A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L U D Z I E N S I S FOLIA S O C IÜLOGICA 22, 1991
Wło dzi m ier z Jaśkiewicz
ENT ERPRISE AS AN INS TITUTION IN POLAND
Di s cu ss io ns on the economi c reform being impl eme n ted in Po l and at present are focused on the enterprise, which sho uld undergo major cha nges according to the assum pt ion s of the reform. The pri nciples of the eco nomic reform pu b lis h e d in 1901, i.e. a u t o -nomy, self-fi nancing, and se l f-m a nage m ent are not only to i n -crease p r o d uct io n e f f ec ti ve nes s of e n t er pr is es but also lead to recovery of the entire national economy. The fact that a sp* cial att en ti on is att ached to c h a ng es in the en t e r p r i s e activitj suggest that fundamental barr ier s to eff ec ti ve e c o n omi c d e v e l o p -ment of the country causing dis l o c a t i o n s in the f u n c tio ni ng of the whole economic system were to be found in the enterprise.
Suc h way of reasoni ng makes us ponder over c i r c u m s t a n c e s in which the e n t er pr ise fun ctions in Polish economy, its model c o n -cept, assumed act ivities and pos s ib i l i t i e s of their rea lization. Therefore, p r e s ent i ng my views I wou ld like to focus a t t e nti o n to con d iti o ns which led to dev iat i o ns from the model of e n t e r p r i s e a s -sumed in so c iali s m and econ omi c and social c o n s e q u e n c e s re s ulti ng from these deviations. In p re mise of model t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the e n t erp r ise as an ins tit u tion ch a r a c t e r i s t i c for p os t wa r P o -land, me c hani sms began to appear aiming at ad a p t a t i o n of this institu tion to real c o n d iti on s of activity, d e c isi v e for the role of ent erpr i se in economy and society. These m e c han i sms should be include d in d i s c us s i on about c ha nges in Polish e c o n o -mic system, because they decide about e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the a s -sumed changes and reveal dilemmas facing the reformers.
1. Assumed model of the enterprise
A specific cha r acteristic of the political system in Poland realized after 1945 was a central control of all spheres of the social life with emphasis on all spheres of economy. The s i g n i ficance of economic power for ex e r cis ing pol itical power was e a r -lier ack nowledged by the communist party and included in its ideological pro g rammes (concept of struggle for power, model of economy, concept of economic development). The moment the p o -litical power was won, central control over economy const it ut ed a basic m e c h an i sm of con trol ling economic s tr uctures and the main instrument of con s oli da tin g the political power [ K a l i ń s k i , 1977 ].
Ref erring to genesis of the eco nomic and political system in the pos t-war Pol and I do not intend to describe well known facts and circumstances. It seems, however, that it is nec essary to outline them because it was in this period of P o l a n d ’s history that the specific type of r el atio nship s between the political and eco nomic spheres was developing. Its essence lay in dom inance of the pol itical sphere over the economic life, on the one hand, and a str ong dependence of the former on effective per formance of the latter [ W i a t r, 1974].
This first dependence was rev ealed in s u b or di na tio n of the entire economy to pol itical cen tres of the state power in a direct way, with its practical exp r ess i on being not only d e t e r min ation of the eco nomic development strategy (forced i n d u s t r i a -lization, pr e dom i n anc e of sector I) by pol itical cen tres but also det er mi na tio n of organ iz at ion al structu re of the economy and ma n age m e nt mec hanisms (centra lism based on adm i nistrati ve int ermediate str uctures between the Centre and the enterprise, sys tem of man age m ent based on commands, c en t ral iz ed allocation of ind ustrial supplies and control). M on o p o l i z a t i o n of the e c o -nomy facilit ated su b ordi natio n of its d ev elopment to pol itical and ideological goals re p resented by the Centre.
Pol itical dominance of the s tr uctures of power over the e c o -nomy, c e n tr al iz ati on of com mands and control were to serve not only the exe r cis i ng of power in the society but also its social
validat ion and therefore the eve r - g r o w i n g i m p o rta nc e of e ff ec ti ve f un ctio ning of the new system of e co nomy st a rted to be e m p h a s i z -ed. Thus, there is rev ealed the second d e p e nde n ce a c c oun t ing for a great sensi ti vi ty of the p o l i t i c a l - i d e o l o g i c a l s ph e re on the scale and mode of attaini ng the assumed e co nomi c goa ls by the economy. Eff ective eco nomic pe r fo r m a n c e of the nati ona l eco nomy becomes not only a cri t eri on of e f f i cie n cy of the pol i tic al power but it also plays a role of a cri t erion of r e l e va n c e and f e a s i -bil ity of the ideology lying at found at io ns of the socio-po- litical sy stem [ M o r a w s k i , 1985 ].
The strategy of exe rc is in g po l itic al power in P ol an d is the refore clo sely co n nect e d with ef f e c t i v e n e s s of the strategy of economic development. A syndrom e of d e p e n d e n c e s "the p ol itical power - the economy" gave a definite cha r act er to the P ol ish eco nomic str uct u r es and their functions w hich was ref lected in attitud e of the political power to the ent e r p r i s e as an i n s t i t u -tion. It is revealecf in d e t e rmi n ing by the p o l i ti c al power its basic role not only in the pro cess of p r o d u c t i o n but also in the con cept of c o n s t ru ct ion and fun ctio ning of the p o l i t ic al system. Ac t ivities of the political power fully s u b o r d i n a t e d e n t er pr ise s to political goals of the state and r e s t ric t ed their activity to imp le me nt ati on of p la nned tasks imposed from a bove (en trance of the party to o rg ani z ati on al str u ctu re s of enterp r ise s, l i q u i d a -tion of workers councils, branch c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of trade uni ons and sub or di nat io n of their activity to p o l i tic a l go als of the party and the state). In this situation, e n t e r p r i s e s wer e d e -prived of their cla ssical at t r ibu te such as e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p and an equ ally important c ha r a c t e r i s t i c such as s e l f - f i n a n c i n g of their activity.
In such ci r c ums tances, the e nt e r p r i s e was only a place of per fo rm ing p r o d uc t i ve work, wit h active i n v o lve m ent and e n t r e pr e neu r s h i p of man a gem en t and personnel bei ng d i r e c t e d at l o w e r -ing their p la nned tasks. The economi c structure, along with c o n -sol i dat i on of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and co m man d sys t em in m a n a g e m e n t of the economy, evo lve d in the di r e cti o n of the "s t a t e - e n t e r p r i s e s " model, or at best - the ’’e n t e r p r i s e s - b r a n c h e s " model, in which the role of nominal ent erp r ise was reduced to an e x e c u t i v e agency of these huge and b ur e a u c r a t i z e d structu res.
The main function of the enterpr ise is production. Initially, this function enjoyed a strict priority (pr oduction regardless of costs, at all means) with the volume of pr o duction fixed in the central plan being the main cri t erion in eva luat ion of the e n t e r p r i s e ’s performance. That allowed to realize a slogan about a common access to employment (unit cost and individual p r o d u c -tivity of a worker were not directly linked with wages) but it also b lo cked effecti vely introduction of modern technologies based on reduction of direct labour, and also it ham pered d e v e l o p -ment of mec hani sms pro viding mo t ivat ion to qua litatively better, more eff icient and better organized work.
In the ass umed model of socialist ent erprise an essential role was played by a set of non pr od uct iv e functions imposed on e n t e r -prise. There could be d is ting uishe d among them two main categories, i.e. pol itical and social. The former con sist in mob ilizing en t erprises and their work force around political goals of the party and it con cerns not only i mp lementation or overimplementa- tion of the plan (production always fulfills pol itical function in socialism), but also exe cution of various u nd er ta kin gs of non- -productive, pro p aganda and political character org anized by the party (pa rt icipati on in elections, celebr a tio ns of party h o l i -days, mass meetings, festive ce l ebr a tion s etc. - see: N a- r o j e k , 1973). Pre sence of the party in the enterprise o r g a -niz ational str ucture facilitates organi z ati on of act ivities of such kind c onstituting, at the same time an essential element of con trol over this basic area of dev elopment of the working class and its activity.
The category of social functions encom pa ss es a wide range of tasks ens uin g from the functioning of the ent erpr i se as a social sys tem and, in part, from the pro t ective function pe r form ed by the state. The authors dealing with analysis of this sphere of the e n t erp r i se activity disti ng uis h many dif ferent functions here such as recreation, supply of personnel with cheaper goods or those in short supply, social education, p ro fess ional and ideological e du cation and training, cultural function, and even urb an iz ati on function [ K u l p i ń s k a , 1969, 1972; К o- h o u t, 1976 ]. It should be noted here that sig nif i c anc e of these functions becomes largely enhance d along with market
dis-luptions caused by con sec u tiv e eco nomic collapses. At such times, em p loye es exert a 'strong pre ssu r e on their e n l a r g e m e n t (this refers esp e cially to the s o c io w e lfa r e function), w hi le the e c o nomic and politic al a dm i nis tr ati o n tends to be muc h more i n c l i n ed to fulfill these e xp e cta ti ons (pacyfy ing of w o r k e r s ’ d i s s a t i s -faction moods).
C e n s e q u e n t l y , the model of enterprise, a s s u med by the variant of s o c i al i sm existing in Poland, is an i ns ti t u t i o n p e r f orm in g many d if ferent functions. Apart from pro d uction, these fun ctions include political and ide ological in d octrinati on, wel fa re a s -sistance, propa ga tio n of spe cific cultural values, e d u c a t i o n etc. The assumed model was, thus, p e r c eiv i ng the work es t a b l i s h m e n t as an institution, which while exe c uting its p r o d u c t i o n tasks - basic in eco nomic and po l i tic al c a t e gor i es for the political sys tem - would be playing, at the same time, a role i nt egrating the personnel, cre ating an a g g r ega ti on of " c o mm un ity " character, and c o n c e n t r a t i n g its act ivity on work, the party p olicy and the ideology of real s o c i ali sm [ к o h o u t, 1976 ].
2. Dilemmas of m u l t i f u n c t i o n a l act ivit y
The en t e r p r i s e model assumed by the c r e a t o r s of the soc ial- ec onom ics system was a true ref l e c t i o n of the co n c e p t about c r e a -tion of the s ys tem and str ateg y of its fun c-tioning. The role of the ent e r p r i s e was b o i led down to a place of e x e c u t i n g a d e f i n i t e fragment of tasks pl a n n e d at the level of the cen t r a l state power, w h i ch h av ing at its dis posal means of p r o d uct ion, raw materials, and m e c h a n i s m s sha ping prices and wages took over, in fact, the role of the en t e r p r i s e m on opol izing , mor eove r, not only p r o d u c -tion but mar ket as well (di s t r i b u t i o n of goods).
P r e s u m e d int ention of those who c r e a t e d such a s y s t e m and c on cept of the ent e r p r i s e was to base ec o n o m y on rat i o n a l u t i l i z a -tion of res ourc es p o s s e s s e d by the "state - e n t e r p r i s e " s t r ivin g to a c c o m p l i s h the pl a n n e d eco n o m i c goals. Their a c c o m p l i s h m e n t was to ensure, s im ulta neous ly, r e a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l and i d e olog ical goals. Mea nwhi le, the e x p a n d e d s y s t e m of the state b u r e a u c r a c y (planning, adm ini s t r a t i o n , c o n t r o l ) was to ensure
effective fun ctio ning of this mon op o l i s t i c giant. An assumption, on which such a concept had to rely, was a c o n vict ion that e c o n o -mic suc cess es would be the best sho wpiece of the new political power being a c c ompa nied by increased social support for it. At the same time it was hoped that the society and the work force would accept and identify as their own not only p r o duct ion goals posed before them but also con ditions in which these goals should be executed. There began to appear various pro blem s con nected with the fun ctio ning of n e w l y - e s t a b l i s h e d economic, social and political structures, clearly testyfying and drawing attention to falseness of such assumptions.
In the eco nomi c sphere, these pro blem s were con nect ed with i ne ffec tiven ess cha r a c t e r i z i n g fun ctio ning m e c h ani sms of in-dustrial structures, det achment of their activity from criteria of economic rationality, arbitrary - com pati ble with goals p u r -sued by the c en tres of power - val uation of work (branch p r i o -rities for heavy and ext ractive industries), wes tage of r e -sources and q u a l i f i catio ns (criteria of appraisal of emp loye es and their p r o m o t i o n not based on their per f o r m a n c e and skills but political engagement), f e t ishi zatio n of pla nned tasks ( a p praisal cri teri a based on indices of pro d u c t i o n act ivity e x p r e s -sed in terms of value), lack of ela stic ity in p l a nnin g and p r o -duction etc. Gen erally speaking, it app eared to be easier to build the new eco nomic system through rea liza tion of the i n -d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n strategy than to ensure eff ecti ve fun ctio ning of new ly- f o r m e d model structures. Dem andi ng attitude of the wor kinh class, the basic because ideological element in c o n s t r u c t i o n of the model of economy and social life for the pol itical power, became ano ther pr o b l e m app eari ng before the pol itical a u t h o r i -ties .
At the en t e r p r i s e level these pro blems rev olve d around e n s u r ing a state of relative equ i l i b r i u m bet ween its p r o duct ion f u n c -tion and rem aini ng func-tions. The former con s t i t u t e d an essential e le ment s a f e g u a r d i n g not only l e g i t i m izati on of eff icie ncy of the new a u t hori ties but also cre atin g a chance for enh ance d social support for them (thus, ens urin g their stability). On the other hand, the r e m a ini ng functions were bec omin g an indispe nsabl e con dition to realize the first function, which was con s i d e r e d to
be of fun damental imp ortance in this sense that it was p av ing the way for a cc ompl ishme nt of pol itic al and ide ological goals.
Omi ttin g here other factors, which were inf l u e n c i n g e f f e c -tiveness of the cen tr a l i s t i c model, the above m e n t i o n e d c i r -c u m stan -ces determined, to a big extent, ap p e a r a n c e of dil emmas facing the "state - ent erpr ise" whose sol utio n was sou ght by the state in the area of nominal " e n terp rises - p la ces of work". That sol u t i o n aimed at def i n i t i o n of con d i t i o n s for activity of e n t erpr ises so as to allow them to lose as little as pos sibl e from their basic pr o d u c t i o n fun ction in c o n n e c t i o n with the a p -p ea ring nec essi ty of e x -p a ndi ng their n o n - p r o d u c t i v e functions, with foremost among them being the soc i o - w e l f a r e and the ensuing p ol itical functions.
The for ty-year his tory of the ent e r p r i s e in the Pol ish p o -litical-social s ys tem pro v i d e s an i l l ustr ation of att empt s to solve this dilemma, with per iods of p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c crises being clinical exa mple s of und e r t a k e n steps. These steps c o n -sis ted in att achi ng greater imp orta nce to s o c i o - w e l f a r e f u n c -tions (June and October 1956, Oec embe r 1970, August 1980) and e n l a rgi ng s e l f-m anagement powers of e m p l oye es and e c o nomi c a u t o -nomy of enterprises. These were, however, s ha mmed act i v i t i e s b e -cause they never c ha nged the rules of the eco n o m i c game and m e c h ani sms d e f i n i n g their con ditions. It was stated that model of central con trol over economy can be i d e n tif ied with the essence of soc ialism, such s i t u ati on being d e s c r i b e d as "de m o c r a t i c d e -c en tra l i z a t i o n " in e-conomy, all this r e s e mbl ed shi f t i n g of the same e l e ment s w it hin the frames of as s u m e d u n c h a n g e a b l e c o n s t r u c -tion [B e k s i a k, 1976]. Pr o d u c t i v e work, on the other hand, due to its close r e l a t i o n s h i p with p r o v i s i o n of always poor market, never lost its p o l i tic al character. In p e r iod of crisis, and, thus, at times of d ra stic di s c l o s u r e of the s y s t e m ’s d i s -functions, it was ass uming the s i g n i f i c a n c e of an index of ideological and p a t r iot ic a t t i tud es and a basic sol u t i o n all owing to ove rcom e cri sis s i t u a t i o n in the propaganda.
Thus, the mai n d i l emma s a p p e ari ng in the field of activity of the "state - e n t erpr ise" res ult from the a ss umed mul t i - f u n c - tifcinal c h a r act er of e n t e r p r i s e s and at times i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i -ver gences be t w e e n the eco n o m i c and pol itic al calculus. It is
es-pecially dif ficult to solve dilemmas occ urin g when in the field of activity of ent erprises there appear economic ent ities a c -cepting per cept ion of the reality c on trad ictor y to the vision assumed in the c e n tral istic model of the fun ctio ning of the e n -terprise and the economy.
3. Adaptative model of the socialist ent erprise
The sources of d i s turb ances in assumed c e n tral istic model could be found in a mis lead ing c o n v ict ion that degree of r e s -p on siveness of -par tici -pants of the e n t e r -p r i s e ’s social system to mob iliz ing appeals of "struggle for the plan" was big enough to cope suc cess fully with req uire ments posed by cen trally planned tasks. The model of the s o c i o - e conom ic system- based on "pure economy" and ass umptions about eff ecti v e n e s s of the c e n tral istic man agem ent had to be sub mitt ed to adj ustm ents as a result of i nt ervention of the "social factor" whose needs were per form ing a secondary and less important role in the model a s s u mpt ions in relation to eco nomic par ameters and functions of the system [ N a г о j e k, 1973]. However, the atm osphere of struggle and total m o b i l i z a t i o n of the society for exe cuti on of pro duct ion ^aals (ch arac teris tic for the war economy) c ou ld not pro vide m o t i v a t i o n for the long run sel f-de nial of society even for the sake of better future. Other sources of dis tu r b a n c e s were p r i o -rities granted to def inite ind ustries res ulting in p r o gres sive dif fer e n t i a t i o n of importance and pri v i l l e g e s pos sess ed by various industrial branches, which caused that the model m o n olit h began to crack from inside. Thus, in practice, the mon o c e n t r i c system of economy was trasforming into m u l t i-u nit str ucture of group of interest, which led to gro wing d i v erge nces be t w e e n the assumed and real fun ctions of the economy. At the ent e r p r i s e level of activity, new d e t ermi nants began to man ifes t the msel ves clearly, d e t ermi nants which h a v e n ’t been con s i d e r e d yet in model a s s u m p -tions. These were the interests of e n t erpr ises and their work- -force - a sig nifi cant element of ind ustrial reality.
The ent erpr ise was bec omin g an area of c o l l isi on be t w e e n the activity strategy of the pol itical power units (external d e -terminants) and the activity strategy of emp loye es (internal
determinants). The external d e t e r m i n a n t s cre ate for mal-legal frames for activity' of the ent erpr ise, and apart from ref lect ing the strategy of e c o n o m y ’s man a g e m e n t and its functioning, they also represent the main goals of the pol itic al system. They are oriented at two basic goals - (1) p r e s e r v a t i o n of the pol itical power and its l e g i t i m izati on through e f f e c t i v e ach i e v e m e n t of eco nomic goals by the e n t e rpr ise (and the ent ire eco n o m i c system), and (2) ideological i nd octr inati on ( s o c i a l izati on) thr ough i n -fluencing awa reness and att itud es of wor kers [ J a ś k i e w i c z , 1985 ].
The internal determ i n ant s have their roots in c h a r ac t eri st ics of par t ici p ants of the e n t e r p r i s e ’s social system and its s t r u c -ture. A special role is played here by groups and ca t egories of em p l oye es and institutional ent ities ( s o cio pol it ica l o r g a n i z a -tions) dif f ering in their share in the power, varying (sometimes quite conside rably) goals and str ate g ies of activity s u b ordi n ate d to them. All pa r tic i pant s of the e n t e r p r i s e ’s social system act within the framework of co n d iti o ns det erm i ned ext e rna ll y but their different interests and exp e cta t ions ad d ress e d to the system lead to d i f f e re n tia t ion of their att i tud es and b e h a -viours.
The e n t e r p r i s e ’s fun ctio ning is an effect of adj ust m ent of its social system to co n diti ons ge n erat ed o ut side Its premises. The adjustment pro cess con sist s in mod y fyi ng the s t r at eg ie s of activit ies of the system p a r t i c i p ant s str ivin g to sa f egua r d their interests in given co n diti ons of activity. Ap p eara nce of elements of game and differe nt str a tegies of e m p l o y e e s ’ act ivi t ies on the area of the enterprise, frequen tly met d i f fe re nc es in their goals in com p ari s on with the e n t e r p r i s e ’s formal goals constit ute, as it was already mentioned, an ele ment of the reality, whi ch was not env is ag ed by the ass umtios of cen t ral ls tlc model. Such a s it uation exerts obviously its influence on the way in which the e nt erprise functions, with the scope in which it m od i f i e s its fun ctioning being dep e ndent on the scale of d iv er g e n c e s b et ween goals of the ent erp r ise and those of p ar t i c i p a n t s of Its social system.
Element s of game and interests also appear In conta ct s m a i n tai ne d by the en t erprise with external ent ities, since
ex-ternal det ermi nants resulting from the c om mand-type model of man agement favour dev elopments of n ar row l y-c on cei ve d interests c ontradictor y with the state interests (declaring a lower real productive potential, exc essive bui lding of inventories, false reports, res triction of p ro duction assortments etc.). These phenomena become symptomatic for all levels of org aniz ation and ma n agement of the economic system, with game, interest and bar gaining becoming categor ies replacing general social r a -tionality in real mec hanisms of e c o n o m y ’s functioning. They block any changes which could increase the existing margin of unc ertainty in activities of economi c ent ities [ R y c h a r d , 1980 ].
The resulting situation is cha r act e rize d with features, which verify the negatively assumed model of the "state - enterprise" and it is contrad ictory with the assumptions and ex p ectations connect ed with c on struction of the ce n tralistic model of the national economy management. Transfer of basic cha ract e ris t i cs of the e nt erprise its autonomy and e n t r epr en eur s hip to e x -ternal system of managin g economic str uctures leads in effect to auto nom iz ati o n of goals of the entire economy. The model of enterpr ise as an efectively ope r ating exe cutive unit has t r a n s formed into the model of institution adjusting itself to c o n -ditions of activity imposed upon it and striving, sim ultaneously, to pro tect its oft entime distinct, n a r r o wl y-c on c eiv e d interests. Meanwhile, e ffectivenes s of as s imilated mec ha ni sm s of ada ptation to relatively stable con ditions uf activity m in imizes pr o duction risk, and makes it unn ecessary for the ent erprise to involve fully into pro d uction activity and display in n ovativene ss in its o p e r a -tions. This u nd ermines the eff ecti v ene s s of pro du ct ion and s o -c ia liza tion fun-ctions assumed in the model. The ultimate result is a mix of determinants, being negativ e from social and e c o -nomic points of view, cau sing that ad a ptability becomes a basic skill to be pos s essed by all units of the eco nomic system.
4. Dilemmas of the reform
The abs ence of natural m e c han i sms regulating social and e c o -nomic life in soc i alism accounts for the fact that each social
cha nge must be ge n erat ed wit hin the p ol itical ce n t re of power. Str ong int er re la tio ns hip s of economy with the ideol og ica l sphere and ide ol og iz ati on of the society fun cti o ning model cause that the ex i stin g sol u tions tend to petrify t h e m sel ve s [ S z с z e- p a ń s k i , 1973 ].
P e t r ifi ca tio n m e c h ani sm s fixed within the as s u m e d model of social reality in Poland are very deep rooted and to ove rcome them is the main c on dition of any suc ces s ful attempt at the reform of the exi sting .reality. Apart from id e o l o g i z a t i o n for which the exi sting political, economic, a dm i n i s t r a t i v e and social str u ctu r es are sy n o nym ous with s o c i al i sm - p e r m a n e n c e of the model is g en erated from the logic of ada pt at ive act i v i t i e s of p o -litical and eco nomic ent ities (social groups and o rg anization s). Each change in the existing thus rec ogn i zed sit u a t i o n c o n s tit u tes a danger of r es tricting their present po s s i b i l i t i e s of att aining goals and interests. The strategy of their activ it y is to block any re f ormatory initiatives. Low ef f e c t i v e n e s s in economy, h o w -ever, provokes the Centre to make att empts at its recovery.
All attempt s of eco nomic reforms whi ch hav e been made so far prove that the Centre con fines the main reasons of poor economi c si t uati o n to the area of the enterprise. Also the legal r e g u l a -tions co n n ect ed with the last ref orm of eco n omy (1901) mainly c oncern the e nt er pr is es (bills of 1981 about e n t e r p r i s e and self- -managed wor kers councils). The ent erp r ise is d e s c r i b e d there as autonomous, s el f- ma nag ed in s t itu tion s e l f - f i n a n c i n g its activity - therefore - having orga niz at ion a l and wor k - f o r c e entity. Legal o pp or t u n i t i e s have been created to change the pre s e n t concept of role and function of ent erprise in the e co n omi c s ys te m on c o n d it ion that changes will follow as regards m e c h a n i s m s of f u n c t i o n -ing of this system, conseq u ent ly also cha n ges in the pol itical system. Up till now, no such changes have bee n observed, and the reform in its present form does not influence inc reas e of e f -fe c tiveness in economy. The politic al cen tre still faces obs ta cl es dif ficult to o ve rcom e and must ans wer qu e stio n s as: (1) is it pos sib l e to reconcile the central p l a nn in g and s u b o r d i n a t i o n of economy to pol itical goals with autonomy of p r o d u c t i o n enterprises, (2) how to reconcile autonomy of ent e r p r i s e with p ri or it y of national economy goals, (3) how to re c o nci l e a u t onom y and
selfmanagement of ent e rprise keeping the att ribute of e n t r e p r e n e u r ship o ut side its area (governement p a r t ici p ati o n in the d i s t r i b u -tion of means and raw materials), (4) how to rec oncile self- -fi nancing of ent erprise with suppressive tendency towards auto- nom i zat i on of its goals in relatio n to goals of the whole economy and political Interests of the Centre.
Such sit uation at the same time makes it impossible to achieve the main goal of the reform - i.e. increase of active pro duc t ion involvement of enterpr ises and their employees. A nt icipating the point of view represented by the Centre - two-out of three fundamental assumptions of the reform autonomy and s e l f m a n a g e -ment - con sti t ute only means leading to this goal. They aim at rel easing social factors of p ro duction (involvement, innovation propensity, savings etc.). Self-financing, as the third element of changes, is to ensure in en t e rpr ise a priorit y for the p r o d u c -tion func-tion, mitiga t e the pressure of e m p l o y e e s ’ claims on managem ent of en t erprise and the state by sub or di na tin g the scope of benefits pr o vide d wit hin the framework of soc i o-w e lfar e to eff e cti v enes s with which economic goals, str ictly c on nec t ed with production, are achieved.
M od if ic a t i o n s of the model of ce n t ral ly m a n ag ed economy p e r -formed mainly at the level of the ent e rpr i se create situation, in which re s p ons ability for success of the reform, pro ductive activity, e c o nom i c eff e cti ve nes s of e n t e rpr i ses and the entire economy is sh i fte d from the Centre onto e n t er pr is es and their workforce. This aspect of reform enhance s the p ri orit y of p r o -duction functio n and becomes c ommon goal of the Centre, e n t e r -pri ses and employees. The s ig ni fi can ce of the political function is not u n d e r m i n e d at all, but is being e qu ippe d wit h a more c o n -crete dim e nsi on of good and efficient work. The remaini ng f u n c -tions of the ent erprise must be limited in such a situation, with o d i um of res p onsahili ty for their p e r for m anc e resting, to some extent, on emp loyees themselves. It also con tri b u tes to dev el op ing a sense of c o r espo n sib i lity for the c o u n t r y ’s economi c s it uation among employees.
In consistenc y in exe c ution of the reform as s umptions in areas lying out si de the ent erpr i se wea ke ns its basic elements such as inc reased r ights of ent er pr ise and consequently, sev eres the
assumed ties between a change in the e n t e rp r ise s i t u a t i o n and increase in economi c e f f e cti v ene s s of man a g e m e n t on the global s c a l e .
A differe nt group of issues appears if we c on s i d e r the point of view rep res e n ted by individual and group e n t i tie s con s t i t u t i n g the social sy stem of enterprise. Assumed ch a nges in the reform must also affect the pos sibi lity of r e a li za tio n of their goals and interests together with pre sent str ategy of ac t ivi t i es within the enterprise.
On the area of ent e rpr i se there is a c o n f r o n t a t i o n of m e -c ha ni sm s and goals of reform viewed from the C e n t re' s p e r sp e-c ti ve and exp ec ta ti ons of ent erp r ises and e m p l oye e s c o n n e c t e d with the r e f o r m . On the one hand the reform is vie wed as a tool to Increase e ff ecti vity of work, on the other hand - as a v ar iab l e a ff ecting pos sib i lit y of rea liza tion of individual and group interests (power, prestige, career, entity in ind ustrial and hu man r e -lat ionships etc.). Oistrus t of e mp loy e es (society) towards I n -tentions of C e n t r e ’s activities, fear of bei ng bur d e n e d with main costs co n nec t ed with coming out of the e c o no mi c crisis, together with limited m o t iva t i on of payment (Inflation, m ar ket shortages) may result in effects con trary to the r e f o r m e r s ’ expectations . Insted of p r e r e q u isi te social rea d iness to p a r t i c i p a t e in the re form and increased pro d uct iv e act ivity the e mp lo y e e s may exert pr e ssur e on devel op men t of social and pro t e c t i v e fu n c tio ns of the ent erprise (natural service s and b en e fit s such as flats, con sumer durables* etc.).
R ef or ma ti on of Polish economy, being r e s t ri c t ed to the level of enterprise, has again failed Its goals In the p os t- wa r history of Poland and the reformers are c o n st an tl y facing the same d i l e m m a s .
The most important pro b lem res ults from the absence of a model mec hani s ms that would boost the e co no mi c system, In c reas ing ela st ic ity of Its functioning. Reforms always follow c ol la ps e of ec o nomi c and political ass umptions, they are thus, Imp lemented in u n f a v ou r abl e conditions. Such sit ua ti on I nc reases e f f e cti vi ty of per f o r m a n c e s aiming at b l o c kin g all cha nge s by those, whose feel e n d an ge red since their in t eres ts wer e In e x i s t i n g conditions. Po l l t l z a t l o n of economy c h a r a c t e r i s t i c for c e n t ra l l y p la n n e d and
control led model makes it easy to refer to political and id e o l o -gical arguments both by those who strive for changes and by those who perceive symptoms of socio-p olitical d ev iations in changes. The next p r o b lem appears - what are the limits of system identity. It is an extremely dif ficult problem to solve in a sit uation where each change imp lemented in the exi sting model of social life may be con sid e red as violation of system identification.
These pro blems result in lack of c o n sequ e nce in change of co n diti ons in which economy functions, uns ucce ssful attempts of re c onci liation of centrally co n trolled economy with autonomy of ent erprises and permanent coexi st en ce of two models c e n t r a l i s -tic and adaptative.
5. An outline of a new model
Almost 10 years old period of ref orming Polish system of economy may give riste to a question about the pos sib i liti e s of solving dilem ma s p re sented earlier. An attempt at finding the answer must be p re cede d by the de f init ion of the cha racter and pr e requ i sit e d e t erm i n ing reformatory activities.
The mea nin g attached to the idea of "economic reform" coded о social c o n s c i o u s n e s s is res tric ted to c ha nges of economic s t r u ctu res in such a way that they would increase their effec- tivity. The idea of eco nomic r a t iona lity based on rel atio n of goals (production, division) and incurred costs.
Eco nomi c cal culu s in so c i a l i s m based on these rel atio ns is sub o r d i n a t i v e to pol itical cal culus e n c o m p a s s i n g larger class of p h e n ome na than eco nomy and dif fere nt criteria of effectivity. These cri t e r i a can be boiled down to ens uring power for com munist party which gives full control over social life in this also over eco nomi c system of the state [B i e ł у с h, I960]. E c o -nomic ref orm in s o c i ali sm (ce ntrally con t r o l l e d model) has not only pol itic al asp ects but is an evident e xa mple of political activity. I n c r eas ed e f f ecti vity of eno nomi c s ys tem is a str ateg ic political goal of the Centre (power). It is m a n i f e s t e d by the party control over "forces, groups and forms of activity des irab le from the p o l i t i c a l point of view" and enc o u r a g e m e n t of only such
social forces to active p e r fo rm anc e [ S z c z e p a ń s k i , 1972 ]. It conc ern s also industrial ent er pr is e and activi t y of entitie s ope rating there.
Political p r e r equ is ite s of the reform make it p o s s ibl e to expand int er pretati on of p he no me na c o n n e ct ed with fun cti o nin g of economic i ns titution and enhance influence of model disfu nc tio n of political -economic s ys tem on tensions and con fl ic ts exi sting within the enterprise. The source of low e f f e cti vi ty of economic system lies outside enterprise. They are rooted in model a s -sumptio ns of cen t rally c on tr ol ed political sy stem c ha r a c t e r i s t i c for P olish variant of s oc ial i sm [ S t a n i s z k i s , 1980; J a ś k i e w i c z , 1985]. The influence of pol itical and system factors on fu n ctioning of economy and fai lure of the r e f o r -matory pro ce ss cla rifies reasons of eco nomi c crisis in postwar Poland [t a r a s , 1986 ].
The present function of the ent e rpr i se and chances to change the c o n d iti on s of its act ivity will bec ome real, when the rules of economic game are changed, together with the e x i st in g political system. The change of pol itical s ys tem c on st i t u t e s an i n d i s p e n s -able c on dit i on for the suc cessful i mp lem e nta ti on of r eform in Polish economy.
Social relatio ns in so c iali sm can be seen an the resultant of mut ual l y referen ces of two social groups - "the ‘ decider s" and "employees". The first group r ep resents the cen tre of political power and therefore, their activity (mainly legal and regulatory) is directe d at stimul a t ion s of e m p l o y e e s ’ re a ctio ns comp lai sa nt with the interests of power. The b eh aviour of e mp loy e es often div erges from "the d e c i d e r s ’" e x p e c t a t i o n s and give rise to s u b -sequent regulatory reactions w hich change the pr e viou s ones which in the p o w e r ’s opinion were not perfect enough. The intentional activity of "the deciders" p ro vo k i n g s p o nt an eou s r ea cti o ns of employees cre at e a tangle of mutual i n t e rr e a ctio ns c h a r a c t e r i s t i c for social relations in soc ia li sm [ N a r o j e k , 1973].
Ref erring to this vision of double- ent it ies , the po s sibi l i t i e s of change in c on ditions of ent e rpr is e activity depend on the readiness of decid er s to change political concept of power in the sys tem and also to lift off the p ri orit y of p ol i tic s over economy. Proper legal reg ula t ions should be the index of c e n t r e ’s readine ss
to introduce political changes. They would create conditions for political and in con sequence decisive pluralism. The d e c i d e r s ’s activities would Be self restrict their own power, thus, they would be u np rece dente d in the postwar history of Poland. The centre of power would again face the dilemma acc ompa nying all attempts of reforms in socialism - def i nition and the extent of changes acceptable within the sys tem identity. Each solution ful filling the condition of pre serving entity of economic o r g a -niz ations (enterprise), employees and political entity of society has a chance of full success in economic reforms.
Assuming that such activities of the centre are realistic, they would create essential changes in co n d iti ons of enterpr ise activity and orientate it towards economic rationality. O r g a -nizational entity (autonomy) makes it possibl e to change e n -terprise goals and strategy of activity. Emphasi s put on p r o d u c -tive function shifts the area of game from economic centre to the market, and the game of interests is played with other producers. The c om peti tion of market offers replaces lobbistic pre ssures and bar gaining with the centre. It influences criteria of p r o d u c tion profitability. Also, it exerts pressure on eco nomic r a t i o n a -lization in en t erprise structure and changes c on diti ons of its performance. The social system of enterprise u nd ergoes changes and present str ategies of its par ticipants. Thus, the fundamental nanges would occur in enterprise functions they would affect outside relations with the system and internal structure. We would be able to speak about the change of. present, socialistic
model of enterprise.
Res toration of classical att ributes of en t e rpr ise such as autonomy, self-fi n anc i ng and entrepr eneurship, do not solve to full extent the problem of economic eff ectivity of the system. This goal may be limited by the reaction of its social entities. Dilemmas of how to reconcile c on tr ad ic tio ns bet we en pro duct ion function and social function may appear in the enterprise. E c o -nomic arguments may contradict social goals, and e m p l o y e e s ’ (self- -management) and e n t e r p r i s e ’s ent ities (autonomy) may be exp loited to obstruct rat io na liz at io n pro cesses and pre f ere nc e may be granted to narrowly conceived interests. This pes sim i s tic variant is based on the assumption that e ff ects of cri sis (shortage of
resources, raw materials, con sume r dur ables) exert st r onge r i n -fluence on strategy • of ent e rpr is e p e r f orm a nce than p ol itical and social effects resulting from sel f -l i m i t a t i o n of cen tre of power. Since there is probab i lit y that such sit ua t i o n may occur, the con cept of “man ager ial" e n t er pr ise based on sole d o m i na n ce of eco nomic c al culu s and pro fes s i ona l skills of emp l oye es seems unreal. Social bar rie r s ex i stin g in ent er pr is e w ould hinder its im p lementation alt hough that would be the most ef f ec t i v e way to cure Pol ish economy.
Another variant of sc e nari o ass umes that e nt e r p r i s e ( e m -ployees) will be ready to cover the costs c o n n e c t e d with lifting economy from cr isis in exchang e for cha ng es in political s ystem (political pluralism, democracy). In such si t u ati o n it would be ne c essa ry to a bandon e x p e c ta tio ns and dem an ds d ir e c t e d at centre, to grant agr eement for the pr i orit y of p ro d u c t i v e function, to be ready to bear costs c o n n ect e d with r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of e n t e r -prise structure. In other words se l f l i m i t a t i o n of e m p l o y e e s ’ int erests w ou ld be essential in such situation. E m p l o y e e s ’ e n -tity (se lf -m anagement) may c o n st it ute an important e le ment which would mak e the i m p l eme nta ti o n of such variant possible. The main role of e m p l o y e e s ’ s e l f - ma n agem e nt would boil down to - apart from d e f in it ion of e nt erprise strategy of activit y - c on tr o l l i n g man age m ent dec i sions and saf e g u a r d i n g fun dame ntal interes ts of personnel. The s el f-m a n a g e m e n t cou ncil w ould on the one hand res trict the m an agerial a c t iv it ies of the dir ec to rs on the- other hand - ensure the fee ling of sec uri t y and ca u s a t i v i t y and closer iden tif ic ati o n of em p loye es wit h e n t e rpr i se goa ls [ G l i s z -c z y ń s k a , 19813. E m p l o y e e s ’ entity rooted in the "self- m a n a g e r i a l ” c on cept of ent e rpr i se c on st i t u t e s essential, alt hough ins ufficient c on di ti on of s u c c ess in e co nom i c reform. It may, however, exert a positi v e in f l uen ce on p ro ce s s e s of cha nges if the e n t e rp r i se finally obt a ins pos s ib i l i t i e s to rea lize the re m aini ng a tt ributes of r ef orm - autonomy and s e l f - f i n a n c i n g (gr anted ac c ord i n g to bill in 1981).
Self r e s t ric ti on of the Cen tre and change of its fun ctio n in eco nomic s ys te m will change the model of e n t e rpr is e and its role in this system. The e n t erpr i se will a pp ro ac h the p ro d u c t i v e in-st i tu t i o n who se activ it y is b a s ed on e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p and
readi-neas to bear risks connected with such activity. The internal structure of enterprise will be based on or g ani zational and e c o -nomic rationality. These features approxi mate the model to cla ssical def inition of enterprise. Features of model must e m -phasize the role of sel f-management ins titutions g ua rant eeing social entity of employees. The model must reconcile economic rationality (goal of reform) with social rat ionality (decisive conditi on for its success), therefore it can be de s crib ed as "self governed and managerial".
The chances of creating such model of enterpr ise lie outside its area. They depend on change of soc io e con om ic s ystem and c o n -sequence of the centre in p ut ting an end to 40 years of e c o -nomic experimentations.
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Artykuł wpłynął do Redakcji w 1988 r.
Włod zim i erz Jaśkiewicz
P R Z E D SI Ę BIO R ST WO JAKO INS T YTUCJA W POLSCE
Artykuł opi euje prz e miany mo delu p r z e d s i ę b i o r s t w a w k o n t e k ście waru nkó w jego f un kcjonowan ia w syst emi e p o l i t y c z n o g o s p o d a r -czym. Do m i nac ja celów p o l i ty c zn ych w życiu g o s p o d a r c z y m i s p o ł e cznym oraz cechy stworzonego po w oj nie modelu or g an i z a c j i s p o ł e c z -nej znalazły swoje odb icie w z ał ożo n ym modelu p r z e dsi ę bio r s twa . Stanowi ło ono filię cen tral n ie z ar z ą d z a n e g o " p a ń s t w a - p r z e d s i ę b i o r ■ stwa", a przeds i ębi or czo ść , s a m o f i n a n s o w a n i e i sa m o d z i e l n o ś ć były p r z y pis a ne Cen tr um po l ity c z n o g o s p o d a r c z e m u . P o z b a w i o n e s w o -ich d ef ini c y j n y c h atrybutów, poddane ścisłej kontr ol i po l it y c z n e j i adminis tracy j nej , było zmu szone rea lizować, obok pr o dukc ji, n a -rzucone funkcje po z apr o d u k c y j n e (w tym - polityc zn e). Pełniły one ważną rolę w założonej strategii ind oktr yn acj i ide ol og i c z n e j i p o l i tyc zn ej p ra co wn ik ów i społeczeństwa. Założona w i e lof u nkc yj - ność rodziła dylematy op t yma l i z a c j i p o s z c z e g ó l n y c h funkcji (sprze czność rac hunku po l ity c zneg o i ek o nom i c zne g o), w y n i k a j ą c e nie tylko z o d m i enn y ch logik racjonalnośc i, ale także z n e g at yw nyc h k on sekw encji w pos ta wa ch i s t r a teg ia ch d z i ał ań p r a c o w n l . r ^ v n b
(działania pozorne, partykularyzm, grupy interesu). Rac jonalność zał ożonego modelu prz ed si ębi or st wa jest zastępowana r a c j o n a l n o ścią adaptacji w działaniach, z ab ez pi eczającej org aniz acyjn e i g r u -powe interesy. Niezmi e nno ść warunków dzi ałania przedsi ę bior s twa (gospodarki) wpł ywała na dużą sk u teczność wyu czo n ych sposobów działań chron ią cy ch różne interesy. Stwarzało to poczuci e b e z p ie czeń stwa u c z e stn ik om systemu spo łecznego p r z eds i ębio r stw a ( g o s -podarki), ale jed nocześnie h am ował o próby wprow ad zan ia zmian. Wsz ystkie dot ychc zas ow e zmiany, nie zmieniając zasad systemu p o -li t yczn o -gospodar czego, nie mogły wpł ynąć na większą ef e ktywność ek o nomiczną przedsiębior stwa. Istotne bariery reformy gospodarki z 1981 r. stanowią, założone przez centrum, granice identyfikacji soc j ali s tycz n ego systemu (atrybut ce n tral izacj i władzy p o l i t y c z nej i gospoda rczej) oraz zakres gotowości pon oszenia kosztów r e -formy przez pracowników. Wza jemne s a m o o g r a nicz an ie interesów s t w a -rza szansę na nowy model pr z eds i ę bio r stw a w Polsce (menedżersko- - s a m o r z ą d o w y ).
