A tale of eight seaports

4 Tale of Eight Seaports

Jac. de Jong

M21

19 JUUIß77

_{Lab. y. Scheepsbouwkn}

ARCHIEF

Technische Hogesc1.

Deiff

____

A Tale

of Eight Seaports

A survey of the position and prospects

of the ports of Hamburg, Bremen /Bremerhaven, Amsterdam,

Rotterdam, Antwerp, Dunkirk, Le Havre and London

CONTENTS

page

Summary 3

i

Introduction 3

2 After the storm 4

2.1 Lessons learned 4

3 Hamburg 4

Major Developments Ahead

3.1 Rich hinterland 4

3.2 New record 5

3.3 Salzgitter 6

3.4 Rivalry 6

4 Bremen/Bremerhaven 7

The Container Ports

4.1 Two firsts 7

4.2 Compass 8

4.3 Two jubilees 8

4.4 Bremen's haven 9

5 Amsterdam 9

Meeting the Demands of Tomorrow

5.1 Patterns change 9

5.2 Outer Port 10

5.3 Discussions 11

6 Rotterdam 11

No more New Ports until 2OOO

6.1 Sensitiveness 12

6.2 Maasvlakte terminal 13

6.3 Oil 14

7 Antwerp 14

Holding on, Fighting back, Spreading wings

7.1 Distribution 15 7.2 Deiwaide's case 16 7.3 Benelux 16 7.4 Extensions 16 8 Dunkirk 17 Widening horizons 8.1 Gateway 17 8.2 Custom sought 18 8.3 Gasport 19

9 Le Havre

19

Multi-purpose for Many Trades

9.1 Antifer a success 20

9.2 And Rotterdam? 21

9.3 Other trades 21

9.4 New lock 21

10 London 22

The Capital Port

10.1 Service is the top 23

10.2 Tilbury 23

10.3 Maplin 24

10.4 Continental competition 24

11 Common seaport policy 24

A long way to go

11.1 More support 25

A TALE OF EIGHT SEAPORTS

A SURVEY OF THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF THE PORTS OF HAMBURG,

BREMEN/BREMERHAVEN, AMSTERDAM, ROTTERDAM, ANTWERP, DUNKIRK, LE HAVRE AND LONDON

by

JAC. DE JONG

Summary

This paper gives an evaluation and an assessment of the present and future potentials of the following seaports: Hamburg, Bremen! Bremerhaven, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerpen, Dunkirk, Le Havre and London. Apart from general information, attention is paid to what prominent spokesmen for the ports have sàid with regard to the ports themselves and their relations among each others.

For this reason the paper concludes with a survey of recent observations_{on the possibilities and scope of a common European}

seaport policy.

i

INTRODUCTION

This survey is based on the position and prospects

of eight major N.W. European seaports, seven Con-tinental ones and one British. The ConCon-tinental ports are comprised in the range beginning with Hamburg,

as the most north-eastern port, and ending with Le Havre, as the most southern port. In between are

Bremen/Bremerhaven, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Ant-werp and Dunkirk.

The ports are treated in this geographical order,

which is followed by a survey on London, the only

British port. The reason why London has been

in-cluded in the survey is because, geographically, this port is placed opposite the range, and economically, there are many strong ties between London and the other ports.

London has also been chosen because as the only insular port,

it has an operative area that differs

from the Continental seaports which more or less

share the same large hinterland and are in

fact

strong contestants for the hinterland's custom. In other respects, it is not often realized that there are also strong competitive elements in the relations

between London and some of the Continental

sea-ports.

-On the Continental side the seven largest seaports

were treated. This means nothing disparaging with regard to ports like Zeebrugge, Ghent, Flushing,

Terneuzen, Delfzijl or Emden: all fine ports with a

rich tradition and an established place in the range;

but not of the same major status of the seven. The survey is not a comprehensive enumeration of the existing facilities. Those can be found in all

the manuals of the ports which are regularly

pu-blished and updated. The survey is an attempt at

evaluation and assessment of the various aspects of

the ports, not only by themselves, but particularly

with regard to the relations they have with each

other.

Problems and prospects such as presented

them-selves at the beginning of 1977 are discussed and

compared. Statistical data are used, but only inasfar

they are required to illustrate a certain position or aspect.

One might say the survey takes an overall glance

at what is going on in the ports, what people say

and expect, about themselves and others. To the

best of our knowledge a "glance" like this of eight seaports has never been published in one survey.

With this objective in mind, it is easy to understand why we have concluded the survey with an evalua-tion of current opinion on a common seaport policy,

It will be found that the chances that such _{a policy} might be materialized in the near future, are

con-sidered remote at the beginning of 1977.'''

'This does not -mean that the 'relations between

the seaports of the various' nations stand no chance

of improvement-; on the contrary

as 'Dr:

Karl-Ludwig Mönkemeier of Hamburg has said: "Let us

continue to talk with each other and exchange our

2 AFTER THE STORM

Statisticians of the maritime countries of North West Europe were quick to obeserve in 1977 that the large

seaports of the HamburgiLe Havre range had

suc-ceeded in disentangling themselves from the clutches

of the trade recession that raged throughout the

world in 1975 and best part of 1976. But the feeling of relief was perhaps most clearly expressed in West

Germany, and as early as Jan. 11, 1977 one trade

journal [1] stated that the Continental European

se2ports had beaten the recession, while in its Jan. 18 issue the same paper said that Hamburg had al-most reached its previous record figure in terms of

seaborne tra flic volumes.

Official sources from the other non-German

sea-ports generally expressed themselves in more

cau-flous terms, with the exception, perhaps, of Antwerp

circles, but then that particular port's recovery was

greeted with the welcome accorded to the

termina-tion of a period full of grave risks and dangers. In general, of course, the recovery from what is

now interpreted as the worst collective drop 'in trade since the Second World War, has special significance

for the large seaports, since it has been accepted that sharp interruptions in the pattern of seatrade

figures follow some time after the economic move-ment that caused them has set in.

It may be true to say now, that if the recession had deteriorated further, it would have inevitably

led to an intensification of the struggle for more

hinterland custom, a field in which nearly all the

Continental seaports have largely overlapping shaves.

The ensuing battle would almost certainly have been in the nature of a real fight for survival, and

something of this threat was expressed by Mr. Henk

van der Pois, Alderman for the Port of Rotterdam, when he said in his speech for the Port Club at the

year's end, that if Rotterdam had not yet learned

by now to get rid of any feelings of complacency, such as it possibly had harboured in its more ex-pansive eras, the port would have 'been on a

colli-lision course with disastrous consequences.

"Perhaps it is not understood fully even now",

said Mr. Van der Pois, "that Rotterdam has to fight

for every ton of cargo".

2.1 Lessons learned

Mr. Van der

Pois' blunt words unequivocally

summed up the feelings by the end of 1976, when,

according to the German source quoted above "the

ports had beaten the recession". Even if this

per-haps would sound a little optimistic, considering the many imponderables still hanging above

internatio-nal commerce, it would be no overstatement to say

that port administrators along the range - and in-deed in London as well - had come away from the

depths of recession as wiser men, who have learned their lesson.

But there is no denying how encouraging an

up-swing from previous downward trends can prove to

be, particularly when this upswing for some ports

came as high as 11%.

3 HAMBURG

Major Developments Ahead

In 1976 the port of Hamburg handled 52.394

mil-lion tons of cargo, almost 8% more than in the year before (48.6 mIn tons) and only 200,000 tons below

the 1974 record. For Hamburg these figures were particularly gratifying for the year to which they relate had not been an easy one for the port. Only a few months after it had been oficial opened, the

Elbe Lateral Canal had to be closed again as a re-sult of a bottom failure, and this meant that Ham-burg would have to wait at least another full year

before the extra 10 million tons of cargo movements

that the port was expected to have gained because of the new canal to the hinterland, could beadded

up to the annual totals.

But the auspices for the Elbe port certainly looked

favourable at the beginning of 1977. Cargo figures for both general and bulk commodities have con-tinued to rise in the first months of the new year, and apart from the re-opening of the Lateral Canal

(linking the Lower Elbe with the North German

canai systems and the large hinterland beyond),

Hamburg is beginning to reap the benefits from the new "Hansaport" (opened in March 1977) that was built for an expected annual througput of 15 million

tons of bulk commodities (although in the initial

phase only 8 million tons are expected).

3.1 Rich hinterland

Hambùrg, founder-member of the Hanseatic League, has owed much of its prominence to the significance

of the liner trades. According to the 1977 statistics the port counted more than 300 regular lines with

up to 700 monthly sailings. In 1976 liner trades

ac-counted for 14.7 min tons of the total trade.

Hamburg is West Germany's premier transit port,

and as such the Eibe port has managed to

recu-perate from its signal pre-war position, when apart from serving almost the entire German territory of these days, it handled large volumes for and from

r

I

-:

:'

---

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4

-Today, Hamburg has a prominent place for the

transit of cargoes to the Gennan Democratic

Repu-blic, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and even Hungary

and Poland. Of the port's 1976 general cargo totals, 11 mIn tons alone were in transit.

The leading position of the port has become an

accepted fact in several Central European countries:

when one tours the port, one cannot help noticing, for instance, the large amount of Czechoslovakian

trucks and barges, too, which serve the link between

this landlocked country and the seaport along the

North Sea.

The ties with the countries of Central Europe,

and indeed with the Baltic nations and the Soviet Union, have been considered as main arteries that pump the blood of the seaport through its various

service systems.

Small wonder, therefore, that Mr. Helmuth Kern,

ex-Senator of the city-state and now President of the Board of Hamburg's main cargo operator, the Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus AG (HHLA), has repeatedly rejected any ideas of putting a ban on Eastbloc shipping, by way of retaliation against alleged cargo dumping practices by the Eastbloc

/

'f

1

The Port of Hamburg seen from a height of 2000 m., stretching from the Elbe bridges to the Container Centre Waltershof.

shipping concerns. In this respect, Mr. Kern has not been alone; his views are wholeheartedly shared by his colleagues in Bremen.

Hamburger Hafen und Lagerhaus AG handled up to 5.64 min tons in 1976, achieving a DM 272

min turnover. These results, said Mr. Kern, had

been far better than expected, while the fact that

1977 started very well with a 48% increase in

January over the corresponding month in 1976 was also most encouraging.

Mr. Kern also referred to the fact that the port

of Hamburg had managed to keep ahead of two

important developments in transport, the movement

of containerized and roll-on/roll-off cargoes. For HHLA, ro/ro had the greatest growth rate: in 1976 218,000 tons of cargo were handled at the

com-pany's ro/ro facilities, a 27.5% increase over the

1975 figure. Of the total export ro/ro alone showed

a 37% rise.

3.2 New record

Container traffic at ail the Hamburger terminais scored a new record in 1976 with 432,516 boxes

handled, 23% more than in 1975. Mr. Kern,

speak-ing for HHLA alone, thinks that container cargo

is in the long run more impressive. HHLA

con-tainer terminals at Burchardkai and elsewhere

handled 282,350 20-ft equivalents of 2.34 mIn tons.

Dr. Wilhelm Nölling, Senator for Economy and

Transport of the City of Hamburg, has said

[2],

that the opening of the new Hansaport has

com-pleted a vast investment programme for Hamburg

that has almost taken ten years, but lest this should leave one with the impression that Hamburg is going to give it a rest for a while, it must be remembered

that for 1977 alone the city-state has earmarked a total of DM 10,000 min for all the state's various

investments (the port included).

This may seem an extraordinary sum for a city, but it must be considered that Hamburg is indeed a city-state, one of the 11 "Länder" that make up

the Federal Republic of Germany [3];

Dr. Nölling has said that the 10-year programme

just completed included the construction of the

Köhlbrand-Hochbrücke, the Lateral Canal, the

deepening of the Lower Elbe, large infrastructural

projects in and around the docks. Hansaport, owned

for 51% by the Salzgitter concern, and for 49%

by Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus AG, will be

the biggest and most modern of its kind in Europe, handling ore, coal, potassium and building, materials, says. Dr. Nölling, who, has added that "Ilamburg as a universal port is now complete". [4].

It is expected that the traffic generated by the

new Hansaport will boost Hamburg's cargo handling

figures in 1978 to over 60 min tons. The city has agreed with Salzgitter that every year at least 5.5 mln tons of ore will be routed through Hamburg, for this concern alone, and as far the accessibility

of the port is concerned, the deepening of the Lower Eibe to 13.5 metres (completed in 1978) will make

it possible to fully laden bulk carriers of up to

110,000 tons dwt. to enter the port. For Hansaport

alone Hamburg has spent some DM 55 min for

infrastructural improvements and adaptations.

3.3 Salzgitter

Salzgitter will move the bulk of its imported ore from Hansaport to its plants some 200 km inland by rail.

[5]. But it. àlso wants the Lateral Canal

back in service soon. It says that canal transport

to its harbours in Peine and Salzgitter.' is cheaper and just as important 'as rail.

Be that as it may, .waterway transport will only

account for some 10-20% of more ore while the

railways will be handling the rest

in 4000 ton

trainlòads, and 'reportedly at special cheap rates.

Most of the handling equipment at Hansaport is

from Salzgitter and associated firms. But other

firms, like Krupp, Poland's Centrocap and Kocks,

are also involved.

The 600 m of quayside available now with 16 m water depth will be expanded by 200 m when Elbe

deepening is finished next year. Most effected by the new facility at Hamburg is the port of Norden-ham. It already has a 10-year contract with Salz-gitter, which expires in 1983, for the handling of 2 min tons of ore a year.

When that ends, Hansaport gets the ore

Norden-ham, capacity 5 mIn tons a year, is already looking

for new customers,.

As an example of the many diverse interests that are generally headed under the category of service,

HHLA has fOunded a sùbsidiary company, the

Hamburger Prt Consulting GmbH (HPC). One of the motives for establishing this company has an

internatiOnal appeal. The HHLA management feels

that, however important it 'is for the developing

countries, to have new updated and efficient port facilities at their disposal, one should not stop at

that. The' modern port can only' be worked efficiently,

if the administration 'has the necessary expertise to

run it, and I'IHLA feels that in this respect the

work by its HPC might come in very useful indeed.

[6].

3.4 Rivalry

Maybe, in its final analysis, Hamburg is pioneering an expanding captive market and its hinterland ties

penetrate deeply into Europe, both to the South

and to the North. Large sections of this hinterland are being overlapped by areas for which the Bene-lux-seaports also compete, and indeed by Bremen,

too.

One journalist has summed up the position thus:

"A knock-out rivalry has always existed between Hamburg and Bremen on the Weser, but the clash

is more like that between brothers than antagonists

staring belligerently at each other across a

threat-ening fence.

Hamburg-Bremen competition is no more' than say Hamburg-Rotterdam, or Bremen-Antwerp

ri-valry" [7].

This may be so, but the fact cannot be denied

that Hamburg port delegations are frequent visitors in Vieniia, Prague and Budapest, to name but three

of the hinterland clients; and, maybe, they come

there more regularly than the Benelux delegations.

This would certainly 'be the case for Czechoslovakia, traditional customer of Hamburg by river, road and rail, although the Czechoslovaldans do se a

num-ber of other ports as well (Rostock, Szczecin and

the Benelux).

Forwarders in Central Europe often feel that

some of the Benelux ports take the

Hamburg-con-nection too much for granted; it is natural, that they,

too, should look at

the angle of ports offering

tempting competing rates and services.

Then, again, time will come when Hamburg will be linked to the Rhine-Main-Danube waterway, and the port will naturally exert its powers, and attrac-tions to put interesting offers out for all-river

trans-port to and from the North Sea, since the

Benelux-ports, too, will then be linked to the system as

well. [8].

On the other hands, the Benelux-ports have re-peatedly uttered bitter complaints

at what they

termed unfair competition by the German Bundes-bahn through the so-called "Ausnahmetarife",

de-scribed by them as an artificially low system of rail tariffs to draw inland cargoes to the German

North-sea ports, that "according to natural eonomic rules should by rights take the waterway route to

Am-sterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp".

Complaints of this nature have been most

out-spoken in Rotterdam, but they have always been

re-futed by German sources, who have denied the

element of unfair competition.

4 BREMEN/BREMERHAVEN The Container Ports

In many respects the position of the smaller of the

two German North Sea ports, Bremen, is similar to

Hamburg's position. Bremen and Hamburg share large sections of the same hinterland, structurally speaking, the ports show striking similarities, too.

Oswald 'Brinkmann, Bremen's Senator for Ports, Shipping and Transport, and Konsul Gerhard Béiér; President of the Board of Bremer

Lagerhaus-Gesell-schaft (BLG), Bremen's major terminal operator, xpect that in 1977 the ports of Brémen (so called, because 'they consist of the 'city-port proper and Bremerhaven) willen handle 5% more cargo than in 1976, when the port group scored a total of 23

min tons.

That total was just i mln tons over the 1975

re-sults, but, like Hamburg, Bremen's best year so far

was 1974,'with' a total 'of 26.6 mln' tOns.

It is expected that the 1977 forecast of 24.5 mln tons will thus 'be' still under the result of the 'very

good year 1974. [9].

Bremen/Bremerhaven feel

justifiably proud of

their importance to the majOr international con-tainer trades. Wheñ in 1966 the first large liner ar

rived, it was handled at the Überseehafen at Bremen. The same year a new terminal was opened in Neu-städter Hafen.

In August 1967 it became possible to take

con-tainerships to Bremerhaven, and the facilities there

have been expanded ever since, so that by 1971

the more seaward port had taken over the major

container terminal operations.

By mid March 1977 the Bremen/Bremerhaven

port group took the decision to start a new

ad-ditional port expansion project, costing DM 130

min. The river quay adjacent to the present

con-tainer terminal on the Outer Weser at Bremerhaven

is to be extended by another 570 m. Behind the

quay a 120,000 m2 water area is to be filled in,

resulting in the addition of 921,500 m2 extra sites,

nearly one complete square kilometre.

The topmost edge of this newest section of

river-frontage will then also be 7.5 m above tidal datum

and a flooding of the berths, even during storm tides, will be prevented by large wave-chambers below the

concrete covering.

The harbour-bottom, off the river quay, is to be

deepened in two stages, to 14 and then 17 m below chart datum.

The container share

in Bremen/Bremerhaven's

general cargo figures has increased from 1% in

1966 to 36.5% in 1976. In Bremerhaven it is ex-pected that by 1980 the container share of general

cargo will have reached 45% and by 1985 50%.

This is no exaggeration when one considers that

the current share of containerised 'general cargo' of

the USA trade for Bremen/Bremerhaven already stands at 60%.

4.1. Two firsts

Two firsts can be chalked up for the

Bremen/Bre-merhaven port complex - the Weser ports weré the first in West Germany to "go container" - in' 1966

when 'the Sea-Land vessel "Fairland" opened the

container service to North America and the' first 'to operate facilities for LASH vessels in 1970.

In the first "container year" 16,670 units were

handled with a capacity of 72,462 tons. In 1976 thé statistic's office reports '466,360 units were hàndled

of 3.7 nm toñs. [10].

Senator Brinkmann has said [11] that in 1976

nothing really speetacülar happened in

the port

complex, except that the volume of goods' handled

in 1976 was indeed up by 45% 'compared to 1975,

like the senator had foreéast earlier in 1976: He

was happy to conclude that' the facts have 'proved

that the decision' not to 'dismiss a ceftain ' ñurnber 'of pOrt labour, was 'a right one.' '

"

" '

Bremerhaven's container-terminal at the Stromkaje and the Nordhafen.

At the time when Bremen was feeling the effects

of the trade recession, it had been suggested that the city should seek other work for its redundant

labour; but this suggestion was rejected by the port administration, rightly so, because it might have led to a situation where Bremen/Bremerhaven could not have offered quick and reliable service to its

custo-mers.

The annual average of ships visiting the complex

is about 12,000. Approximately 300 liner services

operate to and from Bremen/Bremerhaven.

4.2 COMPASS

Since August 1976 the port group has been

em-ploying the stage-phased, comprehensive,

informa-tion and documentainforma-tion system known as COM-PASS - Computer Orientated Management of Port

and Shipping Services - developed by Siemens AG,

Bremen.

The unique system is

operated by Datenbank

Bremische Häfen, established in 1973 in which

over 100 firms of the five Bremen port sections are

participating - forwarding, cargo handling, ship

agency, stevedoring and cargo control.

As from the beginning of 1978 COMPASS will be running flat out at an estimated annual cost of

DM 2.5 mln, shared among the participating firms,

by the end of 1978 total development costs will be

approximately DM 8 min The claim is that with

COMPASS, a computer controlled transfer system with supervision and control by television and radio

t

communications systems no container can get to or

leave the terminal without being "identified" [121.

4.3 Two jubilees

Early in 1977 there were two celebrations. Bremer

Lagerhaus-Gesellschaft had a centenary jubilee, and about the same time the city fathers and their guests

convened to celebrate the 150 years that

Bremer-haven had been in existence. As to the BLG,

Sena-tor Oswald Brinkmann wrote that "none of the

founders of the company could have had any idea at the time how important the firm would become for Bremen and its ports. Today the Bremen ports

can hardly be thought of without the Bremer Lager-haus-Gesellschaft" [13].

In the bad year 1975 BLG handled 10.17 min

tons - 2.1 mIn tons less than in '74. But in 1976

the trade figures were up again to 10.931 mln tons,

7.5% more than the

'75 figures, although still

slightly under the 1974 results.

BLG's container figures take a constantly higher share of the totals: in 1976 the company handled

3.119 mIn tons of containerized goods, 16.2% more than in the previous year.

Konsul Beier has said at the occasion of his

company's centenary celebrations, that "the Bremen

ports can stand up to the competition from the

most important all-round ports of Europe. Their

flexibility, which has grown particularly in the last few years, to meet the demands of modern traffic

LASH and ro/ro-traffic, which are already utilized:

to their maximum capacity today, have made it

possible for the ports to attain an advanced position which remains unassailable".

4.4 Bremen's haven"

On January 11 Bremerhaven celebrated its 150th

anniversary. In 1827 the good burgers of, Bremen,

led by Mayor Johan Smidt, clinched a deal with

the officials of the electorate of Hannover, buying from what

is now the Federal State

of Lower Saxony, a stretch of land that had belonged to the

Swedes in the 17th century. The river-side was de-veloped and Bremerhaven carne into being.

Burgomaster Smidt had to pay 73,658

Hanove-nan thalers for this stretch, and he could hardly

have guessed how important Bremerhaven was to

become for Bremen. As the present mayor of

Bre-merhaven, Bodo Selge, put it: "the competitive

strength of all the Bremen ports is mainly based on

the fact that the customers of these ports, shippers

as well as shipowners, can be offered two geographi-cally separated port complexes under one direction

and one management, which can both put their

specific advantages into the scales of competition".

[14].

It must, however, be recognized that Bremen's

competitive force would be considerably

strengthen-ed if and when the river Weser is adaptstrengthen-ed to take the large-size modem barge traffic, which will be the universal feature on Europe's canal and river systems. In the past year Senator Brinkmann and others have insisted that the deepening of the cen-tral section of the Weser, Bremen's lifeline to the

interior, should be classed as a priority assignment.

5 AMSTERDAM

Meeting the Demands of Tomorrow

Like the other seaports of the HamburgiLe Havre

range, the port of Amsterdam has had to absorb the fundamental changes in the structural traffic patterns of the last twenty years or so. Many observers have

perhaps too hastily drawn the conclusion that Am-sterdam in the course of this development has lost

a great deal of its traditional liner traffic, with very little else to replace the loss.

It is true that the port of Amsterdam has been

sub-jected, in some cases severely so, to the changes in the pattern of liner traffic, one of the traditional

pil-lars on which the development of maritime activi-ties in the Dutch capital have been founded. One shipping expert of Amsterdam [15], has pointed to one of the earlier reasons for this.

"The established Dutch shipowners" he says -"looked upon Amsterdam as if this were their own

port, where no foreigners were allowed in.

Amster-dam was the traditional port of call for all the

major Dutch freight and passenger services to all parts of the world. Under these circumstances it is perhaps understandable that the foreign shipping

lines went to Rotterdam.

When they came there, impetus was given to the

emergency of a great number of ship's agents in

Rotterdam, who were to look after the interests of their foreign principals. Ultimately,

it became an

established pattern that with a few exceptions -Dutch shipping lines concentrated in Amsterdam, whereas the regular foreign lines were in

Rotter-dam. Even so, the Amsterdam pre-eminence in liner trade was quite obvious in those days.

However, time marched on. After the years of

the Second World War a new aspect in liner trades presented itself: international co-operation. Taking numerous factors into consideration, it became less profitable for the majority of the individual lines to

go it alone in a world of increasing competition".

This has been a contributing factor to the

dis-appearance of several liner companies from

Amster-dam. The movement also became apparent in the

Dutch lines, when a large group of liner companies, Koninklijke Rotterdamse Lloyd, Stoomvaart

Maat-schappij "Nederland" and Verenigde Nederlandse

Scheepvaartmaatschappij among them, merged into

what was to become the largest shipping

concen-tration under

the Dutch

flag, the Nederlandse

Scheepvaart Unie. As the years went by, the NSU

gradually moved its lines to Rotterdam, withdrawing some of them from Amsterdam.

5.1 Patterns change

The very fact of international co-operation was one

of the reasons why companies like the NSU

re-organised their trades, sometimes, but not always at the expense of Amsterdam. Yet it would be

fun-damentally wrong to state that this trend has

drain-ed Amsterdam from its life blood, or to conclude

that .a 11 liner trade has disappeared from the port. It would indeed also ignore the fact that where some

went, others came, although the patterns and

sche-dules might have been totally different.

It is equally true that in many cases major bulk trades have come to strengthen Amsterdam's trade

position. Meanwhile, trade figures for the port have

more or less remained constant, as we shall see

later.

In 1952 the new Amsterdam-Rijnkanaal, a 40

mile canal linking the port of Amsterdam with the

river Rhine, was inaugurated. It is today considered

to be one of the Continent's busiest inland

navi-gation

routes, both for Dutch and international

traffic.

The Rhine link makes Amsterdam one of three

major Rhine delta ports; of the other two,

Rotter-dam had natural links with this river, while the third

port Antwerp, was provided with a modern

water-way from the Scheide to the Rhine in 1975.

Currently work is in progress to adapt the

Am-sterdam-Rijnkanaal to full time push-barge convoys,

completion of this work in envisaged for 1980.

Every year some 20 mIn tons of bulk and semi-bulk products are carried to and from the port of

Amsterdam by barge along the canal.

5.2 Outer Port

The costs of deepening the North Sea Canal

(Am-sterdam to IJmuiden, the entrance to the North

Sea) being prohibitive, it was decided several years ago that the construction of an Outer Port at IJmui-den would serve as an economic and most practical

facility to match the requirements for larger ship

size and faster turn-round.

They could be located between the southern mole of the harbour entrance and the coastline, stretching

some 1000 acres. Entrance and exit would be via

the existing harbour mouth via a maritime canal

fairway which could in stages be extended for the passage of ocean carriers up to 180,000/200,000

dwt.

The port, it was hoped, would bring some 60 to 75 min tons of additional annual traffic to

Amster-dam; costs would be around 500 mIn guilders.

These and various other factors and trends, as

well as the facts of Amsterdam's geographical

po-sition, have all played their part in the summing up

-J

by the 'Commissie Zeehavenoverleg" (Consulting Committee on Seaports), chaired by Ir. S. A.

Pos-thumus, when they presented their report on the

feasibility of the Outer Port at IJmuiden [16]. The conclusions - the larger majority of the committee spoke in favour of the new Outer Port - have since been bitterly contested by a number of bodies and

organisations, and also by commercial and shipping groups of Rotterdam.

At the beginning of 1977, however, the fate of the Outer Port was still undecided. Dutch minister

for Transport and "Waterstaat" T. Westerterp stated

on 18th January 1977, that the "further procedure relating to this project" would be introduced in the

council of ministers, adding that the decision could

be taken before the current government would go

out of office.

The Amsterdam Port Alderman Dr. C. H. Goe-koop has also confirmed that talks would be held

with

the Regional Authority

of the Provincial

Authority for Noord-Holland on this subject. The original Outer Port project envisaged a large scale extension beyond the Umuiden piers; the idea has since been mooted to build new facilities inside

the piers, but in the early months of this year the

pros and cons on the plan's merits were not in

balance.

The Amsterdam argument for the Outer Port is

that the potential development should not be nipped

in the bud by failing to adapt the facilities at the

seaward end of the port (the IJmuiden area) to the modern requirements. The cons say that the large

expenditure required for the port would be a waste,

since the facilities would create an overcapacity in Holland. ("Rotterdam activities would have to be

switched to Amsterdam in order to find work for the Outer Port").

II U

_{(___...} ,I1u

5.3 Discussions

In the sometimes heated discussions, in which urban and regional groups in the IJmuiden area took part, rejecting the port as a threat to the environment, the

term "main port" has been bandied about,

especi-ally with reference to container traffic which,

accord-ing to the Amsterdam pros, might be another valid

reason fôr enlarging the facilities.

The Rotterdam argument is that the larger Dutch

port would of a necessity have this "main port ele-ment", with Amsterdam cargo being carried

back-wards and foreback-wards by smaller feeder-ships. While it is true that Rotterdam holds a large concentration

of regular container shipping, it would go too far to state that that there is absolutely no raison d'être

for an Amsterdam container-port, as some have

suggested.

The fact is borne out, for instance, by the CA-ROL consortium which operates full cellular

con-tainer tonnage on the Europe-Caribbean trade, with

Amsterdam being the only port of call in The

Ne-therlands. One of the partners of CAROL is the

Koninklijke Nederlandse Stoomboot Maatschappij

(KNSM), traditional and faithful customer of the

port of Amsterdam, although the company did

establish their own terminals and offices in Rotter-dam, too.

Liner traffic to and from Amsterdam is still very

active in

the West Indies and South American

trades, Indonesia, as well as on various short-sea

routes.

In 1976 the port of Amsterdam handled a total of 19 mIn tons of cargoes (inward 13.4 mln tons; outward: 5.6 mIn tons), compared with 18.7 mIn tons in 1975, of which 12.9 mIn tons were inward and 5.8 mIn tons outward. Cargo figures through Amsterdam went up considerably in the "fifties," doubling themselves from 5.2 mIn tons in 1950 to

10.8 min tons in 1960.

Until 1967 the totals remained fairly stable around

the 14 mIn tons, but in the following four years

there was another sharp increase, from 17.9 mlii tons in 1968 to 24.1 min tons in 1971. This period

was succeeded by one in which the cargo totals

levelled down again to 18.1 mIn tons in 1974, and since then there has been a slow but steady climb

again.

It should be noted that the individual figures for

bulk commodities and general cargo (break/bulk and containerised) have shown stability over the last ten yearsor so, demonstrating that, although there have been changes in the port of Amsterdam's customers

and liner shipping patterns, total goods traffic by

sea has continued to be a reliable factor.

In 1976 Amsterdam has profited from the sharp

increase in the supply of derivates to Europe.

Tran-shiprñents of raw materials for the foods industry rose by 15% last year. According to the

"Vereni-ging Amsterdamse Graanhandel", supplies in 1976

were in excess of 3.5 mIn tons; despite the usual peaks in the supply,

the port was never really

troubled by any serious congestion in grain handling.

[17].

As far as containerised cargoes are concerned, there was a major increase in the period 19 72/73,

with a total of almost 340,000 tons achieved in

1973. But by 1974 this segment was down again to less than 300,000 tons, although there has been

a Smaller increase since. [18].

6 ROTTERDAM

No More New Ports until 2000?

"The prospects for the port of Rotterdam in 1977

are not hopeful, generally speaking. Forecasts about

the activities in the coming four quarters of 1977

are now about 7% below those that were made

three months ago. A n expansion is expected for the handling of containerised goods, but the growth

per-centage will be lower than we have got used to in

the last few years.

There will also be a growth in roll-on/roll-off

traffic, while, as far as grains and derivatives are concerned, it is expected that the situation will be

normalized again in 1977. The prospects for ore

transhipments are not favourable, considering the

delay ïn the West German steel production. Taking

it by and large, we are expecting that 1977 will be a year in which we shall be pleased if we manage to -hold on tò what we got in 1976":

This rather gloomy forecast was made by Dr.

L. J. Pieters, President of the "Scheepvaart

Ver-eeniging Zuid" (the Rotterdam Port Employers'

Association) at the Association's Annual Dinner on

5th January 1977. [19]. At the time when he made his speech, Dr. Pieters did not know what course the events would take around the coming negotia-tions with port labour about their new pay deals. The strikes which ravaged the Dutch seaports in February must have caused considerable damage, but apart from that, there had been warnings from the employers' 'organisations beforehand that the

port of Rotterdam was getting too expensive for

many international customers.

The constantly rising wage levels for port labour in Holland were blamed as the main reasons: similar

levels had been less spectacular 'for Rotterdam's

principal -foreign rival ports. In order to meet these

costs, stevedores and others had to charge the custo-mers more for their services. This, eventually, could

lead to some of the traditional customers turning

their backs on Rotterdam and going somewhere else.

The general impression at the beginning of the

year, however, was that the expense factor -

al-though important in itself - would not be quite so

bad that whole blocks of clients were going to

Ant-werp and Hamburg next, and the trend figures for

the first months of 1977 have confirmed this. On the other hand, it is perfectly true that Rotterdam,

perhaps more than the remaining seaports of the

range, has suffered from the change of mentality

that set in about four or five years ago and caused

widespread feelings of satiation.

Gone are the days, maybe for ever, when a

keenly felt awareness of the necessity of building a

large seaport and adapting it to the requirements

of tomorrow, made large sections of the population

accept the less amenable aspects of industrial ex-pansion. The change has not only occurred among

the public, but also among the authorities

them-selves (municipal, regional, and even in circles of

the port directorate). In a few instances the

pen-General view of Rotterdam's Eemhaven facilities.

dulum has swung too far in the opposite direction,

or so many think, when they consider, for instance, the motives given for turning down submissions to settle new major industries in the Rotterdani/Rijn-mond areas.

6.1 Sensitiveness

Even among trade unions a nagging fear has per-sisted that if Rotterdam's competitive position is

threatened (because industries that were refused

ad-mission into the Rotterdam region have gone to

rival ports), the port employment position might be put into jeopardy, too.

The rivalry among the range ports has been a

factor Rotterdam circles in particular have always been very sensitive about. In the past year Rotter-dam circles have been very outspoken on

Amster-dam's Voorhaven (Outer Port)

issue,

and there

have been notable clashes on the subject between

organisations and authorities and some people have

wondered if the issue really deserved all the fuss that was made about it.

It has been asserted that motivations have had

been solely based on reason. Why. is it, sorné neutral

experts abroad have wondered, that Rotterdam has been up in arms whenever the Outer Port :pJoject of Amsterdam was so. much as mentioned, while

nobody in World Port Number One uttered a

syllable when Hamburg conceived its Hansaport (15

min tons cf bulk commodities per annum), when the river Jade was deepened at Wilhelmshaven to

admit the bigger oiitankers, or when both' Hamburg and Bremen planned a vast expansion of their

con-tainer-terminals?

'Many of those who have been on about the Outer

Port, probably have not even heard of Hansaport and Wilhelmshaven's bigger capacity, although in

purely commercial terms, the competitive element of

both these projects must be superior to the effect that Amsterdam's Outer Port would have on Rot-terdam. On the other hand, Rotterdam circles have been worrying about current and future projects in the large French seaports, particularly in Dunkirk,

Le Havre and Marseilles.

In 1976 31,993 seagOing vessels arrived at the

port of Rotterdam, 1.6% less than in the. preceding

year. Their net register tonnage, however,- rose by

5.8% from 173.1 niln in 1975 to 183.2 mIn in 1976.

The average size of the ships calling at Rotterdam

has more than doubled in' the last- .ten years. In

1976 115 ships arrived at Rotterdam with a draft of 66.5 ft or more, twice the number of the 1975

arrivals.

Goods traffic through the port, bunkers excepted, rose by 5.1% in 1976, compared to the year before,

to 283.1 mIn tons (269.3 mln tons in 1975). Liner

traffic increased by 9.9% from 25.1 mIn tons in

'75 to 27.6 mIn tons in '76. More than half of this traffic comprised container, ro/ro and LASH. The volume of containerized goods handled in the port

in 1976 went up by 15.5% from 8.3 mIn tons in

'75 to 9.5 mIn tons. Ro/ro traffic increased by 0.2% to 3.1 mIn tons.

Merchandise transported

by LASH

carriers

dropped by 5% to 1.2 mIn tons. Loaded and

dis-charged by tramp shipping at Rotterdam were 75.5

min tons. 2.3% over the 1975 results. Coal totals were down by 6.8% to 7 mIn tons;' ores were also

lower, but grains, fertilizers and other dry bulk com-modities gained. Liquid oil carriers loaded and

dis-charged 180.1 mIn tons in 1976, compared with

170.5 mIn tons in 1975 (a 5.7% gain), of which

148 5 mln tons were crude oil, 10.9% mo-re than

the year before.

6.2 Maasvlakte terminal

The increases in containerized cargoes have been

cited by Mr. Henk van der Pols, the Rotterdam

Port..Alderman, as the main reason whythe plans

to bùilda new large container terminal at the Maas-vlakte (the seaward extension of Europoort) should

be put into execution as soon as possible. A report published in February 1975 [20], concluded that

the annual growth in this trade might be about 9%, throughout the period to 1980.

In numbers, this would mean that Rotterdam

would have to handle 925,000 boxes in 1977, just over one million in 1978, 1.1 mIn in 1979 and 1.2 min in 1980. But the estimates might have been a little too optimistic, considering that in 1976

Rot-terdam handled a'bout 800,000 containers instead of the 848,000 boxes forecast.

Even so, -it would, seem to be within the realm of possibilities that 1.2 mln containers might have

to be handled in Rotterdam by 1980, a figure which

is at the top of the capacities of the present

termi-nals. This, according to the alderman, explains why

Rotterdam must not wait too long before clearing

the sites for the Maasvlakte terminals (in the initial

stage 60 hectares would -become available, the whole

shift might take up to 30 years).

It is true, though, that the major terminal

opera-tors in Rotterdam are not particularly keen to move

their business from the present locations at Eem-haven and WaalEem-haven "into the sea", 'SQ to speak.

One of them, the management of Europe Container

Terminus (ECT), has repeatedly argued that they are quite happy to Stay where they are, even if the alderman relates the move to the re-structuring öf

the old Rotterdam 'basins.

With new, modem facilities becoming available,

Rotterdam might proceed to close the Old bas.ins

and. earmark them for urban and residential develop-ment, but by the beginning of 1977 the bulk of this

operation had still to 'be done. The "removal" of the -remaining shipping firms and stevedores from the area, loosely located between Parkhaven and Merwehaven (on the North bank), had also been

mentioned in connection with an earlier project

which looked as if it had been definitely shelved

early 1976.

This concerned the construction of a new port,

known as "Rijnpoort", on the North bank of the

New Waterway, between Maassluis and the Hook of Holland. The Rijnpoort-project, which was to

cater for short sea

ferries,

container and ro/ro

shipping and vessels loading agricultural produce,

dated from the later days of the

Thomassen/Posthu-ma reign (Mr. W. ThoThomassen/Posthu-massen, Rotterdam

burgo-master, and Dr. F. Posthuma, the port director

were the "exponents" of the years of the great

Rt-terdam expansion).

But no sooner had the Rijnpoort-project been

mooted, or objections were raised, first from the nearby horticultural district, later by the

environ-mental sOcieties. While the plan was being debated

cost estimates for the project rose out of all

pro-portions. Lastly, the Rotterdam port operators nèver showed themselves really very keen to move to the

new area, and finally; it looked more than certain

that the plan would have to be suspended

inde-finitely for Iáck of enthusiasm.

A last minute attempt was made to keep the sites

in reservC against the future date when Rijnpoort iùight' be ñee'ded after all. But it was too late, and

amidst groaning and fist shaking from the dwindling number of supporters, the plan was put on the shelf, and will probably remain there, until no one knows âbout it 'ahy- more.

So much for a change of mental climate iñ

Rot-terdam

6.3 Oil

Anóther point still in abeyañce 'in the Rtterdam

area is whether or not the channel leadiñg to the

Europoòrt' oil trrminals should be deepened from its"presènt 68 ft to a. projected 72 ft, which would make Europàort 'accessible to the ULCCs of the 400,000/500,000 dwt categòry. Ships óf this size

can already reach' the Maasvlakte, and indeed, one

did in 1976, the French Shell tänker "Batillus" of

525,000 dwt,' but she was, of course, not fùlly 'laden.

Until late 1976 the port directorate and the

Rot-terdam town-council felt that it would be 'judicious

to pròvide the deèper' cha'anel, but elsewhei'e' the opinions on this' subject were' divided, due' to the

fact that the ULCC and super-ULCC clàss of ships

were struggling throúgh their worldwide malaise,

and no shipowner, whether independent' or related to a major oil company, was, showing any signs of

ordering such tonnage again in a hurry, one

ex-ception being, of course, Mr. Ravi Tikkoo' 'lettèf of intentioñ for threè nuclear600,000 dwt tankers, but they' would be' for the Persian Gulf-USA run

anyway.

The two projects mentioned here (container

t'er-minäl' Maasvlakte and the deeper oil channel) could

be 'called symptomatic for the differences 'in'

as-sèssing the future' Of 'a large port, nOt only

Rotter-dam,' but others as well. Who knows when" the

feelings' will change once more, but at least at thè

beginning of 1977 there' were no indications Of that

yet. ' '

However; one' approach in this matter 'is to' say

that' Rotterdam will 'be able to handle' the 500 mIn

tons, expected by 1990, without having to' enlärge

its ports and f Lcilitiei, taking into áccount the space still available in the existing facilities.

Structurally speaking, a bettér utilization 'of , mo

dem techniques would eliminate' the space

neces-sities, largely piompted by earlier port planning.

7 ANTWERP

Hólding' on, Fighting back, Spreading whigs

The recovery of the port of Antwerp from the re-cessiOn years has been quite remarkable 'and most

encouragingÇ especially to those who felt convinced

that therE' was' sufficient resilience in the port in-dustries, to parry theblows. In' 1976 Antwerp re-gistered 'a tôtal of 67.15' mln tons of cargo move-ments through the port, 11.1% more than in 1975.

The strongest growth was 'in

bulk commodities, wheie. the -'average 'rise över the year was 14.7%, a percentage gaihed pàrticularly 'by the increasE in the

volume of coal (+ 57%) and ore (+17.3%).

Còntainér-traftic 'rose by 11.6% 'to reach. a total of 3.7 mIn ton'r, while the 'number of containers

hand-led 'rose ' 'by an almost 'identical percentáge

to

247,4OO' ''''

' "''''' '

'

'"Half of An twerp's contàiñerized cargoes 'is' 'related to the"USAJCanada trades, accounting for 1 8 mIn

ions, compared to 1.66 mIn tons in 1975. The

vo-lume Of containerized cargoes discharged fiom the USA trade registered the highest individual increase

(+14:4%);

'

'While 'still in 'the throes of the "depression, the Antwerp Port Director,

Dr. R. Vleugels,

stated

early 1976 that the reduction, then' prevailing, in Antwerp's general cargo trade figures 'had. to be attributed to 'the lower export totals of' the West European steel industry. It would appear that the

ovérseas' xports from German, French, Luxemburg and Belgian steel industries suffered from: Japanese and American competition. '

'Aritwerp being the major "steel pOrt" of Europè (50%" or more of all iron and steel in the Antwerp/ Hamburg range ports passes through Antwerp), the

Schelde port at 'the time 'was 'hit hardest by' the

'lower totals iii steel 'exports.' But even then Dr.

Vleu-gels felt optimistic about 'the immediate future. He

rightly estimated that 1976 would bring a total Of 67' mln tons of seabornè meichandise handléd at Antwerp, considerably bétter than 1975, althòugh not yet quite so good as the record 75.8 mIn tons

which Antwerp handled in 1974.

'

'With the general picture at Aniwerp thus leaving feelings of satisfaction with its many well-wishers at"-h'orne and abroad, it shoúld be borne' in 'mind

that the Scheide port nevertheless is

beset by a

number of problems, some of a national character, others of a more or less international nature, all of

which are quite specific.

In the national context, there has been a growing

tendency in the six months preceding March 1977

that the Belgian government is in favour of creating artificial barriers to the trade expansion of the

sea-ports of the country (apart from Antwerp,

Zee-brugge and Ghent must here be mentioned), osten-sibly to distribute traffic in such a way that no

se-nous overlappiñg of traffic patterns could occur.

7.1 Distribution

This, it might 'be argued, is a laudable attempt to-wards an efficient rationalization of seaport func-tions within one country, thus eliminating costly duplications, which would be to no one's benefit,

and might even weaken the competitive position of all three ports.

In another sense this policy could pave the way for the creation of a national guidance on port co-ordination, something like a national port policy

which has been much in vogue in Belgian maritime circles, the ports in question included, ever since the

44 .

-'

A5

-Antwerp: Churchill Dock: busy container handling centre.

phrase was coined, and partly implemented, by its

Benelux member, the Netherlands.

Antwerp circles, however, have expressed fears

that in one way or another, this attempt towards

rationalization, has led to favouritism by the Belgian authorities of the port of Zeebrugge, at the expense

of Antwerp. One recent example of how delicate such a situation can become was the reaction to a

statement by the Belgian minister for transport, Jos

Chabert, on March 3rd 1977, at a meeting of

Bel-gian shipping journalists (European Shipping Press Association) at Antwerp, in which he reportedly had

been philosophizing on the merits of distributing

traffic among the national seaports.

Minister Chabert was reported to have said that ro/ro traffic, in his opinion, ought to be

concen-trated on Zeebrugge, while Antwerp would have to be a major bulk transport place. However, the

Ant-werp town and port authorities, were alarmed at

this statement, since the Schelde port apparently

would have to sacrifice a large section of its normal

trade, which it had acquired through diligence and

competitiveness, and would get very little in return

for it, since Zeebrugge had hardly any bulk traffic

to give away.

7.2 Delwaide's case

The Antwerp Port Alderman, the venerable and

highly respected Leo Deiwaide, was assured by the

government that Minister Chabert had only been

thinking in this cnnection of the short-sea trades

to and from Britain, several of which are already

concentrated on Zeebrugge. Earlier, Alderman Del-waide had told the minister that Antwerp has never accepted any allocation of traffic by any authority,

on the grounds of principles. [21].

Some, said Mr. Delwaide, had in the past

re-commended similar distributions of traffic between

Antwerp and Rotterdam, but Antwerp has always

rejected such recommendations: the port is too

ver-satile to adapt itself to alloted segments of trade

and cast aside others; besides, Antwerp would not

be a worldport if it did not have a versatile function

to fulfIll.

While in Antwerp, too,

the feeling is that a

national port policy would be beneficial in general terms, it should never be that allocations and dis-tributions are detrimental to the port's interests. Alderman Deiwaide was not reticent to point out

that in respect of container traffic alone, the Schelde

port had shown its resilience: it had gone up by al-most 12% in 1976, compared to the year before,

"whereas in the port of Zeebrugge, so feared by

some, inbound container traffic in the same period fell 'by Ï.1% and outbound by 10%".

Based on the principles of good port

manage-ments, Antwerp will never accept any traffic

ditii-bution system imposed by government or other

authorities - Such was the giit of Alderman Delwaide's reaction to this suggestion.

7.3 Benelux

On the international level (if the Benelux relations must be so called), the port of Antwerp has been

fighting it out with the Netherlands almost

uninter-ruptedly in all the post Second World War years, and many were the times when daggers were

virt-ually drawn, as for instance in the days when on

the Rotterdam side Alderman J. Brautigam heavily

collided with his Antwerp counterpart on the issue of what was then styled the Moerdijk-canal, and

also in the times when Alderman Deiwaide and

Rot-terdam btirgomaster W. Thomassen fought battle

royals on mutual port issues.

These days, however, the topical issues between

Holland and Belgium remain the construction of the

Baalhoek Canal, partly running through the Dutch

territory of Zeeuws Vlaanderen, and the re-alignment

of the Westerschelde, also a project that will have

to take part on the territory of the Netherlands. The

Baalhoek Canal is to link the new Antwerp port

expansion project on the left bank of the Scheide. The left bank project was conceived a number

of years ago, when it became abundantly clear that

the possibilities of further expansion on the right bank had been exhausted'. The area is a vast one (about 6,600 hectares, of which 750 hectares will

be green zones). -It is situated on the territory of the

Province of East Flanders and will be linked to the Schelde by two locks (one at Baalhoek in Dutch Zeeuws Vlaanderen, and one at Kalb

- already

completed - on Belgian territory), the Baalhoek

Canal is to connect the two lock systems, and from

this canal will fork a number of docks.

The new industrial zone on the left bank already

comprises the Kalb power station, a nuclear power station at Doel and industrial settlements of Bayer,

Progil, Haitermann and Henkel. In many cases the

industries on the left bank communicate with äthers,

belonging to the same concerns on the right bank,

links being effected 'by 'means of pipe-lilies. Bayer,

Petrochim, Union Carbide and Chevron have sites

on both banks.

7.4 Extentions

Generally speaking, it can be said that the main

works to be undertaken at Antwerp up to 1980,

fall into three categories: the maritime access of the

Scheide, constructions on the right bank and those on the left bank. [22]. The budgeted investments

from 1976-1980 for these considerable infrastÑcture

works total about BFr. 18, 300 mIn.

At the present time vessels with a draught of up to 45 ft can safely navigate the river Scheide on a

spring tide and since June 1976 the various dfedging works completed have allowed vessels of up to 44 ft

6 in. upriver and 38 ft 6 in. downriver during the

same tide in spring conditions.

In 1976 a 45 m. tower with an unmanned radar station was constructed on a artificial island near

Saeftinge from where data is transmitted to the

cen-tral station near the Zandvliet lock (right bank),

while future navigational plans provide-for the

con'-stru&ion of nine additionäl radar stations to

in-crease both the speed and safety of access. The re-alignment of the river at Bath has been allocated

BFr. 2,000 mln, but this project remains in the

long-term future and depends both on Dutch

co-operation and conservations problems for its imple

mentation.

-- The main construction on the right bank covers

the provision of a new large berthing dock east of

Kanaaldok B2 which is to be cómpleted in 1979/80. Its main dimensions feature -a 4,700 m total length

of quay walls, an entrance width of 350 rn and a

16.75 m water depth.

Regarding traffic patterns, the port of Antwerp

has not always had an easy time. Plans for drawing more container shipping, for instance, somehow got

related to attempts by Belgian shipping companies

to get a foothold in a particular trade, such as

happened in the case of the Europe-Far East trade. Again, Antwerp would welcome all sorts of

ad-ditional traffic, such as LASH and Seabee, and in fact

when early March the "Almeria Lykes" - one Sea-bee - happened to visit the port, many speculated

Why indeed these highly specialised vessels should not make more regular calls. The question at the time was answered by Michael D. Shea, deputy director

of Lykes' UK and Europe services, who said that

each call at Antwerp meant something like 12 hours

additional sailing and harbour time for a ship that

was clearly conceived for very fast operation.

Inbound Seabees normally have a 40 ft draught, Shea said: this cannot always be guaranteed on the

Scheide, and, additionally, the access to the docks is strictly related to the tides. [23].

The Schelde-Rhine Canal, however, opened in

1975, has proved a boon to Antwerp, and also

crown-ed the efforts of Holland and Belgium to come to satisfactory terms with one another on so funda-mental an issue. The new canal has considerably

shortened the waterway connection between Antwerp and the German hinterland; navigation has also be-come more efficient and safer because of it, although not all Belgian wishes with respect to the waterway

have yet been fulfilled.

8 DUNKIRK Widening horizons

In 1976 the northernmost seaport of France, Dun-kirk, registered an increase of 12.1% over 1975 in

goods handled, thus scoring a total of 33.5 mIn tons. Liquid bulks, mainly crude oil and refined products

remained stable, but Dunkirk consolidated its po-sition as France's seaport for dry bulk cargoes,

re-gistering a 17.5% increase, compared to 1975, a

growth rate which is far superior to the 7% gain in

this section for all the French seaports together. The increases in bulk commodities (30% for coal

alone, to reach 15.5 mln tons) clearly show that

the rich industrial North of France is reaping the

benefits from the convenient transportation facilities through Dunkirk.

Container movements between the port and the

UK totalled 40,533 TEUs, a gain of 33% compared

with 1975, and according to the port management,

was one of the major achievements of 1976. In

re-spect of liner shipping in general, the Dunkirk

author-ities are particularly pleased with the developments

on the West African and Antilles trades.

However, North American container trades could

do better at Dunkirk, shipping circles believe; the

obvious reason for this development must be sought in the "main port efféct" for the North French region,

resulting in most such traffic being routed through

Le Havre.

One aspect of the developments of Dunkirk is that

the port has to try to stand on its feet amidst

in-creasing competition at home and abroad. Consider-ing that Dunkirk lacks major waterway links to the

hinterland - all the other ports mentioned in the

treatise have them - the results of reaching an annual

traffic output in the order of 30 million tons and

over are all the more remarkable. As far as the water-way link is concerned, this might probably be

recti-fied in the not too distant future, but for the time

being Dunkirk has learned to be realistic and do

without it, the exception being the modern canal,

accessible to large barge-convoys to the coal and

in-dustrial region of Valenciennes.

8.1 Gateway

Dunkirk owes its pre-eminence as a commercial sea-port to the fact that it has served as a gateway to the

local and regional industrial areas. At later stages,

however, the horizons at Dunkirk have widened con-siderably, and it would be no exaggeration to suggest that Dunkirk's hinterland has deepened to encompass

the whole of the "Nord", but also large areas in

Lorraine, the Sarre, Luxembourg, and even parts of

Belgium.

According to Michel Pechère, Director-General of

the Port Autonome de Dunkerque, the port has a

natural function along the Northern French coastline, between the large seaports in the Benelux delta and

Le Havre area. [24].

The f ture development of the port is based on the essence of its traffic: bulk trades and short-sea con-nections. It is in this respect that the scope of Dun-kirk may increase substantially in the years to come: the industrial developments along the French coast have even attracted the attention, and the admiration,

across the Channel, and in the early 1970s John

Lunch, then the Director-General of the Port of

London Authority, told an audience that "great

things were happening on the other side of the

water", and he even suggested that seaports like Dun-kirk, Calais and Le Havre might assume a transitport

function for British traffic.

Be that as it may, the Port Autonome de

kerque is currently engaged on large-scale develop-ment projects, the main scheme being the provision and utilization of the Western Outer Port, the Avant

Port Ouest (there is also one at the Eastern end of

the port), which can roughly be divided into a section for bulk handling and storage, the Terminal

Ponde-reux, including oil terminals for on-site or nearby

refineries, and a section devoted to modern roll-on/ roll-off and short-sea ferry links, the so-called Port

Rapide. The complete Avant Port Ouest has a

sur-face a little over 7,000 ha. [25].

Principal site on the bulk handling bank of the new

port is one covering 115 ha, to which, if necessary another 65 ha can be added. In the initial stage the

terminal will be served by a 669 m quay where up to 175,000 dwt bulkers can be accommodated.

Even-tually the quay can be linked up to a southern

ex-tension of 375 m length, and the water will be deep enough then to berth ships of up to 300,000 dwt.

Actual work on this Terminal Pondereux started in the spring of 1977, and the initial stage is sched-uled for completion in 1979. The terminal must also be made accessible to modern push-convoys, and the access itself is to be linked with the

Dunkirk-Valen-ciennes network.

The new Port Rapide at Dunkirk.

8.2 Custom sought

Early 1977 custom for the new port - at least for the

bulk handling plant - would seem to be the chief concern of the Port Autonome. Although the

ex-pectations are that many industries will be interested,

Dunkirk is open for more. In March it had not yet

been settled whether ICI would come to the French port; the concern was also reported to carry on

nego-tiations about a possible settlement in Wilhelmshaven

and Moerdijk. Dunkirk, for its part, had done its

ut-most to tailor its offer to the requirements of the

potential customer.

Another project related to Dunkirk settlement

pre-sented itself by the end of January 1977. It would

seem that around this time there had been informal contacts between the Belgian Minister for Economic

Affairs, M. Herman, and the French Minister for

Equipment, M. D'Ornano on a possible future func-tion for Dunkirk as port for the recepfunc-tion and

distri-bution of Algerian natural gas bought by Belgium.

[26].

Based on the assumption that the facilities that had been planned for this reception at the Belgian seaport of Zeebrugge quite likely would not be ready in time