in g lin k e d s u p e rn atu ra l b eli efs with m o rał s t a n d a r d s is th at th e in ev itab !e w e a k e n i n g o f o n e gra vel y impe rils the other. T h e re m e d y o f e n d e v o u r i n g to place the new wine o f m odern kno wle dge into the old bottl es o f the hist orie faiths p ro mises little suc cess. I p ro p o se to mee t th e issue squarely by fo ste rin g H u m a n is m , a rational ist ic re li gion b ased on sc ien c e, c e n t e r e d in man, re je ctin g s u p e rn atu ra lis m but re ta in in g o u r c h e r ic h e d m orał v a l u e s u .
Now much depends on how one evaluates the process o f sec ula rization and where he locates its roots. Dew ey thinks apparently that it is an inevitable process which is caused mainly by belief in a supernatural deity, which seems irrational for people in the age o f science. If it w ere true, D e w ey c o u ld be regarded as the last theologian (perhaps together with N ietzsche, M a r a , and Comte). However, this diagnosis is far from being convincing, T he process of secularization seemed to stopped at some point, and many people still believe in a transcendent deity, despite much more extensive knowledge in com parison with what was accessible to Dewey. Besides, atheistic humanism also does not
have any spectacular succeses w hich would ju stify its superiority over tradi- tional theism and religion. There is no reason then, in my view, to regard D e w ey as the last theologian, i.e. as som ebody who wants to preserve the re- m ains o f collap sin g theism and religion. It is much more plausible to see his efforts as fostering in a very clever way this process o f secularization. The originality o f D ew ey and his main contribution to this process is in designing a certain anesthetic device in the form o f religious term inology that lacks, how ever, any properly theistic m eaning.
A n d so e.g. D ew ey suggested keeping the term „G od” despite the fact that, in his sense, it did not refer to any thing other than humanity itself. He was e ą u ally generous with the term „religion” . In the article ąu oted above, com- posed 5 years before his death, he writes:
I n d e e d . it is th e c o r e o f the p r e s e n t p ro p o s a l th at a C h a ir o f R a ti o n a li s m be estab- lis h ed in th e D iv in ity S c h o o l, to be he ld by a well ą u a l i fi e d rationalist, who w ould s u p erv ise the H u m a n is t c u rric u lu m . In s tru c tio n or practice in prayer, ritual, or other te c h n i ą u e o f s u p e rn atu ra li sm w ould have no meaning, bein g d iscarded for the scien- tific a p p r o a c h - c o n tr o l l e d o b s e r v a t i o n , e x p e r im e n t, and v e rifiab le experience. The H u m a n is t c le rg y w o u ld h a v e a t r e m e n d o u s potential field o f m inistry, w o u ld preach relig ion in h a rm o n y with facts as n o w k n o w n , re co g n izin g na turę as imperso nal and in ex orable , fo st erin g c o o p e r a tio n u n d e r th e re aliz ati on that m en has but h im s elf and his f e llo w m en u p o n w h o m to r e l y 12.
D e w ey uses the term „religion” to describe what I w ould rather cali the id eology o f hum anism because he is convinced that one o f the essential ele- ments o f christianity is universalism . So if it is not possible to maintain tradi- tional belief in a transcendent deity, science - the only universal elem ent in co n tem p o rary culture, as D ew ey thought - can be the basis for the new faith on w hich m orality has to be fo u n d e d . That is why hum anism „is in harmony with the new knowledge of science; indeed it is science and scientific method in religion. Thus it is the only religion that can hope to achieve universality” 13. N o w the central role o f science in D ew eyan philosophy seems to be in di- rect disag re em en t with R ortian relativism. Is Rorty simply w rong in claiming that his own philosophy is o f the the Deweyan ty p e ? 14 I think not. And to see
12 I b i d e m , p. 546.
13 I b id e m , p. 54 7.
14 Cf. „ R e la tiv is m - F i n d in g and M a k in g ", p. 32. Also in one o f the interviews he says that his o w n view d o not add a n y th in g m u ch to D e w e y „it is j u s t a d a p t i n g w h a t D e w e y said for
JO HN DEW EY AND RICH A RD RORTY ON THEISM A ND RELIGION 1 2 7
why, we have to notice the influence o f Darwin on Deweyan pragmatism . Out of the three classical pragmatists Dew ey was the m ost d ec isiv e ly D arw inian ihm ke ' . Despite his em phasis on science, he did not think o f it as the ulti- mate unchangeable element. Science undergoes purely accidental changes, and its state tomorrow may be ąuite different than today. Deweyan rationalism isn ’t then a manifestation o f his scientism or universalism. It is rather m anifestation of his Darwinism. More precisely, it indicates that Dewey generalized the idea of evolutionary struggle for existence into the domain of human spirit. Accord- ing to him „intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer abandonm ent of ąuestions together with both of the alternatives they assume - an abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and a change o f urgent interest. W e do not solve them: we get over them. Old ąuestions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new ąuestions co rresponding to the cha n g ed attitude of endeavor and preference take their p la c e ” 16. T hey evaporate, we could add, like those individuals and species which were not able to adjust themselves to the environment.
According to Dewey there is no need to suppose, as Hegel, M arx or Com te did that there is any fixed finał stage of hum an h i s to r y 17 or even som e finał remote aim described as the disclosure o f fuli truth (as Peirce seemed to think). Rationalism in the Deweyan sense is just an unlimited experim entalism within the domain of social matters and within the world of ideas, which assumes that there is no „fixed form” , „finał cause” or „human naturę” . Science is also only one of the results o f unlimited change. T he p h ilo s o p h er who looks fo r un- changing and universal elements can point not to this particular stage of science but rather to a certain underlying „ logie” o f change w hich produces this and any other results (including religion and morality). F o r Hegel such „logie” was his famous dialectics: everything passes through three stages:
a different audience, for people with differen t e x p e c ta t io n s ” (G. B o r r a d o r i, T he A m e rica n
P h ilo so p h e r, p. 106).
15 D e w e y ’s year o f birth (1859) is alm ost symbolic: it is the sam e year in w h ic h The O rigin
o f Species was printed in the the United States. J. P. D iggins d ra w s o u r attention to this symboi-
ism. Cf. his T he P ro m ise o f P ra g m a tism , p. 212.
16 T he C o lle c te d W orks o f J o h n D e w e y, vol. 4, p. 14. T h e a rti cle is e n title d T h e In flu e n c e
o f D a r w in ism on P h ilo so p h y ,
1 Hegel t h o u g h t th at in the i n s titu tio n s o f P r u s s i a n state a n d in hi s o w n p h i l o s o p h y G o d aequires fuli self-kn owledg e. C o m te was co n v in c ed (a nd it is the Hegelian e le m en t in his p h i lo sophy) th at th e p o s itiv e (scientific) st age o f h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t w h ic h c o m e s afte r th e m o re p rim itiv e th eo lo g ica l and m eta p h y s ica l is the last one . M a rx b e lie v e d th at c o m m u n i s m is in a se nse th e end o f strugg le.
thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In the case o f Dewey this underlying „logie” is the logie o f problem -solving. If we look closer, however, this „logie” - is not far away from H egelian struggle of opposites. The im portant difference is that ac cording to D ew ey this logie does not serve any God. In a sense it is God . As such this logie can be regarded as generalization o f Darwinian idea of struggle for life in a very unpleasenst conditions o f all-em bracing chance. T he religion o f ra tiona lism is then simply religion o f the „logie o f universal c h a n g e ” , w hich in the case o f our hum an w orld a c ąu ires the nam e o f prob- le m -solving or experim enting. W e can believe that our way o f so ly in g prob- lems is much better than that of our predecessors but it is ąuite certain that our g randsons will not even share our ąuestions.
Some philosophers tend to see Dewey as a scientistic type of thinker. How- ever, if we look at Dewey and Rorty from the perspective of the generalization o f the D a rw inian evolutionism they both accepted, the main characteristic of R ortian rom antic or anti-rationalist pragm atism is perfectly in line with D ew eyan rationalism . W hat m isleads many people is a D ew eyan use o f the term „rationalism ” . It does not have anything in common with traditional ratio as som ehow described by classical logie and its extensions. It is rather a new e m b o d im en t o f H egelian dialectics or better D arw inian insight o f changes o cc uring accidentally in the course o f the struggle for s u rv iv u ll9.
It is very likely that if D ew ey had lived today, he would recom m end R i chard Rorty to the Chair o f Rationalism at Harvard Divinity School, despite the fact that R orty h im self w ould probably prefer a different name for the chair, e.g. the C hair o f Anti-rationalism . A lthough it seems to be a big difference, it is in fact only term inological sińce both D ew ey and Rorty accept Luck or Chance as the ultimate basis for every idea. It is a problem o f tactics to empha- size reason or feeling as the most valuable (for the time being) result o f totally accidental changes in the world, including the world of ideas. From the theistic
18 W e can se e that D e w e y d id not e s c a p e H egel very m uch. L ik e his d e v e l o p m e n t in the p r o b le m o f theism , his w h o le metaphysics is co n ti n u o u s rather than d is c o n tin u o u s with the first, H e g e lia n , s tag e o f hi s d e v e ! o p m e n t.
19 A n o t h e r c o m m o n ele m ent in D e w e y and R o rt y which is so m ehow mediated by D arwinism o f both o f th em is their em pha sis on genetic m eth o d as the only o n e able to ex pla in the mea ning a n d role o f v a rio u s h u m a n idea s. D e w e y stre sse d th e in f lu e n ce o f D a r w i n on th e genetic way o f t h in k i n g a b o u t ideas; „The in flu en ce o f D a r w in u p o n p h ilo s o p h y re sid es in his h a v in g con- q u e r e d th e p h e n o m e n a o f life fo r th e p r in c ip le o f tr an s it io n , and t h erb y freed n e w logie for a p p li c a t io n to m in d and m o rals and life. W h e n he said o f specie s w h a t G a lil e o h a d said o f the e arth , e p u r s i m u o v e , he e m a n c i p a te d , o n c e f o r all, g e n e t i c a n d e x p e r i m a n t a l idea s as an o r g a n o n o f a s k in g ą u e s t i o n s a n d l o o k in g fo r e x p l a n a t i o n s ” . Ib id em , vol. 4, pp. 7-8.
JOHN DEW EY AND RICHA RD RO R TY ON THEISM AND RELIGION 1 2 9
perspective the result is the same: rejection o f the notion o f God. Still, this rejection can be announced in opposing terms. D ew ey hides it u n d er theistic terminology and Rorty under a relativistic vocabulary allegedly tolerant of theism and religion.
In a sense the source of this difference in term inological p re fere n ces be- tween Dewey and Rorty (especially in relation to the problem o f theism ) can be traced to their biographies. Unlike Dewey, R orty was raised in an antireli- gious or areligious environment:
W h c n I was twelv e, the m os t sa lie n t b o o k s on m y p a r e n t ’s s h e l v e s w e re tw o re d -b o u n d v o!u m es - The C a se o f L eo n T r o ts k y a n d N o t G u ilty. T h e s e m ad e up the repo rt o f the D ew ey C o m m isio n o f the I n ą u ir y into th e M o s c o w Tria ls. I n e v e r re ad t h e m with th e w id e - e y e d f a s c in a tio n I b r o u g h t to b o o k s like K r a f t - E b b i n g s ’
P sy c h o p a tia S e x u a lis , b u t I th o u g h t o f t h e m in th e w ay in w h i c h o t h e r c h il d r e n
t h o u g h t o f th eir f a m i l y ’s Bibie: they w ere b o o k s th at r a d ia te d r e d e m p ti v e tru th and morał s p le n d o r. If I w ere a really goocl boy, I w o u ld say to m y s e lf , 1 s h o u l d have read not on ly the D ew ey C o m m isio n reports, but als o T r o t s k y ’a H is to r y o f th e R us-
sian R evo lu lio n , a b o o k I started man y times but n e v er m an a g ed to finish. F o r in the
1940s, th e R u s s ia n R e v o lu t i o n and its b e trayal by S ta lin w ere, for me. w h a t the I ncarna tion and its betrayal by the C a th o lic s h a d b een to p r e c o c io u s little L u th e ran s fo u r h u n d r e d years b e f o re 20.
Rorty simply does not have any biographical reasons to defen d theistic vocabulary, even in D ew eyan sense, or to be (or pretend to be) a religious person. This does not au tom atically mean hostility to religion. T h e very fact that Rorty contpares the Dewey C ommision report to the Bibie and the Russian revolution to the Incarnation suggests even some sympathy to religious term i nology. But it had to be quite different kind o f sym pathy than in ca se o f Dewey, without strong em otions and memories. From the very b e g in n in g t h e ism and religion simply did not m atter to him at all.
Rorty was, however, a religious type of person in another sense. In his auto- biography he d es c rib es his search for some ground for what he felt as morał imperative inherited from Trotsky: the struggle for social justice. He started to read great philosophers, and noticed that P lato and platonists (w ho - in his view - cover almost the whole history of philosophy) wanted to do exactly the same thing he himself was looking for: they tried to find m etaphysical founda tions for their ethical convictions. It does not matter for us here if this is plau- sible description of what philosophers wanted to do. W hat is o f our interest is
the result o f R o r t y ’s inąuiries. The follow ing passage can serve as a summary of it:
I g r a d u a l l y d e c i d e d th at th e w h o le id ea o f h o ld in g realit y and j u s t ic e in a single visio n had been a mistake - that a pursuit o f such vision had be en precisely what led P la to astray. M o re sp ecifica lly , I d e c id e d th a t on ty re lig io n - o n lv a n o n a rg u m e n t-
a tiv e fa ith M a su r ro g a te p a r e n t who, u n like a n y r e d l p a ren t, em h o d ied lorę, power, a n d ju s tic e in e q u a l m e a s u r e - c o u ld do the trick P la to w a n te d d o n e . Sin ce I c o u ld n ’t im a g in e h e c o m in g re lig io u s, a n d in d e e d h a d g o tte n m o r e a n d m ore r a u c u s ly s e c u la r is t, I d e c id e d th a t the h o p e o f g e ttin g a s in g le visio n b y b eco m in g a p h ilo s o p h e r h a d b e en a s e lf-d e c e p tiv e a th e is t w ay o u r 1. (Italics mine).
It is intriguing why, according to Rorty, only religion and not any philoso phy (like Platonism) „could do the trick” . He does not give an answer for this, but we may suppose that one of the reasons was quite similar to that given by Dewey to preserve theistic terminology: only a elear and intense conception of the union o f ideał ends with actual conditions is capable o f arousing steady emotion. Unlike any philosophical system, theism offers such a conception. But this conclusion isn’t for Rorty any encouragement to become a theist. Quite the contrary, it is encouragement to give up the whole search. Rorty does not offer any other reasons for the unacceptability o f theism. Aguments did not seem to play any significant role, simply because Rorty does not believe in arguments at all. W hat is really im portant to hum an life and to all decisions we make is, according to him, determ ined by extra-rational means. That is why he tries to justify his views by „telling stories” , „sketching pictures” rather than by strict arguments. A nd that is why the only reason he gives for not accepting theism is the im possibility o f im agining becom ing religious.
Now, theists could answer that it is simply because of restricted imagination that Rorty cannot accept theism, and although such response sounds offensive, it should not be regarded as such on R o rty ’s ground. A fter all, his neopragm atic philosophy is directed towards broadening our imagination and u n d erm in in g the value o f arguments. T he follow ing exa m ple given by Rorty is a good illustration o f this:
C o n s id e r a fam ous co u rt cas e in Canada: The w o m en o f Canada noticed in 1927 that the C o n s t i tu t i o n o f C a n a d a sa ys „ any p e rs o n m ay be ele cte d to th e se n a te w h o ...” w i t h o u t m e n t i o n in g sex. So th ey said „ O kay, so w e c an be ele cte d to the S e n a te ” . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f C a n a d a wa s ask ed w h eth er „ p ers o n ” meant „man or w o m a n ”
JO HN DEW EY AND RICH A RD ROR TY ON TH EISM AND RELIG IO N 13 1
or „man". T h e a r g u m e n t o f th e f e m in is t la w y ers was that, in r e a d i n g e v ery o t h e r s ta tu te and co n stit u tio n al p ro v is io n , „ p e r s o n ” h a d a lw ay s b e en c o n s t r u c t e d to m ean „man o r w o m a n ” , T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f C a n a d a d e c id e d th at th at wa s true b u t that it w o u ld be so rid ic u lo u s to let w o m a n be a s e n a to r th at in th is c a s e th e w o r d „ p e r s o n ” j u s t h a d to m ean „ m e n ” .
The fem inist law yers had an a b s o lu te ly airtight argum ent, and it did n o t do th em the slightest bit o f good. R eas o n and a rgum ent were certai nly v a lu e d in th e C a n ad ian judic ial system, but th e im agination o f j u d g e s was insu ffi cient to let t h e m c h an g e the
p ractic es o f th e s o c iety 22.
Now, this is a very good example o f the force o f b roa dening im agination and the weakness of argument in social matters. But in the context o f this exam ple it is even harder to understand why the ju d g m e n t o f R o r t y ’s ow n im agination was good enough reason for not becom ing a theist if, as he says, only theism could solve the problem he wanted to solve, S h o u ld n ’t he simply m ake a shift in his own imagination?
To understand why he could not, we have to return to D arw in, w ho is one of R orty’s heroes. N ot every broadening o f imagination is good and desirable. Rorty simply looks at theism in such a m anner that to b e c o m e a theist w ould be going back to some primitive stages o f the evolution o f hum an mind. So in his view there is no com parison betw een the b roa dening o f im a gination o f Canadian jud g es and the broadening o f im agination a theist suggests. Accep- ting theism would be, from his perspective, restricting im agination, it w ould be like going back from the age of industrial civilizations to the age o f primi- tiye agricultural production.
Let us look now at the way Rorty describes the secularist position he even~ tually accepted:
D e w e y th o u g h t, as I n o w do, th at t h ere wa s n o t h in g b ig g e r , m o r e p e r m a n e n t , and m o re reli able, b e h in d o u r se nse o f m ora! o b l ig a t io n to th o s e in p a in t h a n a c ertain c o n tin g e n t h istoric al p h e n o m e n o n - th e g r a d u a l s p r e a d o f th e s e n s e o f th e p a in o f oth ers m atters, re g ard les s o f w h e t h e r th ey are o f th e s a m e fa m ily , tr ib e c o lo r , r e li gion, nation, or inteilige nce as one se lf. T h is id ea, D e w e y t h o u g h t, c a n n o t be sh ow n to be true by science, or re li g io n , o r p h ilo s o p h y [...] .
This D e w e y a n c la im en ta ils a p ic tu r e o f h u m a n b e in g s as c h i l d r e n o f o u r tim e an d place, w ith o u t any s ig n ific a n t m e ta p h y s ica l o r b i o lo g i c a l lim i ta t io n s on th eir plasticity. It mean s that a sense o f m orał oblig atio n is a m atter o f c o n d itio n in g rather than o f insi ght. It also entails that th e n o tio n o f insi ght (in any area, ph y sics as well as eth ics) as a g lim p s e o f w h a t is th ere, ap art f ro m any h u m a n n e e d s a n d d e s i r e s , c a n n o t be m ad e c o h ere n t. [...] m o re s p e cif ically , o u r c o n s c i e n c e a n d o u r aes th e tic
ta s te s are, e ą u a ll y , p r o d u c ts o f the c u lt u r a l e n v ir o n m e n t in w h ic h we g rew up. We decent, liberał h u m a n i t a r i a n types [...] are j u s t lu ck ier, not m o re insi ghtful, than the bu llie s with w h o m w e s t r u g g l e 23.
Rorty States here his own c r e d o : We are children o f our time and place, w hich m eans that we are n o t the children o f any God. T h e re are no limits to our plasticity, i. e. we do not have any other naturę or conscience than that shaped by our culture. Institutions we are proud of, like democracy, and results we should preserve, like our morał sensitivity, are results o f great Łuck, which means that they are purely accidental results o f blind evolutionary process. Here we have an application o f D arw inism in fuli display. By Darwinian ele- ments in Rorty I m ean here only evolutionary naturalism (but not necessarily reductive biologism ) com bined with the thesis that physical processess, even as sophisticated as those occurring in human brains, occur by chance (without any intelligent direction).
Rorty applies this kind of Darwinism to epistemology expressed in linguistic terms. According to him our present language o f W estern culture „took shape as a result o f great num ber of sheer contingencies” , and „genuine novelty can [...] o ccur in a world o f blind, contingent, mechanical fo rces” 24. W e shuold note again that there is no argument here to support this claim. However. in- stead of accusing Rorty of not giving arguments, it would be good to remember that his aim is not to provide another philosophical system within what we used to cali W estern culture. He wants to radically redefine this culture, and to conv in ce us to accept a com pletely new faith, which could be properly called the religion (or ideology) of L u ck or C ontingency.
This interpretation m ay seem to be exaggerated. In R o rty ’s writings there are ą u ite e xtensive passages w here he gives interesting and solid argum ents, e. g., against foundationalism or realism. So it seems that broadening our ima- gination or redefining our culture is not the only and maybe even not the most important aim Rorty has. Yet this is quite easy to explain. Rorty simply treats the c o m m u n ity o f philosophers in a way sim ilar to how grow n-ups treat ch il dren, u sing their language and their way o f thinking to m ake certain ideas appealing. But he believes that as they „grow o lder” the previous w orldview and previous habits o f looking for argum ents will disappear. So in a sense, Rorty speaks to us as a Nietzschean superman could speak to men. If he
some-22 „ T ro ts k i a n d th e W ild O r c h i d s ” , pp. 9 5 -96.
JO HN DEW EY AND RICH A RD RORTY ON THEISM AN D RELIGION 1 3 3
times uses old images and old argumentation and engages him self in philosoph- ical disputes, it is because of his com passion to slaves o f the old religion whom he want to help.
I intentionally tried to em phasize the sim ilarity betw een R orty and N ie t z sche (Rorty him self often stresses this similarity) while writing about the Dar winian elem ents in his neopragm atism . It has to be re m e m b e re d that the Nietzschean conception of Superman was achieved by a ąuite direct application of evolutionary insight (very similar to that of Darwin although not Darwinian) into the relam of the history of ideas. And so avoiding N ietzschean term s and putting it in Darwinian ones, we would have to say that R o rty ’s philosophy is like a message from the next stage o f evolution given to creatures still at the lower stage. How did Rorty m anage to ac hie ve this new stage o f evolution? The only answ er which is possible from his own p erspective is exactly the same as the answer to the question about every novelty and every achievement. It is „the result o f cosmic rays scram bling the fine stru c tu re o f som e crucial neurons in [...] respective b ra in ” or the result o f „som e odd episodes in in- fancy” 25. In generał, it is the result o f pure C ontingency, pure L u ck or pure Chance.
I have no doubt that we have here one o f the m ost anti-theistic and anti-religious pictures o f the world. W hat som etim es m isleads p eo p le is that Rorty does not criticize theism and religion as openly and aggresively as, e. g., Nietzsche. M oreover, in line with his relativism, he seem s to adm it various languages (even theistic ones) as eąually useful as any other languages (e. g., atheistic). After all the very fact that they survived justifies their utility. In that Rorty seems to be much more open-m inded than m any co n tem p o rary natura- lists. This, however, does not rule out our hypothesis that for R orty theistic language is a relic of an earlier stage of evolution, which some people still find useful because o f their narrow im agination.
However, even if Rorty would not see theism as a passing way o f thinking and even if he adm itted that som etime in the futurę theistic language might appear the w inner of evolutionary com petition, his p h ilosophy has to be re- garded as anti-theistic. In my view, in his heart Rorty is not a relativist. Like Dewey, he believes in generalized and ontologized Darwinian C hance as a kind of an Absolute. And if he admits possibility o f failure o f atheistic language in the futurę it is not because theistic language may appear to be true but because god (or goddess) Chance may have such caprice. And this core b e lie f o f both
Dewey and Rorty is clearly opposed to the theistic claim, which does not con- cern the utility of religious language but the truth of the belief in G o d ’s exis- tence. Rorty is not at bottom a relativist, j u s t as Dewey is not a rationalist. He also believes in god(dess) C hance or Luck. The difference between Dewey and Rorty is only on the level o f expression of this common faith. One urges us to ac quire it by reason the other one by sentim ent and imagination.
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S T A N O W I S K O J O H N A D E W E Y A 1 R I C H A R D A R O R T Y ' E G O W K W E S T I I R E L I G I I I T E I Z M U
S t r e s z c z e n i e
W artykule S ta n o w isko J o h n a D ew ey a i R ic h a rd a R o r ty ’eg o w k w e s tii re lig ii i teizm u p r z e d s ta w io n o n a jp ie rw ro z w ó j p o g l ą d ó w D e w e y a na ten temat. W y c h o w a n y w r o d z in ie c h r z e ś c i j a ń skiej, był on z p o c zą tk u p o z y ty w n ie n a s t a w io n y do teiz m u i reli gii, ale j u ż w ó w c z a s p o jm o w ał Boga j a k o w c ie lo n e g o w L u d z k o ś ć i p r a k ty c z n ie z n i ą się u t o ż s a m i a j ą c e g o . Z b i e g i e m czasu h u m an is ty c zn y n atu ra liz m , u z u p e ł n i o n y o d e k la r o w a n y p r z e z D e w e y a r a c j o n a l i z m , w z iął g ó rę nad teizmem. D ew ey zac h o w a ł j e d n a k term in o lo g ię teis ty c zn ą , k t ó r a sp r a w ia , że n ie k i e d y b ł ę d nie bierze się go za o b ro ń c ę teizmu i religii. R o rty u w a ż a sie b ie za k o n t y n u a t o r a myśli Dew eya, ale zd aje się z a s a d n ic z o od nieg o różnić , p o n i e w a ż o d r z u c a r a c j o n a l i z m i w p r o s t głosi r e la ty wizm. R a c jo n a liz m D e w e y a niew ie le j e d n a k m a w s p ó ln e g o z k l a s y c z n ą lo g ik ą. J e s t o n racz ej g e n e r a liz a c ją na ws ze lkie proc esy społeczne D arw inow s kie j idei p r z y p ad k o w y c h zm ian w walce o przetrwanie. Rorty akce ptuje tę s a m ą ideę, lecz słusz nie o d rz u ca dl a niej n a zw ę „ r a c jo n a liz m ” . P o d o b n i e j e s t w kw estii religii i teizmu. M im o ró ż n ic t e r m i n o lo g i c z n y c h R o r ty z a s a d n i c z o nie wychodzi poza Dew eyow ski kult Ludzkości, który w głębszej w arstw ie j e s t u obu tych filozofów’ k u lte m w s z e c h o b e c n e g o P rzypadku.
