The Scholar and the Artist in the Light of Their Own Ethos

(1)

(2)

O R G A N O N 24 : 1988 _{P R O B L È M E S G É N É R A U X}

Przemysław Kisiel (Poland)

T H E SC H O LA R A N D T H E A R T IST IN T H E L IG H T O F T H E IR O W N ETH OS

1. IN T R O D U C T IO N

W hat is an ethos ? W hat are the reasons th at m ake it so im portant in our investigations and explorations ? These are the questions which have to be answered when we start our discussion on the problem s o f ethos. The ethos o f a group in the society is the very basis, the stem and the core o f this group. The m aterials, which can be collected when we investigate the problem of ethos, are vast and im portant, as they cover the m ost im portant inform ation ab o u t the group whose ethos is being analyzed.

In this paper our exam inations o f an ethos will refer to the ethos o f the scholar and the ethos o f the artist o f the fine arts in the occidental civilization, originating from the circles o f the M editerranean culture. The reason why such a choice has been made is, first o f all, the great significance which both these kinds o f ethos have in the form ation o f the European culture, including also its present state, as well as the relationship which exists between the two kinds o f ethos, discussed in terms of the cultural systems. We have to rem ember th at the act of creation refers not only to art but also to science (e.g. the construction o f a scientific theory). Both these groups have also one com m on objective— an effort to reach truth. W hat makes them different is the perspective in which they can see the whole world.

The concept of ethos is beyond the scope o f this w o rk .1 It has often been the subject of discussions. F o r the needs o f this text (the problem s and aspects which are taken into consideration) we shall accept the definition o f ethos elaborated by J. Gockowski:

The ethos o f a social group is its general axionorm ative orientation, i.e. such a concept o f the life style o f this group which will be observed and respected by this group during its everyday life because

1 The problem o f ethos was com prehensively discussed in a paper by J. G ock ow sk i, “T he Polish Academ ic C om m unity’s Ethos— Continuity and C h ange,” Organon, 1984/86, N o s 20/21, pp. 119— 135.

(3)

56 P rzem ysław K isiel

the members o f the group have assim ilated the pertinent values and objectives, the rules and com m ands.2

This definition will be taken as a basis for further considerations, disclosed in the course o f the present work. Yet, they will refer to the developm ent and changes in the code o f values and principles valid for an individual ethos only (i.e. for the, so-called, ethos o f long duration). In view o f the complex, detailed and vast nature o f the problem , a full analysis o f the codes o f values w ould certainly go far beyond the scope o f the present work.

The form ation and crystallization o f an ethos is a process which depends on various factors. Basically speaking, these factors can be divided into the conditions which prom ote the form ation o f an ethos, and into the effects which back up and accelerate the nucleation and crystallization of this ethos.

There are two conditions m ost essential for the form ation o f an ethos : — the group creating an ethos m ust acquire its own structural in div idu ality ; — the group creating an ethos m ust become conscious o f its own cultural individuality.

The existence o f these param eters form s a basis for the initiation o f the process o f form ation o f an ethos, since only in the case when the above- m entioned requirem ents are fulfilled, a group will be able to form the axionorm ative orientation which will be typical o f this particular group and which will be consciously accepted by its members. A p art from the above-m entioned conditions, some other effects which prom ote the form ation of an ethos could be enum erated but, being o f no m ajor im portance for the problem s investigated in this work, they will be disregarded.3

Ethos can be analyzed in its four m ain aspects, namely: — basic personality,

— social structure, — forms o f culture, — civilizing function.

Now, the characteristics o f an ethos will depend on which o f the above- mentioned aspects o f this ethos will be regarded as a m ost im portant one. In the present work we shall take into consideration only one aspect, namely the form o f culture, i.e. the specific character o f standards, rules o f behaviour and hum an attitudes. This approach will be completed with the aspect o f a social structure, i.e. the place which a given com m unity occupies in the wider complexes of groups.

- 2 J. G oćk ow sk i, “ Sytuacje testujące wierność uczonych wobec ich eto su ” [“ Situations Testing Faithfulness o f the Scholars to Their Ethos”], E tyk a , 1984, vol. 21, p. 106.

3 This problem was discussed in a more detailed w ay in a paper by J. G oćk ow sk i and L. H olow iecka, “ Etos profesjonalny uczonych” [“ The Scholars' Professional E thos”], E tyka, 1981, vol. 19, pp. 162— 163.

(4)

The Sch olar’s and the A r tis t’s Ethos 57

2. T H E SC H O L A R A N D T H E A R T IST — T H E SIM IL A R IT IE S A N D D IF F E R E N C E S IN T H E IR ETH O S

A com parative analysis o f these two kinds o f ethos should be carried out, as far as possible, on various planes. Obviously, the m ere fact th at we are going to analyze an ethos forces us to accept a historical form ulation o f the problem , which imposes a dynam ic approach to the question o f the creation and changes in the ethos. Yet, we cannot stop h e re ; the other form s o f the existence o f the subjects o f our analysis have also to be taken into consideration. Therefore the analysis of the ethos o f the scholar and o f the ethos o f the artist will be carried out on the three, in my opinion, m ost im portant levels. A t the very beginning we are going to deal with the problem o f crystallization o f both these kinds o f ethos and with the crystallization o f the form s o f science and art— this is a level o f the genesis o f an ethos. Then the subject o f our analysis will cover the problem s related to the similarities and differences in both kinds o f e th o s ; the similarities and differences which result from an analysis carried out in term s of the form s o f culture and the social structure— this is the level o f historical transform ations in the form s o f an ethos. Next, our attention will be focussed on the problem o f crisis suffered by both kinds o f ethos— this is the level o f the m odern form s of an ethos. The com parative analysis will end in a quick glance at the scholar and the artist looking for truth in their activities.

W hen we com pare a relative time o f the crystallization o f the ethos o f the scholar and th at of the artist (i.e. related to the appearance o f science and art), we can note th at in this plane b oth kinds o f ethos reveal certain variations. The sources o f science taken as a reflection usually go back to ancient Greece (Popper, Crombie). In th at period the first form s o f the ethos o f the scholar appeared. So, we can risk the statem ent th at the crystallization o f the ethos o f the scholar was a relatively quick process, since it was com prised in the span o f one epoch only (the G reco-Latin civilization). This fact proves that, com pared with other groups, the scholars did not need m uch time to acquire their individuality as a group and the self-consciousness o f their autonom y. The problem was quite different in the case o f artists. The beginnings o f a rt are to be sought as early as in the palaeolithic period, but the ethos o f the artist appears m uch later. It is still absent in the culture o f ancient Egypt where they did have a code o f values which had to be respected by the artist-craftsm an, although it cannot be called ethos, since it referred not only to the artists bu t to the craftsm en as well. The situation is m ore o r less the same in ancient Greece in the archaic and classical period. Only in the Hellenistic period artists became conscious o f their cultural inidividualism , they acquired the structural separateness, and due to this fact the conditions necessary for the creation o f an ethos became finally fulfilled. Nevertheless, the social changes, which took place on the tu rn o f the G reco-Latin w orld and the M iddle Ages, m ade the ethos o f the artist disappear again. The artists lost the consciousness o f their cultural inidividualism and o f the structural separateness. This consciousness was regained as late as in the Renaissance, thus contributing

(5)

58 P rzem ysław Kisiel

to the recreation o f the ethos o f the artists, which continued its existence till m odern times. Since th at time, including additionally the Hellenistic period, we have full right to use the word ethos.

W hen the process o f the form ation o f the ethos o f the scholar and of the artist is com pared, we can wonder w hat are the reasons th at m ake them so different, although in both cases this is the ethos o f a creator. M ost probably the reasons of this difference are to be sought in the very nature o f science and art.

Science is mainly a conceptual activity, while a rt combines in itself the conceptual and executive function (revealed through physical actions). As long as the artist was merely an executor of a concept, he was included into the group o f craftsm en, but as soon as he started thinking about an im plem entation o f his own concepts, he was no longer considered to be a craftsm an and he discovered his own individuality. Yet, to give a full answer to the question why both these kinds o f ethos are different, it will be necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of the reference materials.

The problem how the scholar’s ethos and th at o f the artist crystallized is directly related with the problem o f the crystallization o f certain forms o f science and art. Science is in search o f an accurate and exact self-definition ; the main goal o f science is to give an answer to the question w hat is its scope, subject and m ethods. This is an attem pt which has as its m ain aim to enable full crystallization o f science as a form. The situation is different in the case of art. A rt is striving after the indefiniteness ; it tries to blur the outlines o f its subject, introducing into its scope really everything th at is possible. A rt does not define its m ethods either, due to which the artist has unlim ited possibilities in manifesting his artistic expressions. So, a rt is not interested in its own crystallization, on the contrary, it rejects the process o f this crystallization.

Let us now m ake a step tow ards an analysis which would be m ore related with the history o f both these kinds o f ethos. A t first we are going to de'al with the similarities which occur in the aspect of the forms o f culture.

In this approach an analysis o f the scholar’s ethos will go back to the ancient times since (as it has been m entioned previously) in th at period the beginnings o f scientific reflection are thought to come into existence.

In ancient Greece the appearance o f scientific reflection was accom panied by an emergence from the G reek society o f a group o f scholars. A t the very beginning the group was rather small, but already in the year 285 B. C. the first Academy o f Sciences was established in Alexandria, and the m ost eminent erudites were invited to join it. In this way a separate group— the group o f scholars, was form ed which, certainly, was at least a nucleus o f the later ethos, the m ore so that its isolation was not of a structural character only but was additionally supported by the feeling o f one’s own difference, individuality and cultural separateness. The other towns like Antioch, Pergam um , M iletus and Ephesus followed Alexandria, establishing also their own institutions o f the scientific life.

(6)

The Scholar's and the A r tis t’s Ethos 59

place was occupied by tru th, understood as the m ain goal in the whole activity o f the scholar. To achieve th at goal was possible only through autotelic cognition and explanation o f reality. T h at criterion was changed in R om an times when science was treated in a m uch m ore utilitarian way. A fter all, the practical outlook upon life was a tendency prevailling over the whole Hellenistic epoch, although in th at particular period it became m ost prom inent. The autotelic principles o f science were related with anoth er rule which covered only the sphere o f m otivations o f the scholar. According to this principle, science should be cultivated only as some m eans to achieve the inner im provem ent and self-education, not as a way for gaining m aterial welfare. The code o f values of the ancient scholar included one m ore principle, very im p ortan t for the scientific activities as such. According to th at principle the scholar was granted freedom and independence in his work.

On the turn o f ancient times and the M iddle Ages the scientific activities dissappeared alm ost completely. The reason was both mysticism, reigning at that time, and the invasions o f barbarians. On th at basis a conviction was form ed that the ancients reached a limit in the possibilities o f scientific cognition, leaving no field in the investigations for further generations. The confidence in the perfection o f the scientific achievements o f the G reco-L atin civilization was the very reason why scholars devoted their efforts to the preservation o f the conquests o f the acient knowledge rather, than to the establishm ent o f their own program m e o f researches. Therefore, at th at time to possess the skill o f transferring knowledge in a proper way was considered to be m uch m ore im portant than to enlarge the scope o f this knowledge in a creative way. All these factors resulted in the fact th at in the code o f rules and principles, which was binding for the contem porary scholar, the m ain emphasis was placed on teaching and cultivation o f knowledge. It has to be rem embered, however, th at science cultivated in the M iddle Ages till the beginning o f the 12th century was, in m ost part, governed by theology.

The beginning o f the 12th century is a period in which the ethos o f the scholar undergoes very im portant transform ations. The attitude o f the scholar becomes much m ore active which, combined with réanim ation o f the G reco-A rabic traditions, initiates various technical inventions. On this basis the empirical science was born, and it cretated new prospects for the cognition o f reality. At first, the renaissance o f the G reco-A rabic traditions took place in the society o f goliards, assisted in their activities by the translators, bu t already in the 13th century the scientific life became an institution, and proper conditions were created which enabled the society o f goliards to be transform ed into the society o f academics. The change in the concept o f the scholar caused also some changes in the code o f values included into his ethos. The m ost im portan t objective in the activities o f the scholar became once again the cognition understood in term s of an attem pt to know the tru th about the world, to dissem inate this tru th and to teach it. In return for his activities the scholar was becoming fam ous, and he could gain some means o f subsistence. The ethos o f the scholar also determ ined

(7)

the m ethods which could be used in the scientific research. Here a growing popularity was gained by the empirical and logical m ethods (induction and deduction), although they started to be applied on a wide scale only tow ards the end o f the M iddle Ages.

The code o f values o f the mediaeval ethos form ulated in this way was nothing else b ut a developed and expanded form o f the code o f values valid in the ancient ethos, and this trend followed the ethos o f the scholar till m odern times. The early m odern epoch did n ot change the ethos o f the scholar but extended its range, introducing some new forms. A t the very beginning o f the early m odern epoch, i.e. in the Renaissance, the cult o f knowledge, o f science and o f the hum anistic studies o f the world appeared, and this trend lasted till the end o f the 19th century. It is true th at during this long-lasting period both science and the scientific m ethods o f studies suffered various crises (e.g. Rom anticism con sidered the scientific m ethods o f learning to be insufficient), but it is equally true th at over the whole period the attitude o f the scholar tow ards science remained m uch the same and so did his ethos. W hat changed was the perspective of cultivating science.

In the period from the 16th to the 17th century science was still a value in itself.

T o see the truth is som ething much more w orthy and noble than any possible usefulness o f the work.4

In the 18th century science was discussed in quite different terms. The practical advantages were mainly taken into consideration, the social usefulness o f science was m ore and m ore emphasized as well as its didactic functions. Yet, in those times :

[...] it is difficult [...] to separate the interest show n in the cause o f pure scientific truth from the curiosity in respect o f useful in ven tion s....5

In the code o f values o f the scholar attention was also paid to the m ethods which he could apply in his research. The experimental m ethod was considered to be the best one.

In the course o f the m odern epoch one o f the changes in the principles o f ethos was related with the attitude o f the scholar tow ards teaching and the transfer of knowledge. A t the end o f the M iddle Ages scholars were thinking th at teaching was an element inherent in their profession, as it was one o f the m ost im portant sources o f m aintenance. The Renaissance changed the situation o f the scholar, introducing on a wide scale the institutions o f patronage.

4 S. K am iński, Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [The N otion o f Science and Classification o f

Science], Lublin: K U L , 1970, p. 83.

(8)

The Scholar's and the A rtist's Ethos 61

In this way the hum anists abandon one o f the m ain tasks o f the intellectual— the contact with the m asses, the bond which exists between the know ledge and teaching.6

In the later periods o f the m odern epoch th at situation was changing step by step. The m ain reason was understanding the fact th at only teaching can be a stimulus to the scientific activities and ensure their continuation. Therefore, in quite a short lapse o f time the law, which required from the scholar to share his own knowledge with the others, became one o f the principal rules governing his ethos.

The 19th century certainly became a culm inant period in the creation o f the scholar’s ethos. A t th at time, finally, the fully crystallized and form ulated ethos came into existence. It was know n under the name o f the traditional ethos and was used as a reference standard to m ake com parisons with the previously and subsequently form ulated kinds of ethos. It was characterized by a well-developed code of rules and values, the observation o f which was necessary in the society o f scholars.

The m ost im po rtan t and m ost highly praised value was an autotelic study of the world ; the radices o f this principle go back to the ancient ethos. T ru th and knowledge became m ost im po rtan t objectives in the activities o f the scholar, and to confer to these activities a scientific character, he had to use scientific m ethods. A lot o f emphasis was placed on the character o f the work. On one hand, the work had to be creative, disclosing the mysteries o f this w orld, on the other, it was expected to give self-realization. To meet this requirem ent, the scholar should have an autonom y, i.e. he had to be free in his scientific investigations and explorations as well as in the choice o f the field o f knowledge which w ould be m ost suitable for his scientific activities. It was also im p ortant th at the scholar had no restrictions in the exchange of his opinions and in the publication o f the results o f his explorations. Such conditions created proper atm osphere for the scientific disputes which seemed to be o f the same im portance as the collection o f research m aterials. The model o f an ethos based on th at system obliged the scholar to resist any am bitions, to see in quest for truth the m ain objective o f his activities and to abandon the thought o f any advantages which he m ight get in exchange for his work.

The first h alf o f the 20th century did n o t introduce m any changes in the traditional ethos. All the m ain principles o f the traditional ethos were left. We can still find the autotelic m odel o f studies and the rule to carry o u t the scientific activities by m eans o f the scientific m ethods. T ruth and knowledge continue to be the m ain values which should guide the scholar in his work.

On the other hand, in the 20th century the ethos extends the duties o f the scholar. A part from the requirem ents im posed by the traditional ethos, such as a creative character of the scientific activities, publication o f the scientific achievements, freedom in scientific research and studies, m oral rules are

(9)

becoming more and m ore obligatory. This results from the developm ent of science and from the reflection o f the scholars that, ap art from the advantages, science—when used in the wrong way— can also bring some serious losses. After R. K. M erton :

T he mores o f science possess a m éth odologie rationale, but they are binding, not only because they are procedurally efficient, but because they are believed right and good. T hey are moral as well as technical prescriptions. Four sets o f institutional imperatives - universalism. com munism , disinterestedness, organized scepticism — com prise the ethos o f m odern science.7

The imperatives suggested by J. G ockow ski are quite closely related with the above-m entioned four sets o f institutional imperatives ; J. Gockowski has additionally enriched them with the principle o f responsibility, understood in terms o f a dictate to feel responsible for the results o f one’s own scientific activities.8

It has to be rem embered, however, th at the above-m entioned imperatives are not new. Their radices go back not only to the rules o f the traditional ethos o f the 19th century, but they can be traced even in the rules o f the mediaeval and ancient ethos. Previously they did not bear such a great significance. In early ages science did n o t interfere so m uch in the ethical problem s. N ow adays, when science can bring either salvation or exterm ination to the w orld, the problem o f respon sibility has become a m atter o f utm ost im portance.

The second h alf o f the 20th century brings certain changes in the concept of ethos. The increasing institutionalization o f science, the state control exerted over the scientific life, high degree o f professionalism and specialization of the scientific studies— all these factors cause the disappearance o f the scholar’s ethos in favour o f the w orker’s ethics. The reason o f such changes is the fact th at :

There are changes in the concept o f science, in the concept o f its status and functions in the society, as well as in its relations with the state [...]. Grave and significant transform ations occur in the structure o f the society taken as a whole : the category o f a highly skilled sta ff o f the w orkers with the “ white collars” m entality is expanding, and it becom es a typical segm ent. A s a result o f these changes the scientist carries on his profession as a worker hired by a given institution ; the state interferes in the essence o f the scientific activities and integrates science, m aking it a tool and a source o f the political and econ om ic pow er [...], while the institutions take over and control a number o f the matters which were previously in gestion o f the scientific societies only. A nd although scientists still have the power to take num erous decisions, quite often— in view o f other functions performed in the society— they are forced to resort to the non-scientific means which are o f no service to science.9

7 R. K. M erton, Social Theory and Social Structure, G lencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1957, pp. 552— 553.

8 T his concept was disclosed by J. G ockow sk i during a scientific sym posium on : Badacze

i wychowawcy— E tos ludzi nauki [R esearchers and Teachers— E thos o f the Scholars], Cracow , M ay

27— 29, 1985.

(10)

So, we face a crisis in the scholar’s ethos. The crisis which refers to the values but goes much d e e p e r; it becomes a crisis o f the existence o f the ethos. A t present the scientists are standing at the cross-roads. The total disappearance o f ethos may depend on w hether they are able to either overcome the lack of its adaptive power to the social processes which occur in the circles o f the scientific societies, or to accept the w orker’s ethics which will m ean a slow decay o f the society o f erudites in favour o f the in-plant societies, w orker’s societies and the branch societies.

To end our discussion on the problem o f the scholar’s ethos related to the various forms o f culture, let us try to recapitulate the inform ation disclosed so far, referring it to the ethos o f long duration. W hen the history o f the scholar’s ethos is analyzed, we can note th at it is subjected to continuous and quiet changes, where every next “ step in the developm ent” is a m odification and an expansion o f the previous one. Therefore the ancient ethos is so im portant, and therefore its elements are encountered in all the subsequent periods. A nother reason which makes the A ntiquity im portant is the fact th a t it created the conditions appropriate for the form ation o f ethos and defined the main elements in the code o f values.

These elements can be traced in every next phase o f the developm ent o f ethos, although they are enriched all the time with additional rules. The form ation of the scholar’s ethos can be described in a pictorial way com paring it with a sphere (the core or the basis for the code o f values) which is being “ coated ” around with new group principles. So, here we are speaking abou t one period in the long duration o f ethos. Some doubts m ay occur only when we take into consideration the mediaeval ethos (till the beginnings o f the 12th century), b ut th at period may be regarded as a crisis during which the scholars treated their activities in a less active (more passive) way than their predecessors did although, appreciating duly the value o f knowledge, they tried to im part it to other people. To support this thesis, we can use as an argum ent the fact that in th at period the principal concept o f science, treated as a form o f hum an aspirations to reach tru th , did not, as a m atter o f fact, undergo any changes. Therefore it was a period during which the shape o f science was m oulded not by a “ scholar-explorer” but by a “ scholar-teacher.”

O ut analysis o f the ethos o f the artist, discussed in term s o f the various forms of culture, will begin with the code o f values o f an artist in ancient Egypt. It is true th at art had appeared as early as in the Palaeolithic, but the lack o f reliable data makes the description o f an artist in th at period o f culture impossible.

A t the very beginning it has to be stated th at in ancient Egypt both artists and craftsm en used the same code o f values. The lack o f cultural and structural division between those two societies accounted for the fact th at they were treated as one group. The m ost im portant and fundam ental rules in the code of values o f the artist in Egypt were those which referred to the objectives o f art. A nd the m ost im portant objective o f the Egyptian art was to accept and support the existing social situation.

(11)

In the service o f the great national propaganda, art confirm ed in the m asses the image o f stability o f the existing state o f affairs. The art had to express this im age in a clear and explicit way ; above all art should be understandable. Therefore it did not show a subjective picture in foreshortening, depending on a given poin t o f view , but it was presenting an objective picture o f the reality— not the reality as I can see it at a given m om ent or in a given situation but the reality such as I kn ow that it really is .10

T h at kind o f knowledge referred n ot only to the form o f the presented objects but also to their symbolic meaning. Basing on this knowledge, the Egyptians form ulated their own concept o f art and o f the proper relations which served as a basis for the establishm ent o f their own canons which, on the other hand, were determ ined not by a rt b u t by the liturgical and social factors. The way in which these canons were elaborated expressed another objective o f art, namely the dissem ination o f religious ideas. The canons were expected to exert a double effect on the artist. O n one hand, the artistic canon im peded the developm ent of art, preventing the artist from expressing his ideas in a free and unrestrained m anner while, on the other, it ensured a high artistic level o f the contem porary art, m aking it clear and easily understood by everybody.

A p art from the determ ination o f the m ain objectives which art was expected to satisfy, in the code o f values recom m ended for artists a great emphasis was put on the w orkm anship o f a piece of art. The accuracy and perfection were highly esteemed, since they spoke well o f the artist himself. The fundam ental rules in the code o f values o f the Egyptian artist were definitely o f a very stable nature. Changes in the canons and attem pts to m ake the rules less strict occurred only in the field o f art, and their influence on the binding code o f values was of no m ajor significance. Some im p ortan t changes in the code o f values appeared in the ancient G reek culture. A t the very beginning, in an archaic period, the code of values o f the G reek artist was n o t clearly form ulated. Like in Egypt, he was included into the group o f craftsm en, and he was evaluated in the same way. The reason was the still lacking cultural individuality o f an artist as well as the fact th at a rt was thought to be :

[...] every piece o f the hum an work if it was creative, if it used skills and if it w as consciously based on the general rules.11

The m ain aim o f a rt was to im itate and reproduce reality, and to give pleasure to the onlooker. The classical period developed the existing code o f values. The a rt continued to be regarded as an activity ruled by principles. The m ost im portant objective o f a rt was to represent reality, but to represent it in an idealistic way.

10 K. M ichałow ski, Kanon w architekturze egipskiej [The Canon in Egyptian Architecture], W arsaw, 1956, pp. 8— 9.

(12)

The S ch o la r’s and the A r tis t’s Ethos 65

Even if it be im possible that people like those painted by Zeuxis really existed, it is preferable to present them in this w ay because the ideal should have a priority (over the real).12

The m ain aim o f the artist was to look for ideal p roportions, i.e. to seek absolute beauty. To facilitate the achievement o f this goal, various canons were recom m ended for use, th at is, the rules which should be observed by the artist and which, according to the Greeks, could m ake the a rt perfect. The canons were justified from the artistic point o f view (contrary to the Egyptian ones), they were elaborated gradually, they were changed and corrected, they resulted from the observations o f nature and were form ulated basing on the laws o f nature. The canons were regarded as objective truths, n ot invented b ut discovered.

The classical period also m aintained the rule according to which a rt should serve the pleasure, including also its additional function, i.e. recording o f the historical and m ythological events. The code o f values recom m ended for the classical artist im posed upon a rt one m ore objective. Being o f an imitative and reproducing character, a rt should tend tow ards truth.

Truth, understood as a conform ity w ith the reality w as considered to be an im portant feature o f a rt.13

Tow ards the close o f the Classical period and at the beginning o f the Hellenistic epoch, great changes to o k place in the code o f the a rtist’s values. They were caused by the alterations which occurred in the field o f art. A tra n s form ation o f the Hellenic a rt into the Hellenistic one resulted in the fact t h a t :

[...] in the creative activities o f an artist the relationship betw een art and beauty becam e m ost p rom in en t; in the theory o f art the centre o f gravity shifted from the intellect to im agination, from the im pression to an idea, from the rules o f art to the personal skills o f an artist, from the passive understanding o f art to an active com prehension ; due to these changes the artist w as finally considered to be less o f a craftsm an and m ore o f a prophet and legislator o f a rt.14

In the field o f the artist’s ethos, in the Hellenistic period the m ost im p ortant change consisted in the gradual emergence o f the group o f artists, in the split in the consciousness o f artists and craftsm en, and in the creation o f the separate code o f values. These changes were followed by a growing im portance o f the artist as a creato r o f art. The m ain principles in the code o f values were also undergoing some significant changes. The objectives o f a rt had changed as well as the forms o f their realization. Beauty was gradually becoming the m ain and direct goal o f art, and th at was the very reason why the artist was respected m uch

12 J. B iałostocki, M yśliciele, kronikarze i artyści o sztu ce. O d staro żytn o ści do 1500 [Thinkers,

Chroniclers and A rtists on A rt. From A n tiqu ity to 1500], W arsaw : P W N , 1978, p.43.

13 W. Tatarkiew icz, D zieje sześciu po jęć [The H isto ry o f S ix N otions], W arsaw : P W N , 1975, p. 351.

14 W. Tatarkiew icz, “ H ellenistyczna teoria sztuki i poezji” [“ H ellenistic Theory o f A rt and P oetry”], Kultura i Społeczeństw o, 1957, vol. 1, N o . 4, p. 4.

(13)

m ore th an the craftsm an. The faithful representation and im itation o f reality was no longer the rule to be strictly followed. Hence, in the code o f values new requirem ents were imposed upon the artist, and ap art from the knowledge he was also expected to possess inspiration, originality, boldness o f ideas, and technical skill— the latter factor enabled the creation of a piece o f art. On the other hand, the canon, understood as a set o f the strict rules, disappeared alm ost completely. D uring the Hellenistic period only the tasks o f a rt were n o t changed. A rt was still expected to give pleasure and to record the im portant events.

The decline o f ancient culture and the developm ent o f Christianity caused some im portant changes in the character o f the mediaeval art. The cultural individuality o f artists disappeared again, and they were included once m ore into the group o f craftsm en. This social degradation com bined with a change in the tasks and objectives o f a rt contributed to a change in the code o f values binding for the artists. The rules were changing n o t only on the turn o f A ntiquity and the M iddle Ages but also in the course o f the M iddle Ages. The rules, which had to be observed by the artist in the epoch o f early Christianity, were different from those which existed in G othic times, and the changes assum ed m ore o r less the same course as in A ntiquity.

In the M iddle Ages the definition o f a rt did n ot stray very much from the classical one— a rt is a methodical activity based on certain rules. If, however, these rules were strictly observed in the early M iddle Ages, the late mediaeval period perm itted a deviation in favour o f the a rtist’s own invention.

The objectives o f art, on the contrary, changed in a very definite way. In ancient times a rt represented nature and the w o rld ; it served beauty and “ had to feast one’s eyes in the Middle Ages a rt was expected to represent G o d ’s ideas and religious truths. A rt also changed its character— it started to use symbols since it was representing the tem poral world regarded as a symbol o f the transcendent being and as a symbol o f the eternal world. So, in a way, art belonged to the second world—the world o f G o d ; it was G o d ’s image«created for people. Therefore, in the rules prescribed for artists particular emphasis was placed on the social n ature o f the artist’s activities and on the religious functions o f art. This trend was predom inant in the early C hristian epoch when art was entirely subjected to the religious and m oral problem s o f the Christian faith. It symbolized and illustrated the religious values, and its m ain task was to teach and dissem inate the tru th o f the faith.

Painting m eans the same to people as alphabet to those w h o can read, because those w ho cannot read can see and in the picture they are shown a m odel to follow . Therefore paintings exist mainly for the instruction o f p e o p le.15

Striving after beauty was also recom mended, but it was regarded as a means for expressing the spiritual truth, the tru th revealed and divine. L ater on, in the

(14)

The Sch olar’s and the A r tis t’s Ethos 67

Rom anesque and the G othic periods, the theological concept o f art, prevailing until then, became only a background for the artistic activities. Due to this change, the m ain objective in the artist’s activities was m ore and m ore often an attem pt to reach beauty and, w hat is even m ore im portant, to reach the aesthetic and n o t metaphysical beauty. Yet, even th a t attitude was partly justified from the religious point o f view. The aesthetic sensations were regarded as a m eans to experience the spiritual beauty and to come nearer to G od.

The code o f values also determ ined the character o f the artistic activities. A rt was expected to be o f a reproductive nature, yet it should reproduce n ot the visible w orld bu t the inivisible one, which is eternal and m ore perfect th an the real one. The last rule in the code o f the artist’s principles o f behaviour concerned the problem o f a relationship between the artist, his a rt and truth. Since a rt was representing not the m undane reality b ut it symbolized the world o f G od, artists were released from the duty to be strictly subordinated to art. It was discovered th at a rt is beyond truth and falseness. On the other hand, it was required from art to give a representation consistent with the religious truth. C om paring in a general way the tasks which were given to the artist in those periods, a very im portan t difference can be observed :

The Egyptians had largely drawn what they knew to exist, the G reeks what they saw ; in the M iddle A ges the artist also learned to express in his picture w hat he fe lt.16

The decline o f the G othic and the beginnings o f the Renaissance b rou gh t the next series o f changes in the a rtist’s code o f values. The changes, which had already begun in the times o f the G othic, referred directly to the “ newly discovered” ancient tradition. However, the separation between the artists, taken as a cultural group, and the craftsm en had the greatest direct im pact on the changes in the existing code o f rules. The restoration in art o f the ancient traditions was the very reason why the code o f values also acquired the ancient character. It is true th at at the very beginning, similarly as in the M iddle Ages, art was regarded as an activity dom inated by certain rules, b ut for the sources o f this attitude we have to look back into Antiquity. On the contrary, in the later periods th at definition was gradually abandoned in favour o f the definition o f art understood as an activity following certain predeterm ined rules, b ut it did not disregard entirely an effect o f the artist’s talent, im agination and inspiration. The m ost im p o rtant rule, which governed the activities o f the Renaissance artist, was sticking to the laws o f perspective. This caused a “m athem atization” o f art, and p u t artists into one group with the scholars. The M annerism and Baroque opposed the tendency o f m aking a rt a branch o f science. The result was a rejection o f the rules and subjecting a rt to the artist’s psyche. Similarly, in the Classicism the scientific aspirations o f a rt were n ot cultivated, although strict artistic rules were introduced once again. The m ost im p ortant duty o f the

(15)

Renaissance artist was to im itate nature. The im itation was understood in two different ways : to im itate n ature and to im itate the laws which ruled nature, that is, to perform functions sim ilar to those o f nature itself.

A t th at time another im p ortan t and obligatory principle was to strive in art after beauty. Like in the ancient times, the goal was to be reached through p roportion and harm ony. To this end it was n o t enough to im itate reality and nature, but it was also necessary to create its ideal image. The idealization consisted in selecting the m ost beautiful fragm ents of reality and in using them as a basis for the creation o f ideal beauty.

The artist not only im itated the nature but he also em bellished it according to the rules o f art. Beauty was a sign o f the artist’ s intervention into the order o f nature.17

So we can see that in the epoch o f the Renaissance the artist was not only an im itator o f a rt b ut he was slowly becoming also a creator o f art, since both the reproduction o f reality and striving after beauty were n ot merely mechanical actions. The creative element was gaining im portance. An increase in the im portance o f the creative pow er o f the artist became m ost visible in the M annerism and Baroque. In the code o f values binding in those periods it was clearly emphasized that a rt is a result o f the creative pow er o f the artist.

In those two epochs the attitu de o f the artist tow ards reality also changed. A rt was no longer expected to represent nature ; its m ain task was to become an illusion o f nature, and therefore it should deceive the spectator. The attitude of artists in the epoch o f M annerism and Baroque tow ards the problem o f beauty was also different. In the Renaissance it was thought th at beauty was inherent, first o f all, in nature and then in art, especially the classical one. In the period of M annerism and Baroque the artists considered n ature to be weak and frail. They could see real beauty only in their own illusive art. They considered their own art to be not only superior to the previous one but also better and closer to beauty than nature itself.

T h at opinion o f the artists rem ained unchanged until the period o f Academism which reached its culm inating point during the Classicism. In troducing into a rt certain determ ined principles, it reduced the significance of a creative factor but did not eliminate it totally. A rt became once again a copy of nature, and not o f an arb itrary nature b u t o f the chosen nature, free from imperfections. Such an ideal m odel o f ideal n ature became the ancient art, and it was regarded as an example to be followed. The Renaissance works were also considered to be w orthy o f im itation. Since, ap art from the aesthetic pleasure, teaching became another objective o f art, the invention o f the artists was restricted to the ancient subjects and to those which represented some scenes form the H oly Writ. The reasons, which w ould explain these changes in the

17 Z. W aźbiński, D zieło i tw órca w koncepcji renesansu [The W ork and the C reator in the

(16)

The S ch olar’s and the A r tis t’s Ethos ₆₉ artist’s code o f values, are to be sought in an attem pt o f the artist to reach ideal a rt and in his conviction th at there is only one tru th existing in art. To achieve this tru th was possible only due to the observance o f some strict rules, determ ined on the basis o f the rational criteria. So, it was believed th at a rt could be even m ore beautiful and m ore truthful th an n ature itself, since nature has some im perfect ions, while a rt can be released from these im perfections if the artist observes the right rules.

The 19th century and the 20th century are the periods when m any different concepts o f a rt are coexisting. The pluralism o f concepts has resulted in a pluralism in the artist’s code o f values. In spite o f this, the separate systems had some features in com m on which enabled them to be regarded as a set o f the rules typical o f the artists in this period— the artists creating m odern art.

Com pared with the code o f values recognized by the academ ic artists, the m ost im portant change consisted in renouncing the idea o f objectiveness. The artist’s duty was still to reflect reality but the image o f this reality was a subjective vision o f the world, the w orld seen th rough a prism o f the artist’s own personality.

The work o f art should reflect the im pression received. Therefore to the artist nature m eans noth in g but a state o f his ow n personality.18

Since a rt became a subjective experience o f the artist, and it was no longer bound by an attem pt to reach beauty, the aesthetic criterion was replaced with the criterion o f expression, sensation and feeling, which accom panied the contact with art. The artist, who could rouse with his a rt some em otions, was a good artist, capable o f transm itting to the others his internal feelings and ideas. In the realization o f this goal the artist was not bound by any rules. O f course, he was free to observe some rules, but he could also choose other m eans o f expression.

The artist is relieved from all the rules and conventions, his art has practically n o boundaries ; it does not bother abou t any justifications, and no such justification s are needed bacause art is not necessary as a sym bol o f culture.19

Only one requirem ent is now imposed upo n the a r tis t: to convey with w hat he creates some im p ortan t pieces o f inform ation. There is also an other criterion which becomes im portant— the creative power. The question is w heather the a rt presented by a given artist is sufficiently creative and original, w hether it is a result o f the artist’s independent w ork on a given subject or w hether it is a plagiarism. Previously, the n otion o f plagiarism was alien to art, since copying was not regarded as som ething censurable. M odern art, on the contrary,

18 E. Grabska, H. M orawska, A rty ści o sztuce. O d Van Gogha do P icassa [A rtists on A rt. From

Van Gogh to Picasso], W arsaw : P W N , 1962, p. 85.

19 J. B iałostocki, Refleksja i syn tezy ze św iata sztu k i [R eflections and Synth eses fro m the W orld

(17)

repudiates copying and does not recognize it as an artistic activity. The work of a rt has to be creative, original and independent. The artist is expected not only to m aster the technique b ut to have som ething to say and to be able to do it in his own words. So, the requirem ents imposed upo n the artist have changed completely.

N ow adays art has changed again, and it is a result o f the crisis which has taken possession o f the values o f a rt accepted until now. They have become obsolete and useless. M odern art tries to occupy a different place in the society from the one it has been holding until now. A nd this attitude is backed by the resignation o f a rt from its previous inform ative and substantial role, by the process o f autom atization o f a rt as well as by the disintegration and destruction o f artistic forms. It can be stated th at a rt is subjected to deep and revolutionary transform ations and th at :

[...] this revolution m eans not only breaking with the w h ole European past and with the whole cultural tradition held until now , but also with the w hole past o f the art existing until n o w .20

Some basic changes also occur in the principal elements o f the code o f the artist’s values. It can be observed th a t a new ethos is being form ed ; the ethos which is a result o f the activities o f the artistic vanguard o f the 60s.

T he eth os o f the individualized truth is dom inated by the eth os o f individual activities, while the criterion o f a faithful representation o f the world has to give place to another criterion— that o f being faithful to o n e’s ow n self, that is, to the criterion o f an adequacy between a given act and the deep internal structures o f an individual.21

The artist has to face quite a new task. He is no longer expected to reflect the world in his art, he is no longer interested in the cognition o f the world, but he is acting through his art, he exists due to his art. So, the artist becomes “ full” creator, and he is creating not only a rt itself, like in the post-ancient times, but also reality, all th at surrounds him. The new a rt gives him new tasks, he has to create his own world, environm ent and existence. E. Souriau, the creator o f the m oral system on which m odern art has been based, is o f the opinion th at the only m oral principle o f the artist is his duty to create art. This duty has become so im portant th at artists have degraded their professional skill, preferring the creative idea itself to the skill. It can be noted that the objectives o f a rt as well as the objectives o f the artistic activities have changed completely. N ow the main objective is no t an aesthetic experience b u t an active attitude tow ards one’s own existence. Am ong the different criteria used in the evaluation o f art, the greatest emphasis is p u t on the sublimity o f art. The new ethos imposes quite new requirem ents upon the artist. The artist is expected to create both the world and

20 P. K rakow ski, O sztu ce nowej i najnowszej [On the N ew and the N ew est Art], W arsaw : PW N , 1984, p. 171.

(18)

The S ch olar’s and the A rtist's Ethos 71

the reality. Yet, this act of creation m ust be sublime, it m ust be constructive, it m ust give new values and new ideas ; it m ust release em otions, it m ust be an artistic activity. Therefore the artist is burdened with a great responsibility, although he is n o t the only one to bear it. The responsibility is equally shared by all people, since all people are supposed to be creators o f the new art. So, everybody creates something, every activity, every object can be introduced into the field o f art, and everybody is responsible for the existence and the reality which he creates.

Let us now try to recapitulate the above-given inform ation in the aspect o f the ethos o f long duration.

W hen we investigate the code o f values o f the artist in particular historical periods, we cannot find one leading value which would be com m on to all the codes o f values. Therefore our analysis will be m ade on the basis o f the two main characteristics determ ining art, namely : the objective o f a rt and the attitude o f art tow ards reality.

An Analysis o f the Objectives o f Art

W hen we analyze the above-given inform ation, we can distinguish four main objectives o f art : political, religious, aesthetic (beauty) and em otional (affect ion). The political objectives were fulfilled by art in Ancient Egypt, where a rt was a tool o f power; the religious objectives can be attributed to a rt in the M iddle Ages, and to some— though sm aller—degree in the Egyptian art. The aesthetic objectives, revealed in an attem pt to find beauty, appeared in a visible way in ancient and early m odern times and also, though to a smaller degree, at the end o f the M iddle Ages. The em otional objectives, often related with the aesthetic ones (they m ight be, after all, combined into one com m on group), m ost often expressed in affection o r other em otional reactions, have been and are still observed in m odern art.

An Analysis o f the Attitude o f A rt towards Reality

Basically speaking, two types o f the attitudes o f art tow ards reality can be distinguished : a rt creates reality and art reflects reality. In the scope of the latter attitude, however, we can distinguish : a creative representation of reality and an imitative representation o f reality. In this way we have, as a m atter o f fact, three types o f the attitudes. The imitative representation o f reality occurs in the Egyptian art, in the archaic and classical Greek a rt and in the mediaeval art. The creative representation o f reality is typical o f the Hellenistic, early m odern and m odern art. The creation o f reality through a rt occurs only in the m odern art.

Relating now these rem arks with an analysis o f the ethos o f long duration, it can be stated th at in the history o f ethos the following four periods can be distinguished :

(19)

First period—the Egyptian a rt representing in an im itative way reality and

perform ing political and religious functions.

Second period—the M iddle Ages— a rt also represents in an imitative way

reality but it m ust also perform a religious and aesthetic functions.

Third period—includes the Greek, early m odern and m odern art, which had

to represent reality and was focussed on the fulfilment o f aesthetic objectives.

The last period in the ethos o f long du ration covers the art contem porary to

our times, which also aims at a fulfilment o f the aesthetic objectives but assumes a m ost active (creative) attitude tow ards reality.

From the short historical review presented above we can see that in the aspect o f the form s o f culture, both o f the above discussed kinds o f ethos reveal great differences. Looking for similarities gives rather poor results. The similarities are m ost visible in the Renaissance. A t th at time art and science were treated in a similar way, and the m ain goal was an objective scientific cognition. In science it was an autotelic value, in a rt it served as a means to achieve the principal aim, i.e. an objective representation o f the world. These com m on features observed in some of the values are revealed in both kinds o f ethos through the existence of some com m on rules and activities. Yet, in the aspect o f the forms o f culture, the similarity between the ethos o f the artist and the ethos o f the scientist is rather superficial. The reason is the fact that art does not allow, or maybe it needs not allow us to penetrate into the nature of some phenom ena which occur in reality, as it is necessary in the case o f science. F o r the artist the cognition o f reality is a m uch m ore superficial a c t ; to describe reality is enough for him. F or the scholar the description is not sufficient ; a p a rt from the description, he tries to understand and explain the phenom ena which he finds interesting. So, in spite of the apparen t similarities, there is an obvious difference between these aspects of the ethos. The difference results from a different attitude which is assumed by the artists and by the scholars.

M ore similarities can be found when we analyze the aspect o f a social structure, th at is, the status o f the scholar and th at o f the artist. Artists appear as a group with a very low status, while the social position o f scholars places them, from the very beginninig, in the group o f the “ middle class.” In ancient Greece the status o f the scholar, and hence also his authority, was m uch higher than th at o f the artist. In the Hellenistic period the position o f the artist gained a lot o f im portance, while th at o f the scholar rem ained at the same level. Due to this fact, at th at time both scholars and artists acquired a very sim ilar status. It is true th at in the M iddle Ages the position o f the scholar suffered a decline, but the position of the artist decreased even more. The end o f the M iddle Ages strengthened the influence o f the artist, his social position raised, but the same tendency was observed also in the case o f the scholar ; the hum anistic ideas increased the authority o f science as well. In the m odern epoch the status o f the artist was raising all the time, while th a t o f the scholar was gaining im portance to a very small degree only. Due to this fact, both the scholar and the artist acquired a relatively high social status, although the 19th century brought in some

(20)

changes. The position o f the scholar became definitely stronger, he was included in the élite of the society, he gained a very high authority as well as a social status. On the other hand, the artist, owing to the social alienation and disintegration caused by the feeling o f his own exceptionality, reduced his own authority. Hence, at th at the position of the artist was definitely m uch lower from th at o f the scholar. However, in the course o f time the situation was gradually changing. The growing approval o f m odern art m ade the social status o f the artist raise again. N ow adays both artists and scientists are again placed at the same social level.

In an analysis o f this aspect our attention should be draw n to one very im portant fact. The status o f the scholar and the status o f the artist were form ed in different ways, b u t certain com m on tendencies can be observed here, namely :

— a definite decrease in the social status o f both artists and scholars was observed on the turn o f the ancient epoch and the M iddle Ages, the theocratic mediaeval system was certainly responsible for th at state o f affairs ;

— the early m odern epoch brought in a definite increase in the social position o f both groups ;

— m odern times give artists and scientists a very high social status and a great authority.

A m ore comprehensive and detailed analysis o f the ethos o f the scholar and the ethos o f the artist reveals some similarities, although there are differences as well. To explain this fact is n o t a simple task, and therefore it will be necessary to m ake a less detailed analysis which would enable us to grasp the developm ent tendencies in both kinds o f ethos.

As it has already been m entioned, in m odern times the scientists and the artists suffer a crisis of their ethos, but if the artists are passing through this crisis in a relatively mild way, the scientists face certain difficulties. The com m on feature are here similar developm ent tendencies (i.e. the occurrence o f a crisis), which are a reaction to the actual social situation. To know, however, whether this is a characteristic o f only these two kinds o f ethos, w ould require an analysis o f other m odern forms of ethos. Then we w ould be able to see if this is, by any chance, the peculiarity o f ou r times which induces various crises. It is quite possible th at the social conditions under which we are living now adays cause the same crisis in other groups, too. It is generally supposed th a t the technical progress and economic developm ent have contributed to the crisis o f values in num erous social groups.

The problem o f crisis in the ethos is directly related with the problem of a reaction to this crisis, th at is, with the problem o f looking for some solutions. In this field, the situation is quite different in the ethos o f the scientist and in the ethos o f the artist which consequently brings some variations in the results o f this crisis. The artists reacted to the crisis in a very active way ; they form ulated a new code o f values, they created a new ethos. On one hand, the new system, based on a very “ elevated” ideology conferred to a rt an im portant place in the social code of values; on the other, it enabled the artist to enter into friendly relations with

(21)

the society, breaking the border which existed between him and the society. Such a form ulation o f the concept o f art was a logical step in the visible tendency of m aking the artistic activities more sublime. In the Hellenistic period as well as in early m odern ages the artist was representing in an objective way reality. So, art was an image o f reality, it was something secondary in relation to nature. In the present art the artist is transform ing the objective reality through a prism o f his personality, and due to this art becomes a new value, though it is still related, to some degree, with nature. M odern art is a result o f the creative activities o f the artist. The process o f creation makes the artist’s w ork independent o f nature, it becomes equal to the works o f the C reator. The creation as such is included into the sphere o f sacrum, since it transcends the aesthetic values, tending towards higher values. So, in the creative process o f the artist we observe a constant idealization o f this process, transferring it gradually into the sphere of sacrum, which m eans a “ sacralization” o f the artististic activities. On the other hand, the new ethos expresses quite opposite tendencies. The value o f the work itself is gradually disappearing in favour o f an intention and a creative idea. The character of the ethos also changes. First of all, it becomes available to everybody, since everybody can be a creator. The borderline between art and reality is blurred ; life is art and art is life. This is the m otto which reveals the tendencies o f the artists to oppose the system of élite, the tendencies which might be denoted as a process o f the “ desacralization” o f the artist and his work.

The reaction o f the scholars to the crisis was quite different. It was o f a more passive nature ; they did n o t create a new ethos, they were not able to present new leading values. The social status o f the scholar did not change, either. In the epoch o f the traditional ethos the scholar had a very high social position. The cult o f knowledge and science, which reigned in the contem porary society, con tributed to a great extent to this situation. At that time, science was the field of hum an activities which was believed to be om nipotent and to be able to solve every problem . Due to this, the scholars gained a very high authority. The situation started to change when it was noted that science can be only one o f the cognitive perspectives o f m an, that its possibilities are limited and th at its role is not always o f a positive nature. At th at time, however, the authority o f science did not suffer a decrease, although it seemed that the crisis in the scholar’s ethos and the popularization o f science would unavoidably cause th at state of affairs. Science was only deprived o f its halo o f the loftiness and irrationality (the decisive factor here was a growing consciousness o f the limited possibilities of science), which had previously caused an unjustified cult and fascination resulting from the failure to understand the essence o f science as a social phenom enon. Science had finally reached the state in which the rationalism and logics, th at is, the m ain criteria o f the scientific character o f knowledge, became its m ost im portant force. The process, which is now described, m ight be called “ desacralization” o f science and o f the scientist. One fact has to be emphasized here, however, namely th a t owing to this process science can fully accomplish its objectives, using its own scientific means. The process in question liberated the

(22)

The S ch o la r’s and the A r tis t’s E thos 75

scholar from the ballast which may be the irrationally m otivated cult o f science. An interesting phenom enon can be noted here. A part from its disfunctional characteristics (the disappearance o f ethos in favour o f the w orker’s ethics and other related processes), the crisis o f the scholar’s ethos is also characterized by some functional properties (the “ desacralization” o f science and o f the scientist), related with science as such and with the possibilities o f its developm ent.

The difference in the ethos o f the scholar and the ethos o f the artist, discussed in the aspect o f various forms o f culture, is also the very cause o f differences in the opinions to w hat extent science and art have deviated from truth. In science the criterion o f tru th is m uch simpler than in art, since it is based on A ristotle’s definition o f truth. T ruth is conform ity with w hat is real. In this situation, in science the deviation from tru th will m ean a proclam ation o f the statem ents inconsistent with reality and with the facts. Now, when we speak ab o u t the deviation from tru th in term s o f the ethos o f the scholar, we have to think additionally which rules and principles o f this ethos are violated when we face this situation. Assum ing th a t this is not a deliberate activity aiming at the developm ent o f a “ false science,” it can be ascertained th a t breaking o f the principles o f autotelism , objectivism and criticism is the very cause o f deviation from the scientific truth.

In art tru th is understood in a slightly different way. One fact has to be emphasized here, namely that, according to A ristotle’s definition, art is beyond truth and falseness. In art the notion o f truth has quite different criteria, while the term “ tru th ” is confined in its m eaning and should be understood as a con form ity with the accepted concept o f art.

In ancient Egypt a rt was a reflection o f the existing knowledge ab o u t the world. Hence, the deviation from truth consisted in presenting reality in a way inconsistent with the knowledge and ideas the Egyptians form ed ab o u t this reality. In ancient Greece tru th in art m eant conform ity with the reality, although idealization was also admissible. The deviation from truth occurred when art was inconsistent with the reality, and when it was n ot a result o f the idealization. The M iddle Ages introduced their own criterion o f truth . According to th at criterion a rt was true when it was presenting reality in conform ity with the religious feelings and principles. So, in th at case the deviation from tru th m eant an inconsistency with the principles o f the C hristian faith. The Renaissance restored the ancient m eaning o f tru th and along with this m eaning also the ancient criterion o f the deviation from truth. The M annerism , Baroque and Classicism introduced their own m eaning o f truth. The deviation from tru th consisted in the presentation o f false and artificial poses, gestures and situations as well as in breaking o f the accepted rules (Classicism). A t the same time a definite distinction between the falseness and fiction was introduced, accepting the latter one as consistent with the criterion o f truth. M odern a rt assumes th at the w ork of art is true when the artist expresses in this w ork w hat he thinks and w hat he feels. The deviation from tru th consists in the lack o f expression and feeling in a w ork o f art. As a m ain criterion o f truth the m odern a rt has accepted creation ; if the