Levinas's Ethical iI a and illeity: of Thirdnessin y

The iI y a and illeity: Traces of Thirdness in Emmanuel Levinas's Ethical Language

Ewa Rychter Panstwowa Wyisza Szkota Zawodowa Walbrzych

If

the measure of a

thinker is the

challenge

his writing

poses l,o readers, Emmanuel Levinas should be counted as a

truly

great philosopher. Among

his

many provocative ideas one stands out as

particularly difficult: this is the

idea

of

incommensurability be- t,ween

the

subject's

infinite responsibility for the other,

and the

cquality of the

self,

the other

and

other

members

of the

society.

'l'o find a

balance between

the

immense

ethical weight

which overburdens and

almost

crushes

the

subject, and

the possibility

ot'comparison,

measurability

and

justice,

_seems

hardly

possible.

One may expect

that

Levinas's

third,

epitomised

in

his neologism illeity,

will

hold the balance, but,

in

fact, the term figures as every-

t lring but a position.

Illeity

is weighty enough to

imprint

^a trace on

t,[re faces of both the self and the other, weighty enough

to

support rrrder.

Illeity,

however, effaces

its

own position of the balance-hold- ing

third; its ^gravity

^persists as

its

own erasure, as a

withdrawal

into ephemerality

that

resists the grasp of reason.

In that

paper

I

locus on

the

traces of thirdness

imprinted

on Levinas's

notion of ill.eity.I

also

reflect

on

the proximity

between

illeity

and

the il

y

rr, and on the

gravity

of the

third

as a factor

that

destabilises (but rrcver tips the balance of) cognition.

30

I

ano Rychter

On Levinasian account, the ethical encounter

with

the other is a

liminal

experience. The subject becomes a hostage; he

is

under the ethical pressure to substitute himself for the other, to sacrifice himself, to be exiled

from

everything he considered his own; even

to

answer

for the

other's

irresponsibility.

The subject ^lnas

to

bear

the

other, both

in

the sense of suffering because of

the

other, and

in the

sense of the rnaternal or gestation-like opening

for alterity,

of

yielding

one's

skin

and one's body to the other.

The ethical burden, however, does

not originate in the

face of

the

other. The face already bears

the trace of an

otherness

with

which her

alterity

remains at odds, the trace of thirdness Levinas labels

illeity.

Levinas emphasises

that illeity

can be accessed only via the enigmatic trace

it

leaves on the face of the other. The trace

of illeity

cannot be classified as a phenomenon (from

the

Greek, phairuo, to

bring

to

light)

-

^{the trace does} not submit to the simul-

taneity

and presence of phenomena;

it

does not present itself to the

Iight

of perception and understanding. The trace "manifests

itself without manifesting

itself,"1

it

shows

itself enigmatically in

the etymological sense of

that

word

-

^as

^ainigmq

an obscure, dark or equivocal word, as a

riddle.

The enigmatic manifestation of

illeity

does

not

mean

that

there

is

an

ambiguity in

which two meanings have equal chances;

it

indicates, instead,

that

meaning withdraws

from itself

and becomes

"too

old

for the

game of cognition."2 The trace, as Levinas explains,

is not

a sign

like

any other

but

an ef- facement of sign.

It is what

remains

of

someone who wiped away

the

traces s/he

left

and who cannot be tracked down

like

a game

by

a

hunter.

The

trace

of

illeity is not

merely a

signifier that

re- fers

to

the past

signified; illeity

is

nothing but

the trace;

it is

not,

apart from

the trace. The trace of the

third

means

the

trace

that

is the

third.

The trace of

the

enigmatic character of

illeity

can be observed

in its

equivocal relationship

with

(im)personality, _and

in

the nuances concerning the problem of order.

1 Emmanuel Levinas, "Phenomenon and Enigma," ir Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publish- ers, 1987), p. 66.

2 Ibidern, p. 71.

T}re il y a arrd illeity...

I

³¹

Illeity is neither

^personal

nor simply

impersonal;

on the

^one

lrrrnd,

it

absolves

itself

from the two parties

that

participate

in

the ol,hical relation

-

^{both from the}

^virile

and conquering subject, and l'r'rrrn the

feminine

other. On

the

other hand,

illeity

can exist only rrs a trace

left

upon

human

(masculine, feminine) faces.

Illeity

is rr rreologism

in

which the words

ll

^(tr'rench

"he")

and/or

ille (Latirr

"l,hat one") become nominalised.

It

indicates the type of otherness which occurs

in

the depth of the other person's

alterity, but

which rrcver coincides

with

the human and personal context of

its

occur- r'cnce. Levinas points out

that

the

Infinite

"escapes the objectifica-

I ion of thematisation and of dialogue, and signifi ^es as illeity,

in

the l,lrir:d person.

This 'thirdness' is different from that of the third

nrirn."3 The otherness of the

third is "other

otherwise, other

with

rrrr

alterity prior to the alterity

of

the

other,

prior to the

ethical lrond

with

another and different from every neighbour."a On the one Irrrnd, the

third

detaches

itself

absolutely from the conditions of its ul)surge, i.e.

from

the face of the other person; on the other hand, l,lrc

third

cannot stand absolutely apart from intersubjectivity.

Levinas's thirdness occurs as an enigmatictrace, as an obscure

irrrprint left by an infinite weight which is neither being

nor rron-being.

It is important that the

equivocal trace

signifies,

and rrillnifies

in

an oblique and half-effaced way. When Levinas claims

llrrrt the

anachrony

of the third signifies through the

obscurity

ol'enigma, he

plays

on two

senses

of the French term signifier

which can be glossed

either

as

"to

mean"

or

as

"to

command, to rrr'(ler." Levinas argues

that

"he

lillille

^of

illeityl

signifies from the lirt:e of the other person,

with

a significance not

articulated

as the rclation of

signifier

to signified,

but

as order signified to me."5 The rrrrraning

of illeity

as revealed

through the

trace,

is a

command,

:r Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence, ttar,s.

r\lphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 1r ^ll-r0.

'1 Emmanuei Levinas, "God and Philosophy," in Collected Philosophical

I'rr1x:rs--., 1987), p. 179.

r'Emmanuel Levinas, Outside the Subject, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford,

( 'rrlilbrnia: _Stanford UniverSity Press, 1994), p. 47.

32

I

o*o Rychter

an order.

Illeity

commands the self towards the other ^person

-

^by

signifying/ordering from the trace left in the

face

of the

other, the

third

disturbs

the

order of egoity, directs the self towards the

other. Importantly

enough,

the third

does

not manifest itself in his signification, i.e. in his order;

as

Levinas

says

in

Otherwise Thq,n Being,

illeity is a detour at a

face

and a detour from this

detour.6

In his

command,

the third

does

not

establish

itself

as

an ipseity; his order is not

reducible

to a

system.

The order of illeity disturbs other

orders,

but the

disturbance

"disturbs

order

without troubling it

seriously.

It

enters

in

so subtle

a way that

unless we

retain it, it

has already

withdrawn. It

insinuates itself, withdraws before

entering. [...]

^{Someone rang and there}

is

no one at

the

door: did anyone ring?"1 The order of

illeity

(understood as a command and a law)

is not

synchronisable

with the

logos,

with

the law

in

the sense of

jurisdiction.

The law of

tertialitd

(thirdness)

is different from

^{the law}

that

underlies the judgements passed

in courts, but the

difference does

not lie in the fact that

thirdness

is

transcendental,

while legislation is only

representative

of

the

worldly

order. As

Derrida

^puts

it, "the illeity

of

the third is

thus nothing less, for Levinas, than the beginning of justice, at once as Iaw and heyond the law,

in

law beyond the law."8

The order of

illeity

can neither be understood as

only

a legal.

ity regulating human

masses,

as an

anonymous

sanction that

describes

the

coexistence between

the self, the other and

other others,

nor

can

it

be perceived as a specifically

interpersonal

^oc- currence.

It

has already been pointed

out that the

enigmatically signified thirdness is both a

matter

of detachment and ^a

matter

of

intersubjectivity. Illeity

verges on

the

impersonal measurability, on

the possibility of

comparison between

different

^{others whom} the self faces, and on the

proximity

of the

traumatic

and exclusive relationship

with

the other person. Due

to illeity the ethical

rela-

6 E. Levinas, OtherwiseThan Being..., p. 12.

7 E. Levinas, "Phenomenon and Enigma,"... p. ^66.

8 Jacques Derrida, Adieu, to Emmanuel Leuinas, t'rar's.

and Michael Naas (Stanford, California: Stanford University

Pascale-Anne Brauit Press, 1999), p.29.

The iL y a and illeity...

I

³³

l ionship becomes reversible

-

^{the ego is} also counted as the other irnd remains exclusive.

In

Levinas's words,

the

order issued by

llrc third not only imprints itself,

engraves

itselfs,

i.e.

it

reveals

I lrc

gravity

_of

the ethical

order,

but it

also

overprints

itself.10 The rrrrlcr

of illeity

stamps

out the

order

of

egoism and indicates the

ortlcr

of

ethical

non-indifference extended also on

the

self

-

^the

rrr,l['is somebody's other and demands the same devotion. However,

llrc

order also occurs as

an

excess, as

too

much

of printing,

too rrrrrch pressure, as

too great a weight that tips all

balance and r,rlrrality. The measure and balance are transgressed and the order rrpproaches the

indifferent,

inhuman,

in-finite

Law. The weighing rrrside the order, counterpointed

with

the overweighing, brings the

I lr i rdness of

illeity "to

the point of possible confusion

with

the

stir-

l r n g of ^Lhe there is."11

ln his

early

writing

Levinas associates the there

is

^(the

il y

a)

wil,h indeterminacy and

inhumanity, with

the

pre-ethical or

non- r,llrical sphere of "being

in

general (l'€tre en gdndral)."12 He relates

I lrcru to existence devoid of existents and labels

that

state tlne

il

y a l,lrcre is. The

il

y o is what persists

after

the

imaginary

destruc-

I rorr of

everything; it is the

absence

that returns

as presence, as

"rrrr irtmospheric density, a plenitude of the void, or the

murmur

of ,'ilr,nce."13 The

ll y a

refers

to the universality

of existence which pr,r'sists even

in

the

annihilation

and which

returns in

the

heart

of

rrr.11irl,ion. The ll y o is anonymous and threatening because

it

strips lorrsciousness of subjectivity, allows

for

no escape, and throws the ,lr,srrbjectivised existent-non-existent

into an insomnia, i.e. into

"rrn impersonal vigilance"14

in which

no one (no existent)

is vigi-

') l,lrnmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," in Collected Philosophical Papers..., 1r ^l 0(i

r') Ihidem, p. 104.

I _l,). Levinas, "God and Philosophy,"... p. 179.

1'r Ibiclem, p. 30.

1' I,lmmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen rl'rllr;lrurgh: Duquesne University Press, 1997), p. 47.

rl l,lnrmanuel Levinas, Existence without Existents, trans Alphonso Lingis , l'1r,, llrrgue: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 30.

34

I

n*o Rychter

lant but

the absence

itself.

The indeterminate and anonymous

il

^y

o is both

terrifying

and "irremissible;"15

it is arresting

and "inex- tinguishable."16

Its

impersonality is

frightening

because

it

implies

the impossibility

of avoiding being,

"the perpetuity

of

the

drama of existence."rT The

very

choice of expression is

telling: inthe il

y o neither

identifiable

subject nor

the

verb to be are employed, and being evoked is not related to anything

particular.

The

^possible

confusion

between

illeity and the il y a

can

be

^accounted

for in a variety of

^ways.

Hent

de

Vries

observes

that Levinas's ethics is haunted by its amoral, or

^premoral,

other

- ^{by the} anonymity of the il ^y a. The

significance

of

the menace produced

by the il y a

does

not lie only in the fact that

it unsettles the conditions of ethics. De Vries maintains ^that ethical

transcendence

- ^illeity - cannot exist without "trans-

descendence"l8

- ^the

^descent

^{into and}

^beyond

^the

^elemental

ll y a. The haunting

non-sense

of the il y a protects ethics

from degenerating

into a moralistic

sense.

This

^reasoning

is

inspired by Levinas's presentation of the ethical sense of the

il

^y o to which he devotes one of his

last

sections of Otherwise ^Thq.n Being. Faced

with the il y a, the self

loses

its

freedom and becomes

bereft

of

its

independence;

in that way the self is

confronted

with

^"the

ambiguity of

sense

and

non-sense

in being,

sense

turning into

non-sense."1e

It is from this

helplessness and surrender required of

the

self

that

Levinas derives

the ethical

meaning of

the il y

a.

Tlne

il y o strikes the

self

with absurdity,

overwhelms

him "Iike the fate

of subjection

to all the

other."2o The

il y a

demands from

the

self passivity

without

any assumption, i.e. passivity

not

only purged of intentions, but

-

^{as Levinas puts}

^it -

^passivity

^prior

^to

the differentiation

between the active and the passive.

"The

there

15 lbidem, p. 33.

16 Ibidem, p. 32.

17 lbidem, p. 34.

18 Hent de Vries, "Adieu, A Dierr, A-Dieu," in Ethics as First Philosophy. The Significance of EmmanueL Leuinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, ed- Adriaan Peperzak (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), p. 214'

1e Ibidem, p. 163.

20 Ibidem, p. 164.

'lhe il y a ^and. illeity...

I

³⁵

rrr is

all

the weight

that alterity

weighs supported by a subjectivity l,lrrrt does

not

found it."21 Levinas emphasises

that the il ^y a is

a rrrodality

of the gravity with which alterity

presses

the

self, the 11'tvity of the responsibility asked of the self. The ethical weight of llrc

i.ly

o is aiso

the

seriousness of the accusations

that

come from

l,lrc other, the acuteness of persecution from which the self suffers rrrrrl the severity of the exile which deprives the self of the secrecy ol'l,[re house/one's skin. The weight of the

lly

o pushes the self out rrl' iLself

into the

null-place,

into the

exile. The self

is

"supporting

l,lrrr whole of being

[...] lin

^which

it]

is a sub-jectum;

it

is under the rvrright of the universe, responsible

for everything;"" the

self

is

a lrosLage to something he cannot grasp.

It

is

interesting that

the

il

^y o affects both the subject and the

r rl lrcr'. Both the self and the other experience lhe il y o through

their

rrrrh.jection

to

fatigue. The

stiffening

and numbness characteristic ol'physical

fatigue

are described

by

Levinas as

the

experience of llrrr suffocating, yet irremissible presence of being, as touching the vr,r'y

impossibility

of nothingness, as

the

experience

of the il y

a.

l,'rrl,igue "reveals ^a subjection which compromises our freedom [...].

Wr irre yoked to our task, delivered over to

it.

In the

humility

^of the

rrur rr who

toils

bent over his work there is surrender, forsakenness.

l)r'spite

all its

freedom,

effort

reveals a condemnation;

it

is fatigue rrrrrl suffering."23 Fatigue

is the

condemnation

to being; it is

the rvcight

of present

moments

carried by the

subject

who in

his ,,rlrirustion lags behind himself;

it

is the subject-ion2a artd yielding lrr riomething

that

cannot be abandoned.

'rl [bidem.

:r:r Ibidem, p. 116.

'r'l [4. Levinas, Existence..., p.37.

'rl Levinas ciaims that in fatigue there is an upsurge of presence. This is

;r,,riilrlc ^due to the time-Iag or delay experienced by the exhausted labourer. ^A being

r, 'rro tonger in step with itself, is out of joint with itseif, in a dislocation of the I

lr ,rrrr ilsell'." (E. Levinas, Existence..., p. 35). The lag ^of fatigue opens the possibility ,rl lr,lrtLionship between instants, creates the interval in which the present can ,,,, rrr Also, this event is equivalent to the formation of an existent "for which to

1,,, rrrr.rrls to take up being." (Ibidem). It ^{is not} a coincidence that the ambiguous

I r r r r'l u re of fatigue described by Levinas in his earliest work resembles the highly

36 I

l*o

^Rychter

It is

essential

to notice that fatigue

affects

both the

subject who

is

engrossed

in his

labour, and feminine other, who

toils

over her domestic duties.

This

is not

to

suggest

that

the metaphor only recapitulates

the

ancient curse of labour

for

which

the

woman is responsible and which she has to shoulder.2s The fact

that

in fatigue not oniy the

selfbut

also the other are exposed to the

horror ofthe il y

a, i.e.

to the irremissible

^{presence, raises} questions of utmost

importance. The il ^y a is

so

poignantly "present"

as

to

oppress

both

a being (an existent,

the self)

and

the

otherwise-than-being

(the other). The il y a

occurs as a

peculiar

mode

of

presence to

which

also

the

other

is

condemned

or

subjected.

If in the

case of

the self the time-lag of fatigue

establishes

the

conditions

of

the emergence of an existent, how shall one

treat

the lag

in the

other, who is

prior

to

the

self? The presence of the

il

y _{a bears} a trace of

the third, which

cannot be assimilated

either to

being

or to

^the otherwise-than-being. Newman claims

that

the relationship which

Iinks

the

il

^y

a

^and

itleity

is as

tight

^as

to

allow one

to

say

that

the

ambivalent structure of t]ne there ls described in otherwise Than Being. The Iag, the dislocation characteristic for fatigue, may be compared to the self-contradictory moment of the il y a, in which anonymity of incessant presence tarries behind the trace ofthe temporally prior third (il or ille).

25 Levinas is very often accused of stereotypical, if not pejorative, depiction of the feminine. Tina Chanter, for one, claims that Levinas either deifies or deni- grates the feminine because he limits ^her appearance to the allure of the Eros, to domestic affairs and maternity. My point in this thesis is not to show that the choice of Levinas's metaphors of the feminine other is everything but traditionai.

It ^seems clear that there is a possibiiity of making the case against Levinas's pre- sentation of the feminine. I claim, however, that despite one's critical look at Levi- nasian depiction of the feminine, one should also "ask what indications lie in Levi- nas' presentations, which he himself does not develop." (Tina Chantet, Ethics of

Eros. Irigaray's Rewriting of the Philosophers (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), p.204). In one of his interviews, Levinas remarks of femininity: "I ^haven't quite got to the bottom of this matter." ("Emmanuel Levinas," tn French Philoso- phers in conuersation, ed. Raoul Mortley (London and NewYork: Routledge, ^1991), p. l8). Levinas does not merely cultivate the stereotypes ofthe feminine but prob- Iematises them. chanter is right to say that "no matter how problematic Levinas's depiction of the feminine is in other respects, it challenges the logic of metaphysics with a radicality hitherto unprecedented." (T. Chante-r, Ethics of Eros..., p. 209). I

focus precisely on the ways Levinas challenges the logic.

The jl _v a arrclilteitt,.

. I

³⁷

tl

v

a "forrnisl

and deform[s]

the

condition and

the possibility

of IIrc trace of ill6it6,"26

that the il ^y a is

another excluded

third

on rvlrich Levinas's ethical project depends. The two "excluded

thirds"

,:rrrnot be treated as opposed or outside ofeach other: the

il ofthe

r/ v o and the

ille

of

illeity

are not only counterparts

but

also traces rr/ one another

that

occur

in

one another.2T

This

interdependence lrlt,ween

illeifi, and the il y a, the mutual imprinting, may

be ,lr.scribed as a

result

of a

particular kind

of

gravity

- the gravity

llrrrl keeps one concept

in

the other's

orbit

and exerts an influence

,rn their materiality, i.e.

leaves

traces on the verbal matter

of ltrtth

illeity

and

the il ^y

a.

The

examination of

the

gravity-based rrrl,<:raction between

illeity and the il y a

reveals

that the

way llrirdness absolves and participates

in

otherness and subjectivity

.,

rrruch more complicated, more

difficult

to comprehend and spell

,rrrl, than the isolated reading of

illeity

indicates.

tlleity (as Levinas himself

acknowledges2s)

is a

neologism l,rrrned

with two masculine pronouns: Latin ille fthat

^{one) as}

rvcll as

with

French

il

^(he). Both pronouns refer to possessive and ,,rrrquering

masculinity

and as such,

are

closely connected

with

tltr.'

neutralisation of alterity.

On

the

level of

the signifier illeity

rri very

firmly

rooted

in masculinity,

as

if the

postulated f'eature ,rl t,hirdness

-

the absolution

from

gender determination

-

^were

rrrrlrossible.

It

seems

that in the

case of

illeity, the

non-masculine

lrt:omes subordinated to the masculine, which makes illeity's

llrirdness questionable on gender terms.

'lhe il

of the

il y

a, on the other hand, belongs to the expression

I lrrrt indicates the obliteration of all things and persons, and the in-

, l i I lcrent permanence of this obliteration. 1l of the il y a refers to the r,rl,rration when there is ^nobody, but

it

refers to

that

"nobody"

in

such ,r wily as

if it

were not the negation of presence or erasure of beings

r{j 'I Chanter, Ethics of Eros..., p. 218.

17 Michael Newman, "sensibility, Trauma and the Trace: Levinas liom l'l,r'rrornenology to the Immemorial," in Ethics as First Philosophy..., pp. 128-129,

rrol r, 29.

:8 E. Levinas, Otlterwise Than Being..., p.12.

38

I

o*o ^Rychter

and nouns, but a presentation of erasure, a solidification of absence in the form of the noun

ll.

Even

if

Levinasian il y

a

deswlbes a pure-

ly

impersonal situation,

its

grammar informs of

that

impersonality by means of the personal pronoun

il.

The

il y

a as one of Levinas's

thirds

vacillates between personality and impersonality.

Levinas's thirdness is predicated both on the thirdness of the

il

y

a,

and on the thirdness of illeity, whose trace or echo is preserved

in the

word

il. It is striking that

the two

thirds

echo one another

not

only

in their

(paradoxical) constructions

but

also on

the

level of

the signifier.

What happens between the

il

of the

il y

o and the

illille

of

illeity

is comparable to an irresolvable tug-of-war

in

which

both

sides

fail to

stand the

test

of

stability,

and

in

which the even

distribution of

weaknesses

is

displayed

through the interaction

between

signifiers.

Thus,

the signifier il is

an echo which repeats

but distorts the signifier ille:

the

ille

of

illeity

reverberates

in

the

il

of

the il y a

only as something half-effaced,'disrupted and frag- mented. As a

distortion

and

rupture

of

ille,

the

ll

discloses the fact

that illeity is not

a gender-free notion,

the fact that

^{il-ness (mas-}

culinity) is

never eradicated

from

thirdness.

In terms

of

the

tug- of-war logic, the

il

pulls the rope and demystifies ille's alleged gen- derlessness. To use another metaphor, the

il

anatomises, dissects, dismembers illeity, but

- ⁱⁿ

^fact

-

the dismemberment

it

performs

fails to

absolve (de-masculinise)

illeity.

Because the

il

^{of the}

^{il y}

^ct'

is not

gender-free,

it

reinscribes

rather than

corrects

the

gender

determination of illeifu.

The

il

re-members

the

otherwise evasive masculine presence and

returns to the

decidedly non-neutral con-

dition

of language

it

wanted to avoid. The pretence ^of independence from gender categories

that

was

first

pointed out

in

the

ille

is now found

in

the

il. In trying

to

retreat

from the

virile

and conquering language, Levinas's

writing unwittingly

commits

itself

to

it.

A thorough examination of the

interplay

between the signifiers

il

and

ille

shows a major

duality

or impasse

within

the manifesta-

tion

of thirdness: the

interplay

between the

il

y o and

illeity

leads

to two conflicting

readings of

the third

which

resist

synthesis or reconciliation. The

ll literally

-

^or

letterally

-

^reveals

^ille's

^v:ul-

nerability and non-monolithic

character,

but fails to ultimately

'lhe il y a arLd, illeity...

I

39

rrrrdo

the tacit

gender colouring of

the ille

because

the

masculin- iscd pronoun of the

il y

aremains inscribed

in

the language of the

llrird.

The

interplay

produces, or

rather

en-gender-s, two readings trcither of which describes thirdness

in

stable terms. The way the l,wo

thirds

- ^illeity

^{and the}

^il

^{y a}

- ^{interact with}

^{each other dem-}

orrstrates

the fact that Levinasian thirdness

does

not

have one sl,tble meaning

but

depends on two

mutually

exclusive meanings:

l,ht:

possibility

and

the impossibility of disintegration or

absolv- ing. Since

the relation

between

the il y a

and

illeity

leads

to

the collapse of logic, thirdness should be read as

functioning

through llrc aporetic parallelism between

cutting

and holding together, be- l,wcen absolving and

participating,

the parallelism whose elements 11r'avitate towards one another and resist one another. To say

that

I,lrc iL

y o

and

illeity

engender/en-gender

two

readings

is to

mean I,hut the

signification

of the

third

cannot stabilise

itself;

instead,

it

r'rrn

"manifest" itself

as a passage

from

engendering

to

endanger- rrrg, as a

shift from

production

to

effacement, as

the

process

that

lngenders (produces) endangerment and undermines (endangers) ol-gender-ing: the process,

in

other words, which troubles the neu- l,r'irlising power of masculinity.

lt

is essential to

point

out

that

despite the en-gender-ing of the t,lrird, despite

the

masculinisation of

the

thirdness

that

occurs

in

l,cvinas language,

the signification

of

the third is not ultimately

rrrrbordinated

to the

masculine

profile.

The masculine grounding rrl'f he word

illeity

- ^its

derivation from French and/or

Latin

mas-

luline

pronouns

-

^{must be}

qualified by the fact that the

gram- rrrrtLical gender of

the

word

illeity is not

masculine

but

feminine.

( )ttc says "cette

ill6it6"

artd

rtot

"ce

illdit6." Levinasian

neologism rrttys three

things

about

thirdness:

⁽¹⁾

its

constative level informs Lhnt

illeity participates in both

genders

but

simultaneously, goes lrc.yond

all

categorisation

including

gender;

(2) the

etymological lrrvt:l reveals

that

the resources for the term

illeity

were masculine;

(il) _the grammatical level indicates

that althoughilleity

arose from

l,lrc masculine,

it

functions as the feminine.

Femininity

implied

in

l,lrc

term illeity disrupts or

ironises

masculinity, but at the

same

I irnc masculinity does not allow the feminine disruption to achieve

40

I

P*o Rycl'tter

the

status of

the final

and unquestionable

rupture.

The feminine encroaches the masculine claim to be the foundation of genderless- ness,

but

as

it

does so,

its stability

becomes threatened by

the

in- sidious

masculinity. Neither femininity nor masculinity

can have the upper hand

-

^one jeopardises and unsettles the other.

The sense

ofthe

continuous danger enveloping the two genders is also en-gender-edlengendered and epitomised by the

il

y a,

which

refers

to the

effacement of a1l personality,

but

which,

llke

illeity,

remains

entangled

in the

complicated

network of

relationships between absolving from and ascribing to

femininity

and masculin-

ity. The

constative

level of

Levinas's

writing informs the

reader

that

the

il y ais

the impersonal, anonymous, indeterminate

milieu that

precedes

the

emergence of

the

self and which follows

the

an-

nihilation

of

all

existents. Thus, the

il

y o seems to be understood

as anterioriposterior to both

masculine

and feminine

subjectiv-

ity.

However,

Levinasian

claims about

the

breach between

the il

y o .rri*

gender categories should be read against other aspects of Levinas's account of the

il

y a.

Firstly,

the very phrase

with

which

Levinas

describes

that impersonality, the signifier ll,

draws the reader's

attention to the fact that masculinity

perseveres

in

the

il y a in the form

of

the

masculine pronoun. Secondly,

femininity insinuates itself' through the proximity Levinas

establishes be- tween the

night

of the

il

y

a

and the

night

of erotic love.

In

Totality and,

Infinity it is

said

that

"alongside of

the night

as anonymous

rustling

of the there

is

extends the

night

of

the

erotic."2e

It is

not a coincidence

that

Levinas yokes these

two

types of darkness to- gether:

both

of

them

eclipse representation and

retreat from

the

signification

accomplished

in

the

light

of cognition. And both the

ll

y

a

and

femininity

are described via the

term

of

gravity

or weight, the term whose ethical meaning does not yield _to the grasp of com- prehension

but

consists

in withdrawal and

desubstantialisation.

The desubstantialising character of heaviness, most

intriguing in

Levinasian

account

of femininity,

^provides

an interesting

prism

through

which the thirdness of the

il

y

a

^can be ^seen.

'fhe il y a and ilteity...

I

⁴¹

Levinas uses the

concept

of ^gravity in his description

of l,lrc

feminine other, of the virile ^(or

masculine) subject,

and

of nnpersonality. The heaviness of the impersonal

il y a

refers

to

the lrrrrden of ethical responsibility

for the

other and

to the

burden of

o||O,s

material

existence.

Both

the

virile

subject and

the

feminine rrl,lrcr are subjected to the

"gravity

of alterity"3o attached ^Lo lhe

il

^y

rr i lnoreover, both the subject and the feminine other are encumbered lry the

material

character of

the

present, and

carry the

burden of l,lrcir existence. Yet, despite the simiiarities, the weight of

femininity

rlocs

not quite

equal

the

masculine weight. When ascribed

to

the rrrrrsculine subject,

who

displays

his

"mastery, power,

viriIity,"3l gravity refers to the situation in which the self is

"heavy

with

il,sclf,"S2 enchained to itself, "whose freedom is not as

light

^{as grace,}

lrut

already heaviness."33 When

the

"burden"sa and

the

"weight"3s

rrr.6 associated

with

femininity, other significant features of the term

lrocome conspicuous.In Totq.lity and Infi,nity Levinas claims that the lCrninine "relieves

itself

of

its

own weight of beiilg,"36 dissipates

in

l,lrr.) nocturnal atmosphere and

the

only weight she retains

is "this

w()ight of non-signifyingness, heavier than the weight ^of the formless

r'cirl."37 The feminine gravity is "a monstrous weight in the shadow of

ilo11-sense,"38 a weight in which signification is inverted and ceases to

1)Lran. In Eros, words do not bespeak meanings but ^expose themselves

r r rrd reveal

their "ultramateriality,""

^i.e.

^their

non-representationist

clraracter.

The ultramateriality

provides grounds

for a ^striking

irrl,eraction between

the

masculinised impersonality

of the il y

a rrnd femininity. The feminine weight of non-signifyingness ^leaves its

l,r.irce on the masculine pronoun ^of the il y a

-

^the

^il

^{does not refer to}

r'0 E. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being..., p. 165.

'lt E. Levinas, Existence and Existents..., p. ^83.

;r2 Emmanuel Levinas, Time a.nd the Other..., p. 55.

33 Ibidem, p. 56.

3a E. Levinas, Existence and Existents..., p. ^78.

:'5 Ibidem, p. ^88.

:16 E. Levinas, TotaLitv and Infinity..., p.256.

ir1 Ibidem, p. 25?.

:]8 Ibidem, p.264.

:rs Ibidem, p. 256.

42

I

n*o R^vchter

any meaning, does not represent an identifiable masculine subject;

it

is relieved of its usual (masculine) content. The feminine other, who bathes in the erotic darkness, is the silent and discreet companion of the il-y-a-tic darkness. The gravity of alterity, or rather "the gravity of the trace"a0 of thirdness left

in

tlne il y o, should be viewed through

the

irresolvable

relation

between

the

masculine perseverance and

the

feminine

ultramateriality.

Thirdness of

the il y a is

dependent on

-

but different from

-

the feminine retreat from the logocentric meaning and the masculine dependence on the inescapability of the logos.

In the third

there

is

an indefatigable weighing between the feminine, which is heavier than the formlessness of the il y a, andthe masculine, which in hypostasis separates himself from the elemental, overcomes his immersion

in

the

rustling

anonymity and emerges out of

it

as a subject; there

is

a weighing which does not culminate

in

a conclusion.

Although traces of thirdness in Levinas's language do

not make a readable map,

they

can neither be dismissed as meaning- less

nor

be

taken lightly.

Those traces

indicate that

even though the weightiness of thirdness brings about the collapse of logic, the discourse of the

third

is able to signify.

That

signification

-

^{or, as}

Levinas prefers to call

it,

signifyingness

- ^will

not comply

with

the touchstone

rule

of logic according

to

which one cannot say

that

X is and is not Y. Through

its

simultaneous involvement and absolv- ing from the oppositions

like

the masculine and the feminine,

that signification

gravitates towards the break of the categories of rea- son.

It is that

break

that

enables

the

opening of ethical language

- ^the

^language

ⁱⁿ

^{which the theme,} the content, never outweighs

the

saying

itself;

the language

in

which

the

readiness

to

respond,

responsibility,

exposure

to the interlocutor,

does

not allow for

a composure and placidity. The

third

is

that

which disturbs, discom- poses and unsettles: therefore,

it

is neither the philosopher's stone nor the cornerstone of the temple of theorised ethics, but rather,

it

is

like

a stone of stumbling and ^a rock of offence.

a0 E. Levinas, "Meaning and Sense,"... p. 106

The il y a ^and, illeity...

I

⁴³

Ewa Rychter

I/ y a i ono6i: Slady trzecio6ci w etycznym jgzyku Emmanuela Levinasa Streszczenie

Artykul jest analiz4 zwi4zk6w pomiqdzy dwoma Levinasowskimi pojqciami:

illAiM i il y a, o kt6rych moZna powied.ziei, ii. funkcjonuj4 jako _dwa przypadki lrzecioSci. Illditd (,,ono36") odnosi siq do enigmatycznego Sladu pozostawionego w twarzy innego, Sladu wykraczaj4cego poza ludzk4 podmiotowoSi. Il y a ^(nie-

przetlumaczalny termin; ,,jest" pozbawione podmiotu) to nieludzkie bycie w ^ogole,

;rbsurdalne bycie bez byt6w, aie takZe monstrualny cigZar odpowiedzialno6ci.

'f'rzecioSi illd.itd oraz il y a bqdzie polega6 na ich paradoksalnym statusie, na rriemo2noSci wpisania ich w tradycyjny model, w ktorego obrgbie dana rzecz nie nroZe jednocze6nie posiadai i nie posiadai okre6lonej cechy. Ill1itd nie jest ani po lrrrrstu bezosobowa ani osobowa; jednocze6nie stanowi prawo i zakl6ca je. Il y a d,o-

l,yczy zar6wno bezosobowego szumu bycia, jak i etycznej relacji ja

- ^{inny. Jednak}

zwiqzek miqdzy ill|itd i il 1t a oparty jest nie tylko na ich zbliZonym aporetycznym r:harakterze, ale tak2e na skomplikowanej sieci powi4zari wylaniajqcych sig z sa- rrrc'j materii slowa, z gramatyki, z konstrukcji znacz4cych. Niuanse zoaczeni.owe rodzaju (gender) illditd Lil y atkazt\4migotliwy charakter trzecio6ci i podkreSlaj4 l'rrkl, 2e trzeciosi wymyka sig logocentrycznemu uporz4dkowaniu.

Ewa Rychter

ll y a und Diesigkeit: Spuren der Drittigkeit in der ethischen Sprache von Emmanuel Levinas

Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Artikel ist eine Analyse von den Beziehungen zwischen den zwei Begriffen von Levinas: ille-ite ^,tnd il y o, die als zwei FdIIe der Drittigkeit lrctrachtet werden. Ill1itd (Diesigkeit) bezieht sich auf die rtitselhafte, im Gesicht rlcs Anderen hintergelassene Spur, die die Grenzen der menschlichen Subjektivitiit riberschreitet. Il _-v o Gin uniibersetzbarer Terminus; "ist" ohne das Subjekt) bedeu-

l ct das nicht menschliche Sein im allgemeinen, absurdes Sein ohne Existenzen, aber rrtrch monstr6se Verantwortungslast. Die Drittigkeit von illeite und il y a besteht in

rlcr:en paradoxem Status, dass sie in ein irbliches ModeII nicht eingetragen werden kilnnen, in dem ein bestimmtes Ding eine bestimmte Eigenschaft nicht gleichzeitig lrrrben und nicht haben kann. Illeite ist weder einfach unpersriniich noch persiinlich;

rric gibt Gesetz und gieichermaBen st6rt es. Il y a betrifft sowohl unpersdnliche Da- (,rngewese, als auch die ethische Beziehung: ich- derAndere. Doch die Relation

44 I n*o Rychter

zwischen illeite und il ^y a sttttzt sich nicht nur auf deren iihnlichen aporetischen charakter, sondern auch auf ein kompliziertes Netz von den, aus der wortmaterie, aus der Grammatik und aus bedeutenden Konstruktionen entstandenen verbin- dungen. Die Bedeutungsnuancen von der Art ^(gender) illeite :ur,d,

il

y

a

veran- schaulichen den flimmernden charakter der Drittigkeit und betonen, dass sich die Drittigkeit Iogozentrisch nicht ordnen Idsst.