A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S __________ FO LIA L IN G U IST IC A 36, 1997
Alina K w iatkow ska
L IN G U IS T IC IC O N IC IT Y
1. T H E ARBITRARIN ESS DEBATE
W ithin the co nceptual fram ew ork o f classical stru ctu ralism , lan g u ag e is seen as an entirely self-contained system , an d consequ ently linguistic signs are n o t m o tiv ated by any language-external facts. A rgu in g fo r the a rb it rariness o f the sign, de S aussure claim ed th a t n o t even p u rp o rte d ly o n o m ato p o e ic w ords are directly m o tiv ated by th e actu al so u nd s fo u n d in n a tu re . F ollow ing de S aussure, m o st linguists m ain tain ed th a t iconicity is eith er ab sen t from language o r trivial in im p o rt. C h o m s k y [1981: 3] stated th a t “ o u r in te rp re ta tio n o f the w orld is based in p a rt o n rep resen ta tio n a l system s th a t derive from the structure o f the m in d its e lf an d d o n o t m irro r in any direction the form o f things in the extern al w orld..." J a k o b s o n [1966], w ho insisted th a t the im itative co m p o n en t o f lang uag e is to o salient to be ignored, an d po in ted to d iag ra m m a tic iconicity in the g ram m ars o f various languages, was ra th e r isolated am o n g his colleagues. It is only in recent years, w ith the advent o f cognitive linguistics, th a t th e issue o f iconicity has begun to re-surface. C ognitive linguists em phasize the experiential basis o f linguistic coding; since experience itself is stru c tu red , and organized in to gestalts (cf. e.g. L a k o f f 1977, J o h n s o n 1987], it is n a tu ra l to expect th a t this stru ctu re will be reflected in the physical fo rm o f linguistic co nstru ctions. T h e system atic research o f H a - i m a n [1980, 1983, 1985] and G i v ô n [1985] has d e m o n strate d th a t this is indeed the case.
G ivô n seeks a psychological basis fo r linguistic iconicity, an d arrives at w h a t he calls th e iconicity m eta-principle [1985: 189].
All other things being equal, a coded experience is easier to store, retrieve and com m unicate if the code is maximally isom orphic to the experience.
W hile H a i m a n [1980] m ain tain s th a t linguistic signs in iso latio n are sym bolic, an d it is only the system o f g ram m ar th a t relates them w hich m ay be diag ram m atically iconic, fo r G i v ô n [1985] it is o bvious th a t “ the tra d itio n a l, p ro to ty p ical icon and sym bol are tw o extrem e p o in ts o n a scale th a t represents degree o f abstraction or generalization" (p. 192). A s o ne illu stra tio n o f this thesis, G ivon traces the g rad ual evo lutio n o f th e letter “ A ” , w hich is believed to derive historically from th e p ictorial re p resen ta tio n o f th e H ebrew 'I f - ‘bull, c a ttle ’. T h e process o f a b stra c tio n b egan w hen only the head o f the anim al w as chosen to represent th e w hole, an d co n tin u ed w hen its ‘m in o r’ features an d sm aller d etails were d iscard ed and curving lines regularized - until the head g radu ally assum ed its m o re ab stra c t iconic re presentation, th a t o f an u p tu rn ed A ( ho rn s, ears, h ead -to p , snout). T h e g radual process o f abstraction o f th e iconic m odel was com pleted w hen this sign w as tu rn ed upside dow n [cf. G i v o n 1985: 193-195]. G iv ôn p o in ts o u t th a t “ th ere is no logically principled way fo r deciding a t w h a t p o in t, o n th e c o n tin u u m o f re d u c tio n /a b s tra c tio n o u tlin e d ab o v e , one traverses the b o u n d a ry betw een icon and sym bol” (p. 196). O ne is rem inded h ere o f sim ilar problem s w ith pictorial rep resen tatio n s. S hould w e regard th e h ea rts in V alentine p o stcard s as icons or sym bols, an d how sho uld we a p p ro a c h various extrem ely reduced form s in m o d e rn p ain tin gs? O r the little circles an d triangles on the d o o rs o f public toilets? In visual co m m u n icatio n , as in language, it seems best to answ er such q uestion s using the n o tio n o f a co n tin u u m . T h e ab stracted “ sym b ol” is ju st as iso m orp hic to th e m odeled p h en o m en o n as the “ im age” , th o u g h a t a d ifferent level o f generality.
G i v ô n [1985: 213-214] claim s th a t
it is very likely ...that all “arbitrary” symbols arise naturally - ontogenetically, phylogenetically and diachronically - from m ore concrete/ natural/isom orphic icons. ...It seems to me th a t in order for us to understand the seeming “m agic” o f symbolic representation, we ought to consider iconicity the truly general case in the coding, representation and com m unication of experience, and symbols a mere extreme case on the iconic scale.
G iv ô n ’s exam ple com es from the m o st basic level o f iconic coding. H ow ever, such coding m ay also m anifest itself a t th e p ro p o sitio n a l level o r a t the m o re com plex, ab stra c t level o f vario us d isco u rse-p rag m atic fu n c tio n a l dom ains. I t seems ra th e r obvious th a t a t all these levels iconicity is firm ly g rounded in the visual experience.
2. T H E F O R M /C O N T E N T IS O M O R P H IS M
T h e iconicity o f linguistic form s is o ften m ed iated th ro u g h m e ta p h o rs. It is n a tu ra l fo r us to co n cep tu alize b o th ling uistic form (p hy sically tem p o ra l) and m eaning in spatial term s. T h e C O N D U IT m e ta p h o r [cf. R e d d y 1979], m ak es us see linguistic expressions as con tain ers, an d th eir m eanings as th e co n ten ts o f those co n tainers, which m ak es fo r an au to m a tic close link betw een them . A s a n u m b er o f linguists [e.g. B o l i n g e r 1977; H a i m a n 1980; L a n g a c k e r 1987] have rightly observed, this isom orphism betw een form an d co n te n t, b o th in a single w o rd o r a g ra m m a tica l co n stru c tio n , precludes the existence o f tru e synonym s o r exact p a ra p h ra se s, as different form s m u st have different m eanings.
T h e n atu ra l consequence o f o u r thinkin g in term s o f this m e ta p h o r, is the ex pectation th a t M O R E O F F O R M IS M O R E O F C O N T E N T [ L a k o f f a n d J o h n s o n ’ s fo rm u latio n , 1980: 10-11]. T h u s, p red ictably, “ sm all w o rd s” , being sm aller containers, hold less in v aria n t m ean in g and are th erefo re m o re vague, easier to a d a p t to chang ing con tex ts - i.e. have greatest “ polysem atic p o te n tia l” . T hese include such w ords as particles and prepositio n s, as well as m ostly m onosyllabic co p u lar o r copu la-lik e verbs. W e m ig h t also no te in this conn ection th a t m o st o f the verbs o ccu rrin g in p h ra sal co n stru c tio n s, i.e. w ith particles w hich m ay change th eir m eaning s, are m o nosyllabic (in E nglish, e.g. come, go, p u t, take etc.). A lth o u g h I am n o t aw are o f any system atic research o f this phen om en on in o th er languages, it seems to be ra th e r universal (consider Polish p repo sitio ns, th e verb być, an d such prefix -tak in g verbs as brać, jeść, iść etc.).
A n o th e r kind o f linguistic device th a t reflects the m e ta p h o r M O R E O F F O R M IS M O R E O F C O N T E N T is iteration :
(1) H e talked an d talked and talked, m eans so m ething m o re th a n ju st
(2) H e talked.:
the longer tim e necessary to u tte r the fo rm er represents th e longer d u ra tio n o f the action. I f som eone thinks o f som ething fo r weeks an d w eeks, it seems long er th a n if he ju s t th o u g h t ab o u t it fo r weeks. M o re o f form m ay also ind icate m o re o f em otion al content: the extended len gth ening o f a vowel in
(3) N -o-o-o-o-o-o !
pro d u ces an u ttera n ce infinitely m o re expressive th a n sim ple N o ! A m o n g nu m ero u s literary exam ples, p erh ap s th e m o st fam o u s is G e rtru d e S tein’s A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.; the rep etitio n o f the w ord rose serves to intensify the im age; the flow er seems to be viewed from different angles, a n d sta n d s vividly befo re o u r eyes. Im p licit in a p o em by V lad im ir
M ay a k o v sk i (transi, by G erald F itzgerald; cit. in P o g g i o l i 1968) is the idea th a t th e “ greatness” o f po etry is p ro p o rtio n a l to th e n u m b e r o f elem ents available fo r com b inatio n:
(4) Shakespeare and Byron possessed 80,000 w ords in all; The future genius-poet shall in every m inute
Possess 80,000,000,000 words, squared.
T h is is certainly extending the m e ta p h o r beyond its re aso n ab le limits; b u t th a t is p oetic licence. A ra th e r sim ilar case o f m ag ical th in k in g , how ever, m ay be fam iliar to any teacher w hose stu d en ts p ro d u ce endless pages o f text d u rin g a test, h o p in g th a t w h at they have w ritten will m ak e m o re sense if there is m ore o f it.
P ro b ab ly m o st languages o f the w orld use the m o rp h o lo g ical device o f re d u p licatio n , i.e. the rep etitio n o f one or tw o syllables o f a w ord, o r o f th e w hole w ord . A s p ointed o u t by M o r a v c s i k [1978], the m ean in gs associated w ith (full or partial) reduplication strikingly recur across languages.
T h e m o st co m m on con cep t expressed by red up licative c o n stru c tio n s is th e co n cep t o f increased q u a n tity - eith er q u a n tity o f referents o r the a m o u n t o f em phasis.
T h e use o f n o u n re d u p lic a tio n to express p lu ra lity o f re fere n ts is exem plifiable by
M A N D A R IN : renren ‘every b o d y ’ (ren ‘m a n ’) [ C h a o 1968: 202] R ed u p licatio n o f verbs m ay express repeated o r co n tin u ed occurrence o f an event:
T Z E L T A L : p ik p ik ‘to u ch it lightly rep eated ly ’ (pik ‘to u c h it ligh tly ’); m ahm ah ‘fig h t’ (m ah ‘hit it’) [ B e r l i n 1963: 214]
R e d u p lic a tiv e /ite ra tiv e co n stru c tio n s are also o ften used to express in cre ased e m p h a sis (as M o r a v c s i k [1978: 301] observes, “in ten sity ap p e a rs related to q u a n tity in th a t it involves q u a n tity o f energy inv estm ent o r size o f effect” ):
(5) H e is very very bright.
T h e em p h atic m odifier, in E nglish as in m o st o th e r languages, ca n be redup licated open-endedly for ad d itio n al degrees o f em phasis (e.g. Polish: Bardzo, bardzo dziękuję.).
Predictably, increased m orphological com plexity reflects increased sem antic com plexity: e.g. th e p ositive, c o m p a ra tiv e , an d su p erla tiv e degrees o f adjectives show a g radual increase in length. W e sh ou ld observe, to o , th a t the longer a c o m p o u n d , the m o re com plex an d deep its in ten sio n , as in daughter vs. daughter-in-law.
M ark ed n ess, to o , is assum ed to be iconically m o tiv ated : gram m atical categories th a t are m ark e d m orphologically are also m ark e d sem antically.
A m o n g the n u m ero u s exam ples is th e case o f th e n o n -p resen t tense, the p reterite, d en o tin g an terio rity , i.e. the idea th a t th e n a rra te d event o ccurred a t som e tim e p rio r to the m o m en t o f speaking - th e (u n m ark ed ) present.
Incidentally, the m etap h o r M O R E O F F O R M IS M O R E O F C O N T E N T m ay also be seen to influence the w o rk o f som e visual artists. A n d y W a rh o l’s so u p cans or d o llar bills painted o r p rin ted in huge fo rm a t, repeated over an d over again in stereotyped series, im press th e viewer as h av in g m o re significance th a n ordinary-scale individual objects. Q u a n tity th u s becom es a new quality, as is also well k n o w n to advertising specialists.
T h e rela tio n sh ip betw een form and c o n te n t m ay also be observed in th e case o f w ritte n d isco u rse , w hich co m m o n ly c o n ta in s su b d iv isio n s depicting visually its c o n te n t stru ctu re. W ords are sep a rated by an em pty space, an d so are sentences. P a ra g rap h s m a rk th e ends o f episodes o r th o u g h ts. P o e try is d istin g u ish ed fo r th e eye from p ro se. T h is visual d istin ctio n is n o t a superficial one: th e b reak in g u p o f a line o f w ords in to sm aller units reflects th e p o e t’s m en tal focus o n relatively self-contained, sm all u n its o f experience.
W e m ight also n o te the difference in in te rp re ta tio n betw een (6a) M ary w ashed her h air., and
(6b) M a ry w et h er hair. She opened th e c u p b o a rd an d to o k o u t a b o ttle o f sh am p o o . She opened the b o ttle, applied a d ro p o f the sh am p o o to h er w et h air, and m assaged gently. She th en rinsed h er h air th o ro u g h ly , tow eled it d ry an d styled it as usual.
In b., the p ain stak in g d escription o f th e actio n (it uses nine actio n verbs to re p resen t th e sam e th in g as a., w hich uses o nly o n e verb ) iconically represents the painstakingn ess o f th e actions. P o s n e r [1986: 306] elevates such o b serv atio n s to the statu s o f a general principle, viz. “ th e degree o f painstakingness in th e p resen tatio n o f actio n conveys the degree o f p ainstakingness o f the actions p resen ted ” . W h a t is clearly h a p pening here, therefore, is again a tran sfer o f p ro p erties o f th e sign o n to th e designatum .
I w ould also like to suggest a possibly iconic m o tiv a tio n fo r such tau to lo g ic al co n stru c tio n s as
(7) M en are m en. (8) W a r is w ar., etc.
T h e sp atial sym m etry o f th e co n stru c tio n , o r th e id en tity o f th e tw o n o u n p h rases beginning an d ending the sentence, m ay be a linguistic reflection on the belief th a t the entities involved d o n o t change w ith th e passage o f tim e (reperesentcd here by the left-to -rig h t linearity o f the sentence).
In m an y cases, we m ig h t also p o stu late an iconic m o tiv a tio n fo r the re d u ctio n o f form . A s m u ch as H a i m a n [1983: 802] insists th a t “ red u ctio n
o f form is an E C O N O M IC A L L Y m o tiv ated index o f fam iliarity , n o t an iconically m o tiv a te d ind ex ” , I will argue th a t th e o p p o sitio n is a false one. I believe th a t th e eco n o m y o f expressio n ico nically reflects th e eco no m y o f atten tio n ; one does n o t spell o u t w h at is already k n o w n or u n im p o rta n t, as one does n o t give fam iliar objects in the visual d o m ain o n e ’s full a tten tio n . Linguistic reductions an d ellipsis only reflect a m uch m o re basic tendency in h u m an perception, one th a t m ay have survival v alu e (th e u n fa m iliar re q u ires m o re carefu l scru tin y , as it m a y m ean p o ten tial dang er). W c reduce the tim e spent on th e visual scann ing o f a fa m ilar o bject; since T H I N K I N G IS S E E IN G , we re d u ce th e tim e sp en t on co n tem p latin g a fam iliar concept; since tim e is spatialized, and langu age is conceptualized in spatial term s, this results in th e redu ction o f linguistic form .
3. ICONICITY OF SEQUENCE
O ne o f the m o st often cited cases o f iconicity is th a t o f isom o rp hism betw een the tem p o ral o rd e r o f events/experiences and the o rd e r o f clauses describing these events, as in th e classical “ I cam e, I saw, I c o n q u e re d ” . A n a rra tio n is iconic to the extent th a t events are reco u n ted in th e sequence in w hich they occurred.
It follow s from the principle o f tem p o ral sequence th a t the p referred, o r n a tu ra l, o rd e r o f clauses o f com plex sentences is th a t w ithin which the clau se th a t codes th e causal sta te /e v e n t p recedes th e o n e th a t codes re su lta n t state/event, and the clause th a t codes the co n d itio n precedes the o n e th a t codes its entaiim ent, as the given precedes the new.
T h e principle o f tem p o ral sequence is p ro b a b ly a universal, i.e. all languag es can and d o represent iconically the tem p o ral o rd e r o f events [cf. G r e e n b e r g 1966]. Still, there is a precisely o pposite, co m p etin g p rinciple w hich tells us to atten d first to the m o st salient event; this m ig h t be em otio n ally m o tiv ated . A stu d en t m ight tell a friend th a t she h ad failed h er exam , and then re co u n t the events th a t led up to it, such as e.g. a q u arrel w ith h er boyfriend.
A n o th e r strategy o f expression w here the o rd e r o f events is iconically reflected by th e tex t o rg an izatio n is the fro n tin g o f locative ad verb ials (T o the left o f the church, yo u can see a theatre...) co m m o n in g u id eb o o k s for th e obvious reason th a t a to u rist m u st be guided to a ce rtain place before he ca n be to ld w hat to lo o k at.
4. T H E IC O N IC R EPR E SE N T A T IO N O F D ISTA N CE
I f we co nsider the prevalence o f the conceptu al m e ta p h o r T H I N K IN G IS S E E IN G [cf. S w e e t s e r 1988, D a n e s i 1990], it is n o t su rp risin g th a t co n c ep tu al d istinctions are represented by m ean s o f linguistic-spatial d istin ctions. T h u s, e.g. the linguistic distance betw een expressions co rresp o n d s to th e co n ceptual distance betw een them .
G i v ô n [1985: 202] has p roposed a general cognitive principle th a t he nam ed P roxim ity Principle and form u lated as follows:
The closer together tw o concepts are semantically or functionally, the more likely they are to be put adjacent to each other lexically, m orpho-tactically or syntactically.
T h e principle predicts th e co-lexicalization o f p a rts o f a w hole, as well as the co-lexicalization o f d eriv atio n al affixes w ith th eir stem s, and adjacency betw een m odifiers and m odified w ord.
A s a p ain ter w ho w ants to p o rtra y a yellow flow er does n o t n orm ally sketch a colourless flow er on one p a rt o f his canvas an d p u t a blob o f yellow som ew here else, so in speech the m o st n atu ra l w ay to in dicate th a t a flow er is yellow is to p u t the w ords next to each o th er. A s a w ord has tw o sides, in som e languages it is possible to follow th e p ro x im ity principle w ith tw o adjectives (cf. F ren c h p e tit chat noir, P olish z lo ty ząb trzonow y). W here tw o o r m o re adjectives stan d in succession th ere is o ften a definite tendency to p u t certain adjectives closer to th e n o u n th a n o th e rs. T h e o rd e r o f a ttrib u tiv e ad jec tiv e s w as in v e stig a te d by P o s n e r [1986]. H e has observed th a t th e a ttrib u te stan d in g n ea rer to the head n o u n designates a p ro p e rty th a t changes less in objects o f the so rt referred to by th e head nou n. T h u s we have th e specification o f age before the specification o f sex fo r persons (a young fe m a le singer), and length o f h a ir before color (she has long blond hair); as reg ard s objects, in stan d ard situ atio n s the co lo r adjective is p referred n ea rer to the head n o u n th a n the form adjective (a round white table).
T h e P ro xim ity Principle is also a t w ork in blends, such as sm og, m otel, b ru n ch , w here the co m b in atio n o f tw o form s iconically rep resen ts th e c o m b in atio n o f th eir m eanings.
T h ere is a definite tendency to p u t o p e ra to rs close to th e o p eran d s. O ne case in p o in t is the placem ent o f th e negative m ark e r. B o th in o u r P olish exam ples an d in th eir English tran slatio n s, it is placed as close as possible to the elem ent being negated:
(9a) O n nie widział tego zdjęcia. ‘H e d id n ’t sec th a t p ictu re’.
(9b) O n w idział nie to zdjęcie. ‘I t w asn’t th at pictu re he saw ’. (9c) (T o) nie on w idział to zdjęcie.
‘I t w asn’t him w ho saw th a t p ictu re’.
In sentences which h ad und erg o n e negative tra n s p o rta tio n (placing the negative fu rth e r aw ay from the pred icate it logically negates), such as e.g. (10) M ary d o esn ’t think h e ’ll leave until to m o rro w .,
as against
(11) M a ry thin ks he w o n ’t leave until tom o rro w ., the force o f neg atio n is significantly w eaker.
C o o p e r a n d R o s s [1975] p o stu late a “ M e first” principle, w hich in essence is a n o b serv atio n th a t we tend to place first in expression the elem ents closer to o u r egos: therefore we say here and there ra th e r th a n * there and here; they ta lked about this and that, and n o t *.. about that and this; now and then ra th e r th a n *then and now. W e m ig h t sup pose th a t this principle is responsible fo r the fact th a t if we pu sh o ff th e expression o f o u r o p in io n to th e fa r end o f the sentence, as in
(12) W ell, I believe th a t’s right., as opposed to
(13) T h a t’s right.,
o u r in te rlo c u to r rightly assum es th a t we are distan cin g ourselves fro m w h a t we say, p erh ap s because we are still n o t sure w hat to thin k.
A n o th e r self-distancing device is using a longer descriptive p h ra se to refer to yourself, as in the present author thinks... as o p posed to I think... Such form s as e.g. We, queen o f England... serve sim ilar p u rp o se , th a t o f objectivization/self-distancing o f th e subject.
T h e linguistic category o f ca u satio n provides a n o th e r exam ple o f the iconic expression o f co nceptual distance. T h e co ncep tu al distance betw een cause and result co rresponds to the form al distance betw een cause an d result [cf. e.g. H a im a n 1983]. H ence the difference in m ean in g betw een 'cause to V I' an d l V2' (e.g. cause to die vs k ill in E nglish, eq uivalent expressions spowodować czyjąś śmierć vs zabić kogoś in Polish). T h e analytical co n stru c tio n , w here cause an d result are separated , suggests an absence o f physical c o n ta c t betw een the causer an d the causee; so m u ch so th a t you could only u n d ersta n d the sentence
(14) H e caused the sp o o n to bend, in c o n tra st to
(15) H e bent the spoon
as im plying th a t the p erson in questio n has m agical pow ers.
L ang u ag e is also able to express social distance iconically. E u ph em ism s an d form al expressions are nearly universally longer th an offensive fou r-letter w ords and colloquial ph rases (piss vs. urinate o r spend a penny).
H a i m a n [1983: 801] claim s th a t
[...] the verbosity or prolixity o f form al registers m ay be a verbal icon o f an envelope around the speaker’s actual message. The addressee is protected by this envelope from the speaker’s ideas in th e sam e way th a t he is protected by physical distance from other em anations o f a personality.
T o sum up, it seems th a t there is already q u ite a body o f evidence th a t iconic m o tiv a tio n plays an im p o rta n t role in shap in g th e form o f language. T his is fu rth e r p ro o f th a t linguistic coding is determ ined by o u r experience w ith reality, i.e. u ltim ately by the n atu re o f o u r p ercep tu al processes. I have p o in ted o u t earlier th a t h u m an percep tio n is p re d o m in a n tly visual. T h e iconicity o f language fu rth e r confirm s the im p o rtan ce o f o u r in tim ate re la tio n sh ip w ith space and its inescapable hold on o u r thinking.
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A lina K w iatkow ska
IK O N IC Z N O ŚĆ JĘZY K A
W artykule zebrano wiele przykładów n a to, że form a języka jest znacznie mniej arbitralna, niżby to wynikało z twierdzeń strukturalistów . Takie ogólne m etafory pojęciowe ja k M Y ŚL EN IE TO W ID Z E N IE , prow adzą do pojm owania treści w kategoriach form y, np. utożsam iania fizycznej wielkości kodu z jego inform acyjną zaw artością, fizycznej odległości między elementami kodu z odległością pojęciową, a naw et przestrzennego porządku elem entów kodu z czasowym porządkiem w ydarzeń (co umożliwia inna m etafora pojęciowa, CZAS T O PR ZE ST R ZE Ń ). Obserwacje te prow adzą do wniosku, że form a językow a jest ściśle związana z naszym postrzeganiem rzeczywistości, szczególnie za pom ocą zmysłu wzroku.
