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Summary and concluding remarks

In this paper, the size and development of the shadow economy and of tax evasion of Poland and of Poland’s neighbours (except for the Ukraine) are shown over the period 2003 to 2010. The size and opment of the shadow economies is also shown for 36 highly devel-oped OECD countries. The average size of the shadow economy in 27 EU-Countries is 22.3% in 2003 and decreased to 18.4% (of official GDP) in 2013. We also consider the most important driving forces of the shadow economy in 38 OECD countries. The biggest ones are with 14.6% unemployment and self-employment, followed by tax morale with 14.5% and GDP growth with 14.3%. The size of tax eva-sion (accounting for indirect taxation and self-employment activities) was on average 4.2% (of official GDP) in Poland, 1.9% in Germany and 2.9% in the Czech Republic. What type of policy conclusions can we draw from these results?

1. Our paper clearly shows that a reduction of the shadow econ-omy can be achieved using various channels that governments can influence. The main challenge still is to bring shadow econ-omy activities into the official econecon-omy in a way that goods and services previously produced in the shadow economy are still produced and provided in the official economy. Only then the government gets additional taxes and social security contribu-tions and transfers value added from the shadow into the official economy.

2. The main driving forces of the shadow economy are indirect taxes, followed by self-employment and unemployment. Hence,

to reduce the shadow economy these are the most efficient pol-icy options.

3. It is essential to liquidate tax havens which are currently a tool for commercial and wholesale tax evasion through complicated structure of tax avoidance – which appears to be difficult in the medium term or even long term– due to increasing number of beneficiaries who have the possibilities of hampering political and organizational precautious measures through their accumu-lation of the capital.

4. Fighting tax evasion from VAT-fraud is maybe the most impor-tant policy goal. If also in the European Union all member states try to efficiently fight tax fraud by making the VAT-system more efficient with clear-cut rules and little exemptions, then this would lead to great success in reducing this type of tax fraud. Due to the lack of the common fiscal policy it is unlikely to, among others, harmonize tax rates, and therefore the EU states having the highest tax rates should expect heightened risk of the tax reclaim fraud through numerous dummy transactions and buffer companies within intra-Community trade. Thus, it may lead to elimination of some honest business entities from the market which will be unable to compete with fraudulent en-tities in terms of the price. Budget losses triggered by the grow-ing tax gap because of tax refunds undue will increase the defi-cit (and thus the public debt), and they may translate into spend-ing cuts in the followspend-ing tax year, which may impact the rate of economic growth.

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CHAPTER 2