Responsibility Dilemmas
4.4. Moral responsibility as “a vaccine” for escaping responsibility in general? responsibility in general?
In the ontological-ethical perspective, responsibility is presented as a choice of attitude characterised by taking responsibility or abrogating it. Escape from responsibility is connected with immersion in impersonal structures resulting in: 1) exemption of an individual from responsibility for their decisions or 2) rationalisation of a deed as one on which one had no influence. The remark on responsibility as a descriptive category becomes more radical when the claim for not giving in to the dictate of public opinion is taken into account, for the institutional structure will be located in the context of social role. From this perspective, every attempt to disperse responsibility is also a confirmation of its crucial significance, which assumes that the role performer is responsible.
Similar diagnoses are formed when presenting responsibility as transcendental-pragmatic. According to Apel moral responsibility should be
“a concept that neither can be reduced to individual accountability nor allows for the individuals unburdening themselves from personal responsibility, by, e.g., shifting it into institutions or social systems.”111 Apel, bearing in mind the above mechanism of escaping responsibility, states: “if institutions inevitably have to “unburden” the individuals of some obligations, it must never result in the communication community of human beings capable of discourse losing their sense of responsibility (Verantwortungsdinstanz) or their final decision-making competence to an institution.”112 In this way, moral co-responsibility is formed by the practice participants, which is founded on the concept of the ideal communication community. The image of responsibility thus understood is presented as follows: “Hence, individual actors in a sense cannot really be held accountable for these actions and activities in such a way as individuals have been held responsible for their actions according to traditional morals.
110 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern ethics (Blackwell, 1993), p. 126.
111 Karl-Otto Apel, “Uniwersalistyczna etyka współodpowiedzialności,” trans. Z. Zwoliński, Etyka 1996, No. 29, p. 9.
112 Karl-Otto Apel, “Etyka dyskursu jako etyka odpowiedzialności – postmetafizyczna transformacja etyki Kanta,” trans. T. Mańko, Principia 1992, vol. V, p. 7; Raul Fornet-Betancourt, ed., Ethik und Befreiung, (Aachen: Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1990).
Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that we somehow are responsible also for the effects of collective activities.”113
How do both views answer the problem of escape from responsibility?
To answer this question, I present responsibility in the transcendental and ontological-ethical views as two forms of dialogism. Let us remark that responsibility in the etymological sense assumes response, giving an answer.
Answering “for something” at the same time implies answering “to something.”
This view of responsibility gains a dialogical sense. Hence, presenting both distinguished views of responsibility as forms of dialogism is justified.114
According to linguistic intuition, dialogue presumes a communal momentum, being the opposite of monologue as a form of violence. In what is dialogism expressed, and does the concept rely on overcoming otherness and thus extending the sphere of what is common? Or is it just the contrary – on acknowledging the Other in their otherness? These are the questions with which one may try to identify the concept of dialogue in both views of moral responsibility.115
In the transcendental view, dialogue serves as a linguistic medium within a defined social practice. In this perspective, the goal of dialogism is to build a theory of communication, its subject is argumentative discourse – the conditions of its conduct and legitimisation. As Małgorzata Kowalska stresses:
“In Habermas” perspective, dialogue is to bring consensus and thus level the initial difference, but at the starting point implies some community.”116 This community, in the light of the claim to universality, takes two forms. On one hand, it means formal community, which assumes compliance and abiding by the discourse rules. On the other, it concerns the community of values, which is illustrated by the pursuit for legitimisation of the moral point of view. The aim of dialogue as a form of consensus seems to be the definition and legitimisation of institutional morality, by which we mean a set of values and convictions shared by a social or professional group.
In the view of moral responsibility as ontological-ethical, dialogue is understood as a meeting (dialogic relation) with the Other. On the basis of
113 Karl-Otto Apel, “How To Ground A Universalistic Ethics Of Co-Responsibility For The Effects Of Collective Actions And Activities,” p. 14, http://www.philosophica.ugent.be/fulltexts/52-2.pdf, accessed on 13th August 2018.
114 Filek, Ontologizacja odpowiedzialności. p. 43; W. Weischedel, “Istota odpowiedzialności,” p. 84.
115 The same question is posed by Małgorzata Kowalska, see: “Pytanie o dialog. Habermas – Lévinas,” in Levinas i inni, scientific eds. Tadeusz Gadacz, Jacek Migasiński (Warszawa: Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2002), p. 180.
116 Ibidem, p. 180.
this relation, the subject’s identity is formed.117 In this sense, dialogism is not a language of communication but the subject’s identity structure. The fact that it is created in dialogical relation including the category of the Other allows for the interesting way of seeing of what is homogeneous.118 The root of shunning moral responsibility can be seen in the claim to universality, a manifestation of which is the attempt to describe a subject in reference to one factor. Therefore, the aim of dialogue is the exposition of the difference related to the way of its formation. In this way, room for choices appears and so the moral responsibility connected with making such choices emerges.
A consequence of the indicated difference seems to be that, in the first view, the concept of dialogue focuses on working out discourse rules to enable dialogue within defined pragmatics of social life, whereas in the second view of the outlined meanings, dialogue reveals the subject’s structure, which in effect allows questions of their identity to be asked. Thus, dialogue is not a form of communication but an ethical foundation in which self-knowledge requires considering the Other.119 Moral responsibility in the transcendental view allows the creation of the image of an institution as a fence that sets the limits. In this perspective, the organisational dimension of responsibility is emphasised, while in depicting responsibility as ontological-ethical, the personal dimension of responsibility seems crucial. By presenting both perspectives as complementary it is possible to:
First, present moral responsibility in the individual-structural field. In this perspective, on one hand it becomes crucial to build legal institutions, while on the other structuring the self-awareness of the community participants is vital. Exposure of both views opposes the thesis of determinism. On this basis, it is suggested that, since we act within an institution, which does not leave room for subjective causation, we are not responsible for actions taken and the consequences are not our fault but that of the institution in which we operate. For, because our conduct is determined by institutional structure, there exists the necessity to conform to it. This view is criticised by Michael S. Moore, according to whom we are responsible for actions
117 Emmanuel Lévinas, Inaczej niż być sobą lub ponad istotą, trans. P. Mrówczyński (Warszawa:
Fundacja Aletheia, 2000), p. 202.
118 Ibidem, pp. 203–206.
119 Emmanuel Lévinas, “Dialog: samowiedza i bliskość bliźniego,” in O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl, Emmanuel Lévinas, trans. M. Kowalska (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Homini, 2008), p. 228; Emmanuel Lévinas, “Słowo wstępne,” in Emmanuel Lévinas, Imiona własne, trans. J. Margański (Warszawa:
Wydawnictwo KR, 2000), p. 10.
irrespective of whether or not the requirement to treat responsibility as an obligation for action is created.120
Second, to answer the question posed in the first section of this chapter –
“which and whose responsibility?” From the perspectives presented above we may understand responsibility as the quality of a professional role and the identity of the performer. In turn, when answering the question “whose responsibility?” one may point to organisational and personal aspects. The first of these dimensions is related to obligation that relies on a professional role, while the second results in the possibility of considering the role performer’s action as a form of response to the conferred task. Individual responsibility may thus be understood as a disposition to act responsibly. Referring to the etymology of the word “responsibility,” we may say that performing a role is an answer to the obligation attached to the performed role (community dimension). The answer reveals the individual dimension of responsibility, focusing on the individual performing a role. That is why role responsibility may be viewed in both the organisational as well as the individual dimension.
120 Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 571.