A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S ________ FOLIA PHILOSOPHICA 6, 198B
S ła w o j O lczyk
ON FEYERABEND'S PRAGMATIC THEORY OF OBSERVATION
F e y e ra b e n ď s p h ilo so p h y perform s s p e c ia l r o le in the contem p o ra ry d is c u s s io n s co n cern in g "n a tu r e " of s c ie n c e and i t s p la c e in human c o g n it iv e a c t i v i t y . T h is s p e c ia l r o le c o n s is t s not on ly of c r i t i c i s m of s c ie n tis m as a c h a n v in is t ic id e o lo g y does, but a ls o of in d ic a t io n of some re o rg a n iz a tio n of our c u lt u r e . Th is re o rg a n iz a tio n is to secu re the freedom of a . s u b je c tiv e th in k in g . A ccord ing to Feyerabend t h is freedom i s h is main meta p h y s ic a l fo u n d a tio n . B asin g on t h is fou n d ation he c r i t i c i z e s o th e r p h ilo s o p h ie s and fo rm u la te s h is own one.
The s t a r t in g p o in t of F e y e ra b e n ď s p h ilo so p h y is h is th eo ry of e x p e rie n ce which has been the most c l e a r l y p resen ted in h is p ragm atic theory o f o b s e rv a tio n . In t h ie th eo ry Feyerabend acce p ts fo u n d atio n th a t he c a l l s co sm o lo g ica l h yp o th e sis " t h a t th e re e x is t s a r e a l o b je c t iv e w orld th a t c o n ta in s human o b se r v e rs , and th a t s e n s a tio n s , but not th o u g h ts, are h ig h ly c o r r e la t e d w ith e ve n ts in t h i s w o r ld "1. The au tho r m a in ta in s th a t some g e n e ra l co sm o lo g ica l h yp o th e sis is accepted by e v e ry p h i lo so p h y. P o s tu la te d c o r r e la t io n between human s e n s a tio n s and o b je c t iv e w orld . the au th o r e x p la in s by comparing them w ith i n d ic a t io n s o f a m easuring in s tru m e n t. In d ic a t io n s o f the a u to m a tic d e v ic e s a re c a u s a lly determ ined by an e ven t of the
ob-1 P. K. F e y e r a b e n d , Problem s of E m p iric is m , [in-.] Beyond the Edge o f c e r t a in t y , ed. Colodny Englewood C l i f f s , New York 1965, p. 213.
j e c t i v e world but w ith o u t h elp of some th e o ry , which in t e r p r e t s these in d ic a t io n s , they a re .m ean in g le ss, and i t i s im p o ssib le to a s s o c ia te them w ith the e ven ts of the r e a l w o rld . S im i la r l y , our u n in te rp re te d s e n s a tio n s are m ean ingless, d e sin te - g rate d and co m p le tely in co m p re h en sib le. The meaning of our v e r b a l b ehavio ur and the s tr u c t u r e of our s e n s a t io n ,g iv e o n ly a th e o ry , which in t e r p r e t s them. The th e o ry , which arran g es our sen sa tio n s in to ex p erim en tal f a c t s and our v e rb a l b e h a vio u rs in to m eaningful s ta tem e n ts, i s co m p le te ly independent of r e a l , ob j e c t i v e w o rld , f r e e l y c re a te d by a knowing s u b je c t.
The idea p resented above e x is t s in the fo u n d atio n of the p ragm atic theory of o b s e rv a tio n . Th is th e o ry has been the most c l e a r l y put forw ard in h is paper "An Attem pt a t a R e a l i s t i c
2
In t e r p r e t a t io n of E x p e rie n c e " . According to t h is id ea sen sa tio n s and v e rb a l b e h a vio u rs c a u s a lly determ ined by a r e a l world are termed by Feyerabend on o b s e rv a tio n a l language. This language is co m p le tely c h a r a c te r iz e d by the fo llo w in g c o n d itio n s : p rag m a tic c o n d itio n s and in t e r p r e t a t io n . G e n e ra lly sp eak in g , p rag m atic c o n d itio n s are to q u a lif y in what p h y s ic a l s it u a t io n s and to what s o r t of o b s e rv e rs a c e r t a in atom ic sentence is ob s e r v a t io n a l. Feyerabend fo rm u la te s fo u r p ragm atic c o n d itio n s as fo llo w s :
" I t is demanded th a t f o r e ve ry a to m ic*sen ten ce
ъ
(o f a c la s s A) of the language co n sid e re d th e re e x is t s a s it u a t io n s (a s o - c a lle d a p p r io p r ia te s it u a t io n ) such th a t e v e ry C, when p r e sented w ith a in s w i l l run through a s e r ie s o f s ta t e s and o- p e ra tio n s which term in a ted e th e r iń the accep tan ce of a or i t s r e je c t io n by the С chosen. Th is we c a l l the c o n d itio n of d e c i d a b i l i t y . Any s e r ie s of the kind mentioned w i l l be c a lle d a C - s e rie s a s s o c ia te d w ith a or sim p ly an a s s o c ia te d s e r ie s . The fu n c tio n c o r r e la t in g atom ic sentence w ith a s s o c ia te d s e r ie s w i l l be c a lle d the a s s o c ia tin g fu n c tio n o f the language concerned and i t w i l l be d e sig n a te d by the l e t t e rf_.
-
Second l y , i t i s demanded th a t in the a p p r io p r ia te s it u a t io n the a s s o c ia te d s e r ie s should be passed through f a i r l y q u ic k ly . This we c a l l the c o n d itio n of q u ick d e c i d a b i l i t y . - T h ir d ly , we^ P. K.
F e y e r a b e n d , An Attem pt at a R e a l i s t i c I n t e r p r e t a t io n of E x p e rie n c e , Pro ceed in g s of the A r is t o t e lia n So c i e t y , New S e r ie s , 58, 1958, p. 143-170.s h a ll have to s t ip u la t e th a t i f ( i n an a p p r io p r ia te s it u a t io n ) an atom ic sentence is accepted (o r r e je c t e d ) by some C, i t w i l l be accepted (o r r e je c t e d ) by ( n e a r ly ) e v e ry £. This we c a l l the c o n d itio n of unanimous d e c id a b ilit y . - F i n a l l y , we must s t ip u la t e th a t the d e c is io n made be ( c a u s a ll y ) dependent upon the s it u a t io n and not o n ly upon the atom ic sentence p re sented or the in t e r n a l s t a t e of the £ chosen. This we c a l l the c o n d itio n of r e le v a n c e . Any fu n c tio n c o r r e la t in g s it u a t io n s w ith e it h e r accep tan ce or r e je c t io n o f a g ive n sen ten ce w i l l be c a lle d a r e le v a n c e - fu n c tio n arid i t w i l l be d esig n ated by the l e t t e r R” 3.
The fo u r c o n d itio n s p resented above tho rou g h ly c h a r a c t e r iz e pragm atic p r o p e r tie s of the co n sid e re d language s in c e these c o n d itio n s c o r r e la t e every atom ic sen ten ce w ith a c la s s of o b se rve rs C, an a s s o c ia tin g fu n c tio n F, a p h y s ic a l s i t u a tio n S and a re le v a n c e - fu n c tio n R.. S h o r t ly , the p ragm atic p r o p e r t ie s of a c e r t a in o b s e rv a tio n a l language may be com p le t e ly c h a r a c te r iz e d by a c la s s (П , A, S, F, R) which Feyer- abend c r l l s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f an o b s e rv a tio n a l language. By means of t h is c h a r a c t e r is t ic Feyerabend d e fin e s the n o tio n of the c la s s of the o b s e rv a tio n a l sen ten ces as fo llo w s : "we may s a y , t h a t , g ive n th re e c la s s e s , A, £ and S , the c la s s A w i l l be c a lle d a c la s s of o b s e rv a b le sen ten ces (used by o b s e r v e rs £ in s it u a t io n S ) o n ly i f , unanimous and r e le v a n t d e c i s io n w ith re s p e c t to those A fo r which the chosen _S i s appro p r i a t e ” 4 .
We have a lre a d y mentioned th a t Fe y e ra b e n d 's n o tio n of the o b s e rv a b le language is used in a meaning th a t exceeds i t s common u n d e rstan d in g . T h is n o tio n denotes not o n ly human u t te ra n c e s but a ls o in d ic a t io n s of in stru m en ts as w e ll as our s e n s a tio n s . O b s e rv a tio n a l sen ten ces understood in th a t * way are m ea n in ig less in c o n t r a d is t in c t io n to the o b s e rv a tio n a l sta tem e n ts. The d if fe r e n c e between o b s e rv a tio n a l sen ten ces and o b s e rv a tio n a l statem en ts Feyerabend i l l u s t r a t e s w ith the h elp of the f o llo w in g exam ple: w atching the movement o f an in d ic a t o r , any m easuaring in stru m en t o r a n y , au to m atic d e v ic e , which a cco rd in g to Feyerabend i s i d e n t ic a l w ith a p ro d u c tio n
of a sen te n ce, we d o n 't know what these In stru m en ts measure w ith o u t fu r th e r c o n d itio n s exceeding the pragm atic c o n d itio n s . Whereas we o n ly know th a t a movement of an in d ic a t o r is c a u s a l ly determ ined by a c e r t a in p h y s ic a l s it u a t io n . These fu r th e r c o n d itio n s Feyerabend c a l l s the in t e r p r e t a t io n . Thanks to t h is in t e r p r e t a t io n the p h y s ic a l e v e n ts , d e scrib e d by t h e ir c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , become m eaningful u tte r a n c e s . In Fe yera b e n d 's o p in io n "th e in t e r p r e t a t io n of an ob se rva tio n -la n g u a g e is de term ined by the th e o r ie s which we use to e x p la in what we ob s e r v e " 5. Th is th e s is is c a lle d by Feyerabend ' the c o n te x tu a l th e o ry of meaning. Th is t h e s is m a in ta in s th a t a sentence maches as many o b s e rv a tio n a l statem ents as many d if f e r e n t th e o r ie s th e re are which e x p la in the co n sid ered e v e n ts . E ve ry time th ese th e o r ie s g iv e the d if f e r e n t meanings to the same s e quence of sound th a t is the o b s e rv a tio n a l sen te n ce.
A ccording to the above c o n s id e ra tio n the p ragm atic th e o ry of o b s e rv a tio n d e f i n i t i v e l y d e p riv e s an e x p e rim e n tal f a c t of the meaning of the "ind ep end ent d a ta ” . As such an o b se rva t io n a l sentence w ith o u t an in t e r p r e t a t io n has not any meaning so an o b s e rv a tio n a l s it u a t io n w ith o u t an in t e r p r e t a t io n i s n ' t any t a c t or o b je c t . An u n in te r p re ta te d o b s e rv a tio n a l s it u a t io n c o n ta in s o n ly s e n s a tio n s which a r is e from the r e a l w o rld . From these s e n s a tio n s p e rc e iv e d o b je c ts of v a rio u s typ es can be con- s t it u a t e d acco rd in g to what th eo ry is accep ted .
In t h is way we are approaching the fundam ental d is t i n c t io n in t h is ontology and epistem ology namely: "we must d is tin g u is h between appearances ( i . e . phenomena) and the th in g s appearing (t h e th in g s r e f e r r e d to by the o b s e rv a tio n a l sen ten ces in a c e r t a in in t e r p r e t a t io n ) . Th is d is t i n c t io n is c h a r a c t e r is t ic of r e a lis m " 6 .
Appearances of the r e a l o b je c t iv e w orld a re the s e n s a tio n s and v e rb a l b eh avio u rs " h ig h ly c o r r e la t e d w ith e ve n ts in t h is w o r ld "7 . By no means, th ese appearances r e f l e c t c o g n it iv e ly the s t im u li of the o b je c t iv e w o rld . Nobody knowe what they mean, they c a n 't be d e sc rib e d and even cannot be r e a liz e d .
5 I b i d . , p. 163.. 6 I b i d . , p, 164.
U n in te rp re te d e f f e c t s of o b s e rv a tio n th a t is appearances of o b je c t iv e w orld are a b s o lu te ly no f a c t s which have e it h e r s tr u c t u r e or sen se. The s tr u c t u r e and roeaning p ro v id e them o n ly a th e o ry which c o n v e rts them in to o b je c ts or s ta tem e n ts. A change of a th e o ry le a d s in e v it a b ly to the change o f p e r c e iv e d w orld and meanings of the o b s e rv a tio n a l statem ents and term s.
A f t e r a l l the n o tio n s used by us such as: a th e o ry , a phenom enon, a statem ent come in to being - as Fe y e ra b e n d 's c la im s - in r e s u lt of a b s tr a c t d iv is io n s of i n i t u a l l y homogenious e v e n t. In Fe yerab e n d ’ s c o n v ic t io n the reproach to the a b s tra c tn e s s is con cerned in making an a r b it r a r y d e v is io n of something what d o e s n 't stand any d iv is io n adequate to i t s "e s s e n c e " at a l l .
"To s t a r t w ith , we must become c le a r about the n atu re of the t o t a l phenomenon: appearance p lu s sta tem e n t. There are not two a c ts - one n o tic in g a phenomenon, the o th e r > e x p re ss ing i t w ith the h elp of the a p p ro p ria te statem ent - but o n ly one v iz . sa yin g in a c e r t a in o b s e rv a tio n a l s it u a t io n "th e moon is fo llo w in g me" or "th e stone is f a l l i n g s t r a ig h t down"0 .
A ccording to the author the u n ity of t h is t o t a l phenomenon is a r e s u lt of le a rn in g a language which c o n ta in in g t h e o r e t ic a l p o in ts o f view s in i t s e l f , p ro v id e s in t e r p r e t a tio n of s e n s a tio n s as w e ll as se n te n ce s. We may even say th a t the u n ity of an in t e r p r e t a t io n ensures the u n ity of the whole phenomenon mentioned above. According to t h is p o in t of vie w , th e o r ie s which im ply the a p p ro p ria te in t e r p r e t a t io n s are the ways of seein g the w o rld . The th e o r ie s are c re a te d and then abandoned in r e s u lt of c r i t i c i s m th a t o r ig in a t e s from a lt e r n a t i v e s . E v e n t u a lly the acceptance of a new th eo ry is a change of the image of the p e rc e iv e d w orld as w e ll as the meaning of the o b s e rv a tio n a l sta tem e n ts. In an extreme s it u a t io n , when a new th e o ry d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y from a p re vio u s one, th a t is in case of s o - c a lle d incommensurable t h e o r ie s , o b s e rv a tio n a l statem en ts as w e ll as o n to lo g ie s a re in c o m p a tib le . T h is th e s is about the o n t o lo g ic a l and s e m a n itic in c o m p a ra b ility of the incommensurable th e o r ie s i s a consequence of a c c e p tin g the
n
P. K. F e y e r a b e n d , A g a in st Method, New L e f t Books, London 1975, p. 72.
pragm atic theory o f o b s e rv a tio n and the c o n te x tu a l th eo ry of m eaninig. In accordance w it h , id e a s , the meaning o f the s t a t e ments as w e ll as the o rg a n iz a tio n s of the s e n s a tio n s in to the c e r t a in p ic t u r e of the w arld are co m p le tly dependent on the accepted t h e o r e t ic a l p o in t of vie w . The v a rio u s p o in ts of
• i.
view s are accepted by a knowing s u b je c t in a. le s s or more con s cio u s manner. G e n e ra lly sp eaking, e ve ry p e rc e p tio n o f the w orld or a m eaningful statem ent im p lie s a c e r t a in th eory because
a
th eo ry m ediates e ve ry e x p e rie n c e .Summing i t up, the pragm atic theory of o b s e rv a tio n e s t a b l i shes the p o in t from which not o n ly the essence of the c o g n i t i v e re s e a rch appears to us in a new p e rs p e c tiv e but a ls o the problem of o b ta in in g the most e f f i c i e n t p rog ress o f knowledge.
The pragm atic th e o ry of o b s e rv a tio n r e j e c t s the w idespread c o n v ic t io n of a d e c is iv e r o le of an e x p e rie n ce in a c o g n it iv e e v a lu a tio n of im portance of a th e o ry . As f a c t s of an e x p e r i ence are t h e o r e t ic a l c o n s tru c ts so t h e ir com parison w ith " t h e i r own" theory is not the very e f f i c i e n t way of t e s t in g them. T h is way can o n ly s e rv e to mask d i f f i c u l t i e s , as fo r in s ta n c e , w ith the h elp of ad hoc h y p o th e s is . The lim it a t io n of t h is th e o ry can be dem onstrated o n ly in c o n fro n ta tio n w ith o th ers p o in ts of vie w . Thus the most e f f e c t i v e way ' of t e s t in g any th e o ry is the c r i t i c i s m which a r is e s form d if f e r e n t p o in ts of view . On the o th e r hand, the wrong way o f con d u ctin g s c ie n t i f i c re s e a rc h e s is the accum ulating of f a c t s which conform to a th e o ry . Th is is why the main p r in c ip le of F e yera b e n d ’ s p h ilo so p h y is an appeal fo r p r o li f e r a t i o n of t h e o r ie s .
In F e y e ra b e n ď s o p in io n t h is p r in c ip le i s confirm ed not o n ly by h is a n a ly s is of p rocesses o f c o g n itio n but a ls o by h is t o r y of s c ie n c e . The examples from h is t o r y of s c ie n c e p r e sented by the author are to show th a t the s i g n i f i c a n t p ro g ress in s c ie n c e took p la c e o n ly when a d i f f e r e n t r a d ic a l theory appeared. I t enab les us to n o tic e these f a c t s which a re in con s is t e n t w ith an o ld , g e n e r a lly accepted p o in t of vie w .
E s tim a tin g a tta in m e n ts of human thought which belong to many d if f e r e n t c u lt u r e s , Feyerabend sees in them the o r ig in of a lt e r n a t iv e th e o r ie s in r e la t io n to modern s c ie n c e . These a l t e r n a t iv e s are the components of myths, modern p r e ju d ic e s , w it c h c r a f t s , r e lig io u s b e l i e f s , m etaphysics and even f a n t a s ie s of
c ra n k s . They c o n ta in th e o r ie s of d if f e r e n t stages of p ro g ressio n but they c o n trib u te d or may c o n trib u te to the development of our knowledge, assuming th a t they get an equal chance of t h e ir developm ent.
Demanding an equal o p p o rtu n ity of development fo r every op in io n which was, i s , o r w i l l be propagated a t any time in d e pen d en tly of any i n t e le c t u a l and even moral doubts which t h is p o in t may r a is e in us, Feyerabend p ro c la im s a r a d ic a l th e o re t i c a l p lu r a lis m . He opposes t h is to the idea of a cu m u la tive p ro g ress of .our knowledge. This id ea is a r e s u lt of meta p h y s ic a l c o n v ic t io n th a t we have a p o s s i b i l i t y of an open c o n ta c t w ith the B e in g . The c o n v ic tio n th a t the r e a l , o b je c t i v e w orld i s open, a t le a s t in p a r t , to our c o g n it iv e f a c u l t i e s makes i t p o s s ib le to accum ulate o b je c t iv e know le d g e . This c o n v ic t io n is acco rd in g to Feyerabend not o n ly f a ls e but a ls o harm ful s in c e an a n t y p l u r a l i s t i c p h i l osophy o f s c ie n c e th re a te n s f u r th e r development o f whole c u l tu re of mankind and i t im poverishes s c ie n c e . I t e lim in a te s from the v is io n of s c i e n t i s t s a l t e r n a t iv e th e o r ie s w ith the h elp of v a rio u s kind s of in d o c t r in a tio n p ro ce d u re s, fo r in s ta n c e , by p ersuading th a t a lt e r n a t iv e s a re m ean ing less, u n s c ie n t if ic or c o n t r a d ic t o r y tc human n a tu re .
M eanw hile, r e je c t in g a lt e r n a t iv e s we d e p riv e o u rs e lv e s of the only means o f a c r i t i c a l exam ination of a p r e v a ilin g theory which i s a r e a l l y e f f i c i e n t way of exam ining i t . Of co u rse , when a c e r t a in o p in io n i s g e n e r a lly a ę cep te d , then t h i s s t a t e i s p rese n ted as an e vid e n ce th a t we a re on the r ig h t tra c k of a th e o ry which draws us c lo s e ly to the r e a l fa c e o f B e in g . But the c o s t we would pay f o r t h i s i l l u s i o n would be the s ta g n a t io n of m o n o th e o re tic a l c u lt u r e .
Feyerabend i s co n vin ced th a t the t h r e a t o f s ta g n a tio n is a r e a l danger as our c u lt u r e may become an u n n o tic a b ly mono- t h e o r e t i c a l one. The commonly accep ted t h e o r e t ic a l p o in t of view i s contem porary s c ie n c e . I t i s co n s id e re d to be the o n ly way of the c o n g itio n of r e a l i t y . . Not o n ly s c i e n t i s t s con t r i b u t e t o .t h e supremacy of contem porary s c ie n c e but a ls o these p h ilo s o p h e rs who in t e r p r e t the whole h is t o r y of m ankind's know led g e as a one-way p ro cess aim ing a t th e most advanced l e v e l , i . e . modern s c ie n c e .
The mogt known in t e r p r e t a t io n o f t h i s kind i s P o p p e r's metaphor of the upturned tre e of knowledge. Popper d e s c rib e s the tre e of knowledge as s p rin g in g from c o u n tle s s ro o ts which grow up in to the a i r than down, and which u l t im a t e ly , high up, tend to u n ite a l l branches in to one common stem. Th is stem sym b o lizes our o b je c t iv e knowledge. I f Feyerabend intend ed to use an e c o lo g ic a l m etaphor, he would c la im th a t our c u l tu r e grows as a f o r e s t . In t h i s metaphor an in d iv id u a l t r e e or a p la n t sym bolize an a l t e r n a t i v e p o in t o f view in a d i f f e r e n t s ta g e o f i t s grow th. The popperian t r e e o f o b je c t iv e know led g e i s the o n ly one among them and on account of s p e c ia l c u l t i v a t i o n i t has become the most imposing and ex p an sive one. But how by i t s im b alan ce, d e t e r io r a t io n , decay and s ta g n a tio n i t may be a danger to the whole environm ent.
We can a vo id t h i s d is a s t e r o n ly by g u ara n te e in g freedom of p e rso n a l tho u g h t. A ccording to Feyerabend the s e c u r it y of t h o u g h t's freedom w i l l r e s u l t in in v e n tin g v a rio u s new th e o r ie s and m ethodologies as w e ll as in d e ve lo p in g the o ld ones. By the way, we must remember th a t e v e ry a l t e r n a t i v e th e o ry has i t s own m ethodology. For t h i s геазоп m eth o d o lo g ical r u le s have lim it e d e x te n t in the developm ent o f our c o g n itiw n . In r e s u l t of these l i m i t a t i o n s of e v e ry methodology a l l attem p ts to fin d tra n s c e n d e n ta l r u le s or law s of developm ent o f our knowledge become u n s u c c e s s fu l fo r such .tra n s c e n d e n ta l r u le s , p r i n i c p l e s or law s sim p ly do, not e x i s t . Looking a t .the whole c u l
tu r e o f mankind, Feyerabend c la im s th a t o n ly one r u le e x is t s where p ro g ress o f knowledge tak e s p la c e . He c a l l s t h i s r u le "a n y th in g g o e s ". A cco rd ing to i t e v e ry product of human thought should be developed by those re s e a rc h w orkers who h ig h ly a p p r e c ia te i t .
F o llo w in g t h i s r u le w ith o u t any e x c e p tio n demands s o c ia l reform s, the fundam ental prem ise of which is freedom of any sub j e c t in in v e n tin g and d e v e lo p in g t h e o r e t i c a l in t e r p r e t a t io n s of ap p earances. A cco rd ing to Feyerab end , freedom od s u b j e c t s th o u g h t, h is a c t i v i t y and s p o n ta n e ity i s the a b s o lu te v a lu e
g which i s worthy of a d efence by a l l a t t a in a b l e means . For
q
T h is problem I d is c u s s in a paper of mine U to p ia a g a in s t Method, " K u lt u r a i S p o łe cze ń stw o " 1983, nr 3, p. 119-140 ( i n p o l i s h ) .
t h i s reason Feyerabend c a l l s h is p h ilo so p h y an e p is te m o lo g ic a l anarchism . As i t b e n e f it s the genuine a n a r c h is t , Feyerabend b e lie v e s th a t c u lt u r e , in which the p r i n c i p l e "a n y th in g goes" w i l l be commonly a cce p te d , i s the o n ly one which h elp s man to a c h ic v e genuine human d ig n it y and as such i t i s worthy of in tro d u c in g even by f o r c e .
I I
P re s e n tin g Fe y e ra b e n d ' s p h ilo so p h y I have t r i e d to show th a t h is c o n t r o v e r s ia l t h e s is co n ce rn in g the r o le o f en ex p e rie n c e in ! c r i t i c i s m of a th e o ry , in co m m e n su rab ility of t h e o r e t ic a l p o in ts of view s or e p is te m o lo g ic a l anarchism are the consequences of h is ad op tion of the p rag m atic th e o ry of o b s e r v a t io n .
G e n e ra lly sp e a k in g , t h i s th e o ry i s an attem pt to c h a r a c t e r i z e human v e rb a l b e h a vio u rs which a re c a u s a ly determ ined by B e in g . Th is kind of v e rb a l b e h a vlo u re is c a lle d by the autho r o b s e r v a tio n a l language. As we remember t h i s language i s c h a r a c t e r iz e d by two c la s s e s of c o n d it io n s : p rag m atic c o n d itio n s and in t e r p r e t a t i o n . A cco rd ing to Feyerab end , these c o n d itio n s are to d e fin e c o m p le te ly d i f f e r e n t p r o p e r t ie s of any language: "The d i s t i n c t i o n between the p rag m atic prop e r t i e s of a language and i t s i n t e r p r e t a t io n i s c l e a r and unam biguous"10.
I t is worth th in k in g i t o ver whether i t i s r e a ly so as Feyerabend s t a t e s because coh esion of fundam ental assump t i o n s of h is p h ilo so p h y and r ig h tn e s s o f h is c o n c lu s io n s depend on the answer of t h i s q u e s tio n .
We are going to s t a r t our c r i t i c a l a n a l i s i s from comments co n cern in g p rag m atic c o n d itio n s .
1. F o rm u la tin g h is p a r t i a l d e f i n i t i o n of the e x p re s s io n " o b s e r v a tio n a l s e n te n c e " Feyerabend e x p la in s i t w ith the h elp o f f o llo w in g e x p re s s io n s : "ato m ic s e n te n c e ", "a p p r o p r ia t e s i t u a t i o n " , "a c c e p ta n c e of an atom ic s e n te n c e " e t c . L e t 's t r y to examine the meaning o f these e x p re s s io n s .
fo rm u la tio n s a sequence of sounds th a t i s a p h y s ic a l event which has a s p a tio - te m p o ra l . c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , in o th e rs - an a b s tr a c t o b je c t which i s á c la s s o f these e v e n ts . T h is am b ig u it y can be e a s i l y e lim in a te d fo r in s ta n c e by r e s e rv in g the term "ato m ic sentence". fo r an a b s tr a c t . o b je c t w h ile fo r an atom ic sentence th a t i s a p h y s ic a l e v e n t, we can use the term " r e a l i z a t i o n o f an atom ic s e n te n c e ". Em ploying t h is d i f f e r e n t a t i o n , we can fo rm u la te the c o n d itio n o f d i c i d a b i l i t y fo r example as f o llo w s : " I t i s demanded th a t fo r e v e ry atom ic sen ten ce
a
(o f c la s s A) of the language co n sid e re d th e re e x is t s a s it u a t io n s (a s o - c a lle d a p p ro p ria te s i t u a t i o n ) such th a t e v e ry £ , when p resen ted w ith a r e a l i z a t i o n of a in s w i l l run through a s e r ie s o f s t a t e s and o p e ra tio n s which te rm in a te s e it h e r in the accep tan ce of the r e a l i z a t i o n of a or in i t s r e j e c t io n by the JD ch o sen ". Of co u rse , em ploying the s u g g e s tib le d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , we are a lb e to remove e a s i l y the in d ic a te d am b ig u ity from o th e r c o n te x ts o f the p ragm atic c o n d itio n s but p h ilo s o p h ic a l tro u b le s appear when we t r y to answer the f o llo w in g q u e s tio n : in which way we d ecid e whether the produced sequence of sounds i s a p e rm is s ib le r e a l i z a t i o n of the atom ic s e n te n c e . Th is is , the q u e s tio n about c r i t e r i a o f a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r sequences of sounds in to c la s s e s of atom ic s e n te n c e s .Feyerabend can answer t h i s q u e s tio n in two manners. However, in each case h is answers w i l l be c o n t r a d ic t o r y w ith the most im p o rtan t p r i n c i p l e o f h is p rag m atic th e o ry o f o b s e rv a tio n .
The f i r s t answer would be as f o llo w s : the b a s is of d i s t in g u is h in g between two d i f f e r e n t sequences o f sounds as r e a l i z a t i o n o f the same atom ic sen ten ce i s a p a r t i c u l a r pho n o lo g ic a l th e o ry f o r example the th e o ry which d e s c rib e s c o n s id e re d language. N a t u r a lly , a change o f t h i s th e o ry g iv e s r i s e to ano th er c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the sequences of sounds in to new c la s s e s of atom ic s e n te n c e s . In the case of a
rad-7 i c a l change o f the th e o r y , th a t i s in the case o f incommen s u ra b le t h e o r ie s , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o f the sounds sequences w i l l be uncom parable. Then Feyerabend would have to w ith * draw from h is s ta n d p o in t a c c o rd in g to which a l l p rag m atic p r o p e r t ie s d i f f e r " c l e a r l y and unam biguously" from in t e r p r e t a t io n . He would have to adm it th a t a t l e a s t some p rag m atic p r o p e r t ie s
of an o b s e rv a tio n a l language depend on i n t e r p r e t a t io n . But t h is statem ent c o n ta in s p o t e n t ia l danger. I f o th e r p ra g m a tic p r o p e r t ie s tu rn out to be dependent on a th e o r y , they w i l l be u s e le s s as co m p le tly detemined by i n t e r p r e t a t io n .
The second answer Feyerabend co u ld g iv e us i s c o n t r a d ic t o r y enough to the b a s ic id e a of h is p rag m atic th e o ry o f ob s e r v a tio n th a t we m ention i t ' fo r r e g u l a r i t y . Namely F e y e r abend cou ld s t a t e th a t the sequences o f sounds are the r e a l i z a tio n o f the same atom ic s e n te n c e , i f he d e sc rib e d them " i n the same way" in language independent of any th e o r y . How ever, in t h is s i t u a t i o n he would admit th a t sequences of sounds, as w e ll as t h e i r d i s c r i p t i o n , are g ive n us d i r e c t l y w ith o u t m ed iatio n o f any th e o ry .
2. The e x p ressio n " a p p r io p r ia t e s i t u a t i o n to an atom ic s e n te n c e " i s used by Feyerabend in two d i f f e r e n t meanings. They can be d is tin g u is h e d a n a lo g o u sly as in the case d i s cussed a moment ago and in d ic a te d am b ig u ity of the e x p re s s io n can be e lim in a te d w ith r e l a t i v e e a se . For exam ple, the e x p re s s io n " a p p r io p r ia t e s i t u a t io n to r e a l i z a t i o n of an atom ic s e n te n c e " can d e s ig n a te a c o n c re te even t w h ile a c la s s of these e v e n ts can be termed by us "an a p p r io p r ia t e s i t u a t i o n to an atom ic s e n te n c e ".
A p p lyin g t h is d if f e r e n t a t i o n we can fo rm u la te now d e c id a b i l i t y c o n d itio n as f o llo w s " " I t i s demanded th a t fo r e v e ry atom ic sen ten ce a (o f a c la s s A) of the language c o n s id e re d th e re e x is t s '■!c la s s of s i t u a t i o n S (a s o - c a lle d c la s s of an a p p r io p r ia te s i t u a t i o n s ) such th a t e v e ry C, when p rese n ted w ith some r e a l i z a t i o n of a in s (w here s i s an elem ent of £ ) w i l l run through a s e r ie s of s t a t e s and o p e ra tio n s which te rm in a te e it h e r in acce p tan ce o f r e a l i z a t i o n of a, or in i t s r e j e c t io n by the С ch o sen ".
A n alog o u sly w ith the form er note the tro u b le s emerge on the b a s is o f the p rag m atic th e o ry of o b s e rv a tio n i f we t r y to answer the f o llo w in g q u e s tio n : which way can we d e cid e that the s itu a tio n the o b se rve r rem ains in , belongs indeed to the c la s s of the o b s e r v a t io n a l s it u a t io n s o f an . atom ic sen ten ce a? A f t e r a l l the p r e - c ite d d e c i d a b i l i t y c o n d itio n demands th a t ( e v e r y ) o b s e rv e r £ , who i s in the o b s e r v a t io n a l s it u a t io n £, should a cce p t or r e j e c t , a r e a l i z a t i o n of the atom ic sen ten ce £.
L i k e w i s e ,
as p r e v io u s ly , Feyerabend co u ld p ro v id e twoa n s w e r s
to the above q u e s tio n . In each case he has to provet h a t a
r e a l p h y s ic a l s it u a t io n s_ in which the o b se rv e r rem ains, is s im ila r in e s s e n t ia l re s p e c ts to an a p p ro p ria te s it u a t io n ofth e
atom ic sen ten ce a. Q u a lify in g s i m i l a r i t y .o.f any r e la t io n in some re s p e c t re q u ire s the employing of c e r t a in o b s e rv a tio n a l language. R e je c tin g the p o s s i b i l i t y of a language the i meaning ofw h i c h
is independent of any th e o ry , Feyerabend has to agree w ith f u th e r r e l a t i v i z a t i o n of p rag m atic c o n d itio n s . to c e r t a in th e o ry . I t means th a t the author consents to f u r th e r d e te r m in atio n of prag m atic p r o p e r t ie s by in t e r p r e t a t io n .Meanwhile - as i t seems - Feyerabend theds to the s e p a ra tio n of an a p p r io p r ia te s it u a t io n of an atom ic sen ten ce by comparing accep tan ce or r e j e c t io n r e a c t io n s of chosen o b s e rv e rs . By the way, we must remember th a t an o b s e rv a tio n a l s it u a t io n i s n ' t a fragm ent of a p e rc e iv e d w orld which has a c e r t a in " s t r u c t u r e "
b u t
i s c o n s is t s of appearences which are u n in te r p re te d r e a c tio n s of an o b s e rv e r. These appearences form a p e rc e iv e d w orld o n ly in the l i g h t of a c e r t a in th e o ry .In accordance w ith t h is id ea Feyerabend d e fin e s the c la s s of an o b s e r v a tio n a l s it u a t io n as fo llo w s : "W hether or not a s i t u a t io n s i s o b s e rv a b le fo r an organism 0 can be a s c e r ta in e d by in v e s t ig a t in g the b eh avio u r of 0, mental (s e n s a t io n s ) or o th e rw is e ; more e s p e c i a l l y , i t can be a s c e r ta in e d by in v e s t ig a t io n 0 's a b i l i t y to d is t in g u is h between s and o th e r s it u a t io n s . And we s h a ll say th a t 0 i s a b le to d i s t i n guish between s and s it u a t io n s d i f f e r e n t from j5 i f i t can be s o n d itio n a l so th a t i t ( c a n d i t i o n a l l y or u n c o n d it io n a lly ) produces a s p e c i f i c r e a c t io n jr_ whenever j> i s p re s e n t, and does not produce r when _s i s a b sen t. E x a c t ly the same con s id e r a t io n s ap p ly i f 0 happens to be a human o b se rve r and r one of the atom ic sentence of h is o b s e rv a tio n - la g n u a g e "11.
L e t 's tu rn our a t t e n t io n tfl the f a c t th a t in the p r e - c ite d o p in io n Feyerabend s e p a ra te s a c la s s of o b s e r v a t io n a l s i t u a tio n s w ith the h elp of an o b s e r v a tio n a l sen ten ce w h ile in h is d e f i n i t i o n of the term " o b s e r v a tio n a l s e n te n c e " he ex p la in s i t w ith the h elp of an o b s e r v a tio n a l s it u a t io n . ^ T h is
kin d o f p rocedure i s c a lle d in lo g ic a c l a s s i c a l v i t i o u s c i r c l e .
3. The next terms by means of which Feyerabend d e fin e s an o b s e r v a tio n a l sen ten ce a r : "a c c e p ta n c e of an atom ic s e n te n c e " and " ^ e je c t io n o f an atom ic s e n te n c e ". Thé terms - as F e y e r abend s ta t e s - "a r e prag m atic terms and they r e f e r to two
' 12
s p e c i f i c and c l e a r l y d is t in g u is h a b le typ e s of r e a c t io n " . B a sin g on the statem ent quoted above one could conclude th a t
both the terms d e s c rib e o b s e rv e r ’ s r e a c t io n s in d ep e n d en tly of any th e o ry but th a t s u p p o s itio n i s in e v id e n t c o n t r a d ic t io n to the g u id in g id ea of the prag m atic th e o ry of o b s e r v a tio n . In t h i s s it u a t io n we have to admit th a t the meaning of the terms i s r e l a t i v i z e d to ’a p s y c h o lo g ic a l th e o r y , not men tio n e d by th e a u th o r.
4. The same problem fo r the p rag m atic th e o ry of o b s e rv a tio n makes the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the c la s s of o b s e rv e rs . Also in t h i s case Feyerabend may d e fin e the s e t of o b s e rv e rs in two manners - n e it h e r of them is f u l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y .
For the f i r s t one the s t a r t in g - p o in t would be the com p a ris o n of v e rb a l r e a c t io n s of o b s e rv e rs in i d e n t i c a l ob s e r v a t io n a l s i t u a t i o n s . A cco rd ing to t h is c r i t e r i o n two ob s e r v e r s belong to the common s e t of o b s e rv e rs , i f in id e n t i c a l o b s e r v a tio n a l s it u a t io n s t h e i r v e rb a l b e h a vio u rs are i d e n t i c a l . But r as we have t r i e d to prove - the c h a r a c t e r iz a t io n of i d e n t i c a l o b s e r v a tio n a l s it u a t io n s and v e rb a l b e h a v io u rs i s im p o s s ib le in d e p e n d e n tly of any th e o ry . In consequence the s e t of o b s e rv e rs to which an o b s e r v a t io n a l language i s r e l a t i v i z e d , depends on a p re v io u s th e o ry .
In t h i s s i t u a t i o n the o n ly p o s s ib le way of c h a r a c t e r iz a t io n o f a s e t o f o b s e rv e rs i s the a p p e a lin g to the know ledge. they a c c e p t. Thus, two o b s e rv e rs w i l l belong to the v e ry same s e t , i f th ey a cce p t the v e ry same th e o ry . Of co u rse , the proposed, c r i t e r i o n of c h a r a c t e r iz in g a s e t o f o b s e rv e rs w i l l be u s e fu l on c o n d itio n we know what Feyerabend means -фу th e o ry and i f th e re would be the p o s s i b i l i t y to compare th e
o r ie s which a re accep ted by d i f f e r e n t o b s e rv e rs .
P u t t in g o f f the ex am ination o f t h i s problem of a moment l e t ' s n o t ic e t h a t the next p rag m atic p ro p e rty i s r e l a t i v i z e d to
a p r e v io u s ly accep ted th e o ry . In t h is s it u a t io n we can s t a t e th a t a l l prag m atic p r o p e r t ie s o f an o b s e r v a tio n a l language are determ ined by in t e r p r e t a t io n . T h is statem ent has a ve ry im portant s ig n if ic a n c e fo r the c i r i t c i s m o f F e y e ra b e n d 's philosophy fo r a l l p rag m atic p r o p e r t ie s tu rn out to be formed by an accep ted th e o ry in the same nay as sem antic p r o p e r t ie s of a language or o n to lo g y of n a tu re .
F e y e ra b e n d 's d i v i s i o n in to p rag m atic p r o p e r t ie s o f an even t and i t s in t e r p r e t a t i o n i s - as i t seems - ano th er way o f w e ll known from h is t o r y of p h ilo s o p h y , d is c r im in a t io n between essence and e x is te n c e . In the case of F e y e ra b e n d 's p h ilo so p h y e x is te n c e i s rep re se n te d by the p rag m atic a s p e c ts o f an even t which i s an appearence c a u s a lly determ ined by the e x is t in g r e a l w o rld . Demanding independence of these p r o p e r t ie s from in t e r p r e t a t i o n , Feyerabend i s anxious to s e p a ra te from our knowledge t h i s elem ent which i s independent of a knowing sub j e c t . He wants to i s o l a t e what o r ig in a t e s from the B e in g , what i s a base and sub stan ce in c o n s tr u c t io n o f the p e r c e iv e d w o rld . Of c o u rs e , t h i s w orld tehanges in accordance w ith an accep ted t h e o r e t i c a l p o in t o f vie w . The f a c t th a t p rag m a tic p r o p e r t ie s tu rn out to be dependent on an i n t e r p r e t a t io n b rin g s about th a t the elem ent independent o f a
th e o ry c a n 't be s e p a ra te d . O th e rw is e , autonomy o f e x is te n c e p o s tu la te d by p rag m atic c o n d itio n s i s q u e s tio n e d . In t e r p r e
t a t i o n , on the o th e r h an d ,, a c h ie v e s a dominant p o s it io n because not o n ly essence of -a p e rc e iv e d w orld but i t s d e s c r ip t io n are c o n d itio n e d by a th e o ry in c lu d in g e x is te n c e as w e ll. N a t u r a ly , the elem ent p r o t e c t in g t h i s p h ilo so p h y a g a in s t in d ic a te d i d e a l i s t i c consequences is the r e a l w orld p o s tu la te d by Feyerabend r e a l world-. However, t h i s r e a l w orld d o e s n 't seem to f u l f i l l a n th e r r o le than " th in g in i t s e l f " in K a n t 's p h i l o sophy .
Having a s c e r ta in e d the m ajor r o le of an in t e r p r e t a t io n in F e y e ra b e n d 's p h ilo so p h y , i t i s w orthy of th in k in g o ve r the n a tu re of in t e r p r e t a t i o n . U n f o r tu n a t e ly , a t r i a l of q u a l if y in g the n a tu re of i n t e r p r e t a t io n en co u n te rs d i f f i c u l t i e s and we a re going to examine reason s o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n .
Attem pt a t a R e a l i s t i c In t e r p r e t a t io n o f E x p e r ie n c e ", Feyerab en d 13 s t a t e s th a t in t e r p r e t a t io n i s a c la s s of f u r t h e r c o n d itio n s which to g e th e r w ith the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the language c o n t r ib u te to th e f a c t th a t we o b ta in a f u lly - f le d g e d lan g uag e. U n fo r t u n a t e ly , he d o e s n 't m ention these c o n d itio n s in any shape o r form.
On the f u r t h e r page, in the mentioned pap er, Feyerabend w r ite s about ’ in t e r p r e t a t io n as f o llo w s : " In so f a r as t h is c a u s a l c h a in in v o lv e s our own organism we are on a par w ith p h y s i c a l in s tru m e n ts . But we a ls o i n t e r p r e t the in d ic a t io n s of these in stru m e n ts ( i . e . e it h e r the s e n s a tio n s which occur d u rin g o b s e rv a tio n , or tne o b s e r v a tio n a l sen ten ce u t t e r e d ) and t h i s in t e r p r e t a t io n i s зп a d d it io n a l a c t , w hether now the in stru m en t used i s some ap p aratu s or our own sen sory o r g a n iz a tio n (o u r own b o d y )" 14.
In t e r p r e t a t io n in t h i s meaning i s an " a d d i t io n a l a c t " r e a liz e d to g iv e sense to human u tte r a n c e s and s e n s a tio n s .
In ano th er p la c e of t h is a r t i c l e Feyerabend fin d s i t im p o s s ib le to q u a l i f y the in t e r p r e t a t io n of an o b s e r v a tio n a l language by i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c "becau se no s e t o f o b s e rv a t io n s i s e ve r s u f f i c i e n t fo r us to i n f e r ( l o g i c a l l y ) any one of those i n t e r p r e t a t io n s (problem of i n d u c t i o n ) " 15.
We may con clu d e from t h i s statem en t th a t the autho r id e n t i f i e s the i n t e r p r e t a t io n w ith some s e t of t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t e ments which we cannot l o g i c a l l y deduce from o b s e rv u tio n a l s e n te n c e s . The tro u b le i s th a t th e se t h e o r e t ic a l sta tem e n ts a re not q u a l i f i e d anywhere.
E v e n t u a ll y , in v e s t ig a t in g the r e l a t i o n of in t e r p r e t a t i o n to a th e o ry the a u th o r comes to the f o llo w in g c o n c lu s io n : "The in t e r p r e t a t i o n o f an o b s e r v a t io n a l language i s d e t e r mined by the t h e o r ie s which we use to e x p la in what we o b s e rv e , and i t changes as soon as those t h e o r ie s c h a n g e "16. T h is im n lie s th a t the i n t e r p r e t a t io n i s som ething determ ined by the th e o ry .
13 I b i d ;
14 Ib id . ', p. 146-147. 15 I b i d . , p. 150. 16 I b i d . , p. 163.
In t h i s c o n te x t i t i s worth c o n s id e rin g what kind of being
a
th e o ry i s a cco rd in g to F e y e ra b e n d 's p h ilo s o p h y , and w hether th e re i s any u s e fu l c r i t e r i o n to d ecid e i f two ob s e r v e rs accep t or r e j e c t the same or d i f f e r e n t t h e o r ie s . H aving got t h is s o r t of c r i t e r i o n we would be a b le to a s s e r t th a t o b s e rv e rs a cce p t r e s p e c t iv e ly th e same ' or d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t io n s .In one of the g lo s s e s to h is paper "Problem s of E m p iric is m " Feyera b e n d 17 c la im s what f o llo w s : "th e term n>theory«c w i l l b e'u sed in a wide sen se, in c lu d in g o rd in a ry b e l i e f s ( e . g . , the b e l i e f in the e x is te n c e of m a te r ia l o b j e c t ) , myth ( e . g . , the myth of e t e r n a l r e c u r r e n c e ), r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , e t c . In s h o r t , any s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e ra l p o in t of view co n ce rn in g
lfl m a tter of f a c t w i l l be termed a » t h e o r y « "
In t h i s q u o ta tio n Feyerabend i d e n t i f i e s a th e o ry w ith a p s y c h ic e v e n t. As to me, t h i s f a c t has an im p o rtan t s i g n if ic a n c e fo r F e y e ra b e n d 's p h ilo s o p h y . L e t 's t r y to p re s e n t i t s h o r t ly by two rem arks.
The f i r s t of them con cern s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f the c o g n itio n of a th e o ry understood as a p s y c h ic e v e n t. A ccording to the p rag m atic th e o ry of o b s e rv a tio n , e v e ry f a c t , th e re b y a p s y c h ic e v e n t, is c o n s t it u t e d by a c e r t a in th e o ry . I t means, th a t
a
" s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e ra l b e l i e f " or a " s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e ra l r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f " c a n 't be known w ith o u t the m ed iatio n of ano th er th e o ry . T h is th e o ry d eterm in es an o n to lo g y of a p s y c h ic even t and the meaning of a statem en t which d e s c r ib e s the e v e n ts . Thus the s t r u c t u r e and the meaning of any th e o r y , fo r example A r i s t o t e l ' s or N ew ton's p h y s ic s , depends on a p r e v io u s ly accep ted t h e o r e t i c a l p o in t of v ie w . In the s p e c ia l c a s e , when the p r e v io u s ly accep ted t h e o r ie s a re 'incommen s u r a b le , a ls o the determ ined by them "im ag es" of the same th e o ry ( t h a t i s p s y c h ic e v e n ts ) a re incom m ensurable. T h is remark tends tow ards draw ing our a t t e n t io n to a g n o s tic con sequences of F e y e ra b e n d 's p h ilo s o p h y . One of them concerns our com prehension of any th e o r y . I f a th e o ry i s a p s y c h ic e v e n t, th a t we can grasp i t o n ly in the l i g h t o f ano th erth e o ry . In t h is way our c o g n itio n of c o n te n ts ’ of any th eory depends on ano th er t h e o r e t ic a l p o in t of view and i t changes as soon аз the p o in t changes.
My second remark con cern s the p o tio n of incom m ensurabi l i t y . F o llo w in g the above c o n s id e r a t io n two s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e ra l p s y c h ic e v e n ts , th a t i s t h e o r ie s , can be commensur a b le or incommensurable a cco rd in g to the t h e o r e t ic a l p o in t of view in l i g h t of which we c o n s id e r these e v e n ts . On the o th e r hand, co m m e n su ra b ility or in c o m m e n su ra b ility of two t h e o r ie s a r e n 't a r e l a t i o n of two arguments but th re e ones, namely the r e l a t i o n between two c o n s id e re d t h e o r ie s and a p o in t of view in the l i g h t o f we " p e r c e iv e " them. A part from th a t we must remember, th a t the p o in t of view form which the t h e o r ie s are examined, is a ls o a " s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e ra l b e l i e f " which cen not be known d i r e c t l y th a t i s w ith o u t m ed iatio n of a c e r t a in th e o ry . Of c o u rse , t h i s argument may be con tin u ed ad i n f i n i tum. As a r e s u l t of t h i s we a r e n 't a b le to d e cid e w hether two o b s e rv e rs a cce p t the same or d i f f e r e n t t h e o r ie s . O th e rw ise , F e y e ra b e n d 's p h ilo so p h y d o e s n 't p ro v id e us w ith a c r i t e r i o n which would a llo w us to s o lv e t h i s problem . In consequence the n o tio n of a th e o ry as w e ll as the n o tio n of incommensur a b i l i t y are c o m p le tly v a g u e .- In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , a l l d is c u s s io n s about in c o m m e n su ra b ility a re in c o n c lu s iv e .
F e yera b e n d ’ s p h ilo so p h y i s an attem p t to fo rm u la te a m etap hysics in which a le a d in g id ea a r i s e s from a c o n v ic t io n th a t Being i s n ' t d i r e c t l y a t t a in a b l e to any of our c o g n it iv e f a c u l t i e s . Thus we are d eterm ined to guess I t s n a tu re by i n t e r p r e t a t io n of our v e rb a l b e h a v io u rs and s e n s a tio n s . In o th e r w ords, we are fa te d to t h e o r e t i c a l p lu r a lis m of c o n je c tu r e s . E v e ry of them i s c o g n i t i v e l y equal and worth worth d e v e lo p in g .
F o rm u la tio n of t h i s id e a - as I have t r i e d to p re s e n t i s d e f e c t iv e . The a u th o r, p o s t u la t in g r e l a t i v i z a t i o n o f e v e ry language to a c e r t a i n th e o ry , u n c o n s c io u s ly a r t i c u l a t e s t h i s thought in a t h e o r e t i c a l l y independent lan g uag e. I f we w ant, on the o th e r hand, to escape th e se inconsequences then we are not a b le to grasp the meaning of h is le a d in g t h e s i s .
But l e t ' s ig n o re the in d ic a te d in conseq uances of F e y e r a b e n d 's p h ilo so p h y fo r a moment and ag ree th a t we a re a b le to i d e n t i f y a th e o ry in some unknown to us way. Then in
ac-cordance w ith h is t h e o r e t ic a l p lu r a lis m we must t r e a t h is p o in t of view as the one among many o th e r s . What i s more, these a l t e r n a t i v e s a re n ece sse ry to examine h is t h e o r e t i c a l p o in t . In t h i s s it u a t io n Feyerabend has got to prove th a t h is p h ilo so p h y has an advantage over o th er a l t e r n a t i v e s . I th in k Feyerabend would argue th a t o n ly - h is e p is te m o lo g i c a l anarchism j u s t i f i e s the developm ent o f e v e ry th e o r e t i c a l p o in t of vie w . Only ' the e p is te m o lo g ic a l an a r
chism p e rm its the id e a , which may appear nobody knows
how ab surd, to be a b le to develop as soon as i t s adherent o c c u rs . However, from h is p l u r a l i s t i c p o in t of view e v e ry e f f d r t to j u s t i f y an e x e p tio n a l p o s it io n o f h is e p is te m o lo g i c a l anarchism i s a form of an in d o c t r in a t i o n , p ersu ad in g us th a t the freedom of the thought and the v a r i e t y of human culture are the u n iv e r s a l and tra n s c e n d e n ta l v a lu e s de f a c t o in d e pendent of any th e o ry . In o th e r w ords, i t is an e f f o r t to e s t a b lis h a c u lt u r e in which e p is te m o lo g ic a l anarchism would r e t a in i t s le a d in g , a unique p o s it io n .
S i m i l a r l y as in the case o f fo rm u la tin g h is own p h ilo so p h y so in the case of j u s t i f y i n g i t s e x e p tio n a l p o s it io n among o th e r a l t e r n a t i v e s he has to appeal to tra n s c e n d e n ta l id e a s independent of any th e o ry .
In the l i t e r a t u r e d e d ic a te d to the p h ilo s o p h y o f s c ie n c e Feyer abend i s o fte n tr e a te d as an u n a t t r a c t iv e or even an odd t h in k e r . Bu^ t h i s kind of o p in io n seems to be u n ju s t. F e y e ra b e n d 's view s a re sim p ly bold consequences of h is p rag m atic th e o ry o f o b s e rv a tio n to an end. W ith ou t doubt, th ey a re p ro vo k in g . But i f anyone wants to i n s i s t on h is th e o ry of o b s e rv a tio n f o r any o th e r reason then he should a cce p t t h e o r e t i c a l p lu r a lis m , e p is te m o lo g ic a l anarchism and F e y e ra b e n d 's p ro p o s a ls o f re o rg a n iz a t io n o f our c u lt u r e ,
O bservin g the h is t o r y of p h ilo so p h y one should s e p a ra te two k in d s o f th in k e r s who change i t s tre n d , those who propose new p h ilo s o p h ic a l id e a s and . those who w ithdraw from them a ll. p a ra d o x ic a l consequences not ta k in g in to c o n s id e r a t io n a common o p in io n or even s o - c a lle d commonsense. The l a t t e r oues are seemed to c o n t r ib u te much more to the c o g n itio n o f the i n i t i a l id e a . They in d ic a t e i n d i r e c t l y a t the sama tim e th a t w ith o u t a change o f an i n i t i a l m e ta p h y s ic a l i n t u i t i o n we a re not
a b le to r e s o lv e the problem emerging on i t s grouno. For t h is reason we can say they f u l f i l l a g ra v e - d ig g e r r o le o f some id e a s or even the whole p h ilo s o p h ic a l tre n d s . Feyerabend seems to be one o f them.
C h a ir of P h ilo s o p h y U n iv e r s it y of Łódź
S ła w o j O lczyk
0 FEYERABENDA PRAGMATYCZNEJ T E O R II OBSERWACJI
A rty k u ł n in ie j s z y pośw ięcony j e s t Feyerabenda f i l o z o f i i na u k i. W s z c z e g ó ln o ś c i j e s t on próbę r e k o n s t r u k c ji m e ta fiz y k i przez tę f i l o z o f i ę z a ło ż o n e j. Przew odnią ideę t e j m e ta fiz y k i j e s t p rz e k o n a n ie , że w s z e lk i k o n ta k t z o b ie k ty w n ie is tn ie ją c y m światem za- p ośred n iczo ny j e s t przez ja k ą ś t e o r i ę . Id ea ta n a j j a ś n i e j p rze d staw io n a z o s ta ła przez Feyerabenda w pragm atycznej t e o r i i o b s e r w a c j i. W c z ę ś c i p ie rw s z e j n in ie js z e g o a r t y k u łu t e o r ia ta j e s t szczegółowo p rz e d sta w io n a , n ato m ia st w c z ę ś c i d r u g ie j p o d ję ta zo s t a ł a próba j e j k r y ty c z n e j a n a li z y . Je d n o c z e ś n ie wyrażony z o s ta je p og ląd , że zarówno p lu ra liz m t e o r e ty c z n y , ja k i e p is te m o lo g ic z n y anarchizm Feyerabenda są konsekwencjam i c e n t r a ln e j id e i pragm aty c z n e j t e o r i i o b s e rw a c ji.
