ORG AN O N 4(1967)
LE 250e ANNIVERSAIRE DÉ LA MORT
DE G. W. LEIBNIZ
Anna Teresa Tym ieniecka (U.S.A.)
LEIBNIZ’ PHILOSOPHAT AND SCIENCE TODAY
Leibniz has been often considered our contem porary. We can see in him the prototype of the m odem philosopher “who tries to make the universe intelligible, w orkable and useful.” 1 His contributions to the contem porary science are well known; through his inventions and discoveries he has foreseen the grow th and role of technology in our w orld or today; finally, his tendencies tow ards rationalisation of social life, reconciliation, unification and supranationalism have been incarnated in the present civilisation. The question arises: “could Leibniz still be relevant to our civilisation th a t seems to have already fulfilled his great vision?”
There are, however, two im portant points concerning Leibniz’ thought th a t m erit our attention and will show th a t in spite of its vast re verberations Leibniz’ thought has not y e t been sufficiently explored.
1. O ur “best of th e possible w orlds” is often said to be in a philo sophical crisis. The new “enlightenm ent” having dem ythologized n atu re seems to have alienated m an from n atu re and the w orld as much as it seems to have cut m an’s ties w ith th e su p ran atu ral in all its forms. Allegedly, the scientific and technological progress is to be blam ed for m an’s loss of a “place of belongings” since science in w hich the con tem porary man has p u t absolute faith does not seem to be in any w ay relevant to the problem s of his individual, personal life. And yet, opposing this contention, we will go back to Leibniz and show th a t th e reasons for this crisis do not lie in th e n atu re of science and
technology b ut in th eir inadequate interp retatio n in relation to p h ilo sophy. Leibniz’ theory of the' universal science w ill point the w ay
tow ards overcoming of these difficulties.
1 Brunner, E tudes sur la sign ification h istoriqu e de la ph ilosoph ie de L eibniz, Paris 1950, p. 289.
2. A paradoxical statem ent m ay be ventured. In spite of a great progress in Leibniz’ scholarship accomplished recently, the understanding of Leibniz’ philosophy in his w ritings is fa r behind the vast direct and in direct reverberations of his thought in science and civilisation. Leibniz’ philosophy and m etaphysics have developed as a response to the con crete great problem s science w as facing in his time, since he, Leibniz, like A ristotle has been a scientist par excellence and as Fontenelle said: “pareil en quelque sorte aux A ncients qui avaient l’adresse de mener ju sq u ’à h u it chevaux attelés de front, il mena de fro n t toutes les sciences.” And yet, although the role of psychology, physics, dynamics and n atu ra l science in Leibniz’ m etaphysics have been acknowledged, a panlogistic bias in the in terp retatio n of Leibniz’ doctrine seems still to be p rev alen t especially in th e Anglo-Saxon circles. Since W undt’s alm ost isolated essay no attention has been paid to th e role of biology in Leibniz’ m etaphysics. This m ise au point th a t the recent progress on sch o larsh ip s2 m akes im perative will give a final form ulation of an unbiased perspective in which Leibniz’ th o u g h t should be viewed.
We hope to gain through these tw o argum ents a deeper insight into Leibniz’ endeavour. This insight w ill allow us to draw some conclusions concerning the question of the relevance of Leibniz’ philosophy to the presen t day philosophical research.
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL WORLD
A lready in his tim e Leibniz has been recognized as a universal genius. N ot only did he advance through his discoveries such sciences like m athem atics, physics, dioptrics, historical research and founded other sciences like geology, analysis situs, dynamics, b u t nex t to th e scientific theory Leibniz has been vitally interested in th e ir application. He seems to have believed th a t the tru th -v alu e of a theory m ay be tested in its practical application, since once have we discovered the “m ysteries” of n a tu re we m ight well im itate n a tu re itself. He claimed to have invented a considerable num ber of in strum ents and machines. 3. Among th e machines to w hich he has a ttrib u te d a specific im portance w ere instrum ents th a t could, as he claimed, perform algebraic and logical operations, b u t even such operations as to deduce all knowledge from a certain n u m ber of presuppositions. We see clearly th a t in his far- reaching vision Leibniz saw th e g reat possibilities of science which discovering the w orkings of n atu re itself on the one hand and of the hum an knowledge on the other hand, has in our tim e brought about
2 A. T. T ym ieniecka, L eibn iz’ Cosm ological S yn th esis, Van Gorcum 1964. 3 Letter to Herzog Johann Friedrich, Oct. 1671.
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such a farreaching m astery of m an over the n a tu ra l forces on the one hand, and over his rational pow ers on th e other hand, th a t nothing seems to resist its grasp.
And y et th e trem endous scientific and technological developm ent w hich has not only considerably changed the conditions of hum an life b u t has also the tendency to replace m any of m an’s functions previo usly considered as his specific prerogatives through m echanically op erated instrum ents, like electronic brain s n o t only calculating and tran slatin g b u t inventing music and m aking decisions, and w hich would have enchanted Leibniz, who could tru ly be considered as its fo reru n ner, in itiator and guide, has caused a profound stir, discom fort and an x iety about th e m eaning of life, the role of m an in the universe etc. On the one hand, through science m an became seem ingly m aster of n a tu re and has freed him self from its bonds. On th e o th er hand, science has been accepted uncritically as the u ltim ate answ er to all hum an queries, and questions which reach beyond the lim its of positive scientific concepts are dispensed w ith as false questions. Thus man has been freed from the vision of th e world, him self and transcendence bound in a consistent whole as based upon esoterism , superstition and m ystification. “Enlightened” by w h at he considers the final word of science and progress, m an is expected not to seek any m ore a finalistic explanation of his endeavours and of th e m eaning of his life in a tra n s cendent principle. M an stands isolated and alone, left en tirely to him self, to the use of commodities, science and progress incessantly aug m enting and centered upon his positive achievem ents, which, however, cannot give a m eaning to life. His only streng th and com fort is the illusion th a t he has found in the progress a definitive clarification of his statu s in the universe.
Questions, however, arise: 1. w h eth er it is really science and techno logy th a t could have given such an in terp retatio n of th eir resu lts and w h eth er th eir results do contain decisive factors to prove th e ir final significance? 2. Is it really tru e th a t science and technique can handle all th eir problem s themselves? 3. Can the fact th a t certain essential aspects of m an’s functionning m ay be perform ed by autom ata such as electronic brains, dispense w ith m etaphysical questions concerning the u ltim ate n atu re of man, of th e universe, of th e ir m u tu al relation?
I t is not w ithout interest to consider these questions in the light of Leibniz’ thought, who having seen the possibility of the contempo rary developm ents in science and technology in th eir roots has, howe ver, evaded the bias of a onesided specialist of our day. As a m a tter of fact, all Leibniz’ discoveries, inventions and ideals stem from a common ground; they are m erely th ree faces, intelligible, theoretical and practical of his great p ro ject of the universal science, m athesis universalis. He did not pursue p articu lar sciences like m athem atics,
geology, dynam ics in separation from each other. On th e contrary, Leibniz saw all th e p articu la r branches of knowledge as em ergent from a common foundation th a t w ould contain the universal ru les of disco v ery and invention unifying them all at th e ir roots b u t allowing the developm ent and specialization of th e ir p articu lar m ethods in relation to th e ir respective subject m atter and objective. The so understood universal science was m eant by Leibniz as philosophical in natu re and consenquently as mediating betw een the strictly scientific questions and those concerning man as an experiencing individual.
The project of an universal science, of an u n i v e r s a l l a n g u a g e , or of a s c i e n c e o f c h a r a c t e r s comes from his earliest youth. A lready in his boyhood Leibniz w as fascinated by A ristotelian cate gories. He tried to grasp the universe of knowledge, first, by analyzing it into elem ents and then, by categorizing them. Who did not, disco vering in adolescence the pow er of reason cherish a sim ilar dream? Yet, Leibniz gave to this dream a profound m eaning and has passio nately pursued it all his life. In his essay Dissertation on the A rt of Combinations Leibniz tries for the first tim e to apply his ideas, th at “a kind of alphabet of hum an thoughts can be w orked out and th a t everything can be discovered and judged by comparison of the le tters of this alphabet and an analysis of the words m ade from th em ” to p articu lar sciences. 4 Universal science is m eant, first, as a complete inventory of knowledge presented in exhaustively analyzed characters, such th a t although each branch of knowledge exhibits a different kind of fundam ental character, yet, all of them could be brought to a com mon denom inator. Second, Leibniz opposes the arb itrarin ess of nom ina lism by trying to establish th a t although th e choice of words in signi fying objects or expressing definitions m ay w ell be arbitrary , yet thought, before it is expressed by words, is expressed by “some other signs” 5 which are not arb itrary b u t have a direct relation to the “n atu re of things.”
The assum ption of a direct relation betw een th e “signs” or charac te rs and n atu re is of a m ajor significance for Leibniz’ thought. Once analysis would bring forth the order of th e in terrelations among the characters w ithin a given section of knowledge and the rules of their variations, we would have the key to th e secrets of natu re. A system of such interrelations and ru les would reveal the system of the w or kings of n atu re itself and its rules. Having made these basic discoveries we would be in position to gain control over n atu re by using its own laws and rules tow ards devising methods for invention. Finally, en compassing the totality of data, as well of knowledge as of reality, we 4 “On the General C haracteristic,“ in Philosophical P apers and L etters, p. 341, transl. L. E. Loemker, Chicago U. Press, 1956.
L e ib n iz’ Philosophy and Science Today 1 6 1
could gain control over it in a synthetic w ay by devising ru les of a philosophical calculus th a t w ould allow us to weigh and solve in a dispassionate, noncom ittal, rational w ay questions in all realm s of knowledge and praxis extending from th e scientific field to the social, political, m oral and even religious domains.
One cannot fail to recognize in this program the accomplishm ents of the contem porary science previously mentioned. And one w ould be tem pted to compare the m athem atical su b stru ctu re underlying con siderable p a rts of th e research in behavioural, n atu ra l m athem atical, social sciences and extending even into linguistics, w ith Leibniz’ dream of a universal foundation of knowledge. This p arallel is indeed striking and y et we m ust be cautious in its in terpretation. A cricial point has to be emphasized. F irst of all, th e concept of the universal science in Leibniz’ thought cannot be identified w ith the problem s of m ethodo logy. The fact th a t in advanced trea tm e n t various fields of knowledge m ay be tre a te d by sim ilar or th e same stru c tu ra l or operational models and m ethods is not yet the proof th a t all of n a tu re and reality, or even all th e ir essential aspects m ay be reduced to this common d i mension. And identifying th e essential characteristic of any realm of cognition w ith the stru ctu ra l or m athem atical characteristic is to bring it simply to the m athem atical dimension of this realm .
However interesting it m ight be th a t th ere is such a common dimension in so m any domains of science w e do n o t know so fa r w h at would be its relation to other possible dim ensions of this domain nei th e r of its relation to the specifically “characteristic” dim ension of this domain. Leibniz’ idea of the universal characteristic poses it above every particular, be it m athem atical, algebraic, logical, moral, n a tu ra l dimension. A lthough Leibniz has been a t first tem pted to identify universal science w ith m athem atical sciences and to conceive of the philosophical calculus as a num erical calculus and saw in n u m b er “a basic m etaphysical figu re,” 6 yet progressing in his developm ent he has emphasized more and more the contingent n atu re of th e u n i verse, of n a tu re as the realm of life, lim itless divisibility, evolving n a tu re of the individual substance, opposing its ungraspable essence to th a t of the ideal realm of possibility, as veritates contingentes (veritates facti) to veritates necessarias (of the ideal realm of th e possible). 7
F urtherm ore, he arrives a t the differentiation of m etaphysics from m athem atics and other sciences upon a sim ilar ground: “...m athem atics carry w ith them th e ir proofs and corroborations which is th e principal cause of th e ir success; w hereas in m etaphysics w e are deprived of this
6 Cf. “On the General Characteristic,” ibid., p. 340.
7 De S cien tia U niversalis seu Calculo Philosophico, Erdmann (facsim ile)
p. 1684,
advantage.” 8 He sum m arizes his view in a le tte r to A rnauld w riting: “One should alw ays explain n a tu re m athem atically and mechanically, provided one knows th a t th e very principles or laws of mechanics or of the force do not depend upon the m athem atical space alone b u t on some m etaphysical reasons.” 9 A nd already a few years earlier Leibniz has stated th a t m athem atics itself is only a branch of the science oE characters—may be m ore developed and rational—among o th er p a rti cular sciences. In a le tte r to H enry O ldenburg he w rites: “I have come to u nderstand th a t everything of this kind w hich algebra proves is only due to a higher science, which I now usually call a combinatorial characteristic.” 10 Thus the universal characteristic in Leibniz’ thought has a status independent of specific methodological problems. And for a good reason.
Indeed the philosophical m eaning of th e universal science does not lie eith er in its practical application n o r in its function of unifying the whole system of hum an knowledge. To keep things in proportion: electronic brains do not rise a philosophical problem because they perform m ental operations of m an and even exceed his m ental powers; it is still m an th a t has to devise, invent, operate them and in terp ret th e ir results. The philosophical problem lies in th e relation between the n atu re of existing reality such th a t m an m ay discover its “charac te rs ” and ru les and apply them ; th a t is, the philosophical problem lies in the relation between th e n a tu re of reality, of m an and of cognition itself.
F or Leibniz the possibility of th e universal science raises a crucial philosophical question which none of th e p articu lar branches of know ledge could answ er on its own account. “If ch aracters can be applied to ratiocination, th ere is in them a complex m u tu al relation or order th a t fits th e things, w rites Leibniz and the g reat question emerges: “W hat is the tru e basis upon w hich everything can be attrib u ted its characteristic n u m b er?” 11
In different term s, none p a rticu lar science m ay inquire into the principles of its own methodology. These principles concern the con ditions of knowledge itself as a h u m an enterprise on the one hand and as revealing th e workings) of n atu re on th e other hand. As far as scientific research m ight progress in its discovery of th e positive features and laws of m an’s functioning and of this of nature, as far as it m ight p en etrate into and clarify the rules of th e cognition itself, it w ill not be able to avoid the question of the ultim ate relation be
8 “On the Reform of M etaphysics and of the Notion of Substance,” transl. Duncan in P hilosophical W orks of L eibn iz, 1890, p. 69.
9 14 July 1686, Gerhardt.
1U Dec. 28, 1675. In Loemker, p. 257.
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tw een the universe of things and beings and hum an mind, and the question of th e significance of man, w ho is not only an integral, living p a rt of nature, b u t m ay him self inquire into its law s and control them.
Leibniz’ m etaphysical system of the individual substance and of the preestablished harm ony is an attem p t to answ er these m eta-scientific and m eta-m ethodological questions. Since his time, however, th e tr e mendous am ount of new data flowing incessantly in from all fields of inquiry offers a n am plified basis for the reform ulation and a new tre a t m ent of these questions. Instead of draw ing u n w arran ted conclusions from the scientific progress about th e absolute and u ltim ate statu s of scientific statem ents, conclusions th a t no science entails, and instead of arb itrarily lim iting the range of questions to be seriously asked to those th a t positive science can solve, w e should acknowledge w ith Leibniz the m eta-scientific and m eta-m ethodological roots of science itself asking after its philosophical foundations.
A novel attem p t a t answ ering th e question “W hat is th e tru e basis upon w hich everything can be attrib u te d its characteristic n u m b er?” upon a vast ground of new scientific evidence could give: 1. a novel m eaning to science as a hum an enterprise, 2. a tru ly “enlightened” significance of scientific and technological results fo r individual hum an life, 3. an adequate evaluation of m an’s place in the cosmos, 4. an elucidation of m an’s specific drives and nostalgies tow ards a destiny higher than those of other elem ents in n a tu re in relatio n to super n a tu ra l factors.
Instead of being arb itrarily dismissed as “p o etry ” o r confined to th e clarification of scientific concepts an d of th e ordinary language, or satisfield w ith m ind’s constructive im agination rem ain busy w ith its pursuit, philosophy could assum e th e role of in terp retin g science and progress to man. This role to w hich science itself compels it w ould bridge the presen t hiatus betw een the two and allow m an to recon stru ct his universe around him, m aking again th e w orld a congenial place of his belonging.
TOWARDS THE BALANCE BETWEEN LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE IN LEIBNIZ’ THINKING
The problem of th e relation among sciences brings us directly to our second argum ent.
G enerations upon generations of philosophers drew profound in spiration from Leibniz’ thought. They incorporated m any of L eibniz’ ideas into th e ir own theories. W hereas his body of doctrine w ith its manysized aspects, various tendencies and large spectrum of points of view combined in one vertiginous philosophical reconstruction has
h ard ly found an appropriate evaluation. P erh aps th e v ast range of Leibniz’ interests m ight be responsible for th e fact th a t stu d y of his w ork has developed by fragm entary and onesided approaches. Scholars presenting and interp retin g his philosophy have introduced a distorting bias reflecting th e ir own lim ited perspective, not Leibniz. In te rp re ta tions abound showing his thought respectively as panpsychic, pan- vitalistic, pannm onistic, panenergetic, panfinalistic, panspiritualistic, panlogistic etc. In spite of a considerable progress accomplished recently in Leibniz’ scholarship in French and G erm an researches, th e pan- logistic approach stem m ing from th e tendency of the late 19th and early 20th century scholarship seems to prevade still Leibniz’ u nder standing, especially in th e A nglo-Saxon philosophy distorting his thou gh t and precluding the access to its appreciation and evaluation for th e present day reflection. The domination of this bias seems to be due, a t least p artly , to the neglect of an other, equally im portant source of Leibniz’ philosophical inspiration w hich has influenced him in his m ajor philosophical decisions, nam ely of his roots in th e n atu ral science of his day. A lthough the recent research has, on the one hand, accomplished a few essential steps tow ards establishing an autonomous and central role of Leibniz’ m etaphysics, and, on the other han d the role of n a tu ra l science in his m etaphysical thinking has been pointed out and proved a t least in certain, realm s like dynamics, th e panlogistic bias m ay be definitely disspelled once we clearly and succintly confront the elem ents of Leibniz’ m athem atico-logical inspiration w ith those gained from physico-biological reflection. The so established balance w ill open a new perspective upon Leibniz’ thinking w ith in which a pro per and adequate appreciation can be given to his wide spectrum of concepts and in tuitions in th e ir original, irréductible features.
To restore to th e in terp retatio n the balance betw een the logical and th e n a tu ra l elem ent intrinsic in Leibniz’ thought m eans to bring to light the w onderful proportion th a t Leibniz’ th ought has achieved be tw een th e strict rigour and contingent fluidity, betw een necessary con nections and unpredictability of th e n atu ra l curse of life, betw een the strict rational order and the infinitely divisible and expanding u n i versal process of nature.
L. E. Loemker, in his most recent review of Leibniz’ scholarship today w rites: “It is no longer necessary, after the w ork of K abitz and others, to refu te the argum ent of C outurat th a t the m etaphysics of Leibniz is m ade to rest entirely upon his logic, b u t it is nonetheless im portant not to lose sight of th e fact th a t Leibniz did propose in the early H annover years, and never la ter repudiated, a panlogistic m eta physics in which the divine perfections or perfect attrib u tes themselves constitute, in finite measures, the p rim ary qualities out of w hich God,
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by calculating, m akes the w orld and the individuals in it.” 12 For sup p o rt Loem ker brings Primae Veritates, Discours de M étaphysique, the De Analyse et Synthèse and quotes in p articu la r Leibniz’ com m ent to the little Dialogue of 1677 w hich reads: “Cum DEUS calculât et cogita- tionem exercet, fit m undum .”
A fter our effort to establish previously the relation of p articu lar sciences and m ethods to the universal science and th e following from it tw o different (if not three) meanings of “calculus” and “calculating” L oem ker’s statem en t appears surprizing.13
From the point of a tex tual scholarship, th ere is indeed a certain difficulty since although it is universally recognized th a t th e re are tw o distinctive phases in Leibniz’ thinking, the second of w hich w ith a turning-point in th e 1690s, yet Leibniz has no t expressedly repudiated his ideal of m athem atical and logical rigour. However, if we approach this question from the inside of his philosophical thinking and re cognize the pluridim ensionality of his thought we see th a t th ere is a tertiu m quid betw een the rigour of the necessary b u t m erely possible and the flux of life. I t is only as a te rtiu m quid th a t the individual substance or m onad on th e one extrem e, and the universal harm ony on the other extrem e in the interplay of a c o n s t i t u t i v e s y s t e m o f t h e u n i v e r s e m ay account for the crucial philosophical question em erging from the idea of a universal science. H ere we lim it ourselves only to dissociate on main points of Leibniz’ m etaphysics seen from the inside, the logico-m athem atical and th e em pirico-natural aspects which w ill dissipate th e rem n an t of the panlogical prejudice. The question is not w hether Leibniz has abandoned his ideal of rigo rous organisation and expression in favour of a less rational, vitalistic conception, b u t how he brings them into proportion in w hich the role of logic being acknowledged, y et the y o uthful idea of its absolute p re em inence upon a subsequent corroboration of his ideas vanishes.
There can be no doubt th a t Leibniz’ earliest thinking has been cast in a logical fram e. N either would anyone deny th a t his first philoso phical interests w ere intertw ined w ith logical ones. F u rth erm o re, throughout his life Leibniz aspired to th e ideal of logical clarity, ex- haustivness and completness in stru ctu ra tio n and definition. He realized, however, also and quite early th a t th e re is only a lim ited realm of knowledge w here such com plete and precise definitions a re practicable. D raw ing upon th e evidences gathered from his practice in jurisprudence and his great interest in th e em pirical science of his time, Leibniz makes a radical distinction betw een the rational and th e em pirical
12 L. E. Loemker, “Leibniz in Our Time. A Survey of Recent Leibniz L itera ture,” Philosophische Rundschau, Novem ber 1965, p. 81—111.
intu itio n. 14 The first applies only to relations, w hereas the objects of thought can be grasped only by em pirical intuition. In fact o b j e c t s of thought can n ev er be absolutely grasped and know n. 15
This prim acy of the em pirical intuition in cognition of the w orld th a t a t this early point breaks through Leibniz’ genuine faith in reason, logical principles and rigour is of crucial im portance for Leibniz’ fu r th e r development. I t will pave the w ay for fu rth e r insights into laws of nature, into increasing insistance of counterbalancing the study of form al logic by logic of probabilities w hich Leibniz has urged fo rth with.
B ut th ere are other reasons which m ake us doubt th a t th ere has been really any tu rn in g point in Leibniz’ thinking ra th e r than a simple shift of emphazis upon his interests, of interests w hich have been presen t all the w ay in his mind. To trace in a few points the origin and form ation of his m etaphysical system le t me point out, concerning the individual substance, that:
1. Some of th e basic features of the m onad seem already to be prefigured in Leibniz’ De Principio Individui (1663). This stresses in dividuality, indivisibility and com pletness of th e individualizing p rin ciple. It was Leibniz’ concern for completness of featu res w hich made him reject th e haecceitas of Duns Scotus.
2. Also in th e earliest association w ith Weigel in th e same period w e may trace the notion of th e conatus or striving force w hich has opened th e door to his dynamics. 16 This culm inated la ter in the dyna mic spontaneity of the individual substance.
3. Leibniz’ serious studies in m athem atics and logic stem m from a relatively late P aris period. W hereas still in a pre-logical tim e in Paris, Leibniz has been deeply im pressed by passionate discussions around Theodor K orckring’s thesis (1672).17 K orckring proposed the theory th a t man originates from th e egg, containing already all the prerequisites for his development. The claim of selfdeterm ination, in dependence from exterior factors, and of a selfgoverning agency of living beings contained in this theory seems to fit very w ell w ith the previously m entioned points; we find its alm ost direct transposition in th e theory of the individual substance, as it is form ulated in the Discours (1686).
4. Leibniz m ight have expounded his points of view on n atu re and the universe much longer in his la ter period, y et in the Discours not only do we have already the above enum erated echoes from Leibniz’
14 De S tilo philosophico, Nizoli and Erdmann, facsim ile.
15 A. T. Tym ieniecka, op. cit., aim s at elucidating th e unity of Leibniz’ m ulti farious ideas through th e idea of an underlying “constitute system .”
16 M artial Guérault, D ynam ique e t m éta p h ysiq u e leibniziennes, Paris 1934, p. 24. 17 O stogenia Foetum e t A ntropogenia ichnographia.
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interest in n a tu ra l science b u t th e featu re of th e individual m onad as originating only by creation and having no o th er end possible b u t an nihilation is in correspondance w ith A m au ld b ro ug ht back directly to the studies of Sw am m erdam and Leewenhoeck, and th e ir research about the progressive transform ation of anim als. 18
5. Leibniz’ w ork in physics gave to th e m onad another essential feature, th a t of spontaneity and life. U nder the influence of Huygens, whom he m et in P aris and against th e C artesian notion of a passive space, Leibniz has developed th e conviction th a t th e re is nothing in m atter w ithout life. 19 It is not necessary to stress how well th e idea of vis viva corroborated in th e notion of substance Leibniz’ early con ception of th e conatus or striving force.
From this brief chronology we see th a t the notion of th e individual substance, the cornerstone of Leibniz’ philosophy and m etaphysics, had all the basic features already in the Discours, b u t all its basic elem ents have been already w aiting for this decisive form ulation before Leibniz entered in his logical period, th a t is before h e has invented th e logical calculus (some tim e about 1678). The individual substance is already in germ, individual, spontaneous, indivisible, autonom ous th a t is self- sustaining and selfsufficient, containing w ithin itself his destiny and its laws. It is projected as an im m aterial principle of order, articulating the w orld of agregates and anim ating it through its spontaneity and life.
When about 1677— 9, inspired by his invention of the logical calculus, during his stay in Paris, Leibniz has devised th e notion com plete of the substance, nam ely th a t it could be grasped and expressed in a logi cal w ay as a subject containing all his predicates, all th e “su b stan tial” hyletic features of th e monad w ere ready to be p u t in his final logical form ulation. B ut all these (or alm ost all) featu res come from e x tra - logical, and to a considerable extend physico-biological sources of inspiration. La notion complete of the substance expresses only one of its aspects, this of its selfcontained autonomy, w hereas the significance of th e m onad for Leibniz’ m etaphysical edifice as a cornerstone of th e process of n a tu re on th e one hand, and of th e creativ e planning, on the other, relies to the same degree on its spontaneity, vitality, ind estructi bility, selfgoverning agency w hich give th e concrete ground for the logical form ulation.
18 Letter to A rnauld, Oct. 9, 1687, ed. Georges L e Roy, Paris 1957, p. 189. 19 D ialogue P acidius P h ilaleth i, Couturat, p. 594—627; also in his letter to Remond de Montmort (1714) Leibniz wrote: “Il est vrai que je n ’entrai dans les plus profondes qu’après avoir conversé avec M. H uygens à Paris. Mais quand je cherchai le s dernières raisons du M écanism e et les lois m êm es du M ouvem ent, je fus tout surpris de voir qu’il était im possible de les trouver dans les M athé m atiques, et qu’il fallait retourner à la M éthaphysique.” Erdmann, p. 702.
Leibniz’ la ter stress upon the organic nature, the macrocosmic pro cess of th e universe and th e monad as th e vital principle seems to be m erely a coun terpart to his earlier stress upon the exem plary perfec tion of the m athem atical and logical rationality and expression. But he has been alw ays aw are of both.
The “dem ystification” of th e logical preponderance in the notion of the individual substance is not w ith o u t im portance for th e final eluci dation of th e alledged panlogism a t th e level of th e universal harm ony and creation. As we have already pointed out it is th e n atu re of th e “calculus” w hich Leibniz attrib u tes to th e creative factor in estim ating the capacity of th e universal scheme of the possible w orld and the com possibility of individual substances to coexist w ithin one and the same scheme, th a t is th e great question. B ut two o ther factors have to be considered: 1. th e n atu re of the universal harm ony to be established, 2. w h at role does the individual substance play in the final calculation. The notion of the preestablished harm ony, second in im portance only to th a t of the individual substance has been often considered as a m etaphysical correlate of Leibniz’ analysis situs, in fact as its direct tran splan tatio n from geom etry to metaphysics, emphasizing the aspect of the preestablished harm ony as th e organisatory pattern. N ext to this aspect however, th ere is the role of th e preestablished harm ony in the actual coming of the universe into existence. Indeed, it is as early as in 1666 th a t Leibniz, pandering over th e reason w hy some beings exist and n ot others, sees the u ltim ate reason for existence in the principle of choice w riting th a t “th e intim ate principle of things is the universal harm ony.” 20 Leibniz w rites to A rnauld: “It was therefore not because of th e resolution m ade in respect to Adam, bu t because of the resolution made a t the same tim e in regard to all th e rest (to which the form er involves a perfect relationship) th a t God form ed the determ ination in regard to all hum an events.” 21
We have previously exam ined carefully th e n a tu re of the p re- established harm ony in term s of th e universal creative p attern in which the laws of compossibility among substances entering into it give the basis for the creative planning of th e universe.22 We have distinguished in this respect betw een th e possibility as a strictly rational concept, as simply n ot involving contradiction, and “compossibility”—an existential concept w hich Leibniz defines as an adjustm ent to the system of connections w ith th e rest of the universe. 23 We have also
20 A n authobiographical fragm ent from 1666. Cf. Foucher de Careil, M ém oire
sur la ph ilosoph ie de L eibn iz, I, 11/2.
21 Letter to Arnauld, Ju ly 14, 1686, transi. M ontgomery, p. 120.
23 Cf. A. T. T ym ieniecka, op. cit., Part II, “The S ystem o f L aw s” and 3, 4, 5. 23 In order that som ething be com possible w rites Leibniz: “c’est-à -d ire adm issible à l’existen ce actuelle, il faut connaître sa connection avec le reste de l’univers.” Letter to Bourget, Dec. 1714, Gerhardt, III.
Le ibn iz’ Philosophy and Science Today 1 6 9
tried to establish in the present essay th a t not only la notion complète of the substance, as its logical aspect, could n o t account for the fundam ental features of the monad th a t makes it th e principle of the phenom enal w orld and th e cornerstone of the universal p attern , b u t th a t the in tern al n atu re of th e m onad w hich contains “a law of the continuation of the series of its own operations,” 24 cannot be simply conceived as the law of the m athem atical series, because it could not account for th e organically unifying, qualitatively contingent n atu re of w hat it unifies, and th a t the type of the “unification” of the suc cessive stages itself is not a mere sequence of order b u t a dynamic, specifically vitalistic and productive m otivation. Consequently, we have insisted upon the specific “substantial u n ity ” of th e monadic inw ard stru ctu re involving dynam ism and order in opposition to th e m a them atical law of the series as applying and expressing order alone. If we ask now, how in view of these conceptions both of the monad as of th e universal harm ony thus elucidated, could have Leibniz understood th e principles of the planning, selection and creative mechanism it follows that:
1. As Leibniz has alw ays insisted upon a project of a “philosophical calculus” as applicable already to th e universal science of characters to which n eith er logical no r m athem atical calculus w ould have sufficed, th ere is no reason to believe w ith Loemker, 25 as it seems, th a t the way in which the creative factor (God) “calculates” th e composible elem ents of the w orld thereby em erging should be identified w ith ether, the algebraic or the logical calculus. On the contrary, a specific meaning of th e “philosophical calculus” should be sought. 26
2. If already for the organisation and m anipulation of the system of th e universal characteristic, in view of the contingent n a tu re of the universe, a specific philosophical calculus had to be accepted, how can we imagine th a t th e same universe of things and beings envisaged sub specie creationis could be grasped by a p articu la r type of operations applicable adequately m erely to the “tru th of reasoning” b u t not to the “tru th of fact.”
24 A. T. Tym ieniecka, op. cit., Part I, chap. 1, section 1, “The Monad and the Law of the Series,” p. 107— 116.
25 Cf. Loem ker’s previously quoted article in loc. cit., p. 99.
26 We seem to be in agreem ent w ith G ottfried M artin’s distinction betw een scientific and m etaphysical logic in Leibniz’ thought. Cf. Leibniz, L ogik und
M etaph ysik, Koln 1960. H ow ever a question arises: can the creative “calcu latio”
w hich is only a super-rational planning (the Creator “know s” the substances not in their existing su ccessive unfolding but all at one glance, w hich seem s to be an entirely different type of “rationality” than hum an rationality) but sim u lta neously bringing into existen ce w hat Leibniz calls “fulguration” or “em anation,” that is both rational and dynam ic, be identified even w ith th e “philosophical calculus” dealing at the level of human rationality alone? Even this is certainly not sufficient.
3. Considering th a t already th e m aterial to be “calculated,” th a t is th e individual substances w hich then have to be considered from all possible angles in ord er to ad ju st to the creative p attern of the w orld— th e ir existential condition—cannot be grasped by strictly rational form ula otherw ise b u t m erely in th e ir type of organisation, it seems indispensable to assum e th a t Leibniz could n o t have identified the creative deliberation w ith any singular type of rational operation.
The m isunderstandings underlying the prejudice of Leibniz’ “pan- logism” seem now disspelled no t only on one extrem e point of his system, th a t of the individual substance b u t also on the opposite extrem e point, th a t of the universal harm ony and of the creative planning. 27 By the sam e stroke we hope to have shown th a t all along w ith his generally em phasized ideal of a strictly rational, m athem atical and logical, stru ctu ratio n and form ulation, Leibniz has, albeit w ith varying intensity and emphazis, considered and adequately evaluated th e em pirical evidence of n atu ra l science concerning the contingent n atu re of th e universe and man.
Only in this full-fledged perspective, w hich Leibniz him self has well outlined in his autobiographical N ew S ystem of Nature and Com munication of Substances may we rise to th e authentic meaning of Leibniz’ reflection.
I n c o n c l u d i n g : The enormous progress “in the m ain articles of know ledge” has, on the one hand, led to enorm ous specialization in each field, on the other hand, created an illusory faith in th e selfsufficiency of p articu lar sciences and th eir consequent independence from philosophy. T heir increasing methodological unity, however, does not solve the philosophical questions which its very possibility seems to raise. An inquiry “to guarantee th e un ity to the body of knowledge w hereof all the p a rts w ere p roperly connected” belongs clearly to philosophy. To develop such a new foundation interp reting scientific results and progress for hum an place in cosmos and his life from the ground of the new scientific knowledge of th e present, y et m indful of the philosophical wisdom of the p ast is th e grand philosophical task th a t Leibniz proposes for the future.
