The recursive interaction of institutional fields and managerial legitimation in large-scale projects

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Delft University of Technology

The recursive interaction of institutional fields and managerial legitimation in large-scale

projects

Hetemi, Ermal; Marrewijk, Alfons van; Jerbrant, Anna; Bosch-Rekveldt, Marian

DOI

10.1016/j.ijproman.2020.11.004

Publication date

2021

Document Version

Final published version

Published in

International Journal of Project Management

Citation (APA)

Hetemi, E., Marrewijk, A. V., Jerbrant, A., & Bosch-Rekveldt, M. (2021). The recursive interaction of

institutional fields and managerial legitimation in large-scale projects. International Journal of Project

Management, 39(3), 295-307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2020.11.004

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InternationalJournalofProjectManagement39(2021)295–307

ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

International

Journal

of

Project

Management

journalhomepage:www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

The

recursive

interaction

of

institutional

ﬁelds

and

managerial

legitimation

in

large-scale

projects

Ermal

Hetemi

a,∗

_,

_Alfons

_van

_Marrewijk

b,c,d

_,

_Anna

_Jerbrant

a

_,

_Marian

_{Bosch-Rekveldt}

c

a KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden b Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands c Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands d BI Norwegian Business School, Norway

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Keywords:

Large-scale projects Industry

Institutional ﬁeld complexity Legitimacy

Institutional theory Case study

a

b

s

t

r

a

c

t

Heedingrecentcallsformorestudiesontherelationshipbetweenprojectsandinstitutions,thispaperreportsona collaborativecasestudytoshedlightontherecursiverelationsoflarge-scaleprojectsandtheirinstitutionalfields. Giventheindustryasthefield-levelinstitution,thisstudyexploreshowtwoprojectorganizationsexperienced theindustrychanges,itsinfluenceonthearrangementoflarge-scaleprojects,andthemanagementresponse usedtolegitimizethesearrangements.ThequalitativesecondarydataanalysisoftwoHigh-Speedrailprojects inSpainandTheNetherlandsisbasedonsemi-structuredinterviews,observations,anddocumentanalysis.This paperprovidestheinstitutionalfields’contextualdetailanddeepensourunderstandingoftemporalinstitutional complexitythatboundlarge-scaleprojectarrangements.Thefindingssuggestthatinbothcasesthemanagement responsesalteredacrosstimeandevolveddependingonthesalienceoftheinstitutionalpressure,throughthe interplaywith1)regulative,2)normative,and3)dynamiccultural-cognitiveforces,resultingincyclesofproject legitimacy.

1. Introduction

An organizing form defined as megaproject, global project, or service-led project gained renowned influence in recent years (Scott, et al., 2011; Gemünden, 2015; Söderlund, et al., 2018). Theselabelsapplytolarge-scaleprojectsthattypicallyinvolve multi-organizationsanddeliverasubstantialphysicalinfrastructureora com-plexproductwithalifecyclethatcanextendfordecadesandacross in-dustries(Sanderson,2012;Scott&Levitt,2017;Hetemi,etal.,2020b). Large-scaleprojectsarecomplexendeavorsembeddedinhighly institu-tionalizedsocialstructures,involvingpublicandprivateactorswith var-iousrationalities,modesofcollaboration,andprojectmanagement com-petencies(Brunet,2019;Hetemi,Gemünden,&Ordieres-Meré,2020a; vanMarrewijk,2016).Whilelarge-scaleprojectsareanessential vehi-clefordevelopingsustainability-orientedinfrastructurethathelps over-comemanyoftoday’ssocietalconcerns,theirperformanceintermsof budgetandtimeremainspoor(Flyvbjerg,2014;Flyvbjergetal.,2018). Flyvbjergandcolleagueshavebeencentralinexplainingthe irrational-ityintheplanningoflarge-scaleprojectsandpointingtotheimportance of cost/benefit analysis for improved performance(Flyvbjerg etal.,

∗ _{Correspondence}_author_at:_Department_of_Industrial_Economics_and_Management,_KTH_Royal_Institute_of_Technology,_{Lindstedtsvägen}_30,_SE-100₄₄_Stockholm,

Sweden.

E-mail addresses: ermal.hetemi@indek.kth.se(E.Hetemi),a.h.van.marrewijk@vu.nl(A.vanMarrewijk),anna.jerbrant@indek.kth.se(A.Jerbrant), m.g.c.bosch-rekveldt@tudelft.nl(M.Bosch-Rekveldt).

2018).Theseinsights,however,highlightinstrumentalfactorsand con-sidertechnical elementsthat decontextualizetheprojectsfrom their environment(cf.Ainamoetal.,2010;Hetemi,Gemünden& Ordieres-Meré, 2020a),andprovidelimitedexplanatorypowerconcerning re-currentproblemswithlarge-scaleprojects(vanMarrewijketal.,2008). Thenewgenerationoflarge-scaleprojectscompelseﬀortsthatrequire managementtominimizeeﬀectsonthesurroundingenvironmentand seeklegitimacyfortheproject(Uriarte,2019;vandenEnde&van Mar-rewijk,2019).

Increasingly itis recognizedthatlarge-scaleprojectarrangements andtheirorganizinglargelydependonthecharacteristicsofthe institu-tionalﬁeldinwhichtheyoperate(Scott,2012;Biesenthaletal.,2018;

Lieftink,Smits&Lauche,2019;WinchandMaytorena-Sanchez,2020). Itisthesetofdecisions,goal-formulation,ﬁnancing,andlevelsofactor participationintheseprojects,whichwecalltheprojectarrangement.

DiMaggioandPowell(1983,p.148)definetheinstitutionalfieldas “rec-ognizedareasofinstitutionallife:keysuppliers,resourceandproduct consumers,regulatoryagencies,andotherorganizationsthatproduce similarservicesorproducts.” Giventhisdefinition,“industries” areoften seenasinstitutionalfields(e.g.,Zietsma,Groenewegen&Logue,2017;

Lieftinketal.,2019).Large-scaleprojectsextendacrosstheinstitutional

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2020.11.004

Received5December2019;Receivedinrevisedform17October2020;Accepted19November2020 Availableonline3December2020

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fields (Scott,2012; Dille,SöderlundandClegg,2018; Lieftinket al., 2019).Hence,thedevelopmentoftheseprojectsisrelatedto numer-oussalientinstitutional elementssuchastheregulatoryenvironment (Miller&Lessard,2000;Chi&Javernick-Will,2011),socialfootprint (i.e.,thesize,compositionandthepopulationsaffected)(DiMaddaloni &Davis,2017),environmentalcomplexity(Bosch-Rekveldtetal.,2011), etc.Yet, therelatively temporary nature andstructural hybridityof large-scaleprojectarrangementsallowsaresponsetoshiftingsituational challenges(Raynard,2016).Thechallenge,however,liesinfindinga dynamicbalancein responsetothetemporalinstitutionalfieldshifts (cf.Pemsel&Söderlund,2020).

Sofar,extantresearchhas,forthemostpart,notdealtwiththe dy-namicsofinstitutional ﬁeldshiftsandtheirinﬂuenceson large-scale projects.We agreewithotherscholars(e.g., Biesenthaletal., 2018;

Söderlund& Sydow,2019),that projectstudiesmayhavedescribed “what” institutionalforcesimpactlarge-scaleprojects.Yetweknowvery littleof“how” theseforcesinfluencethearrangementofprojectsand theirorganizingovertime.Hence,wealignourselveswithscholarswho exploretheinstitutionalprocesses– therelationbetweeninstitutional fieldsandlarge-scaleprojects(e.g.,Dille,etal.,2018;Lieftinketal., 2019;Matinheikki,Aaltonen&Walker,2019).Accordingly,ourstudy aimstounderstandhowinstitutionalfield(s)influencethearrangements oflarge-scaleprojectsandhowmanagerslegitimizethearrangements. Atthemostgenerallevel,legitimacyreferstothedegreeofalignment amongtheprojectorganization’sstructures,procedures,andtheorders andassumptionsofitsinstitutionalfield(Scott,2012).Wespecifically focusonhowtheinstitutionalfieldshiftovertime– theexisting indus-trialrestructuration– influencesthelarge-scaleprojectarrangements.

Tofullygrasphowshiftinginstitutionalfieldsinfluenceproject ar-rangements,wedrawfrom therecentstreamin institutionaltheory, emphasizinginstitutionalcomplexityandlegitimacy(Greenwoodetal., 2011;Raynard,2016).Weexplorehowindustry-widereformations pro-ducetemporalpressuresforprojectadaptation.Inthisview,project or-ganizationsdonotsimplyextractlegitimacyfromthefield-level institu-tions,butratherstruggletofindlegitimacy,inaplayingfieldinwhich institutionallogicsandprojectarrangementsincludinggoverning prac-ticesco-existandevolvethroughouttheprojectlifecycle.

Theinstitutionalapproachenablesustodeconstructthetemporal dy-namicandmultifacetedrelationshipbetweentheinstitutionalfieldand theprojectorganization(Söderlund&Sydow,2019).Itgivesaninsight intotheinter-institutionalnatureoflarge-scaleprojects(Dille& Söder-lund, 2011), characterized by multiple “authorities” and conflicting “stakeholders” profferingalternativebasesoflegitimation(Scottet.al., 2011,p.60).Methodologically,webuildonacollaborativecasestudy (Georgeetal.,2005),andusesecondaryanalysisofqualitativedatafrom twoin-depthcasestudies.TwoHigh-SpeedrailLine(HSL)projectswere studied: HSL Madrid-Barcelona (1990-2017, Spain), and HSL South (1998-2009,Netherlands).Datagatheredin1995-2018wasanalyzed, includingasubsetoftheprimarystudies’data,observations,official re-portsandinternaldocuments,17interviewsontheSpanishcase,and 19interviewsontheDutchcase.

Thisresearchisalignedwiththegrowinginterestsofproject schol-arsininstitutionaltheory(Bresnen,2016;Söderlund&Sydow,2019) andmakesatwo-foldcontributiontothedebateonlarge-scaleproject organizing. The first contribution is that we provide a detailed ac-countoftheeffectsoffieldrestructurationtolarge-scaleinfrastructure projectsasinter-organizationalsettingasaskedforbyothers(cf.Sydow &Braun,2018).Wefoundthatprojectactorresponseswerenotsingle andsustainableresponses,norframedthewholetimestrategicallyas frequentlyhighlighted(e.g.,Derakhshan, etal.,2019;Nguyenetal., 2019),butprimarilytemporalresponsesfocusedongainingsocial le-gitimacy. Inlight of the emergingindustryprinciples, new industry procedures,andsubstantiveagendas,diverselegitimacyapproaches co-occurredandalternated(i.e.,normative,technical,etc.),thus,creating whatwelabelascyclesofprojectlegitimacyprocess.Secondly,we de-velopadynamicandnuancedinsightconcerningtherecursiveinfluence

ofinstitutionalfieldsonprojectlifethroughtheroleofregulative, nor-mative,andcultural-cognitiveforcesthatthereformationof collabora-tionmanagement(re)createdthroughthecourseoflarge-scaleprojects. Ouranalysesestablisheddifferenttypesoflegitimationapproachesas unfoldingeventsinwhichprojectactorsengagedinarathertemporal responsivemanner.Wefoundthreelegitimationacquisitionapproaches that the management of the two studiedHSL projectsemployed in coping withthepressurefromtheinstitutional fieldsthroughout the projects’lifecycle.Ourfindingsaffirmthatthearrangementsmadeby projectactors(organizationsandindividualsalike)arepossiblypartial andheavilyinfluencedbychangesintheindustrystructure.

Afterthisintroduction,thepaperisstructuredasfollows.First,the institutionaltheoryandlegitimacyconceptiscriticallyreviewed, fol-lowedbytheresearchdesignandmethodsusedinthispaper.Third,the findingsaresharedaddressingtheinstitutionalfield,anditsinfluencein theHSLprojects’arrangement,theresponsesthattheirmanagement em-ploysforcopingwithit,theacquisitionapproachestogainlegitimacy. Finally,thediscussionandconclusionsectionsprovidetheanalysis, im-plications,paperlimitations,andfutureresearchsuggestions.

2. Institutionaltheoryandlegitimacy

Theinstitutionaltheoryisknownforitscapacitytocontextualize or-ganizationalphenomena(Scott,1987).Ithasasociologicalﬂavor, ques-tioningwhetherindividualchoicesandpreferencescanbeadequately understooddespitehistoricalandculturalframeworksinwhichtheyare embedded(DiMaggio&Powell,1983).Inourresearchcontext,this im-pliesthattheinstitutionalﬁeld– theindustry– penetratesthelarge-scale (projects)temporaryorganizingandcreatesthelensesthroughwhich projectactorsviewtheworld.

2.1. Institutionalcomplexityandlegitimacy(what,whereandhow)

Aninfluentiallinethatrunsinstitutionaltheoryistheinstitutional logics perspective, whichstands againsttheindividualistrationalism perspectiveandbringssocietybackintothemeaningfulpracticeof or-ganizationalspheres(Thornton,OcasioandLounsury,2012,2015;see alsoFriedlandandAlford,1991).Definedasthe“sociallyconstructed, historicalpatternsofculturalsymbolsandmaterialpractices” that sig-nifypatternsthatconstituteproperbehaviorandestablishthecriteria forlegitimacy(Thorntonetal.,2012,p.2),institutionallogicsbridges societalinstitutionsthatyieldstabilityandmeaningwiththelegitimate actionsoftheindividual(projectororganization).Typically,(project) organizationscopewithmultiplelogics,underpinningdifferentand of-tencontradictorynorms,understandings,andidentities,thus experienc-inginstitutionalcomplexity(Greenwoodetal.,2011).Theunderlying argumentisthat(project)organizations’abilitytoengageorrespond tomultiplelogicsthatmanifestattheinstitutionalfielddelivers legiti-macybutalsohasimplicationsfortheirperformanceinsolvingtoday’s complexsocietalconcerns(Greenwoodetal.,2011;Raynard,2016).

Legitimacyisthecornerstoneoftheinstitutionaltheory,understood asthesocialacceptabilityandcredibilitythattheprojectorganization requirestosurviveandthriveintheirenvironment(Pedersen& Dob-bin,2006;Scott,2012).Inprojectstudiestheconceptoflegitimacyand institutionaltheoryatlargeisnascent(Bresnen,2016;Biesenthaletal., 2018;Söderlund&Sydow,2019).Previousresearchhasconsidered dif-ferentmanagementactionstobecriticalinachievingprojectlegitimacy. Somestudieshavefocusedon decisionprocessstrategiesandfactors consideringlegitimacy-as-property(e.g.,Aaltonen,2013;Nguyenetal., 2019),afixedresourcethatismeasurableandoperationally manage-able.Littleisknownabouttheprocessoflegitimacybuilding,how man-agerslegitimizethesearrangementsandhowtheprojectprocessesand activitiesareaffectedbytheirinstitutionalfield(cf.vandenEnde&van Marrewijk,2019).

We therefore turn our attention to organization studies where the concept of legitimacyhas receivedsigniﬁcant attentionand has

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E. Hetemi, A. van Marrewijk, A. Jerbrant et al. International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 295–307 beenthesubjectofextensiveresearch(Deephouse&Suchman,2008;

Suddaby,Bitektine& Haack,2017).Organizational scholarshave fo-cusedtheireffortsoninvestigatingtheessentialpropertiesoflegitimacy andhavecategorizeditintodifferenttypologies.Suchman’s,influential typologyidentifiesthreebroadtypesoflegitimacy:pragmatic,moral, andcognitive(seeSuchman,1995).

Organizationstudiesliteratureisparticularlyhelpfulfor understand-ingthewhat,where,andhowof legitimacy.Yet,a profound reﬂec-tiononthesocialnatureoflegitimacyisneededastheconceptisbuilt onboththestrategic(Oliver,1991) andinstitutionaltraditions(e.g.,

Meyer&Rowan1977;DiMaggio&Powell1983).Toourknowledge, currentprojectstudiesseemtoignoresuchconsequences.Inresponse tothequestionof whatlegitimacyis,weinclinetowardstheprocess perspective. Thus,legitimacy is understood here as not beinga sta-blecondition,butrather“asbeingactivelyandcontinuallynegotiated” (Suddabyetal., 2017, p.24).It isanongoingprocess showingthat theactionsareappropriatewithinthesociallyconstructedsystemof normsandvalues,whichmustrepeatedlybe“created,recreatedand conquered” (ibid.p.25).Contrarytothepriorunderstandinginproject studies(e.g.,Aaltonen,2013),legitimacyisnotmonolithicandcanvary overtime.Indeedthesameprojectpractices,actions,andjudgmentscan becomelegitimateornotovertime.

Turning to the second implied question, where does it occur? When legitimacy is seen as a process, a multi-level analysis is re-quired including the institutional project ﬁeld and the project ac-tors’inter-relations(Scott,2012).Todate,legitimacyinproject stud-ies hasadoptedcross-sectional case studiestoidentify stable strate-gies(e.g.,Aaltonen,2013;Nguyenetal.,2019)andelementsof legiti-macy(e.g.,Derakhshanetal.2019).Takinganinstitutionalapproach,

Scott(2012)commendsthateachproject,independentlyofitsscaleand scope,willbeconfrontedbyitsinstitutionalfield.Thefieldwillinclude (1)relevantgovernmentalorganizations(localornationallevels includ-ingtaxagenciesandofficesreinforcinglaborandenvironmental stan-dards);(2)individualandorganizationalresidentsresidinginand shar-ingtheprojectenvironment(thegroupsthathavealreadyestablished normativeandcultural-cognitiveframeworks);(3)thosecurrently em-ployedintheaffectedsector(e.g.,unionorganizations);(4)social move-mentorganizations(e.g.,professionalassociations,concernedwith nor-mativearguments);and(5)potentialbeneficiaries(thosewhose inter-estsareservedintheeventthattheprojectdevelopmenttakesplace).

Toaddress the thirdand last question: howdoes legitimacy oc-cur?,weneedtoaccountfortheinstitutionalapproachintheproject, entailingacloseunderstandingoftheinter-organizationalfacetsover aperiod.Throughtheinstitutionalprism(Scott,2013),legitimacy is understood via the process of how the project organization creates and maintains “alignment” between the internal structural/ perfor-mance characteristics andexternal fieldpressures in building legiti-macy.Suddabyetal(2017),addressingtheconceptoflegitimacy, ob-servedthreedistinct organizationalapproachestogaining legitimacy – a“fit” withtheenvironmentalpressures:(1)isomorphismor adap-tiontofitunderlyingcultural-cognitivelegitimacybasis,(2)decoupling oradaptationwithin twoenvironmentsorsignalingnormative legiti-macyand(3)performing ordemonstratingtechnicallegitimacy.The mechanismstoensurelegitimacyequalroughlyScott’s(2013)outlining ofthreekindsof‘institutionalpillars’:technical/regulative,normative, andcultural-cognitive,whichservesourframing.

2.2. Projectresponsemechanismstoinstitutionalcomplexityandpressures

Large-scale projects’temporariness andthe conditions of institu-tionalcomplexity can have major implications for theproject man-agementandlegitimacy(Dille& Söderlund,2011;Greenwoodetal., 2011;Scott,2012;Dilleetal.,2018).Institutionalcomplexity resem-blesthemultivocalunderstandingsthatprojectactorsposeinthe man-agementoflarge-scaleprojects(Biesenthaletal.,2018;Gottliebetal., 2020; Winch & Maytorena-Sanchez, 2020). The “temporariness” of

large-scaleprojectsposessigniﬁcantmanagementchallenges(Grabher & Thiel, 2015,p.330). Preciselytheir temporarinessandthenature of institutional complexity concerning large-scale projectsimply the need for explicitly connecting themas projectsin multiple contexts (Manning,2008).Inthebroaderpicture,large-scaleproject arrange-mentandtheirorganizingarenotsubject totheintra-organizational constraintsonly or theirtechnicalenvironment. There arealsojoint constraintsandenablersfromtheinstitutionalﬁeld,suchasthe inter-organizationalnetwork(Sydow&Braun,2018)orthesectorand indus-try(Manning,2008;Scott,2012).Projectsareembeddedinother per-manentinstitutional,butstillchanging,environments(Manning,2008;

Winch&Maytorena-Sanchez,2020).

Hitherto, scholars have recognized the importance of large-scale projects in acquiring knowledge of local institutions (Grabher & Thiel,2015),andthenecessityforaligningtheprojectwiththe insti-tutional field(Engwall,2003;Chi&Javernick-Will,2011).However, projectstudiesareambiguouswhendiscussingtheinstitutionalfieldof theproject(Scottetal.,2011;Scott,2012).Someassociateitwiththe formalandregulatorybodies– treatinginstitutionsasenvironments ex-ternaltotheproject(e.g.,Miller&Lessard2000).Otherstreatitasa fieldthatneedsattentionbutcanbemanagedbytheprojectmanager (e.g.,Morris&Geraldi,2011;Aaltonen,2013).WeagreewithSöderlund &Sydow(2019)thatprojectstudieswouldbenefitfromaddingthe in-stitutionalingredientsofmeaning,conceptcategories,andmodelsfor organizing,perinstitutionaltheory.Inthisregard,itisnolonger pos-sibletothinkoftheinstitutionalfieldsasbeingoutthere(Granqvist& Gustafsson,2016;Tukiainen&Granqvist,2016).Instead,theirelements arepartoftheprojectorganization,infusingitwithvalueand connect-ingitwithlong-termstructures. Theseconsiderationsunderscorethe opportunitytoaddress institutionalfieldcomplexity through institu-tionalprojectresponsemechanisms,temporaryorganizing,andhybrids (Granqvist&Gustafsson,2016;Raynard,2016).Furthermore,these in-sightssuggestthatprojectsas“temporaryorganizations” with “institu-tionaltermination” provideanimmensepotentialfortemporalanalysis of therecursiveinteractionbetween inter-organizationalprojectsand theirinstitutionalfields;onhowlarge-scaleprojectsasrelatively tempo-raryendeavorsrelyupon,copewithandreshapelonger-termstructures (cf.Grabher&Thiel,2015).

Howtheinstitutionalfieldinfluenceslarge-scaleprojectsandhow projectsrespondtoinstitutionalcomplexityandpressurehasrecently attracted academicattention(Hall &Scott,2019; Matinheikkietal., 2019;Qiuetal.,2019;Gottliebetal.,2020).Notsurprisinglyan emer-gentandgrowingstreamofresearchhasstartedtoexaminetheuseof “hybrid” andrelativelytemporaryarrangementsforcopingwithvolatile complexity(cf.Raynard,2016).Forinstance,Gottliebetal.(2020)see thedynamicshapingofprojectpartnerships,influencedbychangingand cominglinginstitutionallogics.Theydistinguishdiversecoping mech-anisms toinstitutional demandsthrough:(1)articulating newlogics, (2)disassociatingexistingpractices,(3)redefiningroles,and(4) creat-ingrulestofacilitatecollaboration.Matinheikkietal.(2019)showhow publiccommissionersofatunnelconstructionprojectadoptedproject alliancingprinciplestoconstructahybridorganizationtorespondto in-stitutionalcomplexity,combiningtherationalesofdifferentlogicsinto theirmodusoperandi.Torespondtoexternaldemands,theyusedthree mechanisms:(1)publicizinganewhybridformof organizing,(2) re-ceivingsocialacceptancefromprojectstakeholders,and(3)selective couplingofexternaldemands.Tomitigateinternaltensions,theyused three othermechanisms:(1)jointlyformingstructurestoaligngoals andunifyactions,(2)ensuringadaptivecapacity,and(3)blending di-verse professionalgroups.Qiuetal. (2019)contemplatefourcoping mechanismsofinstitutionalcomplexityintheirstudyoftheHong Kong-Zhuhai-MacaoBridge.Twomechanismswerefoundforalleviatingthe impactofconflictinginstitutionaldemandsontheperformance:(1)the establishmentofasystemleadertocoordinatewiththegovernments, and(2)thelocalizationofpracticestoreducetheconflictsbetweenthe regulationsandstandardsofthethreeinvolvedregions.Furthermore, 297

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theyfoundtwomechanismsforreducingthemicro-levelimpactof con-ﬂictinginstitutionaldemandsthrough:(1)thecreationofthestructure ofahierarchalfunctionfortasksandorganization,and(2)the ﬂexi-bledesignoftheprojectorganization.Adistinctioncanthusbemade betweenthemacroandmicroinstitutionalcomplexityofresponses. Be-sidesthis,responsemechanismsofprojectstocopewithinstitutional complexityandpressurecanalsoshiftovertime.

VandenEndeandvanMarrewijk(2019)foundthatinametrotunnel megaprojectthestrategiesforcopingwithinstitutionalpressureshifted; fromoppressiveuseofmilitarypolicetorepositioningtheprojectas en-vironmentallysensitive,inclusiveandopen;from hidingfrompublic debatetoengaginginpublicdebateandmakingtheprojectmore vis-ibleandaccessible;andfromdeclaringfuturemetrolinestabooto en-gagingandcommunicatingwithsocietyovernewmetrolines. Further-more,theresponsemechanismcaninﬂuenceinstitutionalcomplexity.

HallandScott(2019)forexample,reportonatemporaryproject-based organizationthatsigniﬁcantlytransformedtheinstitutionalframeworks andassociatedrules,norms,andbeliefsystemssurrounding construc-tionprojectorganizations–inmuchthesamewayas(alineageof) in-novativeexploratoryprojectscantransformtheinstitutionalframework oftheconstructionsectorandthuscreateanopeningforsustainable in-novations(Koch-Ørvadetal.,2019).Amechanismforrespondingto in-stitutionalpressureisthusamulti-levelphenomenon,whichcanchange overtimeandcantransforminstitutionalframeworks.

3. Researchdesignandmethods

Webuild on acollaborative case studydesigntounderstand the recursiverelationsbetweenlarge-scaleprojectsandtheirinstitutional fields.Acollaborativecasestudydesignisacasecomparisonmethod, includingcases,builtbydifferentscholars(Georgeetal.,2005). Accord-ingtoGeorgeetal.,scholarsare“increasinglyworkingcollaboratively acrosscasestoadvance sharedsubstantiveresearchprograms” (ibid. 55).However,astructuredandfocusedcasecomparisonisdifficultto carry out,whendifferent scholarshaveundertakeneach case study, as reportedhere. Specific methodologicalconsiderations are needed whenusingexistingdatatogenerate newknowledge (Heaton,2008;

Andrewsetal.,2012;Dufour&Richard,2019).Wereturntothemin section3.4.

3.1. Caseselection

The railway sector in Europe has undergone considerable

(de)centralization variation over time as a sector (Geyer & Davies,2000).Weselectedthetwocases– theHSLMadrid-Barcelona andHSL South – throughtheoreticalsampling becausewe consider themtobesuitableandrevelatoryinthelightofinstitutionalconstructs (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Firstly, the cases were comparable as they were conducted within the same industry. Although the institutional reform of the rail sector took place in different years, 1995intheNetherlandsand2002in Spain,bothcasessharerelated institutionalelementswithin theEuropean railindustry,i.e.,sharing similarindustrystructuressuchastheERTMSsafetysystems,among others. We considera complex of diverse organizations sharing the same or relatedinstitutional habits asthe focusof analysis. In this context,wetreatspecificprocessesandprojectactivitiesindetail,but itis “the nesting of these processes intothe whole thatgives them meaning” (Scott,1987,p.494).Secondly,bothcasesprovidedaccess topotentially richcriticaldata.They wereconsidered bothsymbolic in terms of infrastructure investment, and there was considerable documentary evidence of them in newspapers, audits, and official reports(Report,2012,2017;OmegaTeamReport,2014).Bothofthe casesthatweexaminehereillustrateorganizingandpracticesdriven bothbytheindustry’sstructuralchangesandtheagencyinprojects.

3.2. Briefdescriptionofprimarydatacollected

Over more than 15 years, data were collected through semi-structuredinterviews,observations,secondarydatasources,audits,and oﬃcialreports.Theprimarysourceofinformationconsistedof137 in-terviewswithrespondentsfromtheMadrid-BarcelonaHSLprojectand theHSLSouth.Wehavecollecteddatafrommultiplelevelsanddiﬀerent actorviewpoints,includingAdifandProRailmanagementdivision, ma-jorcontractors,andsuppliers.Interviewsweresemi-structured,lasted approximatelybetweenoneandtwoandahalfhourseach,andwere digitallyrecordedandtranscribed.InTable1,weexplaintheprimary datacollectedforbothcasesingreaterdetail.

3.3. Qualitativesecondarydataanalysis

Forthesecondary data analysis(Andrews etal., 2012; Dufour& Richard,2019),whichisthefocusofthispaper,asubsetofthedata fromtheprimarystudiesincludedobservations,reports,andinternal documents,17interviewsforcaseI,and19interviewsforcaseII.The firstandsecondauthorswerepartoftheindependentresearchdata col-lectionteams,andtheyanalyzedtheprimarydataforthespecificcases publishedinpeer-reviewedjournals,whichhelpedavoidthemain pit-fallsofsecondaryanalysis(Andrewsetal.,2012).However,alimitation isthatthefirstauthorparticipatedonlyinthesecondhalfofthedata collectionprocessforthefirstcase– thesecondperiod,seeTable1.The extensivecasestudiesanddetaileddatacollectionprocessarereported inresearcharticlesAandB.Inthispaper,wepooledthedatacollected separatelyforthetwocases.Weworkedwithtwootherindependent researchers,thethirdandfourthauthors,incarryingoutthesecondary analysis.Inthesecondarydataanalysis,anin-depthinvestigationofthe emergentaspectsofdatathatwereonlypartiallyaddressedintheprime studiesisundertaken.Indeedthehindsightapproach,whichweemploy, isconceivedtoovercometheessentialprobleminlarge-scaleproject re-searchofthetime-frozencross-sectionofaprocessthatunfoldsover manyyears.Thebenefitsofthisapproachhavealsobeenreportedas the“wisdomofhindsight” (Dufour&Richard,2019).Employingthis approachavailstheknownoutcomesoftheHSLcases,andthedepthof theprimarydatacollectedover15years.

Sinceitisdifficulttoobjectivelymeasuretheinfluenceofthe institu-tionalfieldonlarge-scaleprojects(Tolbert&Barley,1997;Scott,2012), we used an interpretative research approach consciously attempting to discover interviewees’points of view (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2013).Followingtheguidelinessetforqualitativeinquiry (Denzin& Lincoln,2011),we usedbothfirstandsecond-order analyses.Inthe first-orderanalysis,weaimed tounderstandthepeculiaritiesandthe overallimplicationsoftheinstitutionalfield– theindustrialstructure wheretheprojectorganizationsresided.Giventhesuggestionsofearlier researchthatlinksactionsandinstitutions(Tolbert&Barley,1997),we consideredthesetasksinthesecondarydataanalysisthatanalytically correspondtotheresearchprocess.Theyinclude:1)Definingthe insti-tutionalfieldasanindustry,whichinthiscasehadundergonechange over thetermof theimplementedHSLprojects;2) Tracingactivities attheHSLprojectsitesandextractingtranscriptsreferringtoactivities ofparticularperiodscorrespondingtothechange;3)Reviewingscripts forevidenceofchangeininteractionpatternsduringthesameperiods; 4)Connectingfindingsfromobservationaldatawithothersourcesof dataontheindustryrestructuration,e.g.,officialreports(Report,2012,

2017;OmegaTeamReport,2014).

Throughsamplingoftheprimarydatacollected,weincreasedthe possibilityofrevealingtranscriptstomaintainthesuspectedindustry influenceswhileactivelyscanningfordatatodisconfirmthepresence of suchrelations (Chiasson& Davidson, 2005).We employed event structure analysis toidentify the maincross-case patterns of impor-tance:theinstitutionalfield– theindustrialstructure,thephilosophy, andlegalboundariesinfluencingtheprojectprocessesandits organiz-ing.Fromthispartoftheanalysis,fourinstitutionalfieldsor

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industry-E. Hetemi, A. van Marrewijk, A. Jerbrant et al. International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 295–307

Table1

Asummaryofprimarydatacollected.

Data collection method Data collected Case I: Madrid-Barcelona HSL project

Semi-structured interviews

First period (1996-2010)

40 interviews with the HSL PM, Adif Quality Controller, Head of Infrastructure Projects, Engineer at Organization B, project proponent and other relevant actors. Average duration was slightly over one hour.

Second period

(2015-2018) 12 interviews with the program managers and other relevant actors (project managers, construction manager at Adif, Organization A Contractor PM, Organization B Supplier, Organization C Contractor PM). Average duration was slightly over one hour.

(Participant) Observations First period (1996-2010) Participant observations Group interviews

Extensive informal communication Second period

(2015-2018)

The insider spent 2-3 days per week at the organization’s oﬃces and conducted observations: 7 management meetings

Extensive informal communication Field notes for each of the days spent on site Case II: HSL South project

Semi-structured interviews

First period (2003-2005)

85 interviews with four public organizations in the ﬁeld involved: the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment; Rijkswaterstaat, which manages road and water infrastructure; ProRail, which manages rail infrastructure; and the passenger rail operator Dutch Railways. The HSL PM, Adif Quality Controller, Head of Infrastructure Projects, Engineer at Organization B, project proponent and other relevant actors. Average duration was slightly over one hour.

Second period (2007-2010)

10 interviews with relevant stakeholders in the project (project managers, construction managers, and other large contractors and suppliers involved in the project)

Third period (2014-2015)

Three interviews were held with former HSL managers (Participant)

Observations First interval (2003-2005) Participant observations were carried out for 18 months, for three days a week Group interviews Desk research

Extensive informal communication second interval

(2015-2018)

Extensive informal communication Field notes for each of the days spent on site Document analysis

for both case I, and II.

In total more than 30 documents:

For both cases we reviewed internal program documents (internal ﬁnancial and audit reports, overview presentations, internal organization and escalation matrices, lessons learned, and program tools, e.g., risk logs).

Organization-wide guidelines and frameworks for project and program risk management related to the HSL Madrid-Barcelona. Three parliamentary enquiries related to the HSL South project: the enquiry of the HSL tender process (Survey-Committee-Construction, 2002), of the decision-making process used (Commission-Duijvensteijn, 2004), and of the tendering for the high-speed trains called Fyra (Parliamentary-Commission, 2015).

300:; ∗ ˆ pages of public material drawn from the press coverage of the HSL projects.

relatedthemesemerged:1)therestructuringoftherailwaysector,2) assignmentoftheproject,3)tenderregulations,and4)fragmentation ofprojectorganization.

In the second-order analysis, we aimed to understand how the managerslegitimizetheHSLprojectarrangements,andtheresponses thattheirmanagementemploysforcopingwiththeinstitutional inﬂu-ence.Whiletherewerenohypothesesapriori,toensure comparabil-itybetweenthecases,thecontentanalysisofthedatawasguidedby

Scott(2013).Thedataatthisstagewereanalyzed,studyinghowour in-tervieweesinterpretedthe“institutionalenvironment” and“theproject” toseehowtheformerinfluencedtheiractivities,overtimeandpractice. Inthisphaseoftheanalysis,weadoptedaniterativemethodofconstant comparison,movingbetweenthedataandtheinstitutionaltheory. Em-ployingthe“patterninducing,” analysis(ReayandJones, 2016),we tabulatedtheprojectparticipants’activitiesoneachprojectandtheir managementresponsesforcopingwiththeinstitutionalinfluences.For instance,whether,duetosectorreformsintherailwayindustry,the projectactivitieswereinfluenced;orwhethersafetyandengineering normschanged,andhowtheyaffectedtheprojectoperations,etc.In tracingthemanagementresponsesthroughtime,wepaidparticular at-tentiontoeventswithintheprojectlevel,andintheinstitutionalfield level—theperipheraleventsseeminglyremotefromtheproject—in cre-atingatimedependentstorylineofevents,seeFig.1.

Foreach case,themost frequentactivitiesrelatedtolegitimation weregroupedandlatercoded.Again,wefollowedTolbertandBarley’s (1997) recommendations andadopted these processes for analyzing scripts:1)arrangeddatabycategoriesandunitofobservation,2) iden-tifiedactivitieswithin categories,3) identified commonalitiesacross cases,and4)comparedtranscriptsovertime.Weconsidertherailway industrytobearelativelyhighlyinstitutionalizedfield,anindustrywith

existingpractices,powerstructures,governancemechanisms,and sub-jectpositions,whichhelpedustodistinguishtheindustryinfluences (Zietsmaetal.,2017).Foreachinstitutionalfielddimension(e.g., indus-tryorganizationmemberinteraction,involvingnewprocedures,rules), alegitimationelementwassetandcodedindependently.Fromthe de-tailedcaseanalysesandtheircomparison,threelegitimationacquisition approachesweredistinguished.Wediscussthemextensivelyinsection 6.Attheendofthesecondarydataanalysis,theaugmenteddata struc-turewascreated,seeTable.2.Weshowtherepresentativequotations, firstthemes,andempiricaleventsassupplementarymaterialforspace reasons.

3.4. Criteriaforjudgingthetrustworthinessoftheresearchdesign

Wedrawonthesocialscienceresearchqualitycriteriaforthe re-searchdesign(Denzin&Lincoln,2011).Forspacereasons,as supple-mentarymaterialweprovidethecriteriaandthestepstoaddressthe re-quirementsofbothcasesingreaterdetail.Wealsoindicatethekeyissues relatedtoqualitativesecondarydataanalysis(Heaton,2008;Dufour& Richard,2019),andweexplainthemeasureswehavetakento over-comethem.

4. TheinstitutionalﬁeldoftheSpanishHSL(CaseI)

High-speed trainsstarted developing in Spain in the1990s. The Madrid-BarcelonaHSL(1990-2017)wasambitiouslyplannedand de-signedtoreachspeedsof350km/h,connectingSpanishcapitalMadrid withthecityofBarcelona.ItalsoconnectedSpaintotheEuropean high-speedrailnetwork.Adif(owner)developedtheprojectscopebasedon threemajorconstructionsegments.TheﬁrstsegmentreliedonERTMS

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Fig.1.Identiﬁedactionstolegitimationapproaches,compingbothHSLprojectcasetimelines.

Table2

Datastructure,codes,themesandemergentcategories.

Some codes Themes Categories

Railway industry changes Public tendering law

Changes in project procurement Shifts in infrastructure market

Hierarchical governance and organization Diverse teams and expertise

ERTMS system

Installation and manufacturing standards

Project governing and the link to the parent organization Project segmentation

Collaboration or actors’ interaction PPP

Restructuring of the railway sector Assignment of the project Tender regulations

Fragmentation of project organization

The inﬂuence of the institutional ﬁeld in the project arrangement

Managers perform and proactively inform stakeholders Managers review industrial regulations periodically Managers engage in selective coupling

Project members adopt best PM practice and other industry guidelines Mimicking standards, and inclined to complementary technology adoption Endorse project members to participate in external technical discourses Set up of IT integration within organization

Advertising the image of a modern transportation

Advertising the project and its economic beneﬁts and technical content

Normative/Moral legitimacy

Cultural-cognitive legitimation Technical/Pragmatic legitimation

Project legitimacy

1.0,whiletheothertworeliedonERTMS2.0.Theproject’snetwork teamcontinuouslyrearrangedtheproject’sdesignandplans,redeﬁning itsscope.

4.1. Restructuringoftherailwaysector

TheHSLprojectbeingembeddedinthetransportationsectorhas, overtime,undergoneconsiderablecentralizationanddecentralization. Until the early 1990s, most European railway systems were orga-nizedin state-owned andvertically integratedmonopolies (Geyer& Davies,2000;Gruening,2001).Sincethemid-1990s,however,the

rail-waysystemshavebeenrestructuredandderegulated,breakingthe mo-nopolisticpositionsbasedontheEUDirective(Dir.91/440/EEC1991). Suchcircumstancesledtotheemergenceofnewco-operationpatterns amongtherailwaysupplyindustryandtheoperators.Accordingly,in 2003,duringtheMadrid-BarcelonaHSLproject,therailwaysectorwas reorganized,layingthefoundationfornewplayerstoenterthemarket. ThepublicagencyAdifwascreatedandactedastheinfrastructure man-ageroftheMadrid-BarcelonaHSL.Adifreplacedthealreadyassigned functionsofboththeGIFandtheoperator– RENFE.Atthesametime, anewpublicbodywascreated,thebusinessentityRENFE-Operadora [theoperator].TheEuropeanrailindustry,theMinistryof

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Infrastruc-E. Hetemi, A. van Marrewijk, A. Jerbrant et al. International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 295–307 tureDevelopment,theGovernmentofCatalonia,MadridandBarcelona

citycouncils,theEuropeanInvestmentBank,Adif,RENFE-Operadora, largecontractors,andotherspecializedsupplierswereprincipalactors formingthestructureoftheproject’sinstitutionalﬁeld(Report,2017).

4.2. Assignmentoftheproject

DuringtheHSLprojectimplementation,Adifprocuredthework, per-formedthesupervision,andmanagedtheprojectofthelines’ construc-tion.Theindustryandregulatoryregimeinfluencedthemanagement actions,asthetransportationsectorandtherailindustrywere increas-inglybasedoncontractualrelationships.InSpain,theformal authoriza-tionforprojectinitiationwasgivenbytheMinistryofInfrastructure Development,whichinstructedtheSub-directorateofRailwayPlanning toprepareaninformativestudyinvolvingthedetaileddesignand plan-ningaswellastheenvironmentalandsocialimpactoftheproject.With that,theministryissuedaformalorder toAdiftostartthe construc-tionoftheline,includingthesearchforthefinancingofthenewHSL fromEuropeanfunds,andoveralltoexecutetheproject.Nevertheless, thisformalorder toAdifwasgivenbefore theinformativestudywas approved.AstheMinistryofEnvironmentprocessedtheenvironmental impactstatement,itsprogresswasbeyondthecontroloftheMinistry ofInfrastructureDevelopment.Thisresultedinmajorsetbacks,suchas modificationsthatinfluencedtheimplementationandmanagement.The PMatAdifdescribed:“Thereisnotimetoconductafeasibilitystudy ortoassesstheinfrastructureneedsaccurately.” (Interviewwithformer HSLPM,December1997).

4.3. Tenderregulations

Themanagementof theHSLprojectwasdividedintothreeparts, closelylinkedtothemanagementofthecontractsandthelegalregime, preciselyrelatedtothepublicsectortenderinglaw.Adifis100% pub-liclyowned,i.e.,theSpanishgovernmentholds100%ofthesharesand isrepresentedontheboard.Asindicatedearlier,theplanninganddesign oftheHSLprojectwerean“entry”.Thisholdsuntil2003;afterthatand becauseofinsuﬃcientin-houseresources,theMinistryofInfrastructure DevelopmentdecidedtoinitiatethetenderingasaPublic-Private Part-nership(PPP),i.e.,combiningEUfundswithprivateﬁnancingresources (Faraetal.,2018).

TheHSLprojectinvolvedprocurementthroughmultiplecontractors andsuppliersat differentpoints intimeandcontractpackages, e.g., tracks,signal systems,installations,energysystems. There weretwo maincontracttypes:Design-Bid-Build(DBB),andDesign-Build(DB).On theonehand,withinDBBcontracts,thecontractorswerenotinvolved inthedesignandspecificationofthework,butthecontractorscould suggestalternativesolutions.Adifdiscussedthesolutionswiththe con-tractors,andwhentheyweretechnicallyequalandeconomically com-plementarytotheagreementproposedin tenderingdocuments,then Adif’smanagementadvancedthatsolution.Itisworthnotingthatatthe timeoftheproject’simplementation,theSpanishcontractorsand sup-plierswereamongthelargestworldwide,andtheyemployedin-house engineers(Belmonte,2016;Report,2017).FollowingtheEuropean ten-deringlawsandregulationsforthesector,thelion’sshareofthecontract packagesintheHSLproject,over75%,weretenderedthrough prequal-ification.However,theSpanishpublicadministrationtendedtoprotect thelocalconsultinganddesignengineeringfirms(Report,2013).Adif focusedoncompetitivetenderingandselectedthecontractorsbasedon thelowestbid/price.Besides,duetopublictenderinglaw,therewere nolong-termcollaborativearrangements,i.e.,procurementwasbased onacontract-by-contractrelationship.Ontheotherhand,theadoption ofDBforheavycivilinfrastructure,suchastunnelsandbridges, oc-curredbecauseAdifexpectedthecontractorsorspecialistsuppliersto provideinnovativetechnologiesinsuchacomplexendeavor(Internal document;cooperationagreement,2006).DBinvolvedtwocontracts forthe28.7kmGuadarramatunnel,andtwootherstoconnectdifferent

nodestotheexistingrailnetworks(Internaldocument;ﬁnancialreport, 2009).Eachcontractwasgiventoanindependentconsortium.

4.4. Fragmentationofprojectorganization

WhenaprojectisascomplexastheHSLexecution,itisnotpossible todefinethemanagementmodelononelevel.Asseenabove,thistype ofprojectisdevelopedthroughaseriesofperformanceunitsthat ad-dresseitheraspecificspecialtyinline,orsegmentsofthesame.InAdif, theworksweredividedbetweenspecialistteams(theinternalproject stakeholders)attheSpanishregionalheadquarters.Theyworkedwitha rangeofsuppliersand(sub)contractors.Theprojectinvolvedthreemain internalstakeholders:1)theconstructionandengineeringteam,2)the operationsandengineeringteam,and3)theinfrastructureexploitation team.Duetotheprojectprocurementmethodsadopted,thesespecific teamswerenotinvolvedintheproject,whichposedseverechallenges fortheprojectimplementationprocess.Forinstance,onlythe engineer-ingteamwasinvolvedearlyintheprojectandnottheothertwoteams, whichinfluencedfutureinteractions.Theprojectworkershadtorelate toandmakesenseofdifferentteams’opinionsandprocesses,butnot allwereawareoftheimplications.Notallteammembershadaccessor enoughtimetorelatetothemoremacrolevel.Thestructuralchanges in theprojectaffectedtheimplementationprocess,whichalsoledto there-adjustmentoftheorganizationalstructureovertime.Theteam memberswerefocusedongettingtheworkdone.Butthisalsoyielded theissueofalignmentwithintheinternalteamsasraisedbyamember ofAdif’smanagement,whohighlightedthefollowing:

“Iworkcloselytogetherwiththeengineeringanddesignteam,andI prioritizeandreprioritizeworkaccordingtotheirrequests.They are ﬂexible tosome extent, butthey have a program pattern,andthey needtodeliveraccordingly.Wecouldimprovethelearningprocessand gainmutualbeneﬁts,whichwecurrentlydonothave.” (Transcriptofa research-relatedmeetingwithAdif’smanagement,June2017.)

5. TheinstitutionalﬁeldoftheDutchHSL(CaseII)

Inthe1990s,theHigh-SpeedLineSouth(HSLSouth)wasasymbol ofEuropeanintegration(vanMarrewijk,2017).TheHSLSouthconnects AmsterdamtoBrusselsandthefurtherTransEuropeanNetworkof high-speedlines.Themegaproject,which startedin 1995,wascompleted in2009withfouryearsofdelay(vanMarrewijk,2017)andranover budget;originallycontractedfor€6.87billion,itﬁnallycosted €9.79 billion(OmegaTeamReport,2010,2014).Finally,thehigh-speedline nevercameintofulloperationasthedeliveryofnewhigh-speedtrains wasﬁrstdelayedandlatercancelledbyDutchRailways.

5.1. Restructuringoftherailwaysector

During theinitial periodof theHSLSouth,the1990s, theDutch government intended to liberalize the Dutch rail sector. This anti-monopolisticthinkingdominatedtheEuropeanpoliticalagendainthe 1990s (vanDuijnhoven,2010) andtheDutchgovernment was opti-misticoveraEuropeanrailmarket,opentocompetition.Consequently, in1995DutchRailwayswasprivatized,withtheDutchgovernment be-ingthesoleshareholder.Therelationbetweenthenationalgovernment andDutchRailwayswasstableandsecure,buttensionsoverthequality andpriceofrailtransportregularlyemerged.Therefore,tenyearslater, theorganizationwassplitintothepassengerrailwayoperatorDutch RailwaysandtheinfrastructureownerProRail.Thissplitwouldallow formorecompetitionontheDutchrailway.ProRailbecamea depart-mentoftheMinistryofI&Eandwasresponsiblefortheconstruction andmaintenanceoftherailnetwork(vanDuijnhoven,2010).The Min-istryofI&Einitiatedrailprojectsandcontrolledthebudget,while Pro-Railwasresponsiblefortheinitiation,decision-making,andoperating phasesoftherailprojects.However,onlyrecentlytheDutch govern-mentdecided,afteranumberofrailincidentsandafterdroppingthe 301

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ideaofcompetitionontherailnetwork,tomergeDutchRailwaysand ProRailagain,15yearsaftertheirseparation.Expertsintheﬁeldofrail transportareverycriticalandthinkthisstructuralmergerdoesnothing tohelpimprovetheircollaboration.

5.2. Assignmentoftheproject

Backinthe1990stheMinistryofI&Ewasstillpositiveaboutthe philosophyofnewpublicmanagement,whichadvocatedreducingthe responsibilitiesofthepublicsectoronthebasisthatmarket organiza-tionscoulddosuchtasksmorecheaplyandbetterthanpublic-sector or-ganizations(Gruening,2001).TheMinistryofI&Ewantedtobreakthe monopolisticpositionofDutchRailwaysandassignedtheDepartment ofInfrastructureandWaterManagement,inthispapercalledDIWM,to managetheHSLproject.Thisdepartmentisnormallyresponsibleforthe design,construction,management,andmaintenanceofroadandwater infrastructureandhadnoexperiencewithrailconstruction.Totheir as-tonishment,DutchRailwaysweresidelined,anditwasonlyafterthe projectwasﬁnishedthattherailtrackwashandedovertothem. Con-sequently,onlyveryfewprojectmanagerscamefromDutchRailways, whiletheCEOreportedviathesecretary-generaloftheMinistrytothe MinisterofI&E.

5.3. Tenderregulations

TheHSL projectis thelargestPPPcontract everawardedbythe Dutchgovernmentandoneofthemostsignificanthigh-speedrailway projectsinEuropetodate.ThisPPPcontracthasaconstructionperiod offiveyearscoveringthedesign,build,andfinancingofthe superstruc-turefortheHSLline,followedbyatwenty-five-yearmaintenance pe-riod.Althoughmost ofthedesigningwastheresultofpublic-private cooperation,andthehybridorganizationalconstructionwasreflected inthewaytheprojectorganizationswereempowered(70%ofthe em-ployeeswerehiredonatemporalbasis,30%werepublicemployees), exploitationremainedamatterofthestate.WiththePPPcontract,the Dutchgovernmentsawopportunitiestobreakthemonopolisticposition ofDutchRailwaysbypubliclytenderingthehigh-speedlineconcession. DutchRailwayswereveryafraidthatthelinewouldbeoperated by oneoftheirpowerfulcompetitors,suchasDeutscheBahnortheFrench SNCF.Therefore,DutchRailwaystried,unsuccessfully,topreventthe publictenderingoftheHSLSouthconcession.Therefore,theysawno optionotherthantomake anofferthegovernmentcouldnotrefuse, whichwastwice ashighasthebidsofthecompetitors.Not surpris-ingly,alltheintervieweessaidtheyimmediatelyknewthattheoffer andexpectedturnoverwereunrealistic.

5.4. Fragmentationofprojectorganization

Theinstitutionalenvironmentisclearlyvisiblein thestructureof theHSLSouthprojectorganization.TheHSLproject,likethefirstcase, wassplitintothreeparts.Thissplittingintothreeseparatepartswas intended tospeedup therealization of theHSL megaprojectandto makepossiblethepublictenderingoftheconcessionandtheprivate financingoftherailinfrastructure.Thefirstpartwasthefoundationof therailnetwork,consistingoftheconstructionofembankments, tun-nels,viaductsandbridges.Thisinfrastructureworkwasdividedinto fivePPPcontractsforthefoundation.Furthermore,therewasa sepa-ratecontractforaseven-kilometertunnel,andacontracttoconnectthe newraillinetotheexistingnetwork.Eachcontractwasawardedtoa differentconstructionconsortiumafteratenderingprocedure.The sec-ondpartoftheHSLprojectconsistedofconstructingrailinfrastructure, whichcomprisesrails,electrificationandsystemsfor communication andsafety. Thissecondpartwasdesigned,built,financedand main-tainedbyaconsortiumcomprisinginvestors,internationalbanks,and privatecompanies.Until2031,theDutchgovernmentwillpaythe con-sortiumayearlyfeetomaintaintheHSLandguaranteeanavailability

rateof99.46%.ThethirdpartoftheHSLprojectwasthetransport fran-chise.Asdescribedearlier,theexclusiverighttodelivertrainservices wasgrantedtothehighestbiddingparty,whichwasDutchRailways.

6. Legitimationacquisitionapproaches

TheinstitutionalfieldelementsinfluencedthetwoHSLproject ar-rangementsandtheirorganizing.Theinstitutionalreforms,theindustry changescreatedboundariesandshapedtheprocessesinthestudiedHSL projects.However,ourresearchfindingsindicatethattheproject man-agement teamswerenotpassive butdeveloped responsesforcoping withthesechanges.Wefoundpatternsofnormative,cultural-cognitive, andtechnicallegitimationacquisitionapproachesinbothcases, under-liningtheadaptationtotheindustrychangesandtheagencyinprojects. Wedescribethemindetailinthefollowingsections.

6.1. PatternsoflegitimationacquisitionapproachesinCaseI

Normativelegitimationapproaches:Beingundergovernment regula-tion,Adif’smanagementestablishedaphasedreview-basedmodel, seek-inglegitimacyfortheirprojectmanagementactions.Thismodel, follow-ingalinearpath,providedguidelinesfortheiroperationsinrespectof theproject.However,severaleventsintheprojectcontextprevented theAdifPMfromalwaysmakinga“rationaldecision”.Duetohigh un-certainty,projectmanagerssometimesignoredtheprocessguidelines:

“Wewereverytask-orientedandnotbehavior-focused.Weneededa giantsteptobecomingbetterorganized.Therewereprocessguidelines, whichdescribedhowtorunthings,butthewaywelivedlife,theproject hadlittletodowiththem.” (Interviewwiththeconstructionmanager, October2016)

Inthiscontext,PMsatAdifandtheircontractorsengagedin improvi-sationalactions,relatingto“soft” aspectsanddemandsfortheproject, ratherthanthe“hard” keyperformanceindicators.Attheotherend, thecontractorssimilarlydidnotfollowtheguidelinesthoroughly. Of-tentheydidnotrenderthedetailsintheprojectplan,sendingavague designtotheAdifprojectcontrollerforconﬁrmation.Thishelpedto safeguardthemfromcontextualinﬂuences.Regardingthis,theAdifCM drewspecialattentiontocontractors’behavior:“Itseemstobea well-knownbehavior:contractorstendtobeverycraftyanddisclose infor-mationorrevealproblemsonlywhentheyreallyhaveto.Itisbetterfor theirbusiness”.(InterviewwithconstructionmanageratAdif,March 2018).However,forAdifandtheprivateorganizationsandother par-tiesinvolved,itwasessentialtohavestandardizedprojectmanagement modelsandcomplywiththem.

Cultural-cognitive legitimation approaches: Our interviewees de-scribedsituationswhere,eventhoughthenewrulesandguidelinesdid notprovideoptimalconditionsforrationalchoices,itwasalmost impos-sibletoconfrontthem.Adif’smanagementwaswillingtoadoptcertain practicesandexpectedotherstodothesame.Inthiscontext,theproject actorsfeltsaferfollowingthepreferredmethods.Theprojectmembers followedthem– becausethelegitimationoftheiractionswascrucialfor theexecutionoftheproject.Theyhadtorelateto,andmakesensefor, diﬀerentaudiencelevels.TheAdifPMdescribedhowthemanagement wasaﬀected:“Itwaschallengingtodeliverourpartoftheproject.Ihad torelatetoandanalyzetheworkrepeatedlyandintensively,notonly forthetaskathandbutalsoatmacrolevels.” (InterviewwithAdifPM, October2016.)

Therefore,thepreferencesofAdif’smanagementwerenot individu-allydetermined:instead,individualsfittedthemselvestotheactivities andexpectationsofotherswhilerespondingatdifferentlevels.Besides, theAdif managerswereawarethat repetitivechoicesenhanced effi-ciencybutmadethemlessflexible.Inthiscontext,weobservedalack ofmotivationonthepartofAdif’smanagementtoconsideralternatives regardingtheproject.Instead,thebehaviorthatreinforcedrepetitive choicesgainedlegitimacy,triggeringgreateracceptancebytheproject

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E. Hetemi, A. van Marrewijk, A. Jerbrant et al. International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 295–307 members.Aninterviewwiththeheadofinfrastructureprojects

illus-tratesthis:

“Wehaveafactorcalledsocialrentabilitythatisvaluable!...For instance,ifyougivereasonsforaspeciﬁcpartoftheprojectnot per-formingandhavingproblemsduetocommunication,thisargumentis consideredpriortoﬁnancialrentability.” (Transcriptofthenotes col-lectedduringaresearch-relatedmeetingwithAdif’smanagement,April 2017)

Technicallegitimationapproaches:Mimickingstandardsand formal-izingoperationsthroughtheuseandformofcomplementary manage-mentsystems(e.g.,theuseofmanagementstandardsandnational con-structionregulationsinconformitywithpubliclaw)explicitlyguided theprocurementmethods, thus restricting theagents’ choices. Simi-larly,theERTMSsystemanditscorrespondingproductsrepresenteda supportingtool,reinforcingsomeoptionsoverothers.Themanagement practicesattheprojectlevelwereinfluencedbytheregulatory frame-workandtheindustrypracticesinthepublicsector– thepublic procure-mentlawshapedmanagementprocessesandactivitiesby,forexample, reinforcingworkdivisionsduetocostlimitations.Thus,theprojectwas dividedintomultiplepackages,andthemanagementhadtomanage in-dividualworkpackagesthat,simultaneously,influencedeachother.In thiscontext,themanagementatAdifandtheprivateparties (contrac-torsandsuppliers)performedtheirworkthroughrepeatedinteractions onseveralworkpackages.Suchregulatedpublicprocurementandthe industrystandardshadacorrespondingeffectonthecontractors,which focusedonbecomingmorefunctionalinproposing multiplesolutions thatwouldinvolvesimilarprocessesandactivities.

Importantly,theHSLMadrid-Barcelonaprojectsustainedandsailed onregardlessofthedisturbances– legislative,governmental,and ad-ministrative.

6.2. PatternsoflegitimationacquisitionapproachesinCaseII

Normativelegitimationapproaches:TheHSLSouthprojectwas de-finedasaresultofapoliticaldiscussiononfuturemobilityinthe Nether-landsinrelationtosurroundingcountries.Theprojectdesignthat fol-lowedwas“new” inthesensethattheprojectgrouprejecteda“sound blueprint” planin advance (despitegovernmental pressure)but pre-ferredaparticipativemodelofprojectdevelopment.TheDIWMproject administration,whichfurtherdevelopedtheplan,comprised govern-mentalprofessionalswithabroadbudgetmandateandastrongsense ofautonomy.Theyintendedtodevelopaninnovativetendering proce-dureforthePPPcontractsandanewphilosophyofpublic-private col-laboration,bothofwhichwerenewtotheNetherlands.Thisfocuson innovationandautonomyresultedinastrongidentificationof employ-eeswiththeproject.Ashasbeenobservedinearlierstudies(Willems etal.2020)suchidentificationtriggeredaprocessofisolation,which isthecuttingoff ofconnectionswiththemotherorganizationsbythe projectorganization;“they[DIWM]werenotopenanddevelopedan attitudethatputothersoff.Theywenttheirownway” (Interviewwith ProRailmanager,December2003).Inthisway,railwayinfrastructure ownerProRailwasexcludedfromtheHSLprojectorganization;“There wasn’tacooperativeattitude” (Interviewwithamanagerfromthe Min-istryofI&E,September2003).

Cultural-cognitive legitimationapproaches: ProRailargued thatit had100yearsofexperienceinrailconstructionandthatitwasformally responsiblefortheconstructionandmaintenanceofrailinfrastructure intheNetherlands.ProRailpreferredtooptforamatrixmodelinwhich itwouldhavegreaterauthority.Itwantedtodesigninfrastructureand manageapartoftheprojectitself:“Ourpropositionwastogivecertain partsof theprojecttothediﬀerentpartners,andthatthesepartners wouldbeaccountabletotheprojectmanagement” (Interviewwith Pro-Railmanager,January2004).DIWMandProRailcouldnotagreeon howtheactivitiesshouldbeorganized,andProRailwasleftwithlittle ornoauthorityintheprojectorganization:“Wewerelonelywolvesin

thewilderness.Therewasonlyonepersonwithrailknowledge,andthat wasme” (InterviewwithformerProRailmanager,November2003).

Technical legitimation approaches: Conﬂicts over project control hadarisenearlierbetweenProRailandDIWM,whichiswhydetailed protocolsforresponsibilities,roles,andcooperationweredesignedfor joint projects.IntheHSLSouth project,DIWMsigneda cooperation agreementwithProRail,asexpertise onconstructingsuchacomplex megaprojectwasneeded:“Giventhesizeoftheproject,thecomplexity andthechallengesfortheorganizationofconstructionworkand inno-vativetechnologies,itisnecessarytousealltheavailableknowledge” (Internaldocument;cooperationagreement,2000).Thispainful exclu-sionofProRailfromtheconstructionphaseoftheHSLSouthprojectwas riskyfortheMinistryofI&EasProRailwould,aftercompletion,be re-sponsibleforthemaintenanceoftheHSL.TherewasariskthatProRail wouldblameDIWMforbadrailconstruction.Indeed,inOctober2015, theﬁndingsofatechnicalstudy,commissionedbyProRail,indicated thatsomeoftheconcreteusedintheprojectwasofverypoorquality. RespondentsfromProRailcriticizedtheDIWM’sapproachtotheHSL South:

“Wewerenotconstructingarailline,butdikesandtunnels.There wasadominantfocusontheenvironmentwithmanyadaptations,and thatis why[therail]seemstobearollercoaster.Thereisonlyone goodrailline,andthatisastraightline.” (InterviewwithformerProRail manager,November2003)

TheHSLSouthprojectsurvived,yetitnevercameintofulloperation.

7. Discussion

Thispaperaimstounderstandhowinstitutionalfield(s)influenced thearrangementsoftwoHSLprojectsandhowmanagerslegitimizedthe arrangements.Thefindingsfromourcollaborativecasestudiesillustrate thelegitimatingpatternsthatmaketheinstitutionalprojectfieldlevel partoftheproject’slife.Recognizingchangesintheindustryhelpsin understandingtheissuesandmakingsenseoftheactors’project pat-ternsoflegitimation.Thefindingscontributetwomaininsightsintothe relationshipbetweenprojectsandtheirinstitutionalfields.

7.1. Disturbanceintheinstitutionalproject’sﬁeld

Thefirstinsightisthattheinstitutionalprojectfieldsareincontinual flux.Oursecondaryqualitativedataanalysisshowsthatovertime,even maturedfieldsre-formduetoshiftsinsocialsystems,givingrisetonew conditionstowhichtheprojectactors(organizationsandindividuals) responded(Greenwoodetal.,2011;Raynard,2016).Thesefindings con-trastwithpreviousliteratureontheproject’sinstitutionalenvironment consideration(e.g.,Morris&Geraldi,2011),whichprimarilyportrays theinstitutionalfieldassequentiallyorderedandrelativelystable.

Ourempiricalaccountshowsthattheinstitutional reformofboth national railway sectors(Duijnhoven,2010) andthe introductionof PPPcontractingcreatedturbulencesattheprojectlevel,butwith differ-entconsequences.IntheSpanishcase,Adifemergedfromthereforms andstrengthenedtheirpositionwithin theHSLproject byprocuring thework,supervisingit,andmanagingthelines’constructionproject. Whereas,intheDutchcase,thereformsweredeeplyunsettlingfor Pro-Rail,potentiallychallengingitscentralroleontheprojectdelivery.As largeandinnovativecontractswereinexperttotheorganization,itgave risetoaconflictwiththemainactorRijkswaterstaat,whichheld Pro-Railoff frommanagingandcontrollingtheproject.Thus,thereforms madesomeprojectactorslesspowerful,alteringthepowerdifferentials withotheractorsintheprojectsetting.Inbothcases,weseethatthe exerciseofpowerwassubtleanddiscreetduringtheperiodof distur-bance;suchassettingagendasandcontrollingnegotiations.This indi-catesthattheindustryreformation(thiscriticaljuncture)produced rel-ativelylargerdiscursivespacesforrenegotiationoftheprojectactors’ powerandauthority.Insum,weexaminedsimilarprojectorganizations 303

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andindustrysettingspurposefully.Yetwedetectedthatthechanging in-stitutionalfieldinfluenceisnotaninvariantprocessaffectingallactors intheprojectsettingequally.

Acrucialconstitutionalconditionintheprojectsetting,influencing whetheranorganizationpursuesanappropriateresponse,isthe organi-zationalpositionthatenablesthemtoaffectthedevelopmentanddesign ofthenewprojectarrangements.Thegovernment,theregulatory sys-tem,andtheindustrialdynamicsinparticularareessentialinstitutional forces,particularlyconcerningthearrangementoflarge-scaleprojects (Chi&Javernick-Will,2011;Scott,2012).Weseefromourcasesthatthe institutionalinfluenceincreasinglystemsfromtheinternationallevel, forinstancethroughtheEuropeanindustrialregulationsandoptimistic politicaldreamofintegratingEuropeintoonepolitical-economic com-munity.So,thelegitimacyrequiredtoconveythesetypesofprojectsis contestedandremainswithintheinter-institutionalprojectactors,the industry,thelocalandinternationalgovernmentbodies.

Theinfluenceoftheinstitutionalfield’schangesmanifestedthrough normativestructuresoforganizationsandindustrialregimes.Therules andnorms,theseinstitutionalforces,alteredtheestablishedmeaning systemin the large-scaleprojectsetting, shiftinginfluences of inter-nalandexternalforcesintheHSLprojects.Severalactorsandforces criticallyinfluencedtheHSLprojects’governancestructuresandother projectprocessesandactivities.Inthefollowingweturntothe evolv-ingcollectivelegitimacyperceptionsbetweentheindustryandproject actor’ssubset.

7.2. Theprojectasadynamicsettingofinstitutionalforces

Thesecondinsightof ourstudyisthattheinfluenceofthe insti-tutionalfieldsis notunidirectional;thatprojectlegitimacy,in conse-quence,isneithergiven,nordoesitpurelyemerge.Thatis,the man-agementlegitimacyacquisitionapproachesdidnotmanifestmerelyas aconsequence of theinstitutional projectfield’s changes orbecause of criticaljuncturesbut insteadby acontested change along a con-tinuum,whichculminatedwiththereformation’simplementation.We identifiedthattheHSLprojectmanagersusedthreelegitimation acqui-sitionapproachestocopewiththeinstitutionalfieldchanges,which createdpressurestoadaptthroughouttheprojectlifecycle.Wethereby developedanarrativeandtimelineofeventsillustratingthelegitimacy approachvariationduringtheHSLprojectsgivenchangeswithinthe project,andtheinstitutionalfieldlevel,see Fig.1. Weexposedhow actorsengageinmultiplelegitimationactivitiesintheconfluenceof in-stitutionalfieldandindustrypressures.Thiseventtimeview,whichwe haveundertaken,enabledustothoroughlyappreciatethelegitimacy approachesasthey proceedcyclicallyandcapturetheresulting slow endogenousshiftsmorerealistically.

We provide a temporaldynamic on cycles of project legitimacy processand our interpretation of theempirical constitutive features whencomparingbothcaseslegitimatingapproachdominance through-outtheprojectlifecycle.Theproject’sfront-endpromulgatethe nor-mativestructuresoforganizationsandindustrialregimesasdominant inprojectlifeparticipation.Hence,itisthenormativelegitimating ap-proachesthatreflectedthepositiveevaluationoftheHSLproject orga-nizations.Insuchconditions,bothcaseshadtobeconstructed,aligned withthetimerequirements.Thus,theprojectmanagers’normative le-gitimatingapproachesdominated,seeFig.1.Atthisstage,HSL man-agementwasmuchmorewillingtoinitiateproceduralratherthan sub-stantivesolutions,despitetheirproposals beingframed in communi-cationsemphasizingtheircontributionstoprojectorganizational effi-ciency.Whilethusfarseeminglyfluid,theHSLproject’slegitimacy ap-proacheswerenotwithoutresistance.Instead,theproject’slegitimating processwasinherentlychallengedbytheemergingissuesandtheir ac-tivepresenceininstitutionalfields’level.

Atthe projectimplementationlevel, thetechnical elementswere dominant,sotechnicallegitimacyprevailed.Atthisstage,accordingto ourﬁndings,theprojectgainedprominencethroughtheproject

man-agers’performingapproaches.FurtherinsightconcernstheHSL man-agement’sconsiderationsoftheroleofintegrativearrangements– con-tinuallyrecognizingtheneedtosecureendorsementbyfield-level indus-tryactors,seeFig.1.Inbothcases,theprojectmanagersturnedto activ-itiesthatenabledbettercommunicationwiththeir“central stakehold-ers.” Thisconformanceoccurredbothattheprojectfront-endandthe projectimplementationlevel.Intheformercase,however,theproject proponentsgavemeaningtothedecisiontobuildbyadvertisingthe im-ageofmoderntransportationandconnectingtotheEuropeanrail net-work.Concernfocusedmainlyonnormative(external)legitimacywhile addressingbothprojectorganizationalandtechnicalissuesrelatedto theHSLprojectsinarathersuperficialmanner.Yet,weobservedthatthe rulesdonotalwaysgovernsocialactioninprojects,i.e.,thatalthough present– thechanging normsandregulations didnotdirectly affect theprojectandlinemanagementbehavior.Accordingly,inbothcases, theprojectorganization’snormativestructurebecamepartly coupled withitsbehaviorstructure.Insuchacontext,theprojectmanagersat Adifandtheircontractors,forexample,engagedinimprovisational ac-tionsrelatingtothe“soft” objectivesanddemandsoftheprojectrather thanthe“hard” costperformanceindicators.Similarly,ourinterviewees fromProRailcriticizedtheRijkswaterstaatapproachoftheHSLSouth project.Hence,thesefindingsaffirmoneofthemaincontributionsof theopensystemsperspective– theunderstandingthatanorganization’s normativestructureisonlylooselycoupledwithitsbehavior(Scott& Davis,2007).

Besides,eveninrarecasesthroughout theprojectlifecyclewhere theHSLprojectorganization’senjoyedsupportandrecognitionasa rel-ativelylegitimateactor;weobservednoperfectalignmenttothefield levelinstitutions– theindustry.Adoptingalessfocalview,weobserved that themanagement, in bothcases,followedguidelineswithout ac-knowledgingtheirpeculiarinfluencesordevelopingthemfurther.For instance,thePPPadoptionwasselectedwithoutactually demonstrat-ingvalue-for-moneyoverthetraditionalmeans(cf.Faraetal.,2018). Theintervieweesgenerallyinterpretedthenecessityfortheirprojectsto bealignedwithcentralstakeholders,suchastheEU,theregionaland localgovernmentalbodies.ThisindicatesthatthePMeffortswerenot framedstrategically,atleastnotsolely,aspartoftheexistingliterature highlights(e.g.,Aaltonen,2013;Derakhshanetal.,2019).

Insum,thedisturbanceintheinstitutional project’sﬁeld,the in-dustrychangingconditions,contestedtheHSLprojects’development. Theyhadadirectbearingonprojectlegitimacyasanintervening dis-courseapproachamongtheﬁeld’schangingconditionsandtheproject’s relevance.Inlight oftheemergingindustryprinciples,new industry procedures,andsubstantiveagendas,diverselegitimacyapproaches co-occurredandalternated(i.e.,normative,technical,etc.),thus,creating whatwelabelascyclesofprojectlegitimacyprocess,seeFig.1.

8. Conclusions

Inthispaper,weexpandthetheoryoftemporaryorganizing(Lundin &Söderholm,1995)byfocusingattentiontothethusfardownplayed inter-organizingfacet(Sydow&Braun,2018;Hetemietal.,2020b).We provideanunderstandingoflarge-scaleprojectsastemporary(inter-) organizationsoperatingunderconditionsoftemporalinstitutional com-plexity(Greenwoodetal.,2011;Dilleetal.,2018).Wehavestudiedthis bylinkingandrecognizingtheheterogeneityofinstitutionalﬁelds(cf.

Greenwoodetal.,2011;Raynard,2016),andthelegitimacyconcept flu-idity(cf.Suddabyetal.,2017).Weexplorehowtheinstitutionalfield, inpart,determinestheprojectarrangementsoftwoHSLprojectsand howprojectmanagersuselegitimatingpracticestocopewiththe insti-tutionalfieldshifts.Thepapermakesthefollowingcontributionstothe projectstudies.

8.1. Theoreticalcontribution

First,itcontributestoadeeperunderstandingofinstitutionalﬁelds – theindustry– acrosswhichlarge-scaleprojectsextend.Althoughprior