The Classical Conception of Truth in the Light of Hegel's "Logic“

A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S ____________________ FOLIA PHILOSOPHICA 6. 198B___________________

Marek Kozłowski

THE CLASSICAL CONCEPTION OF TRUTH IN THE LIGHT OF HEGEL'S "LOGIC"

I n the i n t r o d u c t i o n to h i s "Phenomenology of S p i r i t " Hegel c h a r a c t e r i z e s t r u t h in a g e n e ra l way. Well-known are h i s form ula­ t i o n s in which he acknowledges t h a t t r u t h i s the whole and the p rocess of i t s own becoming. These f o r m u l a t i o n s , however, r e f e r to the g e n e ra l idea of t r u t h , to t r u t h as such, whereas we tend to d eal w ith p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p tio n s of t h i s id e a , e . g . w ith the c l a ­ s s i c a l or coherence co n c e p tio n of t r u t h . To e x p la in the meaning of the t h e s i s t h a t t r u t h i s the whole one has to a na lyz e the r e l a ­ t i o n between the g e n e ra l id ea of t r u t h and i t s p a r t i c u l a r concep­ t i o n s - the r e l a t i o n between the whole and i t s p a r t s . I t i s obvious t h a t no p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p tio n of t r u t h can a d e q u a te ly fo rm u la te the w h o l e t r u t h ; such a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p tio n f o rm u la te s on­ l y one of the p o s s i b l e a s p e c ts of t r u t h , but not i t s t o t a l i t y . Hegel m a in t a in s , too, t h a t t r u t h i s the p rocess of i t s own beco­ ming. Th is means t h a t the c l a s s i c a l co n c e p tio n of t r u t h in o n ly one of the s ta g e s in s e lf- d e v e lo p m e n t of the whole of t r u t h . S in c e t n i s p ro c e ss in l o g i c a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y a rra n g e d , the c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p tio n of t r u t h o c c u p ie s a p la c e w i t h i n i t , which i s n o t - a c c i - d e n t a l but determined by the ord e r of the p rocess i t s e l f . Hence, my task w i l l be to demonstrate the p la c e which in the whole of t r u t h i s occupied by i t s c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p ti o n . In o th e r words, I would l i k e to show how much o f the t o t a l i t y of t r u t h i s in c lu d e d in i t s c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p tio n .

To t h i s end, I w i l l r e f e r to H e g e l 's " S c i e n c e o f L o g i c " as a system of d i a l e c t i c f i g u r e s , each o f which induces through i t s i n t e r n a l development a s p e c i f i c m e t a p h y s ic a l s i t u a t i o n d e te rm in in g - on account o f i t s v e r y s p e c i f i c i t y - the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c way of u nd e rstan d in g t r u t h . In o t h e r words, p a r t i c u l a r f i g u r e s of He­ g e l i a n " L o g i c " , such as " b e i n g " , " e s s e n c e " , " c o n c e p t " , assume

such a m etap hysical s i t u a t i o n , in which a g iven - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o n ly of them - u nderstanding of t r u t h becames p o s s i b l e . This s t r u ­ c t u r e of H e g e l 's " L o g i c " makes i t im p o s s ib le to p o i n t to some a b s t r a c t , a b s o l u t e l y v a l i d c r i t e r i a a c c o rd in g to which both the c l a s s i c a l or any other,, p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p tio n o f t r u t h could be d e f i n i t e l y r e j e c t e d or acce p te d . The c r i t e r i o n which s i n g l e s out one of the c on ce p tions of t r u t h must be each time r e l a t i v i z e d to a m eta p h y s ic a l c o n t e x t; the change of the c o n tex t means a ls o the i n v a l i d a t i o n of the con cep tion of t r u t h connected w ith i t . And so, e . g . the c l a s s i c a l c e n c e p tio n of t r u t h i s a product of a g iv e n , a lr e a d y bygone, h i s t o r i c a l epoch; i t i s then a n e c e s sa ry sta g e in the development of the idea of t r u t h , although i t i s not the only sta g e in t h i s development. H e g e l 's task i s thus not to r e j e c t or acce p t any p a r t i c u l a r con cep tion of t r u t h , but to e x p l a i n the l o ­ g i c of the p ro c e ss , the c o n s t i t u e n t s of which are these concep­ t i o n s .

When the most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s of the c l a s s i c a l concep­ t i o n of t r u t h are r e c a l l e d , i t i s much e a s i e r to i d e n t i f y in He­ g e l ' s " S c i e n c e of L o g i c " the d i a l e c t i c f i g u r e which forms the me­ t a p h y s i c a l background of t h i s c o n c e p tio n . I t i s known t h a t these fe a t u r e s remain in h i s t o r i c a l con n ec tio n w ith the main assumptions of A r i s t o t l e ' s p h ilo s o p h y : "B a s in g on v a r i o u s p o i n t s , and esp e­ c i a l l y on those which can be found in the vork OeeAnima»-, one can c o n s t r u c t - a f t e r A r i s t o t l e - the f o l l o w i n g model of c o g n i t i o n : being a c t s as a<stimulus»-and .c re a t e s a im p re s sio n ; to the im pre­ s s io n t h in k in g i s added and then develop s i t s a c t i v i t y ; i t s r e a ­ ches back to the b eing , which in t h i s way from a pressumed o b j e c t of im pression changes i n t o the o b j e c t of t h i n k i n g and c o g n i t i o n ( c f . , e . g . Ge Anima, I I I . 0 ) . In t h i s way, A r i s t o t l e may a r r i v e , e . g . at such p r o p o s i t i o n : a l s o knowledge and im p ression a re c a l l e d measures of t h in g s f o r the same reason, s in c e i t i s through them t h a t we get to know something, whereas - in f a c t - they are not measures of t h in g s but are them selves measured by t h i n g s , Met. 1053 a 31. This p r o p o s i t i o n expresses two ways t o g e t h e r : from being to c o g n i t i o n and from c o g n i t i o n back to b e in g ; the f i r s t way i s , however, more im portant to h i m . . . And so, c o g n i t i o n ( i n the tenth book o f «=M e t a p h y s ic s » ) g e ts in c lu d e d as an example in the q u es tio n of measure; and then i t means t h a t knowledge i s measured w ith the cognized o b j e c t , 105 a 12". The c e r t a i n t y of t h i s c o g n i t i o n " d e ­ pends, of co u rse , on the r e c e p t i v e n e s s of t he senses.

•♦Since p e rc e p t io n i s n ot t r u e by i t s e l f , but th e re i s something beyond i t , something t h a t must e x i s t b e fo re any p e r c e p t io n ^ t h a t Í3 how i t i s fo rm u lated in the te n th book of « M e t a p h y s i c s » (1010 b 3 5 )" . The above q u o t a t io n s s e r v e as good i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the p h ix o s o p h ic a l premise o f the c l a s s i c a l con ce p tion of t r u t h , i . e . the acknowledgment of the f a c t t h a t being i s p r e v io u s to and in d e ­ pendent of our knowledge about i t ; and t h a t c o g n itio n , i s p a s s i v e . The s tim u lu s which begins the c o g n i t i o n comes from b e in g , whereas the p a s s iv e c h a r a c t e r of sensual r e c e p t i o n i s the b a s is of the v e r a c i t y of knowledge, i . e . of i t s correspondence w ith i t s o b j e c t . One a c c e p ts here being which e x i s t b e fo re c o g n i t i o n and which can be reached o n ly through c o g n i t i o n . I t means t h a t the c l a s s i c a l con­ c e p t i o n of t r u t h does not concern being whose d e te r m in a tio n s are s t i l l immediate; i . e . such being which i s the o b j e c t of H e g e l 's a n a l y s i s in the " l o g i c of b e in g " . Being which has s t i l l immediate d e te r m in a ti o n s i s o n ly i n t r o d u c t o r y , non-problem atic premise of t h a t c o n c e p tio n . Next, the p a s s i v e , r e c e p t i v e c h a r a c t e r of c o g n i­ t i o n tu rn s i t i n t o - as i f i t were - a moment of being i t s e l f ; know­ ledge would be here a way in which being r e v e a l s i t s e l f - i t s appearance, and not something u t t e r l y e x t e r n a l to the ’cognized o b j e c t . In A r i s t o t l e , c e r t a i n m e ta p h y s ic a l terms ( e . g . form) serve in the i n t e r e s t s of both l o g i c and p h y s i c s . "There i s then, on one hand, d e te rm in in g and l i m i t i n g of m a tter by s p a t i a l o b j e c t s , on the o t h e r , d e te rm in in g and l i m i t i n g of t h a t which i s v a r i e d in a l o g i c a l p r o c e s s " . The p a s s i v e c h a r a c t e r of c o g n i t i o n le a d s to the f a c t t h a t f r e e , s u b j e c t i v e , and p r o j e c t i n g t h i n k i n g - i . e . r e f l e ­ c t i o n e x t e r n a l to t h in g s - has no p la c e w i t h i n the c l a s s i c a l con­ c e p ti o n of t r u t h . Thus, the o b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n being-knowledge ex- lu d es any s u b j e c t i v i t y , which w ith o u t f r e e and undetermined by p a s s i v e r e c e p t io n t h i n k i n g , i s not p o s s i b l e . The c l a s s i c a l concep­

tio n of t r u t h does not concern " s u b j e c t i v e l o g i c " , e i t h e r , the one i impounded i n H e g e lia n " l o g i c of c o n c e p t " .

Having t h i s in mind, l e t us r e t u r n to H e g e l 's " L o g i c " to d is - l u v e r t h a t the m e ta p h y s ic a l background of the c l a s s i c a l co n ce p tio n i f t r u r - i t : че " l o g i c of e s s e n c e " , or b e t t e r : the problem of

t h e

r e l a t i o n between essence and appearance. In t h i s p a r t of " lo

-* 4. \ W‘ r f ł a r k i e w i с z, Układ p o ję ć w f i l o z o f i i A r y ­ s t o t e l e s a , Warszawa 1978, p. 34, 3 5.

g i c " , H egel, by Q iv in g h i s own i n t e r p i e t a t i o n of old c a t e g o r i e s , p re s e n ts the immanent developmąnt of the r e l a t i o n being-knowledge p resented above. The p r i n c i p l e of t h i s development i s " r e f l e ­ c t i o n " , or - as i t i s used in Hegel - " r e f l e c t i v e r e l a t i n g t o . . . ' “ . R e f l e c t i o n mediates between being (now: e s s e n t i a l b e in g ) and i t s d e te r m in a ti o n s . I t must be, however, r e f l e c t i o n not y e t corrup ted by the autonomous, " f r e e " s u b j e c t i v i t y : the essence as "th e r e ­ f l e c t i v e turn towards i t s e l f " corresponds to the appearance as " th e r e f l e c t i v e turn towards o t h e r n e s s " . Thus, " th e w o r ld - i n - i t - s e l f , which i s r e f l e c t i v e l y d i r e c t e d towards i t s e l f , corresponds to the world of appearances. The r e l a t i o n of "being-as-an-appea- rance to ' e s s e n t i a l b e in g " depends on the f a c t th a t "appearance p r e s e n ts what i s e s s e n t i a l , and what i s e s s e n t i a l e x i s t s in i t s ap p e ara nce ". The i d e n t i t y of what i s i n t r i n s i c (t h e e sse n ce ) and what i s e x t e r n a l ( t h e appearance) i s l a b e l l e d by Hegel as the c a ­ teg o ry of " r e a l i t y " . The task of the r e f l e c t i o n i s thus to e l u ­ c i d a t e the i n t e r n a l course of the development of " r e a l i t y " , and not to form u late a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h i s " r e a l i t y " . As a r e s u l t we can say t h a t the c l a s s i c a l con cep tion of t r u t h , seen in i t s proper m eta p h ysica l c o n t e x t, im p lie s the p u r e ly r e c e p t i v e way of a t t a i n i n g knowledge. Knowledge i s then the means of p a s s iv e a d a p ta tio n - s tim u la te d by e x t e r n a l impulses coming to i t from b eing , i t a r r i v e s a t e s s e n t i a l d e te rm in a tio n s of t h i s being and expresses them. Although t r u t h remains the aim of the development of knowledge, t h i s p u r s u it of t r u t h depens on m a in ta in in g the harmony between the e x t e r n a l and i n t r i n s i c by u n i l a t e r a l a d ap ta­ t io n of knowledge to being. H e g eľ s reason ing in " L o g i c " shows, however, t h a t t h i s p u re ly o b j e c t i v e development which t r i e s not to d is t u r b " r e a l i t y " n e c e s s a r i l y lead s to changes.

A d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n appears in the next p a r t of H e g e l's work, i . e . in the " l o g i c of c o n c e p t" , where the r e l a t i o n between su­ b j e c t nad o b je c t is being d is c u s s e d . The p o in t of d e p a rtu re here i s the concept in the form of s u b j e c t i v i t y , t h a t i s " s u b j e c t i v e t h in k in g , r e f l e c t i o n u t t e r l y e x t e r n a l to t h i n g s " . Hegel d is c u s s e s f i r s t the way s u b j e c t i v i t y f u n c t io n s , i . e . l o g i c in i t s t r a d i t i o ­ n a l , non-hegelian sense, connected w ith such c a t e g o r ie s as " j u d ­ gement", "sy lo g isin ' , e t c . The o p p o site of the concept in the form of s u b j e c t i v i t y i s o b j e c t i v i t y , which i s a ls o a form of the con­ c e p t. In o b j e c t i v i t y the i n t r i n s i c d i f f e r e n c e s of the concept are

o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e s . In t h i s way the concept lo s e s i t s s u b j e c t i ­ veness, which i t p r e v i o u s l y , in the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t in an immediate way. This s i t u a t i o n i s r e s o lv e d when the concept re- g a in s i t s su­ b j e c t i v e n e s s , i . e . "when i t reco gnizes i t s o b j e c t i v e world in i t s s u b j e c t i v i t y and i t s s u b j e c t i v i t y in t h i s o b j e c t i v e ' w o r ld " . So, Hegel s t a r t s here from s u b j e c t i v i t y , which i s then o b j e c t i v i - zed only to d is c o v e r in t h i s o b j e c t iv l+ y i t s own transformed su­ b j e c t ] v e n e s s ; o b j e c t i v i t y then becomes com patible w ith freedom. I t i s conspicuous t h a t the s i t u a t i o n p resented above forms the m eta p hysica l background f o r a con cep tion of t r u t h o th er than the c l a s s i c a l one. L e t us c a l l t h i s conception " a c t i v i s t " to emphasize the f a c t t h a t here the impulse which s t a r t s the s u b je c t - o b je c t r e ­ l a t i o n comes from s u b j e c t i v i t y . P a ra p h ra s in g A r i s t o t l e , one lo u ld say th a t i t i3 no lo nger the cognized o b je c t which i s now the mea­ sure fo r knowledge, but i t i s the knowledge i t s e l f t h a t is the measure fo r the cognized o b j e c t . The s u b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r of t h i s knowledge does not mean, however, i t s a r b i t r a r i n e s s . I t i s the i n t r i n s i c moment of a concept which i s the "so u l of o b j e c t i v e exi-’ s t e n c e " . The f a c ł th a t s u b j e c t i v i t y belongs to the concept d e te r s mines c e r t a i n sta n d a rd s of t h i n k i n g , a c c o rd in g to which the su ­ b j e c t has to r e f e r to o b j e c t - a t l e a s t in the s i t u a t i o n where i t r e a l i z e s i t s movement towards t r u t h . The s u b j e c t does not r e f e r here to b e in g , completed and d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t o " n a t u r a l " spe­ c i e s and ty p e s , but r a t h e r i t o b j e c t i v i z e s i t s s u b j e c t i v e n e s s , c o - c o n s t i t u t i n g and d e te rm in in g the o b j e c t s which surround i t . Hence, t r u t h which f i n d i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n in the r e l a t i o n between being and knowledge, must n e c e s s a r i l y be r e l a t i v i z e d to the a c t i ­ v i t y of the s u b j e c t ; the s u b j e c t - l e t us re p e a t - whose th in k in g i s determined by the sta n d a rd s which c o n d i t i o n the r e a l i z a t i o n of r a t i o n a l aims.

The d i f f e r e n c e between the two - p rese n ted above - c o n c e p tio n s of t r u t h , the c l a s s i c a l and the a c t i v i s t ones, i s thus e a s i l y ob­ se r v e d . I f both of them are concerned w ith the r e l a t i o n of c o n f o r ­ m ity between knowledge and b e in g , .then the m e ta p h y s ic a l c o n t e x t, d i f f e r e n t in each c a s e , makes the d i r e c t i o n of t h i s r e l a t i o n d i ­ f f e r e n t too. In the c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p tio n of t r u t h , the p a s s i v e and r e c e p t i v e c o g n i t i o n r e c e i v e s s t i m u l i coming to i t from b e in g , and t r i e s to r e f l e c t the " n a t u r a l " q u a l i t i e s o f being in the possibly most ex act way. In the a c t i v i s t c o n c e p ti o n , on the o th e r hand,

c o g n it io n gets " o b j e c t i v i z e d " in the o b je c t s which i t p r o j e c t s . In the former c a s e, knowledge-is a "ap p earan ce" of being , whereas in the l a t t e r , being i s the " o b j e c t " of knowledge. S in c e the c l a ­ s s i c a l con cep tion of t r u t h has i t s m eta p hysica l background in A- r i s t o t l e ' s work, one can d is c o v e r the h i s t o r i c a l asp ect of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e between the two concep tions in the prpblem known in mo­ dern thought as the "Copernicus r e v o l u t i o n " . The t h e o r e t i c a l r e ­ v o l u t i o n made by Copernicus exposes in the most s p e c t a c u l a r manner the a c t i v e fu n c tio n of the s u b je c t in c o g n it io n . S in c e then, no lo n g e r the p a s s iv e c l a s i f i c a t i o n of o b s e r v a t io n a l data but the v e ­ r i f i c a t i o n of the hypotheses put forward has become the o b l i g a t o r y way of reach ing genuine knowledge. The q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e be­ tween the co n tex t of the c l a s s i c a l and the a c t i v i s t c on cep tion of t r u t h has thus both h i s t o r i c a l and m eta p h y s ic a l meaning. The two c o n ce p tions fu n c tio n in d i f f e r e n t systems of c a t e g o r i e s : the c l a s s i ­ c a l con cep tion i s c l o s e l y connected w ith the r e l a t i o n of c o n fo rm i­ ty in the essence-appearance system, whereas the a c t i v i s t concep­ t io n is lin k e d w ith the r e l a t i o n of c o n fo rm ity in the subject-object system. However, a p a rt from the _I q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s between these two p a i r s of c a t e g o rie s ,' we can observe and p rob lem atiz e t h a t aspect of the idea of tr u th which c o n s t it u e s a necessary p r e ­ mise of the two c o n ce p tions analyzed above, i . e . the ve ry r e l a ­ t io n of c o n f o rm it y . The l a t t e r , both in the c l a s s i c a l con cep tion and in the a c t i v i s t one, appears o n ly in entanglem ent: the main problem of these con c e p tio n s .is not the r e l a t i o n i t s e l f , but these elements belonging to them between which i t takes p la c e . When we now pay a t t e n t i o n to the r e l a t i o n of c o n fo rm ity i t s e l f (due to which t r u t h can appear at a l l ) we express our b e l i e f t h a t p h ilo s o ­ p h i c a l a n a l y s i s should not be s a t i s f i e d w ith the p r e s e n t a t io n of

the two a l t e r n a t i v e co n ce p tio n s of t r u t h , and then w ith d e c la r i n g i t s e l f f o r one of them. I t should in s t e a d i d e n t i f y and d e s c r ib e the premise which enables the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ’ between the c l a s s i ­ c a l and a c t i v i s t c o n c e p tio n , i . e . the f u n c tio n in g of the r e l a t i o n of con fo rm ity i t s e l f .

I t has been s a id e a r l i e r t h a t the premise of the c l a s s i c a l con­ c e p tio n of t r u t h i s being , which does not have y e t any r e f l e c t i v e d e te r m in a ti o n s , i . e . being which has not y e t been form ulated in some knowledge d i f f e r e n t from i t . This v e ry being which h a s . imme­ d i a t e d e te rm in a tio n s i s d is cu s s ed by Hegel in the " l o g i c of b e ing "

- i . e . in the f i r s t p a r t of " S c ie n c e of l o g i c " . The r e l a t i o n b e t ­ ween being and i t s d e te rm in a tio n s i s i n a c c e s s i b l e to c o g n it io n , s in c e i t has a immediate c h a r a c t e r . The o b je c t of knowledge may be only mutual r e l a t i o n between the d e te r m in a tio n s of being; t h i s means something t h a t - a ccord in g to Hegel - i s " i n d i f f e r e n t and e x t e r n a l " to being. As a r e s u l t , the problem of such a being, which has immediate d e te r m in a tio n s , im p lie s n e c e s s a r i l y some o th er concep­ t io n of t r u t h , l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to the c l a s s i c a l one. As i t w i l l be demonstrated below, the l a t t e r is the coherence c o n c e p tio n . Mean­ w h i l e , I would l i k e to emphasize t h a t the immediate C <racter of the d e te rm in a tio n s of being i s r e s p o n s ib le f o r the f a c t t h a t they can m u tu a lly turn in to each o t h e r , e .g . " q u a n t i t y " in to " q u a l i t y " and v i c e v e r s a . What is more, the c a t e g o r i e s which determine of b e in g , cannot be opposed to i t - the problem of con fo rm ity between being and i s t d e te rm in a tio n s does not e x i s t h e re , s in c e something th a t immediately determines and expresses being cannot be "incompa­ t i b l e " w ith t h i s being. I n s t e a d , the r e l a t i o n between these mu­ t u a l l y c o n v e r t i b l e d e te r m in a tio n s is p rob le m atiz ed . H e g e l's argu ­ ment le a d s then to t h e i r s y n t h e s i s : " q u a l i t y " and " q u a n t i t y " become u n ite d in the c a te g o ry of "measure" . The whole argument develops as f o ll o w s : being in the s t a r t i n g p o in t i s a " q u a l i t y " . This de­ t e r m in a t io n i s then s u b la te d by the f a c t th a t i t becomes "one of many", i . e . a d e te r m in a tio n which i s no lo n g e r q u a l i t a t i v e - in o th er words, " q u a l i t y " turns i n t o " q u a n t i t y " which i s d e te rm in a ­ tio n " e x t e r n a l " to being . The t h i r d d e te r m in a tio n , i . e . "m easure", which u n it e s w it h in i t s e l f " q u a n t i t y " and " q u a l i t y " , i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s " e x t e r n a l i t y r e f e r i n g to i t s e l f " . In t h i s way, being f i n a l l y a t t a i n s i t s d e te r m in a tio n s not w it h in i t s e l f , but in something " e x t e r n a l and i n d i f f e r e n t " to i t - in "m easure". I t means t h a t the t r u t h of H e g elia n " L o g ic of b e ing " i s reached not in the con­ fo rm ity between being and i t s d e te r m in a tio n s , but in the mutual co n fo rm ity of these d e te r m in a tio n s which i s reached in "m easure". In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , a c l o s e r p r e s e n t a t io n of the way in which He­ gel develops the c a te g o ry of "measure" i s needed. In h is under­ s ta n d in g , the development of "measure" - as the co n n ectio n of qua­ l i t a t i v e and q u a n t i t a t i v e moments - should be p resented g e n e r a l l y as the c o n n ection of. the "mathematics of n a t u r e " w ith the " q u a l i ­ t i e s of n a t u r a l t h i n g s " . Hegel emphasizes the f a c t t h a t such a dem onstration of the e x is t e n c e o f "a p a r t i c u l a r co n n ection between

q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e moments, the c o n n ection r e s u l t i n g from' the n o tio n of c o n c rete o b j e c t , . belongs to p a r t i c u l a r s c i e n c e s " . In oth er words, examining the -truth of being which has immediate de­ te r m in a t io n s does not remain w it h i n the f i e l d of i n t e r e s t c h a r a ­ c t e r i s t i c of p h ilo s o p h y . According to Hegel, "measure" reaches most co m p le tely i t s q u a n t i t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r in the sphere of "me­ chanism" as the one in which "c o n c r e te c o r p o r a l i t y i s nothing more than a b s t r a c t m a tte r; what q u a l i f i e s here q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e of m atter i s in f a c t the q u a n t i t a t i v e moment". However, a lr e a d y in the sphere of " o r g a n ic n a t u r e " , where r e l a t i o n s between p a r t i ­ c u l a r lim bs of animal organism or the p r o p o r tio n s of human body are co n s id e re d , t h i s q u a n t i t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r of measure c h a r a c t e ­ r i s t i c of mechanics becomes u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . " N a t u r a l s c ie n c e s - w r i t e s Hegel - are s t i l l f a r away from a t t a i n i n g a t l e a s t a c e r t a i n i n s i g h t in to the interdependence between these v a lu e s and o rg a n ic f u n c tio n s on which they are u t t e r l y dependent". To a s t i l l l e s s extend does i t come to the development of "measure" in the realm of s p i r i t . Hegel demonstrates as an example how in the developed b ourgeois s o c i e t e s groups of i n d i v i d u a l s belonging to d i f f e r e n t p r o fe s s io n s remain in c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n to e a c h ^ it h e r , but t h i s r e l a t i o n cannot be d e sc rib e d in p u r e ly q u a n t i t a t i v e c a t e g o r i e s - as in mechanics. Also " i n the sphere of s p i r i t as such th e re are d i f f e r e n c e s concerning the i n t e n s i t y of c h a r a c t e r , the p o w e r of im a g in a tio n s , f e e l i n g s , id e a s e t c . , " y e t the q u a n t i ­ t a t i v e understanding of i n t e n s i t y or the power of im a g in a tio n i s - a ccord in g to Hegel - "m is ty and v o i d " . So, the t r u t h of H e g e l's " l o g i c of b e ing " r e a l i z e s i t s e l f in p a r t i c u l a r s c ie n c e s . These s c ie n c e s use as t h e i r model the sphere of "mechanism" where the q u a n t i t a t i v e approach to "c o n c r e te c o r p o r a l i t i e s " meets w ith l e a s t r e s i s t a n c e . V a rio u s terms from t h i s sphere, such as e . g . mass, d is t a n c e , tim e, w e ig h t, can be in t e r p r e t e d q u a n t i t a t i v e l y , without lo s in g - a t the same time - t h e i r q u a l i t a t i v e s p e c i f i c i t y . H e g e l's examples from anatomy, s o c io lo g y and psychology which I quoted above were to show t h a t these s c ie n c e s depart a lr e a d y from the "me­ c h a n i c a l ” model. They can p a r t i c i p a t e in the t r u t h of being which has o n ly immediate d e te r m in a tio n s on ly inasmuch as they reduce t h e i r systems of d e te r m in a tio n s to sim ple q u a n t i t a t i v e proportions - i . e . inasmuch as they a c h ie v e coherence w ith the p rim ary model. On the oth e r hand, the t r u t h of the "mechanism" sphere r e v e a l s

i t s e l f only in mutual con n ection s of a l l the d e te rm in a tio n s of t h i s sphere. The t r u t h of one d e te r m in a tio n cannot be s t a t e d , since the l a t t e r i s im mediately connected w ith what i s determined w it h i n i t . The v e r i f i c a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r d e te r m in a tio n can j e done only by r e l a t i n g i t to oth e r d e te r m in a tio n s . The coherence of the system of d e te r m in a tio n s s e rv e s as c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h ; the r u l e s of belonging to such a system are determined by the "mecha­ n i c a l “ model. I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s form of t r u t h cannot be ex­ pressed w i t h in the c l a s s i c a l or a c t i v i s t c o n c e p tio n . I th in k t h a t the coherence co n ce p tio n of t r u t h w i l l be i t s most adequate formu­ l a .

When we t r e a t " S c ie n c e of l o g i c " as the m eta p h y s ic a l s k e l e ­ ton of H e g elia n concept of t r u t h , we throw l i g h t on the g e n e ra l idea of t r u t h as the d i a l e c t i c whole, the p a r t s of which a re the th re e c o n ce p tions of t r u t h : coherence, c l a s s i c a l and a c t i v i s t . The n e g a t iv e c h a r a c t e r of t h i s whole r e s u l t s in the f a c t t h a t i t dc> s not a t a l l e x i s t o u t s id e i t s p a r t s ; i t becomes p r e s e n t , in s t e a d , in i t s p a r t s one a f t e r an o th e r. The s u c c e s io n , however, i s not a r b i t r a r y ; but determined by the dynamic l o g i c of the whole. When the H e g elia n concept of t r u t h i s p re s e n te d , i t i s not enough to say th a t w it h in i t t r u t h i s " t o t a l i t y " and "a p r o c e s s " ; one s t i l l has to e x p la in the s t r u c t u r e of t h i s " t o t a l i t y " , i . e . the order in which the stages of the process appear. Moreover, one cannot say t h a t t r u t h i s here i d e n t i c a l w ith the

l a 3 t

stage of t h i s " p r o c e s s " - as w it h in H e g e l's reason ing the u lt im a t e r e s u l t should be each time t r e a t e d to g e th e r w ith the way by which i t has been a c h ie v e d . So, to show th a t t r u t h i s a process means to show a l l the sta­ ges of t h i s process in l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l order t h a t i s proper to them. I have shown above how the c on n ection s between metaphy­ s i c a l s i t u a t i o n s p resented in d i f f e r e n t s e c t io n s of " L o g i c " and corresponding c o n c e p tio n s of t r u t h lead to the f a c t t h a t the order in which these s e c t io n s a r r i v e determ ines a t the same time the o r ­ der in which the corresp on d in g co n ce p tio n s appear. In agreement w ith H egel, we have here the l o g i c of b eing-essence-concept and, r e s p e c t i v e l y , c o h e r e n c e - c l a s s i c a l - a c t i v i s t c o n c e p tio n s of t r u t h . The aim form u lated a t the b e g in in g to p re s e n t the p la c e which - w i t h i n the whole of t r u t h - i s occupied by i t s c l a s s i c a l c on ce p tion has thus been reached. The sense o f t h i s c e n t r a l p

osi-t i o n of osi-the c l a s s i c a l con cep osi-tion of osi-t r u osi-t h can be e x p la in ed as f o ­ llo w s : The course of the development of the d i a l e c t i c whole i s , in H egel, a two-way one, s in c e i t belongs to the n atu re o f t h i s whole t h a t i t s going "beyond i t s e l f " ( i . e . going beyond the e- lement which on a g iv e n stage of the development re p r e s e n ts i t ) i s

done

by i t e going i n t o i t s e l f < B r in n e r u n g ). "As a r e s u l t , the a r ­ gument which develops immanehtly in " S c ie n c e of L o g i c " - each step which forwards the a n a l y s i s of the development of c a t e g o r ie s - at the same time moves us back deep i n t o whole, towards the more and more e s s e n t i a l dimensions of i t s e x is t e n c e . I t i s then u nderstand­ a b le t h a t t h i s reco rd of going deeper i n t o whole s t a r t s w ith the s e c t io n whose s t r u c t u r e d e te rm in e s, so to s a y, the most s u p e r f i ­ c i a l c on cep tion of t r u t h , i . e . the coherence one. The d i a l e c t i c of the e x t e r n a l and the i n t r i n s i c , which f o l lo w s , and the c l a s s i ­ c a l con cep tion of t r u t h which i s connected w ith i t , s e rv e s w it h in the whole as a b rid g e between the most e x t e r n a l and the deepest dimension, of whole; the t r u t h of the l a s t one i s c o n tain e d In i t s a c t i v i s t c o n c e p tio n .

C h a ir of Ph ilo so p h y U n i v e r s i t y of Łódź

Marek Kozłowski

KLASYCZNA KONCEPCJA PRAWDY W ŚW KTLE " L O G IK I" HEGLA

Ponieważ każda k s ię g a h e g lo w s k ie j " L o g i k i " p rz e d sta w ia t y l k o j e j w ła ś c iw y sposób p r z e ja w i a n i a s i ę b y tu , w ięc z ak ład a ona także - o k re ś lo n ą przez ten sposób p r z e j a w i a n i a s i ę bytu - c h a r a k t e r y ­ sty cz n ą w y kła d n ię prawdy. Niedowolna k o l e jn o ś ć poszczególn ych k s ią g o k r e ś la wtedy tak że porządek, w j a k i u k ła d a ją s i ę założone w n ic h w y kła d n ie prawdy. S k o re lo w a n ie k l a s y c z n e j i innych w ykładni prawdy z odpowiednimi księgami " L o g i k i " pozwala w ięc w yko rzystać porządek " L o g i k i " do odtw orzenia s t r u k t u r y c a ł o ś c i prawdy, tzn. także do o b j a ś n i e n i a m ie js c a , j a k i e k la s y c z n a w y k ła d n ia zajmuje zarówno w o b rę b ie c a ł o ś c i prawdy, j a k i wśród w ykład n i p o z o s ta ­ ł y c h .