An evaluation of worldwide transport aircraft fire experiences

AN EVALUATION OF WORLDWIDE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FIRE EXPERIENCES /O*

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\-'t^. ^''* by A F TAYLOR College of Aeronautics

Cranfield Institute of Technology.

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CHOOL DELFT

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Prepared for the International Seminar on ' A i r c r a f t Rescue and Fire Fighting' Nf^PA Geneva, Switzerland, September 13-17, 1976

An evaluation of worldwide transport aircraft fire experiences.

by

A.F. Taylor

Lecturer in Aircraft Systems College of Aeronautics,

Cranfield Institute of Technology, Cranfield, Bedford,

England.

Summary

This further study of turbine engined transport aircraft accidents has concentrated on 269 survivable accidents where there was either a post impact fire, major fuel spillage or an inflight fire involving the fuel An evaluation has been made of the effects on the final fatality rate of such parameters as fuel type, aircraft type and size, load factor, initial impact severity, phase of flight and type of flight. The advantage of kerosine over wide cut gasoline is again confirmed and it is shown that the majority of people who die by the effects of fire do so in approach accidents but nevertheless in those involving

comparatively few or no deaths directly due to the actual impact. Turboprops and jets exhibit a different pattern of cause of death and although a higher proportion of turboprop accidents occur during the approach this does not account for the difference. When considering fire along the effects of aircraft age and type are small compared to the effects of fuel volatility.

Prepared for The International Seminar on 'Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting', Geneva, Switzerland, September 13-17, 1976

INTRODUCTION

'An equally important purpose (to determining the cause) is to determine the facts, conditions and circumstances pertaining to the survival or

non survival of the occupants'. So states the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation and so begins a previous report, reference 1, on which this paper is based. Several other statements made in

reference 1 and/or in reference 2 bear repeating not only to make this paper rather more self contained but also because their importance is only just becoming generally recognised.

The most important fact noted also by CRC in reference 3, is the lack of data relevant to any study of survival and although no one needs reminding of the relevance of fire to the continued survival of crash victims we have lacked actual numbers. Until comparatively recently most accident reports have dealt almost entirely with the cause of the accident and very little space has been devoted to the discussion of factors that ultimately meant life or death to thousands of passengers. As a result of this the airworthiness authorities and the aircraft manufacturers have been supplied with insufficient

information on which to base improvements in crashworthiness and in other factors affecting survival. Thus it is not surprising that the average survival rate in civil transport accidents has remained

virtually unchanged over the last twenty years despite significant improvements in safety generally.

So much has been said before but with a few exceptions it is only recently that systematic studies have been made to try to establish what lessons may be learned from accidents of the past. The need for a computer to do the sorting is evident as soon as one looks at the backlog of over 4000 accidents listed by the ARB in reference 4, the present paper is the second to be based on results from a prototype program used on a selected group of world wide transport aircraft accidents.

This evaluation of accidents tries to spot and to quantify variations in, for example, survival rate or cause of death between different groups of aircraft or accident type and thus to supply evidence for further computer analysis or to justify a detailed study of a

particular group of accident reports and their supporting background information. It may be expected to pose at least as many questions as it answers. Further work will study more details of more

accidents and include built in statistical routines.

THE ACCIDENTS CONSIDERED

At the AGARD conference in April 1975, reference 2, lists were presented of 176 world wide survivable accidents to transport aircraft with post impact fire and of 85 with inflight fires. These accidents were

related to the complete set of accidents which also include non

survivable accidents (defined in this case as all accidents except those with inflight fire where all occupants were killed by the actual

impact), and accidents not involving, or not known to have involved fire. Besides showing there to be a statistically significant

difference in fatality rates depending on whether kerosine. Jet A or wide cut gasoline. Jet B was used (a result predicted by the Air

Safety Group in 1966, reference 5) this AGARD paper shows how consideration of only fatal accidents can hide many important trends and differences.

2

-Reference 1 takes the 176 post impact fire accidents updated where possible, and presents some of these trends and differences as shown by computer analysis. Of particular interest is the difference, demon-strated but unexplained between turboprops and jets.

The present paper reuses these 176 accidents together with a further 93 which include three separate groups of accident. The first group

consists of further 'survivable post impact fire' accidents, the second of inflight fires involving the fuel and the third of accidents

involving spilled fuel but no sustained fire. This last group is taken from the CRC report, reference 3 and need some explanation.

Only yery rarely have passengers or crew died by the effects of fire without the fuel being involved. However, quite obviously, no one at all has been killed by fire when no fire has occurred, thus most previous studies have only considered accidents actually involving fire.

Moreover it was considered important to be able to decide whether occupants died as a direct result of the impact or, subsequently as a result of the fire. Thus accidents involving inflight fires were excluded from the main comparison and all post impact fires were included even if the fire was confined to a tyre or to some other localised area without igniting the fuel. The justification for this even when the principal aim was to compare fuels, was that any fire represented a prolonged source of ignition which could under some conditions ignite the fuel even when still contained within the tanks. The CRC on the other hand seem to have argued that all accidents present some source of ignitiion even if only very short lived, therefore the presence of spilled fuel is of greater importance than the presence of a prolonged ignition source. Therefore the CRC study excludes

accidents involving a fire but with no fuel fire or spilled fuel

but includes those with spilled fuel even if no fire is reported. The CRC also include inflight fires if the fuel was involved.

Comparing the data used for references 1 and 2 with that used for 3 one finds a large common core of accidents involving post impact fuel fire with each taking a further, largely non fatal group that is considered relevant and that enlarges the sample. The present paper accepts both views and therefore both additional groups, as valid.

The CRC has also gone a stage further and included military aircraft using wide cut gasoline. This might also seem a valid way of increasing the sample size. However reference 1 suggests that at very low overall load factors, ie virtually crew only conditions, the occupants are able to escape much more easily than are passengers, therefore the inclusion of even more non passenger flights could be misleading. Study of the CRC report reinforces this view.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The present study includes 269 accidents listed in Table 1. However this total sample is only relevant to parts and the 'inflight fuel fire' and/ or the 'no fuel fire' accidents are at times excluded. The order of presentation may appear somewhat arbitrary but in fact follows that of previous papers and reflects the pursuit of answers to questions

In order to evaluate and present figures for the proportions killed by impact or by fire it has been necessary to make allowance for those accidents where the cause of death is not known. If for example there were 10 fatal and 10 non fatal accidents in a particular group and

the cause of death was known in 8 of the 10 fatal accidents then it is considered acceptable to combine, in effect, 8 of the 10 non fatal accidents with these to provide 16 relevant accidents in all, not 18.

If the same technique is used on all the numbers involved it is believed that the resulting 'adjusted totals' may be used for

statistical purposes with a high degree of confidence. Table 2 gives the present computer printout for the whole set of 269 accidents used, from which the above technique may be checked.

3.1 Fuel Type

The kerosine v. wide cut controversy started back in the mid fifties when some airlines took the view, reinforced by the CRC in its 1964 report reference 6, that although there was laboratory evidence to suggest that kerosine was the less dangerous fuel 'adoption of a single type of aviation turbine fuel by the entire industry would not significantly improve the overall excellent safety record of commercial aviation ...'. This was ofcourse perfectly true because only a very few airlines used wide cut, fortunately, in view of the present evidence, few continued to use it.

While the recent CRC report confirms the overall difference due to fuel type no evidence on cause of death is given. However this is now known with reasonable certainty in all but a handful of accidents and provides valuable evidence for examination. 'Figure 1 shows that for the two turbine fuels the same proportion of those on board were killed by the impact and therefore that the two groups were of the same average severity. Note that the already large difference in the proportion of deaths by fire shown in reference 1 is increased here largely because of the inclusion of such accidents as the inflight explosion of the PanAm Boeing 707 at Elkton and the Air Canada DC8 in July 1970. In this kind of accident the deaths have been attributed to fire even though, unlike in the vast

majority of accidents considered, there was no chance of escape or rescue.

3.2 Year by Year

Figure 2 presents 5 year moving averages for both kerosine and wide cut. From this it can be seen that the larger sample of kerosine accidents has remained fairly steady while the very much smaller sample of wide cut accidents, though consistently higher, jumps around despite the smoothing effect of the 5 year average. The steadiness of the kerosine line suggests that the changes in aircraft, design, materials etc, introduced over the last 20 years have so far made no real difference to the proportion killed by fire. The difference between fuels on the other hand must now be eliminated from the study of other factors

affecting survival, thus in many subsequent figures only kerosine accidents have been considered.

3.3 A i r c r a f t Type

A statistically significant difference between turboprops and jets is mentioned but not explained in reference 1. Figure 3.1 shows that a far greater proportion of those involved in turboprop as opposed to jet accidents die as a direct result of the impact and that this is so

whichever fuel is used. Fire death proportions previously found to be virtually identical, are now only similar. The change here is probably

4

-in part also due to the -inclusion of a few -inflight fires while the reduction in kerosine fire deaths in jets seems to be due to the additional accidents involving no fire. Considering kerosine alone allows a further breakdown according to the number of engines and figure 3.2 shows that this makes very little further difference suggesting that aircraft size makes little appreciable difference.

Within these groups there are eleven individual aircraft types that have had, because of their large production numbers and/or long period service, a sufficient number of relevant accidents to be worth considering separately. However as sample numbers are reduced it becomes increasingly important to eliminate already established differences, therefore in addition to considering only kerosine this group considers only those accidents occurring during approach, landing or take off. The results are shown in figure 3.3 and although sample numbers are small it does look as if the B747 is now rivalling the Comet for crashworthiness, apart from this it seems that neither size nor age makes any appreciable difference to the chances of dying by fire once having survived the impact. In fact if the Chi-Square test is applied to the fire death proportion the level of agreement shows a suspiciously good fit, suggesting perhaps that the sample contains many non fatal accidents that are not truly relevant. On reflection this is plausible since every effort has been made to increase the sample size by including accidents that might well not be relevant to the fuel issue, and that would therefore diminish the difference between the fuels. This was originally done so that no accusation could be made that accidents had been selected so as to demonstrate what had previously been predicted.

The same test applied to the proportion of impact deaths, the inclusion of additional non fatal accidents making no difference here, confirms that in this case the differences between the aircraft types are significant. However the completion of our study of all accidents is required before any firm conclusions can be reached on this finding.

3.4 Aircraft Size

Since figure 3.2 had suggested that aircraft size made little difference a provisional conclusion of reference 1, little further investigation has been made of the possible effects of size. Figure 4 confirms that, with the exception of large turboprops, only the B747 differs much from the norm and it is encouraging to note that the 13 accidents to wide bodied jets (ie over 300 seats) include only two fatal

accidents, the Everglades Tristar and the Nairobi B747

3.5 Load Factor and Number Aboard

Since with any fuel there is only a limited length of time available for evacuating an aircraft and since there are only a limited number of doors available for this evacuation it seemed reasonable to suppose that there might be a greater risk of death by fire if the aircraft is full rather than half empty. At the same time the proportion killed by impact was expected to remain about the same.

1

4. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions relate only to the 269 survivable accidents considered.

4.1 The advantage of kerosine over wide cut gasoline is again confirmed.

4.2 There has been no change in average survival rate over the past twenty years.

4.3 Turboprop accidents cause a significantly higher proportion of those onboard to be killed by the actual impact than do jet accidents. Early turboprops and even converted piston engined aircraft appear to present a similar fire risk to that of larger and more modern turboprops and jets. This suggests that aircraft age, size and type have little effect

compared to that of fuel volatility.

4.4 A possible exception to conclusion 4.3 is that at present the v/ide bodied aircraft have a record for good crashworthiness better than all but the Comet 4.

4.5 Apart from in accidents involving only a very few people, most of whom would be crew members, load factor appears to make little difference to the proportion who fail to escape before being overcome by fire or its effects. There is some indication that in turboprop accidents high 'oad factor is associated with more impact deaths.

4.6 The majority of people who have died as a direct result of fire have done so in accidents where few if any have died as a result of the impact.

4.7 Conversely and not surprisingly the majority of people who died as a direct result of the impact did so in accidents in which no one subsequently died in the post impact fire.

4.8 Some three quarters of all impact deaths and about half of the post impact fire deaths occur in approach accidents. Approach accidents are on average more severe than landing and take off accid(?nts largely because of the much smaller proportion of non fatal accident:; in this group. Landing accidents are the most frequent and despite the very small number of impact deaths account for nearly a quarter of the por.t impact fire deaths. A larger proportion of turboprop accidents occur in the approach phase than do jet accidents and these accidents are also, on average, more severe with respect to impact but less severe with res|)ect to fire than are the jet accidents.

4.9 Non scheduled passenger flights are on average more severe with respect to impact than are scheduled passenger flights with both turboprops and jets. Crew training and freight flights are better with respect to fire deaths providing kerosine is used.

8

-REFERENCES

1. TAYLOR AF 'A study of survivable aircraft accidents involving post impact fire'.

Cranfield CofA Memo 7602, January 1976

2. TAYLOR AF 'Fire, fuel and survival: a study of transport aircraft accidents, 1955-74'. AGARD-CP-166 Paper 26, April 1975

3. Coordinating 'Aviation fuel safety - 1975'. Research Council CRC Report No.482, November 1975.

4. Civil Aviation 'ARB World Airline Accident Summary.' Authority CAA, 1975 and supplements.

5. Air Safety Group 'A review of the aviation fuel controversy' ASG 101, December 1966.

6. Coordinating 'Aviation fuel safety'

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14

-TABLE 2

rNEpC ARE. 26? . ACCIDENTS |..lR.TEP._ ~" "" "" ~ ~- ' ""• ' ^

OCCIDENTS . . eEADyAnOARp_^ ^BQARD/SEATS __ JMPACT/ABOARt» _ F I RE/SURVIVE IMPACT 'IRE ONI.V.. ._._...r v . . _ _ c _ : _ _ i : : _ •_' • '"•"•' "" •'" ' • . -17 749 /1762 1762 /3428 0 /1762 749 /1762 r : " :4 3 y ~ " '"":^~5i x ~ ' _ p—x7^3^—^7:^43 x " : -IMPACT AN^ r i R E j ' - • — — 7 ~ - :-- - _ : ! " " "• .:--^vT. ^-"^^~^~^^^ ?5 128Ö / 1 7 3 3 1753 /3265 586 / i 7 5 3 702 / 1 1 4 7 IMPACT ONLY I_ • ""'~i:....-- -^^-I^..^". "• :;-• ^'•"VT^VJ^ ~-~ =;^.~^'" k2 1191 /2039 2039 /4259 1191 /2039 0 /848

~ " " ' •" 58 X ~ ~ J? .. 4^:y ö^?xgvrr-758; X ~ : ^^^^r^OTX^T^^^r:: ~

o o JD O "O o "O 204 Occidents fire impact u o O. E > 3 T3 O «) fire

16 60 o o o "O o t l n 50 40 30 20 10

5 year moving overages showing middle year

a ) kerosine 60 50 40 30 total OL u -I I I I i I I I « ' « . b) OU L. 60 65 year 70 o § > 3 n o « I 30 20 10 c ) k e r o s i n e 30 - 20 fire 1 10 0 L l—l—I—I—L_l I I I I I l_l I I I J J 0 U I • ' « ' ' « « ' — L _ l I I I I I J 0 60 65 70 60 65 70 year year

*/• deod/survive impact

-n

O C 73

m

3J O > •V

m

er

o

•D -\ O

•u

UI a l l turboprops jets turboprops kerosine turboprops wide cut jets kerosine j e t s wide cut % dèod/Qboord UI o t IM 3 •o o - 1. 00 ( 0

18 30 occ *•* 50 o o o •o o *> n 40 30 20 10 kerosine only fire impoct o Q. E > 3 M •O O •O fire

50 .o o "O o « I TO

approach, londing & take off only kerosine only 15 4u 30 20 10 164 fire impact -140 30 20 10 r». o e*-ta t^ CM r^ m t*-•* . t». m o "«» u> • ^ a , ^ O 00 m > o co U O en U O CM CM X Ü . »«* CM t l . E o o in CM in X u ui c O u M 30-fire o Q. E 20 - l 2 0 > "> 3 m o 10

-oL

10

Jo

20 -O o Ji O "O o «« "O

turboprops

u o Q. E «» > 3 M r> o « "O 30 20 en o» 1 o en o» *~ 1 o o o» o> CM I o o CM tA % • -«/ O E « 3 * . C O C7I O) i O <n <n I o o en <n CM I O o CM en <n • o o co en en i O o 10 -kerosine only

turboprops

j e t s

fire. 20 10

FIGURE A

AIRCRAFT SIZE, by number of s e a t s

o o .o o "D O * 50 40 30 20 10 kerosine only t ' p r o p s O 20 40 60 80 100 •/o lood f a c t o r kerosine only j e t s 25 impact 31 Z^tTM.. 22 34 .TV».»--18 'isky;-^"^' o 20 40 60 60 100 */• lood factor o O. E > > 3 IA •O O • 30 20 10 0

-turboprops

M ^ a kerosine a ^ H only l ^ p l turboprops

jets

kerosine only j e t s .^^9 O 20 40 60 60 100 •/• lood factor fire 20 40 60 60 100 *A toad factor

- 22 50

S

O • 40 30 20 10 OL j e t s using kerosine only g accidents fire impact 2 4 e 16 32 64 128 256 512 total number aboard .

30 u 0 a > 3 M O «» J» 20 10 j e t s using kerosine only fire 4 6 16 32 64 128 256 512 t o t a l number aboard

u o a o "O 60 60 4 0 -20 kerosine . 6 » > 1 1 159

ss^

18 ^ ^

a^g

aS»

^m

m

8 j 13

_e

12 ''•'Ban -. zero O 20 40 60 80 99-9 */• killed by impact/aboard 16* fotal occ** 159 accidents 9 ^ fire u o a E o a E > 3 M •O O 80 60 40 20 OL wide cut •'T-: •• • 2

|i$?ft

^ •.•-•£r

m^

^ ₀ 1 1 * f a t a l acc*s 32 accidents S ^ fire zero O 20 40 60 80 99-9 */• killed by impact/aboard

- 24 \ !! O E 3 900 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 kerosine zero O 20 40 60 80 99-9 "/e k i l l e d by i m p a c t / a b o a r d 16 » f a t a l occ** 159 accidents impact

o o X» o

s

"O 100 8 0 6 0 -40 2 0 -Ol z e r o 12 kerosine only 38 1 ï

1 1

1 1 161

•

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-" 38 f o t o l o c c * * 181 Occidents f i r e impact 20 4 0 . 60 80 100 */• k i l l e d ' by f i r e / s u r v i v e impact M O ••-Q C o w O -O o o ^ 140 120 100 60 60 4 0 20 0 188 1 • > -. i _ O •*^ _u O x> o o ^^

f^

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s

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1

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rr

"^ • j 5 ^ » _ • Y ,\ 7 / zero 20 40 60 80 100 ^ killed by t i r e / s u r v i v e impact

26 -2000 1800 1600 1400 •o o «f JQ E 3 C 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 241 1 •

-1

m

-•:•••;. 61 61 ace

B

f i r e ts. impact 70 all 25^;.: opproach landing awfeM take off

o o ü o "O o "O 50 40 30 20 10 OL 61 Ma 241 96 61 accidents fire impact o o i -Q. Q. O Oi C "O c o o t l O u O o. E « I > 3 M "O o «* "D 30 20 10 -OL f i r e

28 -"O c o o Ji o o • 50 40 kerosine only 30 20 10 204 — 25 27

1 ^

SS 28 occ** impact in CL o vt a o IA in t» IA a o «1 t l

approach landing take off

u o a E «» > 3 M •O o -o 30 20 K) kerosine only f i r e

21 19 o o Xi o r> o •D O a E t« > 3 M "O O "O 50 /O 30 20 10 OL kerosine only scheduled passenger only fire impact 30 20 10 -204 o all 39 18 IA OL o M IA CL O _IA M Q. o IA *•-tl approach r- landing take off fire

FIGURE 8.A PHASE OF FLIGHT, turboprops v jets

30 -O O «• 80 60 40 20

kerosine post impoct fuel f i r e s only scheduled i-» ^^ passenger only 16 i m p a c t 0

all

in a o _IA *^ t* •A o. o IA approach landing a o take off o C > o 60 40 20 f i r e

FIGURE 8.5 PHASE OF FLIGHT, turboprops v j e t s

scheduled passengers only

k e r o s i n e fuel f i r e s only

f

16 accidents fire impoct

•

1

1

•

14

M.

33 I\SEB ' v^ K

32 -50i kerosine only 12 40 30

I

o o •o 204 20 ₁₃₄

S ^

50 Xi o "O o •D 40 30 20 10 16 accidents fire impact

•/o lood factor

o Q . J C O IA X O u IA C o c u IA O» c 'o o XX. E > 3 in n o "O 20 10 fire

32

8

kerosine only 54 81 48 4 4 */• load factor X o o. £. u in X O o . u in c o c u «> X in 3 .D '5 u o a E > '> V . 3 «A

z

20 kerosine only 1^ f i r e

o o Xi o o «t •o E «* > 3 IA •.«

s

"O u in 44 accidents fire impact */• load factor

w^

1

BUM? _^-¥*?* fire