P r z e m y s ł a w K a c z m a r e k
IS IT JUSTIFIED TO TALK ABOUT LEGAL
ETHNOCENTRISM?
Th e aim of this article is to answer the topic question: is it reasonable to talk about legal ethnocentrism as a personal point of view? To answer the question, it is nec-essary fi rst to present the term of ethnocentrism, and next to consider the possibil-ity of its application to the consideration of the concept of law.
1. Ethnocentrism as a consequence of interpretationism
Th e ethnocentric can be analysed not only referring to the change in the under-standing of the term culture, but also to the assumptions due to which it (the ap-proach) can be derived. In this context, ethnocentrism can be defi ned as a conse-quence of interpretationism. Th e reference to interpretationism results from, on the one hand, the knowledge of this project in the legal environment1. On the other hand, it is an eff ect of the connection of two hermeneutical traditions in it, which are oft en contradictory, and which in the article will be studied as projects that complete each other2. Interpretationism binds the process of text interpreta-tion with the process of constructing its meaning. Th erefore, there is no need to refer to other projects, which, if I am not mistaken, talk about a similar tendency (e.g. social constructivism). Starting from them, we can observe a turn towards 1 See A. Kozak, Granice prawniczej władzy dyskrecjonalnej, Wrocław 2002, especially chapters I and II.
2 I mean here the hermeneutics that refers to the interpretation of: a) P. Ricoeur as texts inter-pretation and b) H.-G. Gadamer as a theory of understanding.
culture and ascribing the creative function to it (a culturalist – constructivist as-sumption). To prove it, it is best to refer to cultural research that allows to illustrate the thesis according to which it is possible to decode assumptions characteristic for interpretationism at the basis of the ethnocentric approach3.
A reference to cultural studies indicates that it is reasonable to analyse a com-munity as a social group or an ethnic group, which is created on the foundation of a given culture. Th is diff erentiation (into a professional community and an ethnic community) has been deeply rooted in academic literature, which can be seen in speaking of ethnocentrism in two various meanings, which lead respectively to the “tender” and “tough-minded” attitudes4. Th e fi rst attitude is based on the assump-tion that every community follows a specifi c instituassump-tional structure, which allows it to fulfi ll the functions defi ned in society. Ethnocentrism in this understanding is not universal, it does not impose its point of view on other groups. Th e “tough-minded” ethnocentrism, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that the standpoint represented by a community is the only right one. In this analysis, the fi rst of the presented meanings will be used. It means that, talking about ethnocen-trism, we do not refer to the pejorative treatment of the groups that do not belong to the community that “we” are members of5. It is refl ected in presenting ethno-centrism as a natural consequence of the inability to look from nowhere, without anchoring to a specifi c point of view, and not as an endeavour to evaluate others with our own measure6. Ethnocentrism, in this understanding, is perceived as the starting point for a given group of professionals, and not as a demand to place “our” own vision of the world above other social practices. Th erefore, when talking about ethnocentrism, it is emphasised that it defi nes a specifi c way of perceiving social reality. It can be specifi ed as an internal perspective, which indicates that it is the
3 Th is problem is studied in the article Pytanie o użyteczność perspektywy (etno)centrycznej dla
rozważań nad prawem [in:] Ponowoczesność. Z zagadnień teorii i fi lozofi i prawa, M. Błachut (ed.),
Wrocław 2007, pp. 143–148.
4 In this respect I refer to the diff erentiation by M.J. Herskovits, see Z. Gierszewski, Kultura,
moralność, względność. Doktryna relatywizmu kulturowego M.J. Herskovitsa, Poznań 2000, chapter
3.2. W.J. Burszta also writes about the diff erentiation in Antropologia kultury. Tematy, teorie,
inter-pretacje, Poznań 1998, chapter I, especially, p. 18. See also R. Rorty, Wprowadzenie: antyreprezenta-cjonizm, etnocentryzm i liberalizm and O etnocentryzmie: odpowiedź Cliff ordowi Geertzowi [in:] Obiektywność, relatywizm i prawda. Pisma fi lozofi czne. Volume I, transl. J. Margański, pp. 29–31 and
303–313.
5 M. Buchowski, W.J. Burszta, O założeniach interpretacji antropologicznej, Warszawa 1992, pp. 69–70 and 88.
position of a community member that makes it possible to describe social reality7. However, it is worth paying attention to the fact that diff erentiating the mentioned attitudes of ethnocentrism (“tender” and “tough-minded”) basing on the kind of community, ethnic and professional respectively, seems problematic since it leads to a conclusion that an ethnic community, contrary to a professional one, always issues demands as to imposing its views on other communities. It seems, though, that both a professional community and an ethnic one can, and oft en does, issue demands as to the universality of their views.
Th e ethnocentric approach can be qualifi ed as a project which includes in its scope the “culture” in various branches of humanistic knowledge. Th e term of culture is a factor on the basis of which a fundamental category of community is created for the ethnocentric standpoint. Th e use of the term “culture” results in specifi c consequences. One of them is the obligation to explain the meaning I use the term in. Nevertheless, I do not intend to present its particular defi nitions, since it has already been done in academic writing8. Instead, I will refer to the descriptive and symbolic understanding of culture. Th e acceptance of the fi rst of the above mentioned interpretations leads to talking about culture referring to the elements that make it possible to describe it as the foundation of a community construction. It means that the descriptive understanding studies culture as a collection of be-lieves, values on the basis of which a given community is created. In this stand-point, the values, habits, norms and standards of behaviour characteristic for a given community are emphasised. Whereas the second of the specifi ed stand-points (the symbolic one) is preoccupied with symbolic forms. In such a case, talking about culture leads to the study of phenomena and actions which create something that, according to P. Berger and N. Luckmann, can be specifi ed as social creation of reality9. Th e symbolic view emphasises the power of language and the specifi c rules of using it. Such a means of thinking about culture leads to analysing it in the area of symbolic acts, which can be read due to the knowledge of the cul-ture that creates them. Both the defi ned understandings (of culcul-ture) seem to be connected by C. Geertz10. On the one hand, he describes culture as a collection of 7 Th e internal and external viewpoint is analysed by H.L.A. Hart, see Pojęcie prawa, transl. J. Wo-leński, Warszawa 1998, pp. 127–129.
8 W. Gromski writes on the subject in Autonomia i instrumentalny charakter prawa, Wrocław 2000, ch. II, esp., pp. 44–46; K. Stasiuk, Krytyka kultury jako krytyka komunikacji. Pomiędzy
działa-niem komunikacyjnym, dyskursem a kulturą masową, Wrocław 2003, pp. 10–11.
9 P.L. Berger, T. Luckmann, Społeczne tworzenie rzeczywistości, transl. J. Niżnik, Warszawa 1983. 10 C. Geertz writes that culture is “an ordered set of meanings and symbols (…) by means of which individuals defi ne their world, express their feelings and make their judgments (…) a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate,
believes that abide in a given community, i.e. as a collection of features that defi ne a particular culture in the social space. On the other hand, he defi nes the term “culture” as a system of common meanings, which constitutes the basis of the proc-ess of interpretation. He believes that taking culture into consideration, it is impos-sible not to present the elements that create the image of a community, and smul-taneously make it possible to interpret the actions of the community members. It means connecting the view of culture as a system of symbols and meanings, which constitute an institutional sphere, with the view of culture as a practice that makes acting possible11. Th e understanding of culture presented by C. Geertz includes normative evaluations (setting the goals to realise) and directival evaluations (de-scribing the means of achieving the goals). Culture in such an understanding is called sociopragmatic, since it is analysed in reference to a specifi c social practice, which is identifi ed with the community in which the given kinds of evaluations passed the test of acceptance. Th is defi nition of culture, one that emphasises the local aspect by referring it to a specifi c community, is characteristic of interpreta-tionism, on which the ethnocentric approach is based. As C. Geertz writes, “(…) a man is an animal suspended in webs of signifi cance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning”12. Culture is the context in which the interpretation process is “immersed”. Th e language of culture has a symbolic function, since it is the carrier of meaning, it articulates the image of reality. An interpreter learns an object through the identity of culture. Th erefore, cognition is not possible when separated from the cultural context. It is the context that defi nes and creates an object. It means that the process of inter-pretation is a kind of cultural analysis. Th erefore, defi ning the meaning of an object is based on “immersing” it in the culture in which it functions. Culture is “embod-ied” in symbols by which the reality is created, including both the object and sub-ject of cognition. Th erefore, an obligatory condition to endow an object with mean-ing is its cultural interpretation, one which includes the social context in which the
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life”, see Rytuał a zmiana
spo-łeczna: przykład jawajski, [in:] Interpretacja kultur. Wybrane eseje, transl. M.M. Piechaczek, Kraków
2005, p. 219. See also J. Kmita, Konieczne serio ironisty, Poznań 2007, ch. II.
11 Th is is how W.H. Sewell talks about culture, see L. Kochanowicz, Wspólnota i emancypacje.
Spór o społeczeństwo postkonwencjonalne, Wrocław 2005, pp. 71–73.
12 Th is quote constitutes the starting point for outlining the interpretive theory of culture, see C. Geertz, Opis gęsty: w poszukiwaniu interpretatywnej teorii kultury [in:] Interpretacja…, p. 19.
object functions. Th e mentioned “immersion” of an object in cultural interpreta-tion is something that the anthropologists’ interpretainterpreta-tionism opts for13.
However, the anthropological tradition is not the only one which interpreta-tionism “stems from”. Another one that refers to the (tradition of) pragmatic phi-losophy is presented by H. Lenk14. Th is author, trying to answer the question, what interpretationism is, quotes the words of St. John the Evangelist, “In the beginning was the Word” to claim referring to it that “In the beginning was the interpretation”. Th is statement can be read as a recognition that the basis of and an element that constructs reality is interpretation15. H. Lenk, referring to the tradition of Kant, assumes that interpretationism defends the thesis that cognition of reality in the process of interpretation denotes the creation of the reality. Th us, an interpreter is a member of the creation of reality, or, in more detail, of the subreality in which he functions. It means supporting the thesis that reality is a construct of interpreta-tion. Th is thesis states that thinking about reality and assuming that it exists is the result of an act of interpretation16.
Both the presented traditions of analysing interpretationism are coherent with each other17. A reference to them makes it possible to place interpretationism as a project which evokes refl ection on the opposition subject – object of cognition18. Such a placement makes it possible to understand interpretationism as a path that
13 C. Geertz, Opis gęsty: w poszukiwaniu interpretatywnej teorii kultury [in:] Interpretacja…, pp. 29–36. Th e concept of interpretive anthropology in Polish writings is mostly presented by W.J. Burszta, see Różnorodność i tożsamość. Antropologia jako kulturowa refl eksyjność, Poznań 2004, ch. IV.
14 H. Lenk defi nes two basic kinds of interpretationism: the transcendental and the methodolo-gical one. In my analysis I use the fi rst of the given understandings, see Filozofi czny zarys
transcen-dentalnego interpretacjonizmu [in:] Filozofi a pragmatycznego interpretacjonizmu, transl. Z. Zwoliński,
Warszawa 1995, passim, esp, pp. 15 and next.
15 H. Lenk, Filozofi czny zarys transcendentalnego interpretacjonizmu [in:] Filozofi a…, pp. 9 and next.
16 H. Lenk, Interpretacja i interpretator [in:] Filozofi a…, p. 207.
17 In this respect, the quote of A. Szahaj is of considerable importance: “some of our points of view on the world are so conventionalised that we fail to notice that they are social constructs, and not natural objects outside society or culture, which result from some necessity specifi ed by the object itself. Th is is why there is a conviction of the existence of some literal meaning of a text. It can be spoken of only with respect to some culture or its fragment, referring to some interpretive com-munity that uses its own version of a given culture or even creating a diff erent culture”, see
Paninter-pretacjonizm, czyli nie ma niczego w tekście, czego by pierwej nie było w kontekście (odpowiedź krytykom), “Teksty Drugie” 1998, no. 4, p. 86. See also in this no. the text by W. Kalaga, Tradycja – tekst – interpretacja, esp., pp. 100–103.
objects to the treatment of a community member as a neutral subject19. Interpre-tationism, by placing a subject in a community, defends the thesis that: a) the meaning that is ascribed to a text is socially constructed, and b) every community creates an institutional subworld. In addition, it accepts that there are numerous social practices, and all of them grant their members with something that can be called local knowledge. Th is knowledge, on the one hand, makes it possible for the members of social relations to get to know reality by equipping them with spe-cifi c rules of reading signs. On the other hand, this knowledge creates a structure of behaviour imperatives which gains the dimension of objectivity, thus creating a subreality in the scope of the studied social practice. Th ese claims are derived from the assumptions of interpretationism. It assumes that the meaning that is given to a particular sentence is revealed neither by an interpreter nor by the text or intertextual relations, but it remains the creation of social practice. Th erefore, the reading of a statement is creating, since it includes the cultural identity, which is not as much subjective as social in character. Th e meaning is a social construct, and thus a particular practice can give it the status of an onstitutional fact, which points to other members how they should understand the object. Such a standpoint seems to agree with the view expressed by C. Geertz, when it defends the thesis that the meaning “comes to exist only within language games, communities of discourse, intersubjective systems of reference, ways of world making; that it aris-es within the frame of concrete social interaction in which something is a some-thing for a you and a me, and not in some secret grotto in the head; and that it is through and through historical, hammered out in the fl ow of events (…)”20. It leads to the conclusion that the process of interpretation is set to the identity of the social group in which it is conducted. Whereas, the object of interpretation is the social discourse in the area of which we “immerse” the analysed sentence21. Such an understanding of interpretationism suggests that the identity of a community creates the reality which is objective to the community members, and to other subjects it is (can be) subjective in character. Th e created subreality has got the status of local knowledge because the statements formed in the area of the com-munity must pass the test of truthfulness due to the rules of cultural interpretation
19 See e.g. H. Červinkkova, Trzydzieści lat po fakcie. Uwagi o programie interpretacyjnym Cliff
or-da Geertza, transl. L. Rasiński [in:] Cliff ord Geertz – lokalna lektura, ed. by D. Wolska, M. Brocki,
Kraków 2003, pp. 119 and next.
20 C. Geertz, Pożytki z różnorodności [in:] Zastane światło. Antropologiczne refl eksje na tematy
fi lozofi czne, transl. Z. Pucek, Kraków 2003, p. 99.
21 C. Geertz, Opis gęsty: w poszukiwaniu interpretatywnej teorii kultury [in:] Interpretacja…, pp. 17 and next.
that abide in it. Th e local aspect indicates that it is the cultural factor on which interpretationism is based that is neither universal nor predisposing to form state-ments outside the cultural verifi cation on the basis of which they are constructed22. By rendering the cultural factor the foundation of the process of interpretation, it is indicated that culture can be understood as a collection of convictions that as-cribe meaning to the analysed text. Resultantly, the rules which are understood according to J. Kmita as the rules of cultural interpretation, shape the meaning of a text, as well as the text itself as the object of study23. Th ese rules are revealed in the system of institutions and in the actions of the community members. Accom-panying the change of (these) believes, the rules of behaviour are also transformed. C. Geertz seems to mean the above when writing about law he claims, “Law, I have been saying, somewhat against the pretensions encoded in woolsack rhetoric, is local knowledge; local not just as to place, time, class, and variety of issue, but as to accent – vernacular characterizations of what happens connected to vernacular imaginings of what can. It is this complex of characterizations and imaginings, stories about events cast in imagery about principles, that I have been calling a le-gal sensitivity24”.
Taking the above into consideration, it is reasonable to claim that interpreta-tionism leads to adopting an approach that can be defi ned as ethnocentric. Talking about the approach, I mean a thought structure consisting of convictions approved in a particular social group which specifi es the rules of interpretation. Referring to the term of a community results from the recognition that getting to know real-ity equals with its simultaneous creation, since it does not exist in separation from the community, from the view that it equips its members with25. Understanding ethnocentrism as an approach results in specifi c consequences. Among them, the basic ones concern defi ning the assumptions by which the approach can be dif-ferentiated. It probably will not be a mistake to claim that ethnocentrism, referring
22 Th is thesis is based on the ideas of C. Geertz, see Wiedza lokalna. Fakt i prawo w perspektywie
porownawczej [in:] Wiedza lokalna. Dalsze eseje z zakresu antropologii interpretatywnej, transl.
D. Wol-ska, Kraków 2005, esp, pp. 211–215.
23 J. Kmita, Z metodologicznych problemów interpretacji humanistycznej, Warszawa 1971, pp. 34–36. See also A. Kozak, Reguły interpretacji kulturowej a reguły dokonywania czynności
konwencjo-nalnej [in:] Z zagadnień teorii i fi lozofi i prawa. Kompetencja ze stanowiska teorii i fi lozofi i prawa, ed.
by W. Jedlecka, Wrocław 2004, pp. 154 and next.
24 C. Geertz, Wiedza lokalna. Fakt i prawo w perspektywie porownawczej [in:] Wiedza lokalna…, pp. 211–212.
25 S. Fish, Jak rozpoznać wiersz, gdy się go widzi [in:] Interpretacja, retoryka, polityka. Eseje
wy-brane, ed. by A. Szahaj, Kraków 2002, pp. 91 and 97; idem, Krytyczna samoświadomość albo czy mo-żemy wiedzieć, co robimy? [in:] Interpretacja…, p. 381.
to interpretationism, defends the thesis: a) there is no object without an interpreta-tion, b) on the locality of social practices26.
2. The ethnocentric approach in legal projects
Th e question whether the presented understanding of ethnocentrism can be ap-plied in legal studies can be answered positively for at least a few reasons. Among them, the most valid one is that makes it possible to notice that the application of ethnocentrism to legal studies has already been performed in two ways. On the one hand, law as a social phenomena constitutes the object of interest for the au-thors that believe in the ethnocentric approach27. On the other hand, though, in legal studies it is possible to fi nd projects that refer to the assumptions of the dis-cussed approach. Among them, it is possible to enumerate the project a) of the integral concept of law by R. Dworkin, b) of the juriscentric model of legal practice by A. Kozak. Th ey do not cover all the examples of projects that refer to ethnocen-trism or that are close to this tradition. Th is list can be expanded by e.g. the socio-linguistic to legal language by T. Gizbert-Studnicki, or the construct of the pri-mary and secondary rules by Hart28. I would like to draw attention to the praised projects by R. Dworkin, and A. Kozak, since they try to break the legal epistemol-ogy that is based on opposing the object and the cognitive subject; i.e. on the problem typical for ethnocentrism29. Th e choice results also from the fact that the concepts, although constructed in a distinct legal “environment”, express a similar idea as to the understanding of law and of the role of a lawyer30.
26 M. Zemło, Socjologia wiedzy w tradycji interakcyjno-fenomenologicznej, Lublin 2003, ch. III, esp., pp. 252–254 and 287–288.
27 R. Schott, Die Einheit der Rechtskultur in der Vielheit der Rechtskulturen, “Archiv für Rechts und Socialphilosophie” 1984, no. 22, pp. 158 and next; P. Sack, Ethnographische Beobachtung als Basis
fur die Rechtsvergleichung, “Archiv für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie” 1984, no. 22, pp. 182 and next.
In Polish see B. Wojciechowski, Rola antropologii prawniczej w badaniach prawnoporownawczych [in:] Prawoznawstwo a praktyka stosowania prawa, ed. by Z. Tobor, co-ed. I. Bogucka, Katowice 2002, pp. 66 and next.
28 See T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Język prawny z perspektywy socjolingwistycznej, Kraków 1986; H.L.A. Hart, Pojęcie prawa, transl. J. Woleński, Warszawa 1998.
29 Th e attitude is described by M. Zirk-Sadowski, Pozytywizm prawniczy a fi lozofi czna opozycja
podmiotu i przedmiotu poznania [in:] Studia z fi lozofi i prawa, ed. by J. Stelmach, Kraków 2001, passim.
See also A. Kaufmann, Problemgesichichte der Rechtsphilosophie [in:] A. Kaufmann, W. Hassemer,
Einfuhrung in Rechtsphilospie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart, Heidelberg 1985, p. 122.
30 I am of course aware of the diff erences among the discussed projects. I will not present them here since the enumerated concepts are not the object of this article.
Dworkin’s project of the concept of law refers to ethnocentrism in two elements, i.e.: a) in the research approach – its integral character, b) in the understanding of an interpretive community – its function.
Using the adjective “integral” to describe the concept of law by Dworkin denotes the adopted understanding of law and the function that the theory of law carries31. Let us start from considering the understanding of the theory of law. Th e adjective “integral” points at a specifi c function of the theory of law. It is the justifi cation of the activity of legal practice. It means, as Z. Pulka claims, that “the image of legal practice created by the theory of law should be an image that, on the one hand, refl ects as accurately as possible what the practice really is, and on the other hand agrees to the maximum with a specifi c ideal of law”32. Assuming that legal practice is an interpretive practice, argumentative in character, the function of theory, then, is providing it with justifi cation of its activity. In the presented approach, theory becomes a general part of legal practice, a part that provides it with the bases of legal argumentation, and next justifi es the decisions that are taken. Such an under-standing of theory delimits its space and its research procedure. Th e space is spec-ifi ed by issues connected with the theory of legislation, of the judiciary, and the rule of law. While the fi rst leads to considering the creation of law, the theory of legislative justice, rationality of an employer, the second directs the study toward creating standards of a judge’s adjudication. Th e third issue of the rule of law con-nects the two above, since it covers the theory of obeying and executing the law. Concern with the mentioned issues leads to adopting a specifi c perspective, which is: of a legislator, a judge and a subject. In other words, the issue of legislation is accompanied by the perspective of a legislator, the issue of the judiciary – a judge, and the issue of the rule of law – a subject.
Whereas, integrity in the understanding of law refers to two dimensions: a leg-islative and a judiciary one. While the fi rst one binds legislators to create a legal text taking into consideration the already known solutions, the judiciary dimen-sion points at understanding law as a story to which consecutive interpreters add next fragments33. Although R. Dworkin bases his project of legal integrity on dif-ferentiating both the mentioned dimensions, he undoubtedly views them together as rules of political integrity34. Th erefore, the mentioned dimensions can be seen 31 It is presented by J. Woleński, Wstęp. Integralna fi lozofi a prawa Ronalda Dwornika [in:] R. Dworkin, Biorąc prawa poważnie, transl. J. Woleński, Warszawa 1998, pp. 5–6. See also R. Dworkin,
Biorąc prawa…, ch. IV, Imperium prawa, transl. J. Winczorek, Kraków 2007, ch. VI and VII.
32 Z. Pulka, Struktura poznania fi lozofi cznego, Wrocław 2004, p. 182. 33 R. Dworkin, Imperium…, ch. VI.
through the prism of the postulated coherency between the rules of creation or interpretation of a legal text, or of joining the process of legislation and reading of the law35. It is worth looking closer at both the enumerated aspects, trying to an-swer the question: what is the nature of this integrity?
Th e integral concept defi nes law as a set of rules, principles and policies. Th e rules specify the model of expected behaviour. Th eir scope is specifi ed in detail. Th erefore, responding to a rule, you can either obey it or not, it is impossible to realise it partially. Policies, on the other hand, are a kind of standard, defi ned as a political necessity, which sets the goals to fulfi ll, usually in the sphere of economy, of politics or of the social life of a community. Principles are standards that must be conformed to, since they are obligations resulting from justice, honesty, de-cency, or other instance of morality. Th e values expressed by the rules constitute models, points of reference for legal practice. Th eir scope of usage is underdefi ned, since they reveal not really orders / bans concerning behaviour, but a specifi c ar-gumentation, which should be taken into consideration by the executive body36. Th us, law is analysed from the perspective of a complex structure comprised of principles and policies, as well as of acts and precedences.
Th e fact that the concept of Dworkin can be called integral is also perceived as a consequence of the fact that it connects the abiding formal and factual. Taking rules into consideration, the basis of their force is the legal text of which they are derived. Whereas the prerequisite of obeying the rules is institutional support or the feeling of usage, i.e. social recognition in a given community37.
Th e integrity of the analysed concept is foremost expressed in the ability of viewing the process of legislation and reading of law as a whole38. Referring to the metaphor according to which law is a novel written by consecutive interpreters, makes it possible to connect both processes: of legislation and reading of law. Law is understood as a cultural fact, reconstructed and learned in the process of inter-pretation. Interpretation is perceived as an act of understanding of the social prac-tice, and theory as a justifi cation of legal practice by endowing it with the most
35 R. Dworkin seems to notice the possibility of joining the two dimensions into one, see
Impe-rium…, p. 177. See also J. Wróblewski, Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, “Państwo i Prawo” 1988, no. 3,
p. 125.
36 R. Dworkin, Biorąc…, p. 96. In Polish writings the issue is analysed by W. Lang, J. Wróblewski,
Wsp`ołczesna fi lozofi a i teoria prawa w USA, Warszawa 1986, pp. 74–96.
37 Such an understanding of integrity, as far as law is concerned, seems to refer to the project by Habermas presented in Faktyczność i obowiązywanie. Teoria dyskursu wobec zagadnień prawa
i de-mokratycznego państwa prawnego, transl. A. Romaniuk, R. Marszałek, Warszawa 2005.
38 B. Wojciechowski, Dyskrecjonalność sędziowska. Studium teoretycznoprawne, Toruń 2004, p. 46.
consistent axiology possible, especially as to the ethical dimension of law39. An interpreter, reading the law, shapes it at the same time, since he adds next chapters of the novel, which can infl uence another process of interpretation. If the studied case is similar to the one analysed before, then, in accordance with the approach adopted before, it should infl uence the decision. It means that the decision consti-tutes one of the components of the next decision that will be reached in a similar case. It is caused by the fact that an interpreter does not only read the law, but cre-ates it at the same time. Th e metaphor of law as a novel, seems to be not only op-timising in character, since it does not concern the law understood as a text40. We are convinced of the above by making an interpreter a member of culture that also shapes the law. Such an approach to the process of interpretation makes it possible o step away from the dichotomy of legislation – execution of the law and from problems connected with it, which concern such issues as setting boundaries between them, as well as serves (sustaining) coherency in the law (e.g. between the rules of editing and interpreting a legal text)41. Th is aspect of legal integrity seems to be fundamental for R. Dworkin. He specifi es it as the interpretive foundation that connects tradition with the present and the future. Th is idea is illustrated by comparing the law to writing a novel by various authors. Accepting the metaphor makes it possible to defend the thesis according to which, “Legal integrity rejects therefore as useless the eternal question if judges fi nd or invent the law; the legal way of thinking can only be comprehended that they perform both the things together, and they do neither of them at the same time”42.
Another element of the concept of Dworkin that seems to refer to ethnocen-trism can be noticed when endeavouring to answer the question: what is the source of an interpretive authority43? R. Dworkin, when answering the question, rejects the authority of a legal text, just like the role of an interpreter who would hold this function. He refers to the term of an interpretive community, trying to fi nd there a support for the law. To do so, he uses the metaphor of “chain enterprises”44. It is supposed to illustrate the process of interpretation which in this approach is a con-sequence of institutional history comprised of decisions, structures, and conven-39 S. Wronkowska [in:] S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii prawa, Poznań 1997, p. 80. 40 Comp. R. Sarkowicz, O rozumieniu sp`ojności w interpretacji prawniczej [in:] Teoria prawa.
Wsp`ołczesne prawo i prawoznawstwo, Toruń 1988, p. 268.
41 M. Zirk-Sadowski, Wprowadzenie do fi lozofi i prawa, Zakamycze 2000, p. 213. 42 R. Dworkin, Imperium…, p. 227.
43 R. Dworkin, Trudne sprawy [in:] Biorąc prawa poważnie, transl. T. Kowalski, Warszawa 1998; idem, Imperium…, pp. 210–216.
tions. Assuming that law is understood as a novel to which more chapters are added means that each interpreter is obliged on the one hand to know the chapters that have previously been written, and on the other hand to create new ones. Th is creation can be based on developing a current thought, or on turning into an-other direction when the continuation of the current case analysis would be wrong. However, in such a case, according to R. Dworkin, the doctrine of integrity obliges the interpreter to refer to the already existent judiciary line, specifying its inade-quacy45. A body that controls how an interpreter fulfi lls both functions, especially as far as the creation of new chapters is concerned, is an interpretive community. To look for the basis and for the boundary of legal practice in the community is close to the ethnocentric project. It is worth emphasising that R. Dworkin, referring to the term of an interpretive community, already in the beginning states that he does not mean a community in a homogeneous understanding, i.e. a community in which there are no arguments. Taking the above into consideration, he summons the vision of law as a “chessboard” on which various judiciary or legislative strate-gies are allowed. Such a reservation denotes that an institutional structure is not treated as something given, but as something that is in the process of creation. It serves to prevent a situation in which an interpreter, referring to the existent tradi-tion, would not be able to change it if it were wrong46. A community understood in such a way is specifi ed by R. Dworkin as “a community of principles” and as one that is based on the “we” perspective, which refers to the ethnocentric view of social reality47.
It is not the only project which refers to ethnocentrism. Another one is the ju-riscentric model of legal practice by A. Kozak. In his works, ethnocentrism is pre-dominantly visible in the assumptions on which the project is based, namely on interpretationism and institutionalisation48. Th e reference to interpretationism serves A. Kozak to oppose the vision of Descartes, which is expressed by the op-position subject – object of cognition. Th e opposition is based on questioning the existence of a subject – as the cognitive one and of an object – as the one endowed with an ontological status. Th e reference to institutionalisation, to specify the social
45 R. Dworkin, Trudne sprawy [in:] Biorąc…, p. 170.
46 Th e aim of the study is to show the similarities between ethnocentrism and the concept of R. Dworkin. Th e diff erences between them are presented by S. Fish, see Praca w łańcuchu:
interpre-tacja w prawie i literaturze [in:] Interpreinterpre-tacja…, pp. 227 and next.
47 See the description of the “community of principles” presented by R. Dworkin, Imperium…, pp. 212–216. Comp. M. Smolak, Uzasadnienie sądowe jako argumentacja z moralności politycznej.
O legitymizacji władzy sędziowskiej, Zakamycze 2003, part I, ch. 3.6.
creation of reality, can be read as a consequence of interpretationism. Th e recogni-tion of the fact that social reality is not something given, but an eff ect of crearecogni-tion in the area of various institutions, leads to undermining the vision of Descartes. It is expressed in the thesis that A. Kozak defends: “In reality, a subject exists in insti-tutions (and only provided that the instiinsti-tutions allow it), and instiinsti-tutions manifest their existence by what we are used to calling a subject”49. Th e thesis boils down to accepting that the thinking of a subject is burdened with an institutional impera-tive. Th e presented model of legal practice, defi ned as juriscentric, is based on an assumption according to which law is understood as an eff ect of social creation by individual actors. Th e process of the creation of law is institutionalised in charac-ter, in the meaning that we act by the power of institutional imperatives, which show the individual actors how they should behave and which actions to take. Th is results in accepting that the limits of legal practice are set by culture. It sketches the research perspective, which, referring to the “we” category, is the identifi cation of the internal point of view characteristic for the members of culture. Th e pro-gramme of juriscentrism it, by defi nition, an answer to the question about the limits of legal authority. Resultantly, one of the theses defended by A. Kozak states as follows: “It is from the perspective of a diff erent social institution (…) that law-yers’ actions seem to be arbitrary and authoritarian. From within the institutional perspective of law the scope of our discretion can appear (…) considerably small-er than it is gensmall-erally believed”50.
3. Legal ethnocentrism?
Taking the above considerations into concern, it is possible to state that ethnocen-trism is applied to studies of law. On the one hand, ethnocentric thinking is present in legal refl ection on the law, which can be illustrated by the juriscentric model of legal practice. On the other hand, referring to the term of an interpretative com-munity as a factor that conditions the existence and functioning of a legal discourse is also present in legal studies, which can be illustrated by the project by Dworkin 49 A. Kozak, Trzy modele praktyki prawniczej [in:] Studia z fi lozofi i prawa, p. 2, J. Stelmach (ed.), Kraków 2003.
50 A. Kozak, Granice prawniczej …, p. 160. “In the heart of the matter, the term of discretional authority seems to be a specifi cally outer term, thus one alien to lawyers. Th e term is used by outer observers, who can see a lot of alternatives to legal practice; alternatives that are perceived from other, specifi c to the observers, cognitive perspectives which are shaped in politics, economy, religion, etc. Lawyers themselves do not have to notice the perspectives”.
of “chain enterprises”, or the “community of principles”. A separate question re-mains whether it is reasonable to talk about legal ethnocentrism? Answering the question, it is possible to claim that both the specifi ed projects are based on the ethnocentric view of social reality. Th is remark can be justifi ed by assumptions that can be decoded from the project of legal integrity and of juriscentrism. Th us, R. Dworkin, when specifying legal integrity, states that he reveals an attitude that does not really answer the question what the law is, but what is the specifi city of its cognition. Th e cognition is based on adopting by an interpreter of an internal perspective51. A similar approach is characteristic for A. Kozak, who directly claims that the foundation of a juriscentric programme is made of an ethnocentric project52. Both the enumerated projects are based on similar assumptions, which are characteristic of interpretationism. Th ey defi ne culture as an element that specifi es legal practice53. For this reason, I believe it is reasonable to view both the projects as a consequence of using ethnocentrism in law. Can we therefore talk about legal ethnocentrism? Answering the question, I would like to refer to a project that is adopted in Polish legal culture, instead of talking about legal ethnocentrism54. Th e project is juriscentrism, which is a result of ethnocentric perception of social reality. I understand juriscentrism not as a complete project, but rather as an idea whose content can be specifi ed in more detail referring to ethnocentrism.
51 R. Dworkin, Imperium…, pp. 49 and 414. See also Z. Pulka, Hart-Dworkin dwa warianty
“we-wnętrznego” postrzegania prawa, “Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis” 1999, no. 2142, „Przegląd Prawa
i Administracji” XLII, pp. 29–30.
52 A. Kozak, when writing about juriscentrism, emphasises that “Th e term consciously refers to the concept of ethnocentrism as the basis of the truth by Rorty. Rorty, accepting that the reality of the objects of culture is not outside thoughts in character (the fi rst thesis of interpretationism), se-arched for an explanation for them in the social forms of human existence, in the culture produced by society in the net of internal and external interaction, which shapes individual members of socie-ty functionally as to the needs of the whole (the second thesis of interpretationism), see Granice
prawniczej…, p. 138.
53 R. Dworkin writes, “Th e number of possible interpretations is limited by history, by the form that practice takes, or by the object of its interest (…). from the constructivist point of view, creative interpretation is the matter of interaction between her aim and her object”, see Imperium…, p. 52.
54 P. Kaczmarek, Pytanie o użyteczność perspektywy (etno)centrycznej dla rozważań nad prawem [in:] Ponowoczesność…, pp. 152–157.
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SUMMARY
Th e purpose of my article is to give an answer to the crucial question: is it reasonable to talk about legal ethnocentrism as an inner standpoint? I would like to do so by presenting ethnocentrism as a consequence of interpretationism. Th is reference ought to illustrate the theory according to which in the basics of ethnological point of view we can decipher as-sumptions proper to interpretationism. Th e next stage in the process of realization of our task is the analysis of legal projects which refer to the ethnological stand point – for exam-ple Roland Dworkin’s integral concept or the juriscentrism of Artur Kozak. In relation to those attitudes I will try to show that ethnocentric thinking is present in the legal refl ection on law. Nevertheless, my statement is not an acceptance of speaking about legal ethnocen-trism, but it serves only to point out the need for precision of legal projects which refer to ethnocentrism.
