Cracovia - Krakow, 8: 2003, 35-48
Stanislaw Z I E M I A N S K I *
POSSIBILITY — ACTUALITY — GOD
Introduction
I n „ F o r u m P h i l o s o p h i c u m " vol. 7 (2002) a paper has been p u b l i s h e d i n w h i c h J . R . Spitzer's proof for the existence of G o d has been analysed. The proof proceeded f r o m the disjunction: T h e independent B e i n g exists or does not exists T h e objective of the paper i n „ F o r u m " was to analyse the r e l a t i o n of dependence w h i c h w a s the central point to Spitzer's proof. Since i n September 2001 the second p a r t of the a m e r i c a n Jesuit's d i s q u i s i t i o n appeared i n the same periodical^, i t seems suitable to react to this new text too. S p i t z e r has presented there three n e w arguments for the existence of God: (1) f r o m the past time, (2) f r o m the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t u a l i t y a n d mere possibility a n d (3) f r o m a L o n e r g a n i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the same d i s t i n c t i o n . W h i l e he n a m e d the proofs presented i n the p a r t I m e t a p h y s i c a l , he q u a l i f i e d the proofs brought f o r w a r d i n the p a r t H as cosmological, i n v i e w of the facts belonging to i n a n i m a t e nature, s u c h as: time, space, the velocity of light, etc. w h i c h serve h i m as starting-points. It is w o r t h stressing t h a t Spitzer's method is conducive to discussion, because he adduces concrete examples, something w h i c h makes h i s m i n d more comprehensible. H a d he used some vague descriptions or general d e f i n i t i o n s , discussion w o u l d have been more d i f f i c u l t . So let us analyse the n e w proposed proofs.
* University School of Philosophy and of Education Ignatianum, Cracow; University in Trnava / Slovakia
e-mail: ziemian@jezuici.krakow.pl www.jezuici.krakow.pl/sj/ziemianski/
^ Cf R. J. Spitzer SJ, Proofs for the Existence of God, Part I: A Metaphysical Argument, in „International Philosophical Quarterly", XLI, N° 2, June 2001, p. 161-181.
1. Is it possible to prove the existence of G o d f r o m the past time?
S p i t z e r starts by a d d u c i n g the f o l l o w i n g v a l i d statement f o r m u l a t e d by D a v i d H i l b e r t : „ T h e i n f i n i t e [in the sense of 'an achieved i n f i n i t e succession' or 'an i n f i n i t e n u m b e r of definite objects i n a r e a l set or collection'] is nowhere to be f o u n d i n reality."^ W h e n r e f e r r e d to t i m e t h i s statement i m p l i e s the proposition t h a t i n f i n i t e past t i m e is impossible. F u r t h e r — S p i t z e r says — the last assertion b r i n g s us to a d m i t the necessity of the existence of G o d , C reato r of i n f i n i t e past t i m e . Spitzer's r e a s o n n i n g recalls the m e d i e v a l discussion on the eternity of the w o r l d . T h e X I H century philosophers sought to e x a m i n e w h e t h e r the views of the ancient t h i n k e r s on a n eternally e x i s t i n g w o r l d were compatible w i t h the C h r i s t i a n dogma w h i c h asserts t h a t the w o r l d has been created i n a definite moment of t i m e . It was generally k n o w n t h a t A r i s t o t l e a d m i t t e d eternal persistence of species a n d p e r p e t u a l c i r c u l a r movement, a n d t h a t nevertheless he asserted t h a t t h i s movement depends on the F i r s t u n m o v e d M o v e r (in fact as a final r a t h e r t h a n as a m o v i n g cause).
St. B o n a v e n t u r e i n h i s commentary on Peter L o m b a r d ' s Sententiae t r i e d to show t h a t i t is possible to prove t h a t the w o r l d began to exist i n a d e f i n i t e point of t i m e . T h e argument consisted i n the f o l l o w i n g series of statements: I f the w o r l d h a d h a d no beginning, there w o u l d have exist a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r of c i r c u l a r t u r n s of stars, w h i c h means t h a t the present day w o u l d have h a d before i t a n i n f i n i t e l y l o n g t i m e . B u t the next day w o u l d have h a d also j u s t as l o n g a t i m e as the f o r m e r one. Y e t between to-day a n d to-morrow there is a t i m e i n t e r v a l . That's w h y a contradiction arises w h i c h consists i n t h a t equally l o n g past t i m e precedes the t e m p o r a r i l y d i s t a n t two d i f f e r e n t days. I n order to a v o i d t h i s contradiction — B o n a v e n t u r e says — we m u s t a d m i t a first moment f r o m w h i c h we begin to count the l e n g t h of the world's t i m e . T h u s the w o r l d does not exist eternally. T h e other philosophers disagreed.
F i r s t of a l l St. A l b e r t the G r e a t argued t h i s point a n d c r i t i c i z e d t h i s type of argument. I n his commentary to the 6*^ book of A r i s t o t l e ' s
Physics, the objective of w h i c h is the c o n t i n u i t y a n d d i v i s i b i l i t y of t i m e ,
St. A l b e r t proposes the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t u a l a n d p o t e n t i a l parts. O n l y a c t u a l parts can be counted a n d s u m m e d up. Y e t t i m e possesses no a c t u a l parts. Therefore a day is not a v e r y p a r t of t i m e . Moreover,
^ On the Infinite, in: Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. by P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, Englewood Cliffs 1964, p. 151.
even i f the w o r l d h a d no b e g i n n i n g i t w o u l d be possible to get to the present day.
A s i m i l a r standpoint was h e l d by Bonaventure's contemporary, St. Thomas A q u i n a s . H e treats the problem of the world's eternity i n several books. A n d so, i n the commentary on Peter L o m b a r d ' s Liber
sententiarum he enumerates 14 reasons, u s u a l l y set f o r t h by
philos-ophers i n order to prove the world's eternity. Three of t h e m are related to time:
- Since the only r e a l is w h a t is now a n d „now" consists of the b e g i n n i n g as w e l l of the end, i t h a d always a t i m e before it. Therefore the time is eternal;
- Because „now" is a flowing r e a l i t y , i t h a d always before i t s e l f some other „now". Therefore t i m e is eternal;
- Because G o d dominates the w o r l d , b e i n g its cause, a n d because the w o r l d is a n effect of God's activity, therefore the w o r l d m u s t exist i n p a r a l e l l w i t h G o d , i.e. eternally.
T h e n he enumerates 9 reasons against the world's eternity, but only the t h i r d a n d f o u r t h of t h e m are related to time:
- A d m i t t i n g t h a t the w o r l d is eternal, a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r of days w o u l d have h a d to occur t i l l now. B u t i n f i n i t y is not realisable. Therefore the w o r l d has existed for only a finite time;
- N o t h i n g can be added to i n f i n i t y , whereas incessantly new days follow upon f o r m e r time. Therefore the n u m b e r of days w h i c h have gone by is finite. T h u s the w o r l d does not exist eternally.
St. T h o m a s is more cautious t h a n his predecessors w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h the reasons l i s t e d above a n d he makes none of t h e m h i s own. H e a f f i r m s only t h a t neither eternity nor finite d u r a t i o n of the w o r l d can be proved, because no one m a y draw conclusions f r o m the present t i m e about the moment w h e n the w o r l d arose. T h e p a s s i n g „now" can be first w i t h o u t a f o r m e r t i m e a n d can be last w i t h o u t a next time. W e can count t i m e s t a r t i n g f r o m the present „now" a n d come to no b e g i n n i n g i n the past, but also we can count f o r w a r d a n d come to no end i n the f u t u r e . W e also can a d d something to i n f i n i t y , because i f we start counting back, b e g i n n i n g w i t h 100, we have before i t a n i n f i n i t e l y great series of numbers, as m u c h as we do i f we count back b e g i n n i n g w i t h 10, t h o u g h we have before i t the same i n f i n i t e l y great number, but increased by 90.
I n St. T h o m a s ' opinion the i m p o r t a n t w a y to solve the problem is the d i s t i n c t i o n used f o r m e r l y by St. A l b e r t between a n a c t u a l i n f i n i t y a n d a potential one. O n l y G o d has actual i n f i n i t y . Y e t potential i n f i n i t y consists i n a sequence of segments, either of t i m e or movement, going
i n a f o r w a r d or b a c k w a r d d i r e c t i o n / W e f i n d a s i m i l a r w a y of t h i n k i n g i n St. T h o m a s ' Summa contra gentiles ( C G , II, 38), t h o u g h i n t h i s book A q u i n a s appears more prone to Bonaventure's point of v i e w , i.e. to the a d m i s s i o n of a f i n i t e d u r a t i o n of the world.^ I n Quaestiones disputatae St. T h o m a s s t i l l t h i n k s t h a t i t is impossible to prove either e t e r n i t y or a l i m i t e d d u r a t i o n of the world.^ A l s o i n Summa theologica (I q. 32, a. 1; q. 46, a. 2) we f i n d the same reasons f o r a n d against the eternity of the w o r l d , respectively:
- every „now" has its before a n d after; a n d the w o r l d w i t h o u t begin-n i begin-n g w o u l d have h a d to exist a begin-n i begin-n f i begin-n i t e begin-n u m b e r of days, w h i l e the a c t u a l i n f i n i t y is impossible. St. T h o m a s discusses once more the p r o b l e m of the world's eternity i n the opuscule De aeternitate mundi
contra murmurantes (Opusc. 27), but s u r p r i s i n g l y he does not deal i n i t
w i t h t i m e .
J . R . S p i t z e r f o l l o w i n g F . v a n Steenberghen^ tries to m i t i g a t e the T h o m i s t i c point of v i e w on this topic. H e asserts t h a t „ t h e v e r y concept of i n f i n i t e past time is i n t r i n s i c a l l y contradictory a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l l y p a r a d o x i c a l , a n d i t poses impossible conditions for h i s t o r y a n d a chan-g i n chan-g w o r l d order."^ H e tries to prove h i s proposition t h a t past t i m e is f i n i t e , w h i c h e v e r w o r l d we consider, a n a l y t i c a l l y , i.e. f r o m the mere m e a n i n g of words, as w e l l as m a t h e m a t i c a l l y .
I n order to prove a n a l y t i c a l l y the finiteness of past t i m e , he starts by a s k i n g f o r the m e a n i n g of: „ p a s t time". H e answers: i t means t h a t the t i m e has occurred (existed), i.e. has been achieved. O n the contrary, the f u t u r e t i m e m u s t be unachieved, since i t could not have yet occurred. T h e n a g a i n he asks how m a t t e r s s t a n d w i t h i n f i n i t y . I n f i n i t y of dependent successive parts m u s t be unachievable, for i f a n i n f i n i t e succession were achievable, there w o u l d be no w a y of a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i t f r o m a f i n i t e succession. T h u s eventually the f o r m u l a -tion: „ i n f i n i t e past t i m e " reduces to „ a c h i e v e d inachievable" w h i c h is contradictory. T h e f i n a l conclusion of this argument i s : Since the f o r m u l a t i o n : „ i n f i n i t e past t i m e " is contradictory, such a t i m e cannot occur either i n a n a c t u a l or i n whatsoever possible w o r l d .
^ Cf. A. Antweiler, Die Anfangslosigkeit der Welt nach Thomas von Aquin und Kant, Trier 1961, p. 9, 11, 22. Similar distinction was introduced by David Hilbert. He divides infinity in potential (no limit ad quem) and in actual (no limit a quo). Actual infinity leads to paradoxes, while potential infinity involves no problem.
' Ibid., p. 33. ' Ibid., p. 60, 107.
^ Cf. Le 'Processus in infinitum' dans les trois premieres 'voies' de saint Thomas, „Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia", 30 (1974), p 128.
I n the a r g u m e n t n a m e d mathematical^ S p i t z e r beginns w i t h the assertion t h a t past t i m e m u s t be constituted by constituent ( b u i l d i n g blocks) parts, e. g. seconds. The seconds i n his opinion are not m e r e l y i m a g i n a r y , but s o m e t h i n g r e a l . One cannot a r b i t r a r i l y remove t h e m , since the r e m o v a l of seconds w o u l d affect the whole of h i s t o r y a n d even cause contradictions w i t h i n h i s t o r y (e.g. somebody w o u l d be at the same t i m e l i v i n g a n d dead). „The seconds are ingredient to r e a l events. To remove the seconds f r o m r e a l events i n r e a l h i s t o r y w o u l d i m p l y r e m o v i n g a r e a l t e m p o r a l separation between events i n history. T h e f o r m e r i n v a l i d a t e s w h a t happened i n the past, w h i l e the latter produces contradictions." W e w o u l d have t e m p o r a l l y sequenced causes coincident w i t h t h e i r effects. People w o u l d be i n v a s t l y different places at one a n d the same time.^^
T i m e m u s t be, according to Spitzer, a r e a l , non-contemporaneous separator of the opposed states inherent to change. I n a s m u c h as these r e a l „Separators" f o r m a succession, they m u s t be r e a l b u i l d i n g blocks of the u n i t y of c h a n g i n g occurrences, i.e. of history. O n the other h a n d , i f the past t i m e were i n f i n i t e , a n d composed of a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r of parts, these parts could not have constituent parts because the r e m o v a l of such parts does not reduce the size of the whole. Therefore, i f one m a i n t a i n s the r e a l i t y of a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r of parts, these parts cannot be true b u i l d i n g blocks but only i m a g i n a r y or theoretical constructs. T h u s the proposition „ p a s t t i m e is i n f i n i t e " emerges as a n inherent contradiction. T h i s requires past t i m e to be f i n i t e . T h i s w o u l d not be the case for i n f i n i t e f u t u r e , for f u t u r e t i m e i m p l i e s only a potential to keep a d d i n g parts ad infinitum, w h i c h means t h a t i t does not f a l l prey to a n i n h e r e n t contradiction.
L e t us evaluate Spitzer's opinion. F i r s t of a l l we m u s t notice t h a t his a r g u m e n t a t i o n makes some u n f o u n d e d assumptions: (1) t h a t time consists of instants, (2) t h a t events are s t r i c t l y connected w i t h time, a n d (3) t h a t t i m e flows f r o m past to f u t u r e . W e w i l l e x p l a i n our objection. T i m e is s t r i c t l y connected w i t h local movement. I n m o d e r n physics t i m e is v i e w e d as one of the parameters possessed by m o m e n t u m , w h i c h w h e n correlated w i t h the other m o m e n t u m makes the k i n e t i c energy. T h i s energy was n a m e d u n f o r t u n a t e l y i n ancient times as local
' Ibid., p. 309.
J. R. Spitzer refers to his paper Definition of Real Time and Ultimate Reality, in ultimate Reality and Meaning, „Interdisciplinary Studies in the Philosophy of Understand-ing", 23 (2000) 3, (without indicating the pages).
Ibid., p. 310.
Cf. Aristotle, Physics, A 11, 219*^1; 220^24; 12, 220*^8; 14, 223^33; S 1, 251^12, etc.: „Time is a measure of movement according to succession."
movement. T i m e i t s e l f has no direction. It does not r u n . I n p h y s i c a l equations no direction of t i m e is favoured. A l l the elementary processes can go s y m m e t r i c a l l y this or the opposite w a y . „ T h e l a w s of classical d y n a m i c s a n d electromagnetism, as w e l l as of q u a n t u m mechanics, are a l l expressed by t i m e - s y m m e t r i c a l d i f f e r e n t i a l equations."^^ T h e psychological i m p r e s s i o n of „ r u n n i n g " t i m e is due to a projection of our macroscopic experiences onto the elementary phenomena, whereas the i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y of the macroscopic processes results f r o m t h e i r s t a t i s t i c a l features. W e d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m the s t a t i s t i c a l point of v i e w the microstates a n d macrostates. „ T h o u g h a n y microstate is as probable as a n y other, t h i s is not so w i t h macrostates, a n d given the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t a body is i n a macrostate A , i t is h i g h l y probable t h a t i t w i l l t u r n into a macrostate B r a t h e r t h a n vice v e r s a i f B corresponds to a n ensemble of microstates corresponding to A."^^ „We conclude t h a t microscopic phenomena have no i n t r i n s i c time-direction, at least i f t h i s can only be d e f i n e d i n r e l a t i o n to i n t e r n a l entropy increase."^^ „It is the
contents of the world, the «coUective q u a l i t y of complex Systems» t h a t
have a s y m m e t r y , not time itself."^^
T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n coincides w i t h the opinion of m a n y philosophers w h o say t h a t the local movement is a sort of q u a l i t y i n a substance. It means t h a t i t does not f a l l u n d e r the d e f i n i t i o n of change, thought of as reduction f r o m potency to act. L e t us adduce some statements on t h i s topic:
,A p u r e l y i n e r t i a l motion w o u l d not be a m o t i o n of a body, since there is no r e d u c t i o n f r o m potency to act."^^ „ I n e r t i a l m o t i o n is thought of as a state of a body, a state t h a t is a n u n c h a n g i n g state of a body, i t is equivalent to rest, for i n neither state is there a n y change."^^ T h u s the local m o t i o n is a state w h i c h is r u l e d by the p r i n c i p l e s of i n e r t i a , f o r m u l a t e d by A r i s t o t l e i n h i s Physics: „Nobody can say, w h y w h a t
J. J . Smart, entry „Time" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, t. 8, New York -London 1967, p. 130.
Ibid., p. 131.
M. S. Bartlett, Probability, Statistics and Time. A Collection of Essays. London 1975, p. 17.
S. Happel, Metaphors and Time Asymmetry, in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature. Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. R. J. Russell, N. Murphy, C. J . Isham. Vatican - Berkeley 1993, p. 108.
Th. McLaughlin, Aristotelian Mover-Causality and the Principle of Inertia, „International Philosophical Quarterly", vol. XXXVIII, June 1998, 2, p. 139.
Ibid., p. 140. Cf. also S. Ziemianski SJ, Arystotelesowska koncepcja ruchu jako punktu wyjscia dowodu kinetycznego [Aristotelian Conception of Movement as the Starting-point of a Proof of the Existence of God], „Studia Philosophiae Christianae", 5 (1969) n. 2, p. 179-197.
moves s h o u l d stop somewhere: since there is no reason, w h y i t s h o u l d stop here r a t h e r t h a n there? So, i t w i l l be at rest or necessarily w i l l move as l o n g as something more p o w e r f u l does not interfere with."^^
H a v i n g reinterpreted the concept of movement, we m u s t also reinterpret the concept of t i m e . B u t f i r s t of a l l we m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h ahistorical a n d h i s t o r i c a l time.^^ A h i s t o r i c a l t i m e is related to elemen-t a r y movemenelemen-ts. I n such a elemen-time elemen-there is no direcelemen-tion. There is only d u r a t i o n of movement. Since the velocity of whatever movement is l i m i t e d , every movement has i t s own pace. N o moment, no section of i t is privileged. I n order to measure time, we chose a r b i t r a r i l y the segments of t i m e , proper to the u n i f o r m movements, e.g. circulation of the e a r t h a r o u n d i t s axis or on the t e r r e s t r i a l orbit, a n d we m a k e of i t u n i t s of measure. W e c a n divide these segments a r b i t r a r i l y a g a i n a n d a g a i n i n s m a l l e r parts. To say that a h i s t o r i c a l time changes is nonsensi-cal. B u t i t is possible to say i t of motion. I f a k i n e t i c energy (i.e. m o m e n t u m i n a reference system) becomes a p o t e n t i a l energy state, w h i c h is a possibility of k i n e t i c energy, time disappears, because of disappearance of velocity. T h e k i n e t i c energy can be recovered, i f other, no m a t t e r h o w t i n y , k i n e t i c energy acts on the unstable e q u i l i b r i u m system. Y e t the s u m of k i n e t i c a n d potential energy i n the universe is stable.
H i s t o r i c a l t i m e is related to the changes i n the macroscopic systems. The changes occur w h e n events take place. T h e events are interferences of the p h y s i c a l objects on the different planes of aging, i.e. fields of forces. F o r example, i f a malicious boy throws a stone against a w i n d o w pane, the contact of the stone w i t h the pane is a n event, where the i n e r t i a l movement of the stone, (which is u n i t y of atoms h e l d together by the electromagnetic fields of forces), gets i n contact w i t h a pane w h i c h has a m o m e n t u m of zero-value (and is also a n u n i t y of atoms bounded b y the electromagnetic fields of forces as well). T h e difference between the m o m e n t a of both objects constitues the k i n e t i c energy. T h i s energy actuates the m o m e n t a of the p a r t i c u l a r parts of the pane, to such a degree, t h a t the i n n e r forces cannot w i t h s t a n d a n d stop the movements of particles. So the pane breaks. T h e energy disperses, w h i c h equals i n c r e a s i n g entropy. C o m i n g back to the f o r m e r state, w i t h o u t other a c t i n g undispersed energy, though theoretically possible, s t i l l i t is so improbable that i t never occurs i n the macroscopic condi-tions.
Physics, Ä 8, 215^9-22.
Cf. S. Ziemianski SJ, Czas ijego implikacje filozoficzne [Time and its philosophical Implications], „Rocznik Wydzialu Filozoficznego Towarzystwa Jezusowego w Krakowie", 1999, pp. 102-115.
O n l y on the plane of h i s t o r i c a l t i m e , where the net of relations is s i g n i f i c a n t , we can produce calendars. W e take some e x i s t e n t i a l l y i m p o r t a n t events as the points of departure of our c o u n t i n g the „ r u n n i n g " time. T h e microscopic i.e. elementary t i m e does not r u n , as before. T h e r e r e m a i n only t r a n s i t o r y events „ s t r i n g e d " on t i m e as the coral beads on a file a n d between t h e m the periods of rest stretch out, w h e n no movement exists or the i n e r t i a l one only.
I f we w a n t to save a n y t h i n g of Spitzer's proof f r o m finite past t i m e , we m u s t abandon a h i s t o r i c a l t i m e a n d take a n interest i n h i s t o r i c a l t i m e , i.e. i n the d o m a i n of c h a n g i n g entropy. T h e entropy is n o t h i n g but a m a t h e m a t i c a l representation of the relations between the sets of particles, characterized by d i f f e r e n t parameters. These relations are described i n the theory of i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h the terms of order a n d disorder, as w e l l as i n the theory of p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h the t e r m s of m a c r o - a n d microstate. T h e ordered macrostate consists i n the state where no element of a set has got a m o n g the elements of the other set. If the n u m b e r of microstates w h i c h can realize a macrostate is great, the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the macrostate w i l l be r e a l i z e d is great too. I f there is only one s u c h microstate, we have got a w e l l ordered macrostate, a n d i t is a n extreme, the least probable case. So the proof f r o m h i s t o r i c t i m e reduces into the w e l l k n o w n a r g u m e n t f r o m i n c r e a s i n g entropy. I n the first premise we state the contingent connexion of the order w i t h the particles. T h e contingency m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n the fact of spontaneously decreasing order. I n the second premise the p r i n c i p l e of s u f f i c i e n t reason is a p p l i e d . W h a t is contingently connected w i t h a subject does not r e s u l t f r o m i t . Therefore there m u s t be a n e x t e r n a l reason f o r the connexion. I n a case of a series of subordinate reasons, s u c h a series cannot be i n f i n i t e , because even a n i n f i n i t e series of subordinate facts cannot become by i t s e l f independent. So, unless we act i r r a t i o n a l l y , we m u s t assume the first ontic i m m a t e r i a l reason of the s t i l l e x i s t i n g order i n the w o r l d . T h i s reason is i d e n t i c a l w i t h the Creator, who caused before a dozen or so billions years the c o m i n g into existence of the w o r l d i n a s i n g u l a r state of n e a r l y zero v o l u m e , w i t h n e a r l y i n f i n i t e density a n d temperature. T h e universe was t h e n composed exclusively of energy w h i c h „ b u r s t s " . B e i n g g r a d u a l l y cooled the energy has allowed the b r e a k d o w n of its p r i m i t i v e s y m m e t r y a n d the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the h i d d e n planes of forces. T h e n the possibility of o r i g i n a t i n g m a t e r i a l particles appeared. M a t t e r being u n i f o r m l y d i s t r i b u t e d gave the p o s s i b i l i t y of g r a v i t a t i o n a l condensation. G r a v i t a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l energy was t r a n s f o r m e d into k i n e t i c energy, characterized t h e n by m i n i m a l entropy. N e w l y , i t has been proved t h a t this scenario cannot be p l a y e d twice. I n this sense h i s t o r i c a l t i m e is d e f i n i t e l y past t i m e . T h e cosmo-logical calendar has its starting-point a n d the direction of its t i m e is
determined by the grades of density as w e l l as by the size of the volume of the universe. T h e greater volume a n d the s m a l l e r density, the older is the w o r l d . I f the direction of the world's evolution were reversed, i.e. i f its volume contracted a n d the density grew, i t w o u l d m e a n t h a t h i s t o r i c a l time h a d reversed too. B u t i t is v e r y improbable.Yet since r e a l time is a h i s t o r i c a l t i m e , w h i c h has neither f u t u r e nor past, Spitzer's w a r n i n g against exchanging past time for the f u t u r e time a n d vice versa the f u t u r e f o r the past, as w e l l as against i d e n t i f y i n g t h e m is nonsensi-cal.^^
2. G o d as a cause w h i c h actualizes potency The second of Spitzer's proofs has five steps:
I. A cause is necessary for the emergence of a n a c t u a l state of a f f a i s f r o m a v i r t u a l i n f i n i t y of e q u a l l y logically possible states of a f f a i r s .
II. A n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r of causes cannot have been achieved a n d therefore cannot g r o u n d the emergence of actual states of a f f a i r s f r o m a v i r t u a l l y i n f i n i t e range of merely possible ones.
III. The F i r s t C a u s e of the emergence of a c t u a l i t y out of mere possibility cannot have any i n t r i n s i c restriction (i.e. m u s t be absolutely simple).
I V . The absolutely simple F i r s t Cause m u s t be absolutely unique. V . The one absolutely simple F i r s t Cause is the u l t i m a t e cause of a l l a c t u a l states of a f f a i r s .
S p i t z e r i l l u s t r a t e s his proof w i t h some exemplary facts, w h i c h are the starting-points of argumentation. T h e constant c (the velocity of l i g h t i n vacuum) is a n a c t u a l pervasive, controlling factor i n a l l aspects of energy a n d m o m e n t u m i n the universe. T h e question is: W h y is one equally logically possible v a l u e actual, a n d the other v i r t u a l i n f i n i t y of equally logically possible values m e r e l y possible?
The causes can come i n m a n y forms: the parameters of a n electro-magnetic f i e l d , the geometry of space-time, the m o m e n t u m a n d position f r o m a previous moment, the peculiar dynamics w i t h i n a q u a n t u m system, a n d even the i n t e n t i o n of h u m a n beings. Ever3rwhere there is a selection of one v a l u e f r o m the m a n y possible. „ D e t e r m i n i n g realities can be structures, positions, fields, u n i v e r s a l constants, interactions, i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , space-time coordinate structures, h u m a n intentions, a n d so f o r t h . " T h e universe w o u l d be a collection of possibilities, i f i t were not for causes w h i c h elevate one logically possible state of a f f a i r s
Cf. Proofs for the Existence of God..., p. 311. 2' Ibid., p. 314.
over the rest of its e q u a l l y possible alternatives. A n example of s u c h a n elevation is a n electron w h i c h has t a k e n a specific p o s i t i o n (x,y,z) a r o u n d the nucleus of a n atom. T h e r e are billions of other e q u a l l y logically possible positions, w h i c h could have been actualized. T h e r e a l d e t e r m i n i n g r e a l i t y w h i c h caused its p a r t i c u l a r position, is the l a w s of physics or the presence of other electromagnetic fields i n the area.
A question arises at t h i s point. S p i t z e r enumerates together at one s i t t i n g things belonging to the d i f f e r e n t categories. It m a y be w e l l to set t h e m i n order. T h u s the fields of forces count as the classical f o r m a l causes, w h i c h stabilize a system.^^ T h e forces bond the parts into atoms, atoms into molecules, celestial bodies into galaxies a n d clusters of galaxies, whereas impetus or m o m e n t u m are d y n a m i c causes w h i c h d i s t u r b the fields of forces. T h e space between the parts of the w o r l d owes its existence to the m o m e n t a (or k i n e t i c energy).
Spitzer's r e a s o n i n g r e m i n d s us of t h a t of G . W . L e i b n i z a n d of J , K . D o r d a S J . D o r d a presented h i s proof i n the Study quoted i n the footnote 23 above. L e i b n i z f o r m u l a t e d a proof f r o m contingency for the existence of G o d i n h i s Theodicy. C o n t i n g e n c y of a b e i n g is thought there as a n a d m i s s i b i l i t y of its d i f f e r e n t states. L e i b n i z ' s opinion is t e s t i f i e d at least by a texte such as the following: „God is the f i r s t reason of a l l t h i n g s , because these, l i m i t e d as a l l t h a t we see, are contingent a n d have n o t h i n g i n themselves w h i c h w o u l d m a k e t h e i r existence necessary. It is evident t h a t t i m e , space a n d matter, compact, homogenous a n d i n d i f f e r e n t to a l l circumstances could have h a d other movements a n d f o r m s a n d have been ordered otherwise.^^ L e i b n i z adds: „ 0 f course a l l e x i s t i n g things emanate incessantly j u s t f r o m t h i s source. T h e y are a n d were h i s creatures, because i t is impossible to u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h i s r a t h e r t h a n another state of the w o r l d , to-day t h a n to-morrow one, s h o u l d proceed f r o m the w o r l d alone."^^ I n the second letter to S a m u e l C l a r k L e i b n i z w r i t e s : „ N o t h i n g n a m e l y occurs w i t h o u t some reason, o w i n g to w h i c h something occurs r a t h e r this t h a n other way."^^
Cf., J. K. Dorda SJ, Studium o przyczynowosci sprawczej z zastosowaniami w kos-mologii i w teodycei, [Study of Efficient Causality as Applied to Cosmology and Natural Theology], Cracow 2001, pp. 171, 262, 270, 359, 362.
Theodicee. Essais sur la honte de Dieu, la liberte de I'homme et Vorigine du mal. I, n. 7, in Oeuvres philosophiques de Leibniz avec une introduction et des notes par M. Paul Janet. Paris 1866, vol. II, p. 104. Cf. Reflexions sur Vouvrage que M. Hobbes a public..., n. 5, ibid., p. 429; Monadologie, ibid., p. 599.
De Vorigine radicale des choses, ibid., p. 550; Principes de la nature et de la grace fondes en raison, n. 7, ibid., p. 612; n. 10, ibid, p. 613; Monadologie, n.33, ibid., p. 599.
Letter to Samuel Clarke, y. 1715/16, in Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz , ed. C. J. Gerhardt. Leipzig 1931, vol. VII, p. 356: „C'est que rien n'arrive, sans qu'il y ait une raison pourquoy cela soit ainsi plutost qu'autrement."
D o r d a has reinterpreted the classical concepts of potency a n d act i n the terms of sets a n d t h e i r elements. I n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n potency (possibility) takes place w h e n a subject is ascribed to a n o n- unit a ry set, w h i l e act takes place w h e n a subject is ascribed to a n element i n the set. D o r d a uses V a n der W a a l s ' equation of state for perfect gases to i l l u s t r a t e his suggested d e f i n i t i o n of causal influence: (P + aA^^).(V-b) = R ' . T , where P signifies pressure, T temperature, V volume, a , b , R -constants. T h e three v a r i a b l e parameters P , V , T represent three sets of specific n u m e r i c a l values w h i c h determine the gas' potentiality i n a threefold range of specific values. E a c h specific value, a n element of a p a r t i c u l a r set, is one of the possible acts of pressure, volume or temperature. E v e n t u a l l y , a p p l y i n g the concepts elaborated he describes causal influence as the a t t r i b u t i o n of a specific value to general independent variables.^^ D o r d a formulates s i m i l a r l y the p r i n c i p l e of causality: „If a subject S is ascribed to a n element of a non -u n it ar y set, t h e n there is something ( C ) different f r o m a subject (S) w h i c h selects this element e x c l u d i n g the other elements of the set." T h e same principle f o r m a l i z e d looks as: a.(a | b) D [~ ( C z) ~ C ) D C].^^
H a v i n g a r r i v e d at the conclusion t h a t G o d , the F i r s t Cause, exists. Spitzer deduces h i s attributes. T h i s Cause m u s t be absolutely simple. It results f r o m the fact t h a t a l l l i m i t e d beings stand i n opposition to the i n n u m e r a b l e possibilities or alternatives, w h i l e the F i r s t Cause is unique. It cannot be l i m i t e d i n a n y way, neither externally nor i n t r i n s i c a l l y . T h i s opinion agrees w i t h St. Thomas' doctrine on G o d as pure act, whose essence is existence. A t the same time, i n this concep-tion G o d appears as absolutely transcendent. Since he cannot be q u a l i f i e d or described, we m u s t use, to grasp his nature, so-called negative theology. T h i s art of theology has a long-lasting C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n . T h u s the n a t u r e of G o d can be expressed as follows: „It is p u r e l y i n c l u s i v e , pure being (power) w h i c h is not conditionned by a n y t h i n g a l l o w i n g for restriction, p a r t i a l i t y , q u a n t i f i c a t i o n , or q u a l i f i c a -tion."^^
I n the t h i r d section of his paper S p i t z e r presents a s i m i l a r proof, but i n a new garb. H e refers here to B . Lonergan's philosophy. Its i m p o r t a n t element is a s k i n g „Why?". I n fact the proof i n this section d i f f e r s only s u p e r f i c i a l l y f r o m t h a t i n the former. The difference consists i n the style: T h e first proof was f o r m u l a t e d directly i n the a f f i r m a t i v e sentences. T h e second one was f o r m u l a t e d i n the context of a s k i n g
Studium o przyczynowosci..., pp. 208-214. Ibid., p. 226.
„Why?". T h i s conception r e m i n d s us of some elements i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n method of science. A r i s t o t l e uses the f o r m u l a 5iöc i t w h i c h s i g n i f i e s either the question „ W h y ? " or the answer „ t h e r e f o r e " . T h u s Spitzer's a r g u m e n t goes: Since the continuous questioning, even i f i n f i n i t e l y repeated, does not b r i n g us closer to a n answer, there m u s t be a n originative answer to the question „Why?", because a f i n i t e , dependent series m u s t begin at some point." [...] „ T h e originative [...] a n s w e r to the question „ W h y ? " m u s t be ontologically grounded i n a n i n t r i n s i c a l l y a n d e x t r i n s i c a l l y u n r e s t r i c t e d reality", w h i c h is the F i r s t Cause.^°
R e c a p i t u l a t i o n
A s m a y be seen f r o m the above presentation, w h i l e the a r g u m e n t a -t i o n i n -the f i r s -t sec-tion of Spi-tzer's paper (par-t II) demands correc-tion, the proof i n the second a n d t h i r d section arouses no doubts.
Moreover, i t r e m i n d s us of St. T h o m a s ' „ q u a r t a v i a " f o r m u l a t e d i n the Summa theologica, q. I, s. 3 „ as w e l l as the proofs presented here a n d there i n the Summa contra gentiles a n d i n De potentia. A q u i n a s says t h a t i f some factors are d i s t r i b u t e d between d i f f e r e n t subjects, they do not belong to t h e m necessarily. Therefore they d e m a n d existence of the u n i q u e common cause w h i c h s h o u l d have these factors w i t h i n i t s e l f i n the highest a n d absolute grade. T h e most i n t e r e s t i n g element i n Spitzer's proof is the reasoning a r g u i n g t h a t the F i r s t C a u s e m u s t be u n i q u e , simple a n d completely t r a n s p a r e n t to itself.
It w o u l d be h e l p f u l , i n order to examine the methodological correct-ness of reasoning, to e x p l a i n more penetratingly w h a t is m e a n t by „a m e t a p h y s i c a l " proof (part I) as opposed to „a cosmological" one (part II), There is s t i l l a controvertible problem: i f a n d how f a r we can a p p l y the d a t a specific to the sciences, to the proofs for the existence of G o d , to the proofs w h i c h on p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d be done w i t h i n metaphysics.^^ It seems t h a t the f o l l o w i n g procedure is right: It is pe rm issib le to t a k e as the starting-point of m e t a p h y s i c a l arguments for the existence of G o d
Ibid., p. 326.
Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, Le probleme philosophique de Vexistence de Dieu, „Revue Philosophique de Louvain", vol. 45, 5, Fevrier 1947, p. 5-10; N° 8, Novembre 1947, p. 301-313. He maintains that only the metaphysical argument from the finite being is reasonnable. The same F. van Steenberghen presenting in the paper: La physiqe moderne et Vexistence de Dieu, „Revue Philosophique de Louvain", vol. 46, N° 11, Aoüt 1948 opinion of M. Whittakker, states that this philosophizing physicist is very doubtful, if it is possible to convince the majority of to-day people by means of the proofs for the existence of God, without reference to the sciences. Cf. also S. Kowalczyk, Filozofia Boga [Philosophy of God], Lublin 1993, p. 81-82; S. Ziemianski SJ, Teologia naturalna, Filozoficznaprohlema-tyka Boga, [Natural theology. Philosophical Problems of God], Krakow 1995, p. 135.
the facts recognized i n scientific i n q u i r y , on condition that one presents t h e m i n a philosophical guise. The philosophical approach to scientific d a t a consists i n t r e a t i n g the phenomena not only as f o r m u l a t e d i n m a t h e m a t i c a l equations, but i n s t a t i n g t h e i r existence i n the r e a l i t y expressed by these equations. T h u s p h y s i c a l laws i n a philosophical guise not only are related to our sense-data, described by subject-predicate sentences, but s h o u l d also be interpreted as the expression of the e x i s t i n g r e a l i t y composed of substances a n d accidents a n d a f f i r m e d i n existential propositions. The m e t a p h y s i c a l principles, such as ontologically f o r m u l a t e d p r i n c i p l e of sufficient reason or p r i n c i p l e of efficient causality, w o u l d refer to a r e a l i t y conceived i n j u s t this way.
W h a t r e m a i n s is to solve the problem: w h i c h facts are self-evident a n d p l a i n , a n d w h i c h demand a n ontological explanation. B e y o n d dispute, the contingent connection of factors w i t h i n the beings of this w o r l d demands the existence of a n external reason for t h e m . B u t are we allowed to look for such a reason for the o r d i n a r y facts w h i c h do not m a n i f e s t i n themselves any contingency? A s we have seen. Spitzer as w e l l as two other philosophers mentioned, L e i b n i z a n d D o r d a , seem not to d i s t i n g u i s h these two k i n d s of facts. S t i l l d i s q u i e t i n g is the problem of reasonability of the question asked by W . G . L e i b n i z a n d echoed by M . Heidegger: „ W h y there exists something r a t h e r t h a n nothing?" L e i b n i z proved the p r i o r i t y of being faced w i t h nothing, s a y i n g that „ n o t h i n g is s i m p l e r a n d easier t h a n something" a n d Heidegger agrees w i t h him.^^ I f this argument is right, Spitzer's proof is r i g h t too. B u t i f L e i b n i z ' a n d Heidegger's reasoning were wrong, a n d i n fact i t seems to be a p a r a l o g i s m , Spitzer's proofs presented i n h i s two sections of
Proofs for the Existence of God, part II w o u l d leave m u c h to be desired.
T h e final conclusion is the following: It is good that philosophers t r y to clear the paths i n metaphysics, i n order to get at the A b s o l u t e . A n d even though these paths are not quite right, but r a t h e r devious, none the less they are somehow u s e f u l , because they s t i m u l a t e other philosophers to define more accurately t h e i r concepts a n d to be practised i n finding the proper threads w h i c h l e a d us out t h r o u g h the l a b y r i n t h s of h u m a n t h i n k i n g . A n d this is, one w a y or another, a g a i n .
G.W. Leibniz, Kleinere philosophische Schriften. Mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen deutsch herausgegeben von R. Habs. Leipzig 1883, p. 143; M. Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik? Frankfurt am Main 1949, n. 381 and 383, p. 42: „Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?"
M O Z L I W O S C — A K T U A L N O S C — B O G Streszezenie
O k a z j ^ do n a p i s a n i a tego a r t y k u l u bylo opublikowanie przez J . R . S p i t z e r a I L cz^sci jego r o z p r a w k i pt.: Proofs for the Existence of God w: „ I n t e r n a t i o n a l P h i l o s o p h i c a l Quarterly", t. X L I , n r 2, w czerwcu 2001 r. T r e s c i ^ tej r o z p r a w y s^ t r z y nowe a r g u m e n t y z a i s t n i e n i e m B o g a : (1) z czasu minionego, (2) z odroznienia czystej mozliwosci i a k t u a l n o s c i , (3) z tego samego odroznienia w u j ^ c i u B e r n a r d a L o n e r g a n a .
A u t o r obecnego a r t y k u l u p r z e d s t a w i a w 1. punkcie h i s t o r i c srednio-wiecznego sporu o odwieczne istnienie s w i a t a , aby n a t y m tie u k a z a c pogl^dy S p i t z e r a . S w . B o n a w e n t u r a jest w o w y m sporze z a czasowym p o c z ^ t k i e m , s w i ^ c i A l b e r t W i e l k i i Tomasz z A k w i n u t w i e r d z ^ , ze nie m o z n a w y k l u c z y c odwiecznosci s w i a t a . P o n i e w a z S p i t z e r opowiada s i ^ z a s t a n o w i s k i e m sw. B o n a w e n t u r y , autor p o d j ^ l s i ^ z a d a n i a r o z s t r z y g -n i ^ c i a sporu z a pomoca^ odpowied-nich argume-ntow. G l o w -n ^ r a c j ^ , j a k a p r z e m a w i a przeciwko s t a n o w i s k u f i n i t y s t y c z n e m u , jest zakwestionowa-nie zalozen, z a j a k i c h s i ^ ono opiera. A u t o r odroznia d w a u j ^ c i a czasu: ahistoryczne i historyczne. C z a s w u j ^ c i u a h i s t o r y c z n y m , r o z p a t r y w a n y n a poziomie procesow elementarnych, szczegolnie n a poziomie m i k r o s k o -p o w y m , nie i m -p l i k u j e s a m z siebie -podziatu n a -przeszlosc, terazniejszosc i przyszlosc. J e d y n i e n a poziomie m a k r o s k o p o w y m u z y s k u j e cech^ h i -storycznosci. T y m s a m y m t r a c i sens zalozenie o „ p l y n i ^ c i u " czasu i i s t n i e n i u skohczonego czasu przeszlego.
W 2. p u n k c i e autor o m a w i a a r g u m e n t S p i t z e r a z a k t u a l i z o w a n i a mozliwosci. Dostrzega p r z y t y m podobiehstwo m i ^ d z y t y m a r g u m e n t e m a u j ^ c i e m W . G . L e i b n i z a i J . D o r d y . U w s z y s t k i c h t y c h t r z e c h filozoföw dowodzi s i ^ i s t n i e n i a B o g a n a drodze p o s z u k i w a n i a r a c j i dostatecznej d l a p r z e p r o w a d z e n i a bytow z w a c h l a r z a mozliwosci do konkretnego i s t n i e n i a . J e s l i t a k i c h r a c j i jest wi^cej, to w y m a g a n a jest ostatecznie j e d n a p r z y c z y n a p i e r w s z a , k t o r a nie moze byc ograniczona a n i we-w n ^ t r z n i e , a n i zewe-wn^trznie. W t r z e c i m o d c i n k u swe-wej r o z p r a we-w k i S p i t z e r o m o w i l w a r i a n t powyzszej a r g u m e n t a c j i w koncepcji B . L o n e r g a n a . C h o -ciaz B . L o n e r g a n posluguje s i ^ ci^gle s t y l i s t y k ^ p y t a h , to j e d n a k jego koncepcja i m p l i c i t e z a w i e r a odniesienie do odpowiedzi n a nie. B o g jest w t y m w a r i a n c i e a r g u m e n t u zrodlowa^ odpowiedzia^ n a pytanie „dlacze-go?".
A u t o r w Podsumowaniu w s k a z u j e n a potrzeb^ blizszego w j r j a s n i e n i a roznicy m i ^ d z y a r g u m e n t a c j i m e t a f i z y c z n ^ a kosmologiczn^, rozstrzyg-n i ^ c i a sporu o stosurozstrzyg-nek m e t a f i z y k i do rozstrzyg-n a u k p r z y r o d rozstrzyg-n i c z y c h , oraz ustale-n i a k r y t e r i o w oddzielaje^cych f a k t y , ktore ustale-nie potrzebujg^ w y j a s ustale-n i e ustale-n i a od t y c h , ktore w y j a s n i e n i a s i ^ domagajg^.
