Konstanty Puzyna
The Concept of "Pure Form"
Literary Studies in Poland 16, 101-111
The C oncep t o f “Pure F orm ”
1
The rank exuberance o f W itkacy studies in recent years is w ithout a d o u b t som ething over which anyone interested in W it kiewicz rejoices. It is easy to see, however, th a t the grow ing num ber o f w orks in the field continues to be dom inated by the genera lities, and even truism s, o f the essayistic, whilst the individual subjects dealt with tend to be m arginally im p o rtan t or even dow n right fo rtu ito u s: one could doubtless swell the ran ks o f such titles as “ W itkacy and B recht” or “The Influence o f S hakespeare on the Juvenilia o f W itkacy” (these are genuine exam ples, not ones I have dream t up!) bu t they do no t advance m atters very far, to p u t it mildly. H ence those recent studies th a t attack the central problem s are all the m ore n o tew o rth y : Jan B lohski’s and Daniel G e ro u ld ’s studies o f the plays, K rzysztof P o m ia n ’s w ork on the philosophy, the studies o f the theory o f cultu re carried ou t by M ałgorzata Szpakow ska and M arcin K ról, or Jan usz D eg ler’s re searches into the theatrical reception o f W itkacy d uring the inter-w ar period. They highlight all the m ore clearly the problem s th at still rem ain unbroached, the white spaces on the m ap o f W itkacy studies. These still include W itkiew icz’s paintings and theory o f painting ; his R ussian period which has no t been exam ined from the b io g rap h i cal p o in t o f view; and the theory o f P ure F orm which continues to be a blank space —glancingly referred to in m any studies, but no t placed at the centre o f an analysis.
It is in fact the notion o f P ure Form th at I w ould like to deal with here —or at least m ake an initial probe. U nfortun ately
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som eone has to do this spadew ork, for w ithout it whole swathes o f issues in W itkiewicz studies w ould have to rem ain un touched, and would spaw n m ore or less erroneou s in terpretation s. P ure Form is a concept o f key im portance in W itkiew icz’s aesthetics, an d yet at the sam e tim e it is far from a clear one —despite the fact th at the huge n um ber o f excurses u p o n the subject W itkacy has left us generally have the air o f p atien t or irritable attem p ts to drum into the head o f a dull child the reasons why 2 — 3 = — 1.
The concept o f P ure F orm —as we k n o w —diverges from the various colloquial m eanings o f the w ord “ fo rm .” W itkiew icz repeatedly stresses this:
[ ...] the n o tio n o f Pure F orm [ ...] has n o th in g w h atsoever in c o m m o n w ith the n o tio n o f form as th e rece p ta cle for c o n te n t: form as th e ex p ressio n o f ideas or feelin gs or the fo rm s o f o b je cts in p a in tin g s (N ow e f o r m y w m a la rstw ie — N ew Form s in P a in tin g — hereafter, referred to as N fm — W arszaw a 1959).
This q u o tatio n introduces straightaw ay the first o f the m eanings o f the word “fo rm ” th a t a p p e ar in W itkacy: the trad itio n al, A risto- telean, and now well-nigh colloquial distinction betw een “fo rm ” and “c o n te n t.” F o r W itkiew icz this m eaning is p a rt o f w hat is term ed “a view o f life” and em braces all the ph en o m en a o f the world, and not ju st the sphere o f a r t : “for in the context o f the space-tim e o f Existence wherever we go we encounter con tents inside fo rm s” (N fm , p. 342). C onsequently, this distinction “does n o t p rovide one with any, or ra th e r with any subjective, criteria —for there are no objective criteria here —for distinguishing between w orks o f a rt and o ther existing things” (Nfm , p. 342). It is w orthw hile however paying close attention to the “fo rm /co n te n t” distinction, since it pu ts a sizeable spanner in the w orks o f W itkacy’s disquisitions upon Pure F o rm ; to be sure, W itkiewicz is openly co n tem p tu o u s o f the distinction, b u t he is n o t quite sure how to extricate him self from it. Why is this? We will p u t this question aside until later.
The further m eanings o f the w ord “fo rm ” m anifest themselves in the sphere o f art. The second ch a p te r o f S zk ic e estetyczne (Aesthetical Sketches, 1922), entitled “ O n the C o ncep t o f F o rm ,” presents us with the follow ing sentence:
T he co n cep t o f form is far m o re virulent than that o f b ea u ty —it d o e s not h ave tw o m ean ings but four, an d these also require to b e differen tiated (N fm , p. 184).
The four new m eanings o f the word “fo rm ” are, firstly, (a) outline fo rm s and (b) "real” form s. B oth relate to “the form s o f objects in the external w orld” or, strictly speaking: to the m ann er in which we perceive these objects. O utline form s —flat form s —occur when one looks with only one eye, and bear certain analogies to p a in t ings th at treat the canv as consistently as a tw o-dim ensional plan e; whilst we perceive m ulti-dim ensional “re al” form s when we use o u r no rm al b inocular vision.
In so far as an o u tlin e form ca n be given in a sin g le act o f sim p le o b ser v a tio n (w e c o n sid er the n o tio n o f a sim p le act to be sy n o n y m o u s w ith the n o tio n o f an u n ch a n g in g c o m p le x o f q u a lities in d u ra tio n ), in the sim u lta n eity o f a fixed lo o k , to the sam e e x ten t a “ real” form (that is, o n e that c o r r e sp o n d s to a series o f sense p ercep tio n s) ca n o n ly be d ivin ed with the aid o f b in o cu la r v isio n (and h ere we are n o t d e a lin g purely w ith sen se p ercep tio n s o f sight but w ith a w h ole series o f o th e r se n se p ercep tio n s: in the m uscles o f the ey eb a ll, in th e lens, i.e. th e se n sa tio n s o f th e e y e ’s a d ju stm en t) (N fm , p. 186).
This second form o f the object “can only be exam ined when the object revolves up o n its axes (which m ay be varied or fixed), o r when we m ove aro u n d it o r touch it from all sides” {Nfm, p. 185). T h a t is why “the distinction between these two categories o f form s is fun dam ental when it com es to distinguishing betw een the form s o f p ain tin g and the form s o f sculptu re” {I.e.).
T he third m e a n in g —i.e. (c) — is w hat is called the cap tu re [ujecie] o f the form , “th a t is, the elem ent th a t can be form ulated as for instance angularity or fluidity, featheriness or softness, o r sharp d e m a rc a tio n ” {Nfm, p. 191). This denotes the form s within a picture, no t the form s o f objects in the external w orld, and the “c a p tu re ” precisely designates the stylistic peculiarities o f the given artist, w hich m anifest them selves in his handling o f the sim plest elem ents o f the picture. C ritics fail to distinguish adequately betw een this a rtic u la tio n o f form and the depicted objects them selves, which is why
[...] d e c e iv e d by the d iverse a rticu la tio n s o f form that vary so greatly fr o m o n e m o d e rn m aster, to a n o th er (e.g. P ic a sso , G a u g u in , M a tisse, V o n G o g h ), their d is q u is itio n s u p o n the ob je cts as vario u sly rendered c o n fu se both the c o m p o sitio n and th e c a p tu r e o f the form (nam ely, the fixed arran gem en t o f the tin iest ele m e n ts o f th e p ain ted w ork ) with the “p r o c e ssin g ” , the “d e fo r m a tio n ,” the “ g ra sp in g ” and th e “ in te rp reta tio n ” o f real ob je cts. T h ese e lem en ts m ust be d eta ch ed from o n e a n o th e r b efo re on e can say a n y th in g at all a b o u t p a in tin g , a b o u t a b straction from th e h a p less visual w orld {N fm , p. 191).
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This q u o tatio n , by the way, is a good illustration o f the problem s the “fo rm /co n te n t” opposition causes W itkacy: he wishes to elim inate it by m entioning only one o f its com pon ents —form —whilst passing over the other in silence, ra th e r th an by rejecting the whole category; and so the co n ten t he throw s o u t by the fro nt d o o r creeps in at the back. O f course, W itkacy is continually im paled u p o n the distinction by his polem ical o pp onents, those hated critics. B ut this is neither the only no r the m ain cause o f W itkacy’s entanglem ents.
Finally, the fou rth m eaning o f the w ord “ fo rm ” —i.e. (d) — is aesthetic fo rm . This is
[ ...] the form o f a given w ork o f art, w hich we m ust d efine as a cera in unity in m u ltip licity, w hich p o sse sse s the q u ality o f u n ity for itself. In other w ords, aesth etic form is a con stru ction w h o se u nity c a n n o t be reduced to an y other c o n c e p ts or ex p la in ed by m ea n s o f a n y th in g that is alien to the form itself (N fm , p. 186).
H ere “co n stru c tio n ” m eans “co m p o sitio n .” W itkacy treats these concepts interchangeably, and even prefers the latter, for the term “co n stru c tio n ” has “alm ost the sam e m eaning as its predecessor, except th a t it is to o redolent o f bridges, m achines, the bodies o f living creatures, and o th er objects” {Nfm. p. 191). The purp ose o f this am endm ent seems to be clear : W itkiewicz wishes to dissociate him self from any alleged links with constructivism and futurism , whilst at the sam e tim e setting the art-w ork in total opposition to “o ther objects,” as som ething quite distinct from them and w ithout a m atching term o f com parison.
A esthetic form is in fact P ure F orm , the fundam ental concept in W itkacy’s aesthetics. W itkiewicz even isolates it typographically: he usually writes the term in capital letters. Even when F o rm appears w ithout the adjective “P u re ,” the cap ital letter shows th a t the term is being used in this specific sense. It is this p artic u la r m eaning I w ould like to look at m ore closely. T he previous definitions o f “ form ” given by W itkiewicz have prob ab ly indicated the m eaning o f this key term in his aesthetics; bu t, as we shall see, the pointers they have provided have been m isleading ones. W itkacy, o f course, thinks otherw ise:
In sp ea k in g o f “fo r m ” and fa ilin g to differen tiate the c o n c e p t, the th e o re ticia n s o f form ism lay th e m selv es op en to sterile and m a d d en in g d eb a tes ab ou t un n ecessarily d eform ed ob jects. By p resenting a n ew c o n cep t o f form , w hich we
c o n sid er to be *the o n ly o n e that is a d eq u ate to the reality o f artistic creation — a co n cep t w hich e q u a te s it with the c o n stru ctio n o f form s u p on a p lan e surface, i.e. with c o m p o sitio n or Pure Form —w e at o n c e d isp o se o f the m isu n d erstan d ing (N fm , p. 188).
U nfortun ately , the m isunderstandings are only ju st beginning.
2
“T he co n stru ctio n o f form s upo n a plane surface, i.e. co m po sition or P ure F o rm ” suggests th at one ought to em ploy exclusively form al categories when app ro ach in g a w ork o f art, and bypass all its “c o n te n ts,” which m eans all reference to an extra-artistic reality. W itkacy advances this pro p o sitio n at every step and re peatedly voices it expressis verbis. But w hat it m eans, however, is th a t it is possible to d ra w up ju st such form al categories, and th a t the co nstruction o f form s —or the com position —is governed by definite form al rules that can be exam ined to establish th eir m u tu al relations and interrelations. It m eans, in other words, th a t P ure F orm is a definite system o f relations between the ele m ents (the form s) o f a w ork which is either quite simple or endlessly com plex, but th at the work can always be broken up into its p rim ary elem ents, dissected and explicated.
Indeed, all the detailed rem arks on painting in N ew Forms in Painting (1918) —his first and m ost com prehensive exposition o f the theory o f Pure F orm —ap pear to co rro b o ra te this reading o f the term th a t interests us. Here we en counter reflections on com position and co lo u r, on the pull o f tensions m arked o u t in the p articular elem ents o f a picture, on co lo u r harm onies, on dissolving colour, on the links betw een colour and com position, on com positions with colours th a t clash, and, finally, on the “cap tu re o f fo rm ” m entioned above. All these categories ap pear to m ake up a fully re aso n ed -o u t— albeit a rb itra ry —system o f criteria for b oth the co nstru ctio n (com position) an d the evaluation o f a picture. W itkiewicz him self rein forces this im pression in his Aesthetic Studies where he not only states b u t, w hat is m ore, spells out in italics th at “in o u r book entitled N ow e fo r m y w malarstwie we introduced the concept o f Pure Form in painting, meaning composition with outline fo rm s within
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a given closed space” (N fm , p. 186). In New Forms we also com e across a distinction betw een the P ure A rts, which are p ain tin g and m usic, for “they are able to provide us with an objectified [I would like to stress this w ord —my note] co nstru ction o f p ure qualities, independent o f any u tility ” {Nfm, p. 26), and those arts th a t are m ore o r less “sullied” by elem ents “from life,” such as poetry and the theatre. H ad W itkiewicz rested co n ten t with this, his theory o f P u re Form m ight have been d eb atab le or even erron eou s, b u t it would at least have had a basic coherence. A nd in practice it w ould have led to b o th the F auvist planes o f M atisse and to various kinds o f abstract, non-figurative painting, which com pletely sheds “blasted life” and all its real objects.
But at this point, and quite unexpectedly, statem ents ap pear th a t co n trad ict all the suggestions m ade h itherto . They ap p ear in the first two chapters o f the self-sam e N ew Forms in P ainting : the “P hilosophical In tro d u c tio n ” and “O n P u re A rt.” H ere is a ra n dom exam ple:
P arad oxical as it m ay so u n d , w e d eclare that the p r e c o n d itio n o f p ro fo u n d aesth etic sa tisfa ctio n is the im p o ssib ility o f e sta b lish in g co n c e p tu a lly th e reason w hy a given c o m b in a tio n o f q u a lities c o n stitu te s a un ity (p. 26).
In other w ords: n o t only do all the criteria for the co nstructio n o f P ure Form as a p lan ar com p o sitio n b reak dow n in practice, bu t, w hat is m ore, they are thorough ly in adeq uate to the task, since the essence o f P ure F orm , we recall, is “a certain unity in m ultipli city, which possesses the quality o f unity in its e lf’ —whilst it is im possible to define conceptually ju st why a p artic u la r co m bination o f qualities co nstitu tes a unity^
H ow then is this unity to be defined if concepts are ruled o u t? O ne can easily find an indirect answ er to this q u estio n:
W e ou rselves c o n stitu te the o n ly u nity for o u rse lv es, but certain c o m b in a tio n s o f d u ration al or sp atial q u a lities m ay by virtue o f their fixed nature or regular su cc essio n b eco m e sy m b o ls for u s, d irectly exp ressive o f o u r ow n u nity and that o f the w h ole o f E x isten ce: they ca n trigger m eta p h y sic a l u n ease. In this way it is p o ssib le for us to sp eak o f extern al fo rm s o f u n ity in m u ltip licity , which arrange them selves in a m anner that is u n iform for their crea to r as a d irect exp ression o f his m etap h ysical se n sa tio n s, w hich they can arou se in others (N fm , p. 19).
A h! So it is n o t a question o f aesthetic satisfaction, as we have been inclined to assum e up to this p oint, b u t o f the arousal
o f m etaphysical feelings. They are b ro u g h t a b o u t by a sense o f “ our own unity and th a t o f the whole o f Existence,” whilst “ we ourselves con stitu te the only unity for ourselves,” an d n o t som e work o f art created autonom o us. T he la tte r’s “quality o f unity for itself,” i.e. its P ure F orm , is m erely “ a direct expression” o f our m etaphysical sensations: those o f the creator, and those o f his audience. It is clear th a t such a unity o f elem ents w ithin the work o f art ca n n o t be defined conceptually: it is sim ply the unity o f o u r selves. A nd so:
The m etap h ysical se n sa tio n itse lf c a n n o t find ex p ressio n in a Pure F orm w ith o u t the p o la riza tio n b efo reh a n d o f the w h o le p sy ch ic w orld o f a given indi vidual. [ ...] W e m u st assu m e that in itse lf th is se n sa tio n is u n ifo rm a m o n g all Ind ivid u al B ein gs. W ere it n o t for the further areas in w h ich in d iv id u a ls differ from ea ch oth e r, this w ave [o f m eta p h y sica l se n sa tio n ], as it c o m e s in to co n ta c t w ith the sphere o f Pure F orm , w ou ld in variab ly y ield o n e and th e sam e result, th e sam e set o f form s, or th e sam e c o m b in a tio n o f qu alities (N fm , pp. 22 — 23).
F o rtunately this is n o t the case. B ut all o f a su dd en we now un d ersta n d why “the elem ent o f life: the sphere o f living feelings in m usic and ‘the visual w o rld ’ in p a in tin g ” are “necessary when it com es to the creation o f works o f a r t” {Nfm, p. 24). It is as m uch as a necessity, even tho ugh its purp o se is sim ply to p ro m ote “a com b in atio n o f elem ents o f P u re F orm , and n o t to becom e the m ain c o n te n t.” B ut why n o t? W hat if it im bued us with a sense o f “o u r own unity and th at o f the whole o f Existence” and evoked m etaphysical sensations in us —sensations which, after all, according to W itkacy, are n ot furnished by a rt alone? T hen, all the same, W itkacy would say, the w ork w ould n o t be A rt; for after all what interests us is how to distinguish art in p artic u la r from o th er p h en o m ena.
N evertheless, the difference proves to be only one o f degree.
T h e d ifferen ce b etw een w ork s o f A rt and o th e r p ro d u cts o f b ea u ty is a differ en ce o f degree [ ...] and rests o n the fact that w hereas in th e form er the exp ression o f u n ity in m ultip licity is an end in and for itself, in the latter it is a side-effect. [On th e oth er hand] reality and the feelin g s a n d th o u g h ts o f life can never be e lim in a te d p ro g ra m m a tica lly [because] the m o m en t o f th e a ssim ila tio n o f c o m p o si tio n a l m a sses to this or that ob ject is c o n stitu te d by the en tire p sych e o f the artist in q u estio n , by all his m em o r ie s o f p ast ex p erien ces, his w h o le im agin ative and e m o tio n a l w orld , all o f w hich m ean that irresp ective o f his a b ility to translate his v isio n in to actu ality he is this particular In d ivid u al Being, with this particular ch a ra cter and set o f p sy ch ic ch aracteristics (N fm , pp. 20, 349, 270).
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It m ay now be becom ing clearer why it is th at in his previous reflections on P ure F orm as a system o f relations o f co m po sition al elem ents W itkacy has continu ally entangled him self in the “fo rm /co n te n t” opp o sitio n ; why it does no t occur to him to speak sim ply o f com position and (raw) m aterial; and why he him self does not p ractise geom etric ab straction b u t figurative painting, always inclining ra th e r tow ards painting with a literary them e, even though he treats it p rogram m atically as p ain tin g in line with his theory, as p ain tin g with P ure Form s. O ne can begin to see ju st why he “sullies” p ain tin g with elem ents o f “life,” even though he him self had declared it a P u re A rt in which an “objectified co nstru ctio n o f pure qu alities” is possible. Possible then —b u t im possible for him as an artist? It tu rn s o ut th at this, u n fo rtun ately, is the case. W hy? Because —
T he u n iq u en ess, u n ity and se lf-id en tity o f every In d ivid u al B eing, the lim ita tio n s p laced u p o n his d u ra tio n and e x te n sio n , m ean that even for a d em o n we m ight p o sit as acq u a in ted w ith all the c o n n e c tio n s that o b ta in w ithin the w h o le o f ex isten ce his o w n “ I ,” in the p articu larity o f its im m ed iate ex p erien ce, w o u ld be b o u n d to be a m ystery to him (N fm , p. 17).
A nd that, after all, is the m ost im p o rtan t thing:
T his sense o f the unity o f ou r o w n “ I ” as im m ed ia tely g iven , w hich w e term the qu ality o f u n ity and m ust reco g n ise as ex istin g “c o m p o u n d e d with the b a c k g r o u n d ” o f other q u a lities, is at the r o o t o f the sense o f m etap h ysical u n ea se w hich m a n ifests itse lf a m o n g the higher In d ivid u al B ein g s via relig io n , p h ilo so p h y and art, which have a c o m m o n sou rce b u t b eca m e d istin ct from o n e a n o th er in the co u rse o f s o c ie ty ’s d ev elo p m en t. [O n the other hand] art, we are tryin g to sh o w , is e s se n tia lly — and n o t in its in essen tial elem en ts —an ex p ressio n o f th is u n ity o f each and every Individual B ein g, through w hich that B e in g sta n d s o p p o se d to all that is n o t itself: the w h o le o f B ein g (N fm , pp. 1 6 — 17).
U n d ersto o d in this way, a rt —or P ure F o rm , since W itkiewicz identifies the two concepts with each o ther —is m ediatory in nature. The Individual Being o r “I ” can, by virtue o f its inner unity, stand opposed upon occasions to the whole o f Being, i.e. the external w orld, the object-w orld, “life” : everything th a t can be sum m ed up in the term “the n o n -I.” F o r “the n o n -I” is m ultiplicity. And this duality is no t a sign o f so m ebo dy’s subjectivism or peculiar w him : it is a feature o f Being. T o pu t it in the sim plest term s: viewed from w ithout, Being is an infinite collection o f objects —W itkiewicz would prefer to say “m o n ad s” —within space, whilst when viewed from w ithout it is a flow o f qualities throu gh time.
B ecau se o f the infinite d u ality o f its form as T im e and S p a ce, B e in g is dual in nature, and every In d ivid u al B ein g m ust a lso be dual (N fm , p. 15).
But there are times when the sudden flash o f experiencing oneself as a unity enables one to overcom e the duality o f Individual Being. C reating and responding to w orks o f a rt b o th yield experiences o f 1 this kind. O n occasions they even overcom e the o pp ositio n betw een the “I ” and “the n o n -I” : “expressing directly o u r own unity and th a t o f the whole o f Existence.” A t such tim es we achieve the rarest and m ost precious thing in life: we experience the general “ M ystery o f Being as a unity in m ultiplicity.”
The m ediatory function o f art m akes it possible to cast aside — even if only for a m om ent —
[...] the fu n d a m en ta lly m o n str o u s so litu d e and u n iq u en ess the In d ivid u al B ein g feels in the m idst o f the en d less to ta lity o f B eing. A rtistic c rea tio n d irectly c o n firms the rule o f so litu d e as th e p rice paid for the p o ssib ility o f e x iste n c e in gen eral: it d o es n ot con firm this fo r itse lf a lo n e, b u t also for other In d ivid u al B ein gs, as lo n ely as itself. It rep resen ts a co n firm a tio n o f B ein g in all its m e ta p h y sical horror; th o u g h it d o e s n o t ju stify this horror by crea tin g a system o f p a llia tiv e c o n c e p ts, as occu rs in relig io n , or a system o f c o n c e p ts th a t d e m o n str a tes co n c e p tu a lly the necessity o f su ch a state o f affairs o b ta in in g in the T o ta lity o f Being, as occu rs in p h ilo so p h y . T h e sam e ap p lies to th o se w h o c o m p reh en d the unity o f B eing and their o w n so litu d e w ithin it through the u nity o f form , w hich c o n stitu te s the art-w ork. T h u s we see that the form o f a w ork o f art is its o n ly essen tial c o n te n t. F orm and c o n te n t d o n ot exist sep a ra tely w ithin it but c o m p rise an a b so lu te u n ity (N fm , pp. 20 — 21).
“ Form and co n ten t do not exist separately within it.” H ere at last W itkacy succeeds for once in overcom ing the “ form versus c o n te n t” opp osition th a t has ensnared him up to this p o in t, and will continue to do so for years to com e in the course o f his unceasing artistic polem ics. But the theory o f art we encou nter here has a com pletely different fo un dation from th a t we began with. W hereas the form er was concerned with aesthetic values, what m atters for this one are —m etaphysical sensations. The form er sug gested th at the thing at stake was a work that is au to n o m o u s, independent o f its creato r, and obeys certain form al rules th at can be defined and arranged in a system o f rules. The latter speaks o f the work as the projection o f a personality whose unity de term ines th at o f the work itself; a work th at ca n n o t be detached from the artist, an d whose general unity ca n n o t be fo rm ulated in term s o f any rules. W hereas the form er was a theory o f the w ork
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as form , the latter is a theory o f the w ork as expression. W here the form er theory was form alistic, the latter is blatan tly expressionist.
We are well aw are today o f the co n trad icto ry n atu re o f the assum ptions these tw o theories rest up o n . T here are m om ents when even W itkacy him self senses this.
On the o n e h an d , the artist m ust be en tirely as he is; and on th e oth e r, there m ust be P ure F orm ; on the o n e h and is w h at we h ave term ed the m eta p h y sical se n sa tio n , and on the o th e r —p u re q u a lities c o n n e c te d by a sin g le idea that tran sform s c h a o s in to an in d isso lu b le u n ity. W h at h a p p en s betw een these tw o m o m e n ts is the secret o f the artists (N fm , p . 58).
But no t th a t o f all artists, let us add. F o r the w ork as co m p osition o f form s is an au to n o m o u s object, susceptible o f ex am ina tion from w ith o u t: it is “the n o n -I” ; whilst I for my p art can only u nderstand the work th a t expresses the unity o f a personality by inwardly identifying with it to the extent th at it becom es m yself: the “ I” . O ne has to bear this o pp ositio n between the “ I” and “ the n o n -I” within oneself as a fund am ental split in o rd e r to be able to do as W itkacy did and spend o n e ’s whole life suspended between the two, gravitating n eith er to the one n o r the o th er pole. In order to be able n o t to choo se to the very last.
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C ould it be, however, th a t W itkacy is sim ply incapable o f choosing one or the o th er o f the tw o opposed aesthetic theories, which thus perpetually th w art one an o th er w ithin him ? N o. He is also unw illing to choose. F o r the tw o co n trad icto ry theories he p ro p o u n d s and com bines seem to co n stitu te for him sim ply two aspects o f the self-same w ork o f art. A fter all, the w ork o f art is equally b i-form : b o th an aesthetic object and an expression o f the unity o f a personality. It can m ediate between the “I” and “the n o n -I” because it p articipates in b o th their worlds. W hat is m ore, the fundam ental duality th a t is com m on to Being as a whole, each Individual Being, and, finally, the art-w o rk —can only conclude in a dualism th a t is b o th m ethodological and ontological. W itkiewicz is keenly aw are o f this very consequence.
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C o n cep tu a l sy stem s that take a cco u n t o f o n ly o n e asp ect o f th e d u a lity o f ex iste n c e and then attem p t to d escrib e e x isten ce as a w h o le p u rely o n the basis o f that on e asp ect are b o u n d to be fa lla c io u s; w hilst sy stem s w h ich define the fron tiers o f the m ystery m o re or less p recisely , ta k in g a cco u n t o f the d u ality o f e x isten ce, will exp ress the A b so lu te T ruth , w hich is o n e {N fm , p. 16).
T h at is why the theory o f P u re F o rm is no less dualistic than W itkiew icz’s ontology. It is dualistic in ju s t the same way. In an excellent study o f W itkacy’s philosophy, published in th e Pam iętnik Teatralny, K rzysztof P om ian has clearly defined the ontological and m ethodological dualism o f this philosophy. A n analysis o f the co n ce p t o f P ure F orm yields analogous results in the area o f W itkacy’s aesthetics. W itkiewicz was surely profo u n d ly justified in em phasizing at every step the interconnectedness o f his aesthetic an d his m ore general philosophical views. H is theories really d o ap p ear to be very hom ogeneous —p articularly with respect to their antinom ies. They doggedly solve and resolve a single irrepressible co n trad ictio n in a succession o f fields. P ure F o rm is m erely the “som eth in g” within the art-w ork th a t dispels the co n tra d ictio n s for a m om ent. T h at is all it does. P erhaps one should say it does that much.
