Pavel Neumann
Regionalism : developing tendency in
the U.S. trade relations
International Journal of Management and Economics 19, 158-168
Pavel Neumann
University of Economics, Prague
Regionalism: Developing Tendency in the U.S. Trade
Relations
1Introduction: Regionalism in Comparison with Other Approaches
of Liberalisation
Regional integration agreements (RIA), or regional trade agreements (RTA), repre-sent one of the main directions in the international economic relations. RTAs have been developing since the late 80s. The tendency escalated in the 90s and nowadays more than one third of the world trade is run within RTAs. (Oxford University 2000: 1).
Regionalism is considered to be an alternative choice in the process of the world trade liberalisation. Countries carry out unilateral or preferential or multilateral liber-alisation. Currently, with the general growth of regional preferential agreements, the dilemma of liberalisation is especially concentrated on the relation between regionalism and multilateralism. (Andriamananjara 2003: 1).
Unilateralism is an approach when a country takes symmetric measures towards
all partners in the trade area. Bilateralism (or plurilateralism) is a preferential approach which represents special relations between partners based on the removal of the mutual trade barriers.
Multilateralism as a scheme of international relations demands the integration of all
potential trade partners (today member states of the W T O ) into the proems of the trade liberalisation. In negotiations of these countries the multilateral approach is guaranteed. T h e attitudes of all participants are respected based on the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination.
Multilateralism dominated in the early post-war period. Generally, there is a formal consensus on the multilateralism p r e d o m i n a n c e even now. However, given that the international environment makes negotiating a multilateral trade agreement extremely difficult, preferential arrangements have been put forward as being a more feasible route to reach broad liberalisation (Andriamananjara 2003: 1).
In comparison with the unilateral non-preferential liberalisation regional integra-tion can be more attractive for many countries. It provides individual countries with an easier access to the selected markets of their partners. Reciprocal preferences are provided between partners as well as protection from international competition is guaranteed.
Therefore, liberalisation based on the preferential (often regional) principle seems to be m o r e practical for m a n y countries than the unilateral or multilateral approach. For this reason some of them simply start the liberalisation through joining regional trade agreements.
Since the 90s, resulting f r o m the changes of the regional agreements quality and quantity the development in all the world economy centres has been described as new
regionalism. This article is focused on the regional integration in Americas and on the
role of the U.S.A. in that process. Reviewing the changes of the U.S. attitude to different forms of liberalisation the article describes the regional integration development in the American macroregion. Using the NAFTA and FTAA examples, it shows how within the regional liberalisation the U.S. key interest can be supported more efficiently than in its multilateral form.
Development of the U.S. Attitude towards Regionalism
and Multilateralism
Today the United States are a typical representative of the compromise approach in the process of liberalisation or economic integration. They initiate the proposals within W T O to liberalise the world trade on the multilateral basis, at the same time they negoti-ate for the regional agreements with selected partners, however.
A similar approach can be based on the trade doctrines developed by the U.S. ad-ministration recently, such as additive regionalism or competitive liberalisation. Within the additive regionalism (Hilaire, Yang 2003: 3) the trade agreements are concluded with major trade partners as a complement of the multilateral liberalisation. The additive regionalism should compensate the slow progress of the multilateral process.
According to the strategy of competitive liberalisation2, the U.S.A. should negotiate the removal of the trade barriers on a global (multilateral) as well as bilateral, plurilat-eral or regional platform. Acting in this way, the states will compete each other in the opening of their markets to keep the advantage of the free trade. An example can be the NAFTA, which creates a stimulus for the preferential trade agreement enlargement to both Americas. As a result, in a global scale the competitive liberalisation could con-tinue expanding until one single preferential trade area encompassing the whole world is left (Andriamananjara 2003: 2).
The competitive liberalisation is also linked with the domino theory of regionalism. The theory considers the recent wave of regionalism a result of the NAFTA forming as well as the European single market completion which caused a domino effect. (Baldwin 1995)
Where can the origin of the U.S. (relatively new) approach be found? The U.S. chang-ing attitude to liberalisation mentioned above is based on the gradual shifts of both the internal and external conditions, under which the U.S. economy developed after the Second World War.
160 Pavel N e u m a n n
In the past, especially in the early post-war period, the country chose a different approach in the trade area. At that time the U.S. trade practice followed their d o m i n a n t position as a major supplier of the relatively deficient goods, services and capital. Until the 80s the U.S. trade and foreign investment structure geographically represented a highly diversified model containing the extensive relations both with the western hemisphere and the Euro-Asian area. T h e model strengthened the U.S. global position rather than the regional one. (Fishlow, Haggard 1992: 15). Under that situation the U.S.A. used the unilateral approaches more often. Given by the U.S. economic and political position in liberalisation the symmetric relations towards all partners were supposed.
Nevertheless, the changing trade environment after the Second World War as well as the economic position of individual countries (based on the gradually developing parity between the U.S. and their partners) implied the start of a new liberalisation trend. T h e trade negotiations arranged mostly within the GATT (found in 1947) were strictly built on the multilateral principle. In the liberalisation steps the opinion of all participants was taken in account.
In the long-term period the trade liberalisation on the multilateral basis was con-sidered the preferred method compared to the regional or bilateral scheme. It supposes equal, non- discriminative relations of the countries interested in joining the liberalisa-tion. Thus, trade creation is ensured instead of trade diversion.
Despite all the advantages of the multilateral liberalisation, the regional alternative was not rejected. A closer agreement seems to be helpful in liberalising the trade, if the multilateralism does not work due to any economic or political reasons. Since the 80s even the U.S. key economic interests have been jeopardised in multilateral negotiations. Namely the U.S.A. make an effort to accelerate the G A T T / W T O negotiations in many areas, while their progress is determined by the attitude of most countries which do not prefer such dynamism (caravan effect). Furthermore, contrary to the developed coun-tries, the less developed countries are given a preferential treatment in the multilateral system (free rider problem). Finally, the issues of special importance for the U.S. are not dealt in negotiations, such as services, foreign investment or intellectual property rights. (Gruben, Welch 1994: 35).
For the many reasons mentioned above, in the trade liberalisation the U.S.A. started to accept some partial solutions with the aim to push through their unsatisfied economic and political interests. Accordingly, they intensified the external relations on bilateral or regional basis.
Under certain circumstances, regional liberalisation (or integration) provides ef-ficient solutions. Generally, it has to create such a trade structure which meets various particular requirements of the participating countries. In addition, they should not u n d e r m i n e the importance of the multilateral liberalisation which is considered to be a "first-best" alternative.
A proper functioning of the regional agreement is supposed to ensure the high level of complementarity of the trade partners. Therefore, the more benefits are expected
f r o m North-South arrangements if the greater trade with the advanced countries brings advantages to the developing countries through increased investment flows and tech-nology transfers. Furthermore, the regional agreements should be comprehensive in their coverage of products (manufactured trade, including agricultural products and services). Finally, the agreements may play an important role in reform agenda among participating countries. (Hilaire, Yang 2003: 9-10)
T h e model of the regional integration mentioned above as an alternative of the multilateral liberalisation is generally compatible with the U.S. activities started in the late 80s. At first, the U.S.A. developed the negotiations with Canada and concluded the agreement on free trade between both the countries in 1987 (Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement - CUSFTA). Later, in 1993 the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agree-ment) was signed as a result of wider negotiations including Mexico.
In the 90s the NAFTA seemed to be an example of the agreement, which basically fit-ted the participating countries, fulfilled the criteria of the efficient integration mentioned above, and were compatible with the multilateral liberalisation process including the W T O rules. At first, the North American integration was encouraged by a geographical proximity as well as the similar economic structure of the original agreement members (U.S.A., Canada). Gradually, however, it became clear that within integration a new dy-n a m i s m could be achieved ody-nly by the Mexicady-n ecody-nomy idy-ncorporatiody-n, which would provide much more potential for the U.S. economic activities than the Canadian one.
T h r o u g h the Mexican access to the NAFTA the way was opened to the worked out integration between developed and developing countries. In addition, the required compatibility of the integration participants was offered here (the U.S.A. providing the necessary capital, while Mexico being a cheap labour force supplier). The agreement also exceeded the framework of the manufactured trade liberalisation. Besides the long-term liberalisation of the agricultural products a free movement of services and investment is supposed in selected areas. The agreement also ensures high protection of the intellectual property rights as well as the rules of goods origin. Finally, the NAFTA establishing was felt as the appropriate support of the Mexican economic reforms implemented since the middle 80s (Cihelkova, N e u m a n n 2000: 177-180).
NAFTA: Pattern of Americas' Regional Integration?
The creation of the free trade between the U.S.A. and the developing country was evaluated as an experiment where the positive effects of the free trade (or of even higher levels of integration) on the countries of the American continent should have been demonstrated. The NAFTA success should have become a precedent either for the other states access or the negotiations enlargement with the aim to create a free trade zone in both Americas.
162 Pavel N e u m a n n
For those reasons the NAFTA was predestined to be a model example for the in-tegration progress in the western hemisphere as far as to ail-American free trade zone establishment (Hansen-Kuhn2003). Thus, the NAFTA inspiration led the U.S.A to the opening of the negotiations in 1994 with the aim to create the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTA A).
The agreement should have been concluded by 2005. Excluding Cuba it should cover all the states of the western hemisphere. T h e general aim of the new zone is the trade intensification between the participants as well as their economic growth encourage-ment. T h r o u g h economic prosperity the democracy development will be strengthened in the region.
T h e negotiation agenda is divided into nine groups. Like the NAFTA the FTAA should contain some provisions exceeding the current level of trade liberalisation con-cerning the areas such as investment, services, intellectual rights protection, competition policy, etc. Therefore, both f r o m quantitative and qualitative point of view, the FTAA should currently belong to the most ambitious integration projects besides the EU.
However, the negotiations showed that the application of the standard NAFTA-type pattern of integration was not an easy way due to the considerably different opinion of the participating countries on the final form of the integration. A simple take-over of the NAFTA provisions for the FTAA purpose divided the negotiating countries into two streams. Thus, the opinion differences regarding integration resulted in two competitive proposals of the final FTAA version (Hansen-Kuhn 2003).
T h e first group headed by the U.S.A pushes the "ambitious" variant including the great n u m b e r of integration provisions mentioned above. The U.S. interest is to deepen the integration as much as possible to exploit the considerable potential of the Lat-in-American countries. The U.S. investment in emerging countries combined with the cheep local labour force will lead to the higher productivity of the American companies. Thus, their competition ability can be reinforced on the world markets again. At the same time, the rising economic prosperity of the developing countries would contribute to the political consolidation of the American region.
T h e U.S. interests reinforcement in Latin America was partially supported, e.g. by Mexico, especially in the 80s and 90s. T h r o u g h its participation in the integration model inspired by the U.S.A., such as the NAFTA, Mexico hoped to encourage the process of its domestic economic reforms. The integration was made easier by natural economic dependence of the country on its northern neighbour economy. According to American economists, the trade and investment liberalisation should accelerate Mexi-can economy modernisation as well as the MexiMexi-can progress towards the full market economy. Nevertheless, neither the Mexican view of the economic liberalisation and deep integration is unambiguous. The state control and high protection of the strategic industries and domestic sources remains in the economy. Therefore, full investment and trade liberalisation were rejected even in Mexico.
The second crystallised group of the countries negotiating for the FTAA integra-tion is formed especially by the MERCOSUR member countries. Headed by Brazil and Venezuela those countries oppose the U.S. ambitious integration variant. They incline to the idea that the very sensitive areas (e.g. investment, services, intellectual property rights) should be separated f r o m the FTAA negotiation packet and dealt with only within the W T O agenda. This step is reasoned with the fear of m a n y countries that the foreign (especially the U.S.) investors could obtain strong positions in the developing countries.
Generally, Brazil and the other countries of South America have the economic inter-ests concerning the modernisation of the developing market economy similar to Mexico. However, under the strong anti-Americanism which is led by the fear of the economic supremacy of foreign capital, especially Brazil and Venezuela encourage the origin of the competitive regional blocks. With respect to the integration form these blocks are felt more suitable for the developing countries. In addition, within those blocks (e.g. MER-COSUR) the considerable influence of the U.S.A. can be eliminated.
Brazil and the other opponents of the U.S. policy use the MERCOSUR existence as a specific negotiation instrument of the pressure on the U.S.A. Thus, the MERCOSUR, the third biggest free trade zone of the world, could be considered the competitive in-tegration with the FTAA (Gudinas2003)3. If the MERCOSUR reached the inin-tegration level exceeding the free trade zone or was enlarged, the bargaining power of the member countries would increase in the negotiations for the FTAA. In that case, the U.S. attitude could be opposed more strongly. Contrary, if the U.S. version of the FTAA integration won, the MERCOSUR could lose the reason of its existence.
It is true that with respect to the FTAA the U.S. strategy has not been successful very much. At the summit of the FTAA negotiating countries in Miami, December 2003, a compromise between the U.S.A and Brazil was accepted. The participating countries were enabled to opt-in or opt-out f r o m the nine particular parts of the future agreement (r la carte approach). This rule approval is presented as a victory of the developing coun-tries which keep resisting the pressure of the U.S. A (Ambrose 2003).
The FTAA negotiation deadline was the end of 2004. However, so far the Agreement has not been concluded. In November 2005 the last Pan-American s u m m i t in Argentina confirmed the opinion difference among the negotiating countries as far as the final form of the FTAA is concerned. Therefore, the FTAA completion is in question today.
Regionalism in Western Hemisphere, Its Implications for the U.S.A.
and the World: Discussion
How to evaluate the régionalisation process in the western hemisphere in the light of the integration steps described above with respect to the U.S.A. position? Nowadays it seems that so far the original optimistic vision of the regional integration associated
1 6 4 Pavel N e u m a n n
with the NAFTA model continuation has failed. To a certain extent, the forecasts of some economists expressed as early as after that regional integration zone establishment have come true.
Originally, the NAFTA was considered a more vital and realistic element than the large FTA A conception. Undoubtedly the NAFTA arose from the actual situation existing in the North-American market, where after the Second World War the U.S. trade and investments were extensively oriented towards the neighbouring countries, especially towards Canada and later Mexico, too. As a result, the three countries create a natural economic unit. Their economies are rather more complementary t h a n competitive currently.
T h e same opinion is not shared concerning the FTA A. T h e reason is another nature of the South-American economies and their relations towards the U.S.A. (Orme 1998: 260-261). Therefore, the ability of the NAFTA model transmission into the ail-American dimension seems to be questionable as well.
In addition, the opinion on the NAFTA functioning itself including economic results is much more critical after ten years of its existence. According to J. Stiglitz it is true that the NAFTA has not fulfilled the direst warnings of its opponents and the most fervent expectations of its supporters. In Mexico, however, the Agreement remains a controver-sial and even h a r m f u l step. (Stiglitz, 2004) It has brought a considerable increase of the investment as well as the trade in the country; nevertheless until now there has been an adverse impact on employment, wages, standard of living development, agriculture, etc4. Accordingly, the Mexican experience has not become a considerable inspiration for the other Latin-American countries and this fact was fully demonstrated in the negotiations for the FTAA described above.
Conclusion
To summarise the current U.S. position in the process of the development of new regionalism with respect to the multilateral liberalisation context, we must take into account several points.
The regionalism shift which the U.S.A. made in the late 80s seems to be controversial. However, the regionalism is not only the American specific. T h e regional integration tendencies have been manifested in the other centres of the world economy, too: especially in Europe, and recently the formal integration has accelerated even in Asia.
Regardless the world process, the indisputable reasons have risen namely for the U.S. A to support regionalism based on the need of their trade interest defence. Occa-sionally, the U.S. interests can be enforced by another way than through the multilateral liberalisation. Similarly, supporting regionalism the U.S.A. made a pressure on the other key players of the world trade with the aim to accelerate the multilateral negotiations
which often showed a weak progress in the 90s. This is the way how the strategy of the competitive liberalisation mentioned above can be explained.
Nevertheless, the regionalism has become a subject to the sharp criticism expressed by both the world economists - advocates of the multilateral approach in global trade, and some domestic opponents. Generally, the subject of their criticism is the conflict of the regional agreements with the basic principles of the W T O when regional inte-gration non-members are discriminated (though in case of regional inteinte-gration the discrimination is tolerated in the W T O rules). In addition, according to the opponents a considerable fragmentation of the world trade system occurs in the process of the growth acceleration of new free trade zones.5.
The regionalism is also opposed as a policy which should not be followed by the U.S.A. The regional zones created by the United States encourage the same actions in the other parts of the world. Not only has a similar process r u n in Europe, but even in Asia. The critics state, however, that the U.S.A. have a c o m m i t m e n t to keep and strengthen the global trade system within the W T O . The c o m m i t m e n t results from the U.S. trade geographical structure: so far, there has been a high diversity of the American export which is directed to all parts of the world. If the regional trade orientation is supported (as the last two U.S. administrations have done) the U.S. commitment to the global trade system will be undermined. Therefore, the U.S.A. have to stop their engagement in the regional trade zones and they should support the multilateral liberalisation process. (Gordon 2003).
The objections mentioned above are rightful to a certain extent. T h e conclusions made by some studies (e.g. Hilaire, Yang 2003: 17-21) emphasise that the economic ef-fect of the trade zones is limited for the U.S. A themselves. A more significant benefit is provided to their partners (mostly small countries), as a result of the trade advantages as well as the U.S. investment and technology inflow.
It must be taken into account that the increase of the trade of goods is often not the d o m i n a n t aim of the U.S.A. At present, the U.S. rather focus on the enlargement of the service trade, foreign investment growth as well as intellectual property rights protection. And additionally, other factors, such as the world strategic and safety posi-tion of the country, are emphasised in the U.S. policy. Therefore, the U.S.A. create the free trade zones with m a n y partners all over the world (Hilaire, Yang 2003: 21) and the importance of the zones does not lie only in the compensation of the insufficient process of the multilateral liberalisation. They are also an important and rightful part of the U.S. foreign economic and political relations as a whole.
Though the multilateral approach remains the general leading method of the current trade liberalisation, the U.S.A. as well as the other countries have given it up to a certain extent due to the problems of its implementation. T h e alternative preferential approach based on the regionalism seems to be acceptable as the "second best" to achieve a glob-ally more liberal trade environment.
166 Pavel Neumann T h e U.S. s t r a t e g y o f t h e c o m p e t i t i v e l i b e r a l i s a t i o n is a p r a g m a t i c r e a c t i o n t o t h e l i b e r a l i s a t i o n p r o c e s s c o m p l e x i t y . T h a t a t t i t u d e is n o t f r e e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n s6. D e s p i t e t h e o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e c o m p e t i t i v e l i b e r a l i s a t i o n , t h e U . S . A . t h e m s e l v e s c o n s i d e r it a n i n -s t r u m e n t f o r r e a c h i n g b e n e f i t -s i n -s o m e k e y a r e a -s o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c i n t e r e -s t -s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e a t t i t u d e c o u l d m o t i v a t e t h e o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s t o e n t e r t h e e x i s t i n g t r a d e b l o c k s . T h u s , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e U.S. o p i n i o n , t h e p r o c e s s o f t h e m u l t i l a t e r a l l i b e r a l i s a t i o n w i l l b e s u p p o r t e d a s w e l l . I n c o n c l u s i o n , w e s h o u l d r e m a r k t h a t u n d e r c u r r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s n o u n a m b i g u -o u s e v a l u a t i -o n c a n b e g i v e n r e g a r d i n g t h e b e n e f i t -o f t h e r e g i -o n a l i s m i n r e l a t i -o n t -o t h e m u l t i l a t e r a l l i b e r a l i s a t i o n . D e f i n i t e l y , t h e r e e x i s t g o o d r e a s o n s f o r t h e U . S . A t o s u p p o r t it. H o w e v e r , t h e q u e s t i o n is t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e g l o b a l p r o c e s s o f t h e t r a d e l i b e r a l i s a t i o n c a n b e a f f e c t e d o r s l o w e d d o w n b y t h e g r o w i n g r e g i o n a l i s m . A p p a r e n t l y , it w i l l d e p e n d o n t h e a t t i t u d e o f all its a c t o r s i n t h e w o r l d e c o n o m y a s w e l l a s t h e g e n e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Endnotes
1 This article was worked out within the Grant of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, No.
402/04/0219, „New regionalism: theory and case study (European Union)" for years 2004-2006.
2 The term „competitive liberalisation" was first used in 1996 (Bergsten 1996). The strategy was stressed
by R. Zoellick, former U.S. Trade Representative, for example (Weintraub 2003: 1).
3 The MERCOSUR member states are Argentina, Brasilia, Paraguay and Uruguay currently; Chile
and Bolivia have the associated countries status.
4 For example, based on NAFTAs Promise and Reality issued by Carnegie Endowment for
Interna-tional Peace foreign direct investments created half a million labor places in the Mexican manufactured industry during 1994-2000, but the country lost 1,3 million places in agriculture where 20% of Mexican labor forces is employed. Real wages have decreased compared to the period before 1994 while the number of the inhabitants living in poverty has gone up by 80% since 1984. The other U.S. sources, especially the government ones, bring different arguments in favor of the NAFTA stressing the export growth and the increase of the labor opportunities depending on it (Mekay 2003).
5 According to Bhagwati a Panagariya, when Europe started the mania of free trade zones, America
gets on with it. (Bhagwati, Panagariya 2003).
6 According to some comments, that current proliferation of preferential agreements does not simply
mean the path to the global free trade. Choosing the preferential route as the least resistance path may lead the multilateral trading system into a vicious circle of competitive discrimination rather than a competitive
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