On Cognitive Validity of Religious Experience

Cracovia - Krakow, 9: 2004, 7-24

J a n u s z S A L A M O N

ON COGNITIVE VALIDITY

OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

F r o m religious experience to m e a n i n g f u l beliefs about G o d Does the alleged religious experience of a mystic constitute a reliable source of knowledge about the object of h i s or h e r experience? O r does i t r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f y a move f r o m such experience to m e a n i n g f u l beliefs about G o d or the A b s o l u t e w h i c h is supposed to be the object of that experience? A n d are religious beliefs i n need of b e i n g grounded i n religious experience i n order to be r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d ? A l t h o u g h i t seems pretty obvious t h a t a great m a n y adherents of a l l religions f i n d reasons for t h e i r beliefs i n t h e i r religious traditions r a t h e r t h a n i n their personal religious experiences, one could note t h a t (1) u s u a l l y these traditions present religious experiences of t h e i r founder figures as c o n s t i t u t i n g evidence for t h e i r a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s (consider the importance of A b r a h a m ' s a n d Moses' encounters w i t h G o d for J u d a i s m , the experience of the Apostles on the D a y of Pentecost for C h r i s t i a n i t y , or the experience of M a h o m e t receiving the K o r a n for Islam); (2) the supposed m y s t i c a l experiences of some adherents of a given religious t r a d i t i o n are often treated by t h e i r co-believers as a n i m p o r t a n t evidence w h i c h increases credibility of t h e i r own religious convictions (it seems t h a t p r i m a r i l y for this reason some of the great C h r i s t i a n mystics have been granted the title of 'Doctor of the C h u r c h ' , C h a s i d i c J e w s venerate the m e m o r y of t h e i r s a i n t l y leaders m a k i n g pilgrimages to t h e i r graves, a n d some sufi mystics of medieval I s l a m are s t i l l h e l d i n h i g h esteem n e a r l y a t h o u s a n d years after t h e i r death). I f one considers i n a d d i t i o n the fact t h a t (3) i n our own days m a n y i n d i v i d u a l s report t h a t they have h a d some sort of religious experience a n d they take these experiences to be among m a i n reasons for t h e i r b e i n g religious, or at least among reasons for t h e i r deep religious involvement, t h e n i t has to be concluded t h a t arguments against the

cognitive v a l i d i t y a n d a u t h e n t i c i t y of religious experience as a means of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r religious beliefs, i f not r e f u t e d , w o u l d constitute

a serious challenge to the r a t i o n a l i t y of religious stance i n general. I n the f o l l o w i n g paper I w i l l attempt to show t h a t there are good reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t some religious experience may be a mode of cognitive experience a n d as s u c h i t m a y j u s t i f y a m!ove f r o m religious experience to m e a n i n g f u l beliefs about G o d . I w i l l not c l a i m however t h a t a religious belief has to be grounded i n religious experience i n order to be considered r a t i o n a l but only t h a t religious reports of religious experiences contribute i n specific cases to r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of religious beliefs r e l a t e d to t h e m . M o r e o v e r I a m not going to address the question w h e t h e r construction of the successful theistic a r g u m e n t (for the existence of God) f r o m religious experience is possible.

A r g u i n g f o r cognitive v a l i d i t y of religious experience I w i l l h i g h l i g h t the advantages of the approach shared too a large extent b y W . P . A l s t o n a n d W . J . W a i n w r i g h t who h o l d t h a t some religious experiences are

sufficiently similar to ordinary sense experience to create p r e s u m p t i o n

i n f a v o u r of t h e i r cognitive v a l i d i t y . T a k i n g into account classic explorations i n the field made b y C . F r a n k s Davis^, I w i l l consider attempts to defeat t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n , a n d I w i l l conclude t h a t t h e y do not seem to be successful, as they do not provide a n y e x p l a n a t i o n of all religious experiences t h a t w o u l d be both c o n v i n c i n g a n d more probable t h a n the religious e x p l a n a t i o n w h i c h assumes t h a t at least some of the experiences i n question are examples of a n authentic encounter w i t h G o d or the D i v i n e R e a l i t y independent of the subject's m i n d . R e d u c t i o n i s t hypotheses t h a t have been p u t f o r w a r d so f a r do not seem to be s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to convince us t h a t the basic h u m a n i n t u i t i o n (the P r i n c i p l e of C r e d u l i t y , as R . S w i n b u r n e calls it^), t h a t the w a y t h i n g s seem is a l w a y s evidence of the w a y they are, f a i l s i n the case of religious experience.

A l t h o u g h there is no place here f o r detailed discussion of the complex p r o b l e m as to w h a t counts as a 'religious experience' (as there are accounts of such a v a r i e t y of religious experiences i n v a r i o u s traditions), we have to note at least one i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n . I n the first p a r a -g r a p h , -g i v i n -g p o p u l a r reasons f o r the importance of reli-gious experience i n the context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n of religious beliefs I pointed out, somewhat provocatively, to v e r y d i f f e r e n t examples of experiences w h i c h d i f f e r e n t people could consider as f a l l i n g into category of 'religious experiences'. A c c e p t i n g the arguments of numerous authors I w o u l d l i k e to a f f i r m

' Cf. C. Franks Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, Oxford 1989. ^ Cf. R. Swinburne, The Existence of God, Oxford 1979, 254.

v a l i d i t y a n d c r u c i a l importance of the d i s t i n c t i o n between a religious experience a n d a m i r a c l e . T h e difference here is not entirely easy to define but the simplest w a y of f o r m u l a t i n g could go along the f o l l o w i n g lines. T h e t e r m 'miracle' refers to a n event or experience of such nature t h a t even i f i n fact w i t n e s s e d or experienced by a single i n d i v i d u a l , i t w o u l d be observed or shared b y every i n d i v i d u a l who w o u l d f i n d h i m s e l f i n s i m i l a r circumstances. I n contrast to t h i s , a religious experience is of i n d i v i d u a l nature, i.e. m a y be experienced by a single person although other i n d i v i d u a l s close to h i m i n space a n d t i m e do not experience a n y t h i n g l i k e that. So r o u g h l y s p e a k i n g 'miracle' has a 'public' nature w h i l e religious experience is essentially 'private'. T h u s on this account Moses' 'experience' of G o d i n the B u r n i n g B u s h , as w e l l as the 'experience' of the Apostles i n the U p p e r Room on the D a y of Pentecost, are to be seen as examples of miracles i n the above sense.

B e a r i n g t h i s i n m i n d I propose, for the purposes of this brief study, to use the t e r m 'religious experience' i n r a t h e r strong a n d restricted sense, w h i c h w o u l d be p r e s u m e d i n a w o r k a b l e idea of a mystical experience t h a t most of the adherents of the w o r l d religions w o u l d have. I w i l l be concerned only w i t h those experiences t h a t are t a k e n by their subjects to be of some objective r e a l i t y that transcends t h e i r conscio-usness a n d exists independently of b e i n g experienced. I w i l l assume t h a t experiences described by St Teresa of A v i l a i n the following passages of h e r Autobiography could count as p a r a d i g m a t i c cases of religious experience. It is w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t they are somewhat different, the l a t t e r b e i n g less concrete a n d not f a l l i n g under n a t u r a l senses. T h u s we have to do w i t h two r a t h e r t h a n one paradigmatic case of religious experience, a n d t h o u g h they are different, the argument w i l l go t h a t they are both s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r to sense experience to create p r e s u m p t i o n i n f a v o u r of its cognitive v a l i d i t y . I n chapter 28 St Teresa w r i t e s : „ O n c e w h e n I was at M a s s on the St P a u l ' s D a y , there stood before me the most sacred H u m a n i t y , i n a l l the beauty a n d majesty of H i s r e s u r r e c t i o n body, as i t appears i n paintings"^. I n chapter 27 we read: „ O n e day w h e n I was at p r a y e r (...) I saw C h r i s t at m y side - or, to p u t i t better, I was conscious of H i m , for I saw n o t h i n g w i t h the eyes of the body or the eyes of the soul. H e seemed quite close to me, a n d I saw t h a t i t was He"^.

^ St Teresa, The Life of Saint Teresa of Avila by Herself translated by J.M. Cohen, Penguin 1957, 196.

Constructivist challenge to the cognitive v a l i d i t y of religious experience

One of the earhest a n d most i n f l u e n t i a l authors on the subject w h o m a i n t a i n e d t h a t religious experience is able to serve as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r belief i n the objective r e a l i t y of G o d or D e i t y was W i l l i a m s J a m e s . A f t e r considering a wide range of accounts of p r e s u m e d religious experiences he concluded i n The Varieties of Religious Experience^ t h a t some of t h e m cannot find s u f f i c i e n t e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms of one's socio-religious context a n d can be r i g h t l y t a k e n as experiences of the D i v i n e (under-stood i n r a t h e r broad sense of a godlike object) w h i c h has a n existence distinct f r o m the r e a l i t y of h u m a n l i f e . J a m e s c l a i m s t h a t r e l i g i o u s experience begins w i t h a divine i n i t i a t i v e w h i c h calls f o r a h u m s m response. I n terms of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the nature of these religious experiences the roles of b o t h the religious context a n d the e n s u i n g r a t i o n a l religious concepts are secondary i n t h a t they only assume a role at a l l because of a p r i o r i m m e d i a t e contact between the i n d i v i d u a l a n d the D i v i n e . H i g h l y relevant to our topic is James's conclusion t h a t i n d i v i d u a l religious experiences, r a t h e r t h a n the tenets of o r g a n i z e d religions, f o r m the backbone of religious l i f e a n d therefore i n search of grounds of religious beliefs, one s h o u l d t u r n to the sphere of religious experience.

J a m e s ' v i e w of the n a t u r e a n d epistemic status of religious experien-ce has been shared to a large extent by R . Otto, a n d l a t e r embraexperien-ced a n d developed by such w r i t e r s as E . U n d e r b i l l or W . T . Stace. T a k e n as a group these authors are often l a b e l l e d as E s s e n t i a l i s t s . L e a v i n g m i n o r differences aside, a l l E s s e n t i a l i s t s h o l d t h a t (a) religious experiences across t i m e , t r a d i t i o n s a n d cultures have some core characteristics a n d so are essentially the same; (b) religious experiences a l l have the same objective reference, t h a t i s , they involve i m m e d i a t e a n d direct contact w i t h a n A b s o l u t e P r i n c i p l e w h i c h m a y be k n o w n by d i f f e r e n t subjects of religious experience u n d e r v a r i o u s names.

A s s e r t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t experiences labelled as religious have a common objective reference w h i c h is m e t a p h y s i c a l i n n a t u r e h a s been challenged by a n u m b e r of authors k n o w as constructivists. C o n s t r u c t i v i s t s , l i k e S.T. K a t z a n d W . Proudfoot, point out t h a t there are no pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences^. T h e i n f l u e n c e of our social context u p o n the n a t u r e of our experiences is so p r o f o u n d t h a t

expe-^ W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, Routledge 2002.

^ Cf. S.T. Katz,„Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism", in S.T. Katz (ed.). Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, London and New York 1978, 26.

rience can never be u n m e d i a t e d but is always shaped by p r i o r linguistic, conceptual, discursive a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l presumptions such that the l i v e d experience conforms to a pre-existent pattern that has been learned, t h e n intended, a n d t h e n actualized i n the experiential reality.

U s i n g K a n t i a n i d e a l i s m (or r a t h e r its p a r t i c u l a r interpretation) as a theoretical f r a m e w o r k constructivists argue t h a t our ideas, our concepts a n d our language, do not j u s t correspond to r e a l i t y but i n some sense impose u p o n the w o r l d the structures we experience. W e constitute our o w n experience i n the sense t h a t we provide the rules a n d structures according to w h i c h we experience objects. The subject's conceptual context sets structures a n d boundaries for w h a t m a y or m a y not be experienced. Consequently, i f we are to u n d e r s t a n d the nature of religious experience, i t is necessary that we study not only the reports provided by the subject a f t e r the experience (i.e. its interpreta-tion), but also the subject's conceptual context p r i o r to the experience. N o w , C o n s t r u c t i v i s t s w i l l argue against E s s e n t i a l i s t s that, as the conceptual context of the alleged religious experience m a y r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r f r o m case to case, i t cannot be s a i d that a l l such experiences are necessarily the same. A s K a t z points out r a t h e r convincingly: „ T h e r e is no i n t e l l i g i b l e w a y t h a t anyone can l e g i t i m a t e l y argue that a no self experience of empty c a l m ( N i r v a n a ) is the same experience of intense, l o v i n g , i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p between two s u b s t a n t i a l selves, one of w h o m is conceived of as the personal G o d of western religion a n d a l l t h a t this entails"^. K a t z considers the p o s s i b i l i t y of speaking of one u l t i m a t e objective R e a l i t y or the R e a l a n d arrives at the conclusion t h a t the claims to have discovered such R e a l i t y are often quite incompatible: J e w i s h a n d C h r i s t i a n m y s t i c i s m f o u n d the u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y i n G o d , B u d d h i s m i n N i r v a n a , N e o p l a t o n i s m f o u n d i t i n Ideas, w h i l e the R e a l i t y of a H i n d u a n d a M u s l i m mystic m a y have either theistic or pantheistic nature, depending on the p r i o r beliefs of the mystic about the n a t u r e of the u l t i m a t e R e a l i t y . T h u s the experiences of the R e a l i t y i n each of the mentioned cases cannot be described as s i m i l a r w h i c h suggests to K a t z t h a t the R e a l i t s e l f is l i n g u i s t i c a l l y a n d c u l t u r a l l y dependent^.

F r o m here there is only one step to the c l a i m that religious expe-rience is not only i n f l u e n c e d by the subject's religious context, but m a y indeed be created by this context. W . Proudfoot holds that religious experience can be fully explained t h r o u g h a m a p p i n g of the concepts a n d beliefs w h i c h were available to the subjects p r i o r to the experience itself, the commitments they brought to the experience, a n d the contextual conditions t h a t m i g h t have l e d t h e m to i d e n t i f y their

^ Cf. S.T. Katz, Op. CiL, 39. ^ Cf. S.T. Katz, Op. cit, 50.

experiences as religious. A s a result, Proudfoot concludes t h a t religious experiences do not require any transcendent r e f e r e n t i a l point b u t c a n be f u l l y e x p l a i n e d i n a n a t u r a l i s t i c way^.

H o w e v e r , i t seems t h a t l i n g u i s t i c constructivist model is i l l - s u i t e d to account for much of the d a t a of religious experience f o r a n u m b e r of reasons. F i r s t l y , i t cannot be s a i d t h a t religious experience is a l w a y s conservative i n character (in t h a t the experience w h i c h has been shaped by context c o n f i r m s the expectations w h i c h have been g i v e n by the t r a d i t i o n ) . V e r y often the opposite is true. F o r example, T e r e s a of A v i l a r e f l e c t i n g on h e r experience stresses the irrelevance of h e r expectations w h e n she w r i t e s : „My soul (...) h a d never been moved to desire t h i s , n o r h a d i t come to m y knowledge t h a t s u c h a n experience was possible"^^. M o r e o v e r , the fact t h a t f r e q u e n t l y religious experiences i n s p i r e d religious reformers to t r a n s f o r m t h e i r o w n t r a d i t i o n s w o u l d be i m p o s s i -ble to account for, i f t h e i r experiences were to be d e t e r m i n e d b y w h a t they received f r o m t h e i r t r a d i t i o n . Secondly, some religious experiences appear as contentless a n d therefore there is l a c k i n g w i t h i n the experience i t s e l f a n y contextual concept w h i c h could constitute a l i n k between the experience a n d the subject's t r a d i t i o n (mysticism of M e i s t e r E c k h a r t could serve here as a good example).

M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , the m a i n constructivist a s s u m p t i o n , t h a t there are no p u r e (i.e. unmediated) experiences, c a n be challenged. F o r example, W . P . A l s t o n i n h i s Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious

Experience allows for some u n m e d i a t e d experiences a n d speaks of s u c h

experiences f r o m the side of the subject a n d f r o m the side of the object. F r o m the side of the subject, u n m e d i a t e d experiences consist i n 'direct awareness' of the object. F r o m the side of the object, i n u n m e d i a t e d experience the object is 'presented' or 'given' to the subject. I n A l s t o n ' s opinion, such experiences are independent of a n y conceptualisation, belief, j u d g e m e n t or a n y other a p p l i c a t i o n of general concepts to the object. I n most experiences, he a d m i t s , the subject's direct awareness of the object is i n t i m a t e l y entangled w i t h concepts a n d interpretations but i n c e r t a i n cases the subject's direct awareness of the object c a n exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y of concepts. T u r n i n g against one of the m a i n constructivist critics of religious experience A l s t o n notices: „ P r o u d f o o t confuses between w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n i d e n t i f y i n g a n experience as of a c e r t a i n sort a n d w h a t the experience is or consists of. P r o u d f o o t repeatedly argues t h a t since concepts are i n v o l v e d i n i d e n t i f y i n g a n experience as religious, as m y s t i c a l , the experience i t s e l f is not independent of concepts (...). B u t f r o m the fact t h a t we use a concept to

Cf. W. Proudfoot, Religious Experience, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1985, 348. ' St Teresa, Op. cit, 190.

i d e n t i f y a n experience of something as of a certain type, i t does not follow t h a t w h a t we are i d e n t i f y i n g involves concepts a n d judge-ments"^\

W . T . Stace, a l e a d i n g contempary E s s e n t i a l i s t , makes r a t h e r s i m i l a r point d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the central m y s t i c a l experience, the central m y s t i c a l concept a n d the interpretations given.^^ F o r Stace, the central experience is t h a t of the One or the U n i t y , a n d this is directly appre-hended by the m y s t i c , p r i o r to a n y interpretation. T h e central concept is t h a t w h i c h is d r a w n u p by a proper, e m p i r i c a l analysis of m y s t i c a l experiences. T h e interpretations are var5dng accounts given by mystics themselves, accounts w h i c h are subsequent to the i m m e d i a t e l y apprehended experience of the One. These interpretations are l i k e l y to be i n f l u e n c e d by the teachings of the p a r t i c u l a r religious t r a d i t i o n to w h i c h the m y s t i c belongs. H o w e v e r , the fact t h a t there are v a r y i n g interpretations does not negate the fact that the genuine m y s t i c a l experience is the same i n each case, t h a t is, i t is the experience of the One. A s she puts it: „ T h e U n i t y , the One, is the central experience a n d the c e n t r a l concept of a l l m y s t i c i s m (...) The u n i t y is perceived, or directly apprehended. T h a t is to say, i t belongs to the experience a n d not to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n so f a r as i t is possible to m a k e this d i s t i n c t i o n . T h e u n i t y m a y be v a r i o u s l y interpreted, a n d the interpreta-t i o n w i l l as a r u l e l a r g e l y depend on interpreta-the c u l interpreta-t u r a l environmeninterpreta-t a n d interpreta-the p r i o r beliefs of the i n d i v i d u a l mystic"^^.

E . U n d e r h i l l ^ ^ m a k i n g a simple d i s t i n c t i o n between the experience a n d its context argues t h a t religious experience is essentially indepen-dent of a p a r t i c u l a r religious context. U n i o n between G o d a n d the i n d i v i d u a l t h a t according to U n d e r b i l l constitutes the essential of m y s t i c i s m is the same even across v a r y i n g cultures a n d religious t r a d i t i o n s . T h e c u l t u r a l influences of the context are secondary a n d can be separated f r o m the experience itself. T h e p a r t i c u l a r m e n t a l image w h i c h the m y s t i c f o r m s of h i s objective, the t r a d i t i o n a l theology he accepts, is not essential, a n d i t is possible to arrive at the experience of u n i o n w i t h G o d w h i c h is the core of every m y s t i c a l experience.

Reductionist challenge

T h e reductionist challenge is based on the firm belief that science can f u l l y e x p l a i n a w a y religious experience. B r o a d l y speaking there are

W.P. Alston, Perceiving God, Ithaca and London 1991, 40-41. Cf. W.T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, MacMillan 1960, 5nn. W.T. Stace, Op. cit., 66.

two m a i n alternative explanations of religious experience: pathological a n d non-pathological^^. P a t h o l o g i c a l explanations are those w h i c h seek to e x p l a i n religious experiences i n w a y s w h i c h are n o r m a l l y h e l d to be associated w i t h misperceptions or non-perceptions. T h i s b e i n g the case, religious experience cannot be h e l d to be reliable as a basis f o r beliefs f o r m e d as a result of such experiences. C . F r a n k s D a v i s outlines f o u r m a i n groups of e x p l a n a t i o n w h i c h most of us w o u l d consider to be pathological: (1) hypersuggestibility; (2) deprivation a n d m a l a d j u s t m e n t ; (3) m e n t a l illness; (4) a b n o r m a l psychological states. H 3 ^ e r s u g g e s t i b i l i t y i m p l i e s t h a t religious experiences are brought about t h r o u g h processes w h i c h are somewhat a k i n to hypnosis. A s to the f i r s t e x p l a n a t i o n , i t seems t h a t w h i l e h y p e r s u g g e s t i b i l i t y m a y be i n v o l v e d i n some cases of alleged religious experience, most of the reported religious experiences do not appear to have an3rthing to do w i t h such situations. A r g u m e n t against the cognitive v a l i d i t y of religious experience on the g r o u n d t h a t such experiences are examples of a m a l a d j u s t m e n t b e i n g m e r e l y a f o r m of compensation for people who are socially deprived (as suggested b y K a r l M a r x ' s mgixim ' R e l i g i o n is the o p i u m of the people') can be countered b y the results of sociological studies w h i c h show t h a t religious experiences do not s i m p l y p e r t a i n to lower socio-economic groups. A f u r t h e r argument says t h a t religious experiences can be s u f f i c i e n t l y e x p l a i n e d by reference to the unconscious m e c h a n i s m of the h u m a n psyche because the alleged religious experiences t e n d to occur a m o n g those who s u f f e r f r o m emotional f r u s t r a t i o n s a n d anxiety. It seems however t h a t i n those cases where the concept of G o d does operate i n some w a y as a super-ego (as S. F r e u d w o u l d suggest), i t cannot be proven t h a t this is m e r e l y a h u m a n projection, r a t h e r t h a n s o m e t h i n g w h i c h i n r e a l i t y relates to us along the l i n e s of the super-ego.

Some w o u l d question the cognitive v a l i d i t y of religious experiences on the grounds t h a t they are s i m i l a r to experiences w h i c h are k n o w n to be pathological l i k e h y s t e r i a , delusions, m a n i a or depression. A g a i n s t t h i s , i t needs to be noted t h a t m e n t a l i l l n e s s m a y produce psychotic revelations, but these are generally h e l d to be nonsense b y the subject a f t e r recovery f r o m the illness. T h e i n s i g h t s associated w i t h religious experiences, however, are v a l u e d a n d treasured l o n g a f t e r the experience itself. W h i l e m e n t a l illness is not considered to be i n i t s e l f l i f e -enhancing, religious experience is often s e r v i n g as a n i n t e g r a t i v e step i n the f u r t h e r i n g of h u m a n growth. It has sometimes been argued t h a t religious experiences are s i m i l a r to drug-induced experiences: b u t a g a i n , i t needs to be noted t h a t w h i l e i t is possible t h a t a b n o r m a l psychological states produced by the i n f l u e n c e of drugs m a y i n c e r t a i n circumstances

m a k e a subject more prone to certain types of religious experiences, the presence of drugs is absent f r o m the vast m a j o r i t y of religious expe-rience.

J . L . M a c k i e challenges the cognitive v a l i d i t y of religious experience by proposing non-pathological n a t u r a l i s t i c explanation^^. I n seeking to provide a n e x p l a n a t i o n for religious experience, Ockham's razor is applied to give preference to f a m i l i a r operations w i t h i n h u m a n experience over more hypothetical theistic positions. M a c k i e is con-v i n c e d t h a t religious beliefs a n d religious practices emerge t h r o u g h the n o r m a l processes w h i c h come w i t h l i v i n g i n society. T h i s entails being conditioned to attribute certain experiences to a d i v i n e cause. I n this perspective the i d e a of G o d merely helps to f i l l i n the gaps w h i c h at present scientific knowledge cannot account for. However, M a c k i e ' s n a t u r a l i s t i c approach seems somewhat misguided, as u s u a l l y religion does not seek to be a f o r m of science. Science seeks reasons for w h y things are as they are. R e l i g i o n seeks reasons for w h y things exist at a l l a n d is concerned w i t h u l t i m a t e questions concerning the purpose a n d destiny of h u m a n l i f e . S u c h questions l i e beyond the scope of science to answer. S c i e n t i f i c answers constitute p a r t of the worldview of a r e l i -gious person a n d these answers can have as its background a picture of the U n i v e r s e w i t h G o d i n its centre, but science r a r e l y provides answers to the questions t h a t r e l i g i o n u s u a l l y addresses.

I n yet another commonly employed n a t u r a l i s t i c argument against the cognitive v a l i d i t y of religious experience, the c l a i m is being made that religious experience can be scientifically explained because science has i d e n t i f i e d the type of electrical s t i m u l i upon the b r a i n w h i c h w i l l result i n experiences w h i c h are described as religious or m y s t i c a l . W h a t can be s a i d about the c l a i m t h a t m y s t i c a l experiences are caused by neuro-physiological factors? T h e question here is whether the n a t u r e of any experience c a n always be fully explained i n terms of chemical or electric s t i m u l i u p o n the b r a i n . T h e point w h i c h can be made here is that a n experience is not assessed s i m p l y i n terms of w h a t i t was t h a t i m m e -diately caused the experience. Let's take the example of v i s u a l perception. I m a y c l a i m t h a t I see a book. The actual experience of seeing is not i m m e d i a t e l y caused by the book. The immediate cause is to be f o u n d i n the electrical s t i m u l i w h i c h allow sight - i f these were not operative, the book could be i n f r o n t of me a l l day a n d I s t i l l w o u l d not see i t . T h e fact, however, t h a t the book is not the immediate cause of the experience does not m e a n t h a t the book is not seen by me. Nobody w o u l d d r a w t h a t conclusion, because even though the book is not the i m m e d i a t e cause of the experience, i t s t i l l figures f u r t h e r back

along the causal c h a i n l e a d i n g to the experience. I f there were no book there, I w o u l d c e r t a i n l y not see a book - unless I was h a l l u c i n a t i n g ! T h e condition r e q u i r e d to assert the cognitive v a l i d i t y of m y experience of seeing a book is not t h a t the book is the i m m e d i a t e cause of the experience, b u t t h a t the book figures somewhere i n the c a u s a l c h a i n w h i c h leads u p to the experience. I n a s i m i l a r w a y , i n m a y be a r g u e d t h a t i t is not necessary to c l a i m t h a t G o d is the i m m e d i a t e cause of a m y s t i c a l experience - the i m m e d i a t e cause m a y w e l l be c h e m i c a l or electrical s t i m u l i . A l l t h a t is r e q u i r e d is t h a t G o d figures a m o n g the c h a i n of causes.

'Conflicting t r u t h claims* challenge

T h e challenge posed b y the fact of religious d i v e r s i t y is sometimes k n o w n as the c o n f l i c t i n g c l a i m s challenge. O n e of the most p r o m i n e n t exponents of this challenge was A . Flew^^. T h e challenge rests on the contention t h a t since the subjects of religious experience cannot agree on a description of w h a t i t is t h a t they have experienced, t h e i r experiences m u s t be i l l u s o r y or constitute serious m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n - i n b o t h cases, t h e i r experiences w o u l d c e r t a i n l y be u n r e l i a b l e as a means of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r a t i o n a l l y h e l d beliefs. Indeed, one could point out t h a t the enormous v a r i e t y of religious experiences, i f t a k e n at face v a l u e , w o u l d i n fact substantiate i n n u m e r a b l e religious beliefs. Since m a n y of these beliefs are i n contradiction w i t h each other, how c a n i t be possible for religious experience to serve as a r e l i a b l e w a y of j u s t i f y i n g religious beliefs? C . F r a n k s D a v i s considers five representa-tive types of experiences t h a t can be described as 'religious': n u m i n o u s experiences of a h o l y power; m y s t i c a l experiences of u n i o n w i t h the

Other, m o n i s t i c experiences of i d e n t i t y w i t h the S u p r e m e Self; n a t u r a l

m y s t i c a l experiences of the f u n d a m e n t a l u n i t y b e h i n d a l l creation; the experience of the impermanence a n d transience of a l l reality)^®. A t face v a l u e i t w o u l d appear t h a t they cannot m a k e reference to the same k i n d of religious r e a l i t y w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i n g each other. T h i s seems to constitute a serious t h r e a t to a n y a r g u m e n t w h i c h attempts to proceed f r o m religious experience to m e a n i n g f u l beliefs about G o d . W h a t are the w a y s out here?

T h e most obvious s o l u t i o n is to follow i n the steps of W . J a m e s a n d to argue t h a t religious experiences across t i m e , religious t r a d i t i o n s a n d cultures have some core characteristics a n d so are essentially the same. A c c o r d i n g to this approach experiences never conflict, only doctrines a n d

Cf. A. Flew, God and Philosophy, London 1966, 124-139. Cf. C. Franks Davis, Op. cit, chapter 7.

interpretations do. It is crucial to note t h a t this does not necessarily presuppose the c l a i m that a l l religious or m y s t i c a l 'experiences' amount s i m p l y to one i d e n t i c a l experience w h i c h is later v a r i o u s l y interpreted. W h a t is here pointed out as common maybe m u c h more complex t h a n that. To see this one can follow C . F r a n k s D a v i s who asserts t h a t there are f o u r irreducible types of m y s t i c a l experience: (a) experiences of a n awesome w h o l l y Other; (b) experiences of a l o v i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a personal Other; (c) experiences of the u n i t y of the whole diverse creation; (d) experiences of the u n i t y of the S e l f A c c o r d i n g to her, m u c h of the alleged conflict among m y s t i c a l experiences is s u p e r f i c i a l , as a l l f o u r types of experience are to be f o u n d i n each m a j o r religious t r a d i t i o n a n d i t is possible to derive a common core. I n her opinion a l l n u m i n o u s a n d m y s t i c a l experiences have s i m i l a r i t y i n t h a t they are experiences of the eternal, indescribable, truly real. Since i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can often be incorporated into the experience (as constructivists argue a n d not doubt they are to some extent right), the type of experience one has (in terms of the f o u r i r r e d u c i b l e types mentioned above) m a y be dependent upon both one's personality a n d the p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l background. Therefore i t does not follow t h a t d i f f e r e n t types of experience exclude a common referent.

J . H i c k argues (against the background of a K a n t i a n epistemology) t h a t religious experience consists i n the presence of a transcendent R e a l i t y coming to consciousness i n terms of our h u m a n concepts. Because the d i f f e r e n t ways of being h u m a n have produced a v a r i e t y of conceptual systems, the transcendent R e a l i t y is experienced i n a v a r i e t y of ways w h i c h have become enshrined i n the d i f f e r e n t religious traditions^^. T h u s H i c k sees the language a n d concepts used about G o d i n d i f f e r e n t religious traditions not as t r u e about G o d as G o d r e a l l y i s , but as depictions of how G o d appears to be w i t h i n the conceptual a n d c u l t u r a l forms of each t r a d i t i o n . H i c k m a i n t a i n s t h a t we cannot suppose t h a t any of these depictions are true of 'God' as G o d r e a l l y i s . „ N o n e of the concrete descriptions t h a t apply w i t h i n the r e a l m of h u m a n experience can apply l i t e r a l l y to the unexperienceable g r o u n d of t h a t r e a l m . F o r whereas the phenomenal w o r l d is structured b y our own conceptual f r a m e w o r k s , its n o u m e n a l ground is not... B u t i t is neverthe-less the n o u m e n a l ground of these characteristics"^^.

H o w e v e r W . P . A l s t o n raises the point t h a t H i c k leaves the religious believer w i t h the unsolvable d i l e m m a : w h y should one prefer one religious t r a d i t i o n to another i f a l l are more or less equally t r u t h

-Cf. J. Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion, New

Haven 1993, 21. ^ J. Hick, The Interpretation of Religion, New Haven 1989, 246-7.

depicting (we leave aside the question w h y H i c k t h i n k s t h a t they are at a l l t r u t h depicting). Moreover, f o l l o w i n g W . H a s k e r , A l s t o n notices t h a t on t h i s ground the point can be made against C h r i s t i a n belief because „if there are several conceptual schemes for i n t e r p r e t i n g religious experience w h i c h are alternative to, a n d incompatible w i t h , C h r i s t i a -n i t y , a -n d i f there are -no decisive reaso-ns for t h i -n k i -n g those schemes to be incorrect, t h e n there is a good reason to t h i n k the C h r i s t i a n practice unreliable"^\ W h a t is the solution then? A l s t o n uses here the example of f o r m i n g beliefs on the basis of v i s u a l experience, beliefs w h i c h I believe i t is r a t i o n a l to h o l d . These beliefs are f o r m e d against the w i d e r ' A r i s t o t e l i a n ' belief t h a t i n v i s u a l experience, I perceive separate objects scattered about i n space. It m a y be t h a t i n another culture, w h a t is seen is seen i n quite a d i f f e r e n t w a y a n d hence on the basis of v i s u a l experience, d i f f e r e n t beliefs w o u l d be f o r m e d about the n a t u r e of the w o r l d . T h i s possibility, however, does not cause me to give u p on v i s u a l experience as a reliable w a y of f o r m i n g beliefs about the w o r l d . „ I n the absence of a n y e x t e r n a l reason f o r supposing t h a t one of the (possible) competing practices is more accurate t h a n m y own, the o n l y r a t i o n a l course f o r me is to sit t i g h t w i t h the practice of w h i c h I a m a m a s t e r a n d w h i c h serves me so w e l l i n g u i d i n g m y a c t i v i t y i n the world"^^. A l s t o n m a i n t a i n s t h a t the same p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d a p p l y i n respect to the r e l i a b i l i t y of a C h r i s t i a n f o r m i n g beliefs about G o d on the basis of C h r i s t i a n religious experience.

W . J . W a i n w r i g h t s h a r i n g A l s t o n ' s broadly exclusivist stance m a k e s the c r u c i a l point t h a t as 'religious experience' is a n u m b r e l l a t e r m covering m a n y d i f f e r e n t t3^es of experience, religious experience i n general m a y indeed support c o n f l i c t i n g c l a i m s , b u t the most t h a t follows is t h a t not a l l of these experiences can be cognitive. B u t i t does not follow t h a n none of t h e m are cognitive, or t h a t a l l delusive^^.

A n a l o g i c a l arguments f o r the cognitive v a l i d i t y of religious experience

G i v e n t h a t none of the arguments against the cognitive v a l i d i t y of religious experience considered so f a r seemed to be decisive we could conclude at t h i s point t h a t (some) religious experiences indeed m a y provide e v i d e n t i a l support for (some) religious beliefs. W e could do i t b y a f f i r m i n g the basic i n t u i t i o n t h a t i n the absence of s u f f i c i e n t l y strong positive reasons for challenge, w h a t a person seems to perceive is

W.P. Alston, Op. cit., 272. 2 ' W.P. Alston, Op. cit., 21 A.

probably so. H o w e v e r , t h a t m a y appear a m i n i m a l i s t conclusion as, a f t e r a l l , the present l a c k of decisive defeaters does not exclude the u n r e l i a b i -l i t y of re-ligious experience on some other ground w h i c h s t i -l -l m a y be pointed out sooner or later. W h a t is needed is the epistemological model w h i c h helps to u n d e r s t a n d i n w h a t w a y a n d to w h a t extent religious experiences m a y constitute a ground for religious beliefs. W . P . A l s t o n i n h i s Perceiving God supplies us w i t h such a model.

A l s t o n draws a p a r a l l e l between the question of the r e l i a b i l i t y of o r d i n a r y (direct) perceptual experiences a n d the r e l i a b i l i t y of religious experience. H i s central thesis is t h a t religious experience, or more precisely 'experiential awareness of G o d ' , w h i c h he refers to as the perception of G o d , makes contribution to the grounds of religious belief i n such a w a y t h a t a person can be j u s t i f i e d i n h o l d i n g certain k i n d s of beliefs about G o d b y v i r t u e of perceiving G o d as being or doing so-and-so. A l s t o n openly denies t h a t he is t i y i n g to provide a n argument f r o m religious experience for the existence of G o d . H e does not h o l d that the existence of G o d provides the best e x p l a n a t i o n for facts about reUgious experience or t h a t i t is possible to argue i n any w a y f r o m the latter to the former, but confines h i m s e l f to c l a i m t h a t people sometimes do perceive G o d £ind thereby acquire j u s t i f i e d beliefs about G o d . ( A l t h o u g h he seems to accept the point made by A . P l a n t i n g a a n d W . J . W a i n w r i g h t t h a t even i f ' G o d exists' is not the propositional content of t y p i c a l theistic perceptual beliefs, those propositional contents self-evidently e n t a i l it^^.) A l s t o n proposes a model of perception according to w h i c h perception consists of something presenting itself to me i n a certain w a y , a p a r t f r o m m y conceptualizing i t or m a k i n g judgments about i t , a n d applies i t to direct religious experiences, sho wi n g t h a t m a n y who have religious experiences u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r experiences along s i m i l a r lines. H e concludes t h a t there is no good reason for d e n y i n g p o s s i b i l i t y of someone's h a v i n g a direct, genuine perception of G o d . To the objection t h a t the properties by w h i c h G o d presents h i m s e l f to us are v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m those presented by sensory objects, A l s t o n replies t h a t we often report appearances by u s i n g comparative concepts, w h i c h is w h a t we use to report how G o d presents h i m s e l f to our experience. I n general he stresses t h a t the problems that arise w h e n one makes a n attempt to establish the t r u t h value of religious expe-rience are i n p r i n c i p l e no different f r o m those that arise f r o m o r d i n a r y perceptual experience.

S i m i l a r l i n e of argument was earlier presented, though less developed, b y W . J . Wainwright^^. H e argues t h a t as m y s t i c a l

experien-Cf. W. Wainwright, Op. cit, 1-3. Cf. W. Wainwright, Op. cit, chapter 3.

ce is s i m i l a r to sense experience i t creates a p r e s u m p t i o n i n f a v o u r of its cognitive validity. T h e a r g u m e n t goes l i k e this: (1) Religious experiences are analogous to sense experiences, (2) sense experiences are cognitive therefore (3) religious experiences are cognitive. L i k e A l s t o n , W a i n w r i g h t dismisses the alleged differences between religious experience a n d sense experience as i n s i g n i f i c a n t . M o r e o v e r he points out t h a t i t i s not t r u e (as some critics l i k e C . B . M a r t i n asserted) t h a t sense experiences are r a d i c a l l y u n l i k e m y s t i c a l experiences because they are 'private', not 'public' i n the sense t h a t w h e n the m y s t i c c l a i m s to experience G o d h i s or h e r c l a i m s are not corrigible, as there are no independent tests a n d check-up procedures w h i c h he a n d others w o u l d r e g a r d as relevant to a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of the claims he makes^^. H e presents a n u m b e r of c r i t e r i a of v a l i d i t y used i n t h i s respect i n religious c o m m u n i t i e s . A m o n g t h e m are f e w w h i c h deny p o p u l a r a s s u m p t i o n t h a t there c a n be no p a r a d i g m s of genuine religious experiences a n d therefore no c r i t e r i a of t h e i r v e r i f i c a t i o n .

P . D r a p e r considered this approach a n d came to conclusion t h a t 'theistic experiences' do not b y themselves m a k e God's existence more probable t h a n not^^. H e argues t h a t t h o u g h A l s t o n £ind W a i n w r i g h t w i l l not be ready to a d m i t i t there i s at least one m a j o r d i s s i m i l a r i t y between religious a n d perceptual experiences t h a t i s e p i s t e m i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d u n d e r m i n e s the whole a r g u m e n t w h i c h i s based o n the p r e s u m e d analogy. T h e difference, according to D r a p e r , i s as follows: w h i l e we m a n a g e d to establish n u m e r o u s l a w - l i k e r e g u l a r i t i e s g o v e r n i n g sense perception, no such r e g u l a r i t i e s have been discovered i n t h e a r e a of religious experience. D r a p e r does not agree w i t h A l s t o n a n d W a i n w r i g h t t h a t the f a i l u r e to discover such r e g u l a r i t i e s does n o t h i n g to d i m i n i s h the cognitive v a l u e of theistic experiences. A f t e r a l l , i t i s exactly o u r a b i l i t y to d i s c e r n l a w - l i k e r e g u l a r i t i e s governing sense experiences t h a t m a k e t h e m strong i n d i r e c t evidence f o r the presence of t h e i r apparent p h y s i c a l objects. It is i m p o r t a n t to note t h a t D r a p e r does not c l a i m t h a t religious experience cannot provide evidence f o r God's existence, b u t only t h a t i t cannot be done i n the analogous w a y p r e s u m e d b y A l s t o n a n d W a i n w r i g h t .

R . G a l e argues along s i m i l a r l i n e s p o i n t i n g out d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s between sense perception a n d religious experienced^. H e holds t h a t t h e case f o r religious experiences b e i n g cognitive i s too w e a k to convince h i m t h a t religious experience c a n serve as epistemological basis f o r the

Cf. Wainwright, Op. cit, 85.

Cf. P. Draper, God and perceptual evidence, in „Philosophy of Rehgion" 32 (1992), 149-165.

belief i n the existence of God. G a l e holds t h a t i t is impossible to have a v e r i d i c a l religious experience w h i c h could be described as nonsensory perception of G o d (as A l s t o n w o u l d like). H e does not c l a i m t h a t a n 'of-God-type experience' could not be caused by G o d a n d q u a l i f y as some k i n d of nonperceptual apprehension of God but he holds (against A l s t o n a n d W a i n w r i g h t ) t h a t even i f such experience w o u l d be possible i t w o u l d not be analogous enough to a n o r d i n a r y v e r i d i c a l sense experience a n d therefore i t w o u l d not constitute a n evidence or epistemic w a r r a n t for b e l i e v i n g i n the existence of its object. S i m p l y , there are no t r u t h -directed reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g i n the existence of the apparent object of religious experience (there m a y be pragmatic ones. G a l e r e m a r k s , t h o u g h l a t e r he w i l l d i s m i s s t h e m too). G a l e r i g h t l y notices t h a t Alston's a n d W a i n w r i g h t ' s argument (which he calls 'analogical argument for cognitivity') rests on the p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t sense experiences are a p a r a d i g m of cognitivity a n d therefore, showing t h a t religious expe-riences are s u f f i c i e n t l y analogous to sense expeexpe-riences, w i l l be a good w a y of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r cognitive credentials. T h e n he puts the question how close the analogy m u s t be to m a k e the argument w o r k a n d points out t h a t there is no decision procedure for d e t e r m i n i n g this. A f t e r e x a m i n i n g d i f f e r e n t versions of the 'analogical argument' he concludes t h a t the analogies are always too w e a k to enable us to i n f e r the cognitivity of religious experience f r o m the a d m i t t e d cognitivity of sense experience. T h e m a i n problem here is t h a t the claims based upon religious experiences do not allow for defeating conditions, i.e. they are f a l s i f i a b l e . „ B e c a u s e there are no tests f o r the v e r i d i c a l i t y of religious experience, there is no basis for d r a w i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between h i s a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v i n g G o d a n d i t j u s t seeming to h i m as i f he is perceiving God. B y not p r o v i d i n g for any chance of b e i n g wrong, the analogy f a i l s to m a k e religious experience r e l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r to sense experiences, for w h i c h the v e r i d i c a l - u n v e r i d i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n holds"^^. G a l e dismisses efforts of A l s t o n , W a i n w r i g h t , S w i n b u r n e a n d G . G u t t i n g to show t h a t there are s u c h tests. G a l e t h i n k s they are a l l bound to s u f f e r f r o m vicious c i r c u l a r i t y . B y considering a n u m b e r of sensory tests, t h a t is conditions of r e l i a b i l i t y of o r d i n a r y sense experiences G a l e h i g h l i g h t s d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s between sense experience a n d religious experience thus u n d e r m i n i n g the whole 'analogical argument'. However, i t seems that the success of h i s project depends on his assumption of a h i g h l y restrictive notion of sense perception (as h i s extensive l i s t of sensory tests makes clear) a n d h i s r e f u s a l to allow the religious experience to be treated as sui generis, yet w i t h o u t loosing its analogy to sensory experience f r o m h i s sight.

T h i s seems to me the most sensitive area of the whole debate. H e r e , i t seems. G a l e a n d A l s t o n , W a i n w r i g h t , S w i n b u r n e , P l a n t i n g a (and the present author) w i l l not f i n d s u f f i c i e n t common g r o u n d to r e a c h any agreement. F o r the latter religious experience is s u f f i c i e n t l y a n a l o g i c a l to o r d i n a r y sense experience to m a k e religious beliefs based on i t prima

facie j u s t i f i e d . A n d yet i t is too specific i n nature, too sui generis, to be

accepted by G a l e as analogical enough to pass h i s sensory tests. G o d u n l i k e a table or a n a n i m a l does not 'behave' i n such a w a y as to m a k e h u m a n experience of H i m s u f f i c i e n t l y analogous to sense experience to s a t i s f y conditions set b y G a l e .

B y w a y of conclusion i t needs to be s a i d t h a t Gale's a r g u m e n t s do show that, even i f religious experience c a n be considered as a g r o u n d f o r religious beliefs ( m a k i n g the believer j u s t i f i e d i n h o l d i n g t h e m on t h i s ground), i t is m u c h more d i f f i c u l t to argue f r o m religious experience to the existence of G o d . H o w e v e r , even i f t h a t w o u l d t u r n out to be impossible i t w o u l d s t i l l not s t r i p religious experience of a l l its e v i d e n t i a l v a l u e . T h e debate i n the analjrtic philosophy of r e l i g i o n as i t is conducted i n the last two decades concerns i t s e l f more e x p l i c i t l y w i t h the p r o b l e m of j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of religious beliefs (or t h e i r w a r r a n t ) r a t h e r t h e n w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of p r o v i n g God's existence (and even more so the existence of a specifically theistic God) b e g i n n i n g w i t h the m u l t i p l i -city of reports of v a r i o u s religious experiences. To be sure, the t r a d i t i o n of C h r i s t i a n philosophy does not k n o w too m a n y examples of conscious attempts to argue f r o m religious experience to the existence of G o d . H o w e v e r , the more modest c l a i m t h a t religious experience h a s some cognitive v a l i d i t y , because i t makes contribution to the grounds of religious belief i n such a w a y t h a t a person can be j u s t i f i e d i n h o l d i n g c e r t a i n k i n d s of beliefs about G o d b y v i r t u e of A l s t o n i a n 'perception of God', seems to be r a t h e r w e l l founded. T h e arguments of the fiercest critics of the cognitive v a l i d i t y of religious experience, l i k e G a l e , M a c k i e , Proudfoot, K a t z or F l e w are a p p a r e n t l y directed against the strongest c l a i m s of defenders of the cognitive v a l u e of religious experience, t h a t is against so called arguments f r o m religious experience (for the existence of God), but are i n s u f f i c i e n t to r e f u t e the w e a k e r c l a i m , t h a t religious beliefs m a y be considered rationally justified b y v i r t u e of t h e i r b e i n g grounded i n religious experience, i n analogy to perceptual beliefs b e i n g grounded i n o r d i n a r y sense perception.

W A R T O S C P O Z N A W C Z A D O S W I A D C Z E N I A R E L I G I J N E G O Streszczenie

W c e n t r u m toczg^cej siq a k t u a l n i e w s r o d o w i s k u f i l o z o f i i analitycznej debaty n a d e p i s t e m i c z n y m statusem doswiadczenia religijnego znajduje s i ^ s p ö r m i ^ d z y obroncami jego poznawczej wartosci, t a k i m i j a k W . P . A i s t o n i W . J . W a i n w r i g h t , oraz l i c z n y m i a u t o r a m i odmawiajg^cymi m u epistemicznej wiarygodnosci.

P u n k t e m odniesienia w d y s k u s j i jest stanowisko W i l l i a m a J a m e s a , k t ö r y opierajg^c s i ^ n a bogatych d a n y c h e m p i r y c z n y c h doszedl do wnios-k u , ze n i e wnios-k t ö r y c h f e n o m e n ö w u z n a w a n y c h z a doswiadczenie religijne nie s p o s ö b w y j a s n i c odwolujg^c s i ^ do spolecznych czy psychologicznych a s p e k t ö w r e l i g i i i dlatego nalezy je uznac z a doswiadczenie obiektywnej Rzeczywistosci B o s k i e j . J a m e s p o s t a w i l ponadto tez^, ze instytucjonalny kontekst okreslonej r e l i g i i czy w y z n a n i a , j a k i zracjonalizowany system teologicznych poj^c, k t ö r e u k s z t a l t o w a l y podmiot doswiadczenia, odgry-w a j ^ p r z y p r ö b i e z r o z u m i e n i a n a t u r y dosodgry-wiadczenia religijnego drugo-r z ^ d n ^ drugo-r o l ^ , gdyz s^^ ostatecznie jedynie n a drugo-r z ^ d z i a m i intedrugo-rpdrugo-retacji poprzedzajg^cego j£^ chronologicznie i logicznie p r z e z y c i a bezposredniego k o n t a k t u podmiotu z R z e c z y w i s t o s c i ^ Bosk£^.

T ^ w l a s n i e tez^ odrzucajg^ tzw. konstrukt3nvisci (np. T. S. K a t z i W . Proudfoot), k t ö r z y bazuja^c n a specyficznej interpretacji transcendental-nego i d e a l i z m u 1. K a n t a utrzymuja^, ze k a z d y przypadek doswiadczenia religijnego d a s i ^ w p e l n i w y j a s n i c w n a t u r a l i s t y c z n y s p o s ö b , odwolujg^c s i ^ do poj^ciowego k o n t e k s t u tegoz doswiadczenia i przecz^c j a k o b y doswiadczenie r e l i g i j n e m i a l o j a k i k o l w i e k metafizycznie transcendentny przedmiot. K o n s t r u k t y w i s c i stawiajg^, tez^, ze nie m a w ogöle czegos takiego j a k o 'czyste' doswiadczenie, k t ö r e nie byloby zaposredniczone w spolecznym, j ^ z y k o w y m i k o n c e p t u a l n y m kontekscie, w k t ö r j r m f u n k -cjonuje podmiot doswiadczenia, i w z w i ^ z k u z t y m doswiadczenie zawsze jest u k s z t a l t o w a n e przez uprzednie o c z e k i w a n i a podmiotu, jego obraz rzeczywistosci i t d . , i to do tego stopnia, ze doswiadczenie moze byc calkowicie w y t w o r e m tegoz k o n t e k s t u i nie posiadac zadnego obiektyw-nego p r z e d m i o t u .

G l ö w n e zalozenie k o n s t r u k t y w i s t ö w , ze nie moze istniec 'czyste' doswiadczenie w y d a j e s i ^ j e d n a k byc pozbawione podstaw. Fenomenolo-giczne a n a l i z y W . P . A l s t o n a w s k a z u j ^ n a to, ze bezposrednia swiado-mosc obecnosci jakiegos p r z e d m i o t u doswiadczenia religijnego jest m o z l i w a i nie m u s i byc ona w ogöle zaposredniczona w k o n c e p t u a l n j o n czy inst5rtucjonaln3mi kontekscie podmiotu. Konceptualizacja pojawia s i ^

b o w i e m dopiero n a etapie i n t e r p r e t a c j i i jest chronologicznie i logicznie p ö z n i e j s z a od samej k o n f r o n t a c j i p o d m i o t u z p r z e d m i o t e m doswiadcze-n i a . K o doswiadcze-n s t r u k t j r w i s c i p o p e l doswiadcze-n i a j ^ blg^d s^dz^c, ze podoswiadcze-niewaz i doswiadcze-n t e r p r e t a c j a doswiadczenia dokonuje s i ^ zazwyczaj w k l u c z u poj^c, k t ö r y m i podmiot dysponowal, z a n i m doswiadczenie m i a l o miejsce, to samo doswiadczenie m u s i byc jakos Tiltrowane' przez t^ siatk^ poj^c.

R e d u k c j o n i s t y c z n i krjrtycy kognitjrwnej wartosci doswiadczenia religijnego i n t e r p r e t u j ^ je w k a t e g o r i a c h psychicznej d e w i a c j i l u b b l ^ d u poznawczego inspirowanego przez spoleczny czy i n t e l e k t u a l n y k o n t e k s t p o d m i o t u . R e d u k c j o n i s c i p i e l ^ g n u j ^ zazwyczaj ci^gle zywe tradycje K . M a r x a i S. F r e u d a , a jeszcze cz^sciej nawi^zujs^ do scjentystycznego d u c h a p o z y t 5 w i z m u logicznego ( p r z y k l a d e m w p l y w o w y J . L . M a c k i e ) w p r z e k o n a n i u , ze 'naukowe' w y j a s n i e n i e fenomenu r e l i g i i w ogölnosci, a doswiadczenia religijnego w szczegölnosci jest k o n k l u z y w n e i jedno-znacznie negatywne.

W s r ö d p o p u l a r n y c h z a r z u t ö w m a m y tez ten, k t ö r y z a p u n k t w y j s c i a bierze n i e z a p r z e c z a l n y f a k t r o z b i e z n y c h i w y k l u c z a j ^ c y c h s i ^ w z a j e m n i e i n t e r p r e t a c j i doswiadczenia religijnego w r ö z n y c h r e l i g i a c h . Z a r z u t t e n opiera s i ^ n a zalozeniu, ze skoro r ö z n e podmioty rzekomego doswiadcze-n i a religijdoswiadcze-nego doswiadcze-nie m o g ^ s i ^ zgodzic co do opisu p r z e d m i o t u owych doswiadczen, to nalezy uznac, ze w s z y s t k i e one s£^ i l u z j ^ , albo w n a j l e p -s z y m r a z i e majg^ bardzo n i -s k i -stopien epi-stemicznej wiarygodno-sci i n i e m o g ^ sluzyc z a uzasadnienie racjonalnie z y w i o n y c h p r z e k o n a n r e l i g i j -n y c h . To zaloze-nie jest j e d -n a k z g r u -n t u f a l s z y w e . I s t -n i e j ^ r ö z -n o r a k i e k o n s t r u k c j e epistemologiczne, k t ö r e starajg^ s i ^ w y j a s n i c , j a k to jest mozliwe, ze podmioty doswiadczenia religijnego wywodz^ce s i ^ z r ö z n y c h t r a d y c j i r e l i g i j n y c h z n i e z w y k l ^ r e g u l a r n o s c i ^ interpretujg^^ swoje doswiadczenia w s p o s ö b rozbiezny. Oczywiscie, zawsze do r o z w a z e n i a pozostaje teza, ze n i e k t ö r e doswiadczenia S£\, istotnie i l u z o r y c z n e , a i n n e n i m i nie s^.

W n i n i e j s z y m a r t y k u l e , wyst^puja^c w obronie k o g n i t y w n e j w a r t o s c i doswiadczenia religijnego i podejmujg^c p r ö b ^ odparcia p o s z c z e g ö l n y c h z a r z u t ö w , sugeruje s i ^ , ze z a s z c z e g ö l n i e a t r a k c y j n y model epistemolo-giczny doswiadczenia religijnego nalezaloby uznac ten, k t ö r y p o d k r e s l a analogic m i ^ d z y doswiadczeniem r e l i g i j n j n n i zwyczajna^ praktyka^ percepcji zmyslowej. A p l i k a c j a takiego m o d e l n s t a w i a doswiadczenie r e l i -gijne w 'sytuacji epistemicznej' podobnej do percepcji zmyslowej z w s z y s t k i m i jej z a l e t a m i i w a d a m i . J e d n ^ z k o n s e k w e n c j i takiego u j ^ c i a jest to, ze dostarcza ono racjonalnego u z a s a d n i e n i a d l a p r z e k o n a n r e l i

-g i j n y c h opartych n a doswiadczeniu r e l i -g i j n y m , pozwalaj-g^c u z n a c je z a racjonalne, ale jednoczesnie c z y n i t r u d n ^ obron^ silniejszej tezy o mozl i w o s c i s k o n s t r u o w a n i a j a k i e g o k o mozl w i e k 'dowodu' z doswiadczenia r e mozl i -gijnego n a istnienie B o g a ze w z g l ^ d u n a rozbiezne r o z u m i e n i e poj^cia A b s o l u t u w r ö z n y c h r e l i g i a c h .