ORGANON 25:1989/1993 PROBLÈMES GÉNÉRAUX
A ng elo B aracca (Italia)
“B IG S C IE N C E ” V S. “L IT T L E S C IE N C E ” : L A B O R A T O R IE S A N D L E A D IN G ID E A S IN C O N F L IC T ; N U C L E A R P H Y S IC S IN T H E
T H IR T IE S A N D F O R T IE S IN U S A , E U R O P E A N D JA P A N
1. - T oday w e are so accustom ed to large-scale research, th at w e tend
to consider it as an alm ost natural way o f organizing and perform ing this activity. From an historical point of view , how ever, we cannot avoid ques tions such as: w hat was the genesis o f Big Science? W hat w ere the causes and the conditions o f its birth and developm ent? W hich w ere the steps that prepared its advent?
In fact “Big Science” did not suddenly grow out o f w ar-tim e em ergence and o f such enterprises as the “M anhattan P roject” . It was instead prepared and partly anticipated by a series o f previous choices and changes that took place in the leading fields o f scientific research. Such innovations developed in connection w ith the evolution o f the role, social position, stim uli and cultural horizon o f the scientific com m unity and o f the role o f science and technology and their m utual relationships.
In order to get a better understanding o f these transform ations and to place them in a historical perspective, I have chosen to investigate the co n trasting attitudes that developed (explicitly or im plicitly) against the early trends tow ards large-scale research and the alternatives that w ere proposed to them . Such an investigation should not give the im pression o f a nostalgic point o f view , since our purpose is to contribute to the u nderstanding o f the objective historical trends. This approach does show in fact that the ro ad to large-scale research was not a com pulsory choice from a point o f view o f scientific investigation in itself: extrem ely valuable experim ental and theoretical physics was being done by those scientists w ho did not accept this road; they som etim es got even m ore accurate or better results. B ut Big Science turned out to be the w inning choice because it co rresponded to the stream o f historical and social developm ent.
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W ith this purpose in m ind, I have studied the grow th o f nuclear physics w ith accelerated particles in the thirties, I have follow ed the w ar and post w ar choices in research activity m ade by som e o f the leading scientists in this field and I have com pared the developm ents in different countries, in order to distinguish and characterize conflicting or divergent roads or styles o f research.
2. - L et m e start with the U.S. The outburst in this field o f research
took place here at the very beginning o f the thirties and one is struck by its coincidence with the w orst period o f the econom ic recession: the growing difficulties in the funding and developm ent o f scientific research in general, strongly contrast w ith the relative easiness w ith w hich atom -sm ashers found financial support and started large-scale research. B ehind this one recognizes the precocious interests o f the leading industrial sectors tow ard the em ergent fields and the new role that scientific and technological innovation had to play in the N ew D eal. New features appeared in scientific activity in such fields as particle accelerators and nuclear physics in the U.S. (in contrast - as w e w ill see - w ith other countries): grow ing costs and dim ensions of m achines and labs, team research, com petition and rush for the results, grow ing m ean num ber o f authors for each paper, m anagem ent as p art o f scientific activity raising increasing funds.
Three groups developed early particles accelerators in the U nited S tates1: 1) that o f L aw rence in Berkeley
2) T uve at the D epartm ent o f Terrestrial M agnetism (I will call it DTM ) o f the C arnegie Institution o f W ashington
3) the group o f C rane and L auritsen in Pasadena.
E rnest O. L aw rence w as probably the m ost significant representative o f these new trends, w hile his friend M erle A. Tuve - another protagonist and leading scientist - expressed perhaps the strongest and m ost explicit opposi tion tow ard large-scale research trends.
Som e striking features o f L aw rence’s character have already been ana lyzed2, 3’ 4: his com petitive and m anagerial leadership, his constant trend tow ards larger m achines and higher energies, his ability in collecting finan cial support everyw here, and in this connection his concern w ith show ing the practical usefulness o f his products.
Tuve, on the contrary, had a very different, and in m any respects op posite, attitude. In fact it is striking that he w as one o f the scientists who m ade m ajor fundam ental contributions to the progress o f nuclear physics during the thirties (and o f other disciplines after the w ar) but his nam e and achievem ents are alm ost unknow n to the great m ajority o f to d ay ’s physicists. L aw rence m oreover was aw arded the N obel P rize in 1939, w hile Tuve m issed out, even if he probably w ould have deserved it m ore than once. T hese facts greatly derived from T u v e’s particular character and attitude, w hich led him to dislike the m echanism s and spirit that w ere increasingly
"Bif’ Science" vx. "Little Science" 41 pervading a research activity o f ever grow ing dim ensions. In this sense Tuve at the end ended up defeated by the changes taking place.
R em em ber that Law rence and Tuve were born in the sam e tow n, were school-friends and constantly linked by deep friendship all through their lives. The bitter rem arks Tuve had to m ake about L aw ren ce’s research are even m ore significant.
L aw ren ce’s group published the first results o f experim ents in nuclear physics with charged accelerated particles well before T u v e ’s group5: un fortunately the lack o f rigour in these experim ents becam e evident in short tim e and was recognized and constantly rem arked by T uve him self. On the other hand it is well known that L aw rence, w orking at the cyclotron and disposing o f it, really m issed some o f the m ain discoveries, nam ely artificial disintegration o f the nucleus and artificial radioactivity.
The opposite attitude o f T u ve’s group is striking: a great accuracy in designing the m achines and the experim ental techniques, in testing the ap paratuses, before really entering nuclear physics research.
The first experim ental results published by the D IM group6 w ere in fact in clear disagreem ent with L aw rence’s previous results, but L aw rence replied insisting on his ow n results, even if “there is alw ays, o f course the possibility that these alpha particles are due to im purities”7 (and T uve added a note to the letter: “Im purities?!”)
In the same letter Lawrence reported the first results on the scattering by accelerated deutons, obtained in collaboration with the chem ist Lewis. It is interesting to remark that, in spite o f the growing divergences, the Law rence - Tuve friendship was so deep that the first provided the latter with the heavy water necessary to perform the experiments with accelerated deuton beam s8.
On the other hand these experim ents becam e the m ajor po int o f dis agreem ent. In fact, Law rence, proposed at that tim e the fam ous “deuton disintegration hypothesis”9, that he reported at 7th Solvay C onference raising the criticism o f the European physicists4, 5.
Tuve was already very sceptic on this hypothesis; he had w arned L a wrence: “I am not able to follow your suggestion” 10. L aw rence had already replied that, if the initial evidence was effectively scarce, “ I think we have now pretty conclusive evidence on that point” 11.
A fter the Solvay Conference, Law rence had to perform m ore accurate tests in order to exclude that his results derived from system atic co n tam i natio n s12, as he w rote Tuve on D ecem ber 21, 193313.
Tuve, significantly conscious o f the relevance and the delicacy o f the problem , had answ ered L aw rence’s letter on January 6th 1934, specifying that he had no new result since the w hole period was spent in a very rigorous test of the experim ental techn iq u es14.
But w hen careful experim ents were perform ed by T uve in the follow ing weeks, the disagreem ent exploded. The “prelim inary runs” already show ed
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“a great deal of difficulty in correlating our observations with those you have published” 15 - with the whole set o f observation, not only with the deuton
results! - and suggested: “that you check over your apparatus very carefully,
since at present... there appear to be the basis for suspicion that at least part o f your observations are due to some factor comm on to all your target, which may be contamination, slit edges, target mountings or some other factor” 15.
A t that point L aw rence’s reply was lengthy but appeared very em bar
rassed, and outlined the first autocritical considerations, since in the m ean tim e his deuton results had been contradicted also by the Pasadena g ro u p 17 and at the Cavendish L ab o rato ry 18:
’’Y ou are quite right in surm ising that in our prelim inary m easurem ents there have been som e errors... R ather than continuing experim ents w e have decided to em bark on a program of careful observations o f things already brought to light and it is our intention to get as accurate m easurem ent as w e can” 16.
L aw rence finally adm itted his m istake in the deuton disintegration hy po th esis19. But Tuve criticism , as we have rem arked, was m uch d eeper and concerned not a single result, but the w hole set up and m ethod o f the ex perim ents perform ed in Berkeley and the hurry and lack o f caution with which they had been published. It is interesting to rem ark that on the contrary Tuve, up to the m om ent, had avoided to m ake public the controversy, al though he was already sure o f his ow n results. A t that m om ent, he sent on April 14, 1934 a letter to The Physical R eview 20 contradicting practically all the results published from Berkeley and he sent a copy to L aw rence with som e bitter notes: “I wrote you at the end o f February w arning o f the direc tion w hich our results were undoubtedly taking. A fter w orking up all o f our results, w e reached the astounding conclusion that w e w ere unable to check a single one o f the observations which you have reported so far... I m ust say that we were certainly not enjoyed the position in w hich w e have been placed. O nce in a lifetim e is once too often”21.
In T u v e ’s action one m ay recognize a m ixture o f real em barrassm ent and professional ethics, of a kind that probably has progressively disappeared in subsequent years. In this sense, on one side, evidently pressed by a grow ing debate on the issue, he personally pointed to Lauritsen that “the question for m any people as to w hether we check L aw rence’s w ork or not have be cam e so insistent that there is no way o f avoiding the issue and w e decided that a bald statem ent was far preferable to any evasion o f the question on our part. W e have been very circum spect in what we have said even to close friends visiting the laboratory until the abstracts had to be w ritten”22.
On the other side, however, a harsh press release was em itted by the C arnegie Institution o f W ashington after the M eeting o f the A.P.S. o f April 26, with the hironic title “A tom -Sm ashers Reveal A tom ic M asquerade” , con taining such statem ents as the following:
"Bif> Science" vs. "Little Science 43 ’’Speaking before the A m erican Physical Society m eeting here today (April 26), Drs. Tuve and H afstad o f the D TM , C arnegie Institution o f W ash ington, dram atically announced that they had succeeded in unm asking the outlaw atom s w hich have played havoc with the results o f atom -splitting investigations currently in progress in various laboratories. T he renegade atom s w hich gave rise to pseudo-transm utations o f carbon, oxygen, and other targets w hen bom barded by high-speed atom s o f heavy hydrogen, are the atom s o f heavy hydrogen itself, sticking in the pores o f the solid target after being driven there by the high-speed beam ”23.
O n A ugust 4 th 1934 Tuve H im self sent Science - through Flem ing - an official rectification24 since the Journal had reported in “erroneous and m is leading” term s the results obtained at the D TM , had not explicitly referred o f the “contam ination effects” and had expressed the opinion that the ex perim ental results from various laboratories w ere not in contradiction.
T he w hole story inspired Tuve with a sense o f deep regret that he e x p ressed to Lauritsen bitterly rem arking that such an accident “m ust occur rarely, if at all” and, since Lauritsen replied that “that sort o f things should never appear in print”, he firmly added that rather “the sort o f things that should never appear in print were w hat led to the necessity for such a state
m ent by me ” .
This course o f events reveals, in my opinion, not only the early em er gence o f different styles in perform ing research activity.
In the following years Lawrence concentrated on cyclotron building and insisted mainly on its use in medicine, while Tuve obtained from his rigorous and careful practice some of the most significant results in nuclear physics5, namely in 1935, the first widths of nuclear resonances and, with his beautiful experiments on proton-proton scattering, charge independence o f nuclear forces.
I could note that the cyclotron was perhaps m ainly the father o f the post-w ar new generation o f accelerators, while T u v e ’s “A tom ic O b ser vatory” , built up at the D epartm ent o f T errestrial M agnetism , perfected e le c trostatic m achines, but preserved the fam iliar atm osphere still existin g today in this institution.
L aw rence’s choices appear instead dictated m ore by the goal o f rising funds for big enterprises, by a need o f guiding or follow ing th e stream o f advanced research, than by true scientific m otivations. For instance, in 1935 he w rote Bohr: “In addition to the nuclear investigations, we are carrying on investigations on the biological effects o f the neutrons and various radioactive substances and are finding interesting things in this direction. I m ust confess that one reason we have undertaken this biological w ork is that we thereby have been able to get financial support for all o f the work in the laboratory. As you well know, it is so m uch easier to get funds for m edical research”26.
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A different spirit was really born, anticipating the m echanism o f Big Science.
3. A stronger confirm ation o f the new features that are appearing m ay
be obtained follow ing m ore thoroughly T u v e’s uncom m on choices during and after the war.
It is im portant to rem ark that Tuve had m ade im portant contributions in m ore than one field and there were in principle m any possible fields in w hich he could have given relevant contributions to w ar research. W hen he and G. B reit had tried as early as 1925 to determ ine the ionosphere height observing the echoes of short radio pulses, “they were troubled by echoes com ing from airplanes, w hich interfered with the m easurem ents”27; “this w as the first recorded instance of distance m easurem ents m ade by the pulse- radar m ethod”28.
T uve m ade m oreover leading contributions to the study o f nuclear fis sion. W ith Roberts, M ayer and H afstad he show ed the first fission process at the D TM accelerator , discovered the em ission o f the “delayed neutron”30 and subsequentl\ they contributed to show the possibility o f a chain reac tion31: “Wo have been hard pressed to get som e data on uranium fission, largely because Ferm i, Rabi, Szilard, etc. have been afraid o f chain reaction possibilities. R egular «war seer» with secret m eetings etc.! Pres. Bush is anxious to see it settled. All indications now are that no chain can occur but it is pretty close”32. A confidential m em orandum o f June 1, 1939 to the D irector of the DTM by Gunn, Technical A dviser o f the Naval Research Laboratory at Anacosta, explicitly m entions in this respects T u v e ’s availa bility “to carry on the final tests at his laboratory”33; on m ay 23, 1940 the C arnegie Institution o f W ashington appropriated $ 20.000 “for study on uranium fission” 34.
T uve was a m em ber o f the U ranium C om m ittee called by R oosevelt after E in stein ’s letter, but his attitude changed at the beginning o f 1940. “ It all started in February 1940... At that tim e, Roberts, H afstad, H eudem burg and I sim ply decided that w e w ould do no m ore physics research if the likes o f H itler w ere to inherit our efforts. W e undertook to find a way that we could contribute to the technology o f m odern w ar’0 0 . W hile “by M ay 1940, in talks with officers in the R and D division o f BU O R D , U .S. Navy, I had learned about the ridiculously low effectiveness of antiaircraft fire. I heard the term «influence fuze» (later «proxim ity fuze»), as wistful hope”36.
The history of the “proxim ity fuze” has in part been w ritten . W e are here interested in one specific aspect. In organizing and directing first the “Section-T” and then the A pplied Physics Laboratory (A PL), T uve follow ed an attitude opposite to that then prevailing and grow ing in the other projects, o f early Big Science. He started with the “four indians” and follow ed the concept o f “a local and flexible group to test the feasibility o f various ideas subm itted to him ”38. In T u v e ’s words: “one o f the greatest «new develop
"Big Science" vs. "Little Science" 45 m ents» o f the war... was the rediscovery... o f the efficiency o f the dem ocratic principle o f directing the effort o f organized group o f people... A boss using the dem ocratic principle does not depend on ju st giving order from above... Asking people to help with the w hole jo b was w hat I used in running the proxim ity fuze developm ent... The dem ocratic system is m ore effective, d o l lar for dollar ad hour for hour, than the autocratic system ... T he key to the effectiveness o f the dem ocratic system is sim ply that criticism flow s both ways; criticism and ideas com e up from w orkers as w ell as dow n the bosses” 39.
But, in spite of T uv e’s subjective w ishes and intentions, the A pplied Physics L aboratory evolved into a m odel o f advanced large-scale research. This happened, in my opinion, not only under the pressure o f em ergence in the w ar-period, but m ainly because the force o f things - in this case o f the Big Science m echanism - was stronger than subjective intentions.
T u v e’s post-w ar choices were an attem pt to react concretely against Big Science and to follow a different path. In a research program he proposed in the spring o f 194640 a prelim inary choice was discussed in the initial “General com m ents” : “It is pertinent to question w hether the Institution should have any postw ar program at all in nuclear physics, w ith large-scale governm ent support assured in m any countries and w ith this field o f scien tific effort sure to be tied up with political pow er-struggles, certainly for many years to come. The conclusion was reached, how ever, that w ork in this field should be continued at the D epartm ent.”40
The end o f war-tim e em ergency thus no longer ju stified “large-scale governm ent support” . As a m atter o f fact, Tuve - coherently w ith his p o si tions - had com e back to the DTM (his pupil H afstad had succeeded him as D irector o f the A pplied Physics L aboratory and fully entered the Big Science m echanism ). W hen Jew ett subm itted to L aw rence him self and other m em bers o f the Com m ittee on Terrestrial Sciences o f the C arnegie Institution on M arch 18, 1946 B ush’s suggestion that Tuve be appointed to the D irec torship o f the DTM , he underlined T u v e’s qualities, but raised doubts b e cause “he has at tim es in the past show n a tendency to rub m en the wrong w ay” (even adding that he “has m atured very considerably in the last few years” ) and concluded that “both B ush and I are agreed that Tuve will be either a great success or a very great failure as D irector”41.
Tuve, on his part, presented the already m entioned suggestions40, and a subsequent m ore official statem ent42 concerning the future research p ro gram o f the DTM . In the official report the prem ise on “G eneral objectives an em phasis specifies the connection betw een the choice o f continuing the research activity in a D epartm ent o f lim ited possibilities and the kind of research that can be perform ed: “Bearing in m ind the special ch aracter of the opportunity presented by the Carnegie Institution o f W ashington, with its unusually great freedom o f objectives, since there are no external groups
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whose interests lim it the program , and view ing the corresponding obligations w hich go along with this freedom , it is agreed that we m ust m ake every possible effort to emphasize creative work, work with new potentialities, and work which lies on the front lines of knowledge. There are serious restrictions as to possible size o f staff and annual expenditures, and accordingly our pro gram m ust be chosen with regard to its effectiveness as a stimulus o r catalyst to the w ork of all other groups concerned with a given field. These considera tions lead naturally to a m ajor emphasis on cooperative endeavors, in which the Institution and the Departm ent can be of great influence and value if we are capable o f vigorous leadership in fresh and significant directions”42. In this connection, Tuve proposed that work in nuclear physics should be continued anyway by a “recognized and well qualified group quietly working on private funds at an agency of high standing and very wide connections, such as the Carnegie Institution”40. M ore precisely “True research - creative research - is always done in very small groups, rarely exceeding five or seven individuals, and hence this separation o f the Departm ent’s staff into very small discreet groups, with reasonable fluidity for shifts between groups, is regarded as both realistic and healthy”42.
"...creative research is never carried on by groups larger than seven
m em bers - usually four is a better size. L arger groups invariably concern them selves with engineering or developm ent, not with the painful carving out o f really new ideas or directions o f progress. Several groups o f three to seven m em bers, each with one or tw o strong m en (age difference is valua ble), can be loosely associated but creative research is not carried out by large team s who are coordinated (that is, ordered) or closely d irected by a single head man. A leader can stim ulate several groups to productive activ ity, but real creative research is not carried out tow ard goals w hich are defined in advance too specifically or in too lim ited a way. A t best, its lim itations can only am ount to a positive encouragem ent or em phasis in a selected broad area o f interest, and valuable offshoots are sure to occur in other related but rather unexpected directions. A single over-all leader, stim u lating and guiding tow ard general goals, is, how ever, m ost valuable and even necessary, to insure cooperation and integration in place o f fragm en tation into separate com partm ents and unrelated interests”40.
A nd again: “It is our conviction that investigators can be stim ulated and led to creative contributions, but they cannot be driven; hence w e m ust evolve leaders in our small groups, but we cannot use authoritarian proce dures. Individual professional responsibility, how ever, also m eans that in dividuals should be ju d g ed by their creative research contributions; steady or devoted w ork is alm ost irrelevant as a criterion o f accom plishm ent or virtue. Since individuals differ in their capacity to contribute creatively, how ever, they will be expected to recognize this and to invest their energies
"Big Science" vs. "Little Science 47 w illingly in directions w hich are pointed out by other m em bers o f the group w orking in their field o f interest, after group consideration indicates that these suggested directions for effort give prom ise o f creative fruitfulness.
O ne picture should alw ays be kept in m ind by the professional research staff: it m ust surely be evident to everyone that the Founder o f the Institution had no thought w hatever that his great free endow m ent should be used to keep 150 people sim ply busy six hours per day! In fact, he m u st have in tended ju st the opposite; his endow m ent was intended to free a certain c rea tive group o f m en from the necessity o f having to be busy, and th eir success in m easuring up to th eir opportunity can only be m easured in term o f their creative output”42.
W hat kind o f research did Tuve suggest in this context? “T he c h ie f aim o f the suggested program as for any research program , appropriate to the Institution, m ay be stated as an effort to underw rite and support the vigorous personal activities o f m odest num ber o f com petent research m en, associated in a congenial and cooperative group w ith a variety o f different and related interests, w ho are pushing forw ard the front-line boundaries o f know ledge. T o be appropriate, th eir objectives should be to establish basic principles, or the m aterials on w hich such generalizations m ay be expected to be fo r m ulated; the w ork should be directed tow ard m ajor unknow ns or big u n a n sw ered questions, and it should lie in areas o f learning in w hich such new know ledge, if attained, w ould have im portance, in the sense that it could be expected to have considerable significance to m any hum an beings, other than the specialists directly concerned. The specialized laboratory w ork in nuclear physics at the D epartm ent before the w ar - resulting, for exam ple, in the dem onstration and m easurem ent o f the proton-proton and proton- neutron interactions - and the biophysical w ork w ith rad io activ e tracers during the w ar - concerned with fundam ental physical processes in p h y si ology - has m et these criteria. M uch m ore w ork o f this fundam ental kind rem ains invitingly open to im m ediate postw ar attack. This is one appropriate goal for the laboratory program ”40.
B ut the research w ork “in governm ent and private research institutes, contrasted w ith those o f sim ilar groups in various universities, also public and private” poses, in T u v e’s opinion, a fundam ental problem . “T he im pact o f young m inds has long been recognized as a m ajor factor in keep ing u n i versity staff m em bers productive and creative in fresh directions... In the course o f ten years a (lively) professor will give h a lf a dozen different courses, each o f w hich requires him to w ork o ver a different area o f his broad professional field. H e will also be obliged m any tim es to take charge o f research students w ho select problem s w hich lie m ore or less outside o f his ow n special field o f current interest and work; this, too, req uires him to study, think, discuss, and even create new ideas in various d ifferent areas o f his broad professional field. ... C ontrast this w ith staff m em bers o f sp ecial
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ized research institutes; in the sam e ten years, w orking all o f his tim e in a narrow field, the specialist dries up m any o f the channels by w hich he should receive nutrition from his own broad professional field40. It follow s that “the prew ar program should go forw ard, but it should be m odified to becom e som ething other than ju st a specialist group-activity in nuclear physics or biophysics. T he dangers o f over-specialisation in these fields m ay be a great as in m any others” . Instead, “a research specialist should actually w ork at least a fifth o f his tim e outside o f his speciality and in som e other area o f his broad professional field”40 M ore precisely, “it seem s reasonable that an investigator m ight be required to «work» one-fifth of his tim e on problem s w hich lie outside o f his speciality, and that an actual output in this other area should be expected (that is, some arrangem ent is needed w hich requires him to face critical judgm ents o f others) and furtherm ore that, although he m ay be a lifelong specialist in some one field, this second or m inor area of his w ork should not rem ain the same subject for a num ber o f years (this w ould ju st m ake him a bifurcated specialist)”40.
In the same context, “as before the war, the laboratory program in nu clear physics should again be concerned with «philosophical» problem s re lating to the prim ary particles o f m atter and the laws governing their inter actions with each other and with radiation (...) (The M anhattan Project work w as not directed tow ard these problem s o f nuclear physics; they w ere really concerned with nuclear «chem istry»)”40.
In the follow ing years T u v e’s positions explicitly clashed with m any choices o f scientific community. Allan Needell o f the Smithsonian Institution has thoroughly reconstructed T uve’s struggle against Lloyd Berkner concerning the establishment and operation of a national radio astronomy facility in Green Bank43. Tube in fact had left nuclear physics since “it changed from a sport into a business” . In the struggle with Berkner he expressed the conviction that the new, expensive tools of research were “subsidiary and peripheral” when com pared with the support o f individual researchers. He insisted that those tools, in his words, “ ...did not serve appreciably to produce or develop creative thinkers and productive investigators. ...At best they serve them, often in a brief and incidental way, and at worse they devour them ” .
He repeatedly expressed him self against Big Science. In 1959 he pub lished on the Saturday Review a long paper with the title: “Is Science too B ig for the Scientist?”44. He repeated this concept in a m eeting in which President E isenhow er announced the appropriation o f $ 100 m illion for the future Stanford linear accelerator45: Tuve m ade such a bald statem ent that his colleagues publicly reprim anded him that “this was neither the tim e nor the place” for it46.
Since I started my analysis with a com parison betw een Tuve and L a w rence in their early research activities, I m ay ju st recall here the very different road follow ed by the latter, which rem ained m ost representative of
"Big Science" vs. "Little Science 49 the choices m ade by the scientific com m unity and o f the radication o f Big Science. L aw rence collaborated w ith the N ational D efense R esearch C o m m ittee on m icrow ave research and subm arine detection, took part in the M anhattan Project, actively gave advice on the construction and the use o f the bomb. A fter the w ar the R adiation L aboratory w as financed w ith funds from the M anhattan D istrict. In 1952, on request o f the A EC , L aw rence founded a new laboratory at Liverm ore for m ilitary research, a p rototype o f large-scale specialized structure.
4. - I have dw elt on T u v e’s personality in order to single out, in contrast,
the changes in A m erican nulcear physics in the thirties that an ticipated and led to Big Science.
But, instead o f looking at specific personalities, one m ay study and co m pare the developm ents o f nuclear physics in the sam e period in different national contexts. Such com parison shows the peculiarity o f th e conditions that led the U.S. to play an original role o f absolute leadership in introducing and guiding the transform ation of science and research.
It is not the task o f this paper to perform a thorough analysis, but I w ould like to try to give som e ideas.
T he French, B ritish and Italian physicists brought m ajor contributions to nuclear physics in the thirties. Trends tow ards large scale research m ay undoubtedly be individuated also in these countries, but in m y opinion a careful analysis, w hich does not stop at superficial events, show s that these rem ained isolated exam ples and did not turn into a general and deep trans form ation o f science involving its m ethods, structure, role and connection with technological change and with society in general.
In 1937 H afstad, T u v e’s m ost strict collaborator, visited Jo lio t’s lab o ra tory in Paris, w here work was being done on a program o f cyclotrons, high- voltage and electrostatic accelerators. H afstad noted that “no apparatus was in condition for the m aking of observations” , “in the U.S. this state o f developm ent was passed about three years ago” and “it was evident that Paris was far behind the U .S .”47. A final ju d g em en t included also the italian group in Rom e: “Nearly all European laboratories are at p resen t engag ed in a building program . This perhaps accounts for a rather surprising exchange of positions betw een A m erican and European laboratories. A few years ago it was being said that, whereas m uch w ork on apparatus was being done in the U.S., practically all scientific results had been obtained in E urope using radium technique. T he situation is reversed as scientific results are being obtained from the perfected apparatus in the U.S., w hereas the possibilities o f the old radium technique in Europe are now practically exhausted. It is o f the utm ost significance that, for perhaps the first tim e, E urope is definitely behind the U.S. in experim ental physics and that they now find it necessary to send m en to this country to acquire techniques w hich can be carried back to E urope”47.
50 A. Baracca
It seem s evident that large-scale apparatuses and new techniques in A m erican nuclear physics w ere not in them selves a step tow ards Big Science; they w ere only the exterior events, induced by m uch deeper processes. The better confirm ation is perhaps given by a com parison with the B ritish situation, w here accelerating m achines had been bu ilt and used for the first tim e.
In 1930 British nuclear science had already a sound tradition. It how ever identified itself w ith R utherford’s personality, w hich had a very strong as cendancy on his pupils. T he prevailing spirit was extrem ely different from that o f the A m ericans. It was m arked by the ethics o f pure science as a disinterested academ ic activity. There was no interest in the possible tech nological value o f the investigations (C ockcroft was in som e sense an ex ception and a special figure: he was an electrical engineer; in 1935 he aban doned active research for some years and, after Rutherford’s retirement, started the building of new machines). The figure o f the British scientist seem ed more eighteenth century-fashioned than sim ilar to the Am erican one. H e had faith in the cognitive value o f the experimental result in itself. The experimental groups hardly ever exceeded the number o f a couple o f scientists and had substantially distinct fields o f interest, avoiding consequently competition. D irect interaction between experimenters and theoreticians was rare.
A fter 1935 there was a sensible d eclin e in B ritish n u c le a r physics, d eeply c o n trastin g w ith the grow th o f A m ericans p h ysics. C h ad w ick had found in R uth erford opposition in fo llo w ing an ad vanced research p ro gram . It w as not chance that, after R u th e rfo rd ’s retirem en t and death in
1937, only C hadw ick and C ockroft undertook a pro gram o f b u ild in g new m ach in es and they w ere am ong the B ritish scien tists m ost directly in v o lv ed in w ar-tim e co llabo ratio n on the m ain pro jects w ith th e A m ericans (C ock ro ft on rad a r and C hadw ick as the lea d e r o f the B ritish team in the M an h attan P roject).
5. - T here is how ever another national situation w hose careful analysis
w ould be extrem ely interesting and m eaningfull I refer to nuclear physics in Japan. There is, in fact, a very interesting, peculiar feature o f this situation: the Japanese nuclear physicists did build up ad use w ith a very short delay the new m achines and instrum ents introduced by the A m ericans the other w estern scientist but follow ed an original line o f thought, linked to the J a panese philosophical tradition, that led to physical ideas different from and incom patible w ith the fram ew ork em erging from nuclear investigations o f the western physicists.
In spite o f the choice o f m achines and instrum ents and o f their use in the laboratories, no large-scale style of research at all was induced in pre-w ar Japan, and the previous philosophical tradition had a m uch stronger influence on the program s and the results than the above m entioned m aterial choices and the experim ental results and program s.
"Big Science" vs. "Little Seiend 51
A thorough analysis o f this case-study w ould then, in m y opinion, throw light on the com plex o f factors that created the conditions fo r the birth o f large-scale research and the prem ises o f B ig Science.
I will not actually develop in detail this suggestion and I refer to im portant contributions by T akabayashi48 T akeda and Y am agouchi49, B row n K onum a and M aki50, H ayakaw a . I will lim it m yself to adding som e b rief com m ents.
Japanese physicists acquired the new quantum concepts betw een the end o f the tw enties and the beginning o f the thirties. Som e o f them cam e back after stays in W estern countries: N ishina in particular visited B o h r and R u t herford and played a very im portant role in orienting the activities in nuclear physics and cosm ic-ray physics.
T hese activities grew rapidly: the first could cham ber was bu ilt in 1933 and coincidence m ethods and autom atic operation w ere realized soon after B lackett and O cchialini and quite independently from them ; in 1934 three C ockcroft-W alton accelerators started w orking (one o f 200 K eV , and su c cessively another o f 600 K eV at R iken in Tokio; another o f 600 K eV at O saka); after 1935 W atase and Itoh started building a cyclotron. B ut the experim ental activity, although intense, did not play a leading role, since the Japanese physicists w ere not so m uch interested in applied o r technical aspects, as rather in elaborating a unifying scientific conception, having its roots in the Japanese philosophical tradition. Thus it was that they strictly linked together the problem s o f the nucleus and o f cosm ic rays and fu nda m ental particles, that on the contrary kept for a long period d istinct characters in W estern physics.
They m anaged to build for this w hole field a com prehensive, unifying conception very different from the set o f theories and m odels that w ere elaborated by W estern scientists.
In short, le t’s refer to Y u kaw a’s m eson theory. The m eson w as not only the agent o f nuclear forces - as it was accepted in W estern physics - but w as a central elem ent o f a m uch m ore general and com plex conception, that never w as fully perceived in W estern countries.
A part from the easiness with w hich Japanese physicists in tro duced new particles (as contrasted to the early hesitations o f W estern p hysicists, for instance o f Pauli for the neutrino hypothesis), Y u kaw a’s m eson w as suppo sed to decay into an electron and to be consequently responsible fo r (3-decay as for nuclear forces: contrary to F e rm i’s theory o f (3-decay, d eriving from an interaction different from the nuclear interaction - the w eak interaction - the conception proposed by the Japanese scientists had a unifying charac ter. (W e m ay recall that previously, in 1933, under the influence o f H ei-sen- b erg ’s m odel o f nuclear structure, and before F erm i’s paper, Y ukaw a had proposed to attribute (3-decay to a transm utation o f the proton: at that tim e he considered the electron as a field m ediating the nuclear force. In that
52 A. Baracca
clear force. In that occasion N ishina had suggested that the exchange o f a boson betw een tw o nucleons w ould have preserved spin and statistic.)
Starting from the previous com m ents, it could be very interesting to follow the further developm ents o f the views o f the Japanese scientists in the follow ing years, in a condition o f substantial isolation and independence from the evolution o f the lines o f thought o f W estern particle physics. It will suffice here to m ention, apart from im portant contributions by To- m onaga and Y ukaw a him self, the evolution o f m eson theory with contribu tions o f Taketani and Sakata. T heir m otivations w ere again not prim arily experim ental, but m ainly ideological. The tw o scientists w ere w orking in the fram ew ork o f m arxist philosophy.
A further development, stemming from the problems posed by the mean life o f the meson, was the “two-meson theory”. Only later this theory proved to be wrong when compared with the experimental data that were accumulating.
In 1952, finally, Sakata proposed a theory with tree ferm ions as the fundam ental constituents o f m atter (’’sakatons”) linked together by an un know n “B -m atter” . S akata’s theory anticipated in som e sense the unitary approach, but was in fact quite independent from it and had m oreover com pletely different origin and m otivations. O ne m ay also perceive an analogy w ith actual gauge theories in term s o f quarks and gluons, and prob ably such an analysis has becom e sounder, having a unifying proposal at its basis.
I hope to have given, from the perspective I have chosen, a m odest con tribution toward the individuation o f the specific factors that created the con ditions for the birth of large-scale research and o f the features that really char acterize a turning point in the development of science and research activity.
I w ish to thank the Library o f Congress, W ashington D.C., the B ancroft Library o f the U niversity of Berkeley, California, and the C arnegie Institu tion o f W ashington for they hospitality and the perm ission to consult their archives during the com pletion o f this research.
1 M e M illa n , E .M .. “E a rly h isto ry o f P a rticle s A c ce le ra to rs” , in R o g er H. S tu e w e r (e d .). N u c le a r P h y sic s in R e tro sp e c t, U n iv . o f M in n e so ta P ress, 1979.
2 N . P. D av ies, L a w r e n c e a n d O p p e n h e im e r S im o n and S c h u ster, N ew Y o rk 1968. ? R. W . S eid el, P H . D. T h e sis, B erk eley , 1978.
4 J. H. H e ilb ro n . R. W . S eid el, B. H. W h eato n : L a w ren c e a n d liis L a b o ra to ry, N u c le a r S c ie n c e a t B e rk e le y 1 9 3 1 -6 1 , O ffice fo r H isto ry o f S c ien ce and T e c h n o lo g y . U n iv e rsity o f C alifo rn ia , B erk eley , 1981.
"Bin Science" vs. "Little Science" 53
5 A. B arac c a , R L iv i, E . P ia n c a ste lli, S. R u ffo , “ L a F is ic a d e l n u c le o neg li a n n i ’3 0 e le p re m e ss e d e lla « b ig scie n c e » n e g li S tati U n iti” , in G . B attim e lli, M. D e M aria a n d A. R ossi (e d ito rs) L a R i.itrutturaz.ione d e lle S c ie n ze tra le D u e G u e rre M o n d ia li, L a G o lia rd ic a , R o m e, 1985 (fro m th e In te rn a tio n a l C o n fe re n c e on “T h e R e c a stin g o f S c ie n c e b e tw ee n the tw o W o rld W a rs ” , F lo re n c e a n d R o m e, J u n e 2 0 - Ju ly 4 , 1980).
6 M . A. T u v e , L . R. H a fstad a n d O . D ahl, p h y s. Rev. 4 3 , 9 4 2 (1 9 3 3 ), M ay 1933.
7
E. O . L a w re n c e to M . A . T u v e , M ay 3 , 1933, T u v e P a p e rs, M a n u s c rip t L ib ra ry , L ib ra ry o f C o n g re ss (B o x 12, S p ecial L e tte rs 1933).
8 A. F le m in g to G . N. L ew is, M ay 9, 1933, T u v e P ap ers, loc. cit.
9 E . O . L a w re n c e, M . S. L iv in g sto n , G. N. L e w is, Phis. R ev. 4 4 5 6 (1 9 3 3 ); Ju n e 10. 1933. 10 M . A. T u v e to E. O . L a w re n c e, O c to b e r 2, 1933, T u v e P a p e rs, lo c. cit.
11 E. O . L a w re n c e to M. A. T u v e , O c to b e r 9, 1933, L a w re n c e C o lle c tio n , B an c ro ft L ib ra ry , B erk eley . 12 G . N. L e w is, M . S. L iv in g sto n , M . G. H en d erso n , E . O . L a w re n c e , P h y si. R ev. 4 5 , 2 4 2 (1 9 3 4 ). 13 E . O . L a w re n c e to M . A. T u v e , D e c e m b e r 2 1 , 1933, L a w re n c e C o lle c tio n c it.; see a lso le tte r o f J a n u a ry 12, 1934, ivi.
14 M . A. T u v e to E . O . L a w re n c e, Jan u a ry 6, 1934, L a w re n c e C o lle c tio n B a n c ro ft L ib ra ry , B erk eley . 15 M . A . T u v e to E. O. L a w re n c e, F e b ru a ry 28 , 1934, L a w re n c e C o lle ctio n , B an c ro ft L ib ra ry , B erk eley . 16 E . O . L a w re n c e to M. A. T u v e , M arch 14, 1934, L a w re n c e C o lle ctio n , B an c ro ft L ib ra ry , B erk eley . 17 C . C . L a u ritse n , H. R. C ra n e, P hys. Rev. 45 , 34 5 (1 9 3 4 ); S c ie n c e 79, 2 3 4 (1 9 3 4 ).
18 J. D. C o ck c ro ft, E . T. S. W alto n , P roc. R oy. Soc. A I 4 4 7 0 4 (1 9 3 4 ); M . L . E. O lip h a n t, P. H arteck , L o rd R u th e rfo rd , P roc. R oy. Soc. A 1 44 , 6 9 2 (1934).
19 G . N. L ew is, M . S. L iv in g sto n , M . C. H en d erso n , E. O . L a w re n c e , Phys. Rev. 45 , 4 9 7 (1 9 3 4 ). 20 M . A. T u v e , L. R. H a fstad , P hys. Rev. 45 , 651 (1 9 3 4 ).
21 M . A. T u v e to E . O . L a w re n c e, A pril 18, 1934 L a w re n c e C o lle ctio n , B a n c ro ft L ib ra ry , B erk eley . 22 M . A . T u v e to C. C . L a u ritse n , A pril 18, 1934, T u v e P a p e rs, lo c . cit. B o x 16, L e tte rs - S p e c ia l 1 9 3 4 - 5 - 6 .
23 C a rn e g ie In stitu tio n o f W a s h in g to n a rc h iv e s, fo ld e r “ D T M -M isc e lla n e o u s 1 9 3 4 -3 5 ” .
24 A. F le m in g to J. M ck e e n C attel, A u g u st 4, 1934, N u c le a r P h y s ic s S y m p o siu m : A c o rre c tio n , C IW a rc h iv e s, loc. cit.
25 M A. T u v e to C . C . L a u ritse n , S e p te m b e r 2 6 , 1934, T u v e P a p e rs, loc. cit. B ox 16, L e tte rs -S p e c ia l 1 9 3 4 -5 - 6 .
26 E . O . L a w re n c e to N. B o h r, N o v e m b e r 27 , 1935, L a w re n c e C o lle c tio n , C arto o n 3, F o ld e r 3, B an c ro ft L ib ra ry , B erk eley .
27 R ep o rt o f the P resid e n t, 1952, C arn eg ie In stitu tio n o f W ash in g to n . 28 B io g ra fy o f A . A. T u v e (a n o n y m o u s), p. 4 , C IW a rc h iv e s, F o ld e r T u v e 1.
54 A. Baracca
29 M . A . T u v e , R e p o rt to the D ire c to r o f D IM fo r Jan u a ry 1939, 7 .2 .1 9 3 9 , L ib ra ry o f C o n g re ss, M a n u s c rip t L ib ra ry , T u v e P ap ers, B o x 15, “ M o n th ly re p o rts” ; see le tte r to th e Phys. R ev. 5 5 4 1 6 (1 9 3 9 . S e e a lso R. H . S tu e w e r “ B rin g in g th e N e w s o f F issio n to A m e ric a ” , P h y s ic s T o d a y, O c to b e r 1985.
30 M . A . T u v e , R e p o rt fo r F e b ru a ry 1939, 9 .3 .1 9 3 9 , loc. c it.; s e e le tte r to th e P hys. R ev. 55 , 5 1 0 (1 9 3 9 ). 31 C IW , Y e ar B o o k 1939 (Ju ly 1939 - Ju n e 1940), p. 87.
32 M . A . T u v e to G . B reit, 2 .8 .1 9 3 9 , D T M O ffice A rc h iv e F ile “ A rc h iv e U ra n iu m ” . 33 R. G u n n , M e m o ra n d u m fo r the D ire c to r, 1.6.1939, D T M A rch iv e.
34 M in u te s o f th e E x e c u tiv e C o m m itte e , M e e tin g o f M ay 23 , 1940, C IW A rc h iv e s. 35 M . A . T u v e , in A P L N ew s, F eb. 1982, p. 8.
36 Ib id em .
37 R. B ald w in , T h e S e c r e t W eapon o f W W 2, P resid io P ress, S a n R ap h a e l, C a, 1980, pp. X III-X V . 38 F . R. R o b erts, “ D e v e lo p m e n t o f th e P ro x im ity F u z e ” , m a n u sc rip t re q u ire d q u ic k ly by A b e lso n o n O ct. 2 0 , 1977, C IW A rc h iv e s, F o ld e r D T M M isc., p. 65.
39 F . R. R o b erts, o p .cit., p. 5.
40 “ S u g g e stio n s fo r P o stw a r L a b o ra to ry p ro g ra m o f the D e p a rtm e n t o f T e rre s tria l M a g n e tis m ” p re p a re d b y M . A. T u v e ; M arch 19, 1946; re v ised M ay 9, 1946; L a w re n c e C o lle ctio n , c a rto o n 32 , F o ld e r 32, B an c ro ft L ib ra ry , B erk eley .
41 F ra n k B. J e w e tt to D r. H o m e r L. F e rg u so n , D r. E rn e s t O . L a w re n c e, D r. A lfred L. L o o m is, Dr. F re d e ric W . W alco tt, M a rc h 18, 1946; L a w re n c e C o lle ctio n , c arto o n 3, F o ld e r 32 , B a n c ro ft L ib ra ry , B erk eley .
42 “ S ta te m e n t C o n ce rn in g th e S c ie n tific P ro g ra m o f th e D e p a rtm e n t o f T e rre s tria l M a g n e tis m fo r the Im m ed ia te F u tu re ” , b y M . A. T u v e , Ju n e 22 , 1946; L a w re n c e C o lle c tio n , C arto o n 3, F o ld e r 32, B an c roft L ib ra ry , B erk eley .
43 A llan A. N eedel, “B erkner, T u v e and the Federal Role in R ad io -astro n o m y ” , O siris 3. 44 M . A . T u v e , S a tu r d a y R e v ie w 6 .6 .1 9 5 9 , p. 49.
45 W . J. L e a r, N e w S c ie n tist, 2 1 .5 .1 9 5 9 . 46 N e x S c ie n tist, 2 5 .5 .1 9 5 9 .
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48 T . T a k a b a y a s i, “ S o m e C h a ra c te ristic A sp e c ts o f E a rly E le m e n ta ry P a rtic le T h e o ry in J a p a n ” , In te r n a tio n a l S y m p o siu m o n th e H isto ry o f P a rticle P h y sic s, F e rm ilab , M ay 1980, e d s. L. B ro w n a n d L . H o d d e so n , C a m b rid g e U n iv . Press.
49 G . T a k e d a a n d Y . Y a m ag o u c h i, “ R o le o f In stitu tio n s in R ese arch o f H ig h E n e rg y P h y sic s in Jap a n fo r th e P e rio d 1930N ” , J o u rn a l de P h y siq u e , vol. 4 3 (C o llo q u e C -8 , s u p p lem en t a u n" 12, D ec. 1982), In te r n a tio n a l C o llo q u iu m o n the H is to ry o f P a rtic le P h y s ic s, P aris, Ju ly 2 1 - 2 3 , 1982, p. C 8 -3 3 5 .
50 M L . M . B ro w n , M . K o n u m a and Z. M ak i, P a rtic le P h y s ic s in J a p a n , 1 9 3 0 -1 9 5 0 , J a p a n S o c ie ty fo r th e P ro m o tio n o f S c ie n c e and the N atio n al S c ie n c e F o u n d a tio n , 1980.
