Chapter 35
1You should be happy!
2
Frank Dignum and Virginia Dignum 3
Abstract In this chapter, we investigate the relations between norms and
emo-4
tions. As the title of this paper indicates, people often have norms about having 5
emotions and also apply sanctions when they are violated. However, emotions 6
are taken to be something people cannot (easily) control, so it seems strange to 7
have norms about emotions. We will investigate whether we can give a formal 8
description of these kinds of norms and whether they are the same as other 9
norms or have special properties. 10
1 Introduction
11
A Liber Amicorum with as many contributions as the present one is quite 12
unique! You should be happy! Of course, it may well be that you are quite 13
disappointed with the topics and the level of the contributions and by the 14
time you are reading this article are very bored and disappointed. It is not 15
something you consciously decided to do, it is just an e↵ect of reading the 16
articles. Still, the admonishment that you should be happy seems appropriate. 17
So, what should you do? As happiness is an emotion, it is not really possible 18
to just decide to be happy now again. Or is it? 19
Statements such as: 20
• “you should be happy", 21
• “you should not be angry at your mother in law", 22
• “you should not be afraid of the dog", 23
• “you are allowed to be sad about the rejection of your paper" 24
Frank Dignum
Department of Computing Sciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands e-mail: dignum@cs.uu.nl
Virginia Dignum
Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, The Nether-lands
e-mail: M.V.Dignum@tudelft.nl
all express a normative valuation of an emotion. In order for the norms to be 1
fulfilled one should or should not have a certain emotion. However, when we 2
use norms we usually assume they regulate behavior such that it conforms to 3
the norm. When the person has no control over a state (in this case the emotion) 4
how can we expect that the person complies with the norm and what does it 5
mean if the person violates a norm? In order to check these kinds of properties 6
we should first investigate what type of norm these norms on emotions are. 7
Literature proposes many di↵erent definitions for the concept of norm that 8
basically assume four di↵erent types of norms: universal or deontic norms (ex-9
plicit, imposed norms, enforced by a formal institution, laws), directed norms 10
(explicit, agreed upon, norms between two or more parties), social norms 11
(implicit rules of behaviour in a certain social context, emergent, incited by 12
“critical mass") and private norms (personal convictions on how one should 13
behave, one’s own default behaviour). Basically, it can be said that deontic 14
norms guide how one ought to act based on an external (universal) standard. 15
Directed norms guide how someone should behave based on an agreed upon 16
standard between several parties. Private norms guide how one ought to act 17
based on an internal standard. All of these types of norms are prescriptive 18
norms. Social norms show how people do act based on a standard created by 19
the very act of all people behaving in a certain way (descriptive norms). 20
To our knowledge, there are no laws (formal norms) that regulate emotions. 21
I.e. the norms expressed above would never appear in a legal system of norms 22
regulating the behaviour of people. So, following the ‘classification’ of norms 23
above, it seems the norms on emotions described above, can not be seen as 24
formal norms. 25
We can ask ourselves whether these norms can ever be directed norms. I.e., 26
can they be agreements between two parties? E.g. if I keep my dog on a leash, 27
you should not anymore be afraid of the dog. It seems that this is a reasonable 28
use of directed norms on emotions. Of course, if we look closer at this situation 29
there are probably other norms involved. Possibly I might not be allowed to 30
take a dog with me in some place, because it might bite other people. I can 31
then justify taking the dog by stating that if I keep it on a leash it will not be 32
able to bite other people and therefore they should not be afraid of the dog 33
anymore. 34
Finally, it does seems that the above norms can easily be interpreted as being 35
private or social norms. A person can have a private conviction that he should 36
not be angry at his mother in law, due to the fact that he should avoid any 37
problems with his family in law. It could also be a social law that one should 38
not be afraid of dogs, because they are considered to be cute animals and liking 39
dogs makes one be perceived as a nice person. 40
41
The above considerations already show that norms on emotions reflect 42
more a description of how one is expected to act, according to some value 43
system or cultural background (we will discuss this in more detail later on) 44
than a prescription of behavior. That is, if one is considering social norms, 45
the interpretation of “should" is more likely to be something as “it is socially 46
expected to" rather than “obliged to" as in deontic norms. In the same way, a 47
prohibition is likely to be interpreted as “socially undesirable". Nevertheless, 1
both in formal as in social norms, the aim of formalization is to reason about 2
the e↵ects of compliance and violation. As such, in this paper we will treat the 3
formalization of deontic and social norms in the same way. 4
A lot of research has been done on the use of deontic logic for the inter-5
pretation of formal, prescriptive norms. Using some form of Deontic logic we 6
could easily formally express the statements above as follows: 7 • O(Happy(y)) 8 • F(Angry(y,MiL(y))) 9 • F(Fear(y,dog)) 10 • P(Sad(y,reject)) 11
So, assuming we express emotions as a predicate indicating a state a person 12
can be in, possibly in relation to some other entity, then the above is a correct 13
representation of norms about emotions. But, although we do have a logical 14
representation of these norms, we seem to have missed a lot of subtle points. 15
One of those issues is the connection between the norm over the emotion 16
and behavior associated to the emotion. E.g. I should not be happy if my big 17
rival in a running race just broke her leg. But what if I tell my friends with a 18
big smile that I am so sad she broke her leg? Certainly, that would not really be 19
acceptable. A good hypothesis probably is that any behavior that conveys the 20
forbidden emotion is also forbidden. How we establish this relation between 21
an emotion and behavior is another point of course. 22
Although there are probably many more points to consider, the main point we 23
want to ponder is what the purpose of these norms actually is. The purpose 24
of most norms is to regulate behavior of a group of persons as to benefit the 25
group in some way. Is this also true for norms over emotions? If so, what 26
kind of behavior do they regulate and how do they benefit the group? the 27
above formalizations do not really give any clues for the answers to these 28
questions. However, there is sociological research that can be used to look for 29
some possible pointers to answers. 30
Quite some work has been done in cultural psychology along the lines of 31
the last question, but with a subtle di↵erent emphasis. The question being 32
whether emotions are culture dependent. In specific, there has been research 33
about the di↵erences in emotions between collectivistic and individualistic cul-34
tures. In [7], Eid and Diener show that especially with respect to self-conscious 35
emotions such as pride and guilt there is a di↵erence between people liv-36
ing in a collectivistic culture and those living in an individualistic culture. In 37
general normative behavior is more important in a collectivistic culture and 38
consequently the emotion of pride is valued less high, is experienced less and 39
sometimes even suppressed. The emotion of guilt is suppressed more in in-40
dividualistic cultures as it is more common to blame someone or something 41
outside oneself for failures. This research shows that (cultural) norms do in-42
fluence emotions. However, it does not yet indicate the exact purpose of these 43
types of norms and what exactly is regulated with the norms. 44
In the next section we will shortly describe some characteristics of emotions 45
as background for the discussion on norms over emotions. In section 3 we will 46
discuss the di↵erent types of norms and their properties. We will particularly 1
look for concepts characterizing norms that can be used to link them to emo-2
tions. The relation between norms and emotions itself is discussed further in 3
section 4. In the last section of this chapter we draw some conclusions and 4
speculate about further work. 5
2 Emotions
6
In Wikipedia, emotions are defined as follows: 7
Emotion is the complex psychophysiological experience of an individual’s state of
8
mind as interacting with biochemical (internal) and environmental (external)
influ-9
ences.
10
Whether we agree completely with this definition is not very important for 11
the present paper. However, the most salient point from the definition is that 12
emotions are “psychophysiological". I.e. they involve both physiological parts 13
as well as psychological parts. This poses problems for anyone that wants to 14
create a (formal) model of emotions. There are not many psychophysiological 15
studies and the models that exist are expressed as possible correlations between 16
some personality trait and physiological characteristics related to some specific 17
emotion or phenomenon such as fear or addiction (see e.g. [2]). 18
So, it is clear that it will be very difficult to fully characterize emotions, 19
incorporating both the physiological as well as the psychological aspects plus 20
their relations. We will leave that for some future work (:-)). Nevertheless, 21
we cannot ignore the physiological aspects of emotions even though we may 22
have little information about it. We do know that physiological phenomena 23
have a temporal aspect. Thus emotions also have this temporal aspect. This 24
is confirmed by a classification made by Clore et al. [3], which describes that 25
emotions are a temporary state that relate to a specific object (which can be a 26
physical or mental object or action). So, it seems emotions are not persistent, 27
but they arise from a certain situation and also disappear again. When emo-28
tions arise they trigger an emotion regulation mechanism that supports the 29
disappearance of the emotion. In [8], Gross and Thompson distinguish five 30
mechanisms to regulate emotions: situation modification, attentional deploy-31
ment, cognitive change, response modulation and situation selection. 32
Although the intuition is that emotions arise in an uncontrolled fashion, these 33
mechanisms suggest ways to regulate emotions by adjusting triggers that 34
might lead to emotions. E.g. if I am in love with someone I can choose to be 35
around that person as much as possible, because that situation will cause the 36
positive emotion of love. If I get very sad thinking about a broken relation I 37
can concentrate on my work and thus push away the cognitive state (beliefs 38
about this relation) that leads to the negative emotion. 39
Another important aspect of emotions that is not mentioned in the Wikipedia 40
definition, is that emotions have a positive or negative valence. If a person is 41
in a state where she experiences a positive emotion, she will evaluate that state 42
as being a good one. I.e., it leads to a preference of being in that state (and 43
experiencing the emotion connected to it). Because the emotions are uncondi-1
tionally experienced as positive or negative, indirectly they also can be used as 2
an evaluation of the psychophysiological state that causes the emotion. In that 3
sense an emotion can function as a very explicit marker of a situation stating 4
that it is either a good or bad situation to be in. This aspect of emotions ties 5
in with the notion of value systems of individuals and groups and societies of 6
people. 7
Value systems are also used to valuate situations with respect to a certain 8
aspect [5]. Values are ideals that are considered to be worth pursuing. Or, 9
as defined by Scott in [15], (moral) values as the standards of good and evil 10
that guide an individual’s behaviour and choices. Individuals, groups, and 11
societies develop their own value systems used for the purpose of ethical in-12
tegrity. Examples of widely shared values are health, safety, security, freedom, 13
joy, beauty, friendship, justice. People will generally exercise, promote and 14
sometimes demand behaviour - by themselves and others - that supports such 15
values. E.g. a value such as “security" can be used to compare situations that 16
are (felt to be) more or less secure. If the value of security is important for a 17
person he will avoid taking risks in all kinds of situations. E.g. he will not start 18
talking to a stranger, because he is not sure whether the stranger will react in 19
an adverse way. On a national level this value might lead to a conservative 20
government that enforces strict laws in order to increase national security. 21
[10] gives a conceptual analysis of values and represents them formally through 22
the basic notion of preference. Which enforcement mechanisms are e↵ective and 23
how sanctions are likely to be followed is directly related to the values of a 24
society. 25
The di↵erence between emotions and value systems is that emotions are very 26
personal (even have a physiological component, as stated in the definition 27
above) and temporary. They can be seen as markers of situations that are good 28
or bad. When classifying many situations that trigger the same emotion one 29
might use a value. I.e. if I always get a positive emotion of “pride" when 30
achieving a goal (even though it costs a lot of e↵ort and caused negative emo-31
tions along the way) these situations might be classified through the value of 32
“achievement". The situations that are marked by emotions (like “pride") are 33
thus seen as being preferred in some way and this is “explained" by the fact that 34
the situations are promoting an (important) value (such as “achievement"). 35
In the above we have mainly described primary (or universal) emotions. 36
These emotions are connected to biological factors and thus can be found in 37
all cultures across the world. There are 7 emotions that are seen as univer-38
sal: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, happiness, and contempt. There are 39
also emotions that are triggered by (social) cognitive factors. Especially the 40
social emotions such as shame and guilt are connected with social relations 41
and norms. Castelfranchi et.al. [16] have written about some cognitive charac-42
terisation and formalisation of shame and guilt and their di↵erence. However, 43
they mainly describe how these emotions arise from the existence of certain 44
social relations and norms and private decisions of an agent. I.e. an agent will 45
feel guilty if it has internalized a norm and knowingly violated it by doing 46
something that he could have avoided doing (or not doing something he could 47
have done). So, social emotions are already linked to norms in the way they are 1
triggered. In this paper, we will discuss another aspect, namely that of norms 2
about the emotion itself. So, the point is not that I will feel guilty after I stole 3
something (which is a violation of a norm), but that I should feel guilty after I 4
evaded paying tax (while maybe I don’t feel guilty at all). 5
The above description of emotions shows that emotions motivate actions 6
in diverse ways. The regulation mechanisms are triggered when an emotion 7
arises. Thus the emotion can be seen as motivating the regulative actions. E.g. 8
when I feel fear when standing near the edge of the roof of a high building 9
I can step away to avoid the emotion. In the other hand, when I feel love 10
when close to my partner I can plan to be close to her in order to trigger this 11
positive emotion. Although emotions might be seen as a kind of desires in the 12
second example, they are usually not used in the same way. Our intuition is 13
that emotions are generally not used by themselves as a motivation to generate 14
a goal or plan, but are used in combination with other factors to either enforce 15
the desirability or undesirability of a desired state. 16
This leads us to the question what is the role or purpose of emotions. Why 17
do we have emotions? What would be di↵erent if we don’t have emotions? 18
Although quite some research exists on emotions it is difficult to find any useful 19
answers to these questions. The closest is probably the theory developed by 20
Damasio [4] in which he links emotions to somatic markers. Thus the purpose 21
of emotions is to mark situations (as being special). It gives the possibility 22
to classify many situations together that are marked with the same emotion 23
(even though they might di↵er in many other respects). It also supports the 24
intuition that emotions can be strong or weak, where a strong emotion marks 25
a situation as being very important and worth reacting to and learn from and 26
a weak emotion might just confirm existing (regulative) behaviour. Seeing 27
emotions this way fits with the intuition that they do not, by themselves, 28
motivate certain behavior but are used to guide behavior. It is, of course, not 29
to be expected that we solve the question of the purpose of emotions in this 30
short chapter, but we will use the idea of emotions guiding behaviour later on 31
when discussing norms about emotions. 32
3 Norms
33
A lot has been written about norms in diverse disciplines like law, philosophy, 34
ethics, logic, sociology and computer science. Although we are not going to 35
give an overview of the treatment of norms in each of these disciplines it is 36
important to see that norms play a role in many aspects of life and have many 37
di↵erent facets. 38
One important aspect that we want to mention here is the moral side of norms. 39
This is probably the main di↵erence between a norm and a convention. Both 40
conventions and norms are (expected) patterns of behavior. As an example, 41
we would argue though that e.g. driving on the right side of the road is a 42
convention, while using your indicators when turning of the road is a norm. 43
The di↵erence between the two (in our opinion) is that one would follow the 1
convention of driving on the right side of the road because everyone else is 2
doing the same. Following the expected pattern of behavior and complying to 3
the group is somehow “convenient". There is no intrinsic reason why driving 4
on the right hand side of the road would be better. So, in countries where they 5
drive on the left hand side of the road we will just as easy follow suit. Even the 6
point that one should drive all on the same side of the road is more a matter 7
of convenience than of a moral stance. It has to do with the fact that cars move 8
quick and therefore it is easier to drive if you more or less drive in the same 9
direction. This convention changes when looking at pedestrians. Here people 10
usually are bound to use available space on the sidewalk rather than choosing 11
to walk all at the same side. 12
The use of indicators when turning of the road does have a slightly di↵erent 13
flavor. Even if most people would not use their indicators it would still be good 14
to use them. So, the motivation to follow this norm is not just because everyone 15
else follows it and it is convenient to conform to the group but because one 16
wants to promote a certain value. I.e. it can be said that the norm of using 17
your indicators is established to promote the value of safety. Thus a situation 18
in which the norm is followed is preferred, with respect to the value of safety, 19
over a situation where the norm is violated. Thus the decision of violating the 20
norm or obeying it gets a moral flavor related to some specific values that it 21
promotes. 22
The above does not mean that norms cannot have aspects of conventions. One 23
can fulfil a norm just because it is a norm. Thus implying that one fulfils the 24
norm because everyone does it and it is expected behavior. One might argue 25
that the actual reason to comply to a norm in this way would be to show 26
that your behavior is in line with the values that are prevalent in a group. 27
Assuming that the norm is promoting some group value(s), fulfilling a norm 28
then becomes a way to show that you also promote the group value(s). One can 29
distinguish a situation where an individual agrees with the group value(s) and 30
actually adopts a norm because it promotes these values and a situation where 31
an individual does not adopt the norm, but merely recognizes its importance 32
for being a member of the group. In the second case, fulfilling the norm would 33
not have any moral reason, it would just be motivated by the need to fit into 34
the group and fulfilling the norm supports that. 35
Especially for what are called “emergent" or “social" norms the conventional 36
aspect is important. Social norms are not promulgated by some authority but 37
rather emerge over time from interactions between individuals in a society. 38
The enforcement of social norms is thus not regulated through some authority, 39
but done by individuals themselves. If someone sees a violation of a norm he 40
can react on the violation. The reaction can be a direct punishment, a decrease 41
in reputation, etc. In the same way if someone notices many people fulfilling a 42
norm this might lead to compliance as well. The conventional aspect of these 43
norms will thus increase the enforcement of the norm within a group. 44
Research by Hofstede has shown that national cultures di↵er in particular 45
at the level of, usually unconscious, values held by a majority of the popu-46
lation [11]. Values, in this case, are “broad preferences for one state of a↵airs 47
over others". The Hofstede dimensions of national cultures are rooted in our 1
unconscious values. Because values are acquired in childhood, national cul-2
tures are remarkably stable over time; national values change is a matter of 3
generations. A recent line of research, unsurprisingly quite directly related to 4
the work of Cristiano Castelfranchi, aims to understand and link norm type 5
preferences to society culture. This will in particular, enable policy makers to 6
decide on the best normative approach to use as implementation of a policy. 7
For instance, in cultures centered (or preferring) individual norms, a campaign 8
illustrating the negative e↵ects of smoking will be more e↵ective than a formal 9
law prohibiting smoking. The latter will in turn be more e↵ective in cultures 10
centered on formal normative systems [5]. 11
So far, we have discussed some aspects of norms without any formalization. 12
Although this suffices to discuss general principles, a formal description will 13
enhance the precise definition of the notions involved and also will show 14
whether some expected properties indeed follow from the way concepts are 15
related. Of course, there are many formalizations of norms. Most notably 16
di↵erent forms of deontic logic have been used to formalize them, e.g. [19, 14, 17
6, 12]. 18
Di↵erent formalizations can exist in parallel because they all stress di↵erent 19
aspects of norms. In classical deontic logic [19] the content of a norm was an 20
(abstract) state. This fits with the high abstraction level on which norms are 21
discussed in philosophy. However, this makes it impossible to specify norms 22
over concrete actions, which becomes very important when using norms for 23
software systems. For this reason dynamic deontic logic [14] was developed. 24
In many cases it is important to indicate within which time limit a norm should 25
be fulfilled (e.g. we must finish this article before the end of the month). This 26
gave rise to several versions of temporal deontic logics, some incorporating 27
actions and others only states [6, 1]. 28
The fact that norms might be apparently inconsistent (e.g. when one norm is 29
applicable when another norm is violated) led to the use of non-monotonic 30
logics for formalizing this aspect of norms [12]. 31
When considering a formalization of norms about emotions, the question 32
is which properties we would like to capture in the formal model. Given 33
these properties, one can choose the most appropriate formalism to express 34
them and analyze the possible consequences of these properties. Although 35
emotions do have a temporal aspect it seems that the norms over the emotions 36
do not have this temporal aspect. I.e. we do not say “you should be happy 37
within 20 minutes after reading this chapter". The norms on emotions seem to 38
be instantaneous. Because emotions are a kind of state and a formalism that 39
could express norms over states would seem the most natural. As stated in the 40
introduction we could express the obligation to be happy as follows: 41
O(happy)
42
Probably we would like to extend this with a condition, because most people 43
don’t think one should always be happy, but only in certain conditions, such 44
as when reading this paper: 45
O(happy(x)|read(x,paper))
Now let’s compare this formalization with that of the fact that one has to pay 1
the bill when one has bought something: 2
O(paid(x,item)|buy(x,item))
3
The format of this obligation is identical to the one about being happy. How-4
ever, there seems to be a di↵erence in connotation. As said before, although the 5
emotion seems to be a kind of state, it is not a state that by itself can function as 6
a goal for which actions are planned. Unlike the second case where the person 7
that bought an item should plan actions such that he also has paid for the item, 8
the condition of being happy either follows or does not follow after reading a 9
paper. 10
If we look at a norm that states a prohibition on an emotion like “you 11
shouldn’t be sad when you loose a game" it can be formalized in a similar 12
way: 13
F(sad(x)|lost(x, game))
14
In this prohibition it becomes clear that this norm might also entail norms on 15
the regulative mechanisms of the emotion. E.g. 16
lost(x, game) ! F(express(x,sad))
17
lost(x, game) ! O(suppress(x,sad))
18
O(avoid(lost(x, game)))
19
I.e. one should not express that one is sad after loosing a game, one should 20
try to suppress the emotion itself and one should try to avoid a situation in 21
which the emotion is triggered. The last obligation is quite debatable, but we 22
mention it anyway as it seems at least to be a possible connection. Notice 23
that the above norms are all norms on actions rather than states. They follow 24
semantically from the norm on the emotion, because the actions are connected 25
to that emotion. In a similar way we would have the following norms attached 26
to the norms that you should be happy when reading the paper: 27 read(x,paper) ! O(express(x,happy)) 28 read(x,paper) ! F(suppress(x,happy)) 29 F(avoid(read(x,paper))) 30
As expected, also in this case the norm works the same way for the regulative 31
action of expressing the emotion and reverses for the second and third regu-32
lative actions. A complete logical formalism for norms over emotions would 33
thus need to be able to express both norms over states and actions and also we 34
should have axioms that connect the norms over emotions with the norms over 35
the regulative mechanism of that emotion. We will not pursue this (interesting) 36
aspect in this chapter, but leave it for future work. 37
One aspect that does not appear in this formalization is the connection of 38
norms to values. If it is true that norms exist in order to promote a particular 39
structure of values then we should be able to connect the norms to the values 40
formally as well. In the next section, we will argue that this can be done through 41
the use of constitutive norms, represented through counts-as rules. The basic 42
ideas of using the counts-as rules stem from philosophy and were used by 43
e.g. Searle to define social reality. In [13], Jones and Sergot made a first attempt 44
to formalize and analyse the notion of counts-as. In [9], Grossi has refined 1
the formalization in order to capture the definitional and creative power of 2
the counts-as rules. So, if we state that a drivers licence counts as a means 3
of identification, we are not just stating that drivers licences are classified as 4
identifications. We are also defining means of identification by stating that 5
concrete papers such as drivers licences count as a means of identification. 6
We can use the counts-as to connect norms to values. In order to do this we 7
first introduce values and values structures as criteria along which situations 8
can be compared. I.e. we assume that given a set of values and a structure 9
of priorities over that set we can order pairs of situations using that value 10
structure. E.g. if I think that environment should be of the highest priority I 11
will prefer a situation where I take a bike to go to work over a situation where 12
I take the car. In [18], van der Weide gives a formal description of this idea 13
of using values to create preferences over situations. Now we can state that a 14
norm counts-as an implementation of a value structure i↵ fulfilling the norm 15
leads to a situation that is preferred according to the value structure than the 16
situation one gets when violating the norm. Formally, given 1and 2, states
17
in some Kripke model: 18
Let VS = ({v1, ...vn},<p) be a value structure where <pindicates the priorities over the 19
set of values {v1, ...vn} then 20
O('| ) )caImpl(VS) i↵ ( 1|= ^ ' and 2|= ^ ¬') then 2<VS 1 21
First note that we use Impl(VS) rather than VS. It indicates that the norm 22
does not count as the value system itself but rather as an implementation of 23
the value system. The value system itself is not true or false, it is merely a 24
criterion. The implementation of a value system is a set of norms that indicate 25
ideality aligned with the value system, but can also extend to other preferences 26
that align with the value system. 27
We use <VS as the preference order between states that is induced by VS. It
28
is based on the fact that each value can be used to order the states and the 29
ordering <VS is the combined preference ordering based on all values and
30
their priorities. More on this (intricate) part can be found in [17]. 31
In the next section we will show how value structures as above can be used 32
to provide a formalization for norms on emotions. 33
4 Norms about emotions?
34
The most crucial element in the combination of norms and emotions is the fact 35
that we do not consciously plan for the emotion (at least as an independent 36
state). An emotion arises in certain situations and functions as a marker of that 37
(type) of situation. It does not mean that we have absolutely no control over 38
our emotions. However, this control is not part of our conscious deliberation 39
over plans and actions. As seen from the literature on the connection between 40
emotions and culture, the triggering mechanism might be conditioned through 41
cultural factors that determine the feedback that is given whenever a certain 42
emotion is shown. 43
So, the obligation to have a certain emotional state is not meant to start 1
planning actions to induce that emotional state. One could still argue that such 2
an obligation is actually meant to be an obligation to reach a situation where the 3
emotional condition is triggered. However, as the examples given in this paper 4
show, often the norm is stated with respect to a certain given condition and the 5
emotion should follow straight from that condition. E.g. when you read this 6
article you should be happy. That is, the emotion should be the consequence 7
of (or, be triggered by) the condition of reading this article. 8
The first step that we make to analyze the norms on emotions is the trigger-9
ing of the emotion itself. We claim that the triggering of the emotion leads to a 10
state (where the emotion is felt) that is preferred according to the value system 11
that the person uses. We use emotion to indicate a state transition from a 12
state in which holds to a state in which holds together with the emotion, 13
where that emotion is triggered by . Thus we can define: 14
For a value structure VS = ({v1, ...vn},<p) as above: 15
( emotion) )caUse(VS) i↵ ( 1|= and 2|= ^ emotion) then 1<VS 2 16
Note that the emotion does not have to be a positive emotion. The above just 17
states that the emotion is a kind of marker that indicates how the situation 18
is valued according to VS and when the emotion is felt the situation always 19
is more in line with VS than before the emotion is triggered. Also note that 20
here we use Use(VS) rather than Impl(VS) because we see how a concrete state 21
transition aligns with the value system and thus how the value system is used 22
rather than implemented. 23
The above connects the triggering of emotions with values. However, it 24
did not say anything about norms yet. However, we can extend the above 25
definition with norms as follows: 26
For a value structure VS = ({v1, ...vn},<p) as above: 27
O(emotion| ) )caImpl(VS) 28
So, the obligation on the emotion is implementing the preference ordering 29
induced by the value system VS. 30
We mentioned the definitial character of the counts-as relation before. It is 31
worth to re-iterate that aspect here. Although we say that the norm implements 32
a certain value system, the value system might not be very well defined. It is 33
at least partially defined by the fact that these norms are implementing it. 34
This concurs with the fact that most people would not really be able to give a 35
(complete) account of their value system but would be able to state whether a 36
certain norm (on emotions) is aligned with a value system. 37
The final point to make about these norms on emotions is what to do with 38
it. Apparently they are meant to convey that certain emotions in a certain sit-39
uation are according to a value system or not. However, if the emotions are 40
directly triggered by the situation without the person having (much) control 41
over it, what can one do to comply to the norm? 42
Basically, being reminded of the norm will influence the strength of the trig-43
gering mechanism. And thus the emotion will be influenced by the sheer fact 44
that the norm is made explicit. This reinforcement e↵ect is typical for this type 45
of norms and di↵erent from any other type of norms. We did not formalize 1
this aspect, but this could be done by attaching a strength to the relation. 2
Other things that a person does have control over can also be used to com-3
ply with a norm on emotions. One can try to avoid situations that trigger the 4
emotion or seek those situations if the emotion is desirable. And one can try 5
to avoid expressing the emotions and thus pretend the emotion did not arise, 6
which gives at least the impression that one acts according to a value system 7
that is aligned with the norm on that emotion. We might formalize this link to 8
the regulative actions as follows: 9
O(emotion| ) )
10
[ ! (O(express(emotion)) ^ F(suppress(emotion)))] ^ F(avoid( )))
11
The above means that a model that makes O(emotion| ) true also should make 12
the other norms true. Although we do not discuss this connection in depth 13
we can at least easily see that all these norms also are implementations of VS 14
whenever O(emotion| ) is an implementation of VS. That is the actions that 15
are obliged are aligned with the value system and the ones that are forbidden 16
would lead to less preferred states according to the value system. 17
5 Conclusions
18
In this chapter we have attempted to shed some light on the intriguing notion 19
of norms over emotions. Rather than a careful analysis of a specific aspect of 20
norms over emotions we have attempted to perform a broad sweep over the 21
area touching upon a number of issues that seem important. 22
Firstly, norms of emotions are never deontic norms that are enforced by an 23
external authority. They typically are social norms. The enforcement of social 24
norms is done through mechanisms of social inclusion and/or exclusion. These 25
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion are linked to what is sometimes called 26
the “moral circle" [11]. Moral circles function around the sharing of culture 27
through a common value system. Thus social norms can be seen to be directly 28
linked to a value system in this way. 29
We have argued that emotions can be seen as marking important or salient 30
situations. These situations can also indicate whether on adheres to a certain 31
value system that would prefer that type of situation. In particular we argued 32
that the triggering of an emotion in a situation can be seen as counting as using 33
a particular value system. Thus having a norm stating that an emotion should 34
or should not arise in a situation counts as implementing the value system. It 35
states exactly that the emotion in that situation is according (or against) the 36
value system. 37
Because emotions are not goals in themselves we saw that an obligation 38
over an emotion (although possibly expressed in the same way as an obligation 39
over a state) is not meant to lead to a concrete plan to achieve the emotion (or 40
avoid it). So, the purpose of the norm itself does not seem to be to influence 41
behaviour directly. Rather it seems to be meant to re-inforce the value system 42
that it implements. Thus an obligation on an emotion actually can be seen as 1
an obligation to adhere to a (shared) value system. How this aspect can be 2
formalized and analyzed is an interesting issue for future work. 3
A more formal framework in which norms, emotions, values (and thus 4
norms on emotions) could be expressed will be of great help to understand and 5
verify some assumptions related to social and culture dependent behaviour. 6
Of course, this chapter raised more questions than it gave any answers. It was 7
meant to start some new directions of research rather than report on work per-8
formed. Some first steps for future work would be on a precise characterization 9
of emotions, values and norms in the same framework, expressing their rela-10
tionships and properties. Next would be a framework explaining how norms 11
over emotions influence individual behaviour and interact with it. For this we 12
also would need a model of individual behaviour including not only things 13
like BDI, but also norms, emotions and values. 14
For now we are happy that we reached the end of this chapter and hope 15
that the same holds for the reader of this chapter (either because it is finally 16
finished or because he enjoyed reading it)! 17
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