The Ambivalence of Social Change in Post-Communist Societies

Piotr Sztompka

The Ambivalence of Social Change in

Post-Communist Societies

Kultura i Polityka : zeszyty naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Europejskiej im. ks. Józefa Tischnera w Krakowie nr 2/3, 131-153

THE AMBIVALENCE OF SOCIAL CHANGE

IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES

W hy ambivalence? Because the story o f the alm ost eighteen years since the collapse o f com m unism has been told in tw o opposing ways. The optim istic, heroic narratives describe an epochal success o f countries that have come a long way from Soviet satellites to m em bers o f the European U nion and Atlantic A l­ liance; the process o f liberation, emancipation, modernization, Europeanization, W esternization. The pessim istic, gloomy narratives see the sam e process as the sequence o f failures, excessive social hardships, growing inequalities, survivals o f com m unism , unfinished revolution. B u t in social life, nothing is entirely w hite or com pletely black; as U lrich B eck likes to put it, “either/or” thinking has to be replaced by “both/and” logic (Beck, 2006). And, as will be show n in this talk, there is a grain o f truth in both pictures. H ence - am bivalence. B ut let us begin at the beginning.

The anti-communist revolution and post-revolutionary dilemmas

In the y ear 1989, the w orld changed in East-Central Europe. It was a year o f miracles. Several countries liberated them selves from the grip o f the Soviet empire, and soon the em pire itself disintegrated and collapsed. To these events we give the nam e o f revolution, and deservedly so (Kumar, 2001). For even

* P iotr Sztom pka, pro feso r zw yczajny w U niw ersytecie Jagiellońskim i W yższej Szkole Europejskiej im. JózefaTischnera. Specjalizuje się w zakresie socjologii teoretycznej. K ilkunastokrotnie w ykładał jak o profesor wizytujący w USA, Europie, Australii i Ameryce Łacińskiej. Opublikował 18 książek i ponad 200 artykułów nauko­ wych, które ukazały się w czternastu językach. Jest członkiem rzeczyw istym Polskiej A kadem ii N auk i Polskiej A kadem ii Um iejętności. W latach 2 0 0 2 -2006 pełnił z w yboru funkcję Prezydenta M iędzynarodow ego Stow a­ rzyszenia Socjiologicznego (ISA).

Piotr Sztom pka is a professor o f theoretical sociology at the Jagiellonian U niversity at Krakow, Poland and J.T ischner’s European University. His m ain them es o f research include social and cultural change, social m ove­ m ents and revolutions, sociology o f everyday life, visual sociology, post-com m unist transform ations. Visiting p ro fesso r at a num ber o f A m erican, A ustralian, L atin A m erican and E uropean U niversities (e.g. Colum bia, U CLA , H obart, Rom e, B ologna, B ruges) and a fellow o f six institutes for advanced study (U ppsala, Berlin, Stanford, Wassenaar, B udapest and Vienna). M em ber o f the Polish A cadem y o f Sciences, A cadem ia Europaea (London) and the A m erican A cadem y o f Arts and Sciences. From 2002-2006 President o f the International So­ ciological Association (ISA). Has published 18 books and more than 200 articles which came out in 14 languages.

though they were not accom panied by the usual paraphernalia o f revolutions: barricades, violence, bloodshed, they were clearly epochal, revolutionary events in a m ore im portant historiosophical sense. They constituted a m ajor break in historical continuity, a com plete and radical change at all levels o f social life, for great m asses o f people.

A t the political level it m eant a shift from an autocratic, centralized, m ono­ party system to a W estem -style dem ocratic regime. A t the econom ic level it m eant a shift from central planning and state control to the capitalist market. A t the intellectual and artistic level, it m eant the shift from controlled and cen­ sored circulation o f ideas and values to free and pluralistic expression with open access to world culture. A nd at the level o f everyday life, it opened to the people entirely n ew experiences: instead o f the eternal shortages and long queues at every store, the unlim ited options o f a consum er society; instead o f the g rey­ ness and sim plicity o f uniform life-styles, the colour and diversity o f living spaces, products and fashions; and instead o f lim ited m obility and restrained foreign contacts, open borders and unlim ited travel and tourism.

It was also a revolution in a m ore personal, emotional sense (Am inzade and M cAdam , 2001); a tim e o f trem endous popular enthusiasm, collective efferves­ cence, elation with hard-won victory. The pictures o f crowds o f Germans danc­ ing on the ruins o f the B erlin Wall, or Czech students leading W aclaw Havel “n a H rad,” to the presidential palace, or Poles celebrating the first free elections - entered the iconography o f the 20th century. It w as a tim e o f great national solidarity, regained dignity and pride. There w as full support and trust for the n ew regim e and sky-rocketing expectations and aspirations. Freedom and pros­ perity seem ed ju st around the comer.

The m ore sober, distant observers were warning: a transition o f that m ag­ nitude is not a m atter o f days, it needs time. R a lf D ahrendorf, a fam ous soci­ ologist, in the first account o f the “autum n o f nations 1989” (Dahrendorf, 1990) was writing o f three clocks running at various speeds: the clock o f politics and changes in law s - the fastest, m easured in m onths; the clock o f econom y and building the m arket - slower, m easured in years; and the clock o f civil society, that is, changes in values, m entalities, “habits o f the heart” o f the people - the slowest, beating in the rhythm o f decades or even generations. In a sim ilar m es­ sage, A ndrew Nagorski, Newsweek’s Eastern European correspondent, was giv­ ing a telling title to his report from the tearing dow n o f the B erlin Wall: “The W all R em ains in the H eads.” Z bigniew B rzezinski, a w ell-know n A m erican politologist, was putting forw ard the contrast betw een rejoining the European house, that is, the W estern institutional architecture o f politics and economy, and settling in the European hom e, namely, “feeling at hom e” am id the intan­ gible net o f loyalties, attachm ents, custom s, subtle rules o f conduct pervading everyday life. The latter, he claim ed, is m uch m ore difficult and cannot be

achieved overnight. We were also reminded o f the famous sentence that Giuseppe M azzini is reported to have uttered after the unification o f Italy: “N o w that we have m ade Italy, we have to m ake Italians.” C hanging from Homo Sovieticus to the m odem W esterners, abandoning the crippled and deficient East-European identity and acquiring a full-fledged, proud E uropean identity required time.

In fact, the triumphant and jubilant m ood soon passed, and a sort o f “morning after” syndrom e set in (Sztom pka, 1992). People soon discovered that freedom is not only a gift, but an obligation and som etim es a burden. The new ly estab­ lished pow ers had to m ake num erous choices and m ost o f them took the shape o f dilem m as; no solution was perfect and each im plied social costs, i f not for these groups then for the others. The m ain problem o f every democratic regim e w as faced im m ediately: m ajor reform s are usually not highly popular, and yet they require a m ajority for their im plem entation. The post-com m unist govern­ m ents had one trem endous asset: the credit o f trust. A nd at least for som e tim e a “w indow o f opportunity” opened, allowing a fundam ental reform o f society.

The first dilem m a appeared here: whether to introduce reforms immediately, by “shock therapy” or in an evolutionary, piecemeal fashion - the first was more effective but socially costly; the second w ould relieve som e social hardships but w as m uch less effective. A nother problem , and the second dilem m a, was grasped m etaphorically by Jon Elster, Claus Offe and U lrich Preuss: we were trying to “rebuild the ship at sea” (Elster, Offe and Preus, 1998). It was m ore difficult than building from scratch, w hen one m ay follow som e pragm atic se­ quence, such as starting from the foundations and proceeding up tow ard the chimney. H ere the ship had to be kept afloat; thus, it was not obvious w here to start, which part to rebuild first without endangering the whole. The third unique dilem m a was also m anifesting itse lf quite early: we w anted to m odernize, to catch up with the m ost developed societies. B ut the problem was that they were not w aiting for us, but m oving forw ard at high speed. It was a situation rem i­ niscent o f the H ollyw ood m ovie “The Vanishing P oint.” A nd paradoxically, the m ost developed countries were even able to accelerate and escape further from us because o f n e w opportunities they found in the transform ing Eastern Europe: huge, n ew markets, new sources o f cheaper labor, new terrain for direct capital investm ents. Thus, our pursuit becam e even harder.

Then the question arose: h o w to rebuild. To reform , yes, but in w hich di­ rection? We knew that w e w anted to becom e like the West. For decades m ost people had been looking tow ard the W est and standing w ith their backs to our giant Eastern neighbour, Soviet Russia. There had developed an uncritical ide­ alization o f everything that is Western. B ut n o w that we w ere about to jo in the West, which West we really wanted becam e less clear: Sweden or Japan, the US or Sw itzerland, B ritain or Spain? A nd should w e im itate and im port every­ thing w holesale or rather selectively: W estern institutions, life-styles, fashions,

ideas? Or also unem ploym ent, hom elessness, crime, pornography? Is it at all possible to bring only the good things and leave the b ad things at the border or is the transaction inevitably linked?

M ore concretely, the follow ing questions had to be resolved:

^ W hich dem ocracy to adopt: the parliam entary or presidential system ? ^ W here should the center o f pow er rest: in the strong, central governm ent

or in the civil society: local governm ent, N G O ’s, grass roots associations, social m ovem ents?

^ W hich capitalism to adopt: the neo-liberal or com m unitarian, ram pant individualism or welfare state, American free competition or German social econom y? O r perhaps som e “third w ay”?

^ W hat to do with huge state assets: restitute to form er private owners and privatize, sell to foreign com panies and corporations or keep some stra­ tegic sectors in the hands o f the state?

^ W hat role for the church, which played such a crucial role at the tim es o f democratic opposition and struggle against the communist regime? Should it retain a political role or return to its spiritual m ission and moral leader­ ship, separated from the state?

^ H ow to deal with the comm unist past and the people who were supporting the old regime, who either belonged to the communist party, or even collab­ orated w ith the secret police? Should im m ediate “ de-com m unization” and “lustration” be carried out - like de-N azification in G erm any after W orld W ar II - or rather, should the past be ignored, reconciliation to becom e the m ain goal and all citizens be given equal opportunities to par­ ticipate in the building o f the new regime.

^ H o w to locate the country w ithin the w ider world: to adopt the policy o f cosm opolitanism or parochialism , integration or isolation. A nd m ore specifically: h o w to relate to the only rem aining superpow er, the w orld hegem ony - the US, h o w to develop links w ith the uniting Europe - the EU, and how to find some accommodation with the former imperial power o f the region - R ussia?

Such strategic decisions taken at the beginning o f transform ation w ere to determ ine the different paths that various post-com m unist societies have taken and the various outcom es o f the process that w e witness today, alm ost eight­ een years later. B ecause the baffling fact is the great diversity o f the region to ­ day, in spite o f the m ore or less identical starting point. A fter all, the satellite societies w ere shaped exactly according to the com m on institutional patterns im posed from M oscow ; the “X erox effect” was enforced and at least in their political and econom ic system, the countries o f Eastern Europe were copies o f Soviet solutions. The current, varied m osaic proves ho w m uch earlier, coun­

try-specific history matters, h o w m uch a specific, cultural (including religious) heritage matters, how m uch the strategies adopted at the revolutionary m om ent o f extrication from com m unism matter. B ut perhaps, m ost clearly, h o w the policies chosen in the course o f transform ation are crucially im portant. A nd these will be m y focus in this presentation. I will also lim it m y angle o f vision to only one country, my own, exem plifying the general points w ith facts and data referring to the R epublic o f Poland - b ut I have reasons to believe that several m ore general m echanism s o f post-revolutionary social change, w hich w e shall discover using P oland as an exam ple, are also applicable to other post-com m unist societies.

The Polish trajectory of transformation: the take-off

Three early political decisions have determ ined the course o f Polish trans­ form ation and strongly influenced further political and economic developments, as w ell as the m ore intangible social “ clim ate” and the m ood o f the people (Sztom pka, 1991b). In th e political dom ain, the parliam entary system w as adopted, with a great role given to political parties and the governm ent and lim ­ ited com petence left for the president. There was an unspoken reason for that: the agreem ent reached at the round-table talks (the Polish way o f extrication from the comm unist system) was a sort o f compromise betw een the democratic opposition and com m unist leaders, w hich suggested, am ong other things, the idea “our prim e m inister, y o u r president” pu t forw ard by one o f the leading activists o f the m ovem ent o f Solidarność A dam M ichnik. A nd in fact, after the first dem ocratic elections, General W ojciech Jaruzelski, the form er leader o f the com m unist party, assum ed the office o f the president for som e years, to be replaced only later by the legendary leader o f Solidarność, N obel Peace Prize winner Lech Wałęsa. It was obvious that Jaruzelski’s powers, compared to those o f the governm ent and parliam ent, had to be curbed. There were also other im ­ portant decisions at the political level; the creation o f the C onstitutional Court and the Office o f the O m budsm an - the institutions that have attained strong positions and up to today play a very im portant role in Polish politics.

The second crucial area w as the economy. H ere the finance m inister, the em inent econom ist Leszek Balcerow icz, decided to use the “w indow o f oppor­ tunity” and impose what came to be known as the “shock therapy” or “big-bang approach.” All constraints on the free m arket were released, state controls m in­ im ized, prices liberated, convertibility o f the currency safeguarded - in one reform package, alm ost immediately. In the long run, such a policy turned out to be very successful (m uch m ore so than the alternative, slow, step-by-step “evolutionary” way adopted in some other post-com m unist countries). It m obi­ lized entrepreneurship and econom ic growth, curbed inflation, stabilized the

currency. In my view the econom ic success o f Poland today is due in large part to this first push. B ut in the short run, it led to serious tensions and frustrations, as its side effects touched considerable segm ents o f the population. A nd again, the fact that the econom ic reform started in this w ay w as due to contingent factors: to the nom ination o f B alcerow icz and not som ebody else to the cru­ cial position o f econom ic influence, to B alcerow icz’s training in the neo-lib- eral school, and to the advisory role played by his fellow neo-liberal econo­ m ists - Jeffrey Sachs and Anders Aslund.

The third decision o f fundam ental im portance for the “ social clim ate” had to do w ith the issue faced by all revolutions: ho w to treat the defeated ene­ mies. The rule in several revolutions o f the past was post-revolutionary terror: guillotines or firing squads or machetes. N ot so in the Polish revolution. The first freely elected Prim e M inister, th e em inent intellectual and Solidarność leader Tadeusz M azow iecki, decided on reconciliation rather than revenge. H e declared the policy o f the “thick black line” cutting o ff the past, proposed to ignore form er com m unist party m em bership and even the collaboration with the secret police (as long as it did not consist o f outright crim inal guilt) and to focus on the contribution that all citizens together could m ake in building the future. In the short run, it was salutary for the social m ood and allow ed the use o f the considerable intellectual and professional potential o f the form er com ­ m unists, m any o f w hom soon abandoned their earlier loyalties and jo in e d the effort to construct a viable dem ocracy and a functioning m arket. B ut in the long run, it left a ready argum ent w ith strong populist resonance to som e p o ­ litical parties, w hich becam e quite successful in attaining pow er by blam ing all difficulties and social frustrations on the supposed conspiracy o f form er, unpunished and unrepentant com m unists or com m unist “agents.” A nd in the preserved archives o f the secret police, it left a ready w eapon to sham e and discredit political opponents for those who could get privileged access. The is­ sue o f “de-com m unization” and “lustration” was to resurface seventeen years later and to ov ershadow all really im portant issues o f Polish politics. Once again, let us em phasize the contingency o f history. O bviously “de-com m uni­ zation” and “lustration” could have been carried out im m ediately after the rev­ olution (like in som e neighbouring countries, C zechoslovakia or the DD R), w ere it not for the personality o f M azow iecki, w ith his strong C hristian b e lie f in forgiveness and generosity tow ard opponents. It is an invalid counter-fac­ tual argum ent to tell w hat w ould have been the consequences at that tim e o f the decisions that were not taken. B ut one thing is certain: digging out the is­ sue now, after seventeen years, is the cynical pow er game, w hich has nothing to do w ith high-sounding virtues o f “truth” and “ju stice.”

Legacy of the past

It is a truism that all societies are path-dependent, shaped by their particular history and tradition. Earlier events leave the traces and im prints - in m aterial infrastructure, in institutions and in m em ories (Connerton, 1989). They m ay derive from near history or be transm itted through generations from quite dis­ tant history. In the case o f East-Central European societies, a particularly strong im pact was exerted by h a lf a century o f com m unist rule. This legacy becam e effective immediately after the revolution, producing various obstacles, barriers, blockages and frictions in the process o f transform ation. The im pact o f com ­ m unism w as predom inantly negative; it m ust be counted on the side o f liabil­ ities. There were exceptions, though, w hich m ust be put on the positive side o f the balance. C om m unism was a project o f m odernization. It was, o f course, incom plete m odernization; I have characterized it as “fake m odernizatio n” (Sztom pka, 1995), but it had achievem ents in tw o domains: on one hand, the industrial and technological developm ent, and on the other, the educational and cultural advancem ent o f the population. The balance sheet in the case o f earlier, pre-com m unist history is usually leaning tow ard the positive side. Ear­ lier epochs usually left a m ore positive legacy, gave som e societies the assets, shaped their particular strengths in the building o f a n e w regim e. B ut again, there were also some negative traditions, such as chauvinism, xenophobia, ster­ eotypes and prejudices against som e neighbouring countries, enm ity tow ard m inorities, anarchic tendencies.

In the case o f Poland, the balance sheet m ay be form ulated as follows. On the negative side, com m unism affected the political, econom ic and cultural- m ental sphere. A t the political level, w e inherited a pervasive bureaucracy, an overabundance o f inconsistent and obsolete laws, undeveloped political p ar­ ties, a w eak civil society, a “ social vacuum ” in the non-governm ental sector, a non-existent, apolitical civil service, political elites untrained in dem ocratic procedures and standards. A t the econom ic level, w e were left w ith national­ ized property; huge, state-ow ned industrial enterprises stagnant and inefficient w ith obsolete technology; an overgrow n and fragm ented agricultural sector w ith alm ost 30 percent o f the labour force em ployed in small, fam ily farms.

B ut perhaps the legacy m ost resistant to change, the one featuring the m ost inertia, is to be found in the cultural-m ental sphere, the dom ain o f rules, values, norm s, shared beliefs, ingrained “habits o f the h eart,” subconscious reflexes (Sztom pka, 1999a). Some o f them w ere directly shaped by com m unist prop­ aganda and indoctrination, for exam ple, egalitarianism , or shifting all deci­ sions to the authorities. Som e were spontaneously internalized as useful adap­ tive strategies, allow ing passiveness or opportunism to survive m ore securely, for example.

I w ould classify those cultural and lasting m ental traces o f com m unism in tw o categories. I call the first one “ civilizational incom petence” (Sztom pka, 1993a), indicating by that term that people w ere left unprepared for the d e­ m ands o f m odem , industrial and dem ocratic civilization. They w ere m issing m odem political culture, organizational culture, the citizen’s ethos o f respon­ sibility and participation. They w ere n o t ready for m o dem labo ur culture, business culture, entrepreneurial and m anagerial ethos. A nd they w ere also lacking in som e skills o f everyday life: road traffic culture, com puter literacy, punctuality, consum er discernm ent in v iew o f unlim ited options, scepticism tow ard com m ercial advertising, insulation to m arketing tricks, care for the en­ vironm ent and public spaces. I call the second category “East-European iden­ tity” (Sztom pka, 2004a). It is in the self-definition and associated em otions that culture and m ental habits leave their strongest, synthesized imprint. A nd the identity inherited from the com m unist period was typically tainted by the follow ing traits: insecurity o f o n e ’s position and status, a childish dependence on paternalistic authority, xenophobia and intolerance, an inferiority com plex to w ard th e W est coup led w ith uncritical id ealizatio n o f everything th at is Western, a superiority complex tow ard the East (and particularly Soviet Russia), in the Polish case taking the shape o f a m yth o f a chosen nation, providing the eastern defensive barricade for Christianity.

B ut o f course, each o f the post-com m unist countries could also search for strength and inspiration in earlier history. Thus, in the case o f Poland, our h is­ torically inherited assets included: strong patriotism linked w ith Catholicism preserving the potential o f national-religious comm unity, even if suppressed and going underground at the tim e o f com m unism , attachm ent to the idea o f sovereignty, w hich for so m any periods o f Polish history could not have been taken for granted (for instance, the occupation by Russia, Prussia and the Aus- tro-H ungarian Em pire during the w hole o f the 19th century), rom antic readi­ ness for a collective struggle for com m on, national causes even if seem ingly hopeless (such as several failed uprisings in the 19th century or the W arsaw uprising o f 1944 against the overw helm ing Nazi forces), some dem ocratic tra­ ditions dating as far back as the 18th century, w hen Poland had one o f the first democratic constitutions in the w orld (the “M ay 3rd Constitution” o f 1791), the proud mem ory o f the strong monarchy extending under the Jagiellonian dynas­ ty from the B altic to the B lack Sea, some popular heroes o f free independent Poland after W orld W ar II, including Jó zef Piłsudski and Ignacy Paderew ski, whose exam ples could be taken as inspiration for the current leaders.

All these forces o f history, negative as well as positive, have proven to be o f trem endous im portance in the process o f post-com m unist transform ation. To these one m ay add a new, m ore recent tradition: anti-com m unist revolu­ tion. It m atters a lot ho w each o f the East-C entral European countries got rid

o f comm unism . Some, like Poland or Hungary, had long traditions o f struggle against the regim e and eventually used the strategy o f round-table talks to reach som e com prom ise betw een the dem ocratic opposition and the com m u­ nist rulers, leading eventually to their abdication. In Poland, the experience o f

Solidarność the biggest political m ovem ent o f the 20th century (having some

10 m illion m em bers at the peak o f its m obilization), com parable only w ith the Civil Rights m ovem ent in the US, has left particularly strong traces in the so­ cial consciousness. Perhaps in a little sim ilar way as France, w hich is still in­ fluenced by the tradition o f the G reat French R evolution o f 1789, Poland will for a long tim e experience the repercussions o f the revolution from belo w in 1980-1989 (Ekiert and Kubik, 1999). The events took a different course in R o­ m ania, w hich w itnessed violent, bloody confrontation betw een the democratic forces and the strongly entrenched regim e o f N icolae Ceausescu. Still another scenario was follow ed in the countries that experienced revolution from above, gaining or re-gaining independence in the w ake o f the dissolution o f an em ­ pire (as the post-Soviet republics) or the disintegration o f a federation (like in Yugoslavia). Finally, there was the unique case o f the D D R, w hich was simply incorporated into the Federal R epublic o f Germany. W hether people conceived o f dem ocracy as a treasure w on in their ow n hard struggle or as a gift received freely from above m ade a great difference (Offe, 1997).

Thus, to summ arize, at the m om ent o f take-off, the various courses o f trans­ form ation taken by post-com m unist societies were determ ined by their different historical legacies, the strategies o f extrication from com m unist rule and the initial policies adopted by the new, dem ocratic governm ents.

The turbulence at the beginning: the initial trauma

The quickest to change were the institutions. In the first year o f transform a­ tion, m ost institutions o f the free, dem ocratic and m arket society w ere already in place: political parties, the parliam ent, the president, the constitutional court, the om budsm an, private enterprises, industrial corporations, banks, stock ex­ change, pluralistic m edia. The people found them selves in a com pletely re ­ shaped institutional environm ent. It dem anded certain skills, beliefs, rules and values. B ut initially, the people lacked th em and even w orse, they had been trained to develop radically opposite skills, to accept opposite beliefs and rules, and to follow opposite values. The syndrom e o f Homo Sovieticus was dysfunc­ tional for n ew institutions; and m entalities and culture are, as w e know, the slow est to change. A striking contrast em erged betw een the culture o f com m u­ nism , still rem aining in the peo p le’s m inds, and the culture o f dem ocracy de­ m anded by the n ew institutional environm ent (Sztom pka, 1996b). This can be

rendered by the follow ing oppositions: (1) collectivism vs. individualism , (2) cooperation vs. com petition, (3) egalitarianism vs. m eritocracy, 4) m ediocrity vs. visible success, (5) security o f jo b s, pensions, savings vs. the risk o f in ­ vesting, (6) b e lie f in fate and providence vs. b e lie f in the pow er o f the hum an agency, (7) leaning on state support vs. self-reliance, (8) blam ing the system for personal failures vs. personal responsibility, (9) political passiveness and escape tow ard private sphere vs. participation in public life, (10) idealization o f pre-com m unist past vs. orientation tow ard the future.

To this split in the culture and its adverse, tension-producing consequences for the people, I give the nam e “initial traum a” (Sztom pka, 2004b). Its sym p­ tom s were: disorientation, certain norm ative chaos (or “anom ie”) w ith the lack o f clarity about w hat is right and wrong, w hat is pro per and im proper, good and bad - and consequently the lack o f clear guidelines for conduct. It bred feelings o f uncertainty and insecurity. I extend here the m eaning o f the concept o f traum a in tw o ways: first from the m edical, psychological or psychiatric do­ m ain to the social dom ain, and second, from the consequences o f som e inher­ ently bad events (a traffic accident, term inal illness, death in the family, etc.), to adverse, traum atizing consequences o f fundam ental and rapid changes, even i f they are them selves positive, beneficial o r w ished for. T here m ay also be a “traum a o f success” - when success can change deeply internalized habits, accustom ed w ays o f life, un-reflexive routines, strongly h eld convictions.

The initial traum a produces som e turbulence and even blocks the sm ooth progress o f transform ation at its early phase. The new institutions cannot op­ erate properly until they are m anned, supported or utilized by appropriately trained people. B ut this in itself w ould be relatively easy to overcom e. First o f all, peo ple are learn in g anim als, and th e in stitu tion al en viro nm ent exerts a strong socializing influence, enforcing certain standards o f behaviour. S ec­ ond, p eople w ere not equally affected by the syndrom e o f Homo Sovieticus. There w ere intellectual, academ ic, artistic and oppositional elites - cosm opol­ itan and W est-oriented - w ho w ere able to insulate them selves against this syndrom e, and already under com m unism em braced - in im aginations, dreams and aspirations - the standards and values o f the “free w orld.” Such elites b e ­ cam e the carriers o f the n ew m entality, spreading it to their follow ers and em ­ ulators. A nd third, even i f this occurs m ore slowly, there is a generational change, w hen those w ho have been m entally “polluted” by the com m unist ex­ perience m ove to the m argin o f social life, and the young generation is m ade up o f people already bom , raised and educated in the n ew system. B ut this is m ade m ore com plicated by another traum a, one w hich appears in the second phase o f transform ation.

The aftershocks of reforms: secondary trauma

The fundam ental, structural reform s o f the political, econom ic and cultural domains undertaken in the first period o f transform ation bring about unintended and som etim es unexpected side effects. It is unavoidable. I f the w hole o f soci­ ety is being rebuilt, som e social costs are inevitable, and the burdens o f trans­ form ation touch m any people. As Claus Offe puts it in a paradoxical metaphor, there is a “tunnel at the end o f a light” (Offe, 1997). W hat makes things worse is th at th ese b u rd ens are u n equally distrib u ted , affecting som e g roups very strongly, w hereas others are able to escape their impact. These hardships b e­ come n ew types o f traum atizing conditions, resulting in the secondary trauma.

They m ay be classified into tw o types: objective and subjective. On the ob ­ jectiv e side, there em erge n e w form s o f risks and threats: unem ploym ent, still not controlled inflation, the grow ing wave o f crim e and delinquency and a new phenom enon o f mafias, the im m igration o f culturally alien people from the countries further East, the ruthless com petition. There is also a quick deterio­ ration o f living standards and social status, at least for som e sizeable groups: the devaluation o f savings due to the currency reform , the w ithdraw al o f state w elfare um brella and the resulting poverty, even hom elessness, and the over­ turn o f p restige hierarchies, w ith the degradation o f all w hose rank w as not linked w ith fiscal success (sociologists have called it the “fiscalization o f so­ cial consciousness,” and it touched the academ ic elites and teachers adversely, for example).

On the subjective side there are tw o relative fram ings, w hich m ake the ex­ perience o f burdens m ore acute, leading to the feeling o f relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970). One is the com parison w ith the highly elevated hopes and aspi­ rations o f the revolutionary period. Another is the demonstration effect o f W est­ ern prosperity now m ade m ore visible than ever due to free media, open borders and the invasion o f consum erism (the “ ‘M cD onaldization’ o f Eastern Europe,” as G eorge R itzer w ould call it, see: Ritzer, 1993). People experience relative deprivation w hen they believe that they are justified in deserving m ore than they actually have. A nd several groups are touched by this painful condition. First, those w ho w ere fighting against the com m unist regim e and safeguarded the victory o f the revolution - and this m eans prim arily the w orking class o f huge industrial enterprises - feel cheated, as their lives have generally not im ­ proved, and for som e have even becom e dram atically worse, w ith unem ploy­ m ent and lack o f occupational prospects. This kind o f deprivation becomes even m ore acute w hen the m aterial success o f other groups - entrepreneurs, busi­ nessm en, young professionals - is conspicuous and aggressively m anifested (“the G reat G atsby syndrom e” so aptly grasped by Scott Fitzgerald because early capitalism is replicated w ith the second birth o f capitalism in E astern

Europe). Second, on the other side o f the social spectrum there is a sizable group o f form er ow ners w hose property - real estate, industrial, agricultural - was nationalized under com m unism . Now, w hen the private property has becom e a constitutional principle, they feel that it is their right to dem and restitution. A nd for m any legal and practical reasons, this proceeds very slowly. Third, for all other people the fram e o f comparison has becom e the prosperous, consumer society o f the West - reached either through travel and tourism or invading local life spaces via international superm arkets, shopping m alls and galleries, som e­ tim es even m ore luxurious and exclusive than those in m ajor W estern cities. People feel that now that they live in a capitalist society, they deserve the same level o f affluence as those in the West. A nd yet, their incom es are still m uch lower, w hile prices becom e equalized. B ecom ing sym bolically incorporated into the W estern w orld, for exam ple, by m em bership in the European Union, people also experience more acutely the deficiencies and shortages that accum u­ lated through the period o f com m unism and that they learned to accept before. They are unhappy with the obsolete infrastructure o f roads; they protest against ecological destruction; they com plain about low health and fitness standards.

In social life, subjective feelings count for the same as objective conditions. As the fam ous “Thom as T heorem ” (introduced by A m erican social psycholo­ gist W illiam Isaac Thom as) succinctly puts it: “I f people believe som ething to be real, it is real through its consequences” (Janowitz, 1975). B oth the objective and subjective deprivations becom e traum atizing. The sym ptom s o f second­ ary traum a em erge very soon. Three are particularly significant. First, there is a dram atic fall o f trust: from its peak at the m om ent o f revolution, trust clearly decays. It is particularly visible in so-called vertical trust: tow ard the institu­ tions, the governm ent, the parliam ent, the president, or even tow ard the m ost abstract idea o f democracy (Sztompka, 1996a, Sztompka, 1999b). Second, there is grow ing po litical apathy, lo w p articip atio n in elections, w ithdraw al from public life tow ard the private sphere o f families, friends and close business and professional netw orks. Third, there is a spreading nostalgia for the past, ideal­ ization o f some aspects o f socialism , especially jo b security, assured pensions, state provisions o f free health and educational services.

The split of a society

B ut o f course, these symptoms o f traum a are unequally distributed among the population. In fact the traum atizing conditions and resulting traum atic sym p­ tom s result in a split o f society into tw o unequal parts. One consists o f those who have been successful under the n ew system: they have advanced educa­ tionally, m ade business, professional or political careers, enriched them selves. There are also those who feel successful and satisfied in a m ore intangible way:

intellectual, artistic, academ ic elites for w hom the very freedom o f speech, un­ lim ited access to inform ation, reading foreign books and new spapers, ability to travel abroad - m ake up for any m aterial shortages they m ay still experi­ ence. A t the opposite pole, we find those who either objectively or subjectively experience loss and failure. There are the less educated, m anual w orkers, but also several branches o f m ore skilled w orkers, w hose training and skills have becom e obsolete; there are the peasants, who lost the m onopoly o f food pro­ duction and can hardly com pete w ith im ports from abroad; there are the low- level clerks o f public adm inistration or state ow ned firms, w hose lo w salaries have n ot been raised and who lost various perks; there are retired people, pen ­ sioners and, o f course - all the unem ployed.

At the origins o f such a split, there were unequal structural opportunities that people encountered in the first phases o f transform ation. Three kinds o f cir­ cum stances seem decisive. First, the scope o f initial resources - capital o f var­ ious sorts: financial, social, educational - that people possessed. Those who had som e savings or w ere able to pull together the financial resources o f extended fam ilies (still typically surviving in Eastern Europe) could im m ediately invest, start firms and exploit the m arket, w hich had not yet turned highly competitive. B ut it was not only fiscal capital that m attered. For exam ple, at the m om ent o f privatization o f huge state assets, the rich netw orks o f acquaintances, connec­ tions, also o f a political sort or, in a w ord - the social capital - inherited from com m unist tim es proved extrem ely helpful in obtaining inform ation and priv­ ileged term s o f trade. Youth and com petence w ere also crucial for grasping opportunities. H aving the m ost up-to-date educational capital and being in the right age bracket at the right m om ent, gave y oung people great chances for a good jo b in an infant private sector and a still un-saturated labour market. It w orked in the opposite way for elderly people, who were either already retired or could not retrain them selves easily for new jobs. The second divisive factor was the place o f employment. Those em ployed in the state sector, w ith strictly regulated and low w ages based on the lim ited state budget, have been m uch w orse o ff than em ployees in the private sector, even at equal jobs. The third factor had to do with w here people w ere living. Usually, living in big cities of­ fered m ore opportunities o f various kinds, w hereas living in desolate, indus­ trial tow ns, b ased on som e obsolete, uncom petitive and bankrupting dom ain o f production, left people w ith no prospects for a better life. There w ere also big regional differences, w ith som e parts o f the country m ore m odernized and other parts m ore backward. In Poland, for example, there were huge differences am ong three parts o f the country, w hich, throug ho ut the 19th century w ere ruled by three European superpowers: Russia, Prussia and the A ustro-H ungar­ ian Em pire. Up to today the w estern region is m uch m ore industrialized, with m odem farm ing, w hereas the E astern and southern regions rem ain industrial­

ly underdeveloped, w ith prim itive, fragm entized and fam ily-run agriculture. We even coined the com m on term s for that split: Poland A and Poland B., or sim ply “tw o Polands” .

Once the transformation started on its way and produced secondary traum a o f reform s, these structural differences also im plied unequal access to coping strategies. The obvious way to cope with traum a is to extend one’s resources, the capital w hich provides a kind o f insulation against painful conditions. There are, therefore, three constructive, innovative w ays for coping w ith traum a. One is to raise o n e ’s educational capital. We have observed a trem endous ed­ ucational boom in post-com m unist societies, when, for example, in Poland the level o f scholarization tripled, the population o f students quadrupled and m ore than a hundred n ew institutions o f higher education w ere started. Those who take the risk o f educational investm ent usually land in the successful segm ent o f the population (finding jo b s and careers if not in the country, then abroad). Another coping strategy is entrepreneurship: starting firms, organizing business, saving and investing. Again, we have observed the true outburst o f entrepreneur­ ial activities, w ith m illions (yes, m illions) o f n ew small firms started and some o f them soon developing into serious enterprises. This was another road to suc­ cess. A nd the third coping strategy was to raise social capital, jo in associations, foundations, clubs, organize NG Os. It led to the revitalization o f civil society, and the participants have usually had some opportunities for advancem ent.

B ut not all people are ready and willing to take such constructive and innova­ tive defences against traum as. Som e are clinging to the old ways, accustom ed life strategies, and cultivating ritualistic adaptations. Others turn to withdrawal and resignation. They rem ain passive, believing in the beneficial turn o f events due either to providence and fate or to the em ergence o f a strong leader, the saviour, or to aid and help from foreign countries. There are also those who try shortcuts to success: unlaw ful or o utright crim inal acts, organizing m afias, corruption rings, etc. They may, for a w hile, land in the successful elite, but sooner or later law enforcem ent usually goes after them and they land in p ris­ ons. A nd finally, w e have those w ho blam e their failures on the n e w capitalist system and turn to anarchism or aspire to revive comm unism .

The split into successful and frustrated segm ents o f the population is im ­ m ediately replicated at the political level in the opposition o f liberal, m odem , pro-European parties and more conservative, populist, Euro-sceptical and paro­ chial parties, who find their respective constituencies either am ong those who have succeeded (growing middle and upper classes), or - to the contrary - among those w ho are losing in the transform ation gam e and becom e m arginalized. The political dynam ics o f post-co m m u n ist societies reflects the split quite clearly, with the political pendulum swinging from one side to the other in each consecutive election cycle. In countries like Poland, w here the institutional

church has always played a strong role, the split in the church also emerges along sim ilar lines: on the one side, the more m odem , open, liberal, ecumenical wing and on the other side, the more conservative, fundamentalist, nationalist faction.

The interludes of success and, alas, the trauma of elites

B ut in spite o f all these problem s, there are periods w hen the social m ood changes tow ard optim ism , and the traum atic sym ptom s are relieved. The indi­ cators o f trust go up (Sztom pka, 1999b), m ore people vote in elections, civil society becom es livelier, w ith m ore grass-roots activities, associational life, m ultiplying NGOs. In Poland, we w itnessed it in the second part o f the 1990s when the delayed effects o f the radical economic reforms o f Leszek Balcerowicz and the boom in w orldw ide econom y resulted in high econom ic grow th and im proved living standards. A nd then in the first years o f the 21st century, when the accession to NATO, a successful European referendum and later the accession to the European U nion raises the feeling o f security, enhances trust in the irre­ versibility o f democratic and m arket reforms and accelerates the m odernization o f the country. We are no longer alone but anchored in a strong family o f highly developed econom ies and deeply rooted dem ocracies.

This bright picture is spoiled again by the new, third w ave o f traum a, this tim e o f a different order. It is not so m uch structural as personal. It originates not so m uch in the institutions o f politics, but in personal frailties and weaknesses o f the politicians. I call it the traum a o f political elites. A t the threshold o f the 21st century, the political elites, irrespective o f their ideological orientation - equally the right w ing and the left wing - m anifest both intellectual and moral incapacities. There appears glaring incom petence and errors in decisions, but even w orse, grave abuses o f m oral and legal standards: egoism , cronyism , nepotism , factionalism , corruption (Kojder, 2004). The free m edia turn to in­ vestigative reporting, and a num ber o f political scandals galvanize public at­ tention. The parliam ent nom inates investigative committees, whose proceedings are w idely publicized and aired live on TV. H uge-scale corruption rings and mafia-type organizations are unravelled at the fragile border betw een the worlds o f business and politics. The phenom enon described by sociologists as a “m or­ al panic” (Thom pson, 1998) breaks out. People start to believe - adm ittedly w ith som e good reasons - that the w hole o f politics is com pletely corrupted, that all politicians do not represent the com m on people but only attend to their ow n interests, that nobody can be trusted any more.

The symptom s o f new traum a becom e widespread. First, there is the revival o f the old dichotomy: “w e,” the com m on people, and “them ,” the rulers. This w as a defensive fram e o f m ind under com m unism , pushing people away from public life - treated as alien, im posed from the outside - tow ard the security

and fam iliarity o f the private world: families, friends. The same alienation from politics and the privatization o f life becom e highly destructive in a dem ocratic regim e, w here the participation o f “we, the people” is the crucial precondition for political functioning. For exam ple, the grow ing absenteeism at elections, w hen m ore than h a lf o f the citizens chose not to cast a ballot, allows for com ­ pletely unrepresentative factions to usurp pow er by the skilful m anipulation o f coalitions. The second sym ptom o f traum a is another dram atic fall o f verti­ cal trust, which in the case o f m ajor political institutions, reaches unprecedented low levels (Luhiste 2006, Shlapentokh, 2006). The third sym ptom is the open m anifestation o f grievances and discontent, coupled w ith dem ands and claims directed at the governm ent. This som etim es turns into highly visible sponta­ neous protests, “street politics,” clashes w ith the police. In the case o f Poland, an additional factor adding to the depressive m ood is the death o f Pope John Paul II, the only unquestioned, rem aining charism atic leader and public au­ thority, not only for believers but for the whole society. A feeling o f bereavement sets in, m anifested in a highly em otional way, particularly by the young gen ­ eration in the days surrounding the P o p e ’s funeral. The enthusiastic welcom e that Polish youth, as well as the rest o f society gave - contrary to som e expec­ tations - to his successor, Pope B enedict X V I, indicates h o w a great craving developed am ong the people for authentic m oral and intellectual authority.

The delayed echoes of the revolution: the trauma of backlash

At the background o f such moods, the political pendulum swings to the right in the elections o f 2005. Skillful politicians o f the party, w hose nam e - “L aw and Justice”- already reveals demagogical inclinations, are able to use the trau­ m atic condition o f society as the springboard to power. They prom ised m ajor changes under a slogan o f building the new “IV Republic,” which m eant cutting them selves o ff from the errors and abuses o f the “III R epublic” constructed by round-table comprom ises and carrying a supposedly incom plete and fake trans­ form ation. They prom ised to com plete the “unfinished revolution” by finally elim inating from public life all elites w ho h ad their roots in the com m unist system and w ho were supposedly guilty o f all the problem s. A nd on top o f that they prom ised to build the “ solidary state,” providing rich social benefits to all citizens. N o w onder they have w on the elections, both presidential and parlia­ m entary. The instrum ental exploitation o f social trau m a and the scapegoat m echanism have proven effective and not for the first tim e in history.

A nd yet the m argin o f victory was very low, not sufficient for a parliam en­ tary majority, with the popular m andate only around 20 percent, given the fact that around 5 percent o f the electorate did not take p art in the elections. The pre-selection o f the active electorate also seem ed to w ork in their favour, as it

is usually those who are frustrated, unsuccessful and com plaining w ho are re­ sponsive to populist and dem agogical slogans.

The m anipulation w ith earlier traum as did n ot suffice in the longer run. Ironically, once in pow er the n ew governm ent had soon generated the fourth trauma. Playing with traum a produced new trauma. I call it the traum a o f back­ lash. A nd it is pervading Polish social life at this m oment. The classical trau­ matizing conditions appeared once again. First, the extremely elevated, populist electoral prom ises cannot be met. The frustrated, unfulfilled hopes o f higher salaries and wages, low er taxes, m assive provisions o f cheap apartm ents (the fam ous 3 m illion subsidized flats!) and jo b s for all, result in a w ave o f esca­ lating protests and strikes: o f m edical doctors, nurses, teachers, coal-m iners, policem en, etc. Second, the governm ent, devoid o f sufficient m ajority in the parliam ent, is unable to force decisions and spends several m onths on m ount­ ing coalitions, w hich for the people gives the im pression o f a selfish quest for pow er for po w e r’s sake and abandonm ent o f the service for society, as well as any notion o f the public good. Third, the eventual coalition with highly suspect, m arginal, sm all parties o f extrem e popu list and dem agogical origins (“ Self- -Defence” and the “League o f Polish Fam ilies”) unravel the strategy o f cynical “realpolitik” strikingly at odds w ith the proclam ations o f “m oral revolution.” Fourth, the slogan o f the “IV R epublic” im plies a radical break, the extrem e critique and rejection o f the principles and practices o f the “i n R epublic,” that is, its sin o f origins in the com prom ise o f the round-table talks, its constitution, reforms o f Leszek Balcerowicz, etc. People are told - contrary to all reason - that som e 18 years o f th eir lives and efforts w ere lost, that it w as another in the chain o f Polish disasters and failures, that we have to start anew once again, to build everything from scratch. Fifth, the obsessive hunt for som e supposed com m unist conspiracy that ruled Poland for these 18 years and is guilty o f all our problem s creates a vision o f com pletely untransparent public life, giving rise to anxiety and uncertainty. Sixth, there is a visible effort to suppress and dom inate independent institutions, independent professional circles and inde­ pendent leaders o f public opinion: the C onstitutional Court is repeatedly dis­ credited; the Central Bank, as well as the com m ittee regulating the media, are put in the hands o f loyal politicians; the lawyers, academics, journalists, medical doctors are constantly attacked - som etim es personally. There are also clear attem pts to instrum entalize the law and law enforcem ent for factional, particu­ laristic political purposes and m anifested contem pt for the constitution. Nothing underm ines vertical trust m ore than the grow ing appearance o f unaccountabil­ ity on the part o f the rulers, and the lim itation o f checks and balances, m utual controls inbuilt in a dem ocratic regim e (and even the fact that the offices o f the president and prim e m inister are taken by tw in brothers is considered by m any people to be a m ockery o f the principle o f the division o f powers). Seventh, as

a sort o f subordinate them e to deflect the popular unrest, the government digs out the problem o f lustration, rejects the policy o f the “thick black line” separat­ ing the com m unist past from the future-oriented, constructive efforts and in­ tends to open the archives o f the com m unist secret police to unravel the iden­ tities o f all form er collaborators or agents. The process soon gets out o f hand with self-appointed judges who reveal privately or illicitly obtained information and trigger a num ber o f political scandals. The attack reaches the church, with som e leading clergy accused - w ithout convincing p r o o f - o f collaboration. In a deeply religious, C atholic society it has to enhance the “m oral panic,” and m any people start to b elieve th at form er agents and spies are everyw here, even am ong their priests, fam ilies and friends. The n e w lustration law passed by the ruling m ajority in 2007, w hich dem ands o f som e h a lf a m illion citizens occupying upper positions in a society to w rite self-incrim inating declarations o f their possible collaboration o f forty, fifty and m ore years ago, m eets w ith a huge w ave o f protest and resistance, including cases o f civil disobedience, and leads the still independent C onstitutional Court to veto and scrap the law entirely. B ut a deep division betw een those who w ere opportunistically loyal to the obviously unconstitutional law and those who actively opposed it is a very unfortunate side effect, w hich rem ains, especially am ong the intellectual, aca­ dem ic and journalistic circles. The governm ent does not capitulate easily and prom ises new m oves in the battle for lustration.

All these facts are responsible for the re-em ergence o f the classical sym p­ tom s o f traum a, the fourth in a row, the “traum a o f backlash.” First, the people becom e disenchanted or outright disgusted w ith politics. The dichotom y o f “w e” and “them ” becom es sharper than ever. Participation in public life is even m ore unpopular, and the privatization o f life proceeds further. Political apathy sets in. Second, distrust in public institutions is at its low est level: trust in the parliam ent falls to single digits b elow ten percent, trust in the president below three percent, w ith alm ost 50 percent declaring active distrust. Unfortunately, this spreads from vertical to horizontal trust w ith only 15 percent declaring generalized trust in other people, including strangers not know n to them p er­ sonally. Third, as a functional substitute for lacking internal trust, the external - ization o f trust becomes visible in the phenom enon o f massive, temporal or even perm anent em igration. W ith the opening o f labour m arkets by som e m em bers o f the EU , young educated people, professionals as well as m anual w orkers em igrate in search o f b etter life chances. T heir m otivations are m ost often econom ic, they are looking for jobs. B ut som e research shows that their flight is also due to an unbearable political climate. N ot accepting the current con­ ditions, they decide on w hat A lbert H irschm an has called the “ exit option” (H irschm an, 1970). Fourth, anxieties, frustrations and pessim ism are w idely expressed, n o t only p riv ately b u t in th e still-ind epen den t m edia, w hich in

some sizeable part take a very critical view o f current politics. A sane phenom ­ enon in itself, it has a side effect - feeding the n ew wave o f “moral panics” that are triggered even by minor, singular events. Fifth, we observe a rising demand for gossip, rumors, a new career o f political jokes - w hich w ere a popular form o f expression under com m unism , bu t later lost th eir im portance. All these em erge as substitutes for authentic public debate.

The brighter side of the situation

The picture p ainted above is rather bleak. B ut as usual, the reality is not ju st one shade. The them e o f am bivalence com es back. B ecause it w ould be a m istake to believe that the current traum a o f backlash is the return to the im ­ m ediate post-revolutionary traum a. The sim ilarity o f som e sym ptom s m ay be m isleading. G rave as it is, the traum a is n o w experienced under com pletely different conditions, in an entirely different society, transform ed deeply by the 18 years o f transform ation, so unreasonably discredited by current political elites. D uring that tim e w e have gained som e crucial assets w hich m ake cop­ ing w ith “traum a num ber four” m uch easier.

First, due to the w ise “shock therapy” o f Leszek B alcerow icz, the m om en­ tum o f entrepreneurial m obilization was activated and consistently produces high rates o f econom ic growth, m uch higher than those in the countries that have chosen evolutionary, step-by-step strategies. Second, due to the rigid m onetary policy o f the Central Bank, we have a strong, stable currency, with inflation at a m inim um level. Third, due to opening tow ard the W est and con­ ducive business environm ent (a skilled labour force, usually cheaper than in the W est, an unsaturated m arket), w e have draw n considerable, direct foreign investm ents, w hich bring not only econom ic revenues but also m odels o f la­ bour culture and m anagem ent standards. Fourth, w e have a stable and secure position w ithin the W estern world, thanks to NATO and E U m em bership. The latter results not only in beneficial fiscal flows, but provides an insurance p o l­ icy against any possible anti-dem ocratic turn. Fifth, the educational boom has significantly raised the intellectual level o f the society, w ith rates o f scholari- zation trip led and the population o f students grow ing fourfold as com pared w ith the com m unist time. Sixth, at the level o f civil society, a dense netw ork o f NG O s, associations, self-governing bodies, discussion clubs, philanthropic ventures, foundations, etc., w hich m ushroom ed im m ediately after the revolu­ tion, have in large m easure survived and consolidated and cannot be easily de­ stroyed by current centralizing and autocratic tendencies. Seventh, there is a considerable strength o f national and religious community, usually latent, but emerging very clearly on extraordinary occasions - like the death o f John Paul II or the visit o f B enedict XVI. This reservoir o f authentic solidarities m ay also

be mobilized, if the need arises, for political purposes, in order to block any p o s­ sible drift away from democracy. Eighth, the current political elite antagoniz­ es so m any circles in society that it m ay unw ittingly revitalize the critical p ub ­ lic debate, w hich is alw ays easier to m obilize negatively against some policies than for positive political projects. Re-awakened public opinion m ay effectively curb the abuses o f power.

It was the civil society w hich w on the seem ingly im possible victory over com m unism , w hich “raised itse lf up by its boot-straps,” as A m ericans like to say. Its jo b now is m uch easier: not to allow the fruits o fth e revolution o f 1989 to be wasted.

Theoretical coda

Behind the reconstruction o f East-European, and particularly Polish, history over the last 18 years presented above, there are some hidden theoretical assump­ tions, w hich give internal logic to the narration o f facts and events. It is tim e to reveal them.

I do not believe in the L aw s o f History, in the determ ined, linear and irre­ versible course o f hum an events and processes. I do not believe in historical ne­ cessity or inevitability, supposedly affirming itself irrespective o f hum an actions. A nd I do not believe that history has som e purpose, final goal tow ard w hich it proceeds. Thus, I reject the assum ptions o f determ inism , fatalism and finalism - so often encountered in thinking about macro-sociological, historical change.

There has been nothing inevitable in the fall o f com m unism . M ost people, including all the taxi drivers in my city, have believed that that dam ned sys­ tem m ust collapse one day. B ut it m ight have well outlived us all and still be around. A nd there has been nothing inevitable in the direction and course o f post-com m unist transform ation. The early concept o f transition assum ed that E astern E urope w ould becom e like the W est sim ply by replicating capitalist and dem ocratic institutions. Similarly, the notion o f convergence or m oderni­ zation assum ed that Eastern Europe m ust pass the same route tow ard m oderni­ ty, as follow ed earlier by luckier countries o f the West. As i f all societies were m oving on the sam e huge escalator, som e higher, som e low er but all destined to follow the sam e course.

H istory is m ade by the people, it is constantly becom ing due to decisions and choices m ade by the people - great leaders, groups, social m ovem ents, political parties and com m on citizens in their everyday conduct. B ut o f course these decisions are neither arbitrary nor voluntaristic; they are m ade in the en­ vironm ent o f institutions, rules and beliefs, as well as in the m aterial environ­ m ent produced by earlier generations. Those are not G od-given but have also been produced by the people, our predecessors. B ut the current generation fac­

es them as givens, as the field o f possibilities for choice, neither entirely open nor entirely constrained. W hat shall becom e o f the future is always, to a great extent, in the peop le’s ow n hands. I call this perspective focusing on the trans­ form ative force o f hum an agency a “theory o f social becom ing” (Sztom pka,

1991a, Sztom pka, 1993b).

C om m unism has fallen because there w ere brave, dem ocratically inspired leaders - Wal^sas, Havels - who were able to m obilize the masses. It has fallen because there w ere brave people ready to jo in popular dem ocratic, em ancipa­ tory m ovem ents, in spite o f heavy personal risks, and w ho persisted in their struggle. A nd the fall has been m ade m ore peaceful and relatively victim less because there were enlightened com m unist leaders - Gorbachev, Jeltsyn, Jaru- zelski - who realized that the system had exhausted its potential and that their tim e had com e to an end.

Once com m unism collapsed and dem ocracy was installed, the opportunities for m aking history w ere fundam entally enriched. B ecause the w hole point o f dem ocracy is to m ake the field o f options as wide as possible and as accessible as possible for m eaningful, constructive action to as m any citizens as possible. But again, democracy does not m ean unlim ited options. In 1989, each post-com ­ m unist country inherited different structural conditions for transform ation: different historical traditions and m em ories, different shapes o f institutions, different legacies o f communism, different economic resources, different levels o f educational, cultural, civilizational capital. They had luck, or had no luck for wise, charism atic leaders, which, as Pascal already said, is the m ost unpre­ dictable and random factor o f history.

O f these resources, o f these o pportunities the p eople o f E astern E urope have m ade various uses. B ut in general they have gone a very long way tow ard m aking their countries and their lives better. This was not a road strew n w ith roses, but rather one that led “through blood, sw eat and tears” in the clash o f various interests, ideas, program s, political projects. W ith social costs, hard­ ships and victim ized segm ents o f the population. W ith n ew pockets o f pover­ ty and injustice in place o f the old ones. A nd the process continues in a sim i­ lar, turbulent way. B ut no m ajor transform ation com es easy, and this has been perhaps the m ost fundam ental, radical and com prehensive transform ation in recent history.

Social becom ing does not follow a smooth, linear trajectory but rather a di­ alectical course. Through facing repeated challenges and fighting reappearing traum as, it pushes society forward. This is w hat I have tried to depict in this article, and to w hich I gave a name: am bivalence.

Abstrakt

Artykuł przedstawia syntetyczne ujecie teoretyczne procesu transformacji post-komuni- stycznej na przykładzie Polski. Autor wprowadza i stosuje własną teorie traumy kulturowej dla wyjaśnienia wielokierunkowych i fundamentalnych zmian jakie dokonały się w okresie ostat­ nich 19 lat Mimo niewątpliwego sukcesu transformacji dały o sobie znać uboczne i nieprzewi­ dziane skutki negatywne. Dla opisania tego bilansu zmian autor stosuje pojęcia ambiwalencji.

Abstract

The article presents a synthetic theoretical account of post-communist transformations in Poland. The author introduces and applies his own original theory of cultural trauma for the explanation of multidimensional and fundamental changes that have occurred during the last nineteen years. In spite of the unquestionable success of transformation, some unpredicted, ad­ verse side-effects have emerged. The balance of positive and negative changes is grasped by the concept of ambivalence.

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