Is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's critique of idealism conclusive?

Marek Rosiak

Is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s critique

of idealism conclusive?

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica nr 9, 73-80

1993

A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S

F O L I A P H I L O S O P H I C A 9 . 1993

M a r e k R o sia k

IS K A Z IM IE R Z A J D U K IE W IC Z ’S C R I T IQ U E O F ID E A L IS M C O N C L U S IV E ?

K a zim ierz A jd u k iew icz w as o ccu p ied w ith id ealistic im p lic a tio n s o f e p istem o lo g y fo r a t le a st 15 y ears a n d he w ro te 4 c o m p re h e n siv e self-c o n ta in ed p a p ers o n th is su b ject, n o t to m e n tio n n u m e ro u s item s w h ere th e su b jec t w as also to u c h e d . T h is w as a p ro b le m o f g re a t im p o rta n c e fo r h im a n d - as he w ro te - its a n aly sis h elp ed h im d u rin g his p e rio d o f ra d ic a l c o n v e n tio n a lism to leave th e m e ta p h y sic a l c ro s sro a d a n d to ta k e th e w ay o f realism . M o re o v e r, it is reco g n ized (e.g. in P ro f. J. W o le iisk i’s b o o k o n P o lish A n a ly tic al P h ilo so p ­ hy) th a t th ese A jd u k ie w ic z ’s stu d ie s a re g o o d e x am p les o f s o called m e th o d o f p a ra p h ra se s - a p a rtic u la r m e th o d o f p h ilo s o p h ic a l a n aly sis in v e n te d by A jd u k iew icz him self. E ven fo r th o se tw o re a so n s o n ly th e w o rk s m e n tio n e d deserve th o ro u g h in v e stig atio n .

In th e artic le w ritte n in 1937 a n d e n title d T he Problem o f Transcendental

Idealism in a S e m a n tic F orm ulation A jd u k iew icz tried to use c e rta in m e ta lo -

gical resu lts to criticize th e e p istem o lo g ica l s ta n d p o in t o f th e B ad en fa c tio n o f th e n e o k a n tio n sch o o l. H e to o k in to c o n sid e ra tio n view s o f H e in ric h R ic k ert - o n e o f the lead ers o f th is sch o o l. L et us re c o n str u c t briefly A jd u k iew icz's p re s e n ta tio n o f re le v a n t n e o k a n tia n s ta te m e n ts to g e th e r w ith th e s u b se q u e n t c ritic is m 1.

A jd u k iew icz c laim ed th a t in R ic k e rt’s o p in io n re a lity is n o m o re th a n a m ere c o re la te o f c o n sc io u sn ess a n d it h a s o n to lo g ic a lly d e riv a tiv e c h a ra c te r. T h e p a rtic u la r fe a tu re o f R ic k e rt’s s ta n d p o in t is th a t a c c o rd in g to h im the co n scio u sn ess m e n tio n e d a b o v e h as s u p ra in d iv id u a l c h a r a c te r. It is - in tech n ical te rm s - „B ew u sstsein ü b e r h a u p t” . W h a t is m o re , th e c o n scio u sn ess seem s to be re d u c ed to o n e b asic fu n c tio n o n ly - n am ely th e fu n c tio n o f

1 K . A j d u k i e w i с z, P r o b le m a t tra n scen d e n ta ln e g o id ea lizm u te s fo r m u ło w a n iu s e m a n ty c z ­

7 4 M a r e k R o sia k

ju d g e m e n t. T h is fu n c tio n co n sists in th e fact th a t the c o n scio u sn ess is th e so u rc e o f c e rta in tra n s c e n d e n ta l n o rm s w hich a re th e c rite ria o f tru th fo r s ta te m e n ts u tte re d by in d iv id u als. P u ttin g th e m a tte r o th erw ise, a c c o rd in g to R ic k crt existence c o n sists in c o n fo rm ity o f relev an t e x isten tial s ta te m e n ts w ith tra n s c e n d e n ta l n o rm s. O ne c an see th a t R ic k crt ch o se a 11011-s ta n d a r d th e o ry o f tru th , b ecau se fo r him v eracity m e a n t c o n fo rm ity w ith ru les2.

A s a p re p a ra tio n o f his criticism A jd u k iew icz p re sen te d th e m etalo g ical n o tio n o f la n g u a g e as a d e d u ctiv e system . Such system inclu d es a d c cid ab le set o f well fo rm ed fo rm u la s as well as a set o f ru les o f im m ed iate inference. A n in te rp re ta tio n o f all sy m b o ls o f th e la n g u a g e is a cc o rd in g to A jd u k iew icz e q u iv a len t to the choice o f its rules o f im m e d ia te inference, so th e n a tu ra l la n g u a g e o r the scientific la n g u a g e is a d e d u ctiv e system if its ex p ressio n s have full m ean in g . A jd u k iew icz th o u g h t th a t a t least th e la n g u a g e o f em pirical sciences fulfills the a b o v e c o n d itio n a n d th a t c o n se q u e n tly it is a d ed u ctiv e system . O n th e o th e r h a n d he re ferred to th e fact th a t ric h e r d e d u ctiv e system s (th o se c o n ta in in g a rith m e tic s) a re in co m p lete. I f o n e is re a d y to acc e p t the m etalo g ical p rin c ip le o f ex clu d ed m id d le, o n e im m e d ia te ly a rriv e s a t c o n c ­ lu sion th a t in th e scientific la n g u a g e th e re a re tru e sta te m e n ts th a t a re n o t d eriv ab le. A c co rd in g to A jd u k iew icz th e n o tio n o f tra n s c e n d e n ta l ru le co u ld be in te rp re te d in term s o f th e ru les o f im m e d ia te in feren ce, so we reach the n eg atio n o f th e thesis o f tra n s c e n d e n ta l id ealism b ecau se th e re a re tru e sta te m e n ts w hich d o n o t c o n fo rm to the tra n s c e n d e n ta l ru les3.

W e m u st stress th a t A jd u k ie w ic z d id n o t state categ o rica lly th a t his in te rp re ta tio n w as a n u ltim a te re fu ta tio n o f tra n s c e n d e n ta l id ealism in R ic k e rt's versio n . H e p u t so m e q u e stio n m a rk s o n th e end o f his p ro p o s a l b u t n ev erth less he seem ed to be su re th a t th e m a in p a rt o f his re fu ta tio n is irrefra g ab le. H e m e n tio n e d tu 'o p o ssib le o b je c tio n s to this o w n c o n stru c tio n . F irstly , o ne c an rep lace som e fin itist n o tio n s w ith in fin itist o n es, a n d secondly, th e acc e p ta n ce o f th e m etalo g ical law o f exclu d ed m id d le s h o u ld be so m eh o w ju stifie d . H o w ev e r, he d escrib ed th ese d o u b ts as su b tle , w hich p ro b a b ly m e a n t m a rg in a l a n d he d id n o t d iscuss th e m a t all. B ut it seem s to m e th a t these d o u b ts a rc c o n n e c te d w ith th e very c ru cial p ro b le m o f th is in v e stig atio n , n am ely th ey a re c o n trib u tio n to th e q u e stio n ho w th e w h o le p ro c e d u re is ju stified .

Let us allo w o u rselv es c e rta in e x tra v a g an c e a n d g o in g th ro u g h the lo o k in g g lass q u o te fa m o u s verses: A n d a s in u ffish t h o u g h t h e s to o d . T h e J a b b e r w o c k , w ith ey es o f flam e . C a m e w h ifflin g th r o u g h th e tu lg ey w o o d . A n d b u rb le d a s it cam e! 2 Ib id .. p . 2 7 1 -2 7 3 . 3 Ib id .. p . 2 7 3 -2 7 6 .

Is К . A jd u k ie w ic z ’s C ritiq u e 7 5

Is it p o ssib le to falsify th is s ta te m e n t by say in g th a t J a b b e rw o c k is th e p re sen t re a d er o f this tex t a n d „ to b u rb le " m ean s to sn o re? If a n y b o d y c la im ed th a t, he w o u ld be im m ed iately accu sed o f c o m m ittin g p e titio p rin c ip ii. T h e d isp u te a b o u t th e tru th fu ln e ss o f th e verses a b o v e w o u ld c h an g e in to the d is p u te a b o u t the ju s tific a tio n o f th e in te rp re ta tio n p ro p o se d .

F o r b a la n cin g th is e x am p le let us p u t fo rw a rd a n o th e r one. W h en P la to s ta te d th a t a m a n is a feath erless b ip ed , D io g en es sh o w ed him a plu ck ed ch ick en , crying: „ T h is is P la to 's m a n !" It w as a co n clu siv e falsificatio n o f P la to ’s d e fin itio n a n d as we k n o w , s tu b b o rn P la to m a d e his d e fin itio n m o re so p h istica te d c la im in g th a t a m a n is a feath erless b ip ed w ith flat nails.

T h e se ex am p les s h o w th a t one c an expect c o n clu siv e falsificatio n w hen o n e ’s in te rp re ta tio n fits th e m e a n in g s o f the sta te m e n ts u n d e r c o n sid e ra tio n . G e n erally sp ea k in g , a n in te rp re ta tio n is v a lu a b le if it c re ates sim p le r p ro b le m s th a n it resolves. O f c o u rse th e re a re a lo t o f p h ilo so p h ic al n o tio n s th a t are v ague o r even co m p letely d e p riv e d o f a n y d istin g u ish a b le m e a n in g . Som e people even th in k th a t the v ery essence o f p h ilo s o p h y co n sists in u sin g such n o tio n s, as th e d e fin itio n ta k e n fro m so m e A m e ric a n d ic tio n a ry show s: „M e ta p h y sics: hig h ly a b stra c t s p e c u la tio n , n o t easy to u n d e rs ta n d " . O b sc u re p h ilo so p h ic al th e o rie s c a n n o t be falsified by a n y single in te rp r e ta tio n . It seem s to m e th a t co n clu siv en ess c an be re a ch e d o n ly by so m e k in d o f m etacriticism p o in tin g o u t th a t n o tio n s u n d e r c o n sid e ra tio n a re v ag u e b u t this w o u ld be by no m ean s the re fu ta tio n o f th e re le v a n t th eo ry .

T h e resu lt o f A jd u k iew icz's in v e stig atio n c o n c e rn in g th e p ro b le m o f tra n s c e n d e n ta l idealism b o ils d o w n to th e s ta te m e n t th a t if c e rta in u n iv ersal la n g u a g e o f science co u ld be c o n stru c te d a n d if it h a d th e fe a tu re s o f a d e d u ctiv e system a n d its th eses h a d fin itist c h a r a c te r a n d if tra n s c e n d e n ta l n o rm s co u ld be tre a te d as ru les o f im m e d ia te in feren ce o f this system th e n p ro v id in g th a t m e ta lo g ic al ru le o f exclu d ed m id d le w as acc e p te d , th e m ain th e o re m o f tra n s c e n d e n ta l id ealism w o u ld co llap se. O n e c an see h o w fa r these c o n sid e ra tio n s a re fro m b ein g co n clu siv e a n d I am c o n v in c ed th a t a tte m p ts o f ju s tific a tio n s o f th e a b o v e prem isses w o u ld on ly p ro v o k e fu rth e r q u e stio n s. In p a rtic u la r it is d u b io u s w h e th e r o n e c an ju s tify th e in te rp r e ta tio n o f tra n s c e n ­ d e n ta l n o rm s as ru les o f im m e d ia te inference. S u sp icio n arises b e ca u se th e rules o f inferen ce m u st c o n ce rn tra n s fo rm a tio n s o f c e rta in sta te d sym bols- a n d as such they a lw ay s h av e o n ly lim ited e x te n t. T r a n s c e n d e n ta l n o rm s o n the o th e r h a n d are u n iv e rsal n o rm s o f th in k in g a n d th u s c a n n o t be boiled d o w n to an y d efin ite (even if infin ite) v a rie ty o f sym bols. T h e p ro cess o f th in k in g alw ay s uses c e rta in sy m b o ls b u t nev erth eless it w ill a lw ay s tra n s c e n d every p a rtic u la r sy m b o lism . A n o th e r o b je c tio n a g a in st A jd u k ie w ic z's a tte m p t is te m p o ra ry a n d c h an g e a b le c h a ra c te r o f m e a n in g in th e n a tu ra l lan g u ag e. N e ith e r th e set o f well fo rm ed fo rm u le s is closed n o r m e a n in g s a re a tta c h e d to w o rd s fo r ever. A s th e n a tu ra l la n g u a g e evolves so m u st th e rules o f its

7 6 M a r e k R o s ia k

in feren ce do . A n d o n e c a n n o t d o u b t th a t tra n s c e n d e n ta l n o rm s d o n o t ch an g e in tim e.

T w elve y ears a fte r the c ritiq u e o f tra n s c e n d e n ta l idealism A jd u k iew icz re tu rn e d to idealistic views once ag ain a n d focused on its su b jectiv e v ersio n . In th e p a p e r e n title d E p istem o lo g y a n d sem io tics he to o k in to c o n sid e ra tio n b ish o p B erkeley's views. (It c an be o f h isto ric a l in te re st th a t in th o se tim es an d c irc u m stan c e s p o sitiv e e v a lu a tio n o f th e w o rk o f a n y b ish o p , a n d B erkeley in p a rtic u la r, w as a d eed o f g re a t in telectu al a n d civil c o u ra g e , precisely as to d a y criticism o f a n y b ish o p is)4.

A jd u k iew icz in v estig ates th re e -a rg u m e n t relatio n : la n g u a g ep erce p -tio n s-re a lity . R ela-tio n s o f re fe rrin g b etw een th e m a re as follow ing:

la n g u a g e ex p re s s io n

I

\

p e r c e p i i o n * re al o b je c t

A jd u k iew icz p u ts stress o n e q u iv o c a tio n c o n n ec te d w ith d o u b le reference o f la n g u a g e e x p ressio n s. It arises w hen o n e uses th e sam e w o rd as a n a m e o f a sense d a ta a n d as a n a m e o f real th in g . H e claim s th a t th is e q u iv o c a tio n is re sp o n sib le fo r basic m is u n d e rsta n d in g h id d e n in su b jectiv istic thesis ,.esse = = p e rc ip i" . In his o p in io n B erkeley is rig h t w h en he stresses o v io u sn css o f this thesis, b u t o n ly so fa r as im a g in a tio n s, th o u g h ts , im p ressio n s a n d so o n are co n ce rn e d . All o f th em ecxist o n ly in so m eo n e 's m in d a n d th ey c o n stitu te s e p a ra te re a lm called ,.th e seco n d w o rld ” by K a rl P o p p e r la te r o n . B ut B erkeley d o es n o t sto p h ere a n d g o es fa rth e r, s ta tin g - in A jd u k ie w ic z ’s o p in io n - th a t th e ex isten ce o f th e w o rld (P o p p e r’s „ first w o rld ” ) h as th e sam e d e riv a tiv e a n d d e p e n d e n t c h a r a c te r5. S u ch s ta n d p o in t is o b v io u sly false becau se in th a t case n o t o n ly p in k e le p h a n ts b u t real o n es as well w o u ld find a sh elter in m y m in d . I f o n e is n o t a w are o f th e e q u iv o c a tio n sh o w n a b o v e, o ne c an feel th a t „esse = p e rc ip i” is o b v io u s b u t nev erth eless so m eh o w p a ra d o x ic al. „ E sse = p e rc ip i" is self-ev id en t b u t o n ly as fa r as it refers to p e rc ep tio n s. T h e „ re a listic " p a rt o f this th esis re m a in s u n p ro v e d .

S im plicity o f the p ro b le m sta te d a b o v e re n d e rs th e p re s e n ta tio n o f the p re p a ra to ry m e ta lo g ic al p a rt o f this p a p e r u n n e ce ssa ry . N ev erth eless, A j­ duk iew icz d ev o tes a lo t o f tim e to th ese m a tte rs , m e n tio n in g esp. T a rs k i’s p a p e r o n th e d e fin itio n o f tru th a n d he c laim ed th a t m etalo g ical d istin c tio n s betw een la n g u a g e a n d m e ta la n g u a g e th ro w c erain light o n the p ro b le m . L et us co n sid e r A jd u k ie w ic z's idea o f e x te n d in g th e n o tio n o f m e ta la n g u a g e to a la n g u a g e po ssessin g n am es fo r o b jects fro m „ th e seco n d w o rld ” (so called

4 K . A j d u k i e w i c z . E p istem o lo g ia i s e m io ty k a , [in:] J ę z y k i p o z n a n ie , t. 2 . W a rs z a w a 1965. p . 107 117.

Is K . A jd u k ie w ic z ’s C r itiq u e 7 7

in tro sp e c tiv e lan g u ag e). T h is idea w as in d u c e d by c e rta in sim ila rity in sem a n tic a l rela tio n s in a g e n u in e m e ta la n g u a g e a n d a n „ in tro s p e c tiv e la n ­ g u a g e ” . R elatio n s o f re fe rrin g a re as follows:

m e ta la n g u a g e -» la n g u a g e -» re a lity la n g u a g e -» p e r c e p tio n s -» re a lity

B ut sim ilarities seem s to end a t th is p o in t. P e rc e p tio n s a rc by 110 m ean s lan g u ag e ex p ressio n s. I c a n n o t use m y p e rc ep tio n s a s a m e a n s o f c o m ­ m u n ic a tio n w ith a n o th e r p eo p le w h a t is a b asic fe a tu re o f a n y la n g u a g e. T h u s w h a tso e v e r we a rriv e a t w ith h elp o f this a n alo g y , m u st rem ain d u b io u s a n d u n ju stified .

P u ttin g this m a rg in a l m a tte r a sid e let us re tu rn to A jd u k ie w ic z's claim th a t th e e q u iv o c a tio n is h id d e n in th e a rg u m e n ta tio n o f B erkeley. F irst o f all it seem s h ighly im p ro b a b le th a t su ch sim ple logical e r r o r co u ld re m a in u n d is ­ co v ered in th e fo u n d a tio n s o f the system . S eco n d ly , it c a n be c learly seen in B erk eley 's text th a t he accep ts „ in te n tio n a l" existen ce o f p e rc ep tio n s a n d o th e r s tates o f m in d a n d rejects th e claim th a t a p a r t fro m the k n o w in g su b jec t an d the c o n te n t o f his m in d th e re exists s o m e th in g else. (O b v io u s in c o n siste n c y in a d m ittin g th e ex isten ce o f G o d a n d o th e r su b jects c an be easily e x p la in ed as an self-cen so rsh ip q u ite u n d e rs ta n d a b le in th o se tim es)0. H o w ev er, A jd u k ie w ic z's a rg u m e n ta tio n im plies th a t such a sta te m e n t w o u ld be u n a cc e p ta b le. A c c o r­ d in g to h im , a su b jectiv e id ealist c a n n o t a ffo rd th e s ta te m e n t a b o u t „re al n o n e x isten c e ” o f c e rta in th in g s sim p ly b ecau se he h a s n o t th e n o tio n o f „ re al e x isten ce” a t his d isp o sa l. I f th e o n ly a sse rtio n s th a t c an be s ta te d in the lan g u ag e o f su b jectiv e id ealist are: ,,A e x ists-in -m in d ” a n d „A d o es n o t ex ist-in -m in d ” th e n it is o b v io u s th a t we a re u n a b le to say th a t A d o e s n o t exist in reality . P r o b a b ly th a t is th e w ay o f A jd u k ie w ic z ’s a rg u m e n ta tio n w hen he w rites th a t su b jectiv e id e a list h a s o n ly p u re m e ta la n g u a g e a t his d isp o sa l (i.e. the la n g u a g e d e p riv e d o f n am es fo r e x te rn a l o bjects). B ut su ch a rg u m e n ta tio n is easy to re fu te w h en o n e re m e m b e rs th a t a su b jectiv e id ealist sp ea k s n o t o n ly a b o u t his ow n p e rc ep tio n s b u t a b o u t k n o w in g su b jec t as well. I f he c a n tell th a t a su b jec t exists in d e p e n d en tly , he c an also say th a t o th e r th in g s d o n o t exist in this sense.

Let us allo w o u rselv es to m a k e a g en eral re m a rk . B erk eley 's s ta n d p o in t rejectin g th e in d e p e n d e n t existen ce o f th e o b jects o f exp erien ce h a s u n d o u b te d ­ ly m e ta p h y sic a l a n d n o t sem io tical o rig in . T h e re fo re all a tte m p ts o f its criticism fro m th e sem io tic s ta n d p o in t a re ill-co n stru c te d . I f so m eo n e believes o r d o es n o t believe in existence o f g o b lin s a n d d w a rfs, y o u c a n n o t fo rce h im to

6 G . B e r k e l e y , T r a k ta l o z a s a d a c h p o z n a n ia , p rz e ł. J . S o s n o w s k a . § 89. W a rs z a w a 1956. p. 9 7 98.

7 8 M a r e k R o s ia k

c h an g e liis o p in io n s by re fe rrin g to th e lan g u ag e he uses, unless you d e m o n stra te his in co n sisten cy (a n d even th e n som e p eo p le rem ain resistent). A decisive a rg u m e n t m u st be b a se d on so m e in tu itio n o r ex perience. O ne c an re m in d h ere a tte m p ts o f a n o th e r o u ts ta n d in g P olish c o n te m p o ra ry p h ilo so p h e r R o m a n In g a rd e n w h o a tta c k e d th e tra n s c e n d e n ta l idealism o f H usserl. T h e resu lt o f his e ffo rts in sp ire d b y re sistan ce to re g a rd in g th e w o rld as a c o rre la te o f c o n sc io u sn ess w as his C o n tro versy O ver the E xisten ce o f the W o rld full o f c o n c e p tu a l d istin c tio n s, te n d in g to d isco v e r in th e very essence o f a n aly sed n o tio n s som e fa c to r s u p p o rtin g o u r ev ery d ay 's b e lie f in the re a lity o f the w o rld . T h e ev idence th a t In g a rd e n s o u g h t in v a in is th a t th e a u th o r h im se lf left his w o rk u n e n d ed w ith o u t ach iev in g his goal.

Even if A jd u k iew icz w as rig h t in p o in tin g o u t som e in co n sisten cies o f B erkeley’s la n g u a g e a n d if m o re o v e r su b jectiv e id ealism co u ld n o t be sta te d in a c o n sis te n t w ay, a fo llo w er o f th is sch o o l w o u ld be ab le to say w ith W ittg e n ste in th a t th e la n g u a g e w as o n ly a la d d e r w hich can be th ro w n o u t a fte r re a ch in g th e u p p e r flo o r (i.e. a fte r c le ar re c o g n itio n o f the issue in q u e stio n ). E ven if B erk eley ’s s ta n d p o in t is served in ep istem o lo g ical sauce, its essence h a s g o t a m e ta p h y sic a l co re in accessible to ep istem o lo g ical assau lts. S im ilarly , b e lie f in th e in d e p e n d en t existence o f th e o b jects o f e x te rn a l ex p erien ce c a n n o t be refu ted b y ep istem o lo g ical in v estig atio n s c o n ta in e d in B erk eley ’s Treatise. A jd u k iew icz’s q u e stio n p u t fo rw a rd in th e b e g in n in g o f the p a p e r d iscussed, nam ely: ,.A re th e re an y m e ta p h y sic a l co n seq u en ces o f e p istem o lo g ical in v estig atio n s? " c a n be an sw ered as folow s: such c o n seq u en ces ( if a t all) co u ld be given on ly by exp erien ce o r in tu itio n a n d ep istem o lo g ical in v e stig atio n c an be re le v a n t o n ly to th e lim ited ex ten t.

P e rh a p s A jd u k iew icz w as n o t satisfied w ith his resu lts b ecau se th re e years a fte r the review ed p a p e r he p u b lish e d a n o te r o n e e n title d On the n otion o f

e xisten ce. T h is o n e w as in sp ired by L esn iew sk i’s o n to lo g y in tu rn . T h e a u th o r

tried to sh o w th a t th e s ta n d p o in t o f tra n s c e n d e n ta l idealism c a n n o t be p re sen te d c o n siste n tly . A jd u k iew icz in tro d u c e d tw o d ifferen t n o tio n s o f existence: in te n tio n a l existence a n d real existence. W ith th e ir help he p ro ­ c laim ed th e fo llo w in g id ealistic thesis: ..T rees exist in te n tio n a lly b u t d o n o t exist in re a lity ’’. W e re m e m b e r th a t th e tru th o f th is p ro p o s itio n b o ils d o w n to its c o n fo rm ity w ith the tra n s c e n d e n ta l n o rm s. T h e se n o rm s w ere in te rp re te d as ru les o f im m e d ia te inferece in tu rn . T h e fa c t th a t trees exist in te n tio n a lly (th e o n ly p o ssib ility fo r a n id ealist) is e q u iv a le n t to the fa c t th a t the sta te m e n t a b o u t th e existen ce o f trees fulfills th e tra n s c e n d e n ta l n o rm s. B ut such s ta te m e n t is a n em pirical sta te m e n t w hich m ean s th a t it uses s ta n d a rd n o tio n s o f existence th e real existence. In th is w ay - a c c o rd in g to A jd u k iew icz wc c an see the inco n sisten ce o f a n id ealistic lan g u ag e. F o r on o n e h a n d a n idealist rejected th e s ta te m e n t th a t trees really exist (a c ce p tin g o n ly th a t th ey exist

Is К . A jd u k ie w ic z 's C ritiq u e 7 9

in te n tio n a lly ) a n d o n the o th e r h a n d the c o n se q u e n ce o f th is ste p lead him to affirm th a t n ev erth eless trees really e x ist7.

T h is p a ra d o x seem s to be a p p a r e n t o n ly to o . T h e sta te m e n t th a t trees exist in te n tio n a lly o n ly is a n ep istem o lo g ical s ta te m e n t o f c o u rse, b ecau se sciences do n o t use the n o tio n o f th e in te n tio n a l existence at all. A c co rd in g to tra n sc e n d e n ta l id ealists the tru th o f th is s ta te m e n t d e p en d s o n its c o n fo rm ity w ith c erta in tra n sc e n d e n ta l n o rm s. T h e se n o rm s m u st d eal w ith th is p a rtic u la r type o f s ta te m e n t a n d n o t w ith e m p iric a l s ta te m e n ts , th e re fo re th e re is n o need o f assu m in g th a t these n o rm s will force us to a d m it th a t trees exist in reality . S p e a k in g o th erw ise: if we b e a r in m in d the u n iv ersal c h a r a c te r o f tra n s c e n d e n ­ tal n o rm s, th a t th e y a re a p p lic a b le to all k in d s o f d e clarativ e sen ten ces, we m ust realize th a t b ecau se ep istem o lo g ical s ta te m e n ts a re d istin c t fro m s ta te ­ m ents o f e m p irical sciences, re le v a n t tra n s c e n d e n ta l n o rm s s h o u ld be d ifferen t also. A lth o u g h th e n o rm fo r th e em p irical s ta te m e n t „ T re e s e x ist" co u ld tell us to a d m it th a t trees exist in reality , th e re is n o n eed o f assu m in g th a t in case o f an ep istem o lo g ical s ta te m e n t ..T rees exist in te n tio n a lly o n ly " b ecau se this sta te m e n t h as g o t a n o th e r c rite ria o f tru th fu ln e ss.

F in ally , I m u st re p e a t o n c e ag ain th a t n o o n e o f A jd u k ie w ic z's a rg u m e n ts seem s to be conclusive. If o n e re m e m b e rs the im p o rta n c e o f the a b o v e p ro b le m s fo r th e p h ilo s o p h e r, th e o u tc o m e seem s to be ra th e r d ep ressin g . N o r the m e th o d o f p a ra p h ra se s h a s m a n ife sted its m erits if I a m rig h t to claim th a t m a jo rity o f a rg u m e n ts co u ld be p re sen te d w ith o u t a referen ce to th e logical results. In m y o p in io n these resu lts co u ld a ct as a p o ssib le in s p ira tio n o f c e rta in e p istem o lo g ical h y p o th e se s ra th e r th a n as stric t schem es w hich ep istem o lo g ical sta te m e n ts m a tc h .

P e rh a p s it is sig n ifican t th a t w hile in his first p a p e r A jd u k iew icz claim ed th a t p h ilo so p h ic al p ro b le m s u n d e r c o n sid e ra tio n co u ld be reso lv ed easily w ith help o f fo rm al logic in th e seco n d o n e he seem ed to be m o re m o d e st w ith respect to th a t claim a lth o u g h he still ch ee re d h im se lf w ith c e rta in e p ith e ts ad d re sse d to idealists a n d finally in the th ird o n e ep ith e ts as well as th e im p ressio n o f self-co n fid en ce d is a p p e a re d a t all. Is it po ssib le th a t a fte r lo n g arg u m e n ts w ith id ealism A jd u k iew icz b e ca m e to a p p re c ia te the o p p o site, p a rt o f this co n tro v e rsy ?

D e p a r tm e n t o f L o g ic L ó d ź U n iv e r s ity P o la n d 7 K . A j d u k i e w i c z . W s p ra w ie p o ję c ia istn ie n ia , [in:] J ę z y k .... p . 143 155.

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M a r e k R o s ia k

Z A G A D N I E N I E K O N K L U Z Y W N O Ś C 1 K R Y T Y K I I D E A L I Z M U P R Z E P R O W A D Z O N E J P R Z E Z K A Z I M I E R Z A A J D U K I E W I C Z A

A jd u k ie w ic z p o d e jm o w a ł k i lk a k r o tn ie p r ó b ę a n a liz y i k ry ty k i m e ta fiz y c z n e g o id e a liz m u z a r ó w n o w je g o w ersji o b ie k ty w n e j, j a k s u b ie k ty w n e j. A n g a ż o w a ł d o te g o celu p ew n e p o ję c ia i w y n ik i w sp ó łcz esn ej m e ta lo g ik i. c o s ta n o w iło p rz y k ła d z a s to s o w a n ia w łaściw ej m u m e to d y a n a liz y filo zo fic zn ej, z w a n e j m e to d ą p a r a f r a z . A n a liz a A jd u k ie w ic z o w s k ie j a r g u m e n ta c ji u k a z u je je j d a le c e n ie k o n k lu z y w n y c h a r a k t e r , j a k ró w n ie ż z d a je się w y k a z y w a ć , że m e to d a p a r a f r a z nie z n a jd u je tu sw e g o e fe k ty w n e g o z a s to s o w a n ia . K o n k lu z ją p rz e d s ta w io n y c h ro z w a ż a ń je s t h ip o te z a , iż fu n d a m e n ta ln e p r z e k o n a n ia m e ta fiz y c z n e nie p o d d a j ą się k ry ty c e o c h a r a k te r z e s e m io ty c z n y m .