Cracovia - Krakow, 8: 2003, 81-120
J o l a n t a K O S Z T E Y N *
ACTIO IMMANENS - A F U N D A M E N T A L C O N C E P T
OF BIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION
Actio immanens as m a n y other terms, coined b y the A r i s t o t e l i a n -T h o m i s t p h i l o s o p h i c a l (A--T) t r a d i t i o n - is a biological concept par excellence. It was f o r m e d as a m e n t a l result of biological observation, on the strength of studies on l i v i n g beings a n d so, refers to t h e m f i r s t a n d foremost.
D u r i n g the last century, the t e r m actio immanens g r a d u a l l y disappeared f r o m philosophical encyclopedias^ a n d h a s t o t a l l y v a n i s h e d f r o m the biological a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l language used to describe the d y n a m i s m of l i f e . Moreover, i f this t e r m does appear at a l l , i t s m e a n i n g is r a t h e r vague.
However, actio immanens belongs to the group of k e y concepts, w i t h o u t w h i c h i t w o u l d seem not possible to properly describe, n o r to properly u n d e r s t a n d biological phenomena.
I n textbooks, encyclopedias a n d dictionaries, covering concepts of A r i s t o t e l i a n - T h o m i s t philosophy, the t e r m „actio immanens" is defined as a n activity, action coming f r o m a given subject a n d w h i c h r e m a i n s i n i t , w i t h o u t a n y influence f r o m the outside (cf P o d s i a d 2000/778,
* Institute of Oceanology, Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Powstahcow Warszawy 55, PL 81-712 Sopot, Poland. E-mail: sagitta@iopan.gda.pl
^ The terms actio immanens and actio transiens are missing in: Edwards P. (1967) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, New York; Encyclopedia Britannica (1962) William Benton, Publisher, Chicago; Lexicon Universal Encyclopedia (1991) Lexicon Publications, Inc., New York; The World Book Encyclopedia (1991) World Book, Inc., Chicago.
T h a m i r y 1910) T h u s , both the „ s o u r c e " or „ p r i n c i p l e " (principium) of action, a n d the Jerminus'\ m e a n i n g the result of the s a i d action, are to be f o u n d i n the subject (cf A b b a g n a n o 1977/466, G u t h r i e 1942/4, K r ^ i e c
1995/31, S i w e k 1965/45, W u e l l n e r 1966/7).
I m m a n e n t a c t i v i t y (actio immanens), or self-activity, is opposed to t r a n s i t i v e a c t i v i t y (actio transiens), whose „terminus'^ (result) is to be f o u n d outside of the operating subject. I n other words - as expressed, amongst others, by P o d s i a d , -„the object [of a n activity] is found outside the active subject itself. If, to the contrary, „the object [of a n activity] is found within the subject, we have to do with actio immanens'' (cf P o d s i a d 2000/202-203; 778, cf also K r ^ i e c 1996/22, W u e l l n e r 1966/7, B a l d w i n 1901/521, G u t h r i e 1942/4).
F r o m these statements, i t w o u l d seem t h a t the f u n d a m e n t a l c r i t e r i a for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between a, immanens a n d a. transiens are: the s p a t i a l setting of the „ s o u r c e " of action of a subject under study, as w e l l as the s p a t i a l setting of the „terminus'' of the action of the subject. T a k i n g these two s p a t i a l c r i t e r i a into account, we obtain the result, represented i n t a b u l a r f o r m as follows: T a b l e 1.
Location of the
„source" of action
Location of the
„fermmus" of action
Type of actio1 inside of the subject inside of the subject actio immanens
2 inside of the subject outside of the subject actio transiens
D i s r e g a r d i n g for a moment the m a t t e r of terminology, i t s h o u l d be stressed t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two types of action is of f u n d a m e n t a l importance, especially w h e n the t e r m „ s u b j e c t " refers to a l i v i n g being. O b s e r v i n g l i v i n g organisms, we notice t h a t t h e i r actions are autonomic, m e a n i n g t h a t t h e i r c o m i n g into existence results f r o m t h e i r i n n e r d y n a m i s m . F u r t h e r m o r e , there is no doubt t h a t c e r t a i n actions of l i v i n g entities affect objects w h i c h are present i n t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t - e.g. w h e n a b i r d gathers branches a n d blades of grass, a n d t h e n b u i l d s a nest w i t h t h e m , or w h e n a person uses rushes to weave a basket for shopping. I n both cases, the result (terminus) is f o u n d outside the subject. Some actions, however, do not come „out o f the subject - e.g. w h e n a b i r d b u i l d s u p its body's cells f r o m the food i t assimilates, or w h e n a h u m a n forms the concept of a p l a n t i n h i s m i n d .
A t t h i s point, i t is w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g t h a t the examples most f r e q u e n t l y g i v e n to i l l u s t r a t e the immanent activities, are i n t e l l e c t u a l activities — e.g. a n a l y s i s of concepts, the attempts to solve theoretical problems, etc. O n the other h a n d , the activities of a n o r g a n i s m on the m o l e c u l a r l e v e l are not considered „ f u l l y i m m a n e n t " , despite the fact t h a t t h e i r terminus obviously does not go outside of the subject. A c c o r d i n g to K r ^ i e c Jhe living organism is a great laboratory, where
chemical processes take place as
weir
a n d these, supposedly, are not i m m a n e n t activities ( K r ^ i e c 1996/23).T h e issue of i m m a n e n t a n d t r a n s i t i v e activities is f u r t h e r c o m p l i -cated, since m a n y users of the A - T conceptual f r a m e w o r k e x p a n d the m e a n i n g of the w o r d „ s u b j e c t " . Consequently, almost a n y object u n d e r study (electromagnetic r a d i a t i o n , the M o o n or a combustion engine a n d so on) m a y be r e g a r d e d as a „ s u b j e c t " . T h e t e r m „ a c t i o n " , therefore, no longer refers solely to the actions of l i v i n g organisms^. H e n c e , i t is i m p o r t a n t to t a k e i n t o consideration the fact t h a t the „ s u b j e c t ' s action" can be either autonomic or heteronomic. I f we accept t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , not two, but four s i t u a t i o n s appear i n our table (Table 2). A s m a n y as three of t h e m are c o m m o n l y l a b e l e d as actio transiens.
^ In A-T, „actio" (action) is a manifestation of a substance's existence. In any given action, the substance is the causing agent of the change. Yet, the term „manifestation" can mean two different things: (1) A variable, accidental characteristic of the substance's existence, which does not stem from the substance's dynamism. E.g. a lizard can have a higher or lower body temperature, depending on whether it was lying in the sun, or in the shade. The lizard's body temperature is its accidental characteristic, though, the very nature of the lizard determines the extent (physical limits) of that characteristic. (2) In any living substance we also observe some variable characteristics which are not accidental but essential. The substance produces them by its own active potential. These characteristics are called properties (attributes) of the substance's existence. The lizard's locomotion or feeding habits, are examples of its properties or attributes (cf entries Accident and Attribute in Lenartowicz, Koszteyn 2000b/154-155; 156-157).
From Podsiad's (2000/202-203) definition of actio transiens, and Kr^iec's description of the concept of „action" it would seem that it is clearly a question of (causal) actions and of properties (attributes) of living entities: „The substance I ...I cannot directly act alone by itself, it acts only owing to its properties, called faculties. I ...I the human being acts owing to his hands" (Kr^iec 1995/387).
The heating of the Earth's surface by the Sun or the attraction of iron particles by a magnet, are not actio in the strict, A-T meaning of the term. Neither the Sun, nor a magnet are substantial beings. They are, at most, a blend of different mineral substances. Moreover, solar energy or the force of magnetic fields cannot be identified as „causal actions". As Ziemianski correctly notices (1995/62-63), such types of„force I ...I do not overlap with causal actions /.../we cannot call /.../ kinetic energy an action /.../ kinetic energy is a certain accidental state" of a physical object, which lasts as long as it does not come into contact with another object.
T a b l e 2.
Location of the
„source" of the
subject's action
Location of the
„terminus^* of thesubject's action
Type of action
1 inside inside actio immanens
2 inside outside actio transiens
3 outside outside actio transiens
4 outside inside actio transiens
T h e examples g i v e n most often for the t h i r d s i t u a t i o n are a l l occurrences r e l a t e d to interactions of n o n - l i v i n g p h y s i c a l bodies on each other ( m e a n i n g m u t u a l influences) - atoms, chemical compounds, the mass of a i r , a s t r o n o m i c a l objects, etc.^ (It seems t h a t nobody has pondered the f o u r t h s i t u a t i o n , but i t is reasonable to assume t h a t authors w h o contemplated the issue of i m m a n e n t a n d t r a n s i t i v e a c t i v i -ties, w o u l d consider i t to be actio transiens).
A c c o r d i n g l y , we m i g h t expect t h a t the r i n s i n g of gold nuggets by a river's c u r r e n t is the same type of action as the r i n s i n g of gold nuggets by a h u m a n being. I f we a d d to this the w i d e s p r e a d belief i n the supposedly „ p u r e l y c h e m i c a l " d y n a m i s m of a n o r g a n i s m on the m o l e c u l a r level, t h e n the concept of immanent activity „ s h r i n k s " considerably. T h e d i s t i n c t i o n between i m m a n e n t a n d t r a n s i t i v e a c t i v i t y becomes i n s i g n i f i c a n t .
The concept of actio immanens has thus become r a t h e r vague a n d has lost its o r i g i n a l m e a n i n g , w h i c h St. T h o m a s expressed i n h i s terse assertion: Actio immanens est tantum viventium (Thomas A q u i n a s De potentia, q. 10, a 1).
T h e origins of descriptive terminology i n science
F o r m a n y , or perhaps, most key concepts, f o r m e d w i t h i n the f r a -m e w o r k of A r i s t o t e l i a n - T h o -m i s t philosophy, the p r i -m a r y a n d p r i n c i p a l model used was t h a t of h u m a n d y n a m i s m , as w e l l as t h a t of other l i v i n g entities^. T h e i n t e g r a t i o n (both d y n a m i c a n d structural) of a l i v i n g
^ „The activities of physical science are almost entirely of the transeunt sort: one body, molecule, atom, or system acts upon some other" (Baldwin 1910/521).
being imposed i t s e l f w i t h such obviousness, t h a t there seemed to be no other more „ e n t i c i n g " a n d suitable n a t u r a l object for ontological contemplation. T h e t e r m i n o l o g i c a l a n d conceptual structure i n A - T was shaped p r e d o m i n a n t l y for the needs of proper cognition of l i v i n g forms.
T h u s , we m a y r i s k asserting that the terminological a n d conceptual apparatus of A - T is „biocentric". T h i s is not a c r i t i c i s m , but a stated fact. T h e person, who l a y the foundations for this apparatus - A r i s t o t l e - was, above a l l , a biologist. H e was a n e m p i r i c i s t as w e l l as a theorist, hence, a philosopher. St. Thomas A q u i n a s , together w i t h his teacher a n d f r i e n d , St. A l b e r t the Great, were w e l l aware of this. F o r this reason, St. T h o m a s v e r i f i e d , d e f i n e d more precisely a n d enriched Aristotle's conceptual system, as the perfect tool for the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of living beings - people, angels a n d L i v i n g G o d . T h a n k s to these people, biologists a n d philosophers gained a w o n d e r f u l , i n t e l l e c t u a l i n s t r u m e n t , t h a t enables t h e m to describe a n d u n d e r s t a n d the dynamics of l i v i n g entities.
P h y s i c i s t s , chemists, cosmologists a n d philosophers of i n a n i m a t e n a t u r e d i d not have such luck. A r i s t o t l e d i d not create a distinct -„ p a r a l l e F - terminological a n d conceptual system adapted to specify the properties of the m i n e r a l world^. N e i t h e r m e d i e v a l nor more contempor-a r y philosophers crecontempor-ated such contempor-a system. W i t h time, concepts t contempor-a i l o r e d to describe l i v i n g beings were s i m p l y a p p l i e d - per analogiam - to i n a n i m a t e entities. T h i s created a r e a l danger of f a l l i n g into a n i m i s m , should somebody forget about the l i m i t s of analogy, i.e. endowing i n a n i m a t e objects w i t h the properties of a l i v i n g being^ (cf K o s z t e y n , L e n a r t o w i c z 1999).
T h e opinion t h a t the A r i s t o t e l i a n conceptual system does not apply to objects a n d phenomena of the m i n e r a l w o r l d is, therefore, quite
man's intellectual activity: „Aristotle's opinion on the structure of beings is rooted in the analogy with mental cognitive results, including the effects of intentional tendencies'* (Dorda 2001/174). Cf Zycinski 1987/79.
^ The Aristotelian interpretation of a falling stone gives evidence to this. Stagiryte had no idea about the gravitational field, or the universal law of mass interaction. He tried to explain this phenomenon with the help of concepts, which referred to the world of living entities. Thus, he explained the movement of a falling stone in terms of an „inner tendency" - „a passion to find itself in a natural place, meaning, on the ground" (cf Ziemianski 1995/80; bold type - JK).
^ R. Gerard, for example, in De VUnivers de champ ä VUnivers de mouvement (1966), meditating upon the „essence" of the world, comes to the conclusion that it is just a movement - „The world should be understood only through the aspect of movement. Unity is the desire of another object or even the desire in general - the desire to double oneself (quoted from Ziemianski 1995/86-87; bold type JK).
j u s t i f i e d . H o w e ver , i t is not f a i r to depreciate A - T s i m p l y because i t causes difficulties i n describing the i n a n i m a t e world^. It w o u l d r a t h e r be more appropriate to complete i t , i n such a w a y t h a t i t w o u l d embrace the n a t u r e a n d peculiarities of m i n e r a l phenomena.
U n d o u b t e d l y , the creation of t h i s type of concepts is the a i m of p h y s i c a l a n d ch em i cal research. It is closely t i e d i n w i t h the progress of p h y s i c a l sciences. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the „basic" descriptive language i n these sciences has r e m a i n e d dependent on the above-mentioned „illegi-t i m a „illegi-t e " biological sources. A „illegi-t „illegi-times, „illegi-the supposedly p h y s i c a l „illegi-terms, used to describe the w o r l d of i n a n i m a t e objects, have de facto no straightfor-w a r d m e a n i n g , but j u s t a vague „ a n a l o g o u s " connotation. W h e t h e r or not the audience w i l l perceive a n d properly i n t e r p r e t t h i s analogy, l a r g e l y depends on its deeper awareness of the speaker's p e c u l i a r language. I f we were to acknowledge t h a t the breaking of a b r a n c h b y the wind or the rinsing of a gold nugget by a river's c u r r e n t are activities ( L a t i n actio) i n the same sense, as the breaking of a b r a n c h or the rinsing of a gold nugget by a human being, i t w o u l d l e a d to a r e a l „ i n t e l l e c t u a l catastrophe." L u c k i l y , i n our everyday experience, such m i s t a k e s do not generally take place^.
Nonetheless, i n areas inaccessible to prescientific, common-sense cognition, as w e l l as i n „ g r a y " zones of ignorance, most people have to accept u n c r i t i c a l l y the descriptive language of specialists, who r a r e l y
Jözef Zycinski, among others, gives this attention by writing: „while, many authors categorically postulate the necessity of dismissing Aristotle's rudimentary metaphysical theses, their opponents consider [this] /... / only a case of an easy cognitive surrender. I... I In my opinion, these difficulties do not justify the total dismissal of suhstantialism, as the contemporary state of theoretic physics' evolution appears to be considerably closer to metaphysical texts I ...I than Hume's or MilVs antisubstantialism. I ...I I personally believe that I ...I the possibility, in which the explanatory value of the substantialist doctrine is acknowledged, should be allowed for I ...I in reference to certain types of existence, e.g. entities appearing in animate nature, which was the field best known to Aristotle. The exploitation of this doctrine on all real existences is just the consequence of inductive generalization. Its legitimacy I ...I is yet to be proved" (Zycinski 1987/76, 79).
^ For this reason, we may hope that nobody will take Feynman's words literally, when (in his popular lectures in physics) he states: „Ifa piece of iron or a grain of salt, composed of tightly packed atoms, has so many interesting properties, if water, which is also solely composed of such molecules, identical in rivers and oceans on the whole globe, can create waves and foam, murmur and spill in puzzling patterns, if the whole life of running water is only the collection of atoms, then how many other possibilities are there? [...] Is it possible that 'this something', which walks in front of you and speaks to you, is simply a conglomeration of an immense amount of atoms arranged in such a complicated way, that fails the imagination, when we want to be aware of all its possibilities?" (Feynman 1998/54-55; bold type - JK)
speak e x p l i c i t l y of this analogousness (even i f they are f u l l y a w a r e of it)^. F o r t h i s reason, amongst others, the differences between the dynamics of the i n a n i m a t e a n d a n i m a t e worlds is w i p e d out. T h i s constitutes a r e a l t h r e a t of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , not only to l a y m e n , but also to the scientists themselves^^. T h e u n w a r r a n t e d analogies favor the equally u n w a r r a n t e d reductionism i n biology - be i t ontological, methodological, or theoretical^^ (cf K o s z t e y n , L e n a r t o w i c z 1999, 2000).
^ As an example we can take the description of a reputedly „self-replicating" virus, which Manfred Eigen presents in his book Steps towards life (1992). What follows are some fragments of this text: „First of all, the virus needs materials, in which it can store and protect its genetic information. Secondly, it needs resources to introduce this information to the host's cell. Thirdly, it needs the mechanism to replicate its own information I ...I Finally, it must ensure the reproduction of its own information I ...I The virus is even capable of forcing this cell to be responsible for its own replication; its only input is a certain type of protein I ...I This enzyme becomes active only when a 'password' appears in the virus' DNA. When the enzyme sees this password, it begins to productively copy the DNA of the virus, ignoring the much bigger amount of DNA molecules of the host ceir (quoted from Dennett 1997/33; bold type - JK). A layman might take this text at its face value and believe that the virus is a living entity (and a thinking one at that). Meanwhile, the majority of contemporary biologists has serious doubts as to whether the virus should be considered as a living organism - because they are not able to multiply themselves. Viruses do not reproduce themselves, nor duplicate their DNA - it is the infected living organism, which is able to multiply viruses and replicate the DNA contained in them, thanks to the „molecular machinery" it possesses. The statements that viruses must ensure (their own reproduction), that they need something (e.g. materials or resources) suggest that in the case of viruses, we are dealing with a biological dynamism proper. To ascribe to the protein molecules (enzymes) the ability to see the „password" or ignore certain molecules, is a sheer absurdity. The reader who possesses a certain knowledge of molecular biology, can easily identify this type of false analogy, but would a layman detect this licentia poetical
A good illustration of the danger is a fragment from a book, written by contemporary American biochemists: „/.../ certain structures are evidently animate, for example dogs, flowers or the cells of yeasts, while others are undeniably inanimate, such as the molecules of salt, urea or aminoacids. Between these two extremes, lies a gray area of uncertainty, full of drops of coacervates, pieces of nucleic acids, viruses, or biochemists' artifacts, such as isolated mitochondria or cell nuclei. There is no clear boundary allowing for quickly determining whether something is animated or not /... / It is the same as asking where lies the boundary between a soft-boiled egg and a hard-boiled one" (Rose, Bullock 1993/287). Despite some attempts to move away from it, reductionism still dominates modern biology and significantly influences the shaping of the concept of life by naturalists and philosophers. In his introduction to „Studies in the philosophy of biology," Ayala (1974/VIII) notes that when speaking of reductionism in biology, it is necessary to distinguish three of its types: ontological, methodological and theoretical (which he labels epistemological).
The first refers to the conviction which Dobzhanksky expressed, on behalf of most biologists, with the following words: „Most biologists are reductionists to the extent that we see life as a highly complex, highly special and highly improbable pattern of physical and chemical processes" (Dobzhansky 1974/1). In this case, ontological reductionism is
Actio immanens vs. biological d y n a m i s m
Vivere idem est ac immanenter operari, The question over actio immanens is de facto, s t i l l a current^^ question about life - about biological dynamism. It is not possible to answer it, w i t h o u t e x a m i n i n g concrete living forms. A n oak, a cat, a frog, a b a c t e r i u m is a concrete living form^^.
L i v i n g f o r m
C l e a r l y , the expression concrete living form does not i m p l y s o m e t h i n g „ f r o z e n i n time", a segment isolated f r o m its environment, a n organic structure, w h i c h we see here and now.
W h e n we s t a n d on the b a n k of a pond i n springtime, we see frogs-p a w n . A few days later, we see tadfrogs-poles s w i m m i n g b r i s k l y , equifrogs-pfrogs-ped w i t h gills a n d a long t a i l . A f t e r a w h i l e , we notice frogs j u m p i n g a r o u n d i n the grass, w h i c h no longer have a t a i l nor gills, but w h i c h now have long h i n d legs a n d lungs. E v e n w h e n a f r o g reaches m a t u r i t y , its h e a r t w i l l not be the same as a few days earlier. It w i l l be converted into a „ n e w one", owing to the ceaseless metabolic turn-over (cf L e n a r t o w i c z 1986/45-48, L e n a r t o w i c z , K o s z t e y n 2002a, K o s z t e y n , L e n a r t o w i c z - i n p r i n t , K o s h l a n d 2002).
T h e frog's complex chemical structure changes m i n u t e by m i n u t e , but the f r o g keeps its i d e n t i t y as its developmental d y n a m i s m goes on. T h i s d y n a m i s m „ m a r k s out" the n o n - a r b i t r a r y boundaries of the a c t u a l a n d f u n d a m e n t a l object of biologist's research. The „ b o u n d a r i e s " of a l i v i n g
equivalent to materialistic monism.
On the grounds of methodology, reductionism stands for the belief that the explanations of animate dynamism can be found „hy investigating the underlying processes at lower levels of complexity, and ultimately at the level of atoms and molecules" (Ayala 1974A^II).
Finally, theoretical (epistemological) reductionism is based on the belief that theories, together with the terminological and conceptual structures operative in physics and chemistry, are sufficient to describe the dynamism of life. In consequence, as Ernst Mayr writes „some authors consider biology merely a 'province' of physics and reducible to physics" (Mayr 1996/97).
Daniel Koshland's article „T/ie seven pillars of life" (Science, March 22, 2002) bears witness to this. The author's inspiration to write this article was a symposium, dedicated to an attempt to define life.
As Weiner aptly put it notices „When we contemplate upon what, in fact, is life, a single, living organism comes foremost to mind: an animal, plant, bacterium" (Weiner 1999/29). To focus our attention on the issue of „object" in the debate about life, may seem trivial, even ridiculous. However, in the light of some biologists' questions (in discussing the definition of life), such as: „Is an enzyme alive? Is a virus alive?" (Koshland 2002), the issue is not as trivial as it would seem on the surface. Cf also Lenartowicz, Koszteyn
f o r m are not delineated by its structure, nor by its envelope of s k i n , nor by its c e l l u l a r w a l l s , but by its developmental cycle (cf L e n a r t o w i c z 1986/45-48, L e n a r t o w i c z , K o s z t e y n 2002a, K o s z t e y n , L e n a r t o w i c z - i n print).
However, this does not m e a n that the l i v i n g f o r m is solely a develop-mental dynamism. Nevertheless, this f u n d a m e n t a l biological d y n a m i s m determines the perception of the l i v i n g f o r m as a whole.
F u r t h e r m o r e , this also does not m e a n t h a t we can „ n a r r o w down" the study of the dynamics of life to a single specimen. T h e fact that organisms reproduce themselves, directs our attention to the d y n a m i c of transmitting life „down" the genealogical l i n e of i n d i v i d u a l s . The d y n a m i s m of a concrete specimen is essentially subordinated to the genealogical l i n e of the given l i v i n g f o r m (cf L e n a r t o w i c z , K o s z t e y n 2000a, 2002a).
These comments are crucial, because since the times of Descartes l i v i n g organisms were i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a n a t o m i c a l or c h e m i c a l structures a n d the biological d y n a m i s m was reduced to a p u r e l y m e c h a n i c a l movement of parts^'^. S u c h ontological r e d u c t i o n i s m s t i l l permeates f u n d a m e n t a l concepts of modern biology a n d philosophy of animate nature.
T h e facets of r e d u c t i o n i s m
R e d u c t i o n i s m i n biology has two „sides". Indeed, i t w o u l d be better to say t h a t the above-mentioned ontological reduction goes t h r o u g h two distinct stages.
I n the first stage, a l i v i n g being is reduced to a n extremely compli-cated m a c h i n e or a f u l l y automated workshop (in w h i c h , of course, there is no h u m a n supervision). I n other words this is:
[1] the reduction of a biological d y n a m i s m to a technical dynamism (e.g. a m a c h i n e , a contrivance).
I n the second stage, the reduction of the technical m e c h a n i c a l system into a p u r e l y physico-chemical system is c a r r i e d out. S t r i c t l y speaking, t h i s is:
[2] the reduction of the technical dynamism to a mineral dynamism (i.e. the d y n a m i s m w h i c h takes place i n i n a n i m a t e nature).
T h e consequences of these i n t e l l e c t u a l procedures are:
[a] the suggestion of a (supposedly) possible „ s m o o t h " a n d „ s p o n t a -neous" t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of a m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m to a technical d y n a m i s m
Mechanicism originated in the ancient Greece. It is quite manifest in the writings of Thales from Miletus, Democritus from Abdera, Leucippus or Epicurus.
(as i n H o y l e ' s - a n d a f t e r h i m , D a w k i n s ' behef t h a t a w i n d b l o w i n g over a p i l e of garbage is capable of b u i l d i n g a Boeing)^^,
[b] the complete e l i m i n a t i o n of the concept of a n i m a t e (biological)
d y n a m i s m since i t w o u l d (supposedly) be n o t h i n g more t h a n a c o m p l i -cated t e c h n i c a l process.
T h r e e types of d y n a m i s m .
T h e d y n a m i s m of l i v i n g beings is c o m m o n l y discussed w i t h i n the context of some „ g e n e r a l i z e d " abiotic (nonliving) d y n a m i s m . H o w e v e r , t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the s a i d two „ f a c e s " of r e d u c t i o n i s m , t h i s d i s c u s s i o n ought to be conducted w i t h i n a c o m p a r i s o n w i t h technical
dynamism as w e l l as w i t h mineral dynamism.
T h o u g h i t is t r u e t h a t biology (or the p h i l o s o p h y of a n i m a t e n a t u r e ) is i n t e r e s t e d first a n d foremost i n biological d y n a m i s m , i t cannot lose s i g h t of the r e m a i n i n g types of d y n a m i s m , t h i s b e i n g even more the case w h e n t h e y r e m a i n i n clear, t h o u g h specific, relations w i t h the d y n a m i s m of l i v i n g beings.
A s a n i n t r o d u c t o r y i l l u s t r a t i o n s h o w i n g the specifics of these r e l a t i o n s - w h i l e at the same t i m e r e v e a l i n g the s i n g u l a r i t y of b i o l o g i c a l d y n a m i s m - a n example t a k e n f r o m the l i f e of a b i r d c a l l e d a w h e a t e a r w i l l be used^^.
This kind of opinion is well rooted in the past. See for instance the following text: „Car Dieu a si merveilleusement etably ces Loix [de la Nature - JK], que'encore que nous supposions ... qu'il en compose un Cahos, le plus confus & le plus embroiiille que le Poetes puissent decrire: elles sont süffisantes pour faire que les parties de ce Cahos se demelent d'elles-mesmes, & se disposent en si bon ordre, que'elles auront la forme d'un Monde tres-parfait, & dans lequel on pourra voir non seulement de la Lumiere, mais aussi toutes les autres choses, tant generates que particulieres, qui paroissent dans ce vray Monde." (Descartes [1677-1909/34-35]; see also Hall 1969/261-263, Lenartowicz 1980/226; Miller 1998). We can also find a good illustration of a similar opinion in the writings of David Hume: „If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And what surprize must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may be imagined?" (Hume 1854/167).
Wheatears (Oenanthe) are small birds (of between 20-40 grams in weight) of the thrush family (Turdidae). They inhabit open areas commonly rocky or stony -throughout almost the whole of Europe (including Poland), America, and Northern Africa (cf Hansell 1984/101, Wasilewski 1998/332-333). Aristotle also wrote about the wheatears
T h e b u i l d i n g of nests by w h i t e - c r o w n e d b l a c k w h e a t e a r
F i g . 1. W h i t e - c r o w n e d B l a c k W h e a t e a r (Oenanthe leucopyga). A d a p t e d f r o m George (1978/144) a n d f r o m E . K . D u n n (1988/880). T h e bar = 15 c m .
W h i t e - c r o w n e d b l a c k w h e a t e a r s (Oenanthe leucopyga - F i g . 1) - the subject of the discussion here - i n h a b i t areas at the edges of the Sahara^^. It is not d i f f i c u l t to i m a g i n e t h a t the conditions f o r l i f e there
(Zoology, Book DC, 633a 15). The brief mention of the oinantem, as Aristotle called these birds, presumably concerns the most widely spread species in Europe Oenanthe oenanthe.
Oenanthe leucopyga (17-19 cm, 23-32 g) breeds throughout Atlas of Morocco, over much of Algeria, discontinuously in Libya and in the Tibesti region of Chad. In Egypt it breeds at scattered oases in the west, in the Nile Valley and on the Red Sea coast. Also breeds in Sinai, Israel and adjacent west Jordan and parts of northern Saudi Arabia. A true Saharan species O. leucopyga is characteristic of desert with less than 100 mm annual precipitation (cf Dunn 1988/876-884, Glutz von Blotzheim, Bauer 1988/645-653).
are f a r f r o m easy. I n the course of the day there p r e v a i l s u n m e r c i f u l heat, w h i l e at n i g h t i t becomes cold. There is no vegetation to create a m i c r o c l i m a t e w h i c h w o u l d lessen the drastic differences i n tempera-ture. A d u l t birds are able to take shelter i n the shade of rocks or the rock shelf, a n d besides, the layers of feathers effectively protect t h e m b o t h f r o m the heat of the day as f r o m the cold of the n i g h t . T h e eggs of these b i r d s do not have, f o r obvious reasons, these possibilities. T h e protection of t h e i r offspring, developing u n d e r the cover of a t h i n s h e l l , lies f i r m l y w i t h the parents.
A n i m p o r t a n t element i n t h i s protection is the b u i l d i n g of a n appropriate nest. T h e nests of the wheatears are not large (about 15-16 c m high) a n d are s t a r k i n t h e i r b u i l d , h a v i n g the shape of a p y r a m i d or pile constructed f r o m several dozen, or even several h u n d r e d , s m a l l stones. A t the top there is a bowl-shaped depression. T h i s h o l l o w is often l i n e d w i t h stubby bits of wood.
T h e choice of a n appropriate, i.e. a r e l a t i v e l y shaded place is a m a t t e r of i m m e n s e importance. W h e n the wheatears find s u c h a place they s t a r t to search a n d transport appropriate stones. „ A p p r o p r i a t e stones" are exclusively f r a g m e n t s of porous sandstone (of a size t h a t allows the birds to c a r r y them^^). Despite the fact t h a t a large v a r i e t y of pieces of rock is available, the wheatears select only porous sand-stone. W h y ? T h e porosity of the sandstone means t h a t d u r i n g the course of the cold n i g h t - w h e n w a t e r v a p o u r condenses - the rock takes i n moisture. H o w e v e r , d u r i n g the day the w a t e r „ t r a p p e d " i n the n u m e r o u s micropores t h a t r u n t h r o u g h the whole rock, g r a d u a l l y a n d slowly evaporates, cooling the eggs (and subsequently the chicks) t h a t are i n the nest. D u r i n g the n i g h t i n t u r n the rocks slowly give o f f w a r m t h , w a r m i n g the wheatears a n d t h e i r o f f s p r i n g . T h e wheatear nest is therefore „ a n a i r washer" e n s u r i n g a c i r c u l a t i o n of a i r as w e l l as t h e r m a l conditions s u i t e d f o r the development of t h e i r progeny. T h e b u i l d i n g of such a nest is both a t i m e c o n s u m i n g a n d energy c o n s u m i n g process. Therefore, i n order to complete the task before the p e r i o d for l a y i n g eggs begins, the wheatears u n d e r t a k e the process of collecting the b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s w e l l i n advance (cf D u n n 1988/876-884, D r ö s c h e r 1993/194-195, George 1978/144-148, G l u t z v o n B l o t z h e i m , B a u e r 1988/645-653).
The nest consists of pebbles of 2 - 10 g (sometimes, however, the wheatear is carrying pebbles weighting as much as 20 g). „One female brought 15-20 stones in 20-30 min, rested for 30-60 min, then continued construction. Carrying continues throughout daylight hours, with longer rest around midday" (Dunn 1988/880). The combined weight of the stones from which the nest is built fluctuates from 1 to almost 2 kilos which, in comparison to the bird's body weight, is no mean feat.
L e t us examine this e m p i r i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n f r o m the point of v i e w of the three types of d y n a m i s m w h i c h were mentioned earlier.
M i n e r a l d y n a m i s m . The creation of the sandstone a n d its disintegra-tion, the absorption of water, the condensation of w a t e r vapour a n d its subsequent evaporation, the w a r m i n g of the earth's surface by the sun's rays, the r i s i n g of w a r m a n d the f a l l i n g of cooled a i r are a l l m i n e r a l phenomena. T h e y are examples of v a r i e d m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m s w i t h i n the f o r m a t i o n of w h i c h the wheatear has p l a y e d no p a r t whatsoever. T h i s type of d y n a m i s m are the results of a m u t u a l influence u p o n each other of the objects a n d of various forms of m i n e r a l energy. A t the „ b a s e " of these d y n a m i s m s lie the properties of so-called matter, as discovered by physicists a n d chemists.
O u r attention is also d r a w n to another easily observable fact, n a m e l y that the m i n e r a l phenomena mentioned occur over the entire area of this p a r t of the desert i n h a b i t e d by the wheatears. T h e sun's rays, for example, eq ually reaches rock formations, stones, rocks, as they do the nests of the wheatears. The places i t reaches are determined by, among other things, the l i e of the l a n d , the E a r t h ' s movement i n r e l a t i o n to the S u n , as w e l l as the phenomena w h i c h l e a d to the creation of electromag-netic waves i n this star. The sun's rays do not select a single place upon the earth's surface. Its d y n a m i s m is homogeneous, non-selecting, a n d it is unable to modify itself. S o l a r rays are unable to seif determine either the place they f a l l u p o n or the direction i n w h i c h they f a l l , or equally t h e i r intensity. A l l such modifications are determined by other p h y s i c a l phenomena - the movement of the E a r t h , the clouds obscuring the Sun's disc, the mountainous m a s s i f t h a t is situated upon the route of the sun's rays etc.
T h e phenomena w i t h w h i c h we come into contact i n a c e r t a i n f r a g -ment of n o n l i v i n g n a t u r e are collections of v a r i e d , m u t u a l l y determin-i n g , homogeneous a n d non-selectdetermin-ing m determin-i n e r a l d y n a m determin-i s m s , or the results of these d y n a m i s m s .
T h e size, q u a n t i t y , d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d chemical composition of rock pieces i n the desert is the result of v a r i e d m u t u a l l y d e t e r m i n i n g m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m s .
B i o l o g i c a l d y n a m i s m . T h e searching for pieces of sandstone of a n appropriate size, t h e i r t r a n s f e r to the shaded spot, the g r a d u a l a r r a n -gement of the stones i n such a w a y so as to create a p y r a m i d of the appropriate dimensions, is the a c t i v i t y of the b i r d - this is biological dynamism. O f course the development - embryogenesis of the wheatear progeny, t a k i n g place beneath the shelter of the c a l c i u m shell, is equally biological d y n a m i s m a n d one of a key significance. It is this delicate
d y n a m i s m (sensitive to the u n f a v o u r a b l e influences of its surroundings) w h i c h evidently dominates the endeavours of the a d u l t w h e a t e a r described. W i t h o u t the protection of the embryogenesis there w o u l d not be a n a d u l t b i r d capable of bequeathing l i f e to a subsequent generation of wheatears.
1
>imm&9 mami^^^^g^
1^ massive boulder^^
/overshadowing
the pyramid
.concavity at ine top
r ;of the pyramid
"^utlme of
/ramid
F i g . 2. T h e heap ( „ p y r a m i d " ) of pebbles b u i l d by b i r d . R e d r a w n f r o m George (1978/147)
Selecting dynamism. B y observing a wheatear we see w i t h t o t a l obviousness how i t undertakes v a r i e d selection - its d y n a m i s m (as opposed to the m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m ) is selecting dynamism.
[a] The selection of time. T h e wheatear does not collect pieces of stone for the whole year but m e r e l y d u r i n g the period t h a t precedes the l a y i n g of eggs. T h e moment f o r the commencement of nest b u i l d i n g is correlated w i t h the a v a i l a b i l i t y of sandstone pieces of a n appropriate size. I f the wheatear realizes t h a t the b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l is scattered over a large area (and therefore the search f o r i t a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n are t i m e a n d energy consuming) t h e n the construction of the p j r r a m i d w i l l
be u n d e r t a k e n even several months p r i o r to h a t c h i n g . W h e n the mate-r i a l is not scattemate-red t h e n b u i l d i n g w i l l be stamate-rted a few weeks, omate-r even a dozen or so days before eggs are l a i d .
[b] The selection of place. The wheatear does not b u i l d its nest on j u s t any p a t c h of desert, but - i f this is possible - i n a place w h i c h w i l l
be for at least part of the day shaded. T h e adult b i r d , i n e x a m i n i n g the area i t i n h a b i t s , is itself searching for shelter f r o m the scorching sun's rays, a n d therefore i t is aware of where a patch of shade m a y be found. [c] The selection of material. T h e area i n h a b i t e d by the wheatear is f u l l of various pieces of stone. B u t not every piece is appropriate for the b u i l d i n g of a nest. The b i r d chooses exclusively sandstone, a n d therefore a m a t e r i a l w h i c h absorbs a n d holds w a t e r the most. A m o n g s t the pieces f o u n d i n the desert the wheatear selects the most economic „size class", i.e. stones t h a t are not too b i g a n d not too heavy (for the transportation of the stones is energy consuming, especially w h e n the distance f r o m the nest is significant), yet equally not too s m a l l (although the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of a l i g h t e r stone is less energy c o n s u m i n g t h a n that of a heavy one, the construction of a nest f r o m s m a l l pieces requires a greater n u m b e r of trips w h i c h „in i t s e l f is energy consuming). The weight of the pieces of rock collected by the wheatear is not constant. The b i r d - i f i t has the choice (and on the whole i t does) - collects pieces of a n „economical weight" for i t is aware of the distance i t w i l l have to transport t h e m , a n d i n s t i n c t i v e l y i t takes this into consideration w h e n choosing the b u i l d i n g material^^.
[d] The selection of architecture. T a k i n g into consideration the climatic a n d topographic conditions i n w h i c h the wheatears live, the protection of progeny f r o m the drastic d a i l y differences i n temperature can be ensured by a n airy, stone construction shaped as a m o u n d („a p y r a m i d " ) ' ^
Correlations and orientation. W h a t is the most r e m a r k a b l e about
the v a r i e d selective activities of the wheatear? There are numerous a n d clear correlations t h a t are s t r i k i n g . Correlations, i.e. the l i n k s between
Biologists often come across this type of action strategy that takes into consideration „energy costs". This concerns not simply wheatears, starlings, and other birds, but invertebrates likewise. For example, the mass of nectar that is collected by bees, and put into special little baskets found on their legs, is correlated with the distance to the hive. The further from the hive, the less the load of nectar and pollen transported by the worker, for the weight of the nectar to a significant degree increases the energy cost of the flight (cf among others Krebs, Davies 2001/55-61, Schmid-Hempel 1986, 1987).
Wheatears do not always build pyramid nests. If they find a hole in the ground or a crack in the rocks which is of an appropriate size and depth, then they set up nest there.
the p h y s i c a l p h e n o m e n a or certain of t h e i r parameters. L i n k s i n v i s i b l e to the senses yet obvious to the intellect. These l i n k s do not r e s u l t f r o m a p u r e l y m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m (cf K o s z t e y n , L e n a r t o w i c z 1997, L e n a r t o -w i c z , K o s z t e y n 1999, 2000a). T h e r e is no p u r e l y m i n e r a l l i n k bet-ween, for example, the weight of the stones out of w h i c h the nest is b u i l t a n d the distance of these stones f r o m the b u i l d i n g place, between the shape and size of the pieces of rock a n d the shape a n d size of the nest. T h e r e is e q u a l l y no such connection between the wheatear p i c k i n g u p the stones a n d the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of these stones to the nest site, or between the d y n a m i s m of b u i l d i n g the nest a n d the d y n a m i s m of l a y i n g eggs by the female.
It is the i n n e r d y n a m i s m of the b i r d t h a t creates this type of l i n k a g e . The cognitive dynamism of the w h e a t e a r plays a s i g n i f i c a n t role i n the creation of these correlations both i n surroundings as i n the s t r u c t u r e s and d y n a m i s m of its o w n body^\ A t the same t i m e the objectively e x i s t i n g a n d clearly perceived by us correlations are a n i n d i c a t o r t h a t b e h i n d these specific l i n k s is h i d d e n the dynamism of orientation. C e r t a i n correlations - e.g. those, so to say, „ f r o z e n " w i t h i n the architec-t u r e of architec-the nesarchitec-t - are architec-traces of architec-the biological d y n a m i s m w h i c h is d i f f i c u l t to observe. W e c a n see t h e m w h e n the b i r d w i l l finish b u i l d i n g the p y r a m i d or w h e n i t w i l l abandon the breeding area.
Integration. T h e v a r i e d , selective a n d correlated activities of the
a d u l t b i r d w h i c h l e a d to the construction of the nest, are e q u a l l y correlated w i t h a range of other actions of the b i r d (such as the b u i l d of the body s t r u c t u r e , the acquisition of food, defence i n the face of a n aggressor, the search f o r a mate, etc.). T h e b u i l d i n g of a nest is a n action „ c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n " the individual (undivided and integrative) dynamism of the life cycle. It is also i n a n obvious w a y subordinated to the development of progeny. T h e lost of a n y k i n d of a c t i v i t y w o u l d r u i n its perfect embryogenesis. T h i s means t h a t i n this delicate „ n e t w o r k " of correlated (coordinated) activities no single element c a n be missing^^.
Obviously one can not overlook the mysterious sphere of instinct. Nonetheless, however, even in so-called instinctive activities the living organism does not act „blindly", but an element of orientation occurs in them. E.g. the construction of a perfect web for catching prey is instinctively done by the spider, yet without orientation in the spatial arrangement of the objects between which the web is to be spread, without orientation where the web has been fastened, as equally a lack of orientation as regards the size of potential victims, the spider would not build webs, and not webs thanks to which it would be able to effectively catch insects (cf among others Krink and Vollrath 1997, 2000).
One can say that within this complicated action - that is building a nest - there can be observed the physiological principle „all or nothing" (cf among others Lenartowicz, Koszteyn 2000a).
I n other words the construction of the nest is an action dynamically indivisible, incorporated into the life cycle of the wheatears and insepa-r a b l y (in a s i g n i f i c a n t way) l i n k e d w i t h the enduinsepa-rance of the geneinsepa-ration lines of this l i v i n g f o r m . The b u i l d i n g of a nest is therefore an inte-grated action.
T e c h n i c a l d y n a m i s m . The specific, cooling - w a r m i n g , circulation of the a i r w i t h i n the i n t e r i o r of the nest r e s u l t i n g f r o m its architecture (i.e. equally f r o m the m a t e r i a l as f r o m the structure), is a result of the v a r i e d endeavours of the wheatear. T h i s a i r conditioning, though maybe „ p r i m i t i v e " , is for a l l t h a t technical dynamism - of the sort created by m a n w h e n , for example, he hangs a porous clay container filled w i t h water upon a radiator.
W h a t is technical d y n a m i s m ? B r i e f l y , technical d y n a m i s m is a selec-tively ^confined" (.constrained") - i n r e l a t i o n to place, time, f o r m as w e l l as i n t e n s i t y - m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m .
These v a r i e d selective ^constraints" do not result f r o m m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m but f r o m the dynamics of a l i v i n g being. Biological d y n a m i s m does not create m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m . The latter - i.e. v a r i e d physico-chemical processes - is the result of the matter's properties. Biological d y n a m i s m only selectively „confines" m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m .
B i o l o g i c a l d y n a m i s m - d y n a m i s m c o n s t r i n g i n g m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m
Biological dynamism - as opposed to technical d y n a m i s m - is not „ c o n s t r a i n e d " by m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m , but is a d y n a m i s m constraining m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m .
It is s a i d t h a t a l i v i n g organism is „ s o m e t h i n g more" t h a n „ t h e s u m of the m i n e r a l matter"^^. There is a great deal of t r u t h i n this. B u t
-An illustration of such a viewpoint can be a fragment from the introduction to A. L. Lehninger's textbook for biochemistry: „Living entities are composed of dead molecules. If we isolate and analyze these molecules then we can state that they are subject to all the physical and chemical laws I ...I of inanimate matter. However, living organisms distinguish themselves by such extraordinary characteristics that are not indicated by the collections of inanimate matter. /...I They show the complicated internal structure encompassing many types of complex molecules I... I In opposition to this, inanimate matter in the environment that surrounds, i.e. soil, water and rocks, is comprised usually of a chance mixture of simple chemical compounds with a relatively low degree of structural organization. [...] We can now ask: if living organisms are composed of inanimate molecules then why does living matter differ so extremely from nonliving matter, which is, after all, equally composed of dead molecules? Why is a living organism something
a n d this needs emphasis - on the p a r t of the organization of the struc-tures of a body (to w h i c h biologists f i r s t a n d foremost d r a w attention, a n d w i t h w h i c h s i m p l y they i d e n t i f y the l i v i n g entity) a l i v i n g o r g a n i s m is „ s o m e t h i n g " decidedly less t h a n m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m . A l i v i n g body is a highly selected f r a g m e n t of the d y n a m i c possibilities proper to the m i n e r a l matter.
T h e conditions f o r the b i o l o g i c a l constraint of m i n e r a l dyna-m i s dyna-m
I n w h a t w a y does the l i v i n g f o r m „ c o n f i n e " m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m ? I n other words w h a t m u s t i t have at its disposal i n order to „ c o n f i n e " m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m ?
T h e necessary - „ m i n i m a l " - conditions for „ c o n s t r a i n i n g " m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m by a l i v i n g entity are: the possession of the biological tools, the ability to utilize these tools, the aptitude to orientate oneself within the surroundings and in the structures of one's own body.
[a] Possession of the biological instruments. W i t h t h e i r help a g i v e n l i v i n g f o r m is able to i n f l u e n c e m a t e r i a l objects - or i n f l u e n c e t h e i r p u r e l y m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m . T h e beak of the wheatear, w i n g s a n d legs are biological instruments s e r v i n g to l i f t the rock f r a g m e n t s a n d to transport t h e m to a given place. O u r hands are such i n s t r u m e n t s as w e l l . W i t h t h e i r help we are able to shape a w a t e r j u g out of clay. E y e s h e l p us to realize whether the j u g we have made is well-proportioned. V o c a l cords help us sing. Digestive enzymes precisely disassemble f o r us the polypeptide chains of a s s i m i l a t e d protein, etc.^^
greater than merely the sum of its inanimate components?" (Lehninger 1979/13; bold type - JK).
The greater part of the structures of the body of living entities (people, animals, plants, bacteria) is biological instruments of a varied size scale - from molecular to anatomical. The majority of molecular instruments are biological machines such as, for example, ATP, the proton motive force of the bacteria Escherichia coli, ribosome, proteosome. G.M. Whitesides, although he used a rather imprecise definition of a machine, has, however, correctly noted that biological molecular machines are sensu stricto machines such as those constructed by man: „What is a machine? Of the many definitions, I choose to take a machine to be *a device for performing a task'. /.../. Although machines are commonly considered to be the products of human design and intention, why shouldn't a complex molecular system that performs a function also be considered a machine [...] accepting this broad definition, nanoscale machines already do exist, in the form of the functional molecular components of living cells I... I The broad question of whether nanoscale machines exist is thus one that was answered in the affirmative by biologists many years ago. I ...I Cells include some molecular machines that seem similar to familiar human-scale machines: a rotary motor fixed in the membrane of a bacterium turns a shaft and superficially resembles an electric motor" (Whitesides 2001).
[b] The ability to utilize these instruments. It is not enough to m e r e l y have w i n g s or hands. E q u a l l y essential is the ability to utilize these biological i n s t r u m e n t s . T h i s ability could be i n s t i n c t i v e or acquired b y l e a r n i n g , t r a i n i n g . I n t h a t w a y birds are l e a r n i n g to fly or to b u i l d t h e i r nests, a baby learns to c r a w l a n d w a l k .
[c] The aptitude to orientate oneself within the surroundings and within the structures of one's own body. A n y l i v i n g f o r m m u s t be oriented i n the closest sphere of m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y . T h e wheatear m u s t see pieces of the rock (otherwise i t w o u l d not be able to pick t h e m u p w i t h its beak), i t m u s t perceive the nest u n d e r construction (otherwise it w o u l d not erect the construction), i t m u s t be orientated as to the location of the „ b u i l d i n g site" (otherwise i t w o u l d not reach i t after the search for stones), etc. T h i s obviously e q u a l l y requires some orientation i n the structures of one's own body - first a n d foremost i n the position of biological tools as w e l l as i n the range of possibility i n t h e i r u t i l i z -ation.
T h i s is not a complete list of the conditions f o r the process of c o n s t r a i n i n g the m i n e r a l d y n a m i s m , b u t - as i t seems - i t is the „ m i n i m a l set".
T h e o r i g i n of the tools
W h e r e do the tools come from? A l m o s t a l l of t h e m are created i n the course of embryogenesis. O n l y v e r y few are received l i k e a „dowry" f r o m the p a r e n t a l o r g a n i s m w i t h i n the structures of gamete. Biological tools (organs) are constructed b y l i v i n g entities. I n exactly same w a y m a n -a l i v i n g entity - b u i l d s i t s technic-al instruments.
M a n i p u l a t i o n of matter
O r i e n t a t i o n a n d the selective u t i l i z a t i o n of the previously made biological i n s t r u m e n t s enables the l i v i n g entities to manipulate m a t e r i a l objects. These selective a n d integrative m a n i p u l a t i o n s impose con-straints u p o n m i n e r a l bodies.
This „biological constraints" of the mineral dynamic do not only concern macroscopic phenomena but also the ultramicroscopic ones. Peskin, among others, has drawn attention to the role of molecular biological machines: „Biological cells contain microscopic robotic machinery that is used for cell motility, for transport of vesicles and organelles within cells, to move protein molecules across internal membranes, to partition chromosomes at cell division, and to manufacture the entire biomolecular machinery of the cell. Unlike the macroscopic machinery of everyday experience, these molecular motors function in a regime in which Brownian motion plays an important role. Chemical energy is used [by the living being - JK] to rectify the Brownian motion and hence to drive a molecular motor in a particular direction" (Peskin 1997).
Consequently manipulation is a selective interference i n m a t e r i a l phenomena. It is possible t h a n k s to the fact t h a t the dynamism of the biological instrument (or the dynamism of the technical instrument) i s subordinated to orientation. T h e dynamism of orientation is obviously d i f f e r e n t f r o m the dynamism of the instrument, but w i t h i n the f r a m e -w o r k of the manipulation of m a t e r i a l (or energy) these t-wo d y n a m i s m s are closely correlated^^.
M a n i p u l a t i o n is one of the types of selective, coordinated a n d inte-grated actions w h i c h is r e f e r r e d to as the behaviour of l i v i n g f o r m s (cf K o s z t e y n , L e n a t o w i c z 1997)^^. W e perceive behaviour w h e n a l i v i n g f o r m u t i l i z e s technical i n s t r u m e n t s , e.g. w h e n we see a m a n b u i l d i n g a n engine or h u n t i n g w i t h a crossbow, w h e n we observe the b u i l d i n g of a nest by a b i r d , or w h e n we observe the i m m u n o l o g i c a l defence processes.
Regardless of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l (anatomical, cytological, organellar, biomolecular) level of the l i v i n g e n t i t y we observe, we w i l l a l w a y s observe the behaviour of the (whole) living entity. T h e structure a n d size of the instrument has no significance here whatsoever.
It is i m p o r t a n t to realize t h a t manipulation lies at the basis of the developmental dynamism of living forms - i.e. the construction, recon-s t r u c t i o n a n d r e p a i r of the body'recon-s recon-structurerecon-s.
In mineral nature we are not dealing with manipulation. Solar rays are not „Instruments" serving the Sun to warm the surface of the Earth. Solar rays radiate in every direction, the Sun is not aware of the position of our planet.
Technical dynamism - e.g. the functioning of a machine - is not manipulation. No orientation or selectivity can be detected in the movements of an engine. A machine is just a tool, that is used by a living form.
This has been emphasised by, among others, E.B. Holt in his book The Freudian Wish (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1915, p. 155): „Phenomena which derive from the integrated organism are no longer only the stimulation of a nerve or the contraction of a muscle, or merely the play of reflexes provoked by a stimuli. All of them are present and have a basic meaning for the phenomena talked about here, but now they are components because they have become integrated. This integration of reflex arches - with everything that composes it - in a state of systematic mutual dependence has created something that is not only a reflex action. The biological sciences have for a long time recognized this new and more advanced something and have called it 'behaviour'" (quoted from Tolman (1995/25).
O r i e n t a t i o n a n d the p r o b l e m of action immanens
O r i e n t a t i o n
O r i e n t a t i o n is the p r i m a r y cognitive d y n a m i s m . Therefore i t cannot be defined by the i n d i c a t i o n of other, secondary cognitive phenomena. It m a y be only „ s h o w n " t h r o u g h demonstration (an event or experiment i n w h i c h i t appears).
Orientation c a n be recognized w h e n the l i v i n g f o r m , i n a n obvious way, choose (select) h i s actions (their character, moment, direction, etc.) as w e l l as the object of its action - a n d the selection „ m a k e s sense", i . e. i t is evidently integrated w i t h other, p r e s u m a b l y selective, actions. A n organism w h i c h behaves i n a chaotic w a y m a y be considered „ m y s t e r i -ous", but i t does not i l l u s t r a t e the idea of orientation.
Orientation can be recognized even amongst people who are almost completely p a r a l y z e d , w h e n , for example, i n squeezing our h a n d or closing t h e i r eyes they are able to c o n f i r m the content of our v e r b a l suggestion.
T h i s , however, is not enough. W e m u s t register a correlation of this action w i t h some distinctive t r a i t of the object of the action. I f the object is homogeneous, t h e n we are unable to determine orientation.
F o r example, i f a solution is completely homogeneous a n d a bacte-r i u m swims i n i t i n a stbacte-raight l i n e we abacte-re unable to detebacte-rmine whethebacte-r this is the result of orientation or not. I f the b a c t e r i u m swims straight i n the direction of the only l i g h t a r o u n d then we m a y suppose t h a t i t possesses orientation i n this light. I f the b a c t e r i u m swims i n the direction of the l a r g e r concentration of food, we m a y conclude t h a t the b a c t e r i u m is able to orientate i t s e l f i n the gradient of food concentra-tion.
There is n o t h i n g as obvious as orientation.'^^ The notion of r e a l i t y a n d its u n d e r s t a n d i n g are derivatives of orientation. Orientation i n m a t e r i a l phenomena is more basic t h a n any f u r t h e r , i n t e l l e c t u a l forms of cognition (cf the entry Orientation or Cognition i n L e n a r t o w i c z , K o s z t e y n 2000b/170-172; 174-177).
Orientation means the actual „cognitive contact" w i t h a n object. Therefore i t does not concern the „past". A remembered „ c o n t a c t " w i t h
^® The opposite to orientation is lack of orientation (e.g. in a state of deep unconscious-ness), or disorientation. Many animals in adopting appropriate shapes (a stick insect), colours (chameleon) or postures (immobility feigning death) disorientate the observer, disenabling it - at least momentarily - from a correct sense of orientation.
the object s h o u l d not be s u b s t i t u t e d for the genuine o r i e n t a t i o n . Attained orientation (i.e. in acta) is something momentary, w h i c h has to
change i t s e l f accordingly to the changes i n the object of this o r i e n t a t i o n . M e m o r i z e d , but no more a c t u a l f o r m s of orientation h e l p us to recon-struct a t e m p o r a l p a t t e r n of a n object or event.
The concept of the a t t a i n e d orientation should be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m the concept of a unique, particular act of attaining orientation (orienta-t i o n in fieri), i.e. f r o m cogni(orienta-tive d y n a m i s m i(orienta-tself (which is a n immanen(orienta-t activityf^.
T h e o r i e n t a t i o n in fieri s h o u l d i n t u r n be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m the cognitive behaviour w h i c h is essential i n the process of a c q u i r i n g orientation. T h i s behaviour is connected w i t h the u t i l i z a t i o n of the i n s t r u m e n t a l structures (sense organs, locomotory system ... a n d so on). W h e n we r e a d a newspaper we constantly move our eye balls i n order to discern the text p r i n t e d on its pages. A dog s t a n d i n g on g u a r d constantly moves its h e a d i n order to hear or s m e l l a n intruder.^^
H o w e v e r , i n t h i s behaviour (as opposed to manipulation) a n y interference w i t h the object is avoided (as f a r as i t is possible). T h e means of observation do not change the observed phenomena - the eyes do not move the objects, the ears do not interfere w i t h the bells. E v e n the organs of touch are constructed a n d m a n i p u l a t e d i n the w a y w h i c h does not m o d i f y the o r i g i n a l properties of the object of observation^^
Orientation is i m m a n e n t d y n a m i s m par excellence. H o w e v e r , the cognitive d y n a m i s m p r o d u c i n g the orientation i n the objects does not produce a „ u n i t y " between the subject a n d the object. W i t h i n the sphere
Cognitive dynamism could be - in certain circumstances - ineffective, i.e. it could - despite cognitive efforts - fail to acquire the appropriate level of orientation. Such a „fruitless" process remains - despite everything - an immanent activity sensu strictissimo.
Orientation in fieri is dynamism of substance, i.e. the dynamism of living being in its most essential, comprehensive sphere, while in behaviour there is involved equally the sphere of attributes. All processes connected, for example, with the movement of the eye balls or the photochemical processes in the retina (the selective catching of photons and the transformation of their energy into the form of electrochemical signals) are not therefore immanent dynamism sensu strictissimo, but only sensu stricto. Man could undoubtedly recreate the dynamism of the instrument in an appropriate laboratory, but it would be difficult to call the result „Cognition" - the acquisition of orientation.
Sometimes the acquisition of orientation in the feature of some object requires manipulation. For example, if we wish to be convinced that the petals of flowers are smooth or silky we must stroke them with our fingers. But it is not via the instruments of our sense of touch that we are involved with the flower petals but the instrument that is our hand. At the same time the manipulation of the fingers of the hand is a highly delicate one - so as not to damage the flower.
