Norbert Kasparek
In Quest of surrender: the November
Uprising Army During Capitulation
Talks of September 1831
Echa Przeszłości 12, 85-112
2011
Norbert Kasparek
IN QUEST OF SURRENDER. THE NOVEMBER
UPRISING ARMY DURING CAPITULATION TALKS
OF SEPTEMBER 1831
The November Uprising is generally associated with a series of rem arka ble victories and the courageous struggle put up by the small Kingdom of Poland against the powerful Russia. It featured the legendary battles of Stoczek, Olszynka Grochowska, Wawer and Iganie. The insurgents, among them Juliusz K onstanty Ordon, have been made immortal by Romantic poet ry. The main army participated in capitulation talks on several occasions. Chłopicki did not w ant the cause to end with a “defeat of Naples”, Skrzy necki was afraid th a t the uprising would follow the fate of the battle of Maciejowice, while Rybiński was terrified th a t the armed struggle would conclude with a “second battle of Radoszyce”. M ilitary defeat was not the only thing th a t concerned Polish generals. They were also intim idated by the possibility th a t their professional skills could be exposed to ridicule. Those fears were voiced in the final stage of the uprising, and they became intensi fied near the time of the battle of Warsaw (6-7 September 1831). In the disputes waged by Polish emigres abroad, capitulation talks were not recog nized as a tactical m aneuver for fighting the enemy. The attitude displayed by General Hieronim (Girolamo) Ramorino’s second corps was the only exception1 . The discussion surrounding the second corps was ruthless and uncompromising. Ramorino’s retre at was regarded as the direct cause of the
1 [S. B arzy k o w sk i], H isto ry a p o w s ta n ia listopadow ego sp is a n a p rz ez ..., ed. A e r [A. R zążew - ski], vol. 5, P o z n a ń 1884, p. 215. B a rzy k o w sk i e x p la in s t h a t th e co m m a n d er-in -ch ief a lw ay s h a d h ig h e r a u th o r ity th a n th e c h ie f o f staff. Cf. N. K a s p a re k , K o rp u s R a m o rin o a s z tu r m W arszaw y
(p ierw sza d e k a d a w rz eś n ia 1831 roku), in: O d F r a n c is zk a J ó ze fa do m a ły ch ojczyzn. T om p o św ię cony p a m ię c i Z b ig n ie w a F ra sa , ed. M. G órny, W rocław 2002, pp. 2 2 5 -2 3 5 ; N. K a sp a re k , P o w sta ń czy epilog, Ż o łn ierze listo p a d o w i w d n ia c h klę sk i i in te rn o w a n ia 1 8 3 1 -1 8 3 2 , O lsz ty n
defeat of Warsaw and the Polish army’s m arch to Prussia. The discussion had a somewhat cathartic effect.
The collapse of the National Government after the events of 15 August brought General J a n Krukowiecki to power2. His m ain aim was to continue the armed struggle. In mid August, the range of insurgent activity was limited to Warsaw and several regions bordering the Kingdom of Poland. The w ar required the formulation of new goals, and this was the purpose of the great w ar council th a t convened on 19 August. Most participants backed Prądzyński’s concept of splitting the arm y3. Members of the high command, J a n Krukowiecki, Tomasz Łubieński, Ignacy Prądzyński and Klemens Kołaczkowski, developed the concept by creating four separate command units for operations groups. General Kazimierz Małachowski was appointed deputy commander-in-chief4, and he was also placed in charge of the forces th a t had remained behind in Warsaw. The Cracow region was assigned to general Piotr Szembek from General Samuel Różycki’s corps. General To masz Łubieński took command over the u n it dispatched to the Płock region. Prądzyński hoped to assume control over the 4th and most populous corps of key operational significance, but this responsible task was ultim ately en trusted to a foreign officer, Girolamo Ramorino5.
Krukowiecki and Prądzyński looked to capitulation talks as their last resort, and they failed to protect the Polish capital, especially on the second day of the siege. During the siege of Warsaw, Russian commander Ivan Paskevich took the m ain th eater of insurgent operations by storm, capturing m ilitary factories, stocks of firearms, ammunition, pontoons and equipment th a t could no longer be replaced. Paskevich inflicted the final blow on the morale of Polish commanders, robbing them of the rem aining shreds of self confidence, instilling in them a hatred for their own government and the Sejm, and urging them to surrender. F u rth er m ilitary activity was out of the question. B ut one of the most im portant and still unresolved questions re mains. The Polish generals and the Russian envoy, the shrewd General Berg, came to an arrangem ent, and the fatal night of 7 to 8 September witnessed scenes to which Wacław Tokarz later referred to as “one of the darkest
2 M ich ał S w edorow ski’s u p co m in g d o c to ra l d is s e rta tio n d e liv e rs a fa s c in a tin g a cc o u n t of h is in v o lv e m en t in th e N o v em b er U p ris in g a n d th e e v e n ts o f 15 A u g u s t a n d 6 - 7 S ep tem b er. Cf. M. S w ędrow ski, K ru k o w ie c ki a w ybór S krzy n ec k ie g o n a w o d za naczelnego, M e ritu m , vol. 1, [O lsztyn] 2009, pp. 4 7 -6 8 .
3 W. W ęg liń sk i, R a d a W ojenna z d n ia 19 s ie rp n ia 1831 r. P ró b a a n a liz y za ło że ń i realizacji
przyjętego p la n u operacyjnego, “S tu d ia i M a te ria ły do H isto rii W ojskowości”, vol.18, 1972, p a r t 1,
pp. 1 4 6 -1 5 2 ; [K. F o rste r], P o w sta n ie n a ro d u polskiego w r. 1830-1831. R ys h isto ryczn y p o p a rty
p a p ie r a m i g en era ła hr. K rukow ieckiego p rze d o sta tn ieg o p re zesa R z ą d u N arodow ego, skreślił...,
p a r t 3: U rzędowe p a p iery g en era ła hr. K rukow ieckiego, p rz ek a za n e m i p rz e z sam ego generała,
a doręczone m i p r z e z jeg o sy n a A le k s a n d r a hr. K ru ko w ieckieg o , B e rlin 1873, pp. 9 7 -1 2 2 .
4 K ru k o w ie ck i re q u e s te d G e n e ra l P a c w ho firm ly re je c te d th e p roposal.
5 Cf. a n ex ce lle n t b io g ra p h y of Z. Z ach arew icz - R a m o rin o A n to n io G irolam o, in: P o lski
episodes of our history in the 19th century”6. The negotiations with Berg7 sealed the capitulation of Warsaw and, from the insurgents’ perspective, of the entire uprising. The la tter dilemma rem ains unresolved in historiogra phy, and although many attem pts have been made to answer this question, a unanimous solution has never surfaced. It rem ains unknown w hether by surrendering the Polish capital, Małachowski8 was signing an act of capitu lation for the entire army and, consequently, the uprising, or w hether his m ain intention was prevent bloodshed in Warsaw. This is a complex problem th a t still awaits its historian9. Władysław Zajewski wrote th a t the signed m ilitary convention had no political context. Some generals were of the opinion th a t Warsaw’s surrender was only a prelude to a general capitulation th a t “would take place in the coming days”10. This seemed to be General Małachowski’s m ain objective11. His orders for Ramorino’s and Różycki’s troops foreboded the concentration of the Polish army with the aim of sur rendering (Russian troops were to let through the regrouping Polish troops). These plans were completely inconsistent with the intentions of the National Government, Bonawentura Niemojowski and Sejm speaker Władysław Os- trowski12. Małachowski denied it in his later letters, b ut the nightm are of Polish troops th a t had been disintegrated upon their retre at from Warsaw was a good “excuse” for capitulation. The retre at to the district of P raga13 and to Modlin through Jabłonna was a flight in panic. Lt. Colonel Józef Paszkowski, a skilled officer who had fought in the w ar of 1831 (the last artillery commander in the Modlin fortress) wrote: “Not a single officer accompanied his soldiers on foot. Most infantry officers rode their horses.
6 W. T okarz, W ojna p o lsk o -ro sy jsk a 1830 i 1831, W a rsz a w a 1993, p. 528
7 T he R u s s ia n s la te r d e n ie d t h a t a n y a rra n g e m e n ts a n d n e g o tia tio n s h a d b e e n c o n d u cted w ith th e P oles. S h c h e rb a to v (K a m p a n ia p o ls k a k sięcia P a skiew icza ,, W a rsz a w a 1899) a rg u e d t h a t “a t r e a ty h a d n e v e r b e e n sig n e d w ith th e N a tio n a l G o v e rn m e n t o r K ru k o w ieck i”.
8 M ałach o w sk i w rote: “I w a s c u rse d w ith th e o b lig atio n to sig n a n d s e a l a p itifu l docu m e n t t h a t h a d b e e n d ra fte d by fo reig n e rs w h ils t I, h a v in g n o know led g e o f th e im p e d in g d isg race, fo u g h t a m id s t th e th u n d e r in g fire o f c an n o n s. B u t th e d eed h a d to b e done, a s to m y b e s t k n ow ledge, th e re w a s no o th e r re s c u e ” - [K. M ałach o w sk i], O p o w ia d a n ie d z ia ła ń w o jen
n y c h i w y p a d kó w z a s zły c h o d 1 s ie rp n ia do 10 w rz eś n ia 1831 roku, in: K o rp u s 2 p o ls k i w 1831 roku, o d 23 s ie rp n ia do 16 w rześn ia , czyli opisy d zia ła ń , ra d , m a rszó w , uw a g i, recenzje, rozkazy, odezw y, ed. W. Z w ierkow ski, P a r is 1844, pp. 3 8 -3 9 .
9 I t h a s b e e n ov erv iew ed by T. S trz e ż e k in h is o u ts ta n d in g w ork, e n title d O brona W a rsza
w y 6 - 7 w rz eś n ia 1831 roku, O lsz ty n 1996, pp. 2 1 3 -2 1 6 ; idem , W a rsza w a 1831, W a rsz a w a 1998,
pp. 1 4 7 -1 6 0 .
10 W. Z ajew ski, P o w sta n ie L isto p a d o w e 1 8 3 0-1831, W a rsz a w a 1998, p. 228.
11 M ałach o w sk i n e v e r m e n tio n e d th e m e e tin g w ith B erg in P r a g a w h e re a d ecisio n h a d b e e n m ad e to s u r r e n d e r th e d is tric t to th e R u ss ia n s.
12 J . D u tk iew icz w ro te (W ybór źró d eł do p o w s ta n ia listopadow ego, W rocław 1957, p. L II) “M ałach o w sk i w a s m e re ly a u th o riz e d to sig n th e c a p itu la tio n o f W arsaw ; th e w a r w a s to c o n tin u e ”.
13 P r a g a w a s s u rre n d e re d to th e R u s s ia n s to g e th e r w ith th e b rid g e, a n d th is fa ct se a le d W arsa w ’s tra g ic fa te . T h is so lu tio n h a d b e e n e n g in e e re d b y G e n e ra l K ru k o w ieck i, a n d a n y s im ila ritie s to th e w a r o f 1809 w e re only too obvious.
Soldiers who wanted to w ander off, did. Those who wanted to rem ain behind, were free to do so. Thousands of camp wagons followed every procession. W hat’s worse, morale was equally low during battle. Those who fought were volunteers, those who did not w ant to fight [were free to leave - N. K.], and the only punishm ent they could expect was a bad reputation”14. A nighttime
march is very dangerous, even for an experienced army, and it proved to be disastrous for the defeated ranks of various m ilitary formations. Upon reach ing Jabłonna on 8 September, General Małachowski ordered the concentra tion of Polish forces in the Modlin fortress. The army counted its losses. The infantry had lost 6471 men (since early September), the cavalry - 200 to 300 swords, and the artillery - 39 m en1 5. The generals who remained in Warsaw
(for various reasons, including wounds) were J a n Krukowiecki16, Ignacy
Prądzyński, Wojciech Chrzanowski, Andrzej Ruttie, Karol Turno (who had been taken ill), J a n Malletski (Mallet), Jakub Redel, Piotr Bontemps, Antoni D arew ski, S tanisław Rychłowski17 K onstanty Przebendow ski, Edw ard
Żółtowski and Izydor K rasiński18.
In Modlin, the inept but righteous General Małachowski resigned from the post of commander-in-chief. His decision enabled him to pull out of the deal with the Russians th a t had been made on 8 September. The army, in particular lower-ranking officers, were opposed to the capitulation agree m ent proposed by Małachowski19. The army was in need of a new and
energetic commander. Małachowski rightly concluded th a t the surrender of Warsaw had disqualified him as a leader. His ultim ate defeat was sealed not so much by the capitulation of the Polish capital, bu t by his meeting with generals N eihardt and Berg in Praga. It was after th a t m eeting th a t
14 [J. P aszk o w sk i], W ojna w Polsce ro k u 1831 p r z e z oficera p o lskieg o o p isa n a w ro k u 1832, L viv 1861, pp. 1 6 8 -1 6 9 .
15 P o lish L ib ra ry in P a r is (“P L P ”), m a n u s c rip t 397, D o c u m en ts o f th e P o lish A rm y H e a d q u a r te r s of 1831, vol. 11: P o lish a r tille r y files o f 1831, col. 251, 333, 437, 485, 863; B. N iem o- jo w sk i, O o sta tn ic h w y p a d k a c h rew olucji p o ls k ie j w o d p o w ied zi n a biografię je n e r a ła M acieja
R yb iń skieg o , P a r is 1833, ta b ; T. S trz eż e k , O brona..., pp. 2 2 2 -2 2 3 . T he “so ld iers k ille d ” co lu m n
in c a p ta in L a b a n o w sk i’s r e p o rt o f 9 S e p te m b e r fe a tu re s th e follow ing e n tr y m a rk e d a s “th e cam p in N ow y D w ór”: “2 n d lie u te n a n t O rd o n w a s o rd e re d to ta k e d u ty a t th e telescope; th e re h a s b e e n no f u r th e r n e w s from h im ”.
16 W. Z ajew sk i, K ru k o w ie c k i J a n , in: PSB , vol. 15, W ro cław -W arsz aw a-K rak ó w 1970, p. 395. O n th e second d a y of th e b a ttle o f W arsaw , K ru k o w ieck i d isp a tc h e d h is tro o p s to P ra g a . O n 7 S e p tem b e r, a ro u n d 8 p .m ., h e m e t w ith G e n e ra l M a łach o w sk i in th e c o u rty a rd o f N a m i e stn ik o w sk i P a lac e. M ałac h o w sk i d ism is se d h im on g ro u n d s o f tre a s o n , b u t K ru k o w ieck i h a d no in te n tio n s of lea v in g th e arm y. U m iń sk i th r e a te n e d to sho o t K ru k o w ieck i if h e diso b ey ed th e o rd e rs, w h ic h is w h y K ru k o w ie ck i re m a in e d in W arsaw .
17 Z. Z ach arew icz, R y c h ło w sk i S ta n is ła w , in: P S B , vol. 33, W rocław e t al. 1992, p. 394, R ychłow ski w a s se rio u sly w o u n d ed , b u t h e w a s one of th e few officers w h o h a d n o t re n ew e d h is o a th o f a llian ce.
18 Cf. M. T arczy ń sk i, G eneralicja p o w s ta n ia listo p a d o w eg o ,W a rsz a w a 1980, pp. 2 1 4 -2 2 5 ; R. D u ra n d , D epesze z p o w sta ń c ze j W arsza w y 1 8 3 0 -1 8 3 1 . R a p o rty k o n s u la fra n c u sk ie g o w K róle
stw ie P o lskim , tr a n s la te d b y R. B ielecki, W a rsz a w a 1980, p. 238
Małachowski decided to surrender the bridge and Praga, to free Russian prisoners20 and, in line with the act of capitulation, to march out to the Płock21 region with the second corps22. Bonaw entura Niemojowski, head of the National Government, convened a council of war in Modlin on the night of 9 to 10 September. The meeting was attended by staff commanders and officers, brigades and independent troops. The council was to select three candidates for commander-in-chief. The meeting was more of a raucous ses sion of a m ilitary sejmik. Niemojowski was shouted down by generals H en ryk Dembiński23 and Antoni Wroniecki24, he stepped down, and agreed th a t the candidates be directly voted on by the participants. Rybiński received 18 out of the 72 votes cast, General Józef Bem - 16, generals J a n Nepomucen Umiński, Dembiński and others received 1, 2 or 3 votes each. After a mo m ent of hesitation Rybiński stated th a t “there is but a small difference in the num ber of votes cast in favor of me and the next candidate; therefore, I wave m ilitary command on behalf of General Bem”. Bem concluded th a t he would be honored to serve under a m an in whom the participants had vested the greatest tru s t25. Before assum ing command, Rybiński once again inquired whether General Ramorino had received the orders to unite with the main army. Małachowski and General Jakub Lewiński confirmed, adding th a t a bridge was being built to enable the 2nd corps to cross the Bug River at a safe distance from the Russian-occupied Praga. The chief of staff said: “General Ramorino m ust have been seen on the road to Siedlce. He was ordered to arrive at Bug on the 10th, and he should have reached Kamieńczyk on the 11th. His adjutants should arrive any moment now”26. Rybiński assumed com mand after a debate on the state of the army and the enemy’s positions. He officially took control over the army on 10 September at 11:27 a.m.27 when he
20 K. Z ieliń sk i, W zięcie W arszaw y, d a lsze losy r z ą d u i a r m ii głów nej, in: W ypisy źródłow e
do h isto rii p o ls k i s z tu k i w ojennej, book 12: P o ls ka s z tu k a w o jen n a w la ta c h 1815-1831, eds.
W. L ew an d o w sk i, E . K ozłow ski, M. K rw aw icz, W a rsz a w a 1959, p. 375.
21 T h is is a re fe re n ce to th e in itia l “p ro p o sa ls” m ad e b y Dybicz a t th e b e g in n in g o f th e w ar. Dybicz h a d s u g g e ste d t h a t th e P o lish a rm y c o n c e n tra te its forces in th e P łock p rovince to expose W arsaw . P łock h a d th e w o rs t ro a d s in th e K ingdom o f P o la n d w h ic h sta lle d a ll m ilita ry o p e ratio n s .
22 T h e m a rc h w a s div id ed in to th e follow ing stag es: 8 S e p te m b e r - M odlin, 9 S e p tem b e r - C z erw iń s k , 10 S e p te m b e r - re p o se, 11 S e p te m b e r - B odzanów , 12 S e p te m b e r - P ło ck - W. T okarz, W ojna..., p. 529, footnote 97.
23 “A n d w h a t d id y o u do in W arsa w w h e n I fo u g h t in L ith u a n ia ? I w ill te ll y o u w h a t - you d ra n k , y o u a te a n d y o u re v e le d ”.
24 “D ow n w ith th e K a lisz cam p, do w n w ith L elew el a n d th e p a trio tic club. We d o n ’t w a n t th e S ejm or c iv ilia n a u th o r itie s .”
25 W. Z w ierkow ski, D z ia ła n ia w odza, r a d w ojennych, p a rla m e n ta rzy , p re ze sa r z ą d u i S e j
m u o d 8 w rz eś n ia do 4 p a ź d z ie r n ik a 1831 roku, P a r is 1843, pp. 6 -9 .
26 Ibidem , p. 9.
27 M ałach o w sk i (O p o w ia d a n ie..., p. 45) e rro n e o u sly n o ted : “on th e sa m e n ig h t, i.e. on 10 S e p tem b e r, G e n e ra l R y b iń sk i w a s a p p o in te d th e com m a n d er-in -ch ief, w h ils t som e claim t h a t th e electio n to o k place on 9 S e p te m b e r”.
was also promoted to the rank of division general28. His biographer, Stefan Przewalski, noted th a t “by th a t time, his character had been largely flawed, he was a disheartened man, susceptible to external influences, m arked by an absolute lack of initiative and flexibility. In most cases, he was an accurate judge of the situation, and he wanted to am algam ate all forces and incite them to fight, but he was unable to carry his plans through, thus further weakening the army’s morale”29. Lelewel wrote about Rybiński with sar casm: “as the commander-in-chief, he completed the campaign w ithout firing a single shot”30. Juliusz Falkowski, who participated in those events (wound ed in the defense campaign, he remained behind in Warsaw) and kept chro nicles towards the end of the uprising, wrote: “Rybiński was not born to be a hetm an”, but he did not blame him for the defeat because the army “had already lost its morale, and nobody wanted to listen to his orders”31.
Maciej Rybiński “inherited” the problem of Russian negotiations from his predecessors. Theodor (Fyodor) Berg, the skilful and devious Russian gener al, m et with the new commander-in-chief in Nowy Dwór in the presence of the head of the N ational Government. On 11 September, Rybiński an nounced to the soldiers: “Yesterday, Russian general Berg arrived in Nowy Dwór to propose changes in the distribution of the army. Having consulted the head of the government, I provided General Berg with a w ritten reply stating th a t we are ready to em bark on negotiations to restore peace in both nations provided th a t the proposed term s m aintain the honor and the inter ests of our country”32. Rybiński’s intentions became clear already during th a t first meeting, and he channeled all of his energy to negotiations with the Russians who were very well informed about the condition of the Polish army and were hoping to keep the Polish forces at bay in Modlin33. After the serious blow inflicted on the Russian army during the siege of Warsaw, every
28 A p p e al of th e N a tio n a l G o v e rn m e n t a n d R y b iń sk i’s o rd e rs ; Cf. C z a rto ry s k i L ib ra ry in C racow (“C z a rt. L .”), m a n u s c rip t 5312, “R ząd N arodow y. M isc e lla n e a e t a n n e x a 1831”. N e w s p a p e r clip p in g s, o rd e rs, le tte r s a n d m is c e lla n eo u s d o c u m e n ts, col. 386.
29 S. P rz e w a lsk i, G enerał M a c ie j R y b iń s k i o sta tn i w ó d z n a c ze ln y p o w s ta n ia listopadow ego
(17 8 4 -1 8 7 4 ), W rocław 1949, pp. 1 3 8 -1 3 9 .
30 [J. L elew el], P o ls k a o d ra d za ją c a się, czyli d zieje P o ls ki od ro k u 1795 p o to czn ie opow ie
d zia n e , p rzez ..., in: idem , H isto ria P o ls ki n o w o ży tn ej [D zieła, vol. 8], eds. J . D u tkiew icz,
M .H . S e ra js k i, H . W ięckow ska, W a rsz a w a 1961, p. 160; Z. F ra s , N. K a s p a re k , W stęp, in: [M. R ybiński], M oje p r z y p o m n ie n ia od u ro d zen ia . P a m ię tn ik i ... osta tn ieg o w o d za naczelnego
p o w s ta n ia listopadow ego, e d s. Z. F r a s a n d N . K a s p a re k , W rocław 1993, pp. 25, 39. R y b iń sk i
r e to rte d by c allin g h im “a n in te lle c tu a l e u n u c h ”, “a p o litic a l e u n u c h ”, “a m a n of a foul h e a r t ” “w ho is d isg ra ce d b y h is ow n s tu p id ity ” a n d w ho h a d “e n te re d in to a m o ra l b ro th e rh o o d w ith P o la n d ’s e n e m ie s”, a “c a le n d a r h is to r ia n w ho is good for n o th in g b u t co llectin g d a te s ”.
31 [J. F alk o w sk i], W sp o m n ie n ia z ro k u 1848 i 1849 p r z e z a u to ra “O brazów z ży c ia k ilk u
o sta tn ic h p o k o le ń w P olsce”, P o z n a ń 1879, p. 166.
32 B. C z a rt., m a n u s c rip t 5312, col. 387; L ib ra ry of th e P o lish A cadem y o f S ciences in K ó rn ik (“K ó rn ik L.”), m a n u s c rip t 1548, col. 272
33 P u z y n a (O sso lin eu m , m a n u s c rip t 16159, k . 133) m ad e a few a c c u ra te r e m a r k s w h e n w ritin g a b o u t th e “a lleg ed co n n ec tio n s”.
m ilitary maneuver spelled danger. This explains the Russians’ willingness to enter into peace talks which, starting on 13 September, were conducted by General Franciszek Morawski on Rybiński’s behalf. The Polish side dictated the following term s of capitulation:
“1. The Płock province and the Modlin fortress will be evacuated by our forces by .... Em bankm ent artillery will rem ain in the fortress, and all fortifi cations will be m aintained in the same condition.
2. The Polish army will occupy the provinces of Cracow, Sandomierz and Lublin.
3. The Kalisz province will not be occupied by the Polish army, b u t the army will be entitled to all kinds of resources found therein.
4. The p art of the Podlasie province adjacent to the Lublin province, with the width of 25 versts34, will not be occupied by either army”.
5. The garrison in Modlin will unite with its army.
6. The itineraries of Polish and Russian troops marching to their points of destination will be indicated in the armistice agreement.
7. During the march, R ussian guards will not approach the Polish army at a distance closer th an 30 versts. The only exception will be the Łowicz35 garrison which will transfer 5,000 infantry soldiers.
8. After four weeks, both parties may resume hostilities upon six days’ notice”36.
For the Russians, it was clear th a t the Poles were attem pting to am alga m ate their forces. The deployment of the army to the south was an attem pt to join forces with Różycki, Ramorino and the reserve. It would have been naive to believe th a t Paskevich would opt for this solution after the defeat of Warsaw. Polish officers continued to move back and forth between Modlin and Warsaw, and they could have informed Paskevich about the slacking discipline in the Polish army. General Berg formally consented to the term s dictated by Poland with a num ber of minor adjustm ents. He refused to acknowledge th a t the suspension of m ilitary activity (that had been en forced) were to be the first step to peace. The Russian general opposed the use of this phrase. “This is not a war between two nations, b u t an uprising against a legal monarch. Therefore, our aim is not to m ake peace, but to reinstate order in a rebellious country”37, said Berg. The R ussians w ant ed to prolong the discussion to lock Polish troops in Modlin, deprive them of initiative and keep them motionless. Paskevich could not afford to in iti
34 1 v e r s t -1 0 6 6 .8 m .
35 Łowicz w a s s itu a te d on th e le ft b a n k o f th e riv er. I t h a d s e a te d th e R u s s ia n h e a d q u a r te r s a n d larg e h o sp itals.
36 [K. K ołaczkow ski], W sp o m n ie n ia je n e ra ła ..., vol. 5, K ra k ó w 1901, p. 143; W. Zw ierkow - ski, D zia ła n ia ..., pp. 3 5 -3 6 ; [S. B arzy k o w sk i], H istorya..., vol. 5, pp. 3 4 4 -3 4 6 .
37 [J. L ew iń sk i], J e n e ra ła ... p a m ię tn ik i z 1831 roku, p u b lis h e d by K. K ozłow ski, P o z n a ń 1895, p. 128.
ate more drastic measures due to the losses sustained during the siege of Warsaw38.
On 12 September, the retreating captain Kowalski reported to Rybiński on the situation of the 2nd corps and General Ramorino’s insubordination. Although Rybiński attem pted to conceal the news from the army, the word quickly spread. The Sejm had been removed from Modlin, and it convened in the Capuchin F riars’ church in Zakroczym. Initially, it comprised eight sena tors and 70 deputies. Stanisław Barzykowski gave a highly accurate account of the negotiations process: “a t a time m arked by the futile wander of the army, the Sejm, despite clear evidence of its dedication, had to lose its importance... In Modlin and Zakroczym, the Sejm ceased to be the highest authority”39. General Klemens Kołaczkowski noted: “the national represen tation had no intentions of sanctioning the surrender”40. All redundant offic ers, in particular those who held radical views and were fiercely opposed to capitulation, were removed from the fortress by Rybiński. His efforts re ceived partial recognition. Captain Józef Puzyna, who had reached Modlin from Łubieński’s corps, wrote in his dairy (which he continued to keep in the following years) about members of the patriotic club who “stirred anarchy. They claimed th a t they did not need street lamps to hang prisoners in Modlin. Szynglarski, Pułaski and others were locked in the casemates during the period of recollection”41. Rybiński gave out a num ber of orders to disci pline the army, reduce the num ber of vehicles, carriages and prevent w aste ful use of ammunition42. His aim was to facilitate the talks with the Rus sians and prepare the army for the ultim ate pact with the tsar. Meanwhile, Ramorino’s march towards the A ustrian border weakened Poland’s bargain ing power. The Russians did not sleep when the Polish army remained idle. On 16 September, Berg commissioned Morawski to present the Polish army with a new set of terms. Paskevich refused to evacuate the Lublin province and could only be persuaded to preserve the “m ilitary route” to the fortress in Zamość. Negotiations were still in progress in Nowy Dwór when the final decision had been made in the south on 17 September.
In consequence of Poland’s compliance with the provisions of the capitu lation act, the Russians regained the route to Brest, and they began to surround Rybiński’s army in Modlin. Russian forces outnum bered Polish troops. On 18 September, General Berg told the Poles th a t negotiations with the Polish army were futile because the commander-in-chief could be re placed by civilian authorities a t any moment. The Paskevich-Berg duo were
38 T. S trz e ż e k (O bro n a W arszaw y..., p. 222) c la im s t h a t som e 1 4 ,0 0 0 -1 6 ,0 0 0 h a d b e e n k illed .
39 [S. B arzy k o w sk i], H isto rya ..., vol. 5, p. 349. 40 [ K K ołaczkow ski], W sp o m n ien ia ..., vol. 5, p. 134.
41 O ssolineum , m a n u s c rip t 16159, col. 132. A n o th e r p riso n e r confined to th e c a s em ate s w as d r J a n B ra w ac k i w ho w a s la te r d e n ie d a n y h e lp in P ru s s ia , cf. BPP, m a n u s c rip t 754, col. 141.
hoping to move the Sejm away from Modlin. They were also aw aiting the news of Ramorino’s ultim ate defeat. Niemojowski was fuelling the resistance of Polish officers who were keen to surrender. The Polish camp was still deluded by the hope of a union between Ramorino’s and Różycki’s43 troops.
The Russians were aware th a t unpredictable events could obstruct the reso lution of the conflict in the south. On 19 September, Rybiński began cam paigning for a partial cession of Niemojowski’s powers, but his efforts met with resistance. The fear of a coup d’e ta t convinced the deputies and the National Government th a t evacuation should proceed in the direction of Płock4 4. They were tacitly hoping th a t the Polish troops marching from Płock
along the Prussian border would make their way to the Cracow region4 5.
Already a t the time of the battle of Grochów, there had been plans to con vene the Sejm with a reduced composition, further south in Miechów. On 18-19 September, Rybiński realized th a t capitulation was unavoidable, but an absolute surrender was not an option. After the Sejm had ended its session, Rybiński told Berg th a t absolute power now rested in his hands, which was an obvious m isinterpretation of facts4 6. Berg did not respond, and
he left Nowy Dwór where the negotiations had been taking place4 7. The
Russians formulated new demands on 20 September after Ramorino’s troops had marched out to Galicia. Already on 19 September, the Poles were debat ing on dispatching a p art of their forces to Płock under the command of the energetic and restless General Dembiński4 8. The order was given on 20
September, and the troops set out on the night of 21 to 22 September4 9. On
20 September, Rybiński decided to move away from Warsaw and vacate Modlin which had been previously reinforced with m ain army troops. Gener als Franciszek Czarnomski, Franciszek Młokosiewicz, Antoni Pawłowski, To masz Łubieński5 0, Teodor Szydłowski51 and Józef Załuski resigned their
43 I a m u n d e r th e im p re ss io n t h a t th e co m b at a b ility of R óżycki’s co rp s w a s o v e rra ted . 44 Cf. W. R ostocki, W ła d za w o d zó w n a c ze ln y ch w p o w s ta n iu lis to p a d o w y m ( S tu d iu m histo-
rycznopraw ne), W rocław 1955, pp. 1 7 8 -1 7 9 .
45 A. O stro w sk i, P a m ię tn ik z czasów p o w s ta n ia listopadow ego, p u b lis h e d b y K. R ostocki a n d W. R ostocki, W ro cław -W arszaw a-K rak ó w 1961, pp. 4 5 1 -4 5 2 .
46 “T h e S ejm a n d th e g o v e rn m e n t h a d lo st t h e ir a u th o rity , a n d now th e sole p o w er re s ts in th e h a n d s o f th e C o m m a n d er-in -C h ief”.
47 W. T okarz, W ojna..., sp. 534.
48 J u liu s z F a lk o w sk i (U p a d ek p o w s ta n ia p o lskieg o 1831 roku. R ys h isto ry czn o -p a m iętn iko - w y ...P o z n a ń 1881, p. 308) w ro te t h a t th e im p ra c tic a l a n d in e p t D e m b iń s k i w h o h e a d e d a n a rm y of 50,000 m e n “w ould ta k e a n y a ctio n only w h e n o th e rs h a v e lo st t h e ir h e a d s , w h e n h o rrib le d ifficu lties h a d m o u n te d ”. I n h is sc a th in g (a n d fa c tu a lly in co rre ct) a cco u n t, R y b iń sk i w ro te t h a t D em b iń sk i le ft M odlin a lre a d y on 15 S e p te m b e r a n d s p e n t th e r e s t of th e tim e in Płock. H e did n o t cro ss th e V is tu la “b e ca u se th e w a te r w a s too cold”.
49 B PP, m a n u s c rip t 397, col. 20.
50 R. Ł u b ie ń sk i, G enerał T o m a sz P o m ia n h ra b ia Ł u b ie ń sk i, vol. 2, W a rsz a w a 1899, pp. 84, 87 - w a s do w n w ith ty p h o id in th e M odlin fo rtre ss . H e w a s officially d ism is se d by th e o rd e rs of 28 S ep tem b er.
51 O n ly officially - h e h a d left th e a rm y a lr e a d y before th e siege o f W a rsa w a s a r e s u lt of K ru k o w ieck i’s a lle g a tio n s t h a t h e h a d s u p p o rte d S k rzy n eck i.
posts in Modlin. In a letter to General Morawski, the commander-in-chief urged him to make concessions, especially th a t the news of Ramorino’s de feat had already reached the Polish camp. On 22 September, Polish troops reached Słupno where they rendezvoused with General Franciszek Moraw ski carrying new Russian demands:
- “Absolute surrender to the constitutional king;
- A delegation will be dispatched to the Emperor and the king; - The army will rem ain stationed in the Płock province; - Modlin will be surrendered immediately”.
General Berg, who had been clearly informed of the attem pted offensive, threatened in Paskevich’s name th a t “every general and every commander attem pting to cross the Vistula and initiating hostile action would be pro scribed”5 2. This was an actual ultim atum , and the Poles were ready to accept
it. Rybiński and his chief of staff, General Jakub Lewiński, were devastated by Ramorino’s defeat5 3, and most commanders, not only those who had
remained tacit, were keen on ending the war. Rybiński halted the march across the Vistula River and instructed Dembiński, who was in the vanguard of the troops approaching Gąbin on the left bank of the Vistula, to retre at to the sconce near the bridge.
Rybiński called a council of war in Słupno a t 7 a.m. on 23 September. It was the first of the three great councils th a t convened under his command. In Słupno, the participants were to debate on a formal surrender to Russian demands. The meeting, which greatly resembled the boisterous councils in Ramorino’s corps, was attended by 40 to 43 officers who huddled in a small room. M inutes were not officially taken. The majority of participants were infantry officers, not always regim ent commanders. The artillery, which had dem onstrated very high morale, was represented only by its commander, General Bem5 4. Several commanding cavalry officers also attended. Generals
Małachowski, Ludwik Pac, Stanisław Wojczyński and Tadeusz Suchorzewski held no command, and although not formally invited, they arrived at the council. General Dembiński, an advocate of continuing the war, did not participate on account of the inability to vacate his post in the vanguard. Bonawentura Niemojowski, head of the National Government, attended the meeting although he had not been formally invited5 5. General Rybiński was
52 W. Z w ierkow ski, D z ia ła n ia ... , p. 59.
53 J . Bem, O p o w sta n iu n a rodow ym w Polsce, ed. E. Kozłowski, W arszaw a 1956, pp. 157-159;
K o rp u s 2 p o lsk i..., pp. 5 7 -5 9 - M a łac h o w sk i’s re p o rt; [J. L ew iń sk i], Jen e ra ła ..., pp. 1 2 8 -1 3 1
- d u e to h is u n c le a r role, h e cite s th e w ro n g chronology of e v en ts.
54 Cf.: N . K a s p a re k , A r m ia p o ls k a p o u p a d k u W arsza w y w 1831 roku. R o la gen. B e m a , in:
C ień G enerała J ó ze fa B em a . W 150. rocznicę śm ierci, a collection o f p a p e rs , eds. N. K a s p a -re k
a n d W. B. Ł ach , W ęgorzew o 2000, pp. 4 9 -6 8 .
55 B a rzy k o w sk i (H istorya..., vol. 5, p. 360) c la im s t h a t N iem ojow ski h a d le a rn e d a b o u t th e council a n d th e f irs t p a r t of th e vote from voivod A n to n i O stro w sk i, a n d h e a rriv e d in S łu p n o only a f te r th a t. B lin d e d b y h a tr e d , R y b iń sk i w ro te t h a t N iem ojow ski “h a d p u s h e d h is w ay th ro u g h th e crow d” in th e m e e tin g room .
restrained in nature, and he rarely spoke during the council. He put up the following problem for debate: “w hether crossing the Vistula and prolonging the fight held any promise of a positive outcome”. The discussion was domi nated by those who opposed capitulation. Loud argum ents were incited by General Lewiński, quarterm aster Lt. Marcin Klemensowski and deputy head of the National Government General Karol Zieliński. The head of govern m ent argued in favor of a continued m ilitary struggle, b ut he had left the room before the formal vote. H istorians cite various results of the vote. According to some reports, from the total num ber of 43 votes cast, generals Pac, Małachowski, Wojczyński, Umiński, Bem, Em ilian Węgierski and Lt. Col. Mikołaj Kamieński (commander of the 7th uhlan regiment) voted in favor of continuing the war. Some historians also placed General Stefan Ziemięcki in this group. Lt. Col. Bazyli Lewiński (2nd regim ent of Krakusi cavalry) supported the plan to cross the Vistula (and continue the fight), but he abstained from voting. A clear voting p attern emerged: nearly all propo nents of a continued w ar effort had never served in Constantine’s army56. 36 votes were cast in favor of accepting Russian proposals. Rybiński’s po sition was am biguous, and he sym pathized w ith G eneral Miller, the Skarżyński brothers, generals Wąsowicz and Jagm in who loudly argued in favor of surrender. Years after the council in Słupno, Rybiński wrote in his dairy: “We did everything in our power to bring about a peaceful resolution, and now, only death can save our honor”57. But those declarations were made much later. The act of capitulation, announced nearly two weeks earlier, was voted through in Słupno! The council appointed a delegation to the tsar which comprised pre-uprising generals: Henryk Milberg, Franciszek Moraw ski and Kazimierz Dziekoński. The council’s decision to surrender came as shocking news, especially for the head of the government. Niemojowski convened the last Sejm session in the 19th century. It opened w ith private debates to lay down further course of action. Around 2 p.m., 35 members of both houses58 arrived a t Płock’s city hall. They accounted for the so called small quorum which was legally allowed. Niemojowski resigned his office to dism iss the commander-in-chief. The Sejm, presided over by Speaker Władysław Ostrowski, had to adopt “a decision concerning the Com m ander-in-Chief’. Both functions were entrusted to General J a n Nepomucen U miński59 who had filed his resignation and left for Płock after the Słupsk council. Despite the exerted pressure, Umiński declined the nomination for the government leader, arguing th a t he could not accept a function th a t had
56 B a se d o n W . Z w ierkow ski, D z ia ła n ia ..., pp. 5 9 -6 9 ; [J. N. U m iń sk i], J e n e ra ła ... k ilk a
słow o za szłych w yp a d ka ch w S lu p n ie i P locku w d n iu 2 3 w rześnia 1831. B ru k se la 1843 , pp. 11-15;
M. T arczy ń sk i, G en era licja ..., p. 222; N. K a s p a re k , P o w sta ń czy epilog..., pp. 1 8 7 -1 9 3 . 57 [M. R ybiński], M oje p rz y p o m n ie n ia ..., p. 27.
58 In c lu d in g tw o s e n a to rs . M o st o f th e m re p re s e n te d th e T ak e n L a n d s , a n d R y b iń sk i r e fe rre d to th e m a s d e p u tie s “w ho h a d b e e n e lected in W arsa w ’s ta v e r n s ”.
rem a in ed b eyond h is capability. A s a r e su lt, N iem o jo w sk i w a s r e in sta te d to power. U m iń sk i, a n e n e r g e tic d iv isio n com m an d er and a fe rv en t op p o n en t of ca p itu la tio n , did n o t enjoy a h ig h r e p u ta tio n a m on g h is con tem p oraries. H is la ck o f concern for th e so ld iers w h o se liv e s h e h a d en d a n g ered in Liw, h is u n sk ille d com m an d in th e b a ttle o f W arsaw an d h is w e ll-d eserv ed rep u ta tio n o f a gam b ler p rom p ted som e troop s to d isob ey h im . D u rin g th e S ejm se ssio n , U m iń sk i a n n ou n ced th a t a ll d iv isio n and reg im e n t com m an d ers v o tin g in favor o f su rren d er w ou ld be rem oved from com m and “w hich should be v ested in th e han d s o f eager and en th u sia stic m en ”60. G eneral B em m ade a sim ilar appeal before parliam entary deputies. W hen th e n ew s on th e replacem ent o f the com m ander-in-chief had unofficially reached Słupno, G eneral W roniecki w as appointed th e warlord o f Płock, and h e w a s dispatched to th e city w ith colonel B reań sk i’s guards. B reań sk i had b een in stru cted to restore order in Płock61. A court-m artial headed by G eneral W roniecki p assed a default ju d gm en t on Col. A ntoni S zym ański, F r a n cisze k W iśn iow sk i, Lt. Col. J a n A dam W yszkow ski, c a p ta in S zylick i, 2 nd Lt. B iłock i (?)62 and fa th er S zy n g la r sk i63 “d ep rivin g th e m of th e ir m ilita r y ra n k s, honors and se n ten cin g th em to d ea th ” for in v a d in g h is h ead q u arters and “conspiring to a ssa ssin a te th e C om m an d er-in -C h ief’.
U m iń sk i s e t o u t on a n in sp e c tio n o f th e army. H e b e g a n h is tou r w ith G en eral A m broży S k a r ży ń sk i’s ca v a lry r eg im e n t th a t h ad b e e n sta tio n e d in th e g r e a te s t proxim ity. D e sp ite th e relu c ta n c e e x p r e sse d b y G en eral W ąsow icz and C olonel W ojciech Ł ączk ow sk i, com m an d er o f th e 4 th u h la n reg im en t, U m iń sk i in s tille d in th e so ld iers a n e n th u s ia s m for c r o ssin g th e V istu la . G en era l S k a rż y ń sk i, w ho h a d b e e n rev iled by th e so ld iers for h is a ttitu d e in S łu p n o, declared h is r e a d in e ss to obey U m iń sk i’s orders. T he 1st and 5th lig h t ca v a lry re g im e n ts o f K azim ierz S k a r ż y ń sk i’s d iv isio n g ave U m iń sk i le s s th a n a n e n th u s ia s tic w elcom e, b u t th e r e m a in in g tw o r e g i m e n ts (10 th u h la n r eg im e n t and 3rd lig h t ca v a lry reg im en t) g r eeted h im w ith ardor. A lth o u g h R yb iń sk i p la cid ly a ccep ted th e S ejm ’s d ecisio n 64 to deprive h im o f m ilita r y com m and, h ig h e r-ra n k in g in fa n tr y officers b eg a n to rebel a g a in st th e n ew leader. N ig h t w a s d raw in g near, and U m iń sk i did n ot m an a g e to v is it th e in fa n tr y w h ich ou tn u m b ered th e r e m a in in g d ivision s. Its officers
60 [J. N. U m iń sk i], J e n e r a ła ... , p. 72.
61 H e gives a h ig h ly c o n fu sin g a cc o u n t o f th is in h is o th e rw is e c a p tiv a tin g m em o irs [F. B re a ń s k i], (G enerała ... a u to b io g ra fia , ed. J . F re jlic h , K ra k ó w 1914, pp. 3 3 -3 5 ) h e w rite s a b o u t “v o d k a g las s h e ro e s ” a n d a “d rin k in g b a r ” a tm o sp h e re .
62 H e could be re fe rrin g to B raw ack i.
63 B PP, m a n u s c rip t 512, G e n e ra l M aciej R y b iń sk i’s files, col. 877, re p o rt d a te 25 S e p te m ber. A s lie u te n a n t colonel a n d fo rm er cam p m a s te r, h e s ta y e d in P r u s s ia (w h ere h e h a d p ro b le m s w ith a c c o u n tin g for h is e x p en ses, BPP, m a n u s c rip t 349, col. 206, 235) a n d th e n left for B o u rg es. T h e F re n c h police in q u ire d w ith G e n e ra l D w ern ick i a b o u t W yszkow ski a n d th e e v en ts in P łock - V. S te fa n y k N a tio n a l A cadem ic L ib ra ry in L viv (fo rm erly O sso lin eu m ) (“S te fa n y k L ib ra ry ”), D w en ick i’s files, m a n u s c rip t 12, col. 53.
64 W ith th e fo llo w in g c o m p o s itio n : W a le n ty Z w ie rk o w s k i, W in c e n ty C h e łm ic k i a n d W ła d y sław P la te r.
were heard chanting “Long live Rybiński!”. Major Wilhelm Lipiński of the guard regim ent th re a ten e d to shoot U m iński’s a d ju ta n ts should they attem pt to speak to the infantry65. Lt. Col. Antoni Roslakowski’s battalion and the 1st light infantry regim ent surrounded Rybiński’s headquarters, threatening to put down any attem pts a t depriving the former chief of his command. Soldiers and low er-ranking officers were told th a t although Umiński had been proclaimed commander by members of the patriotic club in Płock, his nomination had not been legally sanctioned. Umiński later wrote in his dairy th a t he initially wanted to “take several cavalry regiments and artillery batteries and bring the opponents to their senses by firing a few missile rounds”, bu t he concluded th a t his plans would only deepen the rift in the army, and he resigned his command66. Generals Dembiński and Bem were the potential candidates, but on the night of 23 to 24 September, Niemojowski issued a w ritten decree reinstating General Rybiński to the post of commander-in-chief67. According to Rybiński, in th a t nomination, Niemo- jowski had also vested him with the powers of the head of the National Government. When Rybiński used th a t title in the Address to the Parliament
o f Great B ritain68, a controversy broke out among Polish politicians in exile.
On 20 February 1843, Walenty Zwierkowski69 and Wincenty Chełmicki is sued an official protest. In a 16-page pamphlet, they attem pted to prove th at after 23 September, Rybiński not only had not held the office of government leader, but due to the absence of one signature on his nomination act, Ry- biński’s commandership had never been legally sanctioned70. They were
65 A fte r 3 O ctober, h e m a rc h e d w ith h is b a tta lio n s tr a ig h t to th e R u s s ia n s . K u r ie r L ite w s
k i, 14 O cto b er 1831; [K. K ołaczkow ski], W sp o m n ie n ia ..., vol. 5, p. 148; J . Św ięcicki, P a m ię tn ik osta tn ieg o d ow ódcy p u ł k u 4 p iech o ty liniow ej, ed. R. B ielecki, W arsz a w a 1982, p. 155; L. D rew n -
icki, Z a m o ich czasów , ed. J . D u tk iew icz, W a rsz a w a 1971, pp. 2 3 0 -2 3 1 ; R. B ielecki, S ł o w n i k . , vol. 3, pp. 4 3 -4 4 .
66 [J. N. U m iń sk i], Jen era ła ..., p. 17. H is c h ie f of staff, L t. Col. F e lik s P ró s zy ń s k i, con v in ced h im of th e in f a n tr y ’s re s is ta n c e a n d th e fu tility o f h is a tte m p ts to enforce obedience. U m iń sk i w a s forced to leav e th e arm y.
67 T h e d e sc rip tio n o f th e e v e n ts in S łu p n o a n d Płock o n 23 S e p te m b e r is b a s e d on: [J. U. U m iń sk i], J e n e ra ła ..., pp. 1 0 -2 0 ; B. N iem ojow ski, O o s ta tn ic h w y p a d k a c h rew olucji
p o ls k ie j w o d p o w ie d z i n a b io g ra fię je n e r a ła M a c ie ja R y b iń s k ie g o , P a r i s 1833, pp. 1 6 -1 9
- it a d d re s s e s th e id ea liz ed im ag e o f th e la s t com m an d er-in -ch ief, F. C hotom ski, M a th ia s
R yb iń sk i, d e rn ie r c o m m a n d a t en c h e f de l ’A rm e e N a tin a le P olonaise, in: J . S traszew icz, L es P o lo n a is et les P olo n a ises d e la R e v o lu tio n d a 2 9 n o vem b er 1830, P a r is 1832; W. Z w ierkow ski, D z ia ła n ia ..., pp. 5 9 -8 2 ; [J. L ew iński], Jenerała...,, pp. 1 2 9 -1 3 4 ; K Z ieliński, W zięcie W arszaw y...,
pp. 3 7 8 -3 8 1 ; [S. B arzy k o w sk i], H istorya..., vol. 5, pp. 3 6 0 -3 6 8 ; A. O stro w sk i, P a m iętn ik..., pp. 4 5 4 -4 8 0 ; W. Rostocki, W ładza..., pp. 180-187; N. K asp arek , P ow stańczy e p i l o g ., pp. 187-193.
68 P a r is 1843.
69 R y b iń sk i w ro te t h a t Z w ierk o w sk i h a d b e e n d r u n k on 23 S e p te m b e r a n d c o u ld n ’t p o ssi b ly re m e m b e r a n y th in g .
70 [W. C hełm icki, W. Zw ierkow ski], O b ja śn ien ia n a u rzędow ych dow o d a ch oparte, tyczące
się p rzyw ła szczen ia w ła d zy prezesa R z ą d u N arodow ego p rz ez gen. R ybińskiego, które delegow ani z se jm u d la w ręczenia te m u ż g enerałow i d y m isji z naczelnego d o w ó d ztw a d la w iadom ości rodaków p o d a ją ..., P a ris 1843; cf. D e m o k ra ta P olski 1842/1843, vol. 5, p a r t 3, p. 187; p a r t 4, pp. 2 3 0 -2 3 1 .
wrong as regards the la tte r accusation. Colonel Ferdynand Dienheim Chotomski71, Rybiński’s close aide, Teodor Morawski72 and General Ja n Nepomucen Umiński73 stood in Rybiński’s defense. General Roman Sołtyk74 argued in support of Rybiński’s case in a series of printed appeals, and he faced opposition from Chełmicki and Zwierkowski75 . The situation provoked a fervent debate in the press: Rybiński was attacked by Orzeł Biały and
Dziennik Narodowy, and he was defended by Józefat Bolesław Ostrowski, an
untiring columnist of Nowa Polska (and member of the M ilitary Alliance)76. The discussion spread far and wide, it ceased to revolve around the events of 23 September 1831, addressing the general topic of Rybiński’s leadership.
After his reinstatem ent, Rybiński ordered the demolition of the bridge to show the Russians th a t he was not contemplating offensive action. General Franciszek Morawski, the key negotiator in the talks with Russia after 13 September, had deserted in the most disgraceful m anner on 23 September. Morawski wrote a letter of resignation, he placed it on a heap of other documents, and he defected to the Russian side. He crossed the Vistula near Wyszogród, and having arrived in Warsaw, he gave a detailed account of events in the Polish q u arters77. Not a single word of condemnation came from Rybiński’s council, testifying to a dram atic drop in the army’s morale. General Umiński was forced to leave the army78, and General Henryk Mil berg, former commander of the 4th infantry regiment, was appointed the new negotiator. When Dembiński inquired about orders for Milberg, Ry biński replied th a t a general needed no instructions. In the daily orders of 24 September, Rybiński reported on previous day’s events, thus publicly
71 F. D. C h o to m sk i, O d p o w ie d ź p a n o m C h e łm ic k ie m u i Z w ie r k o w s k ie m u n a broszurę
ogłoszoną p r z e z n ic h w P a ry żu 2 0 lutego 1843 ro k u p o d tytu łem : O b ja śn ie n ia n a u rzęd o w ych d o w o d a ch oparte, tyczące się p rz y w ła sz c z e n ia w ła d zy p re ze sa R z ą d u N a ro d o w eg o , P a r is 1843.
72 [T. M oraw ski], O d p o w ied ź ... n a o d p o w ied ź p p . C h e łm ic k ie m u i Z w ie r k o w s k ie m u ogło
szo n ą p rz e z F.D. C h otom skiego w P a ry żu , P a r is 1843.
73 [J. N. U m iń sk i], Jen era ła ..., p a ssim .
74 R. S ołtyk, K ilk a słów n a broszurę p p .C h e łm ick ie g o i Z w ierko w skieg o w y d a n a 2 0 I I 1843
w P a ry żu , P a r is 1843.
75 W. Z w ierkow ski, W . C h ełm ick i, O d p o w ied ź p . S o łty k o w i n a jeg o k ilk a słó w ogłoszonych
d r u k ie m 2 V 1843 w P a ry żu , P a ris 1843.
76 In c lu d in g N o w a P o ls ka 1843, vol. 5, s h e e t 12, p. 720.
77 B a rzy k o w sk i (H istorya..., vol. 5, p. 369) w ro te : “h e s u rre n d e re d h im s e lf to th e enem y, a n d h e jo in e d th e M oscow cam p. W h a t could h a v e p ro m p te d th is decision? W as it th e r e a liz a tio n t h a t U m iń s k i’s n o m in a tio n h a d m a d e a n y a r ra n g e m e n t im p o ssib le or, m ore probably, th e fe a r t h a t th e p a trio tic club w ould g a in a d v a n ta g e u n d e r th e new re ig n of th e new com m ander, th u s p u ttin g him , th e negotiator, in d an g er? We can n o t a n sw e r th is question, b u t no re aso n s a re sound enough to ju stify h is disgraceful ac t”. K a jetan K oźm ian, M oraw ski’s frien d w ho w rote about th e “Zakroczym rab b le”, approved of h is desertio n . P a m iętn iki, vol. 3 W rocław e t al. 1972, p. 347.
78 H e left th e a rm y to g e th e r w ith h is a d ju ta n t S te fan G arczy ń sk i w ho h a d p rev io u sly served in D w ern ick i’s corps a n d h a d escap ed from exile in G alicia. H e in sp ire d A dam M ickiew icz to w rite “R e d u ta O rd o n a” (O rdon’s R edoubt). Z. Szeląg, S te fa n G arczyński. Z a ry s biografii, Kielce 1983, p. 83. D ism issed “for h e a lth re a so n s”- B. K ó rn ick a 7864, m ilita ry files u p to 1831, col. 10.
acknowledging th a t he had abandoned any operations “which were deemed to be fruitless by the Commander-in-Chief who focused solely on future negotiations, referring to them as attem pts »to reach truce«”79. During the council of war, Rybiński confirmed th a t attem pts had been made to assassi nate him, adding th a t in order to deprive him of command, a method differ ent th an th a t selected by the Sejm on the previous day was needed. Rybiński argued th a t only the council of war which had elected him had the authority to remove the commander from power. The council decided th a t it would not wait for the Sejm’s decision, and it gave its unanimous support to Rybiński. In Płock, discipline was lax and morale was low. Despite the th reats made by Płock’s warlord, General Antoni Wroniecki, the town resembled a raucous council meeting where loud argum ents, fervent debates mixed with indeci sion and utter resignation. The Sejm and the government headed for Prussia. Rybiński’s strict adherence to procedural requirem ents obstructed the reco very of m ilitary funds.
The chaos also resulted from the commander-in-chief’s lack of a strategic concept. On 25 September, the headquarters moved from Słupno to Płock. The army’s ranks were depleted by desertion as well as formal “resignations” th a t had been readily signed by the reinstated chief. Aided by Morawski’s treacherous testimony, the Russians speeded up the march to the north, approaching Płock where the Poles had wasted three days: 23, 24 and 25 September. Meanwhile, Rybiński resolved m atters with the National Govern ment. Already on 23 September, the Cossacks detained castellan Narcyz Olizar and Wincenty Niemojowski in Rypin80. Niemojowski sent the word to the commander-in-chief with a description of Schrieber’s p artisan “exploits”. Niemojowski also pled for the rescue of his brother, former member of the National Government81 . Rybiński dispatched several squadrons to the north to patrol the road to Prussia. He ignored the request to rescue the prisoners. Deputies and members of the National Government left Płock on 24 Septem ber, backed by two K rakusi squadrons commanded by deputy Walenty Zwie- rkowski (National Guard major, former non-commissioned officer of the fa mous light cavalry regiment) and two squadrons of the 6th uhlan regim ent82. They were followed by a sizable group of “other men who were not welcomed by the Commander”83. The news of previous day’s events in Rypin reached the party near Sierpc, and it encouraged Niemojowski to write a letter to Rybiński. In Rypin mayor’s residence, the head of the National Government
79 S. P rz e w a lsk i, G enerał M a ciej R y b iń sk i..., p. 156.
80 Cf. [N. O liza r], P a m ię tn ik i k a s z te la n a ..., in: P a m ię tn ik i P o lskie, ed. K. B ro n ik o w sk i, vol. 1, P rz e m y ś l 1883, pp. 2 0 -2 1 .
81 B. C z a rt., m a n u s c rip t 5586, col. 493.
82 O n 25 S ep tem b er, th e y w e re in s tr u c te d to p a tro l th e a r e a of S ierpc, B ieżu ń , R y p in a n d S kępe - Ź r ó d ła d o d zie jó w w o jn y p o lsk o -ro sy jsk ie j 1 8 3 0 -1 8 3 1 r., p u b lis h e d b y B. P aw łow ski, vol. 4, W arsz a w a 1935, p. 244.
announced a manifesto in the presence of deputies. The document was coun tersigned by m inister Józef Świrski. Although Rybiński’s supporters in-exile had doubted his existence84, the last commander-in-chief, shaken by the recent events, had undoubtedly authored the manifesto. The document s ta t ed as follows: “In an attem pt to place the national army under the control of the commander-in-chief, the Polish Sejm, in a resolution of 24 January, limited his decision-making powers to the armistice issue, and placed the rem aining authority in the hands of the National Government. By arriving at a ceasefire arrangem ent with the enemy in Modlin, Maciej Rybiński had not abused his powers. The Russian field m arshal communicated the ene my’s position on the m atter with the involvement of General Morawski: Russia had no intentions of signing a truce with Poland, the Polish army was expected to surrender unconditionally and dispatch a delegation to the em peror. In a council of war called on 23 September in the headquarters, the commander-in-chief asked his generals and regim ent commanders to vote on the delegation request. By doing so, the commander-in-chief had abused the powers granted to him by the aforementioned resolution”. This was followed by an account of the events th a t had taken place in Płock on 23 September and the following statem ent: “The head of the Government had no other choice but to reinstate General Rybiński .... he realized th a t the National Government could not preside over the country with dignity if the Sejm’s authority was not respected; he placed the Płock province committee in control of the treasury, he left Płock and the country”. The manifesto also read: “the decisions made by the commander-in-chief in violation of his powers may never affect our honor or the nation”85. This is a long quote, but it is worth citing. It was a sharp protest against Rybiński’s attem pts to strike a deal with the enemy. Unaware of Morawski’s disgraceful desertion, Ry biński sent his adjutant after him. When the news broke out, General Mil berg was dispatched to meet with the Russians. By the time he arrived in Nowy Dwór, General Berg had already left the town. Tipped by Morawski about changes in Polish command, he was afraid th a t the Polish army would begin its advance. Berg left behind a short statem ent on the initiation of war operations. The surprised Milberg asked Rybiński for instructions, and Ge neral Ledóchowski, the second delegate dispatched for the negotiations, speci fied their scope in greater detail on the “term s dictated by him [General Berg - N.K.]”. Rybiński formulated the following instructions:
1. Absolute surrender to the Constitutional king; 2. A delegation will be dispatched to the tsar;
3. The army will be stationed around Płock (or in the Płock province); 4. Modlin will be directly surrendered to the Russian army.
84 P o lish é m ig ré s in P a r is (K niaziew icz a n d P la te r ) sto p p ed th is p u b lic a tio n to p ro te c t th e P o lish a rm y ’s good n a m e in F ra n c e.
O ther points concerned technical details. Rybiński insisted th a t the ar mistice be signed directly, as if fearing th a t he would not have the time to surrender8 6. His instructions were an actual act of capitulation: no referen
ces were made to amnesty, guarantees other th an the preservation of the officers’ m ilitary ranks were not demanded. On 26 September, General Mil berg reported from Modlin on the progress th a t had been made in the negotiations. Initially, Berg had been represented by General Dellinghausen who signed the preliminary arrangem ent. On 27 September, the Polish army set out on a march along the Vistula River to move away from the advancing Russian troops. The headquarters were moved from Płock to Lenie Wielkie near Dobrzyń on the Vistula. Milberg was greatly relieved when General Berg arrived in Nowy Dwór in the evening with new term s of armistice. Although he assured the army of his willingness to continue the struggle, Rybiński did everything to almost unconditionally surrender to the Russians. The Polish army was seething with turmoil, and it advanced in the direction of Szpetal which was to host the general headquarters on 28 September. The news th a t two cavalry squadrons had been unexpectedly defeated in Płońsk reminded Rybiński th a t despite capitulation talks, a w ar was still on. The news was correctly interpreted by the commander-in-chief. A bridge was built across the Narew River. General Milberg was expected to arrive in Szpetal. Milberg was hoping to finalize the capitulation during a meeting with Berg, meanwhile he was told th a t Paskevich was no longer willing to negotiate, and th a t he had demanded absolute surrender. Berg presented the Polish envoy with a note verbale87 calling for absolute obedience, declara
tions to be signed by the commander-in-chief and other high-ranking officers, as well as an oath of allegiance. In his note verbale, Paskevich expressed his disbelief “th a t the Polish army would duly observe their duties to the em per or and the king” for as long as the Modlin fortress remained under Polish control. Paskevich demanded an unconditional surrender of the fortress8 8. It
rem ains unknown w hether this demand merely echoed the guarantees th a t had been made by Polish envoys and the commander-in-chief himself. An alternative section of the note called for immediate obedience to Paskevich and direct surrender of the fortresses in Modlin and Zamość. No references were made to am nesty or a retu rn to the status quo from before the revolu tion of 29 November. The oath of 1815 did not contain the word “F atherland” or the adjective “Constitutional” to describe the king. A council of w ar was called at 4 p.m. on 28 September in Szpetal Górny (on the right bank of the Vistula, opposite Włocławek). Rybiński demanded th a t all m ilitary and tacti cal units share their opinions about Russia’s proposals. Milberg was certain
86 Ź r ó d ła do dziejów ..., vol. 4, pp. 2 4 5 -2 5 0 ; [S. B arzy k o w sk i], H isto rya ..., vol. 5, p. 370; W. Z w ierkow ski, D zia ła n ia ..., pp. 89, 9 5 -9 6 .
87 A n u n s ig n e d d ip lo m a tic n o te w r itte n in th e th ir d p e rso n , e x ch a n g ed by p u b lic i n s titu tio n s in less im p o rta n t m a tte rs .
th a t Paskevich’s ultim atum would be accepted, b ut his abrasive m anner added to the rigidity of the Polish position. Officers opposing capitulation had become mobilized after the events in Słupno. During Milberg’s speech in favor of surrender, the disabled General Suchorzewski used a stick to drag himself to the bedside of General Pac, begging the la tter to use his authority and rescue the nation’s honor. They were joined by General Wojczyński who had been of equally poor health. A touching scene ensued where three sick men, one still suffering from the wounds inflicted on him in the battle of Ostrołęka, slowly made their way to the council, enticing other battery com m anders on their way to join them with loud cries “help us save the honor of the nation!”. Did the fact th a t not a shadow of choice had been left have a decisive impact on the council’s fate? The meeting opened with a controver sy. Some participants were in favor of a secret ballot, and they were keen on beginning the vote with lower-ranking officers. This approach would provide senior officers with an insight into their subordinates’ preferences. An open ballot starting with higher-ranking officers was ultim ately voted through. The commander-in-chief divided a sheet of paper into two columns m arked as “surrender” and “do not surrender”. The first five89 votes were cast in
favor of surrender. The procedure with a seemingly sealed outcome was interrupted by General Ludwik Pac who stormed into the room in the com pany of Suchorzewski, Wojczyński and Ziemięcki. Pac made several sharp rem arks to remind council participants of their duties towards the country. He was followed by General Em ilian Węgierski who said: “Gentlemen! This table, these four walls will bear witness of our wicked deeds. Then again, they could testify to our honor”. Senior generals Wojczyński and Suchorzews- ki and General Ziemięcki ceremoniously approached the table and cast their votes. No other votes in favor of capitulation were cast after that. General Miller and Colonel Benedykt Zielonka (commander of the 5t h light cavalry
regiment) abstained, arguing th a t they had not surveyed the opinions of the officers they represented. At one point, Rybiński interrupted the vote with the words: “We did everything in our power to bring about a peaceful resolu tion, and now, only death can save our honor”9 0. Despite th at, General Miller
was dispatched to inform Berg th a t the council had requested several modifi cations to Russian demands. The letter clearly indicated th a t the Polish army was ready “to observe its duties before the Constitutional king who
89 O th e r re p o rts sp e a k o f six o r e ig h t v o tes c a s t by o u ts ta n d in g d iv isio n c o m m an d ers, in c lu d in g g e n e ra ls M ilb erg , J a g m in , A n d ry ch iew icz, B o g u sła w sk i, M u ch o w sk i a n d C olonel Ż eleń sk i (Z ieliński). Som e h is to r ia n s a d d Colonel W ierzb ick i (1 0 th u h la n re g im en t), A n to n i G a łcz y ń sk i (2 n d lin e in fa n try re g im e n t) a n d J e r z y N iew ęgłow ski (g re n a d ie r re g im e n t) to th is list. 34 v o tes w e re c a s t a g a in s t th e u ltim a tu m .
90 W. Z w ierkow ski, D zia ła n ia ..., pp. 1 0 1 -1 0 4 ; [S. B arzy k o w sk i], H isto rya ..., vol. 5, p. 376; M. K a m ie ń sk i, K ilk a w sp o m n ie ń starego żołn ierza , P o z n a ń 1872, pp. 4 1 -4 2 ; [J. L ew iń sk i],
Jen era ła ..., pp. 1 3 7 -1 3 8 ; [H. D e m b iń sk i], J en era ła ... p a m ię tn ik o p o w s ta n iu w Polsce r. 1830 1831, vol. 2, K ra k ó w 1875, pp. 3 6 3 -3 6 4 ; S. P rz e w a lsk i, G enerał M a c ie j R yb iń sk i..., p. 163;
