The structure of moral dilemma

1.2.2.1. Objective elements of the structure of a dilemma 1.2.2.1.1. Disjunction of options

The first element of a  dilemma is alternativeness and the disjunction of options, which follows from the already quoted definitions. The options cannot be chosen at the same time, and the choice between any of them is necessary. It has to be stressed that we use the term “option of action” since this comprises action as well as nonfeasance. The options often make the structure of a given dilemma a choice between undertaking some activity or not, but it may also be the choice between two actions. In any case, they are irreconcilable, and not on the normative level, for example as in logical contradiction between norms simultaneously ordering a certain way of action and those proscribing it. Such contradictions, not only between norms but also obligations or moral ideals, create contradictory reasons for action, which is analysed as part of reflection on other elements of dilemmas, especially their symmetry. Here, it is truly impossible to follow two options of conduct. In a dilemma, the subject’s choice is an “either-or” one.

Though it could seem that this element is least disputable, it is sometimes remarked that although popular examples of dilemmas indeed assume mutually-exclusive options, but it the choice between them is not necessary. It could be possible to leave the course of events to proceed, namely assume that since the problem is irresolvable, then fate should decide. As it has been pointed out, Railton sees in such situations a more complex problem of a multi-level nature.

For example, if we can save one of two people who, without our intervention, will surely die, then in the first place we have to answer the question of whether to make the choice at all or to let the things happen. This moment is crucial because one may argue that, by deciding to make a choice, we decide to take responsibility for it, and hence the death of the unchosen person burdens us.

The lack of choice would also be a concrete choice in itself, since it would mean the death of two people. By deciding to make a choice, we may save one person.

Resolution according to this argument gives rise to a second problem, that of a specific choice.⁴³

We may also interpret the above analytical conclusion to mean that the concept of dilemma has considerable potential against the subject’s passivity.

If it typically has the form of a  disjointed alternative between action and abandonment (in case of simple dilemmas), or has two disjointed alternatives,

43 Railton, The Diversity, pp. 157–158.

the first of which is between action and nonfeasance and the second between two actions (in the case of multi-level dilemmas), then on a more general plane one may say that the subject faces the problem of whether to interfere in the course of events or just to observe it. Naturally, this is typical, not constant.

However, the above examples of moral dilemmas show they are often, even typically, formed like this. In such situations, we are clearly concerned that we only witness or observe, which is followed by the realisation that such a stance is improper. It is accompanied by the thought that perhaps something could be done to avoid the evil, or at least to try, for even if such an attempt fails, then it is valuable as action, more so than passivity; but another quality of dilemmas, showing that action may be as bad, prevents unequivocal acceptance of this conclusion.

1.2.2.1.2. Symmetry of options

The second element of moral dilemma is its symmetry of options. This means the lack of superiority of any option, which generates an insolvable moral conflict, for there are no reasons that would endorse one option more than another. The duties or obligations of the decision-maker are exactly the same in the case of either option, and there are no grounds to differentiate them.

So, this is not only an issue of cognition of reasons by the subject, but their objective lack. As it has been said, devising any extra-moral arguments for one choice would be to create a kind of rationalisation not reliant on truly exiting reasons. Neither does the fact no choice leads to negative consequences provide justification for making a  specific decision. This in no way this resolves the dilemma, the essence of which is that a subject is forced by the circumstances to sacrifice one of the options for another.⁴⁴ It is sometimes pointed out that thus understood symmetry of options is hard to find in reality, dramatic choices typically lead us to find reasons for preference of one of the options⁴⁵ which is not only rationalisation but also in itself gives real reasons which allow the choice to be made.⁴⁶

Irrespective of this scepticism, it has to be noted that the sources of symmetry of moral dilemmas may be of two kinds.⁴⁷ The first stems from the perfect equality of values that provide reasons for options. They are held to be equally important, so the choice between them is impossible. For instance, the life of every human has the same value, hence it is inadmissible to sacrifice one person to save another. This way of understanding symmetry is faulty in the sense that,

44 Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability, pp. 323–324.

45 Statman, Moral Dilemmas, p. 11.

46 Sorensen, Moral Dilemmas, pp. 292–293.

47 Chyrowicz, O sytuacjach, pp. 187 et seq.

if values are equal and cannot be simultaneously realised, then it does not matter what choice we make. Since sacrificing one will entail the same detriment, and the choice must be made, then its content becomes unimportant and may equally be determined by tossing a coin. For that reason, another source of symmetry of options is more often indicated, namely the incommensurability of values.

This term means a situation in which two values are neither equal nor superior, for there is no scale that would allow such comparison. The consequence of the incommensurability of values is their incomparability. For instance, human life is of incommensurable value and so cannot be compared with the safety or well-being of others. The incidents of incommensurability create only approximate equality, making it hard for us to find reasons for any solution, so the options seem symmetrical.⁴⁸

The examples of dilemmas discussed above illustrate the symmetry of options, including the one resulting from the incommensurability of values.

One may also observe here that the questionability of symmetry in some way confirms the lack of mutual scale of values in particular situations. If we look at the problem of admissibility of calculation, whether to save a greater number of people at the cost of one, then the incompatibility of reasons which may be formulated in such a situation becomes evident, for reasons formulated in both the conventionalist and the deontological perspectives. Adopting the former would mean that options are not symmetrical because saving a greater number of people is more valuable, and so these reasons prevail. Adopting the latter would mean ascribing every human life the same value and the prohibition on contributing to anyone’s death. Hence, the options would not be symmetrical, and the non-conventionalist reasons would prevail. Both views explicate our intuitions as regards values, for we can agree simultaneously that it is worth saving many people and that every life is equally important. The irreconcilable incompatibility of both views is due to the values being incommensurate – there is no scale on which we could base the statement that the value of the lives of a number of people is greater than that of an individual, yet nor is a there a  measure to justify the opposite conclusion, that an individual’s life is more precious than those of many people.

1.2.2.1.3. Moral conflict and harming

The third element of a dilemma is the moral nature of the conflict causing symmetry of options and doing moral evil irrespective of which one is chosen.

48 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 322 et seq. On the different positions in debate on incommensurability of values see: Sylwia Wojtczak, O niewspółmierności wartości i jej konsekwencjach dla stosowania prawa (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2010), pp. 39–77.

This is crucial since it makes the discussed situations moral dilemmas and not simply difficult choices. The necessity of deciding between disjointed and symmetrical options may occur in many walks of life, but these will not always be moral dilemmas. This by no means underestimates their importance or the pains taken on many occasions by the subject who has to resolve them. Surely, their accurate resolution requires prudence, and all other virtues may be helpful.

They occur mainly in conflicts between the subject’s preferences and their beliefs. It should be noted that there is no collision of moral values which would generate reasons for options typical for a dilemma. Such a collision is objective and real, whereas preferences and beliefs are subjective, and perhaps situations of difficult choices reveal to the subject the contradictions between them.

Perhaps resolution will require the subject to step back from some of them, thus making them coherent. The process may be painful, but does not lead to doing moral evil by itself.

When we consider moral conflicts, however, their consequences are not limited to the subjective sphere. They occur in reality as harm done by the subject. Making one’s attitude to options coherent, and thus making the choice, is ineffective, for the harm done is objective. This is mostly why the discussed situations are tragic. It is also important here that the evil is inevitable because it follows from not following the other course of action. Hence, moral dilemmas are never choices between good and bad, but between bad and bad.

The dispute on the scope of negative effects for which the subject may be ascribed responsibility continues. Undoubtedly, the effect must in any case be foreseeable.⁴⁹ The occurrence of unforeseeable effects, such as those related to accidents or catastrophes, may be an element of the subjective attitude to one’s own conduct, but is not part of moral dilemma. As regards foreseeable effects, it is debatable whether the subject is responsible for them since they cannot be avoided. Maybe only for those which were directly intended, as the supporters of the double effect doctrine propose.⁵⁰

Some aspects of this dispute will be discussed with subjective elements of a dilemma, especially the accompanying sense of guilt. It is worth remarking here that bringing forth the problem of the impossibility of avoiding negative effects may be a source of arguments for the subject’s passivity, hence against

49 Chyrowicz, O sytuacjach, p. 302.

50 For considerable literature on the double effect doctrine see i.a. the collection of studies: Paul A. Woodward, ed., The Doctrine of Double Effect: Philosophers Debate a Controversial Moral Principle, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001). See also: Thomas A. Cavanaugh, Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) and Barbara Chyrowicz, Zamiar i skutki: filozoficzna analiza zasady podwójnego skutku (Lublin:

Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1997).

activism, namely the support of those these opposite to the one mentioned when discussing the disjointedness of options. Naturally, this concerns only those dilemmas in which one option is based on action and the other on non-action. As already mentioned, action is supported by the conviction that maybe evil can be at least minimised. So the subject does calculation, which generates reasons for choosing one of the options. Hence, they take the consequentionalist perspective. The main argument against activism, and for passivity, is that since evil in a situation of dilemma cannot be avoided, then there is no reason for the subject to contribute to it in any way. This will happen whether they act or look passively at the events. The argument follows from the agent-centred prerogatives connected with the deontological perspective.⁵¹ According to this, the subject has the full right to consider primarily the consistency of their actions with their moral principles, and be guided by their own preferences as long as they do not breach these principles. Hence, they are not obliged to create the best possible state of the world.

1.2.2.2. Subjective elements of the structure of a dilemma 1.2.2.2.1. Difficulty of choice

Objective elements of the structure of a dilemma correspond to subjective elements. Although it is impossible to allocate each so that one objective element corresponds fully to exactly one subjective, the following dependence may be indicated: apart from disjointed alternativeness of options, the sense of subjective difficulties with making the choice accompanies a dilemma, which is its fourth element. Naturally, dilemmas cannot be reduced only to such difficulties. Not every sense of confusion and impotency about a  decision is a dilemma. If in typical life circumstances I cannot decide on the future, and my preferences collide and cause discomfort, this does not mean that I face a moral dilemma. As already noted, a  dilemma requires that a  subjective sense of difficulties is related to objective moral conflict, which provokes such state in my mind. Hence, it cannot result from colliding preferences, even if they concern non-trivial matters, were crucial in terms of life scale, or were connected with sad circumstances and suffering.

It seems fundamental, as in the case of other subjective elements of dilemma (i.e. moral residuum and sense of guilt), to distinguish two aspects of difficulty with choice-making. First, the cognitive one, which means that the subject recognises their difficulty with choice-making as effect of moral conflict. Therefore, they can identify it and indicate values on both sides. They

51 Kagan, The Limits, p. 75.

also understand reasons related to every option, and see the impossibility of deciding on their basis. Second are the emotional aspect made up of various experiences due to recognition that the situation is basically insolvable. Very different emotions, such as tension or recurring unrest oriented to revising the options and reasons over and over again are at stake. This may also be fear of consequences of any choice. Hence, it should be stressed that subjective difficulty of choice is the situation of a subject finding it impossible to decide, and the one that is particularly uncomfortable.

Subjective difficulty of choice as an element of moral dilemma is hence more than indecision. In effect, such situations are described as dramatic.⁵² Dramatic quality refers to life categories and not literary ones, coming from the Greek term drama, applied to action. A subjectively hard or dramatic choice is always related to a decision about action. Therefore, although it follows from objective circumstances, it is not simply a misfortune falling on an individual. They must choose how to behave, and the choice is accompanied by internal conflict. The subject feels as though their integrity were being questioned. Since a dilemma is not simply a  conflict of preferences or beliefs, but moral one, maintaining integrity seems impossible. The subject here feels the hopelessness of their condition.

1.2.2.2.2. Moral residue

Difficulties with decision-making are part of dilemma, accompanying its resolution. Hence, they concern the time before a  decision is made, and are related both to increased intellectual strain and to negative emotions. A crucial element of dilemma is also the occurrence of similar states after the decision, especially when all the effects of a choice have materialised. Most generally, they are called moral residuum, namely a kind of internal effect of a dilemma and the fifth element of its structure. The very term rediduum is Latin and means remainder, residue. Therefore, it may be said that we apply a geological-chemical metaphor when speaking of moral residue. Every dilemma encountered in life is not only a drama, but also a powerful experience that leaves something behind.

The nature of the residue is disputable, but it is typically described as a sense of guilt or qualms of conscience. Despite soft boundaries between these states, it seems that they may be distinguished on the basis of their source. According to B. Chyrowicz, moral residue is related to the awareness of evil resulting from a chosen course of action (even though it was inescapable), or to the realisation

52 Statman conceives moral dilemmas as tragedy, see: Statman, Moral Dilemmas, p. 19 while Chyrowicz speaks about dead end situations or situations with no way out, see: Chyrowicz, O sytuacjach, p. 21.

of loss due to the unmaterialised, unchosen option.⁵³ These usually co-occur, but it may be assumed that moral residue is less likely, due to the sense of loss, unlike sense of guilt, which is typical for negative consequences of choice. In line with the adopted terminological convention, sense of guilt will be discussed in the following section as a separate element of dilemma.

According to T.C. McConnell, the existence of moral residue is used in debate as an argument for the existence of dilemmas. The realness of feelings proves they are not just situations based on theoretical schemes absent from life.

He is critical about this argument. He marks that three types of moral residue are usually discussed: 1) the remorse or guilt that agents experience after acting in conflict situations, 2) the duty to apologize or to make amends that arises after acting in a conflict situation, 3) the second-order moral requirement to structure one’s life so as to minimize conflicts between basic rules and principles.⁵⁴ As it has been said, the first type is usually identified with the concept, though the others seem essential as they make it possible for dilemmas to play not only negative but also positive roles in our lives. Thanks to moral residue we may gain motivation to act, including in the long-term. In effect, we may not only want to minimise the risk of the occurrence of further situations of this kind, but also to change our lives. Perhaps these situations were brought on by our carelessness, lack of reflection or respect for moral principles. Then, the whole related drama may provide an impetus for different behaviour in the future. It may be treated as a life lesson.

McConnell’s scepticism in reference to moral residue as an argument for the realness of dilemmas seems to result from – as Chyrowicz remarks – treating dilemmas in categories of emotional experiences, whereas it is important to find objective grounds in the case of qualms of conscience, just as in the case of subjective problems with choice-making. As a  result, not only emotions but also a  crucial cognitive element, namely that we are able to recognise these objective grounds, is involved.⁵⁵ On one hand, such dualistic structure of moral residue renders it impossible for this to stand as the only argument for the existence of dilemmas. Hence, we cannot automatically accept that the situations in life accompanied by such a state are dilemmas. On the other hand, since moral residue has a cognitive aspect, it may also mislead us. Hence, it

McConnell’s scepticism in reference to moral residue as an argument for the realness of dilemmas seems to result from – as Chyrowicz remarks – treating dilemmas in categories of emotional experiences, whereas it is important to find objective grounds in the case of qualms of conscience, just as in the case of subjective problems with choice-making. As a  result, not only emotions but also a  crucial cognitive element, namely that we are able to recognise these objective grounds, is involved.⁵⁵ On one hand, such dualistic structure of moral residue renders it impossible for this to stand as the only argument for the existence of dilemmas. Hence, we cannot automatically accept that the situations in life accompanied by such a state are dilemmas. On the other hand, since moral residue has a cognitive aspect, it may also mislead us. Hence, it