ISSN 1509-1619
Monika Cichmińska
Katedra Filologii Angielskiej UWM w Olsztynie
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LANGUAGE OF NEGATIVE EMOTIONS IN ENGLISH AND POLISH: COGNITIVE SEMANTICS
1. Introduction
This paper has a twofold purpose. First, it aims to present the results of the analysis of the language of negative emotions in English and Polish, which was the main objective of the author's doctoral dissertation, and thus answer the question whether there are any differences or similarities in the ways English and Polish native speakers conceptualise negative emotions.
Secondly, it will make an attempt at proving that cognitive semantics as developed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff (1987), as well as by Kövecses (1986, 1989, 1990), is capable of discovering the structure of such concepts as emotions.
The assumptions of cognitive semantics seem particularly well-suited for the analysis of such elusive concepts, which have extremely rich se
mantic representations, as human emotions. It was not until the research by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that it became possible to make a compre
hensive semantic analysis of the language of emotions which would allow to differentiate between different emotions and to account for the structure of their concepts.
In our analysis we rely to a great extent on the research of Eleanor Rosch on categorisation (Rosch 1977, 1978), Charles Fillmore on frames (1982, 1985, 1986) and Charles Fillmore and Beryl Atkins (1992), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson on metaphors and metonymy (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1985), George Lakoff and Zoltan Kövecses on the language of emotions (1986, 1989, 1990).
As far as Polish is concerned, the analysis presented in this paper is based on the computerised corpus of linguistic data collected by the author herself. The corpus consists of over 550 000 words, the linguistic data coming from two main sources: first, fragments of books and articles from
a number of various Polish periodicals published in Poland in the years 1995-1998, representing a large variety of topics, style, register and target audience.
The following magazines have been used: "Polityka", "Sukces", "Pani",
"Uroda" and "Przyjaciółka"1. The material coming from books ranges from typical low-quality romances, action and adventure novels, to literature from the field of organisational psychology, marketing and management.
Although the choice of the linguistic material may seem coincidental, the author tried to collect sources which would contain a large number of data useful for the purposes of her doctoral dissertation, namely, the analy
sis of the language of negative emotions.
The second source of linguistic data was an anonymous survey conduc
ted among 34 Polish native speakers, the average age being 24. The infor
mants had no linguistic background and they were not informed about the purpose of the survey. The aim was to elicit as many examples of usage of language of negative emotions from young Polish native speakers as possi
ble. Some of the questions asked were: "What do you feel like doing when you feel blue/sad?", "How can you tell if somebody is sad?", "What is happe
ning to you when you feel sad/depressed?"
2. Psychology of emotion versus language of emotion
For a long time emotions were considered to be feelings without any conceptual content, so they did not present any interest to linguists. Cogniti
ve scientists claim, however, that emotions have an extremely complex con
ceptual structure and involve different amounts of cognitive processing.
In psychology there have been numerous attempts to account for the nature, origins and development of emotions, as well as the distinction between emotion and non-emotion. Our view is based on the cognitive theory of emotion (Strongman 1996) and claims that emotions arise as a result of certain kinds of cognitions, and physiological, behavioural and expressive aspects presuppose that this cognitive step has taken place. So, in other words, emotions arise as a result of the way in which situations that initiate them are construed by the Self (Lakoff 1985) or by the Expe
riences
It must also be remembered that what is meant here by "emotion" is something that psychologists and linguists have come to call "basic emotion"
(e.g. Ekman 1992, 1994, Izard 1991, Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989, Lan
gacker 1987). There is linguistic and empirical evidence that a set of about
1 I would like to express my gratefulness to the editors and staff of the above mentioned magazines and publishing houses whose assistance greatly contributed to the creation of my corpus.
six emotion categories, among them ANGER, FEAR, SADNESS and DIS
GUST, may be regarded as basic, and that there are certain parallels betwe
en this basic status and concrete basic level categories (the number of basic emotions may differ sbghtly in different theories, but all of them agree that such a concept exists).
Following the analysis of the emotion of ANGER by Lakoff (1985) we assume that there is a coherent conceptual organisation underlying all expressions connected with a given emotion, that much of this organisation is metaphorical and metonymical in nature, that the conceptual metaphors and metonymies are based on a folk theory of the physiology of those emo
tions, and that our concept of every emotion is embodied via the autonomous nervous system (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1985).
People use a wide variety of emotion words to talk about emotions. The language of emotions comes replete with ambiguity, synonymy (or near syno
nymy) and an abundance of lexical gaps and linguistic traps. For some categories of emotion languages like English or Polish provide a relatively large number of linguistic units, for example f e a r /s t r a c h has lexical realisa
tions marking special cases such as very strong fear {te r r i fie d / p r z e r a ż o n y) or weak fear { w o r r i e d / z m a r t w i o n y ) . On the other hand, not all distinct emotion types necessarily have associated words in any particular language:
the absence of a word in one language that might be referred to by a word in another does not mean that people in cultures using the first language do not experience that emotion (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1995 for a n n o y a n c e ,
Wierzbicka 1986).
There have been different views concerning the question which lingu
istic units have to be taken into consideration when one wants to conduct a semantic analysis of emotions. In c o m p o n e n t i a l a n a l y s i s emotions were defi
ned by a set of sense components, one of which was a correlated event being the cause of the emotion (Kövecses 1986, Wierzbicka 1971, 1972). The com
ponential analysis leads to a minimal definition of a concept; for example, the following minimal definition of the concept of joy has been proposed:
"having a strong desire that something (p) be the case and believing that it (p) is indeed the case" (Searle 1983).
Componential analysis was heavily criticised by cognitive linguists (cf.
Lakoff 1987) who claim that concepts of emotions in componential analysis are oversimplified and extremely impoverished, and that minimal defini
tions do not represent the way people really think of such concepts (Kövec
ses 1996, 1989, 1990). Instead, Kövecses (1986) argues that it is possible to uncover conceptual models of emotions by studying the language of emo
tions. He further explains that by "the language of emotions" he means
"conventionalised linguistic expressions", that is linguistic expressions "that are commonly used by and familiar to most, if not all, native speakers of English [...] which do not belong to the sphere of either scientific or artistic discourse" (Kövecses 1986: 3).
It is claimed that the language of emotions is so rich because the nature of emotions is not fully comprehensible, clear and obvious to people, so they use the language to make them more comprehensible and tangible, to name what is difficult to express and communicate them to interactional partners (Nowakowska-Kempna 1995: 125-127). Lexicalised phrases are particularly useful for this purpose, as they are relatively emphatic and are marked expressively (Mayenowa 1966, Nowakowska-Kempna 1995).
The language of emotions does not only include the way people de
scribe and express their own emotions, but any ways that people use to talk about emotions, including analysis of gestures, facial expressions, body movements, and typical behaviours, which inform the world about emotional states going on. Such symptoms of emotional experience are also conventionalised to the extent that we - native speakers of English or Polish - know what kind of behaviour or physical reactions is typically associated with different emotions in our cultures. These symptoms do not usually occur in extra-linguistic reality - one can hardly imagine a person literally pulling hair out of his head (w y r y w a ć s o b i e w ł o s y z g ł o w y ) , which is a conventionalised way of talking in Polish about some
one who is in the state of despair - but they do inform about the emotion experienced by the agent (Nowakowska-Kempna 1985: 128-129). These phenomena are connected with social and cultural norms of the commu
nity that speakers of a given language live in, and which can vary in time and space. The way people speak of their emotions thus reveals the cultural pattern of experiencing emotions (Coulter 1979, Wittgenstein 1972) It is argued that the language of emotions falls into four groups (Nowakowska-Kempna 1985: 15-16):
- naming one'e emotions by the Experiencer, e.g.: S m u t n o m i I I fe e t
s a d , or the emotions of the Agent whose actions lead to a given emotion with
the Experiencer, e.g. Z a s m u c i ł a m g o s w y m i s ł o w a m i / M y w o r d s m a d e h i m fe e l s a d ;
- talking about the symptoms of emotions, e.g.: Z b l a d ł / H e w e n t p a l e ,
- talking about behaviours and actions typically connected with a given emotion, which makes it possible to characterise the emotion, e.g.: W y b u c h - n ę ła p ł a c z e m / S h e b u r s t o u t c r y i n g ,
- describing what the Experiencer is feeling or experiencing, e.g.: U g ię ł y s ię p o d e m n ą k o la n a / M y k n e e s w e r e k n o c k in g , Z a w r z a ł o w e m n i e / H e w a s s e e t h in g w i t h r a g e .
It has been demonstrated that concepts of emotions can be studied with the methodology proposed by Kövecses (1986, 1989, 1990) and Lakoff (1987) in a number of case studies (cf. ANGER, PRIDE, LOVE, FEAR (Kövecses 1986, 1989, Lakoff 1987) and JOY (Kövecses 1990)); a similar analysis has been conducted for the category of UCZUCIA/EMOTIONS in Polish by No
wakowska-Kempna (1995). In the next section we will present the results of the comparative analysis of language of basic negative emotions, namely:
FEAR, ANGER, SADNESS AND DISGUST in English and Polish, conducted by the author in her doctoral dissertation.
3. The structure of negative emotion categories in English
The analysis conducted by the author shows clearly that there are nu
merous similarities between the four emotion categories, namely ANGER, FEAR, SADNESS and DISGUST. They can all be understood as scenarios, involving the stages of cause, actual emotion, control, loss of control and some kind of resulting action. Scenarios derived from the linguistic analysis are by no means the only possible scenarios; instead, they represent the cognitive prototypes of the concepts discussed.
The cognitive model in the centre - the prototype - emerges from a system of conceptual metonymies and metaphors. The combination and interaction of metonymies and metaphors allows for a rich conceptual structure of negative emotion categories, though the contribution of meto
nymies on one hand and metaphors on the other need not be balanced. For example, the category ANGER commands a number or metonymies which are counterbalanced by the heat metaphors and a series of other meta
phors, while the category FEAR relies more heavily on a large number of metonymies.
It is worth mentioning at this point that the combination and interac
tion of metonymies and metaphors is absolutely necessary if it is supposed to help distinguish between emotions. Obviously in many cases physiological effects help us conceptualise different emotions, especially when they are contrasted with opposites, as in the case of the drop vs. increase in the body temperature (FEAR and ANGER, respectively), or jumping up and down (Kövecses 1990) vs. drooping posture (JOY and SADNESS). However, many metonymies apply not to one or two related emotions, but to a range of different emotions. For example, tears and crying can be understood as the sign of SADNESS, but also LOVE, JOY, ANGER and FEAR; heart palpita
tions and accelerated heartbeat can accompany ANGER, FEAR and LOVE, while general physical agitation seems to accompany all the basic emotions.
Hence the need for metaphors whose conceptual potential supports the sys
tem of metonymies.
Granted that ANGER, FEAR, SADNESS and DISGUST are basic emo
tion categories, it seems natural to treat the general category EMOTION as their superordinate category. We will now attempt to validate this claim by searching properties shared by all basic negative emotions. As emotion cate
gories do not command any inventory of observable properties, the shared items will form a list of metonymies and metaphors which will be regarded as equivalent to salient attributes. The list is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Metonymy and metaphors supporting the category EMOTION in English
M etonym y TH E PH Y SIO L O G IC A L E FFE CTS O F A N E M O TIO N STAN D F O R TH E E M O TIO N
M etaphors E M O TIO N IS A N ATU RAL FO RCE EM O TIO N S AR E E N TITIES
EM O TIO N S AR E BO U N D ED SPACES E M O TIO N IS A N O PPO N E N T/TO R M E N TE R E M O TIO N IS A LIV IN G O RG AN ISM E M O TIO N IS A W ILD A N IM A L/B E A ST E M O TIO N IS A FLU ID IN A CO N TAIN ER
TH E B O D Y /T H E E Y E S/TH E H E A R T/O TH E R O R G A N S ARE CO N TAIN ERS FO R TH E EM O TIO N
The question arises at this point whether Figure 1 lists the attributes common to the superordinate category EMOTION, or whether the list only applies to the category NEGATIVE EMOTION, if we pleaded such a catego
ry. It was not the aim of the author to analyse the so-called "positive"
emotions, such as LOVE or JOY. As far the category JOY is concerned, the analysis was conducted by Kövecses (Kövecses 1990). He enumerates the following metaphors in his study: JOY IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, JOY IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL, JOY IS AN OPPONENT, JOY IS INSANITY, JOY IS A NATURAL FORCE (Kövecses 1990). His list overlaps with Table 1 to a remarkable extent.
There are some metaphors which are shared by two or three negative emotions. These are: EMOTION IS INSANITY (FEAR, ANGER, SADNESS), EMOTION IS A BURDEN (ANGER, SADNESS), EMOTION IS SICKNESS/
DEATH (SADNESS, FEAR, DISGUST).
We believe that there are two metaphors which were not mentioned by Lakoff (1987) and Kövecses (1987) in their accounts of ANGER, namely: the ANGER IS BAD WEATHER metaphor and ANGER IS WATER, which is a variant of EMOTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES metaphor.
ANGER IS BAD WEATHER
(1) After a bit of an argument, he s t o r m e d o u t .
(2) Sophie's face c l o u d e d with anger.
(3) The photos caused a s t o r m when they were first published. BC ANGER IS WATER
(4) I was f l o o d e d with anger.
(5) I was overcome by a w a v e of anger.
(6) He hid an o c e a n of hostility towards me.
The ANGER IS BAD WEATHER metaphor also appears in the analysis of SADNESS, while the ANGER IS WATER metaphor is common to ANGER, SADNESS and FEAR.
To sum up, it seems that each negative emotion category bears at least some conceptual metaphors with other categories. However, each category yields one or more metaphors which are emotion-specific, and which are listed in Figure 2. Some of these emotion-specific metaphors are very pro
ductive (for example, ANGER IS HEAT), others are not (for example, FEAR IS COLD). The SADNESS category seems to attract a relatively large num
ber of emotion-specific metaphors, while other emotions yield one, central metaphor (ANGER, FEAR).
Figure 2. Emotion-specific metaphors in English
ANGER ANGER IS HEAT ANGER IS FIRE FEAR FEAR IS COLD SADNESS SADNESS IS DOWN
SADNESS IS HELL SADNESS IS SEA/OCEAN
SADNESS IS LOSS OF VITALITY/ LOSS OF PLEASURE SADNESS IS MAGIC
DISGUST DISGUST IS FOOD
As far as the SADNESS IS DARK metaphor is concerned, we believe that different emotions are conceptualised with means of different colours, which is the result of physiological changes such as the increase and drop in body temperature, increase and drop in blood pressure, and interference with accurate perception. Thus, ANGER combines with red and its intense shades such as purple, scarlet and violet, while FEAR is associated with white, grey or paleness, that is lack of colour.
To conclude, we agree that ANGER, FEAR, SADNESS and DISGUST are basic-level categories, structured as prototype categories, with EMO
TION as their superordinate category. The common features for all the negative emotion categories are the following dimensions:
- ontological dimension, that is understanding emotions as entities (sub
stances, forces, living organisms, animals, etc.),
- temporal dimension, that is understanding emotions as events happe
ning over a period of time, having its onset and termination, as well changes in intensity,
- spatial dimension, that is understanding emotions as moving up or down and inside and outside, for example as fluids in the Experiencer's body,
- dimension of pressure and temperature (which is correlated with the conceptualisation of SPACE and MOVEMENT), that is understanding emo
tions as substance influencing pressure on the Experiencer's body, either insi
de it or outside it; changes in pressure may lead to changes in temperature and colour of the face and skin; extreme pressure may lead to outbursts.
The negative emotions share the dimensions analysed above, but they differ in respect to different experience gestalts which fill the dimensions. Thus, each of the emotions has a temporal dimension with a similar number of stages, but its causes, "essentials" (physiological and behavioural reactions) (Knvecses 1991), and actions which consti
tute these stages, are different for different emotions. The similarities and differences in conceptualisations of particular emotions have alre
ady been discussed.
4. The structure of negative emotion categories in Polish
As it was the case in English, the analysis showed that there are nume
rous similarities between the four emotion categories, namely ANGER, FEAR, SADNESS and DISGUST. They can all be understood as scenarios, which are by no means the only possible scenarios; instead, they represent the cognitive prototypes of the concepts discussed. Similarly to English, in the structure of negative emotion concepts the contribution of metonymies on one hand and metaphors on the other need not be balanced.
F igu re 3. Metonymy and metaphors supporting the category UCZUCIA/EMOCJE in Polish
M etonym y TH E P H Y SIO L O G IC A L EFFECTS O F A N E M O T IO N STAND FO R H E E M O T IO N
M etaphors E M O T IO N IS A NATURAL FORCE EM O T IO N S ARE EN TITIES
EM O T IO N S A R E B O U N D ED SPACES E M O T IO N IS A N O PPO N EN T/TO RM EN TE R EM O T IO N IS A LIV IN G O RG AN ISM E M O T IO N IS A W IL D ANIM AIVBEAST EM O T IO N IS A PLAN T
EM O T IO N IS A FLU ID IN A CONTAINER
TH E B O D Y /T H E EY E S/TH E H E A R T/O TH E R O RG AN S A R E CONTAINERS F O R TH E E M O T IO N
If we assume that in Polish, like in English, ANGER, FEAR, SAD
NESS and DISGUST are basic emotion categories, and the general cate
gory EMOTION is their superordinate category, we will now compile a list of metaphors and metonymies shared by the negative emotion con
cepts in Figure 3.
There are some metaphors which are shared by two or three negative emotions. These are: EMOTION IS INSANITY (FEAR, ANGER, SADNESS), EMOTION IS A BURDEN (ANGER, SADNESS), EMOTION IS SICKNESS/
DEATH (SADNESS, FEAR, DISGUST), EMOTION IS WATER (ANGER, SADNESS, FEAR), EMOTION IS BAD WEATHER (ANGER, SADNESS, FEAR), EMOTION IS HELL (SADNESS, FEAR).
To sum up, it seems that each negative emotion category bears at least some conceptual metaphors with other categories. However, each category yields one or more metaphors which are emotion-specific, and which are listed in Figure 4. Some of these emotion-specific metaphors are very pro
ductive (for example, ANGER IS HEAT), others are not (for example, FEAR IS COLD). It seems that the SADNESS category attracts a relatively large number of emotion-specific metaphors.
F ig u re 4. Emotion-specific metaphors in Polish
A N G E R A N G E R IS H EAT A N G E R IS FIRE
FEAR FEAR IS COLD
SA D N E SS SA D N E S S IS D O W N SA D N E SS IS SE A/O C EAN
SA D N E S S IS L O SS O F VITALITY/ L O SS O F PLEASURE D IS G U S T D IS G U S T IS FO O D
To conclude, we agree that ANGER, FEAR, SADNESS and DISGUST are basic-level categories, structured as prototype categories, with EMO
TION as their superordinate category.
5. Negative emotions in English and Polish: summary
Although there is no agreement among researchers as to how to understand the concept of p r o t o t y p e (Rosch 1977, 1978, 1981, Langacker 1987, Posner 1986, Putnam 1986), it is nevertheless agreed that for such categories as the category of EMOTIONS it is useful and effective to assume that the category of EMOTIONS is structured according to the principles governing family resemblances and prototypical effects
(Lakoff 1987). Prototypical effects are meant as a cover term for various mental operations which manifest themselves in results of psychological experiments, such as what thing should be regarded as better or worse examples of a category.
The category EMOTION is a superordinate category with its basic-level categories of ANGER, SADNESS, FEAR AND DISGUST. They are radial categories, with one most prototypical Idealised Cognitive Model (Lakoff 1987) in the centre. The ICM which is the "most prototypical" is the one which is the most typical and the most representative example of a given category. We are in agreement with the approach of Nowakowska-Kempna (1995: 84) that the most appropriate of all the metonymic models in terms of which we understand categories proposed by Lakoff (1987: 77-90) is the paragon, since, as opposed to t y p ic a l e x a m p l e s , it involves acquiring know
ledge of not only universal cultural patterns, but also local behavioural patterns. The most prototypical example bears family resemblances to all less prototypical members of the category.
The ICM in the centre is a cluster model (Lakoff 1987: 203), which has the fundamental properties of an experience gestalt understood as "multi
dimensional structured wholes" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 81). This particu
lar structure allows us to understand the whole cluster of models easier and faster than its components. Some experience gestalts emerge naturally from experience while others are metaphorically structured. Lakoff and Johnson propose (1980: 85-86) that emotion concepts are structured almost entirely metaphorically.
ICMs are in some respects equivalent to cognitive domains (Langacker 1987: 150) and other similar concepts, such as frames (Fillmore 1975:124, 1985: 223, Fillmore and Atkins 1992: 75) or scripts (Schank and Abelson 1977: 42). ICMs share the feature of simplicity with cognitive domains, in the sense that there are ICMs (or cognitive domains) which are basic, or fundamental in our experience, which are not reducible to other, more primi
tive cognitive structures, or that they cannot be experienced in a different way; according to Langacker (1987: 148) one of "basic domains" is the doma
in of EMOTIONS.
ICMs are basic for the conceptualisation of EMOTIONS. The concep
tualisation is understood as a strategy of revealing ICMs, and placing them within a cluster model of the category EMOTION. ICMs are exam
ples of frames (Fillmore 1977, 1985) since they are complete "unified frameworks of knowledge, or coherent schematisations of experience"
(Fillmore 1985: 223).
Our analysis shows that there is no one prototypical EMOTION, which would enable us to present attributes relevant to the whole category or a set of such attributes. As for particular emotion categories of ANGER, SADNESS, FEAR and DISGUST, not only do they differ from one another, but there are also significant differences between variants within one cate-
gory. However, as it was mentioned before, it is possible to distinguish the category of EMOTIONS, based on family resemblance and prototypical effects.
Isolating the category of EMOTIONS in semantics is thus made possible owing to:
1. The category of EMOTIONS is defined by means of operational terms of value, where value is understood as the object of the emotion. A necessa
ry condition for an emotion to occur is an event which is sensed and evalu
ated as being "relevant" to the Experiencer (Ekman 1994, Lazarus 1994); the events which evoke emotions are not evaluated in an objective, rational way;
on the contrary, they are evaluated subjectively (Scheler 1916: 64). The value assigned to the event by the experiencer is not inherent in that event;
one event may evoke different emotion depending on how he evaluates the given context.
The second operational term is the correlation of the Experiencer's face with the activities of the autonomous nervous system (Ekman 1983, 1992, 1994, Lakoff 1987), as the feeling of the emotion is typically accompanied by the physiological bodily reactions and the facial expression.
2. There are dimensions of experience (or cognitive models) shared by different emotions, namely the ontological dimension, and the dimensions of time, space, pressure and temperature, such as:
EMOTIONS ARE LIVING ORGANISMS
THE BODY/EYES ARE CONTAINERS FOR EMOTIONS EMOTIONS ARE UP/DOWN
EMOTIONS ARE HOT/COLD EMOTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES EMOTIONS ARE NATURAL FORCES
3. Particular emotion categories are defined by thinking in terms of paragons and they are understood as scenarios involving a similar number of stages, or rather as radial categories with the prototypical scenario in the centre.
If thought is embodied (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987), then it is natural to assume that experience gestalts present in the emotion categories should be similar, if not identical. After all, all human beings have identical bodies, so experiencing emotions should also be identi
cal. It is obvious that there might be some individual differences regarding different aspect of experiencing emotions, for example their intensity, length or causes. But emotional reactions - whether observed in ourselves or in others - may be considered a r c h e t y p a l images (Jung 1970, 1976, Campbell 1994), in the sense that they are very old patterns of attitudes and behavio
urs, which belong to the sphere of subconscious experience, and which have always been present in everyday life of all mankind. Although people are not aware of existence of these patterns, they are long-lasting, inherited, un
changeable and conventional; for example, smile is considered to be a stereo-
typical expression of joy or happiness and its symbol (cf. Ekman's findings on universal facial expressions, Ekman 1977).
It is only natural to assume that there are social and cultural diffe
rences in expressing emotions, as ICMs are rooted in the culture and conceptual system of a given language community. There may be cultures which will place more emphasis on excluding a given emotion from the life of their community regarding it as "bad", or it may happen that some culture will have an emotion characteristic only to that particular cultu
re. However, as regards the most basic and universal emotions, such as anger, fear, sadness and disgust, there should not be any differences in the physiological reactions experienced by members of different cultures, though there may be differences in their expression or presence in every
day language.
It would be interesting to know whether the results of the conceptualisa
tion process brings exactly the same results in the case of speakers of both English and Polish as regards the language of emotions. Although we have agreed that in general the structure of negative emotion categories in both the languages is the same, we will now examine some instances of the differences in the conceptualisation.
In Polish there are quite a few instances where the state of being emotional is conceptualised as the movement within the body of the person, or the movement of different organs within the person's body, or the movement of the fluid inside the person's body. The conceptualisa
tions underlying linguistic expressions are different in some cases, as in the examples below:
(7) Tak się zdenerwowałam, że aż w y s z ł a m z s ie b ie .
lit. I got so angry that I w e n t o u t o f m y o w n b o d y .
I got so angry that I lost control.
(8) Mam d u s z ę n a r a m i e n i u .
lit. I have my s o u l o n m y s h o u l d e r .
I have my h e a r t in m y m o u t h .
(9) M a m s e r c e w g a r d l e .
lit. I have m y h e a r t in m y th r o a t.
M y h e a r t is in m y m o u t h .
(10) Strach zakrada się do duszy, serca.
lit. Fear s n e a k s u p to her soul, heart.
Fear b u i l d s u p in her.
(11) Ś c i s k a m n i e w d o łk u .
lit. Something is k n o t t i n g m e d o w n my body.
I have a k n o t in m y s t o m a c h .
Although in the examples the general tendency - that is the movement of the organs ("heart" and "soul") from one position upwards - the organs involved are different.
The same examples, together with examples below, illustrate another difference in conceptualisations in English and Polish:
(12) Gdzieś w środku poczułem u k łu c ie smutku.
I felt a t w i n g e of pain in my heart.
(13) B o l a ł a ją cała dusza.
lit. All her soul was in p a i n
She was d e e p l y h u r t.
(14) C i ę ż k o mi było na duszy.
lit. It lay h e a v y on my soul.
It lay h e a v y on my heart.
(15) Muszę się komuś w y g a d a ć , w y p ła k a ć .
lit. I must h a v e a l o n g c h a t with someone, w e e p m y s e l f o u t .
I must o p e n m y h e a r t to s o m e o n e , w e e p m y s e l f o u t.
It seems that in English the organ which metonymically stands for the human being is his heart, while in Polish in some cases the home of human life is the person's soul.
Another significant difference in conceptualisation of emotions is the case of "freezing" in fear:
(16) Zamarłam ze strachu.
lit. I n e a r l y d i e d of fear.
I fr o z e .
(17) Serce we mnie z a m a r ł o .
fit. My heart d i e d .
My heart s a n k .
(18) Zdrętwiałam ze strachu.
lit. I s t i f f e n e d of fear.
I f r o z e .
Although the physiological state which accompanies a very extreme experience of fear is the same - when all the activities of the human body stop even if for a second only - this state is conceptualised differently in Polish and English: in English it is associated with freezing and the heart going down inside one's body, while in Polish it is imagined as being stiff or dying.
Another interesting difference in conceptualisations comes from the me
taphor FEAR IS A LIVING ORGANISM:
(19) To r o d z i strach.
lit. It g i v e s b i r t h to fear.
It g i v e s r is e to fear.
(20) Rodzi się obawa, że oto ziścił się koszmarny sen.
lit. A fear is b o r n that the nightmare has come true.
A fear a r i s e s that the nightmare has come true.
It seems that in the above examples that in Polish the emotion is conceptualised as a living organism in a very vivid way; the two language focus on the onset of the emotion, but the conceptualisations are diffe
rent.
There are also cases where in Polish the emotion is understood to be an active powerful opponent, while in English the image may be different, without emphasising the aspect of powerfulness of the emotion.
(21) P o w a l i ł a ją rozpacz.
lit. She was k n o c k e d d o w n by despair.
She f e l l in to despair.
(22) Ten człowiek był w b i t y w ziemię przez depresję.
lit. This man was d r i v e n in to th e g r o u n d by depression.
This man was d i s p i r i t e d by depression.
To sum up, even if the general tendencies for the structure of emotion concepts are very similar in English and Polish, there are differences in conceptualisations which fill the framework of those general dimensions.
Thus, it can be said that the emotion concepts in English and Polish bear certain resemblances, but are far from being identical.
6. Conclusions
Cognitive linguistics appears to be a promising paradigm for the analy
sis of the language of emotions. Emotions have been the subject of discus
sion by philosophers, psychologists and linguists for centuries. The present work is an attempt to arrive at semantic representations of emotions which involves relying on Idealised Cognitive Models of G. Lakoff (1987).
The meaning of a concept is equivalent of the understanding of a thing (things) or a state (states) revealed in the concept. Our immediate concern is the kind of understanding which manifests itself in language and thro
ugh language.
In our thesis we tried to compare semantic representations of emo
tions hidden behind the language of emotions used by native users of Polish and English. Our analysis revealed that although the general di
mensions structuring the category EMOTION, as well as the categories of particular negative emotions of ANGER, FEAR, SADNESS and DISGUST in both the languages, bear a strong resemblance, particular gestalts which fill the dimensions, may be different. Thus, the semantic represen
tations are not the same, though the experiential and metaphorical mo
dels revealed in the analysis of the linguistic data are very similar in the two languages.
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