A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S FOLIA OECONOMICA 192, 2005
J a ro sła w J a n e c k i*
TAYLO R-TYPE RULES IN POLAND: A H IST O R IC A L AN A LY SIS OF M ONETARY POLICY
Abstract. This paper examines a history o f the Polish monetary policy using the framework proposed by John B. Taylor. The “Taylor rule” describes an optimal monetary policy in a closed economy, where interest rates depend on deviation of real output from potential output and on deviation o f rate o f inflation from the target rate o f inflation. The paper is organized as follows. At the beginning we briefly summarize different views o f “Taylor rule”, a methodology of the monetary policy rules for closed and open economies and main problems in “Taylor rule” calculations. Then we focus on methods o f calculation Taylor-type reaction functions for Poland over the period from 1999 to 2003. The results o f the calculation and historical evaluation of monetary policy in Poland will conclude the paper.
Keywords: monetary molicy, central banks policies, Poland. JEL Classification: E52, E58, G l.
1. INTRODUCTION
W hich rules should central b anks follow? W hich m o n etary policy is optim al? T hese questions are still open. T h ere are different rules am ong central banks. C urren tly the m ost p o p u lar is inflation targ etin g (e.g. Janecki 2002). Jo h n B. T ay lo r (1997) argues th a t the m o n etary policy rule in which the interest ra te policy instrum ent adjusts to b o th inflation and real G D P w orks b etter th a n policy in which there is n o instru m ent reactio n to real G D P . A basic pro p o sal o f “T ay lo r rule” has becom e a to o l for evaluating m o n etary policy fo r a closed econom y.1 U sing this sim ple rule for m onetary policy, econom ists have estim ated deviations o f in flatio n and o u tp u t from their optim u m . T ay lo r recom m ended a m odification o f the typical policy rule fo r econom ies w ith m ore developed financial m a rk e ts.2 A ccording to
* Financial Policy, Analysis and Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance. 1 Svensson (1997) and Ball (1997) extend the model for an open economy. 2 Taylor (1993) proposal fits the Federal Reserve policy during 1987-1992.
the policy rule, central bank ra te is adjusted to changes in inflation rate and o u tp u t (G D P grow th). “T ay lo r rule” could represent a guideline for the central bank to follow when taking m o n etary policy decisions.
T h e p aper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the th eory o f “T aylor rule” and econom ists’ view on the T aylor proposal together with a fram ew ork for m easuring potential o u tp u t and o u tp u t gaps. Section 3 covers the m ethod o f “T ay lo r ru le” calculations for P oland, the m ethod based on T ay lor (1993) p ro posal. Section 4 presents results o f “T ay lo r ru le” in P oland. This paper provides historical analyzes o f m onetary policy in Poland using ‘T a y lo r ru le” as a p o in t o f reference.
2. MONETARY POLICY DESIGN: “TAYLOR RULE”
2.1. The Conccpt o f “Taylor Rule”
“T ay lo r ru le” captures the key factors affecting inflation: inflation gap, o u tp u t gap and the equilibrium real interest ra te (equ ation 1).
(1) r = я + g y + h(n — я*) + Is ,
where:
r - the short-term interest rate (“T ay lo r ra te ” );
rf - th e central bank estim ate o f the equilibrium real ra te o f interest; у - the o u tp u t gap, the per cent deviation o f real G D P from a targ et
Y - Y * and у = 1 0 0 —
Y - the real G D P ;
Y* - p otential o u tp u t (trend real G D P ), in % ; g - o u tp u t gap coefficient;
n - the inflation rate (q uarterly average in % ); n* - the central bank targ et inflation rate; n - 7 1 * - inflation gap;
h - inflation gap coefficient, the am o u n t by which central bank raises the ex post real interest rate.
T h e co n stan ts are g, h, n* and rf (g and h are non-negative). N ote also th a t 1 + h is the slope coefficient on inflation and ŕ — hn* is an intercept term . T ay lo r (1993) suggested the values for param eters: g = 0.5, h = 0.5, n* = 2.0, r/ = 2.0. T h e problem o f p aram eters value is widely discussed am on g econom ists. “T aylor rule” says th at central bank ra te rises if inflation ra te increases above target o f 2% o r if real G D P rises above trend G D P .
A ccording to T a y lo r assum ptions, if inflation rate and real G D P are on targ e t, then the central ban k interest ra te would equal 4 % (2% in real term s). B ray to n et al. (1997) for exam ple suggest th a t g should be closer to 1 or ju st below 1, b u t still there is no consensus ab o u t a size o f the coefficients o f “T ay lo r ru le” . Ball (1997) derives the o p tim al coefficients on у and я in a closed econom y. H e proposed 1.13 fo r o u tp u t and 0.82 for inflation. A rm o u r et al. (2002) confirm s th a t the o u tp u t gap coefficient (g) should equal 0.5.
“ T ay lo r ru le” in term s o f the E uro p ean C entral B ank (E C B ) m onetary policy provides in fo rm atio n th a t com m on m o n etary policy for different econom ies in eu ro-zone can be p ro fitab le for som e co un tries an d should generate looses fo r o th er econom ies. ECB interest rates are the sam e for all E u ro p e an M o n etary U nion (E M U ) countries, b u t we can differentiate in E M U zone three different countries according to m o ney price. We know , th a t using “ T a y lo r ru le s” , such co u n trie s like G reece, Irelan d , S pain should have m uch higher interest rate: 6.6% in Ireland, 6.2% in G reece, 3.8% in Spain (Bielecki 2003). T ay lo r rates and ECB rates are sim ilar for o th er countries like P ortu g al, the N etherlan ds, an d F in lan d. A ccording to “T ay lo r ru le” the ECB rate is to o high fo r som e countries. In th is g ro u p we have F ran c e (“ T a y lo r ra te ” is 1% ) a n d G erm an y (0.25% ) (Bielecki 2003). T ak in g these aspects in to con sid eratio n , we can conclude th a t there are som e beneficiaries like G re a t B ritain. In terest rate setup by the B ank o f E ngland is higher th an ECB ra te and close to “T a y lo r ra te ” , independency o f the B ank o f E ng lan d is close related to higher G D P grow th. T his view gives su p p o rt for the use o f the “T ay lor rule” fo r m o n etary policy especially in the context o f m o n etary policy in E U zone. A nyw ay, “T ay lo r rule” should n o t be used au to m atically , or m echanically, because o f supply shocks and m a rk e t ex pectation s a t fin an cial m ark e ts (T aylor 1993).
T h e core version o f “T ay lo r ru le” does n o t consider an exchange rate. I t is because the exchange ra te plays a small role in the fo rm u latio n o f US m o n etary policy (T aylor 1997). T h e analyzes based on sim ple “T ay lor ru le” assum e a closed econom y. Svensson (1997) and Ball (1997) derive an open-econom y extension to “T ay lo r ru le” by adding the exchange rate. Ball (1997) adds a w eighted average o f interest ra te and exchange ra te (the m o n etary C o n d itio n s Index - M C I) and the lagged exchange rate. T he M C I is used as the policy instru m en t in C an ad a , New Z ealan d , N orw ay, Sweden (G erlach and Smets 1996), to an overall stance o f m o n etary policy.3 W e should notice th a t there is disagreem ent betw een econom ists ab o u t w hether m o n etary au thorities should react to the exchange ra te w hen setting interest ra te . T ay lo r (1998) reports o ther, n o t solved, problem s. T here are
disagreem ents a b o u t w hether m o netary policy should respond to th e lagged interest ra te o r w hether it should include a m easure o f expected future inflation, ra th e r th a n actual observed values.
2.2. Л Framework for Measuring Potential Output and Output Gaps
“T a y lo r rule” includes a m o n etary policy reactio n fu nctio n y, which requires know ledge o f the potential G D P . T h e level o f p o ten tial o u tp u t and the o u tp u t gap arc m ajo r uncertainty in a calculus. T h e m ost p ro b lem atic is the m easurem ent o f the potential o u tp u t an d o u tp u t gap. T he o u tp u t gap is the difference between the eco no m y ’s actual o u tp u t and the level o f p ro d u c tio n it can achieve with existing lab o r, cap ital, an d tech no logy w ith o u t p u ttin g sustained upw ard pressure on inflation. T h e com m on definition o f o u tp u t gap is a difference between actu al an d p oten tial o u tp u t (equation 2).
T h e o u tp u t gap is positive w hen actual o u tp u t exceeds the econom y’s p o ten tial (potential G D P ) and negative w hen actual G D P grow th is below a p o ten tial o u tp u t grow th. Excess dem and is referred to positive o u tp u t g ap and excess supply is referred to a negative o u tp u t gap. W e tre a t o u tp u t g ap in the m o n etary rule as an indicator o f fu tu re inflation. T h e o u tp u t gap should help to distinguish between dem and shocks and price-level shocks. T h e p rob lem o f the o u tp u t gap estim ation refers to calculation th e potential G D P , w hich is non-observable directly. T here is a need fo r additional assum ptions to choose estim ation m eth ods for o u tp u t gaps. T h ere are several ways to define the concept o f co m p u tatio n m eth o d s fo r p o ten tial o u tp u t and o u tp u t gaps. Concepts based on trend, production function and univariate or m ultivariate filters approaches. We follow in this paper the H odrick-Prescott m ethodology. T h e H odrick-Prescott filter is com puted as (cf. Technical Note...
1995): (3) M in £ (1пУ, — In УГ)2, t =1 subject to: (4) Е [(1 п У Г +1 - In У ,*) - (ln y ; - ln y ,* -,)]2 < e, t = 2
where:
Y, - actual G D P a t co n stan t m a rk e t prices; Y* - trend G D P a t co n stan t m ark e t prices; e - sm all n u m b er arb itrarily chosen.
T h e specification o f the H od rick - P rescott filter can be rew ritten as:
(5)
M i l I (1пУ, - 1пУГ)2 + Я ■ Y [(In Yľ+ 1 - ln 57) - (In у ; - l n УГ_ t ) ] 2l e,
b = l 1 — 2 J
w here Я - L agrange m ultiplier.
T h e choice o f the value for the L agrange m u ltiplier Я determ ines the length o f the weighted m oving average, trend sm o o th in g and trad e -o ff betw een the sm oothing and fit o f trend o u tp u t to actu al o u tp u t. A lower value o f th e L agran ge m ultiplier produces trend o u tp u t closer to actual o u tp u t. It m eans th a t higher Я generates the sm o o th er trend o u tp u t, which p o o re r follows actual o u tp u t. T h e sensitivity test on the value o f the L agrange m ultiplier o f the H o drick-P resco tt filter for E U -15, provides in fo rm atio n th a t small changes in the value o f the L agrange m u ltiplier do n o t significantly m odify the trend for the G D P series (cf. Technical note...
1995).
T h e O E C D and the In tern atio n al M onetary F u n d (IM F ) use a C obb- D ouglas p ro d u c tio n function (C otis et al. 2003). In this situation p otential o u tp u t is defined as the level o f real G D P attain ab le with full em ploym ent o f all p ro d u c tio n factors and sustainable over m edium term at a stable rate o f inflation. W ith this app ro ach , trend factor pro du ctivity, capital input and full em ploym ent lab o r input are determ ined separately and plugged in to th e p ro d u c tio n function to o b tain p otential o u tp u t estim ates. T he D ire cto rate-G en e ral for E conom ic and F inancial A ffairs o f the E u ro pean C om m ission (D G II) adopted th e H o d ric k -P resco tt trend estim ation m ethod for the d etren ding o f tim e series. T h e O E C D m etho dolo gy for estim ation potential o u tp u t and o u tp u t is based on a C obb-D ouglas p ro du ctio n function (described in G io rn o et al. 1995). T his ap p ro ach is h ybrid because it relies o n econom ic relationships (to estim ate the N on -A ccelerating -In flatio n R ate o f U nem ploy m ent - N A IR U ) and u nivariate filters (H P filter) to calculate trend p a rtic ip a tio n rates, trend hou rs w orked and tren d to tal fa cto r p ro d u c tivity. A m ethodology used by the EU Com mission for estim ation o f potential o u tp u t is sim ilar to th a t o f the O E C D . T he E U C om m ission uses also a C o b b -D o u g las p ro d u c tio n function with exogenous tren d (D enis et al.
2002), b u t E U C om m ission uses the N o n -A cce le ratin g W age R a te o f U nem ploym ent (N A W R U ) ap p ro ach (w ithout w orked h o u rs).4 T he IM F a p p ro ach is based on a p ro d u ctio n function m eth o d , w ith assum ptio ns th at vary across countries. It m eans th a t IM F chooses for each cou ntry the m eth o d , th a t fits the cou n try situation best. T he m eth o d s cover the split tim e tren d and the H P filter, the band pass filter and the p rodu ction function (IM F 2002). T h e ECB has no t published any estim ates o f potential o u tp u t for the eu ro area. T he ECB uses trend m easures o f various m ac roeconom ic series derived by an H P filter in its calcu latio n o f cyclically adjusted bu dget balances (B outhevillain et al. 2001).
3. CALCULATION OF “TAYLOR RULE”: THE CASE OF POLAND
T his section presents m ethodology o f calculation interest rate using “ T a y lo r ru le” for P oland (“T ay lo r ra te ” ). T h e calculations arc based on the form ula presented in T aylo r (1993) with param eters: g = 0,5, and h = 0,5:
(6) r = n + 0,5 -y + 0,5 • (n — я*) + гЛ
T h e em pirical analysis o f “T ay lo r rule” presented in this section is based on d a ta from C en tral Statistical Office (G D P ) and N a tio n al B ank o f Poland (interest rates). T he sam ple period covers the years 1995-2003. T h e estim ation o f o u tp u t gap is based on the m ethodology suggested by th e E u ro pean C om m ission (D G II) presented in Section 2 o f this paper. In case o f tw o-digit in flation in P oland (till Q l, 2000), we could n o t follow “T aylor ru le” fo r real equilibrium interest ra te (rf ) on 2 % level. B ecause o f th at, the real th ree-m o n th W IB O R ra te is assum ed as the real equilibrium interest in the Polish case.
A n im p o rta n t factor, in case o f calculation “T ay lo r ru le” , is availability o f d a ta in a p artic u la r day o f M o n etary Policy C ouncil (M P C ) m eeting. L et us assum e th a t M P C should take a decision in last decade o f D ecem ber. W e know in flation rate from N ovem ber and its forecast and G D P grow th for Q4. Real reference rates and in flatio n targ ets are know n. C alculations are based on first inflation ra te estim atio n an d G D P grow th, which we could verify after som e m onths. T his tim e lag could provide errors.
4. MONETARY POLICY VS. “TAYLOR RULE” IN POLAND
T h ere are several sources in the Polish law, w here th ere are rules o f activity o f the central bank in Poland (N BP). T hese are “T h e C o n stitu tio n o f the R epu blic o f P o la n d ” (1997),5 “ A ct on the N atio n al B ank o f P o la n d ” (1997)6 and M edium-Term Strategy fo r M onetary Policy (1998).7 T he M onetary Policy C ouncil (M P C ) determ ines m o n etary policy8 guidelines fo r each year. T h e goal o f m o n etary policy in Poland in the period 1998-2003 was to reduce the inflation ra te and to attain price stability in th e long perspective.
T h e m ain central b a n k ’s policy instrum ents are: interest rates, required reserves ra tio s, open m a rk e t operations. T h e M P C strategy is based on direct inflation targeting. In Septem ber 1998 th e M P C ad o p ted a M edium Term S tra teg y in M onetary Policy 1999-2003, which aim ed to low er inflation rate below 4 % by the end o f 2003. In February 2003 M P C adopted M onetary Policy S tra teg y after 2003, which is aim ed a t stabilising inflation at a low level. T h e in flation targ et is a co n stan t rate o f 2.5% + / - 1 . 0 pp. Until 1998, the N B P h ad two official interest rates: the rediscou nt ra te an d the lo m bard rate. Since 1998, the p red o m in an tly influential ra te has become the reference ra te - the m inim um ra te at which the N B P , is willing to sell N B P bills and set a floor for the yield on N B P bills - the m ain securities
5 Article 227.1: ‘T h e central bank of the State shall be the National Bank o f Poland. It shall have the exclusive right to issue money as well as to formulate and implement monetary policy. The National Bank o f Poland shall be responsible for the value o f Polish currency”.
* Article 3.1: “The basic objective o f NBP activity shall be to maintain price stability, and it shall at the same time act in support o f Government economic policies, insofar as this does not constrain pursuit o f the basic objective o f the NBP”.
1 “The ultimate goal o f the central bank monetary policy will continue to be the process
o f reducing inflation, and consequently, over time, to ensure price stability. Achieving this objective will provide a solid foundation for sustained economic growth. Considering the ongoing transformation o f the Polish economy into a mature market economy, the additional goal o f the central bank is to support the institutional development o f modem financial markets The strategic goal o f Poland is to integrate our economy with EU, and at a later time, with EMU. To accomplish this goal, the Polish economy will have to meet several macro- economic convergence criteria over the next few years. Some o f them represent a serious challenge to monetary policy. The monetary convergence criteria relate to price, exchange rate and long-term interest rates stability. The price stability criterion implies that Poland will have to reduce inflation to the level not exceeding 3-4% annually in a relatively short time. Under the exchange rate criterion, a country aspiring to join the monetary union will have to be a part o f the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM2) for at least two years. Within this system, the Zloty will have to be pegged to the Euro. The market rate o f the Zloty will be allowed to fluctuate around the fixed parity rate, probably within a plus-minus 15% band".
8 Exchange rate policies are established by the Council o f Ministers after consultation with the MPC, the NBP has sole authority to implement exchange rate and monetary policy.
used in the N B P s open m ark e t o peration s to m an ag e m a rk e t liquidity. T he lom bard ra te sets an upper lim it on in terb a n k m a rk e t interest rates. In D ecem ber 2001, the N B P introduced a new official ra te for d epo sit standing facilities. T o gether w ith the lom bard rate it determ ines the b and within w hich the overn ight m oney m a rk e t rate can fluctuate.
T h e deposit ra te constitutes a floor on fluctuatio ns in o vern igh t rates. T he red iscount ra te is the rate a t which the N B P accepts bills o f exchange from com m ercial b an k s extending the rediscount credit o f such bills. T he red iscount ra te is n o t widely used.
It is obvious th a t policy m ix in Poland is far from o ptim al. M P C stressed th a t P oland has a non -optim al m ix o f fiscal and m o n etary policy, th a t m ean s “ a tight m o netary policy in reaction to a loose fiscal policy, which results in an increase in the cost o f reducing inflation, in the form o f low er G D P grow th th an would be possible w ith op tim u m policy m ix” (M onetary Policy Guidelines... 2001). A ccording to M P C m o n etary policy is determ ined by the level o f restrictiveness. T h e prob lem s in achieving an n u al in flation rate (over- and under shooting) are results m ainly o f the “ supply shocks” , situ atio n in public finance an d n o t o ptim al interest rates policy. A ccordin g to M PC: “ A chieving the inflation targ et for 2001, in the con tex t o f the m edium term policy, m ay require tig htenin g o f m onetary policy stan ce” (M onetary Policy Guidelines... 2001). Between 1998 and 2001 we have experienced a slow dow n o f th e P olish eco n o m y . Since au tu m n 1999 M P C ad opted a restrictive m o n etary policy (cf. F igu re 1). In 2000, despite very tight m onetary conditions, the G D P grow th rem ained at average 4 % , bu t in 2001 a real G D P grow th reached 1% (cf. F igu re 2). T his slow dow n was caused by internal and ex ternal factors ju st to m en tio n global recession, especially in m ajo r E U m ark ets, and was also p artially caused by tight m o n etary policy. As early as from th e Q l, 2002 the Polish econom y is recovering forcefully. W e can observe a significant relaxatio n in m o n etary policy from the second h a lf o f 2001. T h e question a b o u t the p ath o f this relaxation and the level o f co n tra ctio n in term s of o u tp u t g row th is open. G D P increased by 1.4% in 2002 and by 3.7% in 2003. It is estim ated th a t in 2004 the G D P will grow in real term s by 5% . O f course, one o f the m ost significant factors determ in ing th e effec tiveness o f m o n etary policy in P o lan d is the finance o f public sector - the size o f th e c u rren t account deficit and the public sector budget deficit. T he slow dow n o f the Polish econom y (especially betw een 2000 and 2001) to g e th e r w ith p ro b lem s in achieving an n u al in flatio n ta rg e ts leads to a conclusion th a t the level o f central ban k interest rates was n o t at the p ro p er level.
% % , p er ce n ta g e p o in ts
Fig. 1. MCI in 1995-2003 (base period: February 1998 = 0). Sources: own calculations based on GUS and NBP data
Ш
GDP - 0 - Inflation rate
Fig. 2. GDP growth and inflation (1996-2003). Sources: GUS and NBP data
Interest rate calculated according to “T aylor rule” was below a „co rrid o r” set by lom bard rate and rediscount rate in 1999 and from Q l, 2001 to Q4, 2003. T he interest ra te policy in 2001 was over-restrictive. A ccording to “T a y lo r ru le” , central ban k interest rates could be low er especially in the period o f recession from the Q l, 2001 till Q l, 2003. T h e “T ay lo r ra te ” was below red iscount and lom bard ra te in th a t period (cf. F ig u re 3 and T ab le 1).
A ssum ing th a t for the Q4 in term s o f average inflation ra te from the past year we will tak e inflation forecast for the q u a rte rs (2% in term s of 0.8 % ), the “T ay lo r ra te ” increases from 3.2% to 5% , b u t still will be below rediscount interest rate from Q4, 2003. T he changes ap p ear in case o f changes to in flation target. Let us assum e th a t N B P have inflation targ et aro u n d 2 % , in th a t case “T ay lo r ra te ” will increase from 3.2% to 3.7% . T h e change in o u tp u t gap (from - 1% to 0% ) brings a sm all increase in “T ay lo r ra te ” , to 3.7% . We have an interesting situ atio n in 2004. Instead o f higher inflation rate, inflation target, “T ay lo r ra te ” is betw een lom bard and red iscount rate. Based on assum ptions for Q l, 2004: inflation rate 2.5% , interest ra te at the level o f Q4, 2003 and - 0.75 for o u tp u t gap, “T a y lo r ra te ” increases by 0.4-0.5 pp. A ssum ing th a t M P C w ants to keep the spread betw een central b an k interest ra te and “T a y lo r ra te ” , there is a high probab ility o f the tightening m o n etary policy in Q2, 2004.
cssi GDP Taylor rate Lombard rate Rediscount rate
Fig. 3. Interest rates according to “Taylor rule” vs. central bank interest rates. Sources: own calculations based on GUS and NBP data
5. CONCLUSIONS
T here is n o single answ er to a question: which rules should central b anks follow o r which m o netary policy is optim al. A ccording to the Polish law N B P should focus no t only o n price stability (inflation targ etin g) but also should provide fo u n d atio n s fo r a sustained econom ic grow th. T he “T a y lo r ru le” covers these tw o aspects. It should be stressed th a t, officially no central ban k would set interest rates ju s t only on the basis o f “T aylor ru le” . O f course, m o n etary autho rities use m an y m o re in dicato rs and in fo rm atio n a b o u t the futu re p ath o f inflation, o u tp u t grow th. W e presented one v arian t o f “T ay lo r ru le” calculations. T he results can be sum m arized w ith th ree m a jo r conclusions. F irst o f all, m o netary policy from th e “T ay lo r ru le” p o in t o f view was no t optim al especially in the p erio d 2001-2003. T h e scale o f in terest rate reductions in Q4, 2001 was in accordance with “T a y lo r ru le” , bu t the policy was to o co n tracto ry in the follow ing quarters. Secondly, m o n etary au thorities can assum e the difference betw een official interest rates and interest calculated o n the basis o f “T a y lo r ru le” . T he “ T a y lo r r a te ” cou ld be tre a te d as a re co m m en d ed ra te . T h ird ly ,
Period GDP seasonal adjusted (PLN mln) Potential G D P (mln PLN)
Output gap Inflation rate (end of period) Inflation target Inflation gap Equilibrium rate (3-months WIBOR rate) Taylor rate (1) (2) (3) = 100 - [(1)—(2)]/(2) (4) (5) (6) = (4 )- (5) СП (8) 1Q’99 92 358.0 93 094.2 -0.79 6.2 7.2 -1.0 7.08 12.4 2Q 94 206.6 93 976.7 0.24 6.3 7.2 -0.9 6.45 12.4 3Q 96 308.3 94 829.4 1.56 6.6 7.2 -0.6 6.18 13.3 4Q 97 523.3 95 651.4 1.96 7.3 7.2 0.1 8.09 16.4 IQ’00 97 892.4 96 442.9 1.50 10.3 6.1 4.2 6.85 20.0 2Q 99 030.1 97 205.4 1.88 10.1 6.1 4.0 7.71 20.7 3Q 99 246.2 97 941.1 1.33 10.4 6.1 4.3 8.94 22.2 4Q 99 873.7 98 653.4 1.24 10.1 6.1 4.0 11.27 24.0 IQ’01 100 069.5 99 346.6 0.73 6.7 7.0 -0.3 11.05 18.0 2Q 99 983.0 100 025.7 -0.04 6.7 7.0 -0.3 9.87 16.4 3Q 99 951.9 100 696.1 -0.74 6.1 7.0 -0.9 10.00 15.3 4Q 100 062.3 101 363.3 -1.28 5.5 7.0 -1.5 9.31 13.4 1Q’02 100 564.2 102 032.2 -1.44 3.4 5.0 -1.6 7.00 8.9 2Q 100 918.2 102 706.9 -1.74 2.8 5.0 -2 .2 7.46 8.3 3Q 101 683.2 103 390.7 -1.65 2.3 5.0 -2.7 7.15 7.3 4Q 102 303.6 104 085.7 -1.71 1.9 5.0 -3.1 6.03 5.5 1Q’03 102 788.7 104 792.9 -1.91 0.5 3.0 -2.5 5.80 4.1 2Q 104 749.1 105 512.3 -0.72 0.5 3.0 -2.5 5.08 4.0 3Q 105 816.4 106 242.5 -0.40 0.6 3.0 -2.4 4.36 3.6 4Q 106 836.3 106 981.8 -0.14 0.8 3.0 -2 .2 4.36 4.0
the results o f “ T ay lo r ru le” calculations fo r the Polish case should be one o f instru m en ts in defining futu re m o n etary policy. T h e “ T ay lo r ru le” should be treated also as a tool for evaluating m o n etary policy. A ccording to T ay lo r (1997) it could be helpful in creating o f a m ore com plex m on etary policy rule.
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Jarosław Janecki
RYS HISTORYCZNY POLITYKI PIENIĘŻNEJ W POLSCE: REGUŁA TAYLORA (Streszczenie)
W artykule omówiono zagadnienie dotyczące prowadzenia w Polsce polityki pieniężnej przy wykorzystaniu metodologii, którą zaproponował John B. Taylor. Funkcja, znana powszechnie pod nazwą „reguły Taylora”, opisuje optymalną politykę pieniężną, prowadzoną w gospodarce zamkniętej, gdzie stopy procentowe ustalane przez władze monetarne zależą od kształtowania się odchylenia realnego produktu krajowego brutto od produktu potencjalnego oraz odchylenia stopy inflacji od wyznaczonego celu inflacyjnego. Toteż najpierw podsumowano różne podejścia do koncepcji Taylora oraz zaprezentowano różne problemy dotyczące obliczeń „reguły Taylora”. Następnie przedstawiono metodologię zastosowaną do obliczenia „stopy Taylora” dla polskiej gospodarki dla okresu 1999-2004. Wyniki obliczeń oraz ocenę prowadzonej przez bank centralny polityki pieniężnej w Polsce zawarto w końcowej części artykułu.
