Turkey and Its Position on the Cyprus
Question Since 1974
Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej nr 7, 117-128
2013
PRZEMYSŁAW
OSIEWICZ
Poznań
Turkey
and
Its
Position
on
the
Cyprus
Question
Since
1974
Introduction
In case of Turkey itsinterests inCyprus date back to the 16thcenturywhen armies of Sultan Selim II managedto conquer the island and incorporate it in theOttoman Em
pire.As aresult, inpracticeCyprus had been underthe Turkishrule until 1878whenthe Britishtookcontrolovertheisland on thebasis of a British-Ottoman treaty. Fromthe legal point of view, however, the period of Ottoman domination finished on the basis of
the Treaty of Lausanne of1923.
After Turks had lostCyprus for goodin 1923 they were not interested in it anymore. At least officially. Despitethefact that they still supportedTurkish Cypriots,Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk did not intend togain control over theisland at thecost of goodrelations withtheUnited Kingdomand Greece. The situation changed when it became clear that Greek Cypriots did not want to endtheir struggle for the unification of Cyprus and Greece, namely enosis.
The Cyprus question has remained one of the most complicatedinternational dis
putessince 1963.1 Itwas the year when theRepublic of Cyprusde factoceased to exist as a kind of consociational federation. It was a consequence of the intercommunal clashes between 1963-1964 and defeats of Turkish Cypriots. These events caused akind ofnational trauma. It wasclear that Turkish Cypriots were defenseless without
any military and political support of Turkey. Moreover, the Cyprusquestion became amatter ofnational interest forTurks. Vamik Volcan claims that “when Turks speak or
write about the Cyprus problem they go back to 1963 andrecount their horror story when theGreek Cypriots, who outnumbered CypriotTurks four to one,forcedthe Cyp riotTurks to live in subhumanconditions in enclaves geographically limited to three
percent of the island. They lived this way, surrounded by their enemies, for eleven
1 Among recentlypublishedbooks on theCyprusquestionare: Michael, S. Michael, Resolving
the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History, Palgrave Macmillan,Basingstoke 2011; T.Diez, N.Tocci (eds.),Cyprus:A Conflict atthe Crossroads, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2009;A.Var- nava, H. Faustmann (eds.), Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond, I.B.Tauris,London 2009;W. Mallinson, Cyprus: DiplomaticHistoryand the Clashof Theory in International Relations,
I.B.Tauris,London2010;A.Sözen (ed.), TheCyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead, Eastern Mediterra nean University PrintingHouse, Famagusta 2008;A.Sepos, The Europeanization ofCyprus: Polity,
Policiesand Politics,Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2008; H. A. Richter, A ConciseHistory of Modern Cyprus 1878-2009, Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen, Ruhpolding2010; D.Isachenko, The Ma king of Informal States: Statebuilding in NorthernCyprusandTransdniestria, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012; H. I.Salih, Reshaping of Cyprus: A Two-State Solution, Xlibris, Bloomington 2013.
years”(Volkan 2008,p. 95). Yetitshouldbe made clear that GreekCypriots do not share thisopinion. Moreover, they claim that suchevents did not take place and these
were Greek Cypriots who became victims of the Turkish invasionof 1974. Conse quently,in their opinion thedisputebegan in 1974,not in 1963.
Although in 50years there weredozens of peaceinitiatives all of them were unsuc cessful. Harriet Martinrightlypoints outthat “Cyprus has thereputationas a mediator’s
graveyardand itis easyto seewhy” (Martin 2006, p. 30). The Cyprus question is not important only to members of bothCypriotcommunities,namelyGreek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots, butalso to Greeks, Turks and the British. There are afew reasons for that including historical background, security issuesaswell as ethnic composition.In
case of Turkey,the Cyprus question is also a matter ofnational interest.
The article represents a comparative approach. Itis dedicated to an analysis of the Turkishforeign policy towards theCyprus question since 1974,namely after the Turk ish militaryintervention.Thegiven period covers almost 40years therefore attention is paid to themost significant moments as well as generalpositions of various Turkish
governments on the Cyprus question. The main aim is to determine elements of conti
nuity as well aselements of change within the Turkish position on the dispute. Inorder to achievethis goal the article has been divided into threemain parts, namely(1) histor ical background, (2) theperiodbetween 1974-2002and finally (3)theperiod of the Peace and Justice (AKP)rule in Turkey.
A BriefHistorical Overview: The Attitude of Turkey Towards theCyprus QuestionBefore1974
The more Greek Cypriots insisted on the unification of Cyprus with Greece, the
more Turkey was interested in developments on the island and its future status. The British rule did not pose any threat to Turkey’s security. The situationwouldhave changeddramaticallyif Cyprus had beenceded to Greece. Hence Turkeywas deter
mined to react and presentits own concept. In the opinion of Sina Ak§in,“Turkey had
initially laid claimto thewhole of Cyprus (with theslogan ‘Cyprus is Turkish and will stay Turkish’), but after reassessment itwas decidedthatthis was unrealistic and anew demand arose” (Ak§in 2007, p. 257). As a result, starting from the mid-50’sTurkey optedfora division of theisland’s territorybetween Greeceand Turkey. Turks intro ducedeven their ownterm,taksim,to counterbalance theGreek concept, i.e.enosis. Yet
none of the above plans was accomplished. In 1959 Greece, Turkey,theUnitedKing dom as well as representativesof bothCypriotcommunitiesmade acompromise con cerning thefuture of Cyprus. During theconferences in Zürich and in London all sides
agreed on thefoundation of an independent Cypriotstate. Asaresult,the Republicof Cypruswas founded in 1960 and Turkey becameone outofthree guarantors of the con
stitutionalorder on the island. Turkey’s rights were confirmedin theTreaty of Guaran tee of 1960 (Treaty, 2003). Moreover,on the basisof the Additional Protocol No. 1 to
theTreaty ofAllianceof 1960Turkey wasallowed to maintain up to 650 soldiers on the
island. They were to counterbalancethepresence of theGreek contingent, namely950 Greek soldiers (Additional, 2003,p. 136).
Unfortunately, itsoon became clear thatthe two Cypriot communities were not pre pared for cooperation and had different opinionswith regard to security issues, power sharing, taxation and the so-called municipal issue. Firstthese differences had led to
a constitutional crisisand then resulted in the intercommunalclashes between1963-64. Although Turkey backed TurkishCypriots,it didnot decidetointervenemilitarily this
time except for a few air raids (Oberling 1982,p. 119). Turkish Cypriots left all public
posts and were forced to live ina number ofsmall enclaves scatteredall over the island.
Aslivingconditions in the enclaves were very bad, Turkey was helping Turkish Cypri ots within bounds of possibility. Simultaneously, Turks engaged ina diplomatic cam paignin order to supportTurkish Cypriots. Despitethat, another crisison the island took place in 1967. According to Cihat Göktepe “the 1967Cyprus crisis brought both
Turkey and Greece tothe edge of war. Turkey was determinedtosendtroops to theis
landwiththe intention to protect her interests and the securityofTurkish Cypriots. This
problemwassolved in a peaceful way. The Americanswere veryactive inthis process” (Göktepe 2005, p. 441). But unsettled disputes remain unsettled disputes. The interven
tionhad taken place neither in 1964 nor in 1967, but in 1974itwassimply unavoidable. And therewerea few reasons for that.
The successful coup d’etat of the Greek Cypriot right of15 July 1974 radically changed the situation on the island. Turkey had two options. The first one was con nected withdiplomaticefforts, while the secondmeant a militaryintervention. It was not a secret that the Turkish armed forces werewell prepared forsuchscenario. First
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit decided to search fora peaceful solution in the UK, albeit
thearmy was ready for landing. Whendiplomatic talks did not meet Turkey’sexpecta
tions,theTurkish government decided to authorize the beginning of the military opera
tion on 20 July.
UmutUzerrightly pointed outthat“the 1974 intervention in Cyprus was acase of
themilitaryandthe governmentcoordinating theirpolicies in a diligent manner. In
fact, because there had been indirect military rule in the years between 1971 and
1973, which had exposed the armyto the gameofpolitics and left itwith littletaste for
itthereafter, the military was reluctant to influencegovernmental policies.The suc
cessful conclusion of the Cyprus debacle increased the military establishment’scon fidence in the Ecevit government in particular andin civilian rule in general”(Uzer
2011, p. 78).
Although theTurkish military intervention in Cypruswas condemnedby the inter national community especially the UnitedNations Security Council, the Turkish authorities claimed that they had no other choicebut to intervene. TheTurkish govern
ment’s priority was to protect the Turkish Cypriot community at any cost. The then
PrimeMinister Bülent Ecevit never changed hisopinion about legitimacy of the 1974
military operation. In 2000, in aninterview with Johann Pillai, Ecevitsaid: “But Turkey -we - cannotgive up our national rights... and we keep reminding our European
friends that there is no realproblem on the island; on the contrary, before the present
setupwas established in 1974,therewas continuous bloodshed on the island, either in theform of genocidalattacks against theTurks,or asconflictsbetweenGreek factions.
Butsince mid-1974, mid-August 1974, there has existedcomplete, uninterrupted peace on the island for the firsttime” (Pillai,2000, p. 21).
Turkeyand Its Position on the Cyprus Question Between 1974-2002 One of the consequences of the intervention has been a de facto division of theis
land. De iure exists onlyone Cypriotstate, namely the Republic of Cyprus,however,de facto thereare two of them.In November 1983 Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared independence and foundation of theTurkish Republic of NorthernCyprus(TRNC).So farthe new realities on theislandhave been recognizedonly by Turkeywhichmain
tains diplomatic relations withthe TRNC. Turkeyis also burdened with the Turkish
Cypriot budget. Annually Turkeyguarantees and transfers money which covers around
a halfof theTRNC’s budget.
According toPhilip Robins, in the 90’stheCyprus question became themostimpor tantissueof the Turkishforeign policy. He claimed thatthe general lackof public mobi lization, for instance, “in the Bosnian case was hardly surprising given the elite orientation offoreignpolicyin Turkey, and the absence ofissues other thanCyprusthat
animate the wider population” (Robins, 2003, p. 369). In the givenperiodthe Cyprus question wasalso important asanelement of theGreek-Turkish relations. Tensions be tween Athens and Ankara made quite an impacton the situationon the island.
Besides,theunsettledCyprusproblem alsodetermined EU-Turkey relations. “The irritations on bothsidesreached a high-point in 1997. After theEU had yet again urged Turkey tofind a solution to the Cyprus question,to improve its human rights record and to ameliorate conditions in Kurdish areas, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs
[Tansu] Qi 11 er threatened to block theNATO membership ofPoland,Hungary and the
Czech Republic unless Turkeywas also giventhe statusof candidate-memberof the EU” (Brusse, Griffiths 2004,p. 23-24).
At thattimethe Turkish position meant unconditional support for TurkishCypriots
especially for the then President of the Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus Rauf Denkta§. Until2002 Turkishgovernments did not intendtocompromisetheirstances
on theCyprus question for the sake of beingaccepted by the European Union. More
over,some Turkish politicians blamedboththe European Union and Greek Cypriots for
a stalemate in the intercommunal negotiation processat the turn of thecentury. The rea son was the opening of accessiontalksbetweenthe EUandtheRepublic of Cyprus,
namely only with the Greek Cypriot side. Turkey was afraid that Turkish Cypriots would become marginalized. Besides, once the Republic of Cyprus became an EU memberstate,it would beableto block the potential accession process of Turkey. One ofthese politicians was Ismail Cem,the former Minister ofForeign Affairs of Turkey, who in 1996 forewarned againstconsequencesof a possible accession of theRepublic
ofCyprusto the European Union. Inone ofhis speechesCem statedas follows:“Greek Cypriots are quite satisfied with thestatus quo. They are encouragedby the European Union,which admitted themas a ‘candidate’for accession. They thinkthat sooneror later theywill become amember and havethe advantage ofmaking integral part to
a powerful union. Then, they figure, they will be in a much stronger position to dictate their will to Turkish Cypriots.Therefore, they do not want anychange, they are not after a mutuallyacceptable solution, and they just want the time to runby” (Cem, 2001, p. 143).
In 2000 Wojciech Forysinski wrote:“There are two other politicalconditions for
standing of theCopenhagen criteria. These are the Cyprus questionandsettlement of outstanding border disputes” (Forysinski, 2000,p. 200). Inaddition heunderlined that
Turkey seemedto have no intention tochange its position on Cyprus and maintained that the European Union’spolicy did not inany way enhance the chances ofa settle ment. It madeit onlymore difficult to achieve (Forysinski, 2000, p.201).Undoubtedly,
such assessmentwas right atthat time. One could saya lot aboutthe Turkishforeign
policytowards Cyprusbetween 1974-2002, but not that itwasflexible orconciliatory. Nonetheless, atthe very beginning of the 21stcenturysome Turkish politicians under
stoodthenecessity ofa realignment of the Turkish foreign policy.Among them were
future leadersRecep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and Ahmet Davutoglu. The out lookof thelast ofthem wasof primarymeaning.
TheReorientation in the Turkish ForeignPolicy Under the AKP Rule:
Implications for theCyprus Question
The Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant changes since November 2002 when thePeaceand JusticeParty(AKP)came into power in Turkey. The Copen
hagen Summit of December 2002 “showed clearly that thepossibility ofTurkey’s ac cession to Europedependson the resolution of the Cyprus conflict” (Keyman, Oni§,
2007, p. 172).Yet it was easy to say, hard to conduct. Nonetheless, the AKPgovern ment was determined to conduct suchchanges.Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly stated, “as an indicationofhisdeterminationto solvethe Cyprusproblem,thatTurkey would bealways one stepahead in coming up withproposals so asto findbreakthroughs in the resolution of the problems” (Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, 2009, 144). The opposition harshly criticized the new government forsuchfundamental changes. At thesame time AKP presented such shiftas anoutcome of rationalchoice and an example ofpragma
tism. This way the government intendedto get rid of ideologicallimitations especially
of nationalistic nature which had been promotedbefore, for instance, by the army and
kemalists.
ATurkish scholar and politician, Ahmet Davutoglu, became the main author of
a new concept offoreign policy. Hisviews and the conceptof so-called strategic depth werefirst presented in the bookentitled ‘Startejik derinlik: Turkiye’nin uluslararas?
konumu’ (Davutoglu, 2012). One of themost important elements of the new foreign
policy was connected with anew concept, namelyzeroproblemswith neighbours pol icy. Its main aspect was elimination of all disputes and normalization ofbilateral rela
tionswith allneighbouring countries includingCyprus.
Thechangeof position on theCyprus question seemed to benecessary in order to
facilitatedialogue with the European Union and open accession negotiations. It wasal
most certain thatany continuation of the hardlinemeantno progress. Although AKP was in favour of such change, such stance was being criticizedby other parties. For in stance, MumtazSoysal,the former Minister ofForeign Affairs of Turkey, wrote inone ofhis articles: “I am not against a solutiontotheCyprus Problem. But we should insist
ona solution that neither suppresses the Turkish population nor disregards Turkey’s rightsasa guarantor state andits legitimate concerns over theisland. Itis unacceptable
to grant England the rightto have amilitarybase on Cyprus and deny Turkey theright
toprotect her interests by militarymeans if necessary. This isnot anacceptable solu
tion.Therefore,when we sit at the negotiating table with our European counterparts, we
should stand up for ourneglected rightsand prerogatives” (Soysal, 2002, p. 351).
From the beginningof the AKP rule in Turkey it was clearthat Turkish Cypriot
leader Rauf Denkta§ lost unconditionalpolitical support of Ankara. He could, however,
still count onthe armyandPresident Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Unfortunately, as a hard-liner, Denkta§had nothing newto offerand became a kind of burden for the new foreign pol
icy of Turkey. Undoubtedly, it was one of thereasons for supporting MehmetAli Talat and his RepublicanTurkish Partyduringthe parliamentary electionsin the TRNC in
December 2003. This way RecepTayyip Erdogan intendedto present aconciliatory
gesture, resumeintercommunaltalks and, as a result, removethe biggest obstacle in EU-Turkeyrelations.Thelaterresumption oftalks and the April 2004 referenda in Cy
prus only provedthat Erdogan’s tactic was right. Althoughthe so-called AnnanPlan hadnot been approved by bothCypriotcommunities,Turkeywas praised for its con structiveapproach towardsthe Cyprus question. TheTurkish government had encour
aged TurkishCypriots toaccept the plan and it was theGreek Cypriot sidewhich turned
it down. In terms of public relations, the 2004 referendawere meant a big successof
Turkey andthe Turkish Cypriotcommunity. One may even say that it was oneof the
main reasons for the opening ofaccessionnegotiations withTurkey on 3 October 2005.
Yetthe new tactic appeared to be only partially successful. Turkey also demanded liftingthedefacto isolationofnorthern Cyprus. The isolationis both political andeco
nomic. It becametiresomeespecially afterthe foundation of theTurkishRepublic of
Northern Cyprus in1983.TopTurkish politicians kept supporting TurkishCypriots and criticizing the EU atthe same time. For example, EgemenBagi§,theTurkish Minister for EuropeanUnion and Chief Negotiator, wrote:“OnCyprus, we expectEUmember statesto act in full awareness of theircommitments. The Council decision ofApril 26,
2004, regarding liftingthe isolation ofnorthernCyprus has not yet been implemented. The direct trade regulationhas notbeen adopted. Itis particularly sad that Turkish-EU relations shouldbeheld hostage by a single member’s selfish interest.It is unfortunate
that largemember states arehidingbehind the island” (Bagi§ 2011, p. 34).
In 2006 Turkey presented its own peaceinitiative knownas the Action Plan. Its
main assumptions were outlinedby thethen Minister ofForeign Affairs Abdullah Gul.
These were:
- “Opening of the sea ports of Turkey to Greek Cypriot vessels serving the tradeof
goods in accordance with the EC-Turkey Customs Union;
- Allowing GreekCypriot air carrierstousetheTurkish air space for over-flightsand
toland at the Turkish airports in accordancewithrelevant international rules andpro
cedures;
- Openingof the ports inNorthCyprus,includingGazimagusa,Gime, and Gemikonagito internationaltraffic of goods, personsand services under Turkish Cypriot management; - Opening of Ercan airport fordirect flights underthe Turkish Cypriot management;
- Special arrangements for the practical inclusion ofNorthCyprus, as an economicen
tity,into the European Union’s customs union. Unhindered direct trade between both sidesof the Island as well as withthe outside world;
- Participation of the Turkish Cypriot side ininternational sports, cultural andotherso
cial activities” (Gul 2006).
The above initiative wasnotimplemented, however, it was a clear sign of goodwill andreadinessfor cooperation.Again lack oftrust became the main reason for the fail ure of theActionPlan.The Greek Cypriot community was afraid of liftingtherestric
tions imposed on Turkish Cypriots.The authorities of the Republic of Cyprus claimed
thatif they allowed, forexample, to open the ports and airports in ‘the occupied territo ries’, Turkish Cypriots would lose motivation to resume bilateral talks. Moreover, GreekCypriots would gain almost nothing, but they would beforced to change their at
titude towards the Cyprus question completely. It should be emphasized that such
claims werepartially true, because theAction Planwasnot well balanced and offered
Turkish Cypriots much more than Greek Cypriots. Nonetheless, the plan still represents agood example of expectations of theTurkishside.It’s a kind ofminimum plan to be
achieved byTurkish Cypriots and Turkey in a course of any bilateral negotiations.
The AKP government supports theongoing negotiation process on theisland which wasinitiated in 2008. Turkey had backed first MehmetAli Talat,the former President of theTRNC and theTurkish Cypriot leader, and then, after the 2008 Turkish Cypriot presidential elections,it gave its support to Talat’ssuccessor Dervi§Eroglu. Just as the TurkishCypriot leadership Turkeyblames theGreekCypriotside for noprogress during
the currentroundof talks. Inpractice thenegotiations were suspended due to presidential
elections in theRepublic of Cyprus and theCypriot Presidencyof the Council of the Eu
ropeanUnion in thesecondhalf of 2012. Itseems that suchdevelopmentssuit both sides.
Nevertheless, the talks are tobe resumedinOctober 2013 (Transcript, 2013).
Baskm Oran claims that“looking back at a decade of AKP majority rule,it appears that most ofTurkey’s chronic problems have evaded treatment. Domestically, the
Kurdish issue remains farfrom any resolution.Internationally,next to noprogress has been made on Cyprus or with regards to relations withArmenia and Armenianclaims
for genocide recognition” (Oran, 2012, p. xxii). Such observation is trueas far as the
Cyprus question is concerned. Despite the moreflexible attitude of the AKP dominated
government one cannotobserve many positiveresults. Probably the mostnoticeable
outcomewasthe opening of checkpoints onthe island in2003. And that’s it. No doubt the Cyprus questionremains the most important matterof the Turkish for
eign policy. The bestproofis that thedisputetopsthe main issues of theforeign policy
on the official websiteof the MinistryofForeign Affairs(Main,2013). Besides, the Cy
prus question is alsovery important topublic opinion. Although Turkeypresentsthe
Cyprus questionas an externalissueand recognizes the TRNC as a sovereign state, thereis adirect linkbetweendevelopments on theisland andpolitical situation in Tur
key. Hence all Turkish governments, including the current government dominated by
AKP, have to take it intoconsideration.Everydeclaration, everyconcessionor decision
arecarefully analyzed in order to save the nationalconsensus. As a matter of fact, al
most allTurkishpolitical parties share the opinion that Cyprusconstitutesan elementof
the Turkish sphere of influence and that controlover it is ofvital importancefromthe geostrategic point ofview. Therefore one can say thatthe main obj ectiveshave been in variable since 1974 and there have beenonlydifferentideas concerning ways of fulfill ing the objectives. As Kivanc Ulusoy claims,“for Turkey,the Cyprus problem has not
been an ordinaryforeign policy issue since its inception.Defined as a ‘national cause’, it had clearrepercussions on the power struggle in Turkey between the parties of status quo and change in domestic politics and foreignpolicy” (Ulusoy, 2008, p.313-314).
The Cyprus Imbroglio: Implications for Turkey
In the 2003 EU Commission Progress Report, “the European Commission has
warnedthatthe absence of a settlementcouldbecome aserious obstacle to Turkey’s as
pirations ofstarting formal accessiontalks with theEuropean Union. For the first time adirect link was established in an EU reportbetween the resolution of theCyprus prob lem and the starting of negotiations withTurkey” (Yilmaz,2004, p. 130). As a conse quence, Turkeymodifiedits stance on the Cyprus question and supported theAnnan
Plan. Although the UN initiative didnot comeintoforce,Turkeymanaged to strengthen itspositionand open the accession negotiationswith theEU in 2005.Unfortunately,it
was the last good news for Ankara. The talks were proceeding very slowly. Within eight
years bothsides provisionally closedonlyone out of35chapters.One of the reasons is
the 2006 decision of the EU whichfroze talks in eight keyareasunder negotiation due to theunsettled Cyprus question and lack of bilateraldiplomatic relations betweenthe Republic of Cyprus and Turkey.“Turkey refused to extendthe Additional Protocol to
the Ankara Agreement toCyprus.Turkey did infactnotopen ports andairportsto Cyp riot vessels,because the isolation ofnorthernCyprus, whichthe EU was supposed to ease, continued, despite theTurkish Cypriotyes vote” (Öktem, 2011, p. 140).Henceat the moment the EU-Turkey accession negotiations dependmainly on the progress in
bi-communaltalks and normalization of relations betweenTurks and theRepublic of
Cyprus.The onlyquestion is if Turkey wasready to sacrificeCyprus for the sake of EU membership. Nowadays itwould be very hard to imagine such progress of events.No Turkish governmentwould take a riskof a complete withdrawal fromtheislandasit is
regardedas a national interest by themajority ofcitizens. Onecould evensay that for
Turks theCyprus question has become a kind of affairof honor. Anysignificant conces
sions wouldbe interpreted as signs of weakness.
According toÖzlem Oguz Qilsal, Praxoula Kyriacouand Fiona Mullen, “thelargest
opportunity, however, comes fromopening upTurkey’s potential as anenergy hub. As
a direct by-product of theCyprusproblem,Turkey has been unable to open the energy
chapter in its accession negotiationswith theEU andthis kind of uncertainty deters in
vestors. Onthe otherhand,a settlement of the Cyprusproblem thatreunites theisland
and brings peace and stability to the Turkey-Cyprus-Greece region would vastly in
crease foreign interestin the energy sector” (Qilsal, Kyriacou,Mullen, 2010, p. 2). It
shouldbe emphasized, however, that there is noproof that potential investors hesitate
to invest inthe Turkishenergysector due to the unsettled Cyprus question. Yet in thefu ture Turkeymight, for instance, derive money fromtransit of Cypriot gas.At themo ment it is impossible becauseofpoliticallimitations. But if the Cyprus dispute was
settled, such solution would bemutually desirable and beneficial.
The most difficult consequence for Turkey, however, isconnected with akind of paradoxicalstalemate. On the one handitishard to imagineTurkey as anEUmember
state withoutany prior settlementof the Cyprus question, but on the other hand it is
highly unlikelythat theCyprusdispute will besettledwithout a prior accessionof Tur
key to theEU. The more time is passing,theworse. Turkishpublic opinion is lessand less interestedin an EU membership forTurkey(Caha, 2011). Suchscenario cannot be
beneficialto any side of thedispute. In the opinionof Ahmet Sözen, “aTurkeyslipping away from theEU will have less motivation to undertake furtherreforms in thearea of democracy; it will have less incentivetosolve theCyprus problem; and it will fail to be
come a modelof consensus ofcivilizations” in the post-September 11 era, as well as a democratic model for thepost-Arab SpringMiddleEastern andNorth African states,
which will be a great loss for theinternationalcommunityatlarge” (Sözen,2012,p. 125).
Conclusions
TheCyprusquestion has been one of thekey aspectsof the Turkish foreign policy
since the 1950’s. Yetits role became evidentafterthe 1974 events. It wasthe moment
when Turkeyengaged directlyin the Cyprus question. Since then all consecutive Turk ish governmentshave beenburdened with the Cyprusproblem and its bilateral as well
as regional consequences. They havetwodimensions,namely internal as well as exter nal. The firstdimension affectstheTurkish political stage, while the second dimension affectsEU-Turkey relations as well as Turkey-TRNC relations and,finally, Turkey-the
Republic of Cyprus relations.
As far as theTurkish tactic on theCyprus question is concerned, one could observe
asignificant changein 2002 whenthePeaceand Justice Party came into power. Yetthe
mainaims remained unchanged. TheAKP government took a more flexible stand inor der toprove its goodwill andimprove itsbilateral relations withthe European Union.
The GreekCypriot side remained skepticalwith reference tothe Turkish goodwill, but
the factis that Ankara wastryingto convince Turkish Cypriots to accept the Annan
Plan in 2004 and bringthe 30years old division of the island to anend. Although the Annan Plan did not come into force due to a resounding ‘no’of Greek Cypriots, the Turkish tacticwas successful as TurkishCypriots accepted the plan. As a result, nobody
could accuse Turkey of inaction orobstructionof negotiations anymore. This time it
was theGreek Cypriot side which was to blame.Undoubtedly, the new policypaved the way for the opening of EU-Turkeynegotiations in October 2005.
One can saythatthe main objectiveshave been invariable since 1974, there have been only different ideas concerningways of fulfillingthe objectives. For instance, in terms ofofficial rhetoric theAKP positionis more flexible than theposition ofCHP,but
what both parties have in commonis that they want Turkeyand Turkish Cypriots to
gain as much aspossible without any serious concessions. The reason is the Cyprus question still remainsthe most importantissueof the Turkishforeign policy. What’s more,it isalso a national cause with all its impacts on the power struggle in Turkey.No matter who is in power, there are some concessions which will neverbe made, e.g. acomplete withdrawalofTurkish troopsfromtheisland.As a result, boththe European UnionandGreekCypriotscanexpect a constructive approachof Turkey tothe Cyprus
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Summary
The Cyprusquestion is one ofthe most complexinternational disputes, whichthe Republic of Turkey has been engaged in since its foundation in1923. AlthoughCyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, the Turks actuallylost controlover the island in 1878. British rule only strengthened ethnic divisions in Cyprus, especially when Cyprus becameaCrown Colony in 1925. After World War II, Greek Cypriots wantedto unitewith mainland Greece (enosis),
whileTurkish Cypriots promoted the division ofthe island’s territory between Greece and Tur key (taksim). Finally, both sides agreed onthe foundation ofan independent Cypriot state, named the Republic ofCyprus, in 1960, andbecame its guarantors. Yet thiswas not the end of the Cyprus question. Lack of mutualtrust ledto further clashes betweenthe two communities in 1963 and resulted in a disintegration of the state. The mostimportantevents, however, took place in1974, when Turkey decided to intervene militarily on theisland in response to a Greek Cypriot coup d’etat. This paper is devoted to the Turkish position onthe Cyprus questionafter the inter ventionanddivisionof Cyprus. Has the policyundergone any significantchanges since 1974? Is the Cyprus question a matter of Turkishnational interest? The papercompares twoperiods, namely that from 1974 to 2002andafter 2002.
Streszczenie
Turcja i jej stanowiska w kwestii Cypru od 1974 roku
Kwestia cypryjska pozostaje jednym z najbardziejzłożonych sporów międzynarodowych, w który RepublikaTurcji jest zaangażowana od początków swegofunkcjonowania,czyli roku 1923. Cypr zostałpodbity przezImperiumOsmańskie w 1571 roku. Turcy stracili jednak nad nim faktyczną kontrolęw 1878 roku. Okres brytyjskich rządów przyczynił się do zaostrzenia po
działu etnicznego na wyspie, zwłaszcza po tym, gdy w 1925roku Cyprzostałogłoszony kolonią. Po IIwojnie światowej Greccy Cypryjczycynadal chcieli doprowadzićdo zjednoczenia z konty nentalną Grecją (enosis), podczas gdy Tureccy Cypryjczycy i Turcja opowiadali się za po działem terytorium wyspy pomiędzy Grecję iTurcję (taksim).Ostatecznie obie stronyprzystały na rozwiązaniekompromisowe-utworzenie niepodległej Republiki Cypryjskiej w 1960 roku. Grecja i Turcja stały się wówczas państwami gwarantami ładu konstytucyjnego nawyspie.Jed nakże,jaksięmiało wkrótce okazać, przyjęte rozwiązanianie oznaczały końca problemu. Deficyt wzajemnego zaufania doprowadziłdo starćpomiędzy członkami obucypryjskichspołeczności i,będącej ichkonsekwencją,faktycznej dezintegracji państwa w1963 roku. Niemniej, najistot niejszewydarzenia miały miejsce w roku 1974, gdy tureckirząd podjął decyzjęo przeprowadzeniu interwencji zbrojnej wodpowiedzi na prawicowy zamachstanu.Niniejszyartykuł poświęcony jest stanowiskuTurcji w sprawie Cypruw okresie pointerwencji i w warunkach faktycznego po działu wyspy na dwa państwa.Czy po 1974roku stanowisko Turcji ulegało znaczącymmodyfi kacjom? Czykwestia cypryjska stanowiturecki interes narodowy? Podstawę analizy stanowi podziałi porównanie polityki tureckiej w dwóch okresach: 1974-2002 oraz po2002 roku.
