P I O T R S Z U K A L S K I
Ethnic and religious changes in W estern Europe
in the first decades of the 21st century
1. Introduction
D em ographic outlooks on W estern E urope that have been constru cted in the recen t years in dicate that in the lo n g term its popu lation w ill rep ro d u ce at a leve l b e lo w replacement. Consequently, the popu lation w ill decrease and the share o f sen iors w ill grow larger. T h e advan cing agin g o f the popu lation linked w ith d em ogra p h ic im p losion will entail mass im m igration, an influx o f you n g p eo p le capable o f stren gth en in g the continent’s eco n om y that w ill have to cope w ith a sh ortage o f w o rk ers in the future - particularly w o rk ers read y to take the lo w -sk illed and lo w -p a id jobs. Given the limited poten tial resou rce o f im m igrants in o th er European cou ntries and in overseas countries m ain ly popu lated b y p eo p le o f European descent, m ost im m igrants are likely to com e from o th er regio n s o f the w orld.
This m echanism arises from the lo gic o f the lon g-term d em ogra p h ic changes that can be co m p a red to the so-called transition o f spatial m o b ility associated w ith the dem ogra p h ic transition. T h e m o d el assumes that in period s o f fast expanding populations in tern ation al m igration becom es one o f the effective solutions to the problem o f o verp op u la tion - m oreover, at som e stage it is o b viou sly the m a jor solution. At present, high dynam ics o f popu lation g ro w th can be found in the South A m erican, Asian and, a b ove all, A frican countries, w h e re d em ogra p h ic transition is still goin g on. Th ese region s o f the w o r ld have a „su rplus” o f p eo p le and so th ey try to "ex p o rt" at least som e o f them , on e o f the destin ation s bein g the con tin en t o f Europe. In the com ing decades, this ten d en cy w ill have a huge effect o f u nim aginable consequences on E u rope’s ethnic com position.
This a rticle aim s to presen t the m agnitu de o f the changes that w ill a ffect the ethnic and religiou s co m p o sitio n o f the W estern European so ciety in the com in g decades, as w ell as the p rob a b le social consequences o f the changes. A d irect intellectu al im pulse that led to the prep a ra tion o f this article w as produ ced by the e x p ert re p o rt „Th e dem ograph ic visio n o f Europe in 2050 [W iz ja dem ograficzna E uropy 2050 rok u ) w hich was co m p iled fo r the Forecast Com m ittee, Polish A ca d em y o f Sciences [Szukalski, 2007]. Som e aspects discussed in the r e p o r t’s final versio n induced m o re reflections, thus p ro v id in g a startin g poin t fo r this article.
2. Ch an gin g ethnic stru c tu re o f W e ste rn E u ro p e in the com in g d e c a d e s
T h e section b e lo w presents several varian t outlooks on the ethnic com p osition o f the European popu lation to the y e a r 2050 that w e re p repa red by the UN forecasters [UN, 2001] and severa l European states [Colem an, 2006]. A m ore deta iled discussion o f the o u tlook s has to b e preceded, though, b y several com m ents on the m eth o d olo gies u n d erlyin g the estim ations.
Firstly, the term „p o pu lation o f fo reign o rigin ” as used in the outlooks refers to the im m igran t p opu lation that is eth nically d ifferen t from that livin g in the given area and to the im m igran ts’ children. A c c o rd in g ly th e ir grandchildren are con sid ered to be the n ative popu lation, regardless o f h o w stron gly th ey id en tify th em selves w ith their cou n try o f residen ce. Because o f that, the estim ations u ndervalu e the d e g re e to w hich im m igration shapes the ethnic pictu re o f our continent. T h e releva n t qu estion concerns in tegration (o r sim ply a ssim ilation ) b e tw een the im m igran t and n ative populations.
Secondly, the sizes o f ethnic m in orities in particu lar W estern European countries are con sid era b ly at variance, lik ew ise the cou ntries' shares and structures o f the im m igran t populations. Because o f the d ifferen t startin g points the cou ntries have, forecasts produ ce dissim ilar results even if m igration balances are re la tive ly the same.
Thirdly, im m igran ts are usually characterised b y h igh er fe rtility rates than p o p u la tio n s119 livin g in the re ceivin g countries. O w in g to the factor and the much yo u n g er age p r o file o f the im m igran t populations, natural increase b ecom es another en gin e d rivin g th e ir grow th .
W ith the a bove com m ents in mind, let us exam ine several in d ep en d en tly com piled reports.
Th e com pu tation s that the UN forecasters m ade several years ago [UN, 2001] w e re in ten ded to d eterm in e the m agnitude o f m igration that w as n ecessary to provid e European cou ntries w ith dem ogra p h ic sta b ility120.1 w ish to u nderlin e that the results o f ou tlook s built upon particu lar o b jectives/d esid era ta are shocking and scary, using the term s that have becom e so popu lar a m on g the Polish politicians. This opinion esp ecia lly applies to tw o ob jectives con cern in g the values o f the poten tial su pport ratio, w h o se fu lfilm en t in the first h alf o f the 21st c. w o u ld requ ire, if on e w ish ed to m aintain the ratio’s m axim al values fo r Europe and EU-15, 1,386 m illion and 701 m illion im m igrants, resp ective ly (its n ot a mistake, in the first case the o rd e r o f m agnitude is
109). A cu rsory lo o k at the a b o ve values is enough to understand that the scenario is not feasible. H ow ever, even a m o re „realistic” varian t (re q u irin g lo w e r in flo w s ) estim atin g the poten tia l s u pport ratio at 3.0 in 2050 indicates that Europe w o u ld n eed 235 m illion im m igran ts and the EU 154 m illions; fo r som e European countries the n um bers w ou ld be 35 m illion s (Ita ly ) and 40 m illion s (G e rm a n y )121. Let us n ote that the num bers o f
119. For instance, around the yea r 2000 the non-European im m igrants accounted fo r 66 % in the UK, in the N eth er lands it was 62 % and in France 59% ; in Belgium and Sweden these im m igrants represented „on ly” 4 0 % o f the im m i grant population [Coleman, 2006: 405].
120. Th e publication interprets the notion o f econom ic and dem ographic stabilisation in several ways. It considers the num bers o f im m igrants necessary to maintain the fo llo w in g values until the yea r 2050: 1 } the largest num ber o f inhabitants achieved a fter 1995 assuming no m igration; 2) the largest num ber o f the w orkin g-age population (15-64 yea rs) achieved b e fore m id 21st c., assuming no m igration; 3) a potential support ratio o f 3.0 (calculated as the number o f p eop le aged 15-64 years divided by the num ber o f p eop le aged 6 5 +); 4 ) the highest potential support ratio that w ill be achieved to the yea r 2050 w ithou t migration. Th e produced estim ates o f the num ber o f im m igrants and o f the size o f the population that the country needs in the given scenario are com pared w ith the baseline data derived from the 1998 UN population ou tlook (the m ost probable varian t and the same variant assuming no m igration).
121. For the sake o f com parison le t me add that the national reports on Italy and Germany produced in the mid-1990s indicated that im m igration am ounting to 12-15 m illion p eople w as necessary to keep the sam e numbers o f their w or- king-age population by m id 21th c. (se e [Bosw orth, Burtless, 1998]).
immigrants are assum ed to b e even ly d istribu ted in tim e and that the n e w popu lation will contribute to h igh er n um bers o f births in the re ceivin g country.
A huge influx o f im m igran ts (1 0 0 m illion s in Europe, 47 m illion s in EU-15, and 18 millions in G erm any) w o u ld be necessary, even if efforts w e re m ade to keep the size of the European popu lation at its m axim al leve l re co rd ed du rin g the 55-yea r-p eriod (being the d esired state in volvin g the lo w e st level o f im m igratio n ). A lthou gh the magnitude o f the n ecessary influx is em barrassing fo r m any reasons, m ost countries are probably d o o m ed to receive im m igrants. W ith o u t im m igran ts and w ith the UN outlook’s pred iction s o f fe rtility rates com in g true, in 2050 the poten tial su pport ratio w ou ld reach w o r ry in g ly lo w values in m any cou ntries (1.52 in Italy and 1.75 in Germany).
A ccordin g to the UN forecast o f 1998, b y 2050 im m igran ts a rrivin g a fter 1995 and their descendants w ill constitute fo r instance 6.2% in EU-15 and 19.8% in Germany. An influx o f im m igran ts fu lfillin g any o f the fou r o bjectives form u lated by the UN forecasters w o u ld m ean ra p id ly g ro w in g p ercen tages o f eth nically fo reign populations. Omitting at this p o in t the m ost p ro-m igra tion varian t (w ith the potential su pport ratio maintaining its m axim al va lu e), w h e re n on e o f the analysed cou ntries and regions has the p ercen tages b e lo w 68% , even the varia n t that on ly aspires to keep the total numbers o f popu lation s at a constant leve l produ ces su rp risin g values fo r som e o f the studied countries. In the variant, 2 8 -2 9 % o f p eo p le livin g in Italy and Germany, 18% in Europe and „o n ly ” 1 7 % in EU-15 w o u ld be eith er im m igrants o r th eir descendants. The political in correctn ess o f the qu estion p reven ted the authors o f the re p o rt from asking about the cou ntries o f o rigin from w h ich the p rosp ective im m igran ts could come. However, even a cu rsory lo o k at the num bers ex p licitly show s that in the case o f the European cou ntries the eastern parts o f the con tin en t w o u ld n ot b e the o n ly o r p rim a ry source o f im m igrants, as e v e ry sixth person livin g in Europe in 2050 w o u ld have th eir roots - d irectly o r via th eir parents - in o th er region s o f the w o rld (th e rate tod ay is ca. 5% ). Is, th erefore, a llo w in g the p o ssib ility (o r necessity, as som e claim ) o f im m igrants substituting dom estic fe rtility not a p relu de to ethnic, cultural and religiou s conflicts that could erupt, as the recen t years have sh o122wn, in the cou ntries affected by the problem ? Given that the labou r m arket sh ow s both surplus and sh ortage o f w ork ers and in creasin gly reveals the du ality o f its character, perhaps o th er solutions p rotectin g from social conflicts should be sought, esp ecia lly con sid erin g the advancem ents in labour-saving tech n o lo gies and tech niqu es and the m ore and m o re com m on ly asked questions about the p o ssib ility o f p ro vid in g the p resen t citizens w ith jobs and w ages that w ill en able them to live d ecen t lives, and particu larly w ith fa ir pensions paid by the capital-based system s?
T h e results o f d em ogra p h ic p rojection s p rep a red b y the statistical auth orities in several European countries and discussed in a v e r y in terestin g article by D. Colem an [2006] m ake the a b o ve qu estion s even m o re relevant. T h e p rojection s o f the ethnic co m position tend to assum e that the com in g decades w ill have re la tive ly constant
122. Th e im m igration p rob lem is, how ever, m ore com plex than that, because a shortage o f w ork ers is found for the low -skilled and low -paid jobs and fo r the high-skilled jobs involving the k n ow ledge o f technical, exact, biochemical and medical sciences. It is so, because you ng Europeans are reluctant to study subjects requiring intellectual effort and discipline.
levels o f im m igratio n and that the im m igran t popu lation ’s fe rtility exceeds that of the n ative population. Table 1 presen ts the p ro jec tio n s’ outcom es that are the most releva n t to the subject m a tter o f this article.
Tab. 1 Shares o f popu lation s o f fo reign o rigin in selected European countries as estim ated in the national d em og ra p h ic p rojection s spanning the years 2000-2050
Country Year
Total population
(m illion s)
Share o f foreign population (% ) total HDI+
countries HDI- countries
Austria 2000 8.10 9.31 5.39 3.92 2050 7.80 28.00 7.94 5.07 England and Wales 2001 52.0 11.3 2.7 8.7 2051 63.1 36.1 11.6 24.5 Denmark 2004 5.4 8.74 2.40 5.96 2050 5.45 14.76 3.30 11.45 Germany 2000 82.20 9.90 3.28 6.57 2050 68.30 23.56 5.40 18.16 The Netherlands 2004 15.90 17.50 8.60 8.90 2050 16.90 29.70 13.20 16.50 N orw ay 2005 4.55 7.50 4.10 3.40 2060 5.58 23.50 9.20 14.30 Sweden 2004 9.01 15.90 9.66 6.25 2050 10.63 32.30 10.46 10.71
Th e ita licised valu es in the last tw o colum ns concern the y e a r 2030
HDI+ d e v e lo p e d cou ntries w ith the Human D evelop m en t Index a bove its average value
HDI- u n d erd e velo p ed countries w ith the Human D evelop m en t In dex b e lo w its average value
Source: [Colem an, 2006: 414]
In W estern European cou ntries try in g to p red ict th eir ethnic com positions, p eo p le o f fo reig n o rigin account fo r 10-1 5% o f the popu lation alrea d y today. In each o f the analysed cases, the structural ratios g r o w to the y e a r 2050, reachin g from 1/4 to 1/3 o f the total p o p u la tio n 123. A t the sam e tim e, in the m id 21st c. A ustria and G erm any w ill have much sm aller popu lation s than at its outset, d espite the fast g r o w in g sizes and shares o f the im m igran t populations, w h ile in the o th er cou ntries popu lations w ill not expand w ith o u t im m igrants, because the assum ption about net in tern ational m igration n ot b ein g p o sitive leads to lo w e r n um bers o f popu lation s in e v e ry instance.
123. Interestingly, if the presen t im m igration trends and fe rtility differences continued in the lon g term, im m igrants and the first generation o f th eir children w ou ld becom e m ajority populations in Sw eden and the Netherlands before the 21st c. ended. D. Coleman believes [2007] that the situation m ay appear in a larger num ber o f w estern European countries.
A particularly in terestin g aspect is the cou ntries from w hich im m igrants come. In the table above, on ly in direct in form a tion on the subject can be found. Although particular cou ntries d ifferen tly sp ecify m in o rity grou ps in th e ir estim ations, the latter a llo w id en tifyin g com pa rab le ca tego ries o f the d ev e lo p e d cou ntries (w h e re the Human D evelop m en t Index exceeds the average - H D I+) that can be equ ated w ith the European countries and th ose w h e re m ost o f the popu lation is o f European descent and o f the d e v e lo p in g cou ntries (H D I-). From the persp ective o f this division, it is notable that the shares o f p eo p le h aving fo reign o rigin w ill m ain ly increase (Austria being an ex cep tio n ] driven by the g ro w in g num bers and shares o f the non-European people w h o se o u tw a rd appearan ce makes them d ifferen t from m o st o f the cou n try’s population, w hich w ill certain ly b e an additional ro a d b lo ck to th e ir assim ilation.
3. Im m igrant fertility
The changes ou tlin ed a bove w ill be indu ced b y the com bin ed in flu ence o f imm igration and h igh er fe rtility o f popu lations a rrivin g from o th er continents. Let us illustrate th e secon d fa ctor using France, w h e re the ethnic studies p o in t to d ifferen t fertility o f the n ative French w o m e n and those b elo n gin g to ethnic m in orities - for instance, the total fe rtility rate as calculated fo r all fem a le popu lation in the cou n try has been oscilla tin g arou nd 1.9 in the recen t years, but fo r the fo reig n fem ales it stands at around 2.6 [Colem an, 2006]. T h e m o re specific analyses show, how ever, that w h en the im m igrant fem a les’ age at th e ir arrival to France is taken in to account, the d ifferen ce betw een the im m igran t and n ative fe r tility clea rly decreases. For instance, in the last years o f the 20th cen tu ry fem ales born in m etrop olita n France had 1.7 ch ildren on average, w h ile im m igran t fem ales 2.16. In this context, the substantial variations in fem ales’ p ro p e n sity to have ch ildren d eterm in ed b y th e ir cou n try o f o rigin are w o rth stressing - w h ile the Turkish w o m e n had 3.21 ch ildren on average and the M oroccans 2.97, fo r the Spanish and Italian fem ales the rates w e re o n ly 1.52 and 1.6, respectively. The A frican fem ales w e r e found to be v e r y special (M oroccan s - see above, Tunisians - 2.9, A lgeria n s - 2.57, o th er A frican cou ntries - 2.86) and v e r y d ifferen t in fertility terms from the n ative popu lation [Tou lem on, 2004],
In France, lik e w is e in o th er cou ntries pursuing „fa m ily -frien d ly " social policies o fferin g an extensive ch oice o f benefits, high fe rtility in the im m igran t popu lation is en cou raged b y fa m ily allow a n ces that freq u en tly constitute its m a jo r source o f livelih ood, and qu ite often the p rim a ry o n e 124. T h e righ tist grou ps in France, alarm ed by the high fe rtility o f the M uslim fam ilies, o p en ly called som e tim e ago fo r redu cing - o r even liq u id a tin g - fa m ily allow a n ce granted to the fou rth and next ch ildren and to ch ildren b orn b y the secon d w ife 125, p ro p o sin g instead to use the funds saved to increase fa m ily allow a n ces fo r fam ilies w ith fe w e r children, w hich w as in tended to encourage the n ative French to take rep ro d u ctive e ffo rt [Kiezun, 2007].
Generally, research ers stu dyin g this subj ect area p o in t to the fact that the n ew com ers
124. In France, an additional inducem ent fo r fem ale im m igrants to have many children is the awareness that m others that have raised at least five children are en titled to minimum pensions, even i f they have no episodes o f gainful em ploym ent in th eir lives.
125. Getting a fam ily allow ance fo r the second w ife's children is easy in France. Although the French state rejects p o lygamy, it practically grants benefits to children born by successive w ife that shares the abode w ith her husband, thus th eoretically form in g a m onoparental family.
absorb the n ative fa m ily m o d el w ith its n um ber o f ch ildren v e r y q u ick ly as a result of w h ich m o st d ifferen ces b e tw e e n the fe rtility levels dim inish w ith in the lifetim e o f one generation .
4. Ch anges in the re lig io u s com po sition o f the W e ste rn E u ro p e a n p o p u la tio n
T h e d escrib ed changes in the ethnic structure o f the popu lation w ill a ffect its religiou s co m p o sitio n as w ell. Th e statistics o f religio n s has n ever b een v e r y credible, because p e o p le (sm all religio u s grou ps and esp ecia lly n o n -b eliev ers] are reluctant to revea l th e ir religiou s beliefs, particu larly if d ifferen t from those predom in atin g in th e ir society. A fte r the m atters o f conscien ce w e r e recogn ised as b elo n gin g to the person al sphere, the qu estion s about in dividu als’ re ligio n w e r e gradu ally w ith draw n from popu lation censuses and from the records o f d ifferen t d em ogra p h ic events in the 20th century. Accordingly, this ty p e o f in form a tion p rovid es in Europe an ou tlin e rather than a p recise pictu re o f the continental popu lation s’ religions.
Th e a forem en tion ed in flow s o f p eo p le o f foreign origin to Europe w ill change the contin en t’s religious com position. For instance, in the m id-21st c. Austria is predicted to have - dep en d in g on the assum ptions - from 14% to 2 6 % o f Muslims in the total num ber o f its population, com pared w ith only 4 % it has today (in 1980 Muslims constituted only 1%, and the 1971 rate was only 0.3 % ) [Goujon et al., 2006], B etw een 1975 and 2005, the percen tage o f persons declaring them selves Muslims increased in the UK from 1 to 3% , the shares o f persons indicating religions o th er than Islam and C hristianity g row in g in the sam e w a y [UKCH Religious Trends, 2005/2006], The religious com position can be generally expected to be m ore diverse, w ith the m ost com m on non-Christian religion bein g Islam, w hich already has m illions o f practicing b elievers in the UK and France. Th e p o w e r o f Islam is strengthened b y strong religious h om ogam y characterising its follow ers, w h e re b y children sm oothly accept th eir parents’ religion. High fertility 126 and the structural factor (la rg er p rop o rtio n o f you ng p eo p le bein g eith er in the p eak fertility p eriod o r approaching it in the Muslim population than in the Christian popu lation ) - w ill exert a sim ilar influence. Even then, R. Buttiglione w as right to ask [2005: 20]: „can w e blam e Islam fo r taking o ver our land, if childless Europe volu ntarily decides to give up h er p eo p le and disappear from history?”
M any W estern European research ers stu dyin g the issue are fearfu l o f the ou tlined course o f events alrea d y today, because som e estim ates sh o w that around the mid 21st c. in France the adult Muslim s w ill p rob a b ly ou tn u m ber the adult non-M uslim s, w ith all consequ ences o f the phenom ena, such as the p o ssib ility o f the fo rm e r legally assum ing p o w e r in the cou n try in lin e w ith d em ocratic procedu res [Kiezun, 2007: 20]. Th e estim ates on A ustria sh o w that in 2051 M uslim s m ay pred o m in ate in the age grou p to 15 years [Goujon et a l., 2006],
It has a lrea d y b een m en tio n ed that the shares o f p eo p le fo llo w in g o th er religions, q u ite exotic from the European perspective, w ill also grow . This process w ill be a ccom pan ied b y a d ecreasin g p ro p o rtio n o f the Christian popu lation, the reasons bein g not on ly the g r o w in g num bers o f the fo llo w e rs o f o th er religions, but also secularization m u ltip lyin g the ranks o f individu als d eclarin g th e ir atheistic ou tlo ok o r trea tin g re ligio n as a v e r y p erson al matter. In the Czech Republic that besides the Neth erlan ds 126. For instance, in 1981 the Austrian T F R fo r the Muslim fem ales w as 3.09, in 1991 it w as 2.77 and 2.34 in 2001, w hereas fo r all fem ales livin g in the country the rates w e re 1.67,1.51 and 1.33, respectively [Goujon, 2 0 0 6 :1 3 ]
irrespective o f th e ir religions, w as 76% , although a rate lo w e r b y 5-15 percen tage points was e x p ected 128. It is w o rth em phasising, though, that am ong the m em bers o f the youngest age grou ps w h o se religio n w as d eterm in ed b y th eir parents the share o f the n on -believers w as risin g fast b e tw e e n y o u n g er and yo u n g er age groups, from 15- 16% am ong teen a gers to 2 3 % fo r ch ildren aged 0-2 years, b ein g an indication o f the likely direction and pace o f future changes.
5. Consequences o f the fu tu re ethnic ch an ges
The com in g decades w ill certain ly w itn ess g ro w in g ethnic and religious differentiation in Europe, fo llo w e d b y cultural, social and id en tity changes. It is v e ry likely that the changes w ill spark escalatin g ethnic conflicts fu elled b y d ifferen t economic, social and politica l goals pursued b y the n ative and fo reign populations. The fo llo w in g are exam ples o f poten tial p rob lem areas:
a. regional p o licy (n a tive popu lation s usually live in rural areas and sm all and m ed iu m -sized tow ns, w h ile im m igran ts are o v e rrep resen ted in la rge cities); b. social p o licy (becau se the natives p red o m in a te in the o ld e r popu lation and the
im m igran ts in the y o u n g er age groups, particu larly a m on g teen a gers and children, the first grou p w ill o p t fo r m o re effective p o licy a ddressin g old-age problem s and the elderly, w h ile the o th er grou p w ill push fo r school system s and fa m ily b en efits - an ethnic con flict m ay p artially o verla p an in tergen eration al co n flict);
c. fo reign p o lic y (th e „s o ft” approach to the p rob lem o f Iraq o r Iran that som e European go vern m en ts p resen t tod ay arises from large grou ps o f Muslim vo ters).
A t the local level, these p rob lem s can be particu larly painful, as the im m igrants tend to gravitate to la rg er tow n s. For instance, around the y e a r 2000 4 0 % o f the Am sterdam , Rotterdam and London popu lations and 2 8 % o f the popu lation s inhabitin g Brussels and Frankfurt had fo reig n roots. Further in flow s o f im m igrants fo rm in g den sely populated areas m ay lead to residen ts o f fo reign o rigin b ec om in g the m a jo rity in sm aller a d m in istrative units129.
As far as the advantages o f the situation are concerned, the on ly ones seem to be larger popu lation livin g on the con tin en t and a b ove all the con tin en t’s m ore sizeable w ork in g-a ge popu lation , because the h opes that som e research ers express that a n e w nationality - a European - w ill d ev elo p from the g r o w in g ethnic d ive rsity - m ainly due to m ixed m a rria ges and the resu ltin g in d efin ite ethnic id en tity o f th e ir o ffsp rin g
127. Data source: http://www.czso.ez/eng/edicniplan.nsf/t/F80039F946/SFile/40320119.xls. Similar numbers can be found fo r East German Länder, w h ere the self-declared non-believers accounted fo r 63.5% at the turn o f the 1980s compared w ith 7.6% in 1950 [Therborn, 1998]
128. It w as so, because the p rop ortion o f p eople declaring them selves Christian was higher than expected (7 0 % ). Ear lier studies iden tified a much sm aller share o f Christians - the European Value Study o f 1999 found 66 % and the British Social Attitu de R eport o f 1998 53 % o f persons that considered them selves Christians. A t the same time, the percentage o f baptised babies drop ped b etw een 1991 and 2001 from 51 % to 4 5 % [UKCH Religious Trends, 2005/2006]. 129. This p rob lem can be found in the UK, w h ere p eople o f foreign origin exceed 50% in 9 areas o f the country (in large cities w ith quarter m illion populations). In the UK, all p eop le w h o previou sly resided in the C om m onw ealth territory are autom atically allow ed to vote.
- should be considered too high. Th ere are m any in dications that the non-European im m igrants and their descendants build th eir id en tity not around the secular notion o f citizenship or there bein g part o f the en tire society, but around th e ir relatives, local com m unities (enclaves o f p eo p le sharing the sam e ethnic o rig in ) and religion [Coleman, 2006: 426].
From the standpoint o f social cohesion theory, the im m igran ts' acceptance o f their acculturation that in the co n tem p o ra ry w o rld m ain ly w ork s through the school system is vital for their children b ein g easily able to adjust to the re ceivin g cou n try and fo r their chances o f success. Th e releva n t studies p o in t out that the variou s cou n tries’ school systems have d ifferen t effectiven ess in fo rm in g im m igran ts' children (e.g. S w itzerland and G erm any) and that the tim e o f parents’ arrival to the n e w cou n try as w e ll as their cou ntry o f o rigin are o f im portan ce. Generally, the o ffsp rin g o f the Europeans and Far Easterners that have re settled in the recen t years are b e tter edu cated than the receivin g societies. For o th er m igration areas the educational attainm ents are poorer, freq u en tly because o f the im m igran t paren ts’ reluctan ce o r unaw areness that th ey could ch oose better, free elem en ta ry and secon d a ry education fo r th e ir children and due to p rob lem s a risin g from such decisions (e.g. the need to b rin g the child to a b e tter school that is located in a d ifferen t part o f the to w n ). N o tw ith sta n d in g the less favou rable p osition that som e im m igrants have, the d ifferen ce b etw een the levels o f education ch aracterising the im m igran t ch ildren and the n ative children is d eclin in g in the lo n g term . T h e situation o f the im m igran t ch ildren is im p ro vin g o w in g to the b etter p e rfo rm in g eco n om ies and re la tive ly lo w levels o f u n em p loym en t in m ost European countries, and because o f th e ir parents’ g r o w in g aspirations that m a terialise as in creasin gly soph isticated edu cational strategies. T h e strategies are form u la ted based on the fin d in g that a m arket segm en t d em an din g h igh er qualification s from its potential w o r k fo rc e d iscrim in ates the descendants o f im m igran ts m o re rarely. H ow ever, the edu cational successes o f the European im m igran ts’ children are re la tive ly n e w and p o in t to e v o lv in g m o tiva tion fo r changing o n e’s place o f residence. As recen tly as 20- 30 years ago, the situation w as d ifferen t - the social status o f m ost im m igran ts was re la tive ly low, w h e re b y th e ir ch ildren ’s w e r e less edu cated than th eir n ative p e e rs 130.
T h e w estern European studies show, how ever, that the leve l o f u n em ploym en t am o n g the im m igran t popu lation s and th e ir children is usually tw ic e as high as that re co rd ed fo r the n ative popu lation, w h ile the leve l o f eco n om ic a ctivity is slightly lo w e r [Colem an, 2007].
6. C onclusion
T h e h istory o f hum ankind has n ever seen in tim es o f peace such im m en se changes as th ose that w ill shape the W estern European ethnic and religiou s structures in the com in g decades. Because o f that, som e research ers go as fa r as callin g the changes „a third d em og ra p h ic tran sition " [Colem an, 2 0 0 6 ]131.
130. W ritin g these w ord s I am p rim arily dra w in g on the papers presented at the session on im m igrants that w as held during the conference European Society o r European Societies. Euroconference on the Causes and Consequences o f Lo w Education in Contem porary Europe, Granada, 18-23 Septem ber 2004.
131. How ever, the term w as used fo r the first tim e during the m eetings o f the UN's dem ographic experts in the late 1990s to describe the coexistence o f high levels o f econom ic activity am ong w om en o f fertile age and rela tively high fe rtility levels in som e European countries (Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands). Th e phenom enon w as v ie w e d as a sym ptom o f „a third transition" enabling w o rk / life balance.
Already to d a y the fea r o f excessive shares o f im m igran t popu lation s makes som e European cou ntries pursue an ti-im m igration o r selective im m igration policies, depending h o w th ey estim ate the gra vity o f the situation. Th e ten den cies are likely to become even m o re distinct in the com in g decades, one in dication o f w hich is the slo w ly growing aw areness that m igration issues (co n c ern in g both internal and international migration) must be m ade part o f the EU’s agenda [Vignon, 2005].
It is v e r y certain that by 2 050 W estern Europe w ill red efin e - from the persp ective o f particular regio n s - its attitu de to citizen s’ rights and duties w ith resp ect to nationality and citizenship. T h e p resen t deb ate concentrates on im m igran ts’ rights, w h ile all voices p o in tin g to the rights o f the n ative popu lation s are trea ted as the m anifestation of xenophobia o r even racism. Th e future years w ill p rob a b ly w itn ess - alon g w ith the shrinking shares o f the n ative popu lation s (o r even th eir m argin alisation in som e regions) - the n ative resid en ts’ effo rts to p re serve th e ir lifestyles, languages, religion and cultural h eritage, w hich w ill in evita b ly lead to the re d efin ition o f the rights and duties that the m in o rity and m a jo rity grou ps have. In form u la tin g EU's official documents, the opin ion s o f p eo p le u nin volved in the traditional political, n orm ative and m o ra lity debates are taken into account m ore and m o re often. T h e reason is the necessity o f co n sid erin g im m igran ts’ opin ion s that are som etim es v e r y untraditional [G^sior-Niem iec, 2006].
So, w h a t w ill the W estern European so ciety be like? G yo rgy’s opin ion s [2 0 0 6 ] on the p rogressin g - also because o f the ethnic and religiou s fa ctor - social segm en tation (a b reakdow n into grou ps pu rsuing co m p le te ly d ifferen t life p ro g ra m m es) seem to be v e r y true. Th e Hungarian resea rch er b elie ves that som e reasons behind this process are the in ab ility o f the tradition al European culture to assim ilate im m igrants, its u nattractiveness and a g ro w in g n u m ber o f Europeans b elie v in g that qu ite m any im m igrants - esp ecia lly th o se com in g from the culturally d ifferen t region s o f the w o rld - are „social parasites".
Th e a rticle sh ow s that in v ie w o f the exp ected influx o f im m igran ts the con tin en t’s future w ill d ep en d on th e p ercep tio n o f m u lticu ltu rality and on the p o ssib ility o f building a sin gle identity, „u nity in d iv e rs ity ’’, d espite all differences.
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