REVIEWS–REPORTS
Ewa Narkiewicz-Niedbalec (rev.): Piotr Arak, Michał Boni, Krystyna Szafraniec, Youth Report 2011, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Warszawa 2011, pp. 425. What do sociologists really know about young Poles – what can politicians off er them?
As the names of its authors may suggest, the study that served as the inspiration for the following paper is not a typical publication. Dr Michał Boni, the fi rst of the authors, is a politician holding a Ph.D. in sociology and recently appointed as the Minister of Ad-ministration and Digitization in the Donald Tusk government. Another co-writer is Krystyna Szafraniec, a professor of sociol-ogy at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, who is a renowned researcher of youth issues. Th e third author, Piotr Arak, is an expert at the United Nations Develop-ment Programme. Between 2008 and 2012, he worked at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Administra-tion and DigitizaAdministra-tion, serving as a consult-ant in the latter, among other things. Expert studies ordered by politicians, governmen-tal institutions, or associational institutions oft en have teams of multiple authors, who
share collective responsibility for the pre-sented theses and selection of empirical material. Th e aforementioned authors pre-pared the study aft er a cycle of seminars that took place in 2010/2011 and included a number of participants mentioned in the study by their names – academic and non-academic social scientists, pedagogues, doc-tors, therapists, representatives of various organizations and associations, both youth and educational ones (i.e. the Foundation for the Development of the Education Sys-tem, Institute for Social Education, Lower Silesian Council for Voluntary Youth Ser-vices, Social Dialogue Forum, Polish Chil-dren and Youth Foundation, Institute of Public Affairs Foundation), associations helping people with clearly defi ned prob-lems (i.e. the Center of Prevention and Ad-diction Treatment MONAR, Commission for Drug Abuse and HIV/AIDS Prevention, Institute of Psychiatry and Neurology), and, fi nally, members of governmental institu-tions like the Ministry of National Educa-tion, delegating representatives from the Department for European Aff airs or Educa-tional Opportunities Department to take part in the seminars. Th us, one can assume that such a diverse group of experts on youth issues made it possible to discuss
a majority, if not all, of the most crucial problems that the young generation faces. Th e result of the debates, most of which are concluded with some reflection or with a proof of new knowledge acquired by par-ticipants and available for later use in their publishing and practical work, was recorded in a written form – a truly remarkable deed. Th e “Youth Report 2011” is a tangible result of meetings, discussions, as well as the work of the editors, authors, and project coordi-nators that followed. All of this contributed to the fact that the study is a piece of work to be elaborated on and referred to. By the end of 2011, it was presented at the Ministry of National Education and on many diff er-ent occasions aft er that, e.g. during scien-tifi c conferences.
In the preface, Michał Boni writes that participants of the seminar were interested in everything that made it possible to re-place the intuitive image of a young genera-tion with reliable knowledge. Th is was pur-sued in order to enable the formulation of practical, youth-serving proposals in the fi eld of politics. Th ough it is impossible to address every issue, I believe that the report is fi lled with diverse and (hopefully) reliable pieces of information about the young gen-eration. Th e selected sources seem to con-fi rm it. Th e authors used both hard data, coming from the Central Statistical Offi ce, National Bank of Poland, Polish Bank As-sociation, Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Central Examination Board, re-ports from the Public Opinion Research Center based on nationwide polls, Europe-an statistical data (Eurostat, documents of
the European Commission, OECD, and WHO reports) concerning demography, education, labor market, as well as the re-sults of studies conducted by youths and published in the form of scientifi c articles or books. Moreover, Krystyna Szafraniec is an experienced scientist-empiricist, which is why on many occasions she could refer to the results of research conducted by either herself, teams she participated in, or her stu-dents and disciples (Jarosław Domalewski, Piotr Mikiewicz, and Krzysztof Wasie-lewski).
Szafraniec is also an expert on the gen-eration issue and, while refl ecting on the contemporary generation of young people, she oft en reached for such classics in this fi eld as Karl Mannheim, among many oth-ers. Still, I took the liberty to put question marks next to some of the statements con-cerning generations: are they right or not? For example, the fi rst chapter entitled “Czas na młodych: O konieczności wymiany pokoleniowej w Polsce” [Time for youth: On the necessity of generational change in Poland], opens with a statement that it is generations, among other things, that de-cide about social change. Apparently, it is confirmed by sociological theories and opinions presented by publicists, writers, or even common people, who claim that the world is unchanging because there is no generational change. What does it mean? People do multiply (though in some areas it may occur at a slower rate) and, biologically speaking, new generations do appear. I am aware of the fact, that an age cohort must go through some generational experience to be
called a generation. What was so special about the “Solidarność” [Solidarity] genera-tion that it became a generagenera-tion of massive change? It was rather a course of various processes (another advanced stage of eco-nomic competition between western capi-talism and eastern socialism), accumulation of particular features (substantial debt of the People’s Republic of Poland and no chance of loan repayment, the economic recession in Poland in the 1980s), but also changes in intellectual elites’ beliefs, which through actions of the Workers’ Defense Committee or various magazines like “Poli-tyka” and “Tygodnik Powszechny” penetrat-ed the general awareness. All of these fac-tors resulted in free trade unions coming into existence 35 years after the Second World War. And, after the following 10 years, triggered the Great Change. Th e size of the industrial working class, readiness of authorities to seek compromise in the situ-ation of a nsitu-ational stalemate, and individu-al features of leaders like Lech Wałęsa, individu-along with those of his advisors – Tadeusz Ma-zowiecki and Bronisław Geremek – led to the transformation of 1989. Was there any-thing special in the generation of twenty- and thirty-year-olds of that time? It seems that any other community of Poles would have acted in the same manner in similar circumstances provided their socialization experiences had been consistent with the spirit of the epoch in which they were raised. It is diffi cult to imagine how a com-munity of youths experiencing the contem-porary level of consumerism would have behaved if they had entered adult life in the
late 80s; however, market defi ciencies and growing inflation of that time could not constitute life of those experiencing the pros (and cons) of raging consumerism. Krystyna Szafraniec appears to think other-wise, writing that “(…) the potential of a given generation is not a result of features attributed to the youth, but of attitudes and predispositions acquired in early life under the infl uence of some particular historic circumstances”. If it is true, not every gen-eration grows to be historically signifi cant and trigger changes, yet the generation of “Solidarity” certainly did. The period of great systemic transformation, starting from the events of the Polish Summer and ending with the 1990s, was based on the po-litical and intellectual potential of people raised in the times of the People’s Republic of Poland. It was this generation, currently aged 50 and older, who were the actors of the great change. It was this generation, then-aged 30+, which built the Polish de-mocracy, along with the foundations of a free-market economy. Nowadays, a num-ber of problems connected with social life and a fl urry of challenges seem to imply that people of the “Solidarity” generation are inevitably expiring, especially when confronted with young people that are growing up in the new Poland and whose expectations are reaching far beyond the encountered reality while capabilities ex-ceed the current potential of the middle-aged generation” (p. 21). What does the au-thor mean by the “political potential” of that generation? In the mid-1980s, 46% of Poles considered socialism a better system than
capitalism, while 64% believed there was no need to bring back capitalism (Jadwiga Stan-iszkis, Ontologia socjalizmu [Ontology of Socialism], Warszawa 1989). Still, the vast majority of Poles supported the democratic model of governmental elections and wanted to capture the absolute power from the hands of the one true party, consequently making room for the “Solidarity” movement – candi-dates of which they supported so enthusiasti-cally in 1989 – to take part in the elections. Th e direction of the changes initiated at that point, however, was decided upon by elites representing both sides – the ruling party and the opposition. Th e Polish Round Table Talks enabled the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki to establish and carry through market reforms according to the plan and acts outlined by Leszek Balcerowicz and his team. Th at is why I believe that Michał Boni has put it more accurately by writing, “No Polish generation, with all its strengths and weaknesses, has possessed and taken advan-tage of its historical opportunity better than the widely understood generation of “Soli-darity” (meant as an age group regardless of its members’ political affi liations) with room for Lech Wałęsa, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jarosław Kaczyński, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Jerzy Buzek, but also for Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leszek Miller, and cur-rently for Donald Tusk – to name only some of the living ones” (M. Boni, p. 403).
One could say that the people of 19431 -1959 got lucky that a juncture of many
cir-1 Th e birth year of Lech Wałęsa, who defi
-nitely belongs to the “Solidarity” generation (as its
cumstances led to them becoming the “Sol-idarity” generation. At present, they are simply elders that in many cases have reached a favorable position in life and at-tained some sense of fulfi llment (winners), but also those disappointed with the lack of personal profi ts reaped aft er the transfor-mation (losers of the transfortransfor-mation). Krystyna Szafraniec writes that resources of the “Solidarity” generation keep expiring in an inevitable manner. Does she mean that “the winners” do not wish to see any more changes, while “the losers” are unable to start a new “revolution”? All in all, both groups are closing in on retirement.
Krystyna Szafraniec treats contempo-rary youths in a multifaceted way – as a product of social change, a meaningful resource of further transformations, and a signifi cant social actor whose engagement and activeness is prerequisite to putting some of the recommended ideas into prac-tice. Th e authors of the report were trying to determine what challenges await modern societies, which are realizing or aspiring to realize the model of expansive and dynam-ic, yet intrinsically contradicting, demo-cratic capitalism. What they consider fun-damental is building a new kind of com-munity that would respect freedom of choice, making decisions about oneself and the sense of one’s autonomy, but at the same time off er possibility of brotherhood and togetherness. Th is social solidarity is sup-posed to be based on “a tedious and painful
leader); thus his birth year can mark the begin-ning of this generation.
process of creating bonds from the scratch while taking into consideration diverse goals, values and overcoming existing divi-sions. This community does not exclude anyone nor does it make anybody worth-less. It is not in opposition to other com-munities and does not need an enemy to exist. It is inclusive – that is, allows for free choice of belonging based on the rule of conscious confi rmation of common values. In this community, education and demo-cratic procedures constitute the method of solving diffi cult problems. Raising people to acceptation of pluralism, otherness, variety and tolerance causes that apparent chaos starts being perceived as an inherent feature of a social world, inhabited by diverse peo-ple and cultures” (p. 16). Notional sources of this concept of community come from ethos of the post-modern liberalism, which does not absolutize the value of individual-ism, but stresses the need for community bonds and altruism that involves solidarity and responsibility for others. Th e question remains: is the Polish society with its insti-tutions able to put such message into prac-tice and develop attitudes consistent with this ethos? And one more thing – it is obvi-ous that this process may be tediobvi-ous, but why painful?
Th e “Youth Report 2011” contains plen-ty of valuable information about young Poles, which is oft en presented by referenc-ing data about the young people of Europe or the world, or referencing certain charac-teristics revealed by Poles in general. Both contexts off er a chance to highlight diff er-ences, sometimes similarities. Refl ections
on the nature of the labor market and youths’ position on it are of particular im-portance here since it is one of the most pressing issues in many European countries. However, conclusions found in many Euro-pean reports are not optimistic and can be narrowed down to the following directive – you should do something about it. For ex-ample, the European Commission, brought up on page 172 in reference to the two forms of employment – full-time, thus more stable, and part-time, insecure, undertaken mostly by youths – suggests that govern-ments should devise a coherent strategy based on the idea of fl exicurity. “According to the European Commission, such strategy should include a few political initiatives adapted to specifi c conditions of a given country (as opposed to the ‘one – size – fi ts – all’ strategy” (p. 172). Th e Commission takes into consideration examples of strate-gies that follow one major idea, which has not managed to off er the solution to the problem while, at the same time, putting forward other ideas, such as introducing a minimum wage rate, establishing the uni-versal right to obtain insurance against los-ing one’s job regardless of the job contract, limiting short-term contracts offered to employees, implementing new strategies of economic development, etc. Each of these ideas has its supporters and critics in our country, yet one must ask whether anybody (a single author, politicians representing various factions, or other social actors) has managed to devise such strategy? Th e ques-tion remains whether it is even possible to eliminate unemployment and overcome the
diffi culties facing the youth with entering the labor market. Still, it is important to keep trying and, as far as the individual di-mension is concerned, to choose such solu-tions (if available) that will enable an indi-vidual to join the ranks of “winners”, not “losers”. Th e report contains data that can provide a good basis for this kind of deci-sions and actions.
Now, a few critical remarks addressing some minor lapses and mistakes will be made. Firstly, in the opening section, Krystyna Szafraniec compares the “Solidar-ity” generation to the generation of “his-toric hope and opportunity” and follows it with the question of whether children of the “Solidarity” inherited their parents’ adapta-bility and readiness to continue with the changes. Aren’t these two features contra-dictory? If the “Solidarity” generation had adapted to the conditions, they would not have made so radical changes. What they aimed to do was changing their living con-ditions and, at least in the beginning, lend “a human face” to socialism. Th erefore, it is not about inheritance of adaptive skills, but about adapting to conditions created by the parents’ generation and making the neces-sary corrections wherever they failed.
Secondly, the author writes that in terms of values preferred by young generations, those cherished by youths of the 1990s are not dramatically diff erent from those cher-ished by their counterparts from the 1980s. Both chose proven values like stability, fam-ily happiness, friendship, satisfactory job, and revealed introvert attitudes. Here, Krystyna Szafraniec cites a book by Hanna
Świda-Ziemba on existential values held by youths of the 1990s. Th is reference is appro-priate only in relation to the individualist approach. As for values meant as goals to be attained, it would be more accurate to cite the results of research conducted in accord-ance with the notion by Stefan Nowak, not by Świda-Ziemba, who had never re-searched values treated in this particular way. In the cited book, Świda-Ziemba prac-tically does not refer to the results of the research on the values preferred. She does, however, discuss how to understand them in a previous paper. Other remarks are of an editorial nature and might suggest hurried proofreading. For example, the content of analyses on page 58 does not match the fi g-ure that they are being referred to; the data presented on page 251 is missing an expla-nation; and on four diff erent occasions the bibliography duplicates the same title (with some of the entries only more precise).
Some remarks on the chapter by Michał Boni – “Rekomendacje dla polityk społecznych” [Recommendations for social policies]. Expressions like: “One cannot speak about youths without speaking about the future. And, one cannot speak about the future without speaking about youths” sound similar to “Youth – future of the na-tion”. Perhaps without statements like that there would be no communication and public debate. Societies consist of individu-als and groups in diff erent age, including youth, and I understand that in a report de-voted to young people they must occupy a “privileged” place, yet the document stresses the need to fi nd solutions adopting
a perspective that is intergenerational in character. According to the fi rst suggestion, it is necessary to make generational dimen-sion crucial in developmental strategies of the world, Europe and Poland in order to enable young people to enter life more eas-ily and prepare ground for active senility and “silver economy”. Another suggestion points to the young generation as the one that can lead the country into the future and make a civilization leap on the basis of new competitive advantages. I understand that the following excerpt of the second recom-mendation: “In solving various problems and accepting challenges we should look to youths” implies – if we were to refer it to the fi rst suggestion – that if we do not manage to ensure the best interest of both the old and young generation, the latter should go fi rst. (Taking into consideration the unem-ployment rate among youths, it is pretty obvious that this is not the case at the mo-ment).
Th e fi nal chapter of the report is dedi-cated in large parts to the issue of education, starting with preschools, which are believed to off er equal educational opportunities un-like any other institution. We read: “Th e low level of participation in education among 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds does not allow for quick equating of differences in cultural capital that result from one’s family of ori-gin. Th ere are still educational discrepancies between the city and the village2,
particu-2 Th ose diff erences also concern subjecting
children aged 3-6 to preschool care and educa-tion. In 2007/2008 75% of city and 39% of village children attended preschools (Oświata
i wychow-larly between diff erent types of schools” (p. 392). Has Michał Boni really come to be-lieve that mass preschool and early school education can eliminate the diff erences in cultural capital present in children’s social environment? Results of the research con-ducted by PISA specify social composition of students of a given school as the major diff erentiating factor. Although in the year 2000 Ireneusz Białecki and Jacek Haman wrote: “Putting things simply, when consid-ering student’s characteristics as well as those of a given school, one’s social origin and home environment are most closely re-lated to school achievements. What is more interesting (though other studies seem to confi rm it), the most important school fea-ture turned out to be its students’ social ori-gin. To put it simply (and quite exaggerat-edly), if – when changing school features – one wants to improve a given student’s test result, it will be most advisable to change his or her social origin or transferring the stu-dent to a school with stustu-dents of better so-cial origin. Similarly, one could oversimplify that if one were to transfer students along with their social background from a good school to a bad school, the bad school would become good even though all of its characteristics remained the same. Th ose two factors: student’s social origin and other students’ social origin have the biggest in-fl uence on both student’s achievements and the collective achievement level of the
anie w roku szkolnym 2007/2008 [Didactics and Education in the 2007/2008 School Term], Cen-tral Statistical Offi ce, GUS, Warszawa, p. 34).
school’s students”3. I believe that nothing has changed in this matter since then. Early school education is one of the constituents of educational environment of upper social classes – with parents also more active pro-fessionally when their children are in pre-school age – more oft en than that of lower social classes. Nevertheless, it is only one of the factors that are seemingly underesti-mated in political debate. I might be wrong, but neither the analyses of PISA results nor external fi nal test results of primary and junior high school students take into con-sideration whether they attended preschool. Th at is why it is diffi cult to estimate its ac-tual impact on competences acquired dur-ing later stages of education. Nowadays, no one will question preschool’s part in a child’s development, yet in the era of in home tu-toring4, which requires from parents a con-siderable and systematic eff ort, it is possible to imagine the very intensive development of a home-schooled child in preschool age – provided that his or her home off ers con-siderable social and cultural capital, with one of the parents or grandparents busily
3 I. Białecki, J. Haman, Programme for
Inter-national Student Assessment OECD/PISA. Polish Results – Report from Research, www.pisa.oecd. org.pl, p. 18
4 In 2011/2012 school term about 1200
pri-mary and junior high school students received in home tutoring (according to the news item pro-vided by TVN 24 on April 12 or 13, 2012, in the evening hours); in his article in “Polityka” from 28 November 2008, entitled Educated Diff erently, Krzysztof Burnetko writes that clerks from Kra-kow do not know the number of children taught at homes, therefore I am unable to assess the va-lidity of the news item.
engaged in the child’s development-orient-ed activity.
Another remark concerns higher educa-tion. Michał Boni writes about the “educa-tional boom self-created by youths” in the early period of the transformation. The creation of this boom by students by them-selves would have been impossible. Aft er 1989, some sociologists and publicists start-ed to spread beliefs about a supposstart-ed lag between Poland and western countries as far as the structure of education was con-cerned (7% university graduates in Poland, 20% in the west). Advantages of having a university diploma, supposed to improve one’s position on the labor market, were stressed. Since the system inherited aft er the People’s Republic of Poland off ered higher education only to a small number of youths (10% each year at most), for-profi t public universities, followed by private universities, appeared and began providing the youth with the opportunity to receive an educa-tion and the teaching staff with decent earn-ings from working double- or triple-shift s. Th us, young people were not the only ones responsible for the educational boom.
Michał Boni considers the change in the structure of education and a fi ve-fold in-crease in the number of students over the period of 20 years as the key achievements of the young generation. According to the report, considerable social problems in-clude the quality of higher education, wrong choices (considering the needs of the labor market) made by youths when choosing academic specialties, and the high unem-ployment rate among university graduates.
Michał Boni writes about actions already undertaken by the government that are in-tended to change these unfavorable phe-nomena (p. 392). He points to the continued existence of high social aspirations that are believed to be fulfi lled by university educa-tion, but also mentions the barriers that preventing people with low capital and ma-terial background whose chances were not evened at earlier stages of educational sys-tem from realizing these aspirations. “At the same time,” writes Michał Boni, “it off ers the possibility of sensible state intervention. It is obvious that the current development re-quires selective intervention aimed at par-ticular areas and, most of all, at eff ective-ness, appropriate addressing, and a high rate of investment return – everything from the perspective of public good” (p. 392). Since the cited idea sounds quite general, it is worth wondering what specifi c concepts lie behind it? On the one hand, Michał Boni writes that it is necessary to create such con-ditions so that “every young man had access to any educational path he or she wishes to follow, which, in turn, requires the policy of equal chances be achieved by off ering all-around education to every child aged 3+ and personalized teaching processes in or-der to stimulate individual development of highly talented ones or those making up deficits” (recommendation number 3, p. 393). On the other hand, he stresses the need to improve and modernize vocational education and make it possible to acquire professional skills during studies for a Bach-elor of Education degree. It can be inter-preted as keeping higher education
aspira-tions “warm” while highlighting the attrac-tive nature of vocational education. In 2011, aft er the Czech government concluded that the percentage of youths with university di-plomas was too high (though it was lower than in Poland), it started to urge its citizens not to study5. Th e Polish government, via minister Boni, seems to say, “Make reason-able decisions”. But, what is this rational de-cision? Is it possible to determine how many workplaces require higher education quali-fi cations? Ten percent is surely too little. What about twenty? Defi nitely, not fi ft y, yet this is the approximate number of youths that enter universities each year. About 40% of them do not pay for education them-selves, while the remaining 60% pay school-fees, choosing specializations that are easily accessible but off er no job aft erwards. (In this situation, Polish youths oft en opt for emigration and work in occupations lower than they are qualifi ed for). Since the re-cruitment policies, in the fi rst place, take
5 The „Gazeta Wyborcza” daily paper, 29
March 2011, Czechs, do not study! Lubosz Palata wrote that Josefa Dobesza, the education minis-ter, had said that the attempt to increase the num-ber of students in order to catch up with the EU’s average rate (60% for OECD countries as com-pared to 30% for the Czech Republic) made no sense and announced 10% cuts in funding higher education. He argued that at that time it was nec-essary to deal with the consequences of too big number of colleges and their graduates holding Bachelor’s and MA’s degrees. Some experts agreed with that claim, yet point out to the fact that higher education funding, that is – 1,2% of GNP, is one of the smallest in the EU. At the same time, the number of people holding a university di-ploma among 25-30 year-olds amounts to 18%, while in Poland and Hungary it is 30% and 25% respectively.
into account results of the matura exam, those who scored better get into the univer-sities of their choice, mostly public ones. Th e rest are left with public vocational col-leges or for-profi t universities. In the system of higher education that has developed in Poland over the last 20 years, the number of places at universities available at present ex-ceeds the number of high school graduates. Th e problem with sustaining a university will partly solve itself due to the baby bust as some universities will lack students. What would happen to the higher education sys-tem if full tuition fees were also introduced at public colleges? Probably, the number of students would decrease with only the most talented or highly motivated ones remain-ing (Th ose revealing extraordinary talents, but lacking funds would need to be off ered financial aid). Then, those less capable might choose vocational education and would avoid disappointment aft er receiving their diplomas. Jan Szczepański once wrote that there is nothing more demoralizing than aspirations that are too high. Tuition fees in case of professions where it is pos-sible to go abroad and fi nd a job matching one’s qualifi cations (doctors, nurses, com-puter scientists) would solve the problem of expenses incurred on Polish society (public good) in case of job-related profi ts obtained by both the individuals – educated in Po-land – and societies that did not participate in the costs of education. I realize the diffi -culty of convincing Polish society to accept this idea. In the so-called Environmental Strategy, prepared by the Polish Rectors Foundation and outlined before passing the
amended bill on higher education in 2011, it was recommended to introduce general payments for full-time studies at public uni-versities amounting to one fourth of the costs. However, before embarking on the project, Prime Minister Donald Tusk an-nounced that there would be no consent for general tuition fees6.
The recommendations 8-12 refer to changes intended to open the labor market for young people by hiring graduates in self-governments so that they could realize task-related projects. It is also suggested that it should be obligatory for employers to off er former interns “more stable” contracts. Tel-ecommuting is a recommended form of employment with support for young micro-entrepreneurs, i.e. those who have an idea for their own small business. Still, the 12th recommendation is the one that would make many people happy: “It is crucial to create conditions that would enable keeping the costs of work at similar level while guar-anteeing social insurance to those in non-typical employment”. Has the government already undertaken actions conducive to such conditions? What is the employers’ opinion on the subject or those who have no choice but to take up self-employment yet obtain salary that is barely enough to support them? And what about the view of government economists?
6 16 April 2008 – the initial presentation of
assumptions of the bill in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister; (increase in the expenses from 1,2% to 2% of GNP in 2013 and no consent for general tuition fees for studies (“Forum Aka-demickie” [Academic Forum] 2008, No. 5, p. 4).
Recommendations 19-20 raise the ques-tion of changes in the system of family ben-efits, which are aimed at the permanent elimination of poverty, while mentioning an increase in support for multi-child families and urging them to have more kids (tax re-liefs for families with more than three chil-dren). A conscious decision to have more children, backed up with the ability to fulfi ll their needs does not raise my concerns. More oft en, however, multi-child families are the result of ever-present poverty and not using contraceptives. Is this the model that we are supposed to consolidate and promote? Is the support for multi-child families a necessity that no government and society can avoid? Martyna Bunda7, invok-ing studies by demographists, social psy-chologists and sociologists ponders the de-mographical prognoses that predict a de-crease in the number of Poles and, eventu-ally, asks the following question: “If we are supposed to dwindle in numbers anyway, perhaps it is time to stop considering it a disaster? Th is situation – from a logical point of view – may have its pros and cons, with the former including an increase in the quality and comfort of life, better careers, a more careful upbringing and education of younger generations, better care for the el-derly, as well as smaller burden on natural environment, resources, and infrastructure. Perhaps the term “family policy” – consider-ing what the family of the future is sup-posed to look like – should be understood
7 M. Bunda, Demonic Demography,
„Polity-ka” 29.02.2012, No. 9, pp. 20–24.
diff erently than being mere encouragement to procreate. People will sooner require as-sistance not in caring for a single child but for a pyramid of living ancestors. Instead of urging people to multiply (all politicians seem unanimous that we need pro-natalist policy), which in the current demographical context this will bring little result, it may be the right time to help people fi nd them-selves in this new reality; less populated, yet more demanding”.
Th e recommendations concerning stim-ulating creativity, participating in culture, experiencing of science resources in an at-tractive manner, and building social capital through proper human relations (recom-mendations 24-30) should be applauded. While laying legal and material foundations of these aims, it will probably be necessary to tackle many issues, the most important one, however, will be to determine and se-cure fi nancing sources.
One of the last recommendations, num-ber 31, very acutely worded and stressing the necessity to create mechanisms of “par-ticipation and consultation in preparing public decisions as in participatory democ-racy […] with the use of modern Commu-nication Technologies (the Internet)”, has already been tested through the ACTA case, that is – an agreement to prevent counter-feiting goods and copyright infringement. Michał Boni, during a press conference on 23 January 2012 (the “Gazeta Wyborcza” daily paper), announced the Polish govern-ment’s signing of the treaty, though he did admit that until that time not enough “con-sultative eff ort” had been put into the issue.
It was not until the wave of youth protests that swept both the Internet and “real” world – outside the Presidential Palace in Warsaw – that the government backed down from its stance. At the beginning of February 2012, when addressing the ACTA issue, Michał Boni spoke of a great lesson of humility for administration workers. Edwin Bendyk8 considered the matter nothing short of a virtual civil war that stemmed from the confl ict between the “old,” outdat-ed world, representoutdat-ed by politicians and state administration, and the “new” world that is created by the Internet users. What makes these worlds diff erent is how they ap-proach and access information. To control and regulate information is the way of the “old” world, while the “new” world recog-nizes the right to access information with-out limitations. Internet users fi rst reacted in 2009, when the government was working on the Unlawful Internet Gambling En-forcement Act and wanted to create the Registry of Banned Websites and Services. In response to their reaction, Michał Boni, at that time holding a position as one of the Prime Minister’s strategic advisors, stated, “Until now we have thought that it is we who are building the information society, but it has come to life on its own without asking for authorities’ permission”. For some time the government, on a few occasions represented by Donald Tusk, but more oft en by Michał Boni, was engaged in a regular
8 E. Bendyk, Virtual Civil War, „Polityka”
15.02.2012, No. 7, pp. 20–22.
dialogue with Internet users about web-re-lated issues. However, the talks came to an end halfway through 2011. Edwin Bendyk put it in this way, “Th e fragile bond that had connected those two worlds was seriously fractured. The groups and organizations participating in the talks started to wonder to what extent the grandiose declarations about the digital modernizing impetus based on opening public information re-sources and forming mechanisms of the Open Government (in which citizens take part in works on new regulations and legal acts) are just an expression of wishful think-ing by Michał Boni – in the best-case sce-nario. Th e worse case scenario assumes that it is all just the government’s PR strategy. Th e ACTA issue has completely broken this fractured bond and Donald Tusk is right when he talks of the lack-of-trust crisis. It was the fi rst time the rebels stood up from their computers and showed they were something more than mere avatars – the magnitude of anger took everyone by sur-prise. If, however, the Prime Minister had read the “Youth Report 2011”, which Michał Boni had prepared the year before, he would have understood that if it had not been for ACTA, another similar “mistake” would have sparked the outburst. Wacław Iszkows-ki, the president of the Polish Chamber of Information Technology and Telecommu-nications, had openly anticipated this situa-tion. He had warned that it was the Internet that would spark a social protest in Poland. Politicians treated these words as an expres-sion of his trade-related hyperbole while those from the Civil Platform considered
the lack of outrage on the from the youth or the digital world as an expression of their natural love towards the all so modern Civ-il Platform”9.
So, to whom are the recommendations for social policies addressed, considering the actual actions undertaken by the gov-ernment? Perhaps they form a long-term plan, diffi cult to implement on the spot?
Th e chapter by Michał Boni is concluded with his refl ections on concerns whether the contemporary generation of youths will be-come “the lost generation”. Michał Boni writes, “The young generation of Poles should not be the lost one. It has innovative and creative potential, it has advantages, and it represents hope and opportunity in years to come. Th ere are three highly signifi cant and dire perils” (p. 403). Th e fi rst one is un-certainty that accompanies entering adult-hood. Next, there is a large scale of inequal-ity and incoherence, which will most prob-ably hinder balanced activeness of the entire generation. Th e third peril results from bar-riers of partaking in public life due to low social capital, lack of trust towards the state, and unclear roles available to citizens in the process of democratic ruling, in particular youths that are being blocked by those older than them. Th erefore, the fi nal recommen-dation mentions creating a “political climate appropriate for a debate on solidarity and generational change”, which would com-mand respect towards diff erent worldviews, ideologies, and political beliefs, and would
9 Ibidem, p. 22.
be held “in search of public good and trans-ferring the leadership” (M. Boni, p. 404).
So, what is the “Youth Report 2011” like? Some, by publishing it at that very time, per-ceived it as an opportunity to reach young voters and convince them to support the ruling party in the upcoming 2011 elec-tions. Others commented that by publishing the report before the elections Michał Boni would do the Prime Minister a disservice, because it contained plenty of documented knowledge about the unfavorable position of contemporary Polish youths – unem-ployment, no chance to obtain living places of their own (expensive loans, high rent that is accompanied by low or no salary at all), etc. Th e youth vote helped Palikot’s move-ment to gain seats in parliamove-ment, yet the Civil Platform won the elections and there was no need to wonder whether and to what extent the report by Michał Boni contrib-uted to electoral decisions made by young people. Would such an estimation even be viable?
So, the problem remains: to what extent are the contemporary states and their insti-tutions responsible for disadvantageous phenomena and for an equally unfavorable situation of a portion of citizens, including youths? And, to what extent does the re-sponsibility lay with modern societies, along with their economic, educational, and religious institutions? Or, perhaps it is indi-viduals and their closest environment, namely their families, which should take the blame? Perhaps the state bit off more than it could chew and, at present, is unable to complete all tasks in a way that would
sat-isfy all of its citizens. At the same time, by collecting taxes and mandatory insurance premiums, it gathers resources, consequent-ly limiting its citizens’ decision-making op-tions with regards to how they fulfi ll their needs. Perhaps, worrying about one’s source of income or children’s future source of in-come, though diffi cult in the times of the risk society, should pose a problem for an individual and his or her family rather than for a career counselor or public institutions supposed to hire them. Looking for a way to popularize this kind of thinking (for in many families it is the case) should be the subject of intergenerational debate before youths change and introduce their own rules of the game. Maybe, when thinking about upbringing and education, in the fi rst place we should induce self-reliant attitudes rather than those where one counts on sup-porting relatives or institutions.
Ewa Narkiewicz-Niedbalec
University of Zielona Góra, Poland
Anna Izabela Brzezińska, Tomasz Czub, Anna Nowotnik, Małgorzata Rękosiewicz (rev.): Piotr Arak, Michał Boni, Krystyna Szafraniec, Youth Report 2011
Supporting Polish Youth into Adulthood. Discussion on the Margins of the Youth of 2011 report
1. Introduction
In 2011, the Offi ce of the Prime Minister issued Th e Youth of 2011 Report1. Th e Youth of 2011 Report was the result of the debate over the current generation of young people at the threshold of adulthood. Young people entering adolescence and adulthood, as well as young adults, were the focus of the re-searchers’ interests. Th e aim of the Report was to fi nd answers to the question about: what the young people are like; what are their values, preferences, and goals in life; and how they diff er, if at all, from previous generations of young people (especially those from the „solidarity” generation) in preparing for an independent adult life.
Heated discussion and analysis of the condition of the young generation is a result of the growing awareness that aft er the po-litical transition in Poland, we are faced by new and difficult challenges in building a modern society. In this context, young people with their natural energy potential, innovativeness, openness, and criticism are perceived by the authors of the Report as
1 K. Szafraniec, Raport Młodzi 2011,
