Portrayal of th e Egyptian Revolution
in the Polish m edia
K ata rzy n a B ratan ie c
Wydział Psychologii i N auk H um anistyczych
Krakowskiej A kadem ii im. A. Frycza-M odrzew skiego D epartm en of Psychology a n d H um anities
Andrzej Frycz M odrzewski K rakow University
Abstract
The article describes political protests in Egypt fro m the perspective o f the Polish press. The Arab Spring proved to be a breakthrough fo r a completely different reason than previously thought. It did not bring about the democratization o f political life, extension o f civil rights or an increase in the freedom o f the Arab individuals a n d societies. Counter to w hat was expected, it resulted in partial dismantling o f social and political institutions, limitation o f civil rights and, above all, challenging o f the institutions o f the state as such. The Arab Spring exposed the weakness o f the state with regards to its legitimacy. Previously, researchers o f the region em phasized the Arab identity crisis and the con stant search fo r a new form u la fo r the revival o f M uslim culture. They also gave hope fo r the restora tion o f this identity to the extent that would allow f o r an effective fu n c tio n in g o f the Arab societies in a globalized world and fo r the strengthening o f national identities. As a result o f the revolution, the authority o f the president and the excessive pow er o f the police in Egypt were limited. This was fo l lowed by an increase o f anarchy and the paralysis o f the state. Consequently, the a rm y seized pow er in the country and enforced stricter law: censorship o f the press and m edia was strengthened, fu rth e r restrictions on the rights o f the individuals and the activities o f non-governmental organizations were introduced, while military courts fo r civilians an d a state o f emergency were upheld.
1. Introduction
The Egyptian Revolution has b een present in the Polish press a n d m edia fro m the v ery b e g in ning. Egypt is one o f the m o st p o pular holiday destinations for th e Poles. The educated Poles also appreciate the im m ense significance o f th e cultural heritage o f this country. However, this is n ot the only reason why Egyptian issues occupy an im p o rta n t place in the Polish m edia. M any p o liti cians see analogies between the Polish “Solidarity” m ovem ent from the 1980s a n d the national Egyptian uprising in January 2011. The issues o f systemic change have a long trad itio n in Poland due to the transform ational changes that o cc u rre d in the 1990s.
As rightly pointed out by Jerzy W iatr: “The fate o f the d em ocracy in the A rab states (an d o th e r Islamic countries) depends on w hether there will exist strong d em ocratic groups capable o f effec tive action, which will be in favour o f the secularism of the state. Their w eakness m akes the arm y the only protection against the flood o f Islamic fundam entalism . The army, however, regardless
o f the in ten tio n s o f its generals is n o t a dem ocratic force. In th e best case scenario, it acts as a m ediator, as recently h a p p e n e d in Egypt.
Egypt, th e largest A rab state, w hich in July 1952 m a rk e d the b eginning o f a wave o f revolu tions w hich elim in ate d in e p t a n d co rru p t m onarchies, is a n d will be o f crucial significance for the future o f the d em o crac y in Islam ic countries. Therefore, th e twists a n d tu rn s o f the Egyptian revolution have im plications reaching far b ey o n d th e scope o f this state.3 .
At th e b eg in n in g o f m y article I w ould like to briefly describe the Polish society, as o ur national identity as well as cultural a n d social d eterm in a n ts significantly influence the perception of the events in Egypt. The m o d e rn Polish society is socially diverse, although ethnically hom ogeneous. Before th e Second W orld War, we were a m ulti-ethnic, culturally diverse society. A part from the Poles, ab o u t o n e -th ird o f this m u lti-eth n ic a n d religiously diverse m osaic in the then Polish republic consisted prim a rily o f Jews, G erm ans, U krainians, Belarusians a n d Roma. Currently, the d o m in a n t religion in Poland, declared by ab o u t 98% o f Poles, is the R om an Catholicism in a decidedly conservative/folk form a n d far rem oved from th e ec u m e n ism o f Pope John Paul II and Pope Francis.
This C h ristia n conservatism o f the C h u rch in P oland is extrem ely visible w h en it comes to the issues o f gender, w o m e n s position in society, attitude to ab o rtio n a n d sexual life o f the believ ers, w hich - according to the Polish church - is to be focused solely o n procreation. The status o f the C atholic C h u rc h in P oland is extrem ely high, as since th e end o f W orld W ar II and during the influence o f th e Soviet U nion, the Polish church acted as th e m a in institution of resistance against the c o m m u n ist regim e a n d preserved n ational identity. This situation can be com pared to th e activity o f M uslim clergy a n d the role o f Islam in Algeria d u rin g th e F rench occupation o f the country. C urrently, P oland has only two significant political parties: the ruling liberal- centrist Civic P latform a n d the o p p o sin g right-w ing/nationalistic Law a n d Justice. A lthough d u rin g the tra n sitio n p e rio d after 1989 we h a d ab o u t three h u n d r e d parties, the consolidation o f the d e m o cratic system b ro u g h t the n u m b e r of political parties down.
2. Polish Press
I w ould like to focus m a in ly o n the Polish press, as the T V inform ation in P oland regarding the events o f the p ast three years in Egypt focused p rim a rily on th e dram atic a n d violent incidents w ith o u t fully d ep ictin g th e ir political a n d cultural conditions. Balanced analyses appeared m ainly in the socio - political press.
Polish m a in stre a m press: „Polityka”, „Tygodnik pow szechny”, „Gazeta W yborcza”, „Do rzeczy” a n d „Gazeta Polska”, em phasise this ideological division o f the Polish society, represented by the following o p in io n -fo rm in g milieus:
• Liberal / leftist circles, w hich include progressive Catholics
• Rightist / nationalistic circles, including conservative Catholics. Press titles associated with these tw o o p p o sin g w orld views are available to the m a in liberal a n d right-w ing circles in the country, as well as to th e political parties.
In the c o m m e n ts o n th e Egyptian revolution, one can see a clash o f discourses regarding the Arab world, w hich have existed for a long tim e in the E uropean intellectual traditions. In addition to the w o rld view divisions typical for the co n tem p o ra ry Polish society, th e re are still three perspec tives in th in k in g o f th e M iddle East, ste m m in g from W estern E u ro p e an ideas:
• the perspective of civilisational superiority o f the W est (the W estern orientalism described by Edw ard Said), nam ely the right, deeply-rooted in the E uropean m indset, to assess all the events and processes taking place in the A rab w orld according to the p ara d ig m o f the civili sational a n d cultural superiority of the West a n d the inferiority o f the East;
• the perspective confronting the final outcom es of the civilisation processes a n d m u tu al rela tionships between the West and the East, m anifested in considering the consequences o f col onization in the M iddle East: delayed developm ent, m odernisation, and above all, an in tra civilisation split - a p articular tension betw een tradition a n d m o d e rn ity existing in Islam; • (and finally) the perspective based on u n d ersta n d in g a n d exam ining the internal dynam ics
of civilisation processes of Islamic societies.
The first perspective adds n o th in g new to o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f the A rab world. In fact, it is a reproduction o f the com m onplace prejudices and cultural stereotypes. It is, however, still present in the com m ents o n the revolution in Egypt. It also m eans judging all the events o f the revolution from the viewpoint o f W estern dem ocracy and its standards. The second perspective „is d etached from the views an d judgem ents specific to one civilization, and recognizes the diversity o f form s of perception and accounts o f the history o f o th e r civilisations4.” It focuses particularly on the outcom es o f W estern European colonisation in its political, social, econom ic and cultural aspects. The colonisation of the Arab world, in addition to w ell-know n political a n d econom ic effects, has increased its internal social conflicts, the E uropeanisation o f the elites a n d generated a civilisa tion conflict between the East a n d the W est5. The th ird perspective considers „the civilization as a state, a way o f life for people o f different cultures a n d nations” to be the starting p o in t and recognises the diversity of the developm ent o f Arab societies a n d the values carried by the Islamic civilization in its internal dynam ics as the m a in fram e o f reference .
In their assessm ent of the events in the M iddle East, som e political com m entators find it dif ficult to give up their O rientalist prejudices. Some researchers even speak about the creation of a new myth - a neo-orientalism , w hich does n o t allow to adequately present the processes that are happening before o u r eyes. This m yth presupposes that Islamic radicalism has only one side, predictable a n d know n to all: the implacable hostility towards the West, the rejection of m odernity and its achievements, the strict application o f Sharia law in accordance w ith a literal interpretation of the Koran a n d the tradition, restrictions on the rights o f individuals, especially those of w om en and religious m inorities living am ong the followers of Islam. F urtherm ore, it feeds on the belief that Islamic political parties seek only to b uild som e form o f theocracy as soon as they gain power. Then - as the advocates of this th e o ry claim - they will reject the dem ocracy and show the w orld their true face. Public o p in io n in the West finds it very difficult to p a rt with their perception of the East, accrued over centuries a n d sustained by the mass culture. In the Muslim socio-cultural m agazine ,,As-Salam” published in Poland we read: „The im ages o f crowds in the streets of Casablanca, Rabat, Tunis, Cairo or Benghazi, expressing their opposition to the authorities’ denial o f basic liberties and political freedom s, guarantees o f safety an d d evelopm ent prospects are a p ro o f that concepts such as citizenship, political subjectivity, autonom y a n d d ig nity of the individual or the spirit o f republicanism are n o t lim ited to one - W estern / E uropean
4 Jan Kieniewicz, W prow adzenie do histo rii cywilizacji W s c h o d u i Z ach o d u , Dialog, W arszaw a 2003, s.
13.
5 H ieronim Kubiak, Europejskie tran sfo rm acje i ich w pływ n a zm ian y cywilizacyjne w spółczesnego świata, „Krakowskie Studia M ięd zy n aro d o w e”, A rabska W io sn a Rok Później. N u m e r 1, K raków 2012, s. 27.
- cultural sphere, its trad itio n s and historical experiences, b u t constitute a p a rt o f m u c h broader, universal heritage a n d values w hich should be defended regardless o f latitude, wealth, language, skin colour or religion.”6.
All political, social or cultural changes o c c u rrin g in the M iddle East will be associated with Islam, as it is the real source o f culture a n d identity for everyone inhabiting the circle o f this civi lization. Therefore, we should n o t expect the M iddle E astern societies to ren ounce their religious roots in the n am e o f secularism , w hich for W esterners is the fo u n d atio n o f freedom and dignity of the individual a n d is sy nonym ous with progress. These values can be achieved and im plem ented in accordance w ith M uslim tra d itio n 7. Moreover, as the M oroccan w riter Tahar Ben Jelloun said in an interview for “G azeta W yborcza”: „D e m o cra cy is n o t o w ned by the Europeans. It is a u n i versal system”. A n d he goes o n to say, „There is n o clash o f civilizations’, b ut a ‘clash o f ignorance’”. There prevails an acute lack o f know ledge ab o u t one another, w hich creates an insurm ountable wall. A n d ignorance is ac co m p an ie d by arrogance. The belief that one know s everything best does n o t encourage o n e to dee p en one's know ledge ab o u t o th e r religions a n d cultures.8
In m y opinion, the best chance to explain the c u rre n t situation is offered by the th ird perspec tive a n d the re c o n stru c tio n o f th e A rab identity.
The shaping o f the A rab identity after the colonial p e rio d was based largely on the perceptions and m yths th a t have never been im plem ented, a n d w hich were m o st fully expressed in pan- Arabism . The first o f these was the m yth o f the creation o f one c o m m o n Arab state, w hich would
gather the scattered political entities on a single territory, u n d e r the guidance o f a strong leader. In th e 1960s, th e p u rsu it o f the political u nity o f th e A rab w orld co rresp o n d e d to the belief of the masses w hich recognized the E gyptian P resident Nasser as the u n d isp u ted leader o f all A r abs. This search for u nity was s u p p o rte d by a n o th e r belief, w hich assum ed that the boundaries betw een individual A rab countries are artificial a n d designated by the E uropean im perial policy em ploying the help o f local regimes. It was this very m y th th a t S addam H ussein referred to while trying to legitimize the attack o n Kuwait a n d its p artial annexation in 1990. The th ird notion ro o ted in th e A rab m in d set was the conviction o f the existence o f c o m m o n political, social and econom ic interests o f all A rab countries. The developm ent o f oil m onarchies ended even those hopes.9 It was th e n th a t th e new concepts o f u n ity a n d solidarity o f A rab societies appeared in the fo rm o f religious revival a n d the recognition o f Islam as th e m ain elem ent o f identity and the fo u n d atio n o f com m unity. In the light o f Islam ist ideology, Pan-A rabism a n d secularism were exposed as th e tools o f E u ro p e an colonialism an d im perial policies o f the U nited States. Reli gion was to becom e th e fo u n d atio n o f the solidarity o f A rab societies, reaching beyond national identification a n d referring to the existence o f a spiritual c o m m u n ity o f the Arab world. The nation-state was th e p r o d u c t o f E uropean h istory a n d the influence o f W estern ideas. In contrast, according to the fundam entalists, authentic u n ity could only m aterialize in the form o f um m a - a religious com m unity, tran sc en d in g th e cultural a n d historical d eterm in a n ts that constitute the A rab identity. Nowadays, Arab societies are experiencing conflict, the object o f w hich is the shape
6 Bracia M u z u łm a n ie. N eo -o rien talizm a m it islam skiego radykalizm u, “A s-Salam ”, n r 1, 2011, s. 3. 7 K atarzyna Brataniec, N iep ew n e losy rewolucji. Egipt, M aroko, Tunezja, Libia, “Z d an ie” 2012, n r 1-2, s.
75.
8 W y w iad Jolanty Kurskiej z m aro k a ń sk im p isarzem , K obieca rew olucja islamska, „Gazeta W yborcza”,
30.11-01.12.2013, s. 38.
9 E m an u el Sivan „A rab N atio n alism In the Age o f th e Islam R esurgence”, w: I. G ersh o n i, J.Jankowski [ed.] “R e th in k in g N a tio n a lis m in th e A rab M id d le East”, h ttp ://w w w .c ia o n et.o rg /b o o k /jan k o w sk i/ja n k l l.h tm l
of their identity. Despite the feeling o f co m m o n fate an d the political crisis caused by the U.S. policies in the region, som e argue that there is n o co m m u n ity o f A rab states, a n d talking about it is only a confirm ation o f the illusion. Each o f the countries in th e region has its ow n foreign policy either in cooperation with the U nited States or against them . The A rab countries are c o n nected solely through their language, and the only shared belief across the Arab w orld refers to a state o f deep crisis, in w hich A rab societies presently a re 10.
M odern Arab states refer to a specific concept o f the n atio n as a c o m m u n ity o f beliefs, language and civilisation, expressed th ro u g h the ideals o f ethics11. This n o tio n rejects the u n d ersta n d in g of the state functions lim ited solely to the political sphere. A ccording to Islamic tradition, the idea of freedom has no place in the concept o f th e state a n d has n o political or social significance. Symbols o f freedom in this tradition have always equalled actions against the state. Such was the understanding of every m o vem ent transgressing the d o m a in o f th e state: n om adism , tribalism and in the religious sense - Sufism. The traditional societies preserved the balance betw een state and society, and autonom ous groups had a m argin of freedom . D u rin g the colonial expansion, this particular balance was destroyed, a n d every in d e p e n d e n t activity was elim inated in the nam e of building a strong state.
3. Colonial heritage
Having gained independence, m ost Arab countries preserved the post-colonial structures o f p o litical power in the form o f advanced army, com plex a d m in istra tio n a n d centralized c o m m u n i cation. The W estern m odernization o f the A rab w orld resulted in reducing the freedom o f its citizens and strengthening autocracy. The centralized state lim ited the d em ocratic participation of the public in politics. C olonial pow er structures accounted for the au th o ritaria n dim ension of the political m odernization in the Arab w o rld 12. This dual heritage o f E uropean im perialism and autocratic reform ism shaped the newly em erging political systems. They called themselves m onarchies or republics governed in accordance with the will o f the people, b ut the second half of the tw entieth century replaced these systems with m ilitary regim es o r o n e-p a rty rule in alm ost the entire region. At the same time, this p erio d was characterised by political stabilization and economic development. In Egypt, the regim e was in pow er continuously since 1952, starting with the rule of G am al Nasser, th rough A nwar Sadat to H osni M ubarak. In Syria, the Al-Assad fa m ily has ruled since 1970. In M orocco, King M o h a m m e d VI has been the h ea d of state since 1999, taking over the throne after his father, w ho ruled the c o u n try from 1961. In Libya, G addafi was a leader from 1969, and in Tunisia, Ben Ali has been in pow er since 1987. Jordan a n d Yemen also experience this continuity of leadership.
The regimes created their legitimacy by m obilizing society a ro u n d the slogans o f national unity, freedom, justice a n d development. Some of th e m focused on identifying an internal m ission or on the defence of traditional values. They also applied th e discourse o f dem ocratization and hum an rights. The validation o f pow er was m ainly based on the fear o f political chaos a n d an Islamist takeover in case o f their fall. Paradoxically, in Egypt, by denying the citizens the right to participate in the political life, the regim e strengthened the authority o f the Islamic establishm ent
10 ,,A1-Ahram Weekly”, April 2 4 -30; M ay 15-21, 2003.
i 1 N azih N. Ayubi „O ver-staling The A rab State. Politics a n d Society in the M iddle East”, I. B. Tauris P u b lishers, L ondon N ew York 2001, s. 19.
12 John O. Voll, „Islam a n d D em ocracy; Is M o d ern izatio n a B arrier” w: Sh. H unter, T.M alik, „ M o d e rn iz a
in the public sphere. M u b a ra k also allowed religious institutions to control the judicial system an d th e society th ro u g h passing a law regarding defam ation o f religion13. In the Arab world, p o litical parties are weak, alth o u g h in Egypt, M orocco, Jordan, Tunisia a n d Yemen, governm ents o p en e d up to a m u lti-p a rty system. However, it served m o re to m aintain the illusion o f political pluralism rather th a n genuine political freedom . M u lti-p arty system in the Arab world stren g th ened, in fact, the pow er o f the ruling party. It was an au th o ritaria n rule with a dem ocratic facade. In Egypt, the N ational D em o c ratic P arty was in pow er from 1978, although there were 24 p a r ties operating legally14. In th e liberal o p in io n -fo rm in g circles, culturally and politically oriented tow ards Europe, th e re d o m inates a positive perception o f changes w hich began with th e revolu tion in 2011, alth o u g h it is n o t free from the anxiety ab o u t the fate o f the dem ocratic processes in Egypt. At this p o in t I w ould like to present the m ain elem ents o f this discourse. I w ant to pay p articu la r attention to th e m also because liberal m agazines in Poland are free from prejudice and in m y o p inion provide reliable inform ation about the situation.
4. “Polityka” m agazine
Patrycja Sasnal (an analyst in th e Polish Institute o f International Affairs) “P haraoh takes off his mask. The new president was elected, b ut the arm y will continue to rule the country. The Egyp tian arm y is one o f the largest c ro ss-in d u stry co rp o ratio n s today.” “Polityka” no. 26, 27 June-03 July 2012. M arshal Tantaw i becam e the te m p o ra ry head o f state. In this article the au th o r focuses o n the social dim en sio n o f an au th o ritaria n state. She claims that the Egyptian society is a u th o ri ta rian and “replicates the style o f M u b a ra k ’s rule at hom e, at work, in the street. This behaviour is e n h a n ce d by p atriarchy - in everyday life it is the father w ho m akes the decisions, while the te n d er m o th e r rem ains silent.” Egyptian Family restricts p ersonal freedom and individual rights. A ccording to Sasnal, the ed ucation system is similarly based on obedience and lack o f any creativ
ity. “Social change in Egypt has n o t yet caught up w ith political change.”
Patrycja Sasnal “The B rothers divide the Family” “Polityka”, no. 50, 12-18 D ecem ber 2012. “Ev erything is ready. Egypt u n d er the rule o f M o h a m m e d M orsi is once again on the verge o f revolu tion. The new president, assum ing power, led the Egyptians to the streets.” M orsi has been called the “second dictator” a n d “shed the im age o f the president w ho is at the m ercy o f the arm y by having two o f its heads retire. In return, he left alone the im m ense estates o f the army, and the n ew draft o f the constitution does n ot assum e civilian control over the m ilitary forces. Hence, the A rm y m oved to the back seat a n d quietly rem ains on go o d term s w ith the Brotherhood.” In her words: “M any Egyptians boycott the civilian p ro d u ctio n of the arm y in protest against its secretive dual power.” Officers were relieved to see the Freedom an d Justice Party take responsibility for the co n d itio n o f the State. “M u b a ra k has disgraced capitalism to the p o in t that today som e Egyptians tu rn to socialism.” Patrycja Sasnal ends h e r article by stating that the second revolution in Egypt is inevitable, because the social divisions have intensified, the sense o f security am ong the Egyptians has declined drastically, the police has disappeared from the streets, and the econom ic situation o f the c o u n try is disastrous. Meanwhile, M orsi called for a referendum o n the draft of the new constitution with a strong position o f the president (the referendum on D ecem ber 15).
13 Policing Belief: The Im p ac t o f B lasphem y I.aws on H u m a n R ights”, Freedom H ouse R eport, O c lo b cr 2 0 1 0.
14 E m ad E l-D in S hahin, „Political Parties in Egypt: Alive, b u t N o t K icking” w: Kay Lawson, Saad E ddin
Ib ra h im [ed]., „Political Parties a n d D e m o cra cy ”, Vol. V, The A rab W orld, Praeger, Santa Barbara, C a li fornia, D en v er C o lo rad o , O x fo rd E n gland 2010, s. 9.
„Egypt is p utting its head in a noose. The d isgruntled in the streets o f Egyptian cities have called for m ilitary assistance, as they were d isa ppointed by their dem ocratically elected Islamist govern m ent. They m ay soon regret it” is the title o f A rtu r Domoslawski's article in one o f the opinion- form ing weekly „Polityka”, no. 28/2013, 10-16 July
Domoslawski adm its that the Brothers co n trib u ted to social d iscontent and mass criticism, an d yet he doubts w hether it was justified to call the arm y to overthrow the first dem ocratically elect ed president in the history o f Egypt. The Polish co m m entators felt th a t the decision o f th e Egyp tian society is completely incom prehensible. W h y d id the young Egyptian d em ocracy voluntarily impose on itself a restriction in form o f the control o f the army? Is a d em o crac y fashioned by the arm y becom ing the norm ? W hy does the society let the arm y use violence and repression against its political opponents? A nd if the next g overnm ent disappoints a large n u m b e r o f people, will the m ilitary take control yet again?
Polish com m entators do n ot u n d ersta n d the respect the Egyptian society feels for the army. D em ocracy does n ot allow a coup. Signatures collected by T am arod are n o t impressive.
Domoslawski writes: “Some Egyptians believed the pro p ag a n d a o f the old regim e claim ing that as soon as the Brothers com e to power, they will tu rn Egypt into a religious state. A year o f the Islamist rule of M o h a m m e d M orsi did n o t confirm these fears. O v erth ro w n by the army, M orsi com m itted several extremely grave sins in politics, though o f a com pletely different category.” Domoslawski is wrong, because it was M orsis rule th a t created the version of the constitution, in which the Salafists o f al-N our insisted on Article 219, tu rn in g Egypt into a religious state. He emphasises, however, the incom petence in the ad m in istra tio n of the state, unresolved econom ic problem s a n d social crisis. Domoslawski highlights the fact that th e Brothers - successful in charitable activities (for example, the earthquake in Cairo in 1992 and the ex traordinary m o bilization o f syndicates o f doctors and engineers) - “could n o t replace the experience o f social w ork with any state policy that w ould give hope for the future.” F urtherm ore, in his opinion, Morsi broke the underlying principle o f the B rothers regarding politics an d used violence against his political opponents after the a n n o u n c e m e n t o f the decree providing h im w ith im m u n ity in N ovem ber a n d D ecem ber 2012, and the riots w hich this decree induced. D om oslaw ski believes that the Brothers represent the non-liberal dem ocracy trend, nam ely they disregard th e rights o f religious m inorities a n d discrim inate on grounds of gender, religion, language, health condition and social status. The m a in accusation m ade by the Brothers against the opposition co n cerned its glorification of the rights of religious m inorities a n d freedom o f speech with the sim ultaneous disregard for the will o f the voters, an issue w hich is still audible in successive d em o nstrations against Sisis governm ent.
Łukasz Wójcik: “D angerous straitjacket”, “Polityka”, no. 29, 17-23 July 2013: “The fall o f the Islamists in Egypt will be o f trem en d o u s significance for the future o f political Islam in the whole region. After all, Islamists’ reconciliation with d em ocracy was one o f the m ost im p o rta n t changes in recent years in the M iddle East. This was m ade possible largely due to the Egyptian B rother hood, which in the 1970s first ren o u n c ed violence, and two years ago, taking advantage o f the fall of their his sw orn enem y H osni M ubarak, entered the realm o f official politics. Now, the way Islamists in other countries of the region will act depends to a large extent on the fate o f the Egyptian B rotherhood. A nd for the tim e being, the B rotherhood has chosen a direction of the head-on collision.” 15
„Islam has becom e a useful excuse for b o th sides o f the conflict in Egypt. The A rm y gained a
tacit approval o f the West for its activities, explaining that it took the pow er away from the fu n dam entalists. For the Brothers, on the o th e r hand, it is convenient now to argue that they have bec o m e m a rty rs for their faith, although they d id develop disastrous econom ic and social p o li cies a n d it was because o f that - n o t because o f religion - that m illions o f Egyptians w anted to take their pow er away.” W ójcik indicates th a t M orsi co nstituted a serious threat to all authoritar ian A rab regim es, firstly, because he was dem ocratically elected a n d spoke o n behalf o f millions o f Arabs, a n d secondly, as he openly criticized th e m for „stifling n ational d em ocratic aspirations.” Therefore, after his fall, Saudi A rabia su p p o rted th e m ilitary g overnm ent with billions o f dollars
in loans. A ccording to the com m entator, th e greatest achievem ent o f the B rothers was the re n u n ciation o f violence a n d active participation in politics w ithin the dem ocratic system. It would be a pity if this process were com prom ised.
“Sisi, the son o f N asser”, “Polityka”, no. 35,2 8 A u g u st-0 3 S eptem ber 2013, the headline says: “Af ter the recent tragic events in Cairo, G eneral Abdel Fattah al-Sisi becam e the hero o f liberal Egypt. Even th o u g h he was b ro u g h t to p o w er by the Islamists”. Patrycja Sasnal argues that “the Egyptians, always susceptible to th e cult o f the individual, have a leader yet again, a father a n d m aster in one person.” O n the o th e r hand, even “the liberal cream o f the Egyptian society anointed Sisi to be the leader, sta rtin g with writers, actors, to philosophers.” The au th o r indicates n u m e ro u s parallels betw een Sisi a n d Nasser: th e ir charism a, the application of street dialect in their speeches, the use o f al-A zhar to legitimize the m ilitary p o w er in the country, as well as violence and repressions against the Islamists. She also talks a b o u t the fo rm a tio n o f a new alliance of non-dem ocratic countries in th e region: Saudi Arabia, the Em irates, Kuwait, along with Russia and China.
5. “Gazeta Wyborcza” newspaper
Thursday, 4 July 2013. R obert Stefanicki “The C oup in Egypt. M o h a m m e d M orsi is no longer the president. There will be a new civilian governm ent, th o u g h at the army's bidding.” The constitu tion was suspended, a n d a plan o f te m p o rary seizure o f pow er was discussed with a n u m b e r of political groups. Stefanicki em phasises th a t Morsi was the first president elected in free elections, an d th e first Islam ist to lead a d em ocratic Arab state. “O ver the last year, th ro u g h its incom pe tence a n d greed, the B rotherhood, th e strongest political organization in the country, embezzled the capital o f social trust, accum ulated over the p e rio d o f 60 years o f persecution from the hands o f the army.” In a survey co n d u cted by the Ibn K haldun C entre for D evelopm ent Studies in Cairo, 82% o f resp o n d e n ts were in favour o f the arm y s re tu rn to power. Wyborcza's co m m en t refers to the w ords o f an Egyptian blogger: “The Egyptians are facing a difficult choice between a ju n ta a n d a theocratic dictatorship. We deserve m ore, b ut we were n o t able to w ork out a better alterna tive.”
F riday 5 July 2013, M a rta U rzędow ska “A rm y rules Egypt”. “Adli M ansur is to rule te m p o rar ily, a n d his function is likely to be purely symbolic, because in reality it was the arm y that seized the power.” “... The arm y is doing everything to deprive the infuriated Islamists of their leaders. W arrants have been issued for the arrest o f h u n d re d s o f im p o rta n t activists o f the Brotherhood a n d their leader - M o h a m m e d Badi - has already been arrested.” As a c o m m en tary on these events, U rzędow ska interview ed Yasser El-Shima, an analyst from the International Crisis G roup in Cairo. In his opinion, it is difficult to stabilize the c o u n try if the Islamists rem oved from pow er are n o t involved in the process o f form ing a new governm ent. “Should the M uslim B rotherhood be p erse cu te d yet again, as it was d u rin g M ubarak’s rule, should they be im prisoned or detained w ith o u t charge anew, it w ould be a massive step backw ards a n d a great tragedy for the d em o cra tization process, or even for the stability o f Egypt.”
6. Social democratic thought
In his article “Crisis or failure o f the Arab revolutions” 16, Jerzy W iatr notes th a t the policy of W estern intervention in the internal affairs of A rab countries has proven to b e u n s u c c e s s f u l as it is impossible to create dem o crac y th ro u g h m ilitary intervention. Rom an Kuźniar, a Polish politi cal scientist, accused such actions o f “a b a n d o n m e n t o f m orality in favour o f th e easy rhetoric of h um an rights.” 17 W iatr indicates the following factors relevant to the developm ent o f events in the Arab w orld and in Egypt, w hich have co n trib u ted to the outbreak o f the revolution: d e m o graphic changes, th e increasing influence o f education and educational success experienced by these societies, the role o f the young generation an d its sensitivity to dem ocratic ideas, a k in d of diffusion of these the ideas resulting from the th ird wave o f dem ocratization a n d the awareness of the co rruption of existing governm ents.
W iatr cites the oft-quoted w ords of Zbigniew Brzeziński: “In Egypt, we will have a state ruled either by religious fundam entalists or by the military.”18 Thus, he opts for the idea, p o p u la r in the West and su pported by au thoritarian regimes, that as a m atter o f fact, d ictatorships p rotected the Muslim society against Islamic radicalism. A ccording to Wiatr, religious fu n d am e n ta lism is incompatible with d em ocracy a n d respecting the rights o f m inorities w ithin it. O nly a secular or ideologically neutral state can provide the conditions for the coexistence o f the diverse ethnic and religious groups. He adds: “C hristian Europe nee d ed a few centuries in order to to u n d e rsta n d and accept this principle, th o u g h even here one can som etim es see how difficult it is to im ple m ent this principle in practice.”19
The Polish press features all these three perspectives, so d ep ending on the editorial as su m p tions there dom inates a paternalistic approach or the one taking into account the civilisational autonom y of the Arab world. A com pletely different perception o f the role o f the M uslim B ro th erhood is presented by the right-w ing press, w hich in its evaluation o f th e events o f the Egyptian revolution often falls into the trap o f n o t only O rientalism , but even o f C hristian fundam entalism . I do n ot intend to spend too m u c h tim e on this discourse as I consider it an expression o f p reju dice and xenophobia, w hich you will see for yourselves. I am also forced to tone dow n som e o f the wording as I do n ot w ant to em barrass myself.
7. Right-wing press
The extreme attitudes towards the Islamic civilisation, referring directly to m edieval prejudices and teachings o f the C hurch Fathers are reflected on the pages o f the right-w ing press. Starting from the M iddle Ages, E uropean civilization has rem ained prim arily C hristian an d it was the religious differences that determ in e d the context o f perceiving such distinct cultures as Islam. The Church Fathers - John of Dam ascus, Peter the Venerable a n d T hom as A quinas - form ulated interpretations o f Islam w hich w ere binding for m any centuries. They considered Islam as heresy, the creation o f a m a n w ho used a fake revelation in order to gain p o w er20. They p o in ted to the
16 Jerzy J. W iatr, Kryzys czy fiasko rewolucji arabskich?, „Myśl so cjaldem okratyczna”, N r 1/2 2013. 17 R om an Kuźniar, N ieznośna lekkość zabijania, G azeta W yborcza, 17-18 g ru d n ia, 2011.
18 Zbigniew Brzeziński, Szach królowej, „Gazeta W yborcza”, 5 - 6 listopada 2011 cyt. za: Jerzy J. W iatr, K ry
zys czy fiasko rewolucji arabskich?, „Myśl so cjaldem okratyczna”, N r 1/2 2013.
19 Jerzy j. wiatr, dz. cyt., s. 55.
20 R.W. S outhern, W estern Views o f Islam in the M iddle Ages, H a rv ard U niversity Press, C am b rid g e -
practical, n o t spiritual d im ension o f Isiam: lack o f m iracles in M uham m ad's activities, excessive a tta c h m e n t to w orldly possessi<\ii an d a sensual idea o f Paradise. The image o f Islamic paradise m ade C h ristian s believe that Islam is a religion devoid o f a spiritual or supernatural dim ension. The d ep icte d vivid d escription o f M uslim P aradise co ntrasted with ascetic C hristian ideas.
For them , Islam was a p aro d y o f Christianity, an inadequate copy o f its practices an d rituals. It was criticized for the d o ctrin e o f the holy w ar a n d violence against infidels. These old ideas are r e ferred to by Tom asz P. Terlikowski, a C atholic co lu m n ist in „D o rzeczy” m agazine (which m eans “to the p o in t” b ut should rather be called “no n se n se”), no. 17, 2 0 -2 6 M ay 2013, in his article titled “T am ing o f the Islamic lion”, w hich represents th e right-w ing discourse and constitutes the es sence o f C atholic fu n d am e n ta lism a n d its u n d e rsta n d in g o f Islam. H e regards Islam as a religion w ith c o n te m p t as well as any attem pts at dialogue a n d cooperation, going as far as criticising the ecu m e n ica l policies o f John Paul II a n d Pope Francis. It is w o rth q u oting a few elements of this discourse:
A ccording to this C atholic publicist, the C rusades a n d the Reconquista in Spain were necessary actions o f C hristians against the pow er o f Islam, a battle for living space a n d a defence against p erse cu tio n s by th e M uslims. Terlikowski consistently negates the coexistence o f the two religions in A ndalusia calling this historical p erio d “a m yth o f peaceful cooperation”. “The pow er o f the W est a n d the fall o f Islamic superpow ers later caught the W est off guard, a n d the new strategy of M uslim s, w ho replaced the arm y o f w arriors w ith an arm y o f w o m en having children in the West, m a d e th e E uropeans forget ab o u t “the m issionary natu re o f Islam” a n d the fact that its purpose is to subjugate the w hole earth.” He goes o n to say: “the gesture o f John Paul II, w ho kissed the holy b o o k o f Islam, has m a d e it increasingly difficult to talk a b o u t the “falseness” o f this holy book”. However, Terlikowski does n o t give u p a n d continues: “But in fact, from a C hristian perspective, it is difficult to look at Islam a n d its holy b o o k as anything o th e r th a n false”. “The teachings of the Koran are, however, a regress n ot only from the C hristian, b ut also Jewish perspective”. Quote: “The G o d o f the K oran - [ . . . ] is n o t a n d can n o t be close to his followers”. A n d an o th er quote as a su m m ary : “Islam ism, as well as Islam (although one needs to be aware o f the difference between the two), sh o u ld therefore be considered to be a th rea t also to the C h u rch an d to the Western civilization, in the sam e way th a t co m m u n ism o r N azism once were (radical fundam entalism , in facts, draw s fro m both). W h ich m eans that it is necessary n o t only to m inutely analyse the a n thropological an d religious principles o f this religion a n d its political branch, b u t also to indicate how they m ay im p act th e social life a n d how the C hristians should defy it”. Unfortunately, this C atholic fu n d am e n ta list considers Islam b e one o f the m o st serious threats to C hristianity in the tw enty-first ce n tu ry a n d places Islam in th e sam e category as relativism, aggressive secularism, civilisation o f death and gender ideology21. He sees the co m in g to pow er o f the M uslim Brothers a n d th e ir policy o f co n frontation w ith th e C opts in Egypt as synonym ous with religious w ar .
“Do rzeczy” no. 30, 19-25 A ugust 2013, Jacek Przybylski talks to Frederik Encel, a French ex p e r t o n the M iddle East, in an interview entitled: “There will be n o safety u n d e r the Pyram ids”. Right after the tragic events in Tahrir, Encel prophesies that Egypt “is rapidly approaching a fully fledged civil w ar”. He com pares the situation in Egypt to the A lgerian conflict in the 1990s.
„Gazeta Polska”, 10 July 2013, A ntoni Rybczyński: “H ow the a rm y stopped Islamization” d e scribes the reasons w hy M orsi lost his pow er an d the w ithdraw al of public s u p p o rt for the B roth ers. “G azeta Polska”, 08 July 2013, K rzysztof Warecki (in his article) „Egypt faces pow er struggle. After th e overthrow o f M orsi / The M uslim B ro th e rh o o d does n o t know the concept of c o m
p r o m is e ”, clearly regards the B rothers’ rule in Egypt as the in tro d u c tio n o f principles o f radical Islamic elements. The Brothers applied the dem ocracy in an in stru m en ta l way in o rd er to im pose their authority on the entire society. “Gazeta Polska” highlights the Brothers’ attitude tow ards the Egyptian Christians a n d their persecution. It treats the s u p p o rt o f Obama's a d m in istra tio n for the Muslim Brothers as an expression o f ideological in d o c trin atio n a n d his leftist beliefs. Warecki advocates decisive actions by the Egyptian arm y so as to stop the violence a n d prevent anarchy. He quotes a statem ent by the U.S. Secretary o f State John Kerry: “W h a t we h ad in Egypt was an exceptional situation, w hich becam e a question o f life or death, threatening with the o u tb rea k of a civil war and extensive violence, w hereas now we are dealing with a rapidly progressing consti tutional process”. “Gazeta Polska” in a way justifies the m ilitary actions as the B rothers “blindly refer to the electoral legitimacy” a n d use violence against their opponents. Because their actions constitute a threat to the state security, they will n o longer be tolerated by the arm y ”.22
8. W omen during the revolution
The Polish press has devoted quite a lot o f space to the w o m en s role in the Egyptian revolution, recognizing their unique role in the protests against au th o ritaria n rule, their participation in dem onstrations a n d their experience o f violence at the h ands o f the police an d security services.
Agnieszka Krzemińska, “Break the bracelets! The Egyptian upheaval is to lead to political, but also social changes. Will w om en benefit from it, so far living in the shadow o f m e n ?”, “Polityka”, no. 13-26 March, 2011. The author em phasizes the low social status o f the Egyptian w o m en and the deep social division that they experience - into the educated residents o f the cities and the illiterate village inhabitants w ith no prospects for the future. O n the one hand, Egyptian fem inists are fighting for a shift in social awareness: a dep a rtu re from the infibulation procedures a n d a greater participation of w om en in public life. O n the o th e r hand, despite the 2008 ban, ab o u t 90% of w om en still becom e circumcised, a n d the pow er o f trad itio n is n o t decreasing, as evidenced by the data from 2009 m entioning 2.7 th o u sa n d suicide attem pts m ade by educated w om en because of their spinsterhood.
A rtur Domoslawski (“Egyptian suffragists”, “Polityka”, no. 10, 7 -1 3 M arch 2012) referring to S hahinda Miqlad, claims that w o m en “have been a n d will be in the v anguard o f the fight for rights in Egypt” - n ot only w om ens rights, but h u m a n a n d civil rights as well. D u rin g the rev o lution, the w om en of Egypt declared a full-scale w ar against sexual h arassm ent a n d this - ac cording to H oda Elsadda - resulted in an im provem ent in the situation in the streets o f Cairo. Domoslawski em phasises that the wave o f political Islam strengthened the Islamic fem inism , namely the m ovem ent o f devout M uslim w om en, for w h o m Islam is a religion o f equality b e tween m en and women.
M arta Urzędowska (“G azeta W yborcza”, 0 9 -1 0 June 2012, “W om en o f Tahrir betrayed by the Egyptian revolution”): “Just like m en, they fought with the police, they were arrested, hum iliated and tortured.” However, only a few w om en entered the parliam ent, th o u g h there were h u n d red s of female candidates. The au thor points o u t that 70% o f the new MPs are Islamists “for w h o m the place of w om en is at home, n ot in politics.”
“Gazeta W yborcza” 31 D ecem ber 20 1 2 -Jan u a ry 1, 2013, M arta U rzędow ska “The strength of Muslim Sisters”. It is estim ated that “the expanding M uslim B rotherhood has a b o u t one to one and a half million m em bers, at least half o f w h o m are w om en”. D u rin g the election cam paign, women were m ainly occupied w ith recruiting the voters. However, according to the rules prevail
ing am o n g th e Brothers, w o m e n should n o t occupy significant public positions or serve im p o r tant functions in the B rotherhood. O n the basis o f h e r interviews, M arta Urz^dowska argues that being a Sister “is an unofficial position” - w o m en are m ainly focused on propagating the p rin ci ples o f Islam and on social work, they do n o t contribute to the funds. A n u m b e r o f them joined the F reedom a n d Justice Party, w hich “organized w orkshops to teach th e m how to ru n an election cam paign a n d co n tac t the media.” A ccording to the a u th o r o f the article, such a large p roportion o f w o m en in the organization results from the political p ersecution of the Brothers. W h e n m en were sent to p risons, it was the w om en that to o k care o f the co n tinuity o f the organization. “Since they have never been treated as a serious th rea t by the regime, they able to operate m ore freely.” W hich, o f course, radically changed after the o v erthrow o f P resident Morsi, evidenced - am ong
oth e r things - by the verdict o f 28 N ovem ber 2013, w hich sentenced 21 girls to 11 years in prison for peaceful d e m o n stra tio n su p p o rtin g M orsi23. There is a newly established youth branch of the party, called Nur, at the A in Shams university. Its aim is to p ro m o te the knowledge o f Islam and to take care o f the problem s of female students, e.g. im proving the conditions in the dorm itories a n d se curity on c a m p u s24.
Having w on th e elections, the elected representatives o f the M uslim B rotherhood paid a c o u r tesy visit to Poland, w hich to o k place from 22 to 27 M arch 2012. Their pu rp o se was to gather in fo rm atio n about the Polish stru ctu ra l changes after 1989. They were particularly interested in the issue o f w ithdraw al of the m ilitary pow er in Poland. This visit received no attention either from th e Polish or fro m the Egyptian press.
9. C onclusion
Edw ard Said believes that the greatest progress th a t has been m a d e in the co n tem p o ra ry th e o ry of culture is the belief that cultures constitute a heterogeneous m ix a n d are interrelated an d m u tu ally in te rd e p e n d e n t.25 A ny attem pt at unification or creation o f in su rm o u n tab le barriers between civilisations co n tra d ic t th e h u m a n experience of h istory and contributes to the im poverishm ent o f individual cultures: speaking o f ‘“W estern civilization’ m eans su p p o rtin g the ideological fic tion suggesting a certain im partial superiority o f som e values an d ideas, none o f w hich really m a tte r outside o f h isto ry conquest, im m igration, travel an d m ixing o f peoples, w hich provided the W estern nations w ith their prese n t m ixed identity.”26 Every division o f cultures and peoples, according to Said, is responsible for the false representations a n d m isstatem ents, and m ore im portantly, identifies the differences betw een people w ith hostility, w hich in tu rn results in wars a n d im perial control.
However, the revolution in Egypt has n o t been com pleted. Some say it has com e full circle a n d once again the arm y is in power, a n d its new face is general Sisi. The arm y skillfully fuels the hostility tow ards the B rothers a n d their supporters. However, in m y opinion, the biggest problem lies in th e sharp division o f the Egyptian society into three groups:
• those w ho accept the situation an d the role the arm y plays in the changes that have no
pre-23 M u h a m m a d M anso u r, R ou g h justice: 21 girls se n ten ced to 11 years for peaceful protests, “Egypt I n
d e p e n d e n t”, 28.11.2013, h ttp ://w w w .e g y p tin d e p en d e n t.c o m ./n e w s /ro u g h -ju stice -2 1 -girls-sentenced [06.12.2013]
24 M a rta U rzędow ska, Siła S ióstr M u zu lm an ek , „Gazeta W yborcza" 31 g ru d n ia 2012-1 stycznia 2013, s. 8.
25 E. W. Saida, O rien talizm , Zysk i S-ka, P ozn ań 2005, s. 476.
dictable outcom e - perhaps to preserve the authority a n d p o w er o f the army, as in their o p in ion there is no alternative;
• those who definitely w ant the political dem ocratization o f the c o u n try and the abolishm ent of m ilitary dictatorship;
• and finally those w ho fervently su p p o rt the Islamic ideals created by the M uslim B rother h o o d and the Salafists.
All three groups consist of M uslim s a n d they do n o t question the Islamic foundations o f the Egyptian society. The dispute revolves a ro u n d the u n d ersta n d in g of Islam. O n the one hand, as a cultural and civilisational project, heritage a n d values, w hich include contributions by the Copts and other religious m inorities living in Egypt, an d o n the o ther hand, as th e regulation an d the only source of rights for all citizens, w hich is h eading tow ards a religious state. The debate, w hich takes place not only in Egypt but th ro u g h o u t the M uslim w orld bears the hallm arks of an in tra civilisation clash which was long noted by Piotr K lodkow ski a n d Jerzy Zdanowski.
