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Rzym antyczny Polityka i pieniądz The Ancient Rome Politics and Money

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NR 3200

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Rzym antyczny Polityka i pieniądz The Ancient Rome Politics and Money

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Azja Mniejsza w czasach rzymskich Asia Minor in Roman Times

Pod redakcją

Wiesława Kaczanowicza

Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego • Katowice 2014

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SYLWESTER FERTACZ Recenzent LESZEK MROZEWICZ

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Contents

Wprowadzenie (Wiesław Kaczanowicz) 7 Önsöz (Wiesław Kaczanowicz) 9 Introduction (Wiesław Kaczanowicz) 11 Marek Jan OlbRycht: the Pontic Kingdom, Arsacid Iran and Armenia: Remarks

on the Political Strategy of Mithradates VI Eupator (until 89 b c ) 13 tomasz ŁAdOń: l Fannius and l Magius: Fimbriani or Sertoriani? 29 Norbert ROgOSz: the Roman Republic and the Parthian threat of the Eastern

Provinces in years 53—50 b c 41 Agnieszka bARtNIK: Храм и статуя Дианы Эфесской по изображениям на

монетах периода Римскй Империи 64 Wojciech bORuch: the Role of Familial Propaganda in the coinage of the Pro-

vince of Asia during the Reign of Julio-claudian dynasty 85 Krzysztof ŚcISŁO: the Provinces of Asia Minor in caesar trajan’s Policy

(98—117 A d ) Outline of Issues 106 Przemysław dyRlAgA: Selected Aspects of Relations between the Imperial

Power and the Provincial cities during the Reign of the Emperor Macrinus (with Emphasis on the Region of Asia Minor) 123 Agata A KluczEK: « Vue d’Asie Mineure » sur les problèmes de la crise

du IIIe siècle dans l’Empire romain les thèmes monétaires à cyzique (276 apr J -c ) 139

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Agata A KluczEK: Quelques remarques sur l`iconographie des médaillons de Probus du type virtus Augusti triumfum Gotthicum 159 Rafał KOSIńSKI: Nostalgia or a Political Necessity? the background of the

Emperor zeno’s Numerous donations in Isauria 173

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Wprowadzenie

Oddajemy do rąk czytelników już piąty z kolei tom serii wydawniczej

„Rzym Antyczny Polityka i pieniądz” Seria ta jest rezultatem zainteresowań i prac badawczych prowadzonych przez pracowników zakładu historii Staro- żytnej uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach Profil naukowy naszego zakła- du dotyczy bowiem w głównej mierze historii starożytnego Rzymu, a przede wszystkim numizmatyki tego państwa

Niniejszy tom różni się w swoich założeniach od poprzednich czterech Wcześniejsze dotyczyły różnych aspektów historii, a szczególnie historii pie- niądza na całym terytorium państwa rzymskiego i obszarach ościennych Piąty tom odnosi się natomiast jedynie do Azji Mniejszej oraz spraw małoazjatyc- kich, zawierając przy tym artykuły zarówno pracowników zakładu historii Starożytnej uniwersytetu Śląskiego, jak i zaproszonych gości Wachlarz za- prezentowanej problematyki jest jednocześnie bardzo szeroki chronologicznie dotyczy on bowiem kwestii Małej Azji w dziejach późnej Republiki Rzymskiej oraz w czasach Imperium Rzymskiego aż po wczesne bizancjum tematycz- nie nawiązuje natomiast do spraw historii politycznej tego regionu, a także do tamtejszych kwestii ideologicznych, kulturowych, religijnych oraz społecznych Polski czytelnik otrzymuje w ten sposób szeroki, panoramiczny obraz historii Małej Azji w czasach rzymskich, a dzięki bogatemu aparatowi naukowemu w postaci stanów badań nad poszczególnymi problemami i cytowanej literatury przedmiotu — wiedzę co do światowych studiów o tym obszarze w starożytno- ści rzymskiej czytelnicy spoza Polski otrzymują natomiast w ten sposób wgląd w główne profile polskich zainteresowań badawczych nad tym fascynującym rejonem w tamtych czasach

Wiesław Kaczanowicz

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Önsöz

„Eski Roma Siyaset ve Para” kitap serisinin beşinci ciltini Okuyuculara tanıtıyoruz bu seri Katowice’deki Silezya Üniversitesi’nin Eski tarih bölü- münün araştırmacılarının ilgileri ve araştırmalarının sonucudur Çünkü bölümü- müzün bilimsel profili Eski Roma tarihi ve öncelikle bu ülkenin numismatiği ile ilgilidir

Sunulan beşinci ciltin varsayımları önceki dört ciltin varsayımlarından ayrılır Öncekiler tarihinin farklı acıları ve özellikle Roma’nın bütün alanında ve komşu ulkelerinde para tarihi ile ilgilendi Oysa ki beşinci cilt sadece Küçük Asya (Anadolu) ve onunla ilgili meseleler ile alakalıdır Ayrıca bu kitap hem Silezya Üniversitesi’nin araştırmacıları hem de davet edilmiş misafirlerin makalelerini içinde barındırır Aynı zamanda sunulan problemler geniş alana yayılır Kronolojik olarak geç Roma cumhuriyeti ve erken bizans devrine kadar Roma İmparatorluğu zamanındaki Küçük Asya ile ilgili meselelere dokunur Konusal olarak Anadolu bölgesinin siyasal tarihi yanı sıra ideolojik, kültürel, dinsel ve sosyal sorunlarını anlatır bunun sayesinde Polonyalı Okuyucu Roma döneminde Küçük Asya’nin tarihinin geniş, panoramik görüşünü elde edebilir buna ek olarak, belirli meseleler uzerine yapılan araştırmaların sonuçları yada alıntı yapılmış feyizli edebiyat gibi zengin araştırma araçlarının sayesinde Eski Roma döneminde bu alanlarla ilgili dunyadaki araştırmalar hakkında bilgi sahibi olabilir Aynı zamanda, böylece yabancı Okuyucular Polonya’da bu büyüleyici bolge üzerine yapılan araştırmaların ana profilini öğrenebilir

Wiesław Kaczanowicz

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Introduction

We pass the fifth volume of the series Ancient Rome. Politics and Money into the hands of Readers this series is a result of interests and researches conducted by the employees of the Ancient history department at the univer- sity of Silesia in Katowice the scientific profile of our department concerns mainly the history of ancient Rome and, above all, numismatics of this country

As far as its assumptions are concerned, this volume differs from the four previous Earlier volumes concerned various aspects of history and, particularly, the history of money in the whole territory of the Roman Empire and neigh- bouring areas the fifth volume relates only to Asia Minor and its issues and includes articles written by both the employees of the Ancient history depart- ment of the university of Silesia and invited guests therefore, the range of presented problems is very wide chronologically-wise, it concerns the issues of Asia Minor in the history of the late Roman Republic and at the time of Roman Empire until early byzantium the subject of this volume refers to the political history of this region as well as to the ideological, cultural, religious and social issues thus, Polish readers gain a wide, panoramic image of the history of Asia Minor during Roman times and, thanks to a wide scientific system represented by the current state of research and plenty of quotations from reference books, knowledge of global studies about this area at the time of ancient Rome Read- ers outside Poland, in turn, acquire insight into main scientific profiles of Polish researches concerning this fascinating region at that time

Wiesław Kaczanowicz

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MAREK JAn OLbRYCHT

The Pontic Kingdom, Arsacid Iran and Armenia:

Remarks on the Political Strategy of Mithradates VI Eupator (until 89 b.C.)

After Mithradates VI Eupator had noticed the Ro- man expensionary policy in Anatola, he formulated precise war aims and political plans which, in con- temporary terms, may be called a military and politi- cal strategy the Roman state posed a threat of sub- jugating the whole Anatolia coupled with efforts of incorporating them having correctly identified the capabilities and intentions of Rome, Eupator aimed at consolidation inside the Pontic state and strengthening its position vis-à-vis neighbouring powers because his assessment of the above-mentioned threats was correct he was able to fight Rome for more than 25 years

to start with, the notion of military strategy needs some explanation Military strategy is defined as the art of designing and managing military cam- paigns but military factors are inseparable from the non-military ones in conducting the war and in schemes designed for securing the peace the starting point of all strategic planning and actions is state policy conducted by its leaders carl von clausewitz, one of the greatest students of strategy, summarised this relation in the following words: “War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by other means ” the same ideas flourished in antiquity, too 1 thus, one have

1 E l W h e e l e r: “Methodological limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part II ” The Journal of Military History, vol 57, no 2, 1993, p 221

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to distinguish between political and military aspects of strategy Political factors of strategy comprise state policy (sometimes formulated as political programmes) as well as the enemy’s policy and intentions Military strategy deals with the state of the armed forces, aims of campaigns, the theatre of war (including bases of operations and lines of communication), principles of preparedness, and coalition warfare It can be inferred from the source material that the political strategy of Eupator towards Rome was based upon the programme which consisted of the following postulates:

1 building the kingdom and its economic as well as military ressources 2 Subjugating/conquering new territories in the black Sea area, chiefly beyond

the Roman sphere of control or interest in the black Sea area

3 gaining new powerful allies, including the Parthian empire and Parthian- dominated Armenia

Issues pertaining to the points 1 and 2 have been investigated by the his- torians for a long time Eupator attached utmost importance to the erection of fortifications and strongholds during the internal consolidation of the kingdom, the fortified centres made the basis for the dynasty at the same time becom- ing the elements of defence system against the aggression of the neighbouring powers For instance, Eupator established his hold on Armenia Minor and the adjacent country by erecting 75 forts where he deposited most of his treasures (Strab 12 3 28) to avoid a direct confrontation with Rome, Mithradates Eupa- tor’s first greater military operations were in countries around the eastern and northern shores of the black Sea 2 control over Armenia Minor and Kolchis was gained probably during or after the crimean campaigns 3 then Eupator turned his attention to Anatolian kingdoms, whereupon military operations against Paphlagonia, galatia and Kappadokia ensued 4

2 h h e i n e n: “Mithradates VI Eupator, chersonesos und die Skythenkönige Kontro- versen um Appian, Mithr 12f und Memnon 22,3f ” In: Roms auswärtige Freunde in der späten Republik und im frühen Prinzipat hrsg A c o ş k u n göttingen 2005, pp 75—90; F d e c a l l a t a ÿ: L’histoire des guerres mithridatiques vue par les monnaies (Numismatica Lovaniensia 18) louvain-la-Neuve 1997, pp 245—264; cf M J O l b r y c h t: “Mithradates VI Eupa- tor, der bosporos und die sarmatischen Völker ” W: Kimmerowie, Scytowie, Sarmaci. Księga poświęcona pamięci Profesora Tadeusza Sulimirskiego Red J c h o c h o r o w s k i Kraków 2004, pp 331—347; I d e m: “bosporos, the Steppe Peoples of the black Sea Area and Parthian Iran in the grand Strategy of Mithradates VI Eupator ” In: Bospor Kimmeriyskiy i varvarskiy mir v period antichnosti i srednevekov’ya. Militaria Ed V N z i n k o Kerč 2008, pp 324—325

3 For Kolchis as part of the Eupator’s empire, see Strab 11 2 18; Memnon FGrHist 434 F 22 3 For Armenia Minor, see Strab 12 3 28 cf E A M o l e v: “Malaya Armenia i Mitridat ” In: Problemy antichnoy istorii i kultury 1 Erevan 1979, p 188; d b S h e l o v: “Kolkhida v sisteme Pontiyskoi derzhavy Mitridata VI ” VDI, vol 3, 1980, pp 28—43; F d e c a l l a t a ÿ:

L’histoire..., p 253

4 On the history of cappadokia, see R d S u l l i v a n:   “the dynasty of cappadocia ” ANRW II 7, 1980, pp 1125—1168; I d e m: Near Eastern Royalty and Rome, 100—33 B.C.

toronto 1990

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the present study focuses on Eupator’s efforts to gain support from Arsacid Iran and Parthian-dominated Armenia (point 3) until 89 b c concerning the Eupator’s basic security objectives and war preparations, the position of Arsacid Iran was essential Sources point to the existence of vivid relations between Eupator and the Arsacid empire under Mithradates II (122—87 b c ), one of the greatest Parthian kings because of his achievements some antique accounts call him “the great ”5 Armenia, which remained an Arsacid vassal at this time, played a special role in the relationship between Parthia and Pontos

***

Iustinus (42 2 6) claims that Mithradates II made war on “Artoadistes,”

king of Armenia — ad postremum Artoadisti, Armeniorum regi, bellum intulit.

the mention directly follows an account of wars against the “Scythians,” i e nomads of central Asia later Iustinus focuses on a digression about the origins of Armenian kings, embellishing it with legendary themes, which makes histori- cal analysis difficult (Iust 42 2 7—42 3 9) but even in this digression there are realistic references which deserve attention For one thing, Armenia is accurately depicted as a country which then played a dominant role in transcaucasia, i e in the area from cappadokia to the caspian Sea 6 Furthermore, two men- tions of caucasian Albania (42 3 4, 42 3 7), although shrouded in myth, suggest that the country was then closely linked with Armenia, and, by extension, with Parthia Probably Albania, like Armenia, had recognized Parthian hegemony Since Albania offered the most convenient transit routes from caspian steppes to Iran, it was a strategically important country for the Arsacids to be able to defend transcaucasia and the entire empire against the nomads from the north

In Prologus libri XLII, trogus makes a general mention of Mithradates II’s war against Armenia: Phrati successit rex Mithridates cognomine Magnus, qui Armeniis bellum intulit. trogus is wrong in saying that Mithradates was the suc- cessor of Phraates II; in reality he reigned after Artabanos I In Prologus libri XLII there appears the Armenian ruler tigranes, a hostage at the court of Mithra- dates II and later (from 96 b c ) a Parthian vassal in Armenia: In Parthicis ut est constitutum imperium per Arsacem regem. Successores deinde eius Artabanus

5 Iust 42 2 3: Mithridates [...] cui res gestae Magni cognomen dedere; quippe claritatem parentum aemulatione virtutis accensus animi magnitudine supergreditur cf trog Prol 42 On Mithradates II the great, see N c d e b e v o i s e: A Political History of Parthia chicago 1938, pp 40—50; M J O l b r y c h t: Parthia et ulteriores gentes. Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen dem arsakidischen Iran und den Nomaden der eurasischen Steppen (Quellen und Forschungen zur Antiken Welt, bd 30) München 1998, pp 96—105

6 Iustinus says that “it is not right that so great a kingdom should be passed in silence, since its territory, next to that of Parthia, is of greater extent than any other kingdom.” According to him, Armenia stretches over a space of 1,100 miles, and is 700 miles in breadth from cappadokia to the caspian Sea (42 2 7—9).

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et Tigranes cognomine Deus, a quo subacta est Media et Mesopotamia. that Tigranes cognomine Deus must be tigranes of Armenia during his conquests (from c 80 b c ), when he used the title theos (latin Deus) Along with him Iustinus mentions one Artabanos this passage has aroused much controversy in historical research the mention of tigranes (96—55 b c ) right after an account of the origins of the Parthians under Arsaces I (247—211 b c ) is clearly an error by the epitomist 7 Not impossibly, the Artabanos mentioned together with tigranes really stands for Artabazes, or Artavasdes, king of Armenia 8

the Arsacid intervention in Armenia resulted in that country being included in the Imperium Parthicum While Iustinus calls the Armenian king opposing the Parthians by the name of Artoadistes, which is a distorted form of Artavas- des, the tigranes handed over to the Parthians as a hostage was, according to Appian (Syr. 48), a son of tigranes: “tigranes, the son of tigranes, king of Armenia, who had subdued many of the neighbouring nations which had kings of their own, and from these exploits had acquired the title of King of Kings ” this confusion may be explained as follows: Artavasdes was killed fighting the Parthians, and his probable successor tigranes (I), made a deal with them and handed over his son tigranes (II) as a hostage

Iustinus’s account implies that the conquest of Armenia occurred after a ma- jor crackdown on the nomads, which occured certainly after 119 9 the probable terminus ante quem is the year 110, when Mithradates II assumed the “King of Kings” title In the year 111, Mithradates II engaged in an intervention in the empire’s north west babylonian Astronomical Diaries of the time speak of an attack on the land of hanigalbat (month V, year 201 of the Seleukid era, i e 8 August—6 September 111 b c ) 10 An earlier babylonian text from 165 b c identifies the “land of habigalbat” as Armenia.11 considering that about 113—111 b c the Parthians were deeply engaged on the Syrian frontier,

7 therefore, the whole passage in Parthicis ut est constitutum Dictusque in excessu Ara- biae situs was moved by A von gutschmid (in an edition of Iustinus by Ruehl) to the prologue of book XlII details are referred to in M S c h o t t k y: Media Atropatene und Gross-Armenien in hellenistischer Zeit bonn 1989, p 209

8 J M a r q u a r t: Eranšahr nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenac‘i (=Abh Königl ges der Wiss göttingen, phil -hist Klasse, N F III, no 2) berlin 1901, p 645; M S c h o t t k y:

Media..., pp 211—212

9 See M J O l b r y c h t: Arsakid Iran and the Steppe Peoples of Central Eurasia leiden 2011 (forthcoming)

10 A.J. S a c h s, h h u n g e r: Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia.

Vol III: Diaries from 164 B.C. to 61 B.C. Texts (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften Philosophisch-historische Klasse denkschriften 247 band) Vienna 1996, pp. 346—347, no. 110;

G. d e l M o n t e: Testi dalla Babilonia Hellenistica Vol I: Testi Cronografici Pisa—Roma 1997, pp. 153—154.

11 G. d e l M o n t e: Testi..., pp. 80—81.

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subjugating dura Europos,12 and in northern Mesopotamia, the annexation of Armenia may have happened at that time the strategic position of Armenia on the way from Anatolia or the steppes north of the caucasus to Iran, and its military and economic potential, were recognized by Mithradates II that is why the Arsacids made the control of Armenia one of the fundamental targets in their policy toward Rome up to the end of the dynasty

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Parthian control over Armenia might have compelled Mithradates Eupator to get in touch with the Arsacid empire It seems, therefore, highly probable that one of the essential components in the Pontic-Parthian relations, established by 101/102 b c , was Pontic interest in receiving at least safety guarantees from Parthian-dominated Armenia and Parthia herself

After spending many years at the Parthian court, tigranes was released by his sovereign Mithradates II the great and appointed king of Armenia 13 the year 96 b c for tigranes’s accession can be surmised based on Plutarch, who describes a meeting between tigranes and claudius in winter 71/70 b c : by that time tigranes had been rulling for 25 years, thus he must have begun his rule in about 96 b c 14

Information on tigranes’s accession is also provided by the babylonian Astronomical Diaries One of these texts says that tigranes’s father died in month I of the year 216 according to the Seleukid era (27 March—24 April 96 b c ) While in babylon at the Parthian court, tigranes made preparations for his journey home:15

5: [ ] I heard as follows: the king of (the city) Armini died [ ] 6: [ ] was entrusted [with] , to this (city) Armini for king[ship? ] 7: [ ] who lived in babylon, he gathered and to his support he [ ]

tigranes departed in month II of the year 216 (Seleukid era) (25 April—24 May 96 b c ) to ascend the Armenian throne:16

11: [ t]igranes, crown prince of (the city) Armini, [took?] the road to the city [ ]

12 M J O l b r y c h t: Arsakid Iran...

13 On tigranes, see M S c h o t t k y: “tigranes ” DNP, bd 12, 2002, pp 567—568;

N g a r s o i a n: “tigran II ” In: Encyclopedia Iranica (www iranica com), 2005

14 Plut Luc 21 detailed discussion in M S c h o t t k y: Media..., p 216, n 240 tigranes II died in about 55 b c (cic Sest 59; Plut Crass 19) at the age of 85 (cf lukian, Makrob.

15) 15 A.J. S a c h s, h h u n g e r: Astronomical Diaries..., pp. 418—419, no. -95C

16 Ibidem, pp 422—423, no. -95D.

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Strabo informs that tigranes obtained “the privilege of returning home,”

a statement emphasizing his vassal status On this occasion, the Arsacid king exacted the cession of the area called “Seventy Valleys” to Parthia — it was a peculiar reward or pledge (Strab 11 14 15; cf Iust 43 3 1) the cession of that area and Strabon’s phrase mentioned above imply that tigranes was to be fully controlled by the Parthian King of Kings the Seventy Valleys were a bone of contention between Armenia and Parthia for a long time; they were probably located in the border with Atropatene and may have been part of the area taken from Atropatene by Artaxias 17

It is common that the scholars overestimate tigranes’s position at the be- ginning of his rule 18 the Arsacid empire was at that time at the apex of its power and it is impossible to see in tigranes an independent ruler from the very beginning Obviously, at least two stages in tigranes’s career should be distinguished during the first one, encompassing the period from 96 until about 80 b c , he remained a faithfull vassal of Parthia In 83 b c tigranes was still viewed as a Parthian vassal 19 there is no evidence for any anti-Parthian action of tigranes before 80 b c the second stage, in the 70s and 60s b c , saw tigranes’s independent policy and establishing an empire, partially at the expense of Parthia

there is evidence coming from Iran for a close connection between Par- thia and tigranes in 88 b c According to the parchment from Avroman in Iranian Kurdistan, dated the year 88 b c , the second wife of Mithradates II Aryazate surnamed Automa, was a daughter of the “great King tigranes ”20 As the Parthian ruler is named in the text great King of Kings, the hierarchy is maintained and tigranes appears as a vassal his title, however, points to the fact that he was respected by his sovereign, apparently due to his exploits achieved in full accordance with Parthian policies, otherwise the Parthian king would reject Aryazate

While mentioning tigranes’s enthronement, Iustinus 38 3 1 says that Eupa- tor “was eager to entice this man (sc tigranes) to join him in the war against Rome which he had long had in mind ” the subsequent moves were tigranes’s invasion of Sophene and intervention in cappadokia against Ariobarzanes, a Ro- man nominee Moreover, Eupator gave his daugther cleopatra to tigranes as

17 See J M a r q u a r t: Eranšahr nach der Geographie , pp 109, 173; M S c h o t t k y:

Media..., p 222

18 For example, R d S u l l i v a n: Near Eastern Royalty and Rome, 100—33 B.C. toronto 1990, p 116

19 M J O l b r y c h t: “Mithradates VI Eupator and Iran ,” p 177

20 the document is dated to the year 225, month Apellaios by the Seleukid era, which gives us November of 88 b c , see E h M i n n s: “Parchments of the Parthian Period from Avroman in Kurdistan ” JHS, vol 35, 1915, pp 38 Aryazate might have been Mithradates II’s wife prior to 95, cf M S c h o t t k y:  “gibt es Münzen atropatenischer Könige?” AMI, bd 23, 1990, p 214

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a bride 21 All these facts testify to the existence of a specific strategic planning on the part of the Arsacid King of Kings, who stood behind tigranes and his Pontic ally

the first military action of tigranes was aimed at the subjugation of Sophene in about 95 b c 22 At this time, Sophene was ruled by Artanes or Orontes,23 a descendant of zariadres, a Seleukid general who made himself independent about 189 b c Sophene had often been a disputed territory between Armenia and cappadokia (diod 31 22) the Sophenian dynast was probably not deposed by tigranes, but he continued to rule as vassal of the Armenian king It was only after tigranes’s annexation of Sophene that Armenia acquired a common frontier with cappadokia and easy access to the Euphrates crossing at tomisa, on the way leading to Melitene and cappadokian hinterland 24 Significantly, the next military operation of tigranes was an invasion of cappadokia

tigranes’s activities in Sophene, then in cappadokia, and his close coopera- tion with Eupator must have been a result of Parthian strategic plans: the Arsacid king, a politician of broader horizons, was surely aware of Roman predominance in Anatolia and Roman military appetite With the new alliance established, Eupator was able to challenge Roman power in Anatolia At the same time, the Parthians showed their interest in control of Syria, Kilikia and Kommagene It is thus conceivable that Arsacid strategy intended to secure the Parthian sphere of interest by annihilating — either with Pontic or Armenian hands — Roman influence in cappadokia, a country stretching along the Euphrates and bordering with Kommagene, Armenia, and Kilikia Pedias, i e areas which Parthia con- trolled or planned to subjugate thus, Kappadokia remained the main disputed territory in eastern Anatolia in the 90s and 80s of the 1st century b c

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Parthian strategic planning under Mithradates II took into account Kom- magene, a country between Syria, Kilikia, Kappadokia and the Euphrates river which had been a Seleukid possession 25 Kommagene became independent in

21 Iust 38 3 2 links the marriage between cleopatra and tigranes with tigranes’s action in cappadocia

22 For tigranes’s subjugation of Sophene, see Strab 11 14 15, 12 2 1 R d S u l l i v a n:

Near Eastern Royalty..., p 99, rightly dates the event “soon after his accession ”

23 Strab 11 14 15 with R d S u l l i v a n: Near Eastern Royalty..., pp 99 Stephanos of byzantion (s v Sophene) calls Sophene’s ruler Arsakes, but it is probably a mistake

24 the geographical peculiarities of the region reports Strab 12 2 1 he underscores the communication links between Melitene, Kommagene, and Sophene cf R d S u l l i v a n: Near Eastern Royalty..., p 99

25 On the history of Kommagene, see R d S u l l i v a n: “the dynasty of commagene ” ANRW II 8, 1977; J Wa g n e r: “dynastie und herrscherkult in Kommagene Forschungsges- chichte und neue Funde ” Istanbuler Mitteilungen, bd 33, 1983; F K d ö r n e r: Kommagene,

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about 163—162 b c when Ptolemaios, a Seleukid governor, proclaimed himself a king (diod 31 19a) under Samos (c 130—100 b c ), Mithradates I Kal- linikos (c 100—70 b c ) and Antiochos I theos (ca 70—36 b c ), the kingdom tried to maintain independence in the face of the pressure of its major neighbours including Parthia, Pontos, Rome and Armenia the small kingdom controlled strategic Euphrates crossings from Mesopotamia to northern Syria and Anatolia and was thus the favoured invasion route for Iranian armies moving west 26

Initially, Kommagenian rulers attempted to maintain friendly political rela- tions with the Seleukids thus, Mithradates Kallinikos married laodike thea, the daughter of the Seleukid king Antiochos VIII grypos, as well as the mother of Antiochos I of Kommagene (c 96 b c ) 27 the strategic merits of Komma- gene did not escape Parthian attention as Arsacid activities in that country are well attested from the middle of the 1st century b c Antiochos I arranged the marriage of his daughter laodike to Orodes of Parthia (c 57—38 b c ) 28 In 51—50 b c , Parthian troops were allowed to cross Kommagene to raid Roman Syria (see cic Ad Familiares 8 10 1, 15 1—2, 4 4) Even under the Flavian dynasty in Rome Kommagene was suspected of favouring the Parthians (Ios Bell. 7 219ff ) In the official art of Kommagene, strong Parthian influences are conspicuous already in the first half of the 1st century b c 29

Iosephus Flavius (Ant. 13 13 4/371) offers an intriguing account of some Parthian activities in the regions to the west of the Euphrates According to his narrative, the queen named laodike summoned the Seleukid king Antiochus X Eusebes (ca 95—92 b c ) to her assistance,30 but he was killed in a battle with the Parthians 31 Antiochos X’s death may be dated approximately at 92 b c 32 the most essential question concerning the analysed Iosephus’s account is the identity of laodike who ruled a kingdom invaded by the Parthians the testimony implies the location of the country somewhere on the borders of both Parthia and Syria, probably along the Euphrates unfortunately, the phrase

Götterthrone und Königsgräber am Euphrat. Neue Entdeckungen der Archäologie, bergisch gladbach 1981; M F a c e l l a: La dinastia degli Orontidi nella Commagene ellenistico-romana.

(Studi ellenistici 17) Pisa 2006

26 Strab 16 1 22 23; 16 2 2—3; App Syr. 48; cic Ad Familiares 8 10 1; dio 49 13; Plin NH 5 86

27 J d g r a i n g e r: A Seleukid Prosopography and Gazetteer leiden—New york—Köln 1997, p 48; R d S u l l i v a n: Near Eastern Royalty..., p 65

28 See M F a c e l l a: La dinastia..., pp 236—239

29 F K d ö r n e r: Kommagene...

30 On Antiochos X Eusebes Philopator, see J d g r a i n g e r: A Seleukid Prosopography..., p 33

31 A detailed discussion on the passage offers J d o b i á š: “les premiers reports des Ro- mains avec les Parthes et l’occupation de la Syrie ” Archiv Orientalni 1931, pp 221—223

32 A R b e l l i n g e r: “the End of the Seleucids ” Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol 38, 1949, p 75, n 73; M F a c e l l a: La dinastia..., p 216

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mentioning the nation ruled by laodike is corrupted and the manuscripts con- vey different versions Regardless of the textual reconstruction of Iosephus’s account, the identification of laodike as a queen in Kommagene seems highly probable 33 the conclusion is that about 92 b c the Parthians attacked Kom- magene, subjugating it and killing the Seleukid ruler Antiochos, who tried to help his relative laodike

Kilikia is another territory to the west of the Euphrates which witnessed Parthian activities in the 90s Strabo 14 5 2 maintains that the Parthians became masters of Kilikia before the Armenians Some scholars link this evidence with Parthian actions in Syria in 88/87 b c 34 but a more convincing date would be the end of the 90s,35 when the struggles between Rome, Pontos and Parthian- dominated Armenia escalated the operation in Kilikia may have been coordi- nated with the Parthian engagement in Kommagene and Parthian support for tigranes’s raids into cappadokia in about 92 b c

by and large, the King of Kings Mithradates II of Parthia conducted ac- tive policies in Western Asia Northern Mesopotamia and dura Europos were incorporated into Parthia to the west of the Euphrates, the Parthians were contended with the establishment of protectorates In many cases local vassal rulers (like Philippos in northern Syria) were able to retain their thrones under Parthian suzerainty It seems that Kommagene remained for some time under Parthian domination Parthian military operations reached Kilikia

***

In 102/101 b c , a heroon dedicated to Mithradates Eupator was erected on delos the monument is significant for many reasons, and offers evidence for Parthian-Pontic contacts there were 12 relief busts inside the heroon and one in the tympanon of the façade the reliefs are mutilated but can be identified by inscriptions which name several dignitaries and generals of Eupator the only persons not belonging to Eupator’s family, court or army were Antiochos VIII grypos of Syria and two Parthian officials — envoys of the Arsacid King of Kings 36 Antiochos VIII grypos (126—c 96) probably maintained friendly relations with Eupator 37 In this select company around Eupator attested in the delos heroon, two Parthian officials appear they were apparently envoys of

33 See M J O l b r y c h t: “Mithradates VI Eupator and Iran ,” p 166

34 A R b e l l i n g e r: “the End ,” p 77, n 82

35 See A b o u c h é - l e c l e r q: Histoire des Séleucides París 1913, p 42,1 n 2 cf A R b e l l i n g e r: “the End ,” p 75, n 74

36 On the monument, see b c M c g i n g: The Foreign Policy of Mithradates VI Eupator King of Pontus (Mnemosyne, Suppl 89) leiden 1986, pp 90—91

37 On Antiochos grypos, see J d g r a i n g e r: A Seleukid Prosopography..., pp 31—32

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the great Mithradates II, called in one of the inscriptions King of Kings 38 the building was in fact intended as a propaganda monument for the Pontic king demonstrating his magnanimity and power documented by his international rela- tions the presence of the Parthian envoys at the court of Eupator and showing them reverence in the delos heroon implies that Eupator and the Parthian king cooperated already by 102/101 b c

While analysing the political situation before the outbreak of the First Mithradatic War in 89 b c , the Parthian factor has to be assessed the Ar- sacid empire with its vassal kingdoms, including Armenia, was rich in financial resources At this time the Arsacid empire was at its heyday and the support of the Arsacid King of Kings was vital for the Pontic ruler planning military confrontations in Anatolia

Memnon of herakleia, who summarizes the political aims of the Pontic king, lists Parthia and her vassals — Atropatenian Medes and Armenia — among Eupator’s allies: “he [sc Mithradates, MJO] increased his realm by subduing the kings around the river Phasis in war as far as the regions beyond the cau- casus, and grew extremely boastful On account of this, the Romans regarded his intentions with suspicion, and they passed a decree that he should restore to the kings of the Scythians their ancestral kingdoms Mithridates modestly complied with their demands, but gathered as his allies the Parthians, the Medes, tigranes the Armenian, the kings of the Scythians and Iberia ”39

the Medes are often mentioned in the sources separately from the Parthians for they formed one of the richest parts of the Arsacid empire this applies not only to greater Media (with Ekbatana), incorporated to the royal Arsacid do- main, but also to Media Atropatene, ruled by vassal kings Armenia was a vassal kingdom of Parthia at this time Worthy of note is the mentioning of Iberia In the late 2nd and early 1st centuries b c , the Iberians were probably depended on Armenia, in other terms, they belonged to Parthian sphere of influence dur- ing the 2nd century b c , Armenia seized some southern parts of Iberia (Strab 11 14 5) When Armenia was subjugated by the Parthian king Mithradates II, probably also other transcaucasian lands, including Iberia (and perhaps Alba- nia), were made to Parthian vassals A massive influx of Parthian coins from the time of Mithradates II into Armenia, Iberia and Albania40 strongly implies

38 IDélos 1581—1582 cf SEG 36, 1986, p 741

39 FGrHist 434 F 22 3—4 with corrections by b c M c g i n g: The Foreign Policy..., p 63, n 85, and comments by h h e i n e n: “Mithradates VI Eupator ,” pp 83—87

40 M J O l b r y c h t: “die Aorser, die Oberen Aorser und die Siraker bei Strabon zur geschichte und Eigenart der Völker im nordpontischen und nordkaukasischen Raum im 2 —1 Jh v chr ” Klio. Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, bd 83, 2001, pp 425—450; I d e m: “der Fernhandel in Ostsarmatien und in den benachbarten gebieten (zweite hälfte des 2 —1 Jh v chr ) ” Laverna, bd 12, 2001, pp 86—122

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that these countries were simultanously incorporated to the Parthian sphere of political domination the sources testify to the fact that Eupator seized Armenia Minor and colchis, but he did not try to penetrate and conquer Iberia Appar- ently, the Iberian rulers of this time acted as Parthian vassals and supported Eupator as his allies

Memnon’s account is corroborated by the statements in Appian and Posei- donios Appian (Mithr. 15) reports a speech by an envoy of Eupator Pelopidas, directed to the Roman generals just before the outbreak of the First Mithradatic War Among Pontic allies and subjects, the envoy mentions several peoples of the black Sea area and finally adds: “tigranes of Armenia is his [sc Eupa- tor’s, MJO] son-in-law and Arsakes of Parthia his friend (‘philos’) ” According to Poseidonios of Apamea (apud Athenaios, Deipn. 213a), the Armenian and

“Persian” (i e Parthian) kings were Eupator’s allies (in 88 b c )

thus, through diplomacy and policy, Mithradates Eupator expanded Pontos’

network of foreign connections creating bilateral and multilatelar coalitions was to ensure favourable balances of power and thereby attain regional objectives at lower cost that otherwise would be possible the support of Parthian-dominated Armenia and direct Parthian aid were, actually conditio sine qua non for Eupa- tor’s new policy, initiated in 95 b c It was due to the support of the Arsacids that the Pontic king began to think in terms of war with Rome convinced by his own achievements and the strenght of his allies, Eupator took initiative in Anatolia, showing disrespect to Roman demands

***

In 95 (or early in 94), the pro-Roman king Ariobarzanes, ruling in cap- padokia, was ousted by tigranes in the interest of Eupator, his cappadokian ally gordios and Parthia 41 the Roman reaction was sending Sulla to Asia the reason for the expedition was not only to reinstate Ariobarzanes, but also to check Eupator’s intentions Sulla did not have a large army but made use (mainly) of his allies According to Plutarch (Sulla 5) Sulla: “after inflicting heavy casualties on the cappadokians themselves, and even heavier casualties on the Armenians, who came to help the cappadokians, he drove gordios into exile and made Ariobarzanes a king ” In cappadokia, some Pontic troops also opposed Sulla, but it seems that Eupator tried to make his case there indirectly, by appointing the Pontic commander Archelaos, a general in gordios’ servic- es 42 Sulla’s main enemy were the Armenians and the cappadokians from the anti-Roman faction Sulla’s intervention took place not earlier than in 94 b c 43

41 Iust 38 3 2—3 F d e c a l l a t a ÿ: L’historie..., p 274 places the action at the beginning of 94 b c

42 Front Strat. 1 5 18 with b c M c g i n g: The Foreign Policy..., p 78, n 46

43 M J O l b r y c h t: “Mithradates VI Eupator and Iran ,” p 173

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Sulla’s expeditionary force reached the borders of the Parthian sphere of influence therefore Parthians envoys came to Sulla willing to check Roman intentions On the banks of the Euphrates, Sulla was visited by Orobazos, rep- resenting the Arsacid King of Kings Mithradates II 44 Many misunderstandings arose around this meeting so it needs some closer examination the Parthians intended to discuss the possibility of entering into treaty of friendship (philia) and alliance (symmachia) (Plut Sulla 5 4) As the newly appointed cappadokian ruler Ariobarzanes accompanied Sulla, the conference probably took place in eastern cappadokia in the area of Melitene, bordering with Sophene 45 Accord- ing to Plutarch (Sulla 5 4—5), “Sulla put out three chairs, one for Ariobarzanes, one for Orobazos, and one for himself, and negotiated while seated between the other two the Parthian king later put Orobazos to death for this ”

the scholarly communis opinio maintains that Orobazos was executed be- cause he took a lower seat than Sulla or the ambassador allowed Sulla to assume a position of primacy at the meeting by seating in the centre 46 however, an essential, often overlooked, circumstance is the presence of Ariobarzanes who had been dethronised by tigranes acting according to Parthian (and Pontic) demands Sulla installed him in cappadokia again Orobazes’s fundamental fault was thus his participation in negotiations with Ariobarzanes, who was a usurper in the eyes of the Parthian King of Kings

Another point should be stressed — after Sulla’s intervention, no negotia- tions between Armenia and Rome were initiated, although the Armenians had been involved in cappadokia directly Instead of this, a meeting between Sulla and Parthians was organized the conclusion must be that Sulla saw no need to talk to the vassal ruler of Armenia for the real power acting behind him was the Arsacid King of Kings there is no solid evidence for the often expressed assumption that between Sulla and Orobazos a formal treaty was concluded 47 Mithradates II of Parthia did not consider himself bound by any kind of ter- ritorial restraints in his western policies In the 90s—80s of the 1st century b c, Parthian armies crossed the Euphrates many times, as in the 50s—30s the fate of Syria, Kommagene and eastern Anatolia including cappadokia was during the 90s—80s not decided yet in favour of Rome A recognition of the

44 Plut Sulla 5; liv Epit 70; Vell Paterc 2 24 3; Ruf Festus 15 2 On the negotiations, see J d o b i á š: “les premiers reports des Romains avec les Parthes ,” pp 218—221;

N c d e b e v o i s e: A Political History of Parthia chicago 1938, pp 46 ff; K h z i e g l e r:

Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Partherreich Wiesbaden 1964, pp 20—23; A K e - a v e n e y: “Roman treaties with Parthia, circa 95 — circa 64 b c ” AJPh, vol 102, 1981, pp 195—199; J Wo l s k i: “l’Arménie dans la politique du haut-empire Parthe (env 175—87 av n ? ) ” Iranica Antiqua, vol 15, 1980, pp 257 ff; I d e m: Seleucid and Arsacid Studies: A progress report on developments in source research Kraków 2003, p 76

45 On the meeting place, see h z i e g l e r: Die Beziehungen..., p 20, n 2

46 See, e g , R d S u l l i v a n: Near Eastern Royalty..., p 99

47 M J O l b r y c h t: “Mithradates VI Eupator and Iran ,” pp 174—175

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Euphrates frontier would have been for Mithradates II a unilateral gesture of acceptance of Roman supremacy in Western Asia 48 the Arsacid King of Kings became convinced that the Roman presence in Kappadokia was dangerous for Parthian interests in the neighbouring areas including Kommagene, Kilikia and Armenia thus, the anti-Roman actions in Anatolia were to be intensified by Pontos and Armenia acting in Anatolia as directly engaged powers, whereas Parthia supported their allies financially and took some activities to the south of the taurus in Kommagene, Kilikia and Syria An agreement was concluded between the rulers of Pontos and Armenia that the subjugated cities and land would belong to Eupator, the captives and all movable goods to tigranes (Iust 38 3 5) the strategic planning of Eupator, tigranes and the Arsacid King of Kings aiming at abolishing Sulla’s arrangements in cappadokia would inevitably develop into an open confrontation with Rome

Ariobarzanes was expelled by an army led by the generals named bagoas and Mithraas about 92 b c and Ariarathes (IX) was again installed in cap- padokia 49 Incidentally, the names of the tigranes’s commanders bagoas and Mithraas are clearly Iranian 50 Indeed they could have been Parthian generals in Armenian services While tigranes’s troops operated in cappadokia, Eupa- tor sent Sokrates chrestos with an army against bithynia 51 the Parthians did not remain idle neither for they subjugated Kommagene (about 92 b c ) and probably attacked Kilikia It seems that Eupator felt ready to a full scale con- frontation with Rome With a secured rear, he had huge financial and military resources at his disposal 52

the following years wintessed an escalation of the conflict the Roman Sen- ate ordered to restore Ariobarzanes in cappadokia and Nikomedes in bithynia the Roman general Manius Aquilius reinstalled the Kappadokian ruler at the end of 90 or in 89 53 According to Appian (Mithr. 11), Eupator had his forces in readiness for war, but did not resist the Roman actions he remained idle even when Nikomedes ravaged western Pontos (App Mithr. 11, 12—14; livy, Epit 74) Moreover, Eupator had Sokrates killed to display his good will toward Rome tigranes’s troops apparently retreated from cappadokia contrary to the

48 As rightly remarked by J Wo l s k i: Seleucid and Arsacid Studies:..., p 76: “the his- torians who put forward this claim were only following the old and well-established habit of belittling the Parthians, this time in favour of Rome ”

49 App Mithr. 10 cf Iust 38 3 5 F d e c a l l a t a ÿ: L’historie..., p 276 proposes the summer of the year 91

50 See th R e i n a c h: Mithridates Eupator. König von Pontos leipzig 1895

51 Appian (Mithr. 10) stresses that the actions in bithynia and cappadocia were simultaneous

52 the Pontic coin production was intensified in 92 and again from May—June 89 It is plausible that the increased amount of minted coins was connected to military preparations, see F d e c a l l a t a ÿ: L’historie..., pp 283—284

53 b c M c g i n g: The Foreign Policy of Mithradates..., pp 79—80 liv Epit. 74 places the restoration of Nikomedes IV and Ariobarzanes between the events of 90 and 89

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Roman demands, the reinstated Ariobarzanes Philoromaios did not take part in the hostilities against Eupator the Pontic king entered negotiations with the Ro- man legates in Asia and complained of Nikomedes’ hostile actions (App Mithr.

12) When the Pontic-Roman talks failed, Eupator sent his son Ariarathes with a large army to seize cappadokia Ariobarzanes was quickly driven out (App Mithr 15) the sources do not speak of tigranes’s involvement in that action, but it cannot be excluded

Supported by Arsacid Iran, Parthian-dominated Armenia, as well as by peoples, tribes and cities around the black Sea, Mithradates Eupator was at the height of his power in 89 b c he recruited huge military forces, consisting of more than 200,000 soldiers 54 the Social War in Italy offered a good opportunity for anti-Roman actions of the Pontic king in Anatolia 55 Emboldened by these circumstances, Eupator felt strong enough to risk a full confrontation with Rome

the events of the First Mithradatic War (89—85 b c ) are well known and there is no need to repeat this story While Eupator fougth the Romans, the Parthians intervened in northern Syria and made it to their protectorate (88/87 b c ) In 87/86 b c , the mighty Eupator’s ally, Mithradates II of Parthia, died under Mithradates II’s successors Parthia was to plunge in internal struggles at the very end of the 80s

by and large, in Mithradates Eupator’s political strategy, an essential part was played by Arsacid Iran and Parthian-dominated Armenia the power of Pontos collapsed for several reasons, but an essential factor was that Eupator was devoid of Parthian assistance in the 70s and 60s, and remained left on his own and to some extent on tigranes’s resources the Pontic king tried to renew the old alliance with Parthia but the new Parthian rulers, Sinatrukes and Phraates III, representing a new Arsacid branch, were by far more passive in their western policies than Mithradates II the great until the wars between Rome and Parthia under Orodes (57—38 b c ), Parthian strategic perspective did not reach beyond the Euphrates line in the west upon Armenia’s defeat at the hands of lucullus and Pompey, and upon the failure of his own military efforts, Mithradates Eupator found a strategic sanctuary in the crimea and bo- sporos lacking alternatives, he tried there to gain the support of the nomadic peoples including the Sirakoi and Aorsoi, but he could not maintain himself against a rising of his own son Pharnakes

54 Memnon FGrHist 734, F 22 6: 190,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry; App Mithr. 17: 250,000 infantry, 50,000 cavalry, 400 ships, 130 chariots

55 there were negotiations between the rebells in Italy and Eupator (diod 37 11)

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Abbreviations

AMI — Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran

AAntASh — Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum hungaricae dNP — der Neue Pauly

Idélos — Inscriptions de délos Paris 1926—1950

Fgrhist — Fragmente der griechischen Historiker hrsg von F J a c o b y berlin 1923—1930; leiden 1940—1958

VdI — Vestnik drevney istorii

zdMg — zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen gesellschaft

Marek Jan Olbrycht

KRólEStWO PONtyJSKIE, IRAN ARSAKIdzKI I ARMENIA:

uWAgI NA tEMAt StRAtEgII POlItyczNEJ MIthRAdAtESA VI EuPAtORA (dO ROKu 89 PRzEd chR )

S t r e s z c z e n i e

W strategii politycznej króla Pontu Mithradatesa Eupatora zasadniczą rolę do lat 80 przed chr odgrywały państwo Partów oraz Armenia ta ostatnia znajdowała się wówczas pod zwierzch- nością Arsakidów Osłabienie Eupatora w latach 70 oraz jego ostateczny upadek wynikały z wielu przyczyn, ale jedną z najważniejszych był brak wsparcia ze strony państwa Partów co prawda Eupator próbował odnowić sojusz z Imperium Parthicum, wysyłając poselstwa do Sinatrukesa oraz Fraatesa III, reprezentujących nową gałąź Arsakidów, jednak starania te pozostały bezowoc- ne W latach 70 i 60 partyjskie planowanie strategiczne nie sięgało na zachodzie poza Eufrat Sytuację zmieniła dopiero wojna Rzymu z Partami za Krassusa (54—53 przed chr ) Militarne działania lukullusa i Pompejusza zniszczyły potęgę króla Armenii tigranesa zwanego Wielkim i jednocześnie doprowadziły do upadku władzy Mithradatesa Eupatora w Anatolii Eupator ratował się ucieczką do Królestwa bosporańskiego i próbował zbudować nową koalicję przeciwko Rzy- mianom, licząc na ludy stepowe (m in Aorsów i Siraków) bunt jego syna Farnakesa przekreślił te zamierzenia

Marek Jan Olbrycht

lE ROyAuME du PONt, l’IRAN ARSAcIdE Et l’ARMéNIE : REMARQuES SuR lA StRAtégIE POlItIQuE dE MIthRIdAtE VI EuPAtOR (JuSQu’à l’AN 89 AV J -c )

R é s u m é

dans la stratégie politique du roi du Ponte Mithridate VI Eupator le pays de la Parthie et l’Arménie jouaient le rôle principal jusqu’aux années 80 av J -c l’Arménie se trouvait alors

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sous l’autorité des Arsacides l’affaiblissement d’Eupator dans les années 70 et son effondre- ment final résultaient de nombreuses causes, dont une des plus importantes était le manque de soutien de la part du pays des Parthes Il est vrai qu’Eupator essayait de renouveler la coalition avec l’Empire parthe, en envoyant les messages à Sanatrocès et à Phraatès III, représentant une nouvelle branche des Arsacides, mais ces efforts sont restés vains dans les années 70 et 60 les stratégies parthes à l’ouest ne dépassaient pas l’Euphrate la situation a changé pendant la guerre entre la Rome et les Parthes, sous crassus (54—53 av J -c ) les démarches militaires de lucullus et de Pompée ont détruit la puissance du roi d’Arménie tigrane le grand et, en même temps, ont conduit à l’effondrement du pouvoir de Mithridate VI Eupator en Anatolie Eupator a tenté d’échapper au Royaume du bosphore et de construire une nouvelle coalition contre la Rome, en comptant sur les peuples (entre autres les Aorses et les Siraces) la rébellion de son fils Pharnace a mis fin à ces projets

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TOMASZ ŁAdOń

L. Fannius and L. Magius:

Fimbriani or Sertoriani?

In the year 76 or, at the latest, in 751 Quintus Sertorius, a Marian renegade who fought a war with Rome from the beginning of the 80s on the Iberian Peninsula, signed the famous mutual help treaty with Mithridates VI Eupator the king of Pontus committed himself to support the Spanish rebellion with money and fleet, and in return he expected territorial concessions in the East, as well as help in training his army in the Roman way 2

the alliance against the Sullans was repeatedly a subject of profound studies and analyses and it aroused controversy and emotions the researchers focused on the sequence of the pact, the circum- stances of its formation, individual decisions and its significance 3 however, it is rarely pointed out that

1 the dates refer to the times before the birth of christ

2 Plut , Sert 23—24; App , Mith 68; 70; 72 See also: cic , Manil 9; 46; Verr 2, 1, 87;

Mur 32; Sall , Hist II, 79 (Maurenbrecher) = II, 90 (Mcgushin); liv , per XcIII; Flor II, 10, 5; Oros VI, 2, 12; Ps —Asc In cic Verr 87, p 244 Stangl

3 See: P R von b i e ń k o w s k i: “Kritische Studien über chronologie und geschichte des sertorianischen Krieges.” Wiener Studien, bd 13, 1891, p 158; g S t a h l: De bello Sertoriano Erlangae 1907, pp 70—72; A S c h u l t e n: Sertorius leipzig 1926, pp 106—107; h b e r v e:

“Sertorius ” Hermes, bd 64, 1929, pp 213—214; P t r e v e s: “Sertorio ” Athenaeum, vol 10, 1932, pp 138—143; V E h r e n b e r g: “Sertorius ” W: I d e m: Ost und West. Studien zur Geschichtlichen Problematik der Antike brünn—Prag—leipzig—Wien 1935, pp 194—197;

z z m i g r y d e r - K o n o p k a: “Sertorius a Pompeius na tle paktów z Mithradatesem.” Przegląd Klasyczny, t 4, 1938, pp 398—417; l W i c k e r t: “Sertorius ” W: Rastloses Schaffen: Fest-

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the formation of the treaty was possible, among others, due to the adherents of Sertorius who stayed in the king’s circle this issue concerns mainly the two not very well-known luciuses: Fannius and Magius

Some basic information about the relations between Mithridates VI Eupa- tor and these mysterious Romans can be found in the Appian of Alexandria’s work, which describes the struggle between the Republic of tiber and the king of Pontus 4 the main advantage of the historian’s work is the complex perspec- tive of the conflict the drawbacks most often pointed out are the mistakes and inaccuracy of the text, however, recently the contemporary scholars acknowl- edge Appian’s literary technique 5 the historian from Alexandria usually writes reluctantly about Sertorius and his supporters standing by Mithridates, mainly presenting them in bad light 6

Important information about l Magius and l Fannius can be found in some of the cicero’s speeches and in the commentaries of Pseudo-Asconius 7 the great orator, who was hostile towards the hellenistic ruler, additionally spoke in lucius licinius Murena and gnaeus Pompeius’s interest — these were the leaders who actively participated in the wars in the East In spite of being very valuable (among other reasons, because the author was an observer of the events), the information provided by cicero are marked with subjectivism and need to be approached carefully

A lot of data on the topic I find interesting can be found in Plutarch’s Par- allels Lives; which is of foremost importance, are several passages of Sertorius

schrift für Friedrich Lammert Stuttgart 1954, pp 101 f; J Va n O o t e g h e m: Lucius Licinius Lucullus Namur 1959, pp 50—51; M g e l z e r: “hat Sertorius in seinem Vertrag mit Mit- hradates die Provinz Asia abgetreten?” In: I d e m: Kleine Schriften bd II, Wiesbaden 1963, pp 139—145; b S c a r d i g l i: “Sertorio Problemi cronologici ” Athenaeum, vol 49, 1971, pp 252—258; P O S p a n n: Quintus Sertorius and the Legacy of Sulla Fayetteville 1987, pp 99—104; F g a r c i a M o r á: Un episodio de la Hispania republicana: La guerra de Sertorio granada 1991, pp 287—298; c F K o n r a d: Plutarch’s Sertorius. A Historical Com- mentary chapel hill—london 1994, pp 190—202; A b К о р о л е н к о в: Квинт Серторий.

Политическая биография Санкт-Петербург 2003, pp 227—231; t Ł a d o ń: “Antysullański charakter sojuszu Mitrydatesa VI Eupatora z Kwintusem Sertoriuszem ” Antiquitas, t 29, K Nowotka, M Pawlak Wrocław 2007, pp 397—413

4 Appianus, Mithridatica, passim About this writer and his work: K b r o d e r s e n: “Ap- pian und sein Werk.” ANRW, t 2, hrsg h te m p o r i n i, W h a a s e, bd 34, 1 berlin—New york 1993, pp 339—363; b c M c g i n g: “Appian’s Mithridateios.” In: ANRW, t 2, hrsg h te m p o r i n i, W h a a s e, bd 34, 1 berlin—New york 1993, pp 496—522

5 See e g App , Mith 68, 288; 71, 299; 72, 308 l P i o t r o w i c z: “Appian i jego dzieło.”

W: Appian z Aleksandrii: Historia rzymska t I, Wrocław 1957, p XVIII cf g S b u c h e r:

“toward a literary Evaluation of Appian’s civil Wars, book 1.” In: A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography Vol II Ed J M a r i n c o l a Oxford 2007, pp 454—460

6 App , Mith 68; 70; 72; 112; 119

7 cic , Verr 2, 1, 87; 2, 2, 51; Mur 32; Manil 9; 46; Ps Ascon , in cic Verr 87, p 244 Stangl About cicero’s speeches: K K u m a n i e c k i: Literatura rzymska. Okres cyceroński Warszawa 1977, pp 189—293

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and lucullus’s biographies 8 they are supplemented by data from the works of Memnon of heraclea, cassius dio and Orosius 9 the remaining utilised source fragments are of lesser importance for the following article

Spotting the information from the sources about the Roman renegades and exiles, mentioned in the title of the present article, who cooperated with the king of Pontus, investigating the circumstances in which they found themselves in the circle of the ruler, as well as an attempt to clarify the motives they were driven by when fighting on the side of the enemy of Rome — all these actions will allow to better understand the intricacies of the Roman politics in the twilight of the Republic Since no historian has ever presented this matter as a whole, the research conducted herein is by all accounts justified

the ancient authors attribute the biggest part in creating the agreement be- tween Q Sertorius and Mithridates VI to l Magius and l Fannius 10 the iden- tification of these figures is disputable and uncertain lucius Magius, originating from a capuan anti-oligarchic family, is usually identified as one of the two sons of Minatus Magius of Aeclanum 11 lucius Fannius, on the other hand, could be related to the plebeian aedile from the early 80s (83?), Marcus Fannius12

It is a well-known fact that both of the mentioned luciuses set off to the East with lucius Valerius Flaccus’s army in the year 86 13 In bithynia this

8 Plut , Sert 23—24; Lucull 8 c F K o n r a d: Plutarch’s Sertorius , pp 190—202 See also: t W h i l l a r d: “Plutarch’s late-Republican lives: between the lines ” Antichton, vol 21, 1987, pp 19—48

9 Memnon, F.Gr.Hist 434 F I, 28; cass dio XXXVI, 8, 2; Oros VI, 2, 12—24 d d u e c k: “Memnon of herakleia on Rome and the Romans ” In: Rome and the Black Sea Region Ed t b e k k e r - N i e l s e n Aarhus 2006, pp 43—61; g z e c c h i n i: “Jerome, Orosius and the Western chronicles ” In: Greek & Roman Historiography in Late Antiquity Ed g M a r a s c o leiden—boston 2003, pp 319—329; A W l i n t o t t: “cassius dio and the history of the Roman Republic.” In: ANRW, t 2, hrsg h te m p o r i n i, W h a a s e, bd 34, 3 berlin—New york 1997, pp 2497—2523

10 App , Mith 68, 287; Oros VI, 2, 12; cf Plut , Sert 23, 4

11 cf Vell II, 16, 3; F M ü n z e r: L. Magius (6) In: RE, hlb 27, Stuttgart 1928, col 439;

E g a b b a: “le origini della guerra sociale e la vita politica romana dopo l’89 A c ” Athenaeum, vol 32, 1954, pp 314 f = I d e m: Republican Rome, the Army and the Alles berkeley—los Angeles 1976, p 113 See also: E b a d i a n: “caepio and Norbanus.” In: I d e m: Studies in Greek and Roman History Oxford 1964, p 60; t P W i s e m a n: New Men in the Roman Senate (139 B.C.—A.D. 14) Oxford 1971, p 239; c N i c o l e t: L’ordre équestre à l’époque républicaine (312—43 av. J.-C) Vol 2 Paris 1974, p 938; E b i s p h a m: From Asculum to Actium. The Municipalization of Italy from the Social War to Augustus Oxford 2007, p 271, n 141

12 F M ü n z e r: “l Fannius (12) ” In: RE, hlb 12, Stuttgart 1909, col 1992—1993;

b S c a r d i g l i: Sertorio , p 252, n 97; c N i c o l e t: L’ordre , p 874

13 t R S b r o u g h t o n: The Magistrates of the Roman Republic Vol II, New york 1952, p 53; Vol III, Atlanta 1986, p 212 (sources); CAH Vol IX: “the last Age of the Roman Re- public 146—43 b c ” Eds J A c r o o k, A l i u t o t t, E R a w s o n cambridge 1994, p 160

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