Cracovia - Kraköw, 9: 2004, 241-258
R o m a n D A R O W S K I
JÖZEF ALOJZY DMOWSKI SJ (1799-1879)
PRECURSOR OF THE RENEWAL OF THOMISM
J ö z e f A l o j z y [Josephus Aloisius] D m o w s k i was one of the precursors of the n i n e t e e n t h century r e n e w a l of T h o m i s m a n d this was a few dozen years before the p r o m u l g a t i o n of Pope L e o X I I I ' s encyclical, Aeterni Patris (1879). H e was one of the most famous C h r i s t i a n philosophers of the n i n e t e e n t h century. H i s w o r k was also the f i r s t extensive philosophy textbook of t h a t t i m e w h i c h i n c l u d e d a l l the disciplines of the time, p u b l i s h e d b y the J e s u i t s a f t e r the re-establishment of the O r d e r i n 1814. (The suppression took place i n 1773).^
U n t i l now D m o w s k i ' s philosophy h a s not been the subject of a n extensive study. I a i m to remedy t h i s i n the present article.
B i o g r a p h y a n d publications
J ö z e f A l o j z y D m o w s k i w a s b o r n on the t w e n t y - f i f t h of November 1799 i n Z y t o m i e r z (now the U k r a i n e ) . H e j o i n e d the Society of J e s u s on the s i x t h of J u n e 1818 i n a B e l a r u s s i a n Province. A f t e r the exile of the J e s u i t s f r o m R u s s i a i n 1820, h e l e f t f o r I t a l y a n d continued h i s studies of rhetoric i n Genoa^. N e x t he c a r r i e d out philosophical studies i n F o r l i a n d G e n o a (1821-1824), a n d theological studies i n R o m e at Collegium Romanum (1824-1828). I n Rome h e w a s ordained i n 1828. H i s pro-fession of the f o u r vows took place i n Rome on the f i f t e e n t h of A u g u s t 1835.
University School of Philosophy and Education Ignatianum, Cracow
^ Josephus Angiolini SJ as early as in 1819 published Institutiones philosophicae, in Polock but it did not contain any ethics.
^ Catalogus Prov. Russiae, 1820, Archivum Romanum Societatis lesu (abbreviation: ARSI), Russ., 8, f. IV.
F r o m 1829 D m o w s k i was a professor of philosophy, i n p a r t i c u l a r logic, metaphysics a n d ethics (1829-1837). H e was a professor of dogmatic theology a n d f o r a w h i l e , also of m o r a l theology (1835-1836, 1838-1844) i n Collegium Romanum (presently the P o n t i f i c a l G r e g o r i a n U n i v e r s i t y ) . T h e n for m a n y years he was a superior i n v a r i o u s J e s u i t houses i n Italy, among others he was the rector of the college i n M o d e n a (twice) a n d i n Reggie E m i l i a . A t the b e g i n n i n g of the sixties he was a superior i n V e r o n a a n d t h e n he w o r k e d i n Venice. F r o m 1866 he was the rector i n the house of the t h i r d probation i n R o m e (at S a i n t Eusebio). I n 1870 he resided i n Collegium Germanicum i n R o m e where he p r i v a t e l y t a u g h t students philosophy, m a i n l y metaphysics as w e l l as a c t i n g as t h e i r s p i r i t u a l father. I n 1877 he was also the general prefect of studies at Collegium Romanum. H e died on the second of F e b r u a r y 1879 i n R o m e l
D m o w s k i p u b l i s h e d the f o l l o w i n g w o r k s :
Logica et metaphysica, quae traditur in Collegio Romano S.I. exeunte anno 1835 et proximo 1836, a n anonymous text, d u p l i c a t e d l i t h o g r a p h i -cally. - It is considered a w o r k of D m o w s k i ' s by J . A . V e n t o s a A g u i l a r i n the book by the t i t l e of: El sentido comun en las obras filosoficas del Padre Claudio Bufßer S.J., B a r c e l o n a 1957, p. 139, footnote 72 (refe-rence to D m o w s k i also on page 143). J . P e t r i r e n a w r i t e s about t h i s i n the book La certeza litre [...], p. 8, footnote 4. It does not i n c l u d e f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n , for example about the l e n g t h or location of Logic and metaphysics.
Institutiones philosophiae auctore Josephe A l o i s i o D m o w s k i e So-cietate J e s u i n Collegio R o m a n o philosophiae m o r a l i s professore. V o l . I continens institutiones logicae et metaphysicae [ontolgia, theologia n a t u r a l i s , psychologia, p r i n c i p i a cosmologiae]. E d i t i o R o m a n a ab A u c t o -re emendata plerisque notionibus aucta, R o m a e 1840, 21 x 14 c m , V I I I + 464 p. V o l . I L continens i n s t i t u t i o n e s ethicae sive philosophiae m o r a l i s , R o m a e 1840, 21 x 14 c m , 288 p.
Institutiones philosophicae auctore Joseph-Aloisio D m o w s k i , e So-cietate J e s u , i n Collegio R o m a n o philosophiae m o r a l i s professore. I n U d e n , L o v a n i i 1840, 3 v o l . : V o l . 1. C o n t i n e t institutiones logicae et metaphysicae generalis, V I + 168 p. V o l . II. C o n t i n e t institutiones metaphysicae specialis, 317p. V o l . III. C o n t i n e t i n s t i t u t i o n e s philoso-phiae m o r a l i s , 1841, 21 x 14,5 c m , 272 p. - 1843, 3 v o l .
^ The biographical data above are based on sources from the Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu; ARSI; R. Mendizabal, Catalogus defunctorum in renata Societate lesu ab a. 1814 ad a. 1970, Rome 1972, p. 91, no. 32. - Several earlier publications provide slierhtlv different bioeranhical data.
Institutiones philosophicae [...]. E d i t i o T a u r i n e n s i s ab auctore emen-d a t a et q u i b u s emen-d a m notionibus aucta. A n . 1841, T a u r i n i [Torino], v o l . 1¬ 2, V I I I + 380 + 136 p.
Institutiones philosophicae auctore Josephe Aloisio D m o w s k i , e So-cietate J e s u , i n Collegio R o m a n o philosophiae m o r a l i s professore. V o l . I. continet institutiones logicae et metaphysicae generalis. V o l . II. continet institutiones metaphysicae specialis. V o l . III. continet i n s t i t u -tiones philosophiae m o r a l i s , L o v a n i i , M o g u n t i a e 1843, 23 x 14,5 cm, 168 + 318 + 272 p.
Institutiones philosophicae auctore Josephe A l o i s i o D m o w s k i , e Societate J e s u , i n Collegio R o m a n o philosophiae m o r a l i s professore. E d i t i o q u a r t a , a l t e r a R o m a n a , ab auctore emendata et novis a d d i t i o n i -bus i l l u s t r a t a . Romae 1845, 22 x 14,5 c m . V o l . I. continens institutiones logicae et metaphysicae, V I I I + 342 p. V o l . II. continens institutiones philosophiae m o r a l i s , 240 p.
Institutiones philosophicae auctore Josephe A l o i s i o D m o w s k i e So-cietate J e s u i n C o l i . R o m . p r i u s logicae et metaphysicae, deinde philo-sophiae m o r a l i s prof[essore]. V o l . I continens institutiones logicae et metaphysicae [ontologia, theologia n a t u r a l i s , psychologia, p r i n c i p i a cosmologiae]. E d i t i o q u i n t a , t e r t i a R o m a n a , ab auctore emendata et novis additionibus i l l u s t r a t a , Romae 1851, 20,5 x 14 c m , V I I I + 376 p. A second volume c o n t a i n i n g ethics probably also appeared, however I was unable to locate i t .
It is n o t h i n g strange therefore, t h a t - i n the presence of so m a n y publications by D m o w s k i - F r y d e r y k K l i m k e i n h i s History of Philo-sophy claims t h a t Institutiones philosophicae was v e r y widespread^.
A p a r t f r o m t h i s , D m o w s k i p u b l i s h e d two polemical w o r k s i n I t a l i a n on the subject of d e f i n i n g n a t u r a l l a w , as a discussion w i t h R o s m i n i :
Analisi dello scritto intitolato: Risposta di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati ad alcune osservazioni critiche del R. P. Giuseppe Luigi Dmowski della Compagnia di Gesü intorno alla definizione della legge morale (Lugano as w e l l as (seperately!) L u c c a 1841, the f o r m a t 8° a n d 12°, resp. 19 a n d 28 pages).
Alcune considerazioni sulla ristampa milanese dello scritto aretino del Sign. Abate Antonio Rosmini-Serbati intorno alla definizione della legge morale colVAnalisi d'un altro scritto del medesimo autore intorno alla teoria dell'essere ideale in risposta al P. Giuseppe Luigi Dmowski [...] (Lugano 1842, 8°, pp. 75, as w e l l as (seperately!) L u c c a , December
1842, 8°, pp. 111). - See below, i n section: Moral philosophy.
M O R E I M P O R T A N T V I E W S
I n t h i s w o r k I w i l l present D m o w s k i ' s v i e w s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those w h i c h are more i m p o r t a n t e x i s t e n t i a l l y a n d those w h i c h are characteristic f o r the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d he undertook.
A concept of p h i l o s o p h y
D m o w s k i defines philosophy i n the f o l l o w i n g w a y : It is „a science of r e a c h i n g t r u t h a n d good, achieved by a correct use of reason"^. P h i l o -sophy can be d i v i d e d into speculative, whose t a s k is to achieve t r u t h , a n d m o r a l , whose t a s k is a c h i e v i n g good. Speculative philosophy i n t u r n can be d i v i d e d into logic a n d metaphysics. W i t h i n the l i m i t s of metaphysics, general metaphysics or ontology a n d detailed metaphysics (m. specialis) are singled out. T h e l a t t e r embraces n a t u r a l theology, psychology a n d cosmology. D m o w s k i also notes, t h a t „ p h i l o s o p h y is l i k e a servant to theology"^.
L o g i c
A c c o r d i n g to D m o w s k i , logic is a n a b i l i t y f o r correct r e a s o n i n g a n d discovering the sources of truth.^
L o g i c is d i v i d e d into two parts. I n p a r t one the f o l l o w i n g themes were touched on: T h e first operation of the m i n d ( f o r m i n g concepts). T h e second operation of the m i n d ( f o r m i n g judgements). T h e t h i r d operation of the m i n d (reasoning; a m o n g other things here about a n a l y t i c a n d synthetic methods of learning).
I n the second p a r t are discussed: T r u t h . Sources of t r u t h (the evidence as c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h ) . T h e i n n e r sense (sensus intimus) - i n n e r experience, consciousness. It has been shown, t h a t cognition of our o w n existence, of our „1" is a n o r i g i n a l a n d basic cognition.
F u r t h e r themes: R e a s o n i n general; the constituent elements of h u m a n r a t i o n a l i t y (Diversa rationalitatis nostrae constitutiva exponun-tur). G e n e r a l ideas (here is i n c l u d e d a m o n g others h i s polemic w i t h no-m i n a l i s t s ) .
T h e a u t h o r c l a i m s , t h a t the first principles of reason are absolutely certain. T h e n he discusses the p r o b l e m of certainty, d e m o n s t r a t i n g
^ „Scientia veri et boni assequendi, recto rationis usu comparata". Institutiones philosophicae, Lovanii-Moguntiae 1843, vol. I, p. 1. -1 make further use of this publication in discussing Dmowski's views.
^ „[.,.] philosophiam esse quasi ancillam Theologiae". Ibidem, p. 1.
several of its types. T u r n i n g to the problem of the existence of bodies, he c l a i m s (in opposition to idealists) t h a t i t is undeniable.
H e supports the thesis, t h a t sensory cognition can be a n d is a source of definite cognition a n d t h a t h u m a n a u t h o r i t y can, u n d e r certain circumstances, become a n undoubted n o r m of t r u t h (here the author rejects, among others, the v i e w represented by de l a M e n n a i s ) .
E q u a l l y i n logic, as i n other disciplines, the author devotes a lot of t i m e to discussion w i t h those who have, over history, voiced other views. R e l a t i v e l y o f t e n he comes out against sensualists a n d idealists especially. H e also often r e f u t e d v a r i o u s accusations, u s u a l l y in forma, so m a k i n g use of syllogisms a n d a p p l y i n g diverse distinctions.
Metaphysics
W i t h i n the l i m i t s of general metaphysics, i.e. ontology, D m o w s k i discusses the f o l l o w i n g subjects: T h e r e l a t i o n of necessary a n d contin-gent t r u t h s ( m a i n l y about the p r i n c i p l e of non-contradiction a n d adequate reason); E x i s t e n c e , the possibility a n d essence of beings; Substance, subsistence, the person a n d the i n d i v i d u a l ; T h e problem of relationships; A n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of finite a n d i n f i n i t e being, of contin-gent a n d necessary; P r i n c i p l e a n d reasons a n d t h e i r d i v i s i o n .
B e i n g , according to h i m is „ t h a t w h i c h i n some w a y exists"^. I n the question of the difierence between essence a n d existence he opts for Suarez's concept (accepting between t h e m only the difference i n thought^). H e also accepts - a g a i n f o l l o w i n g i n the steps of S u a r e z - the modi, or the a c t u a l m o d i f i c a t i o n of substance. Modus can be for example, q u a l i t y or a i l m e n t ^ ° . H e accepts a m o d a l difference at last. It occurs, f o r example, between a n object a n d its colour or shape, or between the m i n d a n d a thought - t h i n k i n g is a modus of the m i n d . I n the first case (object a n d its colour or shape) occurs a m o d a l difference i n thought, i n the second - a n a c t u a l (real) difference^^ It seems t h a t
® „[...] quod aliquo modo est". Ibidem, p. 100.
^ „Quod si essentia accipiatur pro ipsis proprietatibus, quae actu naturam entis constituunt, tunc nulla est ratio distinguendi essentiam istam actualem ab existentia, quasi nempe haec esset entitas quaedam realis, seu forma superaddita essentiae. Etenim optime intelligo, ens aUquod existere, dummodo ejus proprietates essentiales in rerum ordine ponantur, seu reducantur ad actum. Unde compositum ex essentia actuali et existentia est tantum metaphysicum; haec enim duo ratione nostra dumtaxat distinguun-tur". Ibidem, p. 124.
„Reflexione adhibita super conceptus nostros objective reales, satis claram et distinctam Substantiae et Modi, seu Qualitatis vel Accidentis notionem comparamus". Ibidem, p. 124.
even i n D m o w s k i ' s d e f i n i t i o n of self-existence of beings (subsistentia) appears a S u a r e z concept of modi^^.
D m o w s k i describes a person as a self-existing b e i n g (subsistentia), r a t i o n a l , v o i c i n g several reservations a n d explanations to the d e f i n i t i o n expressed b y B o e t h u i s .
I n answer to the question, about w h e t h e r o r i g i n a l elements, of w h i c h m a t t e r is made u p of, are s i m p l e or not, D m o w s k i is i n c l i n e d towards the opinion, t h a t continuous q u a n t i t y (continuum quantum) is made u p of v e r y s m a l l elements, w h i c h however are extendible a n d not s i m p l e . A s i n the opposite case a n a c t u a l existence of e x t e n d i b i l i t y w o u l d be, i n h i s opinion, threatened. I n t h i s context, the possibility of d i v i s i o n of m a t t e r into i n f i n i t y is discarded, as the consequence of t h a t k i n d of d i v i s i o n w o u l d be a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r of a c t u a l (actu) e x i s t i n g parts, w h i c h is unacceptable (repugnat)^^.
S p e a k i n g about the causes, he u n d e r l i n e s h e a v i l y - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n opposition to occasionalists - t h a t secondary (created) reasons are r e a l g e n e r a t i n g causes a n d - appropriate to t h e i r n a t u r e - are d i s t i n g u i s h e d by r e a l activity, whose r e s u l t can be v a r i o u s consequences^^.
N a t u r a l theology
I n the treaty natural theology (included i n the e d i t i o n discussed here v o l . II, p. 1-123), i n w h i c h „in the l i g h t of reason G o d a n d h i s perfections are penetrated", D m o w s k i touches on three groups of problems: the existence of G o d , the essence of G o d a n d the attributes of G o d .
R e j e c t i n g on the one h a n d the ontological argument, according to w h i c h G o d is k n o w n per se, t h a t h i s existence does not d e m a n d proof, a n d on the other h a n d both £in agnostic a n d a n atheistic attitude, D m o w s k i states t h a t f o r m a n , the existence of G o d is s o m e t h i n g obvious, e q u a l l y t h a n k s to the easy deduction of t h i s t r u t h f r o m direct p r i n c i p l e s , as to the a i m s of its r a t i o n a l n a t u r e .
A m o n g the evidence, the author distinguishes three types of argument: m e t a p h y s i c a l , p h y s i c a l a n d m o r a l . F r o m the m e t a p h y s i c a l , he discusses two extensively: f r o m the v i e w of essential b e i n g a n d f r o m
et rotunditatem objecti; vel inter subjectum et modum, e. g. animum et ejus cogitationem; et haec dici potest realis modalis: subjectum enim potest realiter existere sine tali modo, quamvis hic sine illo existere nequeat". Ibidem, p. 135.
„Hinc Subsistentia a nonnullis definitur: Modus ille existendi, qui naturam entis reddit sui ipsius propriam, et adaequatum principium suarum operationum". Ibidem, p.
129.
Ibidem, p. 136-138. " Ibidem, p. 153-155.
the v i e w o f uncreated being^^. T h e fact of o m i t t i n g other „ w a y s " of f i n d i n g G o d , presented by Thomas A q u i n a s , shows that D m o w s k i , s i m i l a r to other thomists of the t r e n d k n o w n later as L o v a n i u m ' s t r e n d - provides m e t a p h y s i c a l proof about the existence of G o d to a certain type of synthesis of evidence f r o m the contingency of beings a n d f r o m t h e i r causal relationships.
F r o m p h y s i c a l evidence, he also presents two: the l a s t i n g order r e i g n i n g i n the universe t h a n k s to the permanent laws of n a t u r e a n d the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l causes^^. W h i l e f r o m m o r a l evidence he e q u a l l y discusses two: the belief of the peoples a n d the idea of the highest legislator. I n this context he dedicates considerable attention to the a f f a i r s of atheists a n d a t h e i s m .
H e discussed b r i e f l y the problems concerning the essence of God: on only f o u r pages (40-43). H e allocated the rest of the treaty to a lecture on the attributes of G o d , w h i c h he divides m a i n l y into absolute attributes ( i n f i n i t y , i n v a r i a b i l i t y , eternity, simplicity, s p i r i t u a l i t y , i m m e a s u r a b i l i t y , the m i n d a n d the w i l l of God, the oneness of G o d , the good of G o d - here among others the problem of evil) as w e l l as relative attributes (creation of the w o r l d , its preservation, interaction w i t h the creation, the Providence of God).
Psychology
D m o w s k i dedicates more attention a n d space to psychology t h a n to n a t u r a l theology (pp. 124-264). A t the v e r y b e g i n n i n g he claims, that cognition of oneself, not only f r o m the point of view of m o r a l i t y but also f r o m a m e t a p h y s i c a l point of v i e w , w h i c h is achieved m a i n l y i n psycho-logy, is the most sublime t a s k of m a n . K n o w l e d g e i n other areas w o u l d not h e l p us m u c h i f we d i d not k n o w w h a t our „condition" (conditio), a i m , possibilities a n d f u t u r e were. Psychology f i r s t l y deals w i t h exactly these types of problems. It is necessary to note at once t h a t we are t a l k i n g here about philosophic psychology, r a t i o n a l a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d not about psychology i n today's u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the t e r m .
T h i s psychology reveals numerous s i m i l a r i t i e s to modern philosophy of m a n . T h e author especially displays the s p i r i t u a l element, or the
„Supremi Numinis existentia invicte probatur sub conceptu entis necessarii et improducti, sive entis a se [...]". Institutiones philosophicae, vol. II, Theologia naturalis, p. 3.
,Admirabilis hujus mundi ordo, COMPLETE et ADAEQUATE sumptus, ejusque constantia per leges stabiles determinata, nec non causarum finalium subordinatio, existentiam Dei, sub conceptu entis SUMME intelligentis, invicte demonstrat". Ibidem, p. 17.
soul, since the soul, more t h a n a n y t h i n g else determines the ontic status of m a n . F o r t h i s reason, i t is the direct a n d m a i n object of interest of D m o w s k i . F r o m t h i s point on, he discusses i n t u r n the n a t u r e of the h u m a n soul, its o r i g i n , essence, how i t is connected to the body a n d the powers of the soul (reason a n d w i l l ) .
H e c l a i m s t h a t the soul is a b e i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the body. Its powers a n d actions exclude a p h y s i c a l compound, i t is therefore a s i m p l e being, or noncomplex. These powers, a n d p a r t i c u -l a r -l y the actions r e s u -l t i n g f r o m t h e m show va-lues opposing a n d opposite to the proper values of matter, therefore they have a s p i r i t u a l q u a l i t y . T h e soul is therefore spiritual^^. T h i s s p i r i t u a l i t y is j u s t i f i e d b y v a r i o u s arguments r e s t i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y on the f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e : the b e h a v i o u r of a b e i n g is according to its nature^^, a n d finally on the p r i n c i p l e of causality. Because m a n performs at least some actions, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the field of reason, w h i c h are not m a t e r i a l , t h e i r subject, basis a n d source therefore m u s t have a n o n - m a t e r i a l character, they m u s t be s p i r i t u a l . A m o n g the examples of t h i s k i n d of i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y are mentioned, a m o n g others: cognition of m y o w n self, a concept of u n i t y , a concept of t r u t h , cognition of coherence or incoherence of j u d g m e n t w i t h r e a l i t y , connection between the premises a n d conclusion i n reasoning^^. I n this context the a u t h o r forcibly stresses t h a t m a t t e r does not posses the a b i l i t y to t h i n k .
L e t ' s point out the more i m p o r t a n t thesis for the p h i l o s o p h y of m a n t a k e n fi:*om the scope of psychology:
T h e h u m a n soul, b e i n g s p i r i t u a l is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e a n d i m m o r t a l . G o d d i r e c t l y creates the h u m a n soul a n d it's probably t h e n , w h e n the body is f o r m e d enough to be capable of c a r r y i n g out some of life's activities'^.
T h e h u m a n soul is connected w i t h the body i n a p h y s i c a l w a y a n d together w i t h i t f o r m s a s u b s t a n t i a l , complex u n i t y (unum substantiale compositum), therefore one h u m a n n a t u r e w h i c h comes about fi:om two substances (soul a n d matter).
T h e soul w o r k s t h r o u g h its m a i n powers: cognition (reason) a n d acts of the w i l l . A s w e l l as sensory cognition, i n t e l l e c t u a l cognition is also
„Facultates et operationes animae nostrae manifeste excludunt ab ipsa compositio-nem physicam; est igitur simplex. Ostendunt quoque contrariam et contradictoriam oppositionem cum proprietatibus materiae; est igitur spiritualis". Psychologia, p. 137.
„[...] ergo talis necessario erit natura entis, quales sunt ejus operationes". Psychologia, p. 138.
Ibidem, p. 138.
„[...] tunc animam a Deo creari, quando corpus humanum ita est efformatum, ut quibusdam vitalibus operationibus peragendis sit idoneum instrumentum [...]". Ibidem,
discussed w i d e l y here. T h e m a i n feature of w i l l is free choice, whose existence is j u s t i f i e d first of a l l (1) on the basis of i n n e r experience (consciousness of freedom precedes h u m a n choice, accompanies i t a n d follows a f t e r it), (2) f r o m the concept of n a t u r a l l a w , w h i c h places on m a n the d u t y to act according to reason a n d conscience - w i t h the hope of r e w a r d or u n d e r t h r e a t of p u n i s h m e n t , depending on the type of action, as w e l l as, (3) f r o m the common conviction of h u m a n i t y about the freedom e n t i t l e d to m a n .
Cosmology
T h e p a r t concerning cosmology, D m o w s k i entitled: The principles of cosmology ( P r i n c i p i a cosmologiae). C e r t a i n l y by this title he meant, t h a t he w o u l d treat t h i s section briefly; a n d indeed this part takes up l i t t l e more t h a n f o r t y pages of p r i n t (pp. 265-306 as w e l l as 316-317, index).
T h e author notes at the b e g i n n i n g , t h a t he has expounded a few of the problems f r o m the sphere of cosmology earlier, especially i n ontology, f o r example about space, t i m e a n d parts of component mate-r i a l . W h i l e i n cosmology he deals w i t h those pmate-roblems, w h i c h i n a p a r t i c u l a r w a y belong to the w o r l d considered as one being, therefore a collection of a l l „sensory"'^ beings.
A s s u m i n g t h a t w h i c h is proved i n n a t u r a l theology (that the w o r l d was created b y God) he undertakes i n p a r t i c u l a r , the f o l l o w i n g problems:
W a s the w o r l d , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r matter, w h i c h is a basic component of a l l bodies a p p e a r i n g i n t h i s w o r l d , created f r o m nothing? - To w h i c h he responds: m a t t e r is not a n necessary being; i t was therefore created by G o d f r o m n o t h i n g .
H a s the w o r l d existed eternally, or at least could i t exist eternally? - T h e w o r l d w a s not created eternally, i t d i d not always exist, neither could i t exist eternally, because eternity constitutes a v a l u e of absolute-l y necessary b e i n g (God).
W e r e there a n y necessary conditions for the creation of the world? - Space a n d location were necessary (spatium et locus). I n r e l a t i o n to t h i s , D m o w s k i discusses the problem: is the simultaneous existence of the same b e i n g possible i n m a n y places? H e responds t h a t i n a n a t u r a l w a y t h i s is not possible, however w i t h the „ p o w e r of G o d " (virtute Divina) i t is possible.
„Nunc ea aggredimur, quae peculiari ratione pertinent ad mundum consideratum per modum unius entis, seu aggregati omnium entium sensibilium". Principia cosmologiae, pp. 265-266.
W h y does the w o r l d exist, or to w h a t a i m d i d G o d create it? - T h e a u t h o r f i r s t notes, i n opposition to L e i b n i z , that the w o r l d i n w h i c h we live i n , is not the best possible. W h i l e God's a i m i n creating the w o r l d was a disclosure of h i s attributes w i t h benefit for creation.
M o r a l p h i l o s o p h y
T h e t h i r d volume of D m o w s k i ' s w o r k Institutiones philosophicae n u m b e r s 272 pages a n d is dedicated to ethical problems, w h i c h a m o n g the p h i l o s o p h i c a l disciplines represented i n the w o r k were most extensively discussed.
I n the Preface, the author notes t h a t t h i s section of r a t i o n a l philosophy [i.e. based on reason], w h i c h concerns i t s e l f w i t h good a n d considers l a w s , on w h i c h the happiness of the whole of h u m a n society a n d of p a r t i c u l a r unities depends, is called „ t h e study of n a t u r a l , p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e l a w , or m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y ^ ' . H e gives two d e f i n i t i o n s of t h i s . A c c o r d i n g to the f i r s t , m o r a l philosophy is „a p r a c t i c a l s t u d y concerned w i t h h u m a n deeds, d i r e c t i n g t h e m towards honesty"'^; according to the second: i t is „a study e x a m i n i n g the p r i n c i p l e s a n d g i v i n g clues, t h a n k s to w h i c h , h u m a n actions are directed i n a free w a y towards honesty a n d consequently towards happiness - i n accordance w i t h a r u l e p or t ray ed i n the l i g h t of good reason"'^.
M o r a l philosophy i n D m o w s k i ' s case is d i v i d e d into f o u r m a i n parts: 1. T h e problem of happiness (felicitas), w h i c h is based on a perfect cognition a n d „ u s e " (fruitio) of the highest good (God), as the u l t i m a t e a i m of m a n . A c t s of m a n i n general a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r : t h e i r n a t u r e , i m p u t a b i l i t y (imputabilitas) a n d m o r a l character. T h e m o r a l i t y of a n action is defined by the object, circumstances a n d a i m .
2. A r u l e , or the [general] n o r m of h u m a n acts, i.e. N a t u r a l l a w . T h e conscience as a direct, i n d i v i d u a l n o r m of h u m a n acts.
3. T h e state of h u m a n i t y ( n a t u r a l a n d r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h i s , civil) versus principles of public l a w ; c r i t i c i s m of v i e w s , expounded b y Rousseau, Hobbes a n d P u f e n d o r f . State power comes u l t i m a t e l y f r o m G o d , the C r e a t o r sind the L o r d of h u m a n nature. T h i s power has the
Juris naturalis publici et privati scientia, seu philosophia moralis. Philosophia moralis, p. 1.
„[...] scientia practica, quae circa actus humanos ut ad honestatem dirigendos versatur". Ibidem.
„[...] scientia, principia inquirens et praecepta tradens, quibus libere hominum actiones ad honestatem et per consequens ad felicitatem dirigantur, juxta regulam rectae rationis lumine manifestatam". Ibidem, p. 1.
r i g h t , among others to m a k e use of the death penalty. T h e monarchy seems to h i m to be the best f o r m of leadership.
4. Responsibilities of m a n r e s u l t i n g f r o m n a t u r a l l a w . H e r e the author stressed, among other things the responsibility of c a r i n g for the s p i r i t u a l culture (cultura animi) of m a n a n d presented the need f o r dialogue, g i v i n g i t s conditions ( i n a n i n t e r e s t i n g a n d f a i r l y extensive i n t e r v i e w by the title.: De mutuo officio sermocinantium, p p . 241-246). H e also expressed the view t h a t w a r , considered as „a violent method of achieving public peace a n d r e t u r n i n g justice"'^, i n some cases c a n be j u s t i f i e d .
S p e a k i n g about n a t u r a l l a w , D m o w s k i defines i t as „a reflection of e t e r n a l l a w i n a r a t i o n a l being"'^. I n r e l a t i o n to this he criticizes among others, the concept of n a t u r a l l a w , given to h i m by h i s contem-porary F a t h e r A n t o n i o R o s m i n i - S e r b a t i (1797-1855) i n the workPrincipi della scienza morale as w e l l as i n the book Filosofia della morale ( M i l a n o 1838): „ L a legge morale n o n e che u n a nozione della mente"'^. Rosmini's views provoked a polemic on Dmowski's side concerning the d e f i n i t i o n of n a t u r a l l a w a n d the theory of the ideal (mental) being. T h e y both defended t h e i r views also i n w r i t i n g . R o s m i n i p u b l i s h e d a p a m p h l e t by the t i t l e of: Risposta ad alcune osservazioni critiche del R. P . Giuseppe Luigi Dmowski della Compagnia di Gesü intorno alla definizione della legge morale (Arezzo 1841). D m o w s k i i n t u r n answered w i t h the pamphlet: AnaZis/ (see above: Publications). R o s m i n i replicated the w o r k u n d e r the title. Sulla definizione della legge morale e sulla teoria delVessere ideale. R i s p o s t a d i A n t o n i o R o s m i n i - S e r b a t i prete Roveretano alle osservazioni d e l R . P . Giuseppe L u i g i D m o w s k i , della C o m p a g n i a d i G e s ü ( M i l a n o , 14 III 1842, 8°, ss. 52). D m o w s k i w o u l d not be w o n over a n d published: Alcune considerazioni (see above: P u b l i c a -tions) - See, i n r e l a t i o n to this: Institutiones philosophicae [...] Volumen secundum continens institutiones ethicae, Rome 1845, p. 80.
A t the e n d of Ethics (and the whole work) there is a n anex, i n w h i c h f o u r problems are discussed: V i r t u e s a n d passions. M o r a l v i r t u e s i n p a r t i c u l a r , passions i n general a n d passion i n particular'^.
„[Bellum est] violentus modus quaerendi publicam tranquilitatem et laesae justitiae reparationem". Ibidem, pp. 235-236.
„[...] participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura". Philosophia moralis, p. 80. 2' Ibidem, pp. 81-82.
^® Rosmini, whose some thoughts were condemned in the middle of XIX century was re-approved by the Holy See in 2001 - See: Karl-Heinz Menke, Lehramtliche Selbstkorre-ktur. Zur Rehabilitierung von Antonio Rosmini, „Herder Korrespondenz", 55: 2001, Heft 9, pp. 457-460.
C o n c l u s i o n
T h e L o v a n i u m editors of D m o w s k i ' s work Institutiones philosophicae ( L o u v a i n a n d M a i n z 1843) preceded i t w i t h a n i n t r o d u c t i o n , i n w h i c h they h a v e i n c l u d e d , among others the f o l l o w i n g v i e w of the a u t h o r a n d h i s w o r k :
„ J o s e p h - A l o i s i u s D m o w s k i , a P r i e s t of the Society of J e s u s , a n o u t s t a n d i n g m a n , a n exceptionally l e a r n e d professor of philosophy at Collegium Romanum, y i e l d i n g to the suggestions of m a n y , agreed to the p u b l i c a t i o n of the w o r k Institutiones philosophicae, e q u a l l y r i c h i n content, as i n the language i n w h i c h i t is w r i t t e n , a language desired b y a l l i n the use of e d u c a t i n g the young. It does not h a v e a complex style, i t does not boast w i t h a n i m p r o p e r e r u d i t i o n a n d lecture. O u r a u t h o r also does not follow a n y - as they say - system. O n the contrary, he tries h a r d to dissuade the y o u n g f r o m t h i s , b y example as w e l l as b y its w r i t i n g , he teaches adherence to the t r u t h , wherever t h i s t r u t h s h o u l d come from. T h e w o r k of the respected a u t h o r i s not weighed down b y superfluous questions, however i t does not l a c k i n t h a t w h i c h is essential.
L e t i t not be thought, however t h a t our a u t h o r discusses only those problems, w h i c h are generally discussed i n school. B e i n g t o t a l l y conscious of how i m p o r t a n t i t is to give y o u n g people a n appropriate weapon against the errors of day to day, he speaks at l e n g t h about a l l the problems, w h i c h these days touch t h e m i n d s of some p i t i f u l l y cheated people"'^.
M a r i a n M o r a w s k i , one of the most famous P o l i s h philosophers of the n i n e t e e n t h century wrote w i t h great respect about D m o w s k i as e a r l y as 1876, a n d therefore s t i l l w i t h i n h i s l i f e t i m e :
„Joseph-Aloysius Dmowski, sacerdos Societatis Jesu, vir clarissimus, Philosophiae in Collegio Roriiano Professor doctissimus, superiore anno morem gerens suadentibus non paucis, in lucem edi consensit Institutiones philosophicas, cum doctrina uberrimas, tum scriptas eo dicendi genere, quale quisque ad institutionem adolescentium vel maxime cuperet. Nullae hic styli ambages, nullaque inopportunae eruditionis et doctrinae ostentatio: nullum denique auctor noster sy sterna, ut aiunt, sectatur; contra adolescentes illinc avertere vehementer contendit, ac tum exemplo, turn scripto veritatem, undecunque tandem ipsa prodeat, docet amplectendam. Ac sicuti CI. auctoris institutiones non sunt oneratae quaestionibus supervacaneis, ita nec deficiunt necessariis.
Nec vero, quod quis sibi forte persuadeat, tractavit Noster auctor eas tantummodo quaestiones, quae vulgo in scholis tractari solent; verum optime gnarus, quam multum intersit, ut contra novos in dies succrescentes errores peculiari ratione juvenes armis instruantur, et de iis omnibus quaestionibus disserit, quas nostris diebus misere delusorum hominum quorundam movit Ingenium". Institutiones philosophicae, vol. I, Lovanii-Moguntiae 1843, p. V.
„ T h e credit for the i n i t i a t i v e i n t h i s renev^al [of scholasticism] goes, i n our opinion, to two men: B a 1 m e s, the famous S p a n i s h publicist, l i n o w n for h i s political, h i s t o r i c a l a n d especially philosophi-cal w o r k s , a n d to our f e l l o w - c o u n t r y m a n D m o w s k i , who, t h i r t y years ago was a professor of philosophy at Collegium Romanum a n d p u b l i s h e d the v a l u a b l e a n d famous for its time: Institutiones philosophicae^^. T h e former, w i t h a f i r m n e s s of thought true to h i m s e l f a n d a freeness of style, pointed out the f a l s i t y of G e r m a n i d e a l i s m a n d the shallowness of F r e n c h sensualism. H e recalled the l e a r n e d w o r l d of S a i n t Thomas a n d t u r n e d m i n d s towards scholastic principles. W h i l e the l a t t e r r e v i v e d the ancient scholastic precision, a n d rejecting the f r a g m e n t e d research of his forebearers, thoroughly developed a n d j u s t i f i e d the great t r u t h s of philosophy f o l l o w i n g i n the steps of the ancient scholastic masters. B a l m e s promoted scholasticism i n the o p i n i o n of the l e a r n e d w o r l d , D m o w s k i promoted i t i n scholastic i n s t i t u t i o n s , perhaps not so m u c h t h r o u g h his p u b l i -cation, as t h r o u g h the direction he gave to philosophy at Collegium Romanum, where the finest publicists a n d professors were l a t e r to be educated, a n d who promote scholasticism today"^\
]Morawski's opinion of D m o w s k i a f t e r the t h i r d edition of h i s book (1881) shares a n d almost l i t e r a l l y repeats F . W i n t e r t o n i n h i s w o r k The Lesson of Neo-Scholasticism:
„ F a t h e r [Joseph Aloysius] D m o w s k i , S. J . , born i n P o d o l i a i n 1799, wrote, w h e n professor i n the Collegium Romanum, h i s r e m a r k a b l e work, Institutiones Philosophicae, based on a p u r e l y Scholastic f o u n d a t i o n , though i t does not enter so m u c h into the details of the system as l a t e r w o r k s , a n d is r a t h e r less orthodox upon secondary points. It r a n t h r o u g h five editions i n a short time, a n d was once the text-book i n m a n y C a t h o l i c seminaries a n d universities. F a t h e r D m o w s k i was the first founder of Neo-Scholasticism, for he was the first to p u t into execution its p l a n of campaign, v i z . , to break away f r o m the t r a d i t i o n s of the O l d School as regards puerile a n d useless questions, a n d to accept f r a n k l y a n d w i t h o u t reserve every
con-[in the original note no.: 1] „This work ran through five editions in a short time and rapidly became known in Catholic universities and seminaries. Jözef Alojzy Dmowski was born in Podolia in 1799. In his nineteenth year he joined the Society of Jesus and today he still lives in Rome at Collegium Germanicum'\
M. Morawski, Philosophy and its task, Lviv 1876, edition of Father Edward Podolski, pp. 238-239. I am using an edition unknown to bibHographers, which appeared as early as 1876 [!]. (copy in the Jesuit Philosophical Library in Cracow, No: III-2993); the same text is in the edition from 1877. Later editions of Morawski's books, which appeared during the Hfe of the author in 1881 and 1899 (p. 311), contain minimal differences.
elusion a n d discovery of m o d e r n science. Besides, h i s position, i n w h a t is perhaps the most famous C a t h o l i c s e m i n a r y i n the w o r l d , gave h i m m u c h i n f l u e n c e over the m i n d s of the r i s i n g generation; indeed, most of the later upholders of Neo-Scholasticism amongst the J e s u i t s were f o r m e d by h i m . B a l m e s , a m a n i n c o m p a r a b l y a n d deservedly better k n o w n i n a d i f f e r e n t w a y , thought out a n d wrote h i s Fundamental Philosophy a n d other w o r k s at about the same t i m e - i.e., d u r i n g the first h a l f of this century. T h e S p a n i s h philosopher produced a w o r k w h i c h , l i t t l e as i t is k n o w n i n E n g l a n d , m a y on m a n y accounts be styled a masterpiece. Cool a n d i m p a r t i a l c r i t i c i s m of adverse theories is h a r d l y the distinctive q u a l i t y of S o u t h e r n m i n d s ; but we cannot w i t h o u t i n j u s t i c e refuse to acknowledge the depth of h i s thought, the s i m p l i c i t y of h i s ornate style. W h e t h e r he w e n t so f a r as D m o w s k i i n the n u m b e r of doctrines t h a t u n i t e d h i m w i t h the School, i t w o u l d be impossible to say before h a v i n g r e a d a l l h i s w o r k s ; but the book j u s t mentioned, of w h i c h there is a v e r y readable F r e n c h t r a n s l a t i o n , suffices to j u s t i f y the t i t l e of N e o -Scholastic here a p p l i e d to h i m " ^ ' .
A t the b e g i n n i n g of h i s article F . W i n t e r t o n admits ( i n a footnote): „I w i s h here to acknowledge m y obligations to R e v . F . M o r a w s k i , S. J . , f r o m whose p o l e m i c a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l w o r k . Philosophy and its task, m a n y statements contained i n the f o l l o w i n g sketch are taken".
A b e a u t i f u l testimony was also issued to D m o w s k i i n a m e m o r i a l book f o r the one h u n d r e d y e a r r e v i v a l of Collegium Romanum:
„ F o r m a n y years J ö z e f D m o w s k i lectured here, first philosophy (1829-1842), a n d t h e n theology; he was the first a n d I t h i n k the most successful, along w i t h P . B a l l e r i n i , a n opponent of the f u n d a m e n t a l m i s t a k e s of the R o s m i n i system. T h r o u g h h i s Institutiones philoso-phicae, p u b l i s h e d i n 1840 a n d several times re-issued, he gave a n
excellent example, as to the methods a n d the doctrines themselves, in premendis vestigiis S, Thomae [in the steps of St. T h o m a s ] . H e subjects new philosophical systems, f r o m s e n s u a l i s m to i d e a l i s m a n d f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l i s m to ontologism, to h a r s h a n d p r o f o u n d c r i t i c i s m , w h i c h prepares f o r the firmer steps w h i c h C a t h o l i c philosophy w o u l d have t a k e n t h r o u g h F e l i c e Sopranis a n d Giuseppe Pecci, i f t h e i r teachings h a d not been i n t e r r u p t e d , almost at the b e g i n n i n g by the events of 1 8 4 8 " ' l
F. Winterton,T/ie Lesson of Neo-Scholasticism, „Mind", 13,1888, pp. 383-404 (quoted from J. Gulkowski).
„Ma inoltre qui insegnö molti anni Giuseppe Dmowski, prima filosofia (1829-1842) e poi teologia, il prime e forse il piü efficace oppugnatore, insieme al P. Ballerini, degli errori fondamentali del sistema rosminiano. Egli con le sue Institutiones philosophiae
D m o w s k i ' s books are characterised b y t h e i r cohesion a n d systema-tion, t h e i r order a n d c l a r i t y of lecture as w e l l as t h e i r h i g h level of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d t h e i r h i g h l y developed c r i t i c a l sense, proof of the intelligence of the author. I n the h i s t o r y of philosophy they m a r k the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m the t h e n r e i g n i n g s e n s u a l i s m and eclecticism to neo-t h o m i s m .
I n the Introduction to h i s work, the author recommends ten more recent authors, n a m i n g the w o r k s of some of them; among t h e m are: B a l d i n o t t i , Storchenau, Genovesi, Imre, Degerando (Histoire compares des systemes de philosophic) a n d P a s q u a l e Galluppi^^. W h i l e at the b e g i n n i n g of Ethics, he claims that f r o m the more recent ones, the f o l l o w i n g were p r a i s e w o r t h y i n t h e i r ontake of m o r a l philosophy: F i n e t t i G e r d i l , S p e d a l i e r i , Z a l l i n g e r , M u r a t o r i , S t e l l i n i , Piccadori, G a l l u p p i , R o s m i n i , P a c e t t i a n d others^^. H e t h u s points at the sources, besides the classics of C h r i s t i a n thought, f r o m w h i c h he drew, a n d to w h i c h he yielded.
I n h i s w o r k he often cites various authors a n d philosophers, often i n c l u d i n g quotations, also contemporary, u s u a l l y i n the o r i g i n a l language (in some editions he puts a L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n of cited texts at the end of the treaty, e.g. i n the L o u v a i n edition f r o m 1843). H e u s u a l l y does this to support h i s v i e w s , but sometimes also critically. T h i s shows us D m o w s k i ' s great e r u d i t i o n .
T a k i n g into account the whole of D m o w s k i ' s w o r k a n d the views contained i n i t , i t m u s t be stated here t h a t he most often relies on T h o m a s Aquinas^^ as a n a u t h o r i t y i n several places. H e often shares h i s v i e w w i t h o u t a n obvious expression of this. B y this he displays a thorough knowledge of h i s w o r k .
uscite in luce nel 1840, e vane volte ristampate, diede un esempio notabile, per il metodo, e per la dottrina stessa, in premendis vestigiis S. Thomae. Sistemi filosofici moderni, dal sensismo all'idealismo, dal tradizionalismo all'ontologismo, vengono da lui sottoposti ad una critica acuta e profonda: che prelude ai passi piü decisivi che, certo, la filosofia cattolica avrebbe fatti con Felice Sopranis e con Giuseppe Pecci, se il magistero di questi non fosse stato interrotto quasi agli inizi dagli awenimenti del '48" {Universita del Collegio Romano, p. 13; The author of this part of book is signed as: P. P.).
„Qui uberiorem enarrationem philosophiae habere cupit, consulat Prolegomena philosophiae Log. p. 1. 01. Baldinotti; Storchenavii [Storchenau] et Genuensis [Genovesi]
Tom. 1; Imre Tom. 1 et 2; Degerandum [Degerando] Histoire des systemes compares de la philosophic [!] [...]. Institutiones philosophiae, Rome 1840, p. 4.
„Ex nostris recentioribus in exornanda morali philosophia laudabile studium et operam navarunt [...]. Institutiones philosophiae, Roma 1840, vol. II, p. 9.
Dmowski more than 50 times clearly cites Thomas Aquinas, usually quoting his texts, among others v. I, pp. 116-119, 154; v. II, p. 115, 169, 171, 201, 225, 249, 264, 291; v. Ill, p. 18, 19, 36, 43, 53-56, 62, 68, 73, 88, 113, 114, 116, 122, 125, 132, 139, 140, 145,
H e takes u p a large p a r t of the w o r k w i t h a c r i t i c a l discussion w i t h v a r i o u s philosophers a n d authors, especially i n the p a r a g r a p h s dedicated to accusations (difficulties, difficultates, „ s a t i s f i t d i f f i c u l t a t i -bus") against the author's theses as w e l l as generally extensive a n d f a i r l y e x h a u s t i n g answers to t h e m . B o t h are often g i v e n in forma, or i n the f o r m of syllogisms.
F r o m the point of v i e w of p h i l o s o p h i c a l doctrines, the p h i l o s o p h y contained i n the w o r k is i n its essential d e f i n i t i o n a n A r i s t o t l e ' s a n d Thomas's philosophy w i t h a slight l e a n towards A u g u s t i n e a n d S u a r e z . H e also takes into account several newer trends, especially i n ethics. K a z i m i e r z W a i s i n h i s w o r k Scholastyka i neoscholastyka [Scholasti-c i s m a n d Neo-s[Scholasti-cholasti[Scholasti-cism] notes t h a t D m o w s k i „did not re[Scholasti-cognize [...] m a n y f u n d a m e n t a l scholastic studies, f o r example: h y l e m o r p h i s m a n d the f o r m a t i o n of general concepts t h r o u g h abstraction" (pp. 29-30). B u t closer to the t r u t h w o u l d be not to say t h a t D m o w s k i didn't recognise t h e m b u t to say t h a t he didn't w r i t e about t h e m . It is necessary however to a d m i t , t h a t the philosophy u n d e r t a k e n by D m o w s k i is not „ p u r e scholasticism" but t h i s statement s h o u l d not be treated as a n accusation.
P . P i r r i looks at t h i s problem f r o m a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t point of v i e w , he considers D m o w s k i to be f a r f r o m pure t h o m i s m , b u t t h a t he has made a gigantic step towards i t , w i t h regards to method a n d v i e w s , aoid he prepared the w a y f o r more progress i n the direction of thomism^^. T h e anonimous author of the article i n „ L a C i v i l t a C a t t o l i c a " evaluates the m e r i t of D m o w s k i i n t h i s f i e l d : „It is r i g h t to a d m i t t h a t D m o w s k i a n d [Matteo] L i b e r a t o r e [SJ] i n a n age of contemptuous a n d not u n c o m p r o m i s i n g aversion to everything, where a middle-age adherence to doctrine was felt, they m a n a g e d to p u r i f y the f i e l d of religious thought, t h e n d i r e c t i n g y o u n g m i n d s as f a r as the edge of scholasticism: the times d i d not t h e n allow f o r a n y more"^^.
D m o w s k i h i m s e l f at the b e g i n n i n g of h i s w o r k , c a r e f u l l y ack-nowledges T h o m a s . H e expressed i t as follows:
,As I f o u n d these k i n d s of general concepts - solidly, c l e a r l y l a i d out a n d j u s t i f i e d - almost exclusively expressed b y those Doctors w h o were not f a r f r o m the steps of St. T h o m a s , I w a s also not i d l e to
„Col P. Dmowski siamo ancora lungi dal puro tomismo, questo nondimeno, quanto a metodo, ed anche quanto alla sostanza delle dottrine, faceva con lui un passo gigantesco, e preparava la via ai progressi ulteriori". II P. Taparelliart. cit., p. 407.
^® „E' ben giusto riconoscere che il Dmowski e il Liberatore, in un periodo di sdegnosa e intransigente awersione a tutto ciö che sapeva di medioevalismo dottrinale, seppero sgombrare il campo del pensiero religioso, fin d'alora indirizzando le giovani menti fino alle soglie della scolastica: i tempi alora non censentendo di piü". II P. G. Roothaan e gli studi sacri nella prima meta del secolo XIX, „La Civilta CattoHca", 80 (1929), III, p. 129.
sometimes follow i n the same steps, f i r s t l y because i n our times there i s no l a c k of great, l e a r n e d m e n who show h i m p r o f u s e l y the necessary respect also i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l disciplines."^^
H e c l e a r l y follows T h o m a s A q u i n a s i n Metaphysics:
,As i t i s necessary to also h i g h l y v a l u e t h e teachings o f S a i n t T h o m a s i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems, especially where reasoning i s based on general principles, i t i s w o r t h g i v i n g a bit of i n f o r m a t i o n according to t h e thought of s u c h a d i s t i n g u i s h e d Doctor o n the subject of the n a t u r e of possibilities. Since he does not only assumes our opinion as certain, but also teaches positively about i t i n m a n y places i n Summa Theologica'' [...]^^.
To conclude, i t is necessary to agree w i t h the v i e w of J e r z y G u l k o w -s k i , who f i n i -s h e -s h i -s article about D m o w -s k i i n the f o l l o w i n g way: „[...] the mentioned textbook [by D m o w s k i ] , to a no lesser degree t h a n the s i m i l a r textbook b y L i b e r a t o r e , contributed towards the p r e p a r a t i o n of a breeding g r o u n d f o r t h e scholastic restoration i n a peripatetic-thomistic s p i r i t . D m o w s k i c e r t a i n l y overcame the u n w i l l i n g n e s s shown towards scholastic methods of teaching a n d issues. G o i n g even f u r t h e r t h a n t h i s , h e showed t h a t i t i s possible to m a k e use of the ancient scholastic method i n presenting the s t i l l relevant problems of C a t h o l i c philosophy a n d t h e i r confrontations w i t h contemporary positions i n a creative w a y t h a t r e m a i n s i n agreement w i t h contemporary methodi-c a l a n d epistemologimethodi-cal demands"^\
B i b l i o g r a p h y
Estreicher, Bibliografia polska, De Backer-Sommervogel, Bibliotheque de la Compagnie de Jesus, I, t. Ill, Bruxelles-Paris 1892, col. 103-104; Bibliografia filozofii polskiej, 1831-1864, Warszawa 1960, p. 65; L . Polgär, Bibliographie sur Vhistoire de la Compagnie de Jesus, 1901-1980, Roma 1990, III/l p. 598 - Wielka Encyklopedia Ilustrowana, t. 15, Warszawa 1895, p. 632; Encyklopedia
„Quia autem hujusmodi notiones [universales] solide et dilucide expositas ac vindicatas fere penes eos dumtaxat Doctores reperi, qui a premendis vestigiis S. Thomae nimis alieni non fuerunt, me quoque non piguit eadem vestigia interdum premere; eo vel maxime quod hac ipsa nostra aetate non desint eruditissimi viri qui eidem S. Doctori debitum laudis honorem etiam circa philosophicas disciplinas abunde persolvunt". Institutiones philosophicae, vol. 1, Rome 1840, Praefiitio, s. VI.
„Quia porro doctrina S. Thomae etiam in philosophicis quaestionibus, praesertim ubi ex communibus principiis ratiocinatur, magni momenti est habenda, juvat haec pauca circa possibilitatis naturam, ad mentem tanti Doctoris innuere; ipse enim sententiam nostram non solum tamquam certam supponit, sed etiam positive docet pluribus in locis Summae theologicae [...]. T. I, p. 116.
Powszechna S. Orgelhranda, t. 4, Warszawa 1899, p. 397; Podrqczna Encyklope-dia Koscielna, t. 9-10, Warszawa 1906, p. 42; Polski Siownik Biograficzny, t. V, Kraköw 1939-1946, p. 213 (S. Bednarski); Enciclopedia Filosofica, t. 2, Firenze 1968, kol. 592; Encyklopedia Katolicka, t. 3, Lublin 1979, col. 1361; T. Bzowski, K. Drzymala, Wspomnienie Naszych Zmariych, 1820-1980, Kraköw 1982,1.1, p. 93; L. Grzebien, Siownik jezuitöw polskich, Kraköw 1993, t. III, p. 42 (ms. in main polish libraries); Encyklopedia wiedzy o jezuitach [...], Kraköw 1996, Diccionario de Historia de la Compama de Jesus, directores: Charles E. O'Neill, Joaquin Dommguez, Roma-Madrid 2001, t. I, t. II, p. 1131; Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii, Lublin, t. II: 2001, p. 609 (R. Darowski). - M. Morawski, Filozofia i jej zadanie, wyd. 1-4, Lwöw 1876 [!] and 1877, p. 238-239; 1881; 1898, p. 311; „Przeglqd Lwowski", 17 (1879) p. 252; F. Winterton, The Lesson of Neo-Scholasticism, „Mind", 13,1888, p. 383-404; K. Wais, Scholastyka i neoscholasty-ka, Lwöw 1921 (first published in: „Przeglqd Teologiczny"), p. 29-30; Universita del Collegio Romano nel primo secolo dalla restituzione, Roma 1925, p. 13, 132, 139, 141, 156 (biogr., phot.); P. Pirri, / / P. Taparelli d'Azeglio e il rinnovamento della scolastica al Collegio Romano, „Civiltä Cattolica", 78 (1927), I, p. 121 (note), 407; G. Van Riet, Epistemologie thomiste, Louvain 1946, p. 36, 57; F. Lackner, Die dogmatische Theologie an der Universität Innsbruck 1857-1957, „Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie", 80 (1958), p. 105, 106, 107; J. Petrirena, La certeza libre en la filosofia escoldstica del siglo XIX, Bilbao 1965, p. 8-12; J. Gulkowski, Jözef Alojzy Dmowski, zapomniany prekursor, „Novum", 19 (1978) z. 6, p. 146-149; Idem, Jözef Alojzy Dmowski - zapomniany prekursor neoscho-lastyki, „Studia Philosophiae Christianae", 15 (1979), nr 1, p. 238-246; Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Hrsg. von E . Coreth SJ u. a., B. 2, Graz 1988, p. 113, 300; A. B. Stopien, Wst^p do filozofii, 3d ed., Lublin 1995, p. 250. - Archivum S.J., Kraköw, t. 76: Vitae, f. 72-72 (excerpta ex Archivo Romano Societatis lesu, Rome - ARSI).
R o m a n D A R O W S K I
J Ö Z E F A L O J Z Y D M O W S K I S J (1799-1879) P R E K U R S O R O D N O W Y T O M I Z M U
P o w y z s z y tekst powstal w zwis^zku z przygotowywang^ przez m n i e p r a c ^ p t . : Filozofia jezuitöw w Polsce w XIX wieku. Z a n i m ksig^zka u k a z e s i ^ w d r u k u , sluz^ z a i n t e r e s o w a n y m polskg^ wersjg^ e l e k t r o n i c z n ^ powyz-szego a r t y k u l u , k t ö r a jest nieco obszerniejsza od w e r s j i a n g i e l s k i e j .
