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Vertical Integration in Poland in the First Stage of Economic Reform (Empirical Analysis)

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A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S |________________ FOLIA OECONOMICA 85, 19B8____________________

E l ż b i e t a Guzek*

VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN POLAND IN THŕ FIR ST STAGE OF ECONOMIC REFORM

( E m p i r i c a l A n a l y s i s )

1. I n t r o d u c t i o n

Due to the h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d economic management system opera­ t i n g in Poland t i l l the e a r l y e i g h t i e s companies had l i t t l e f r e e ­ dom to form t h e i r own m ark eting c h a n n e ls . D e c i s i o n s c o n c e rn in g d i s ­ t r i b u t i o n as w e l l as those in o t h e r a re a s of the n a t i o n a l economy ( e . g . p r o d u c t io n , p r i c i n g ) were made m a in ly in an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e way. The C en tre was shapin g the market s t r u c t u r e - d e c id in g about e s t a b lis h m e n t or l i q u i d a t i o n of companies, t h e i r s i z e , t h e i r e q u ip ­ ment w it h f a c t o r s of p r o d u c tio n as w e l l as scope and forms of their a c t i v i t y . In many c a s e s , the C en tre would a l s o d eterm in e t i e s of a g iv e n company w it h i t s s u p p l i e r s and b u y e rs . S tro n g c e n t r a l i z a ­ t i o n of management accompanied by r e s t r i c t i o n of s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n p r o c e s s e s in the economy ( r e s t r i c t e d o p e r a t i o n of the market me­ chanism, absence of c o m p e t i t i o n ) le d a l s o . t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e monopo­ l i z a t i o n and u n i f i c a t i o n of market s t r u c t u r e and c o n t r i b u t e d to c r e a t i o n of deep d i s p r o p o r t i o n s between sup p ly and demand. In these c o n d i t i o n s development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n based on h o r i z o n t a l l i n k s between companies was p ro c e ed in g v a ry s l o w l y . D e s p ite numerous p o s t u l a t e s aim ing a t c r e a t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s t h a t would be f a v o u r ­ a b le fo r development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n in the P o l i s h m arket, and e s p e c i a l l y a t expanding c o o p e r a t io n between i n d u s t r y arid tra d e as w e ll as d i f f e r e n t con ce p ts of im proving the p r e v i o u s i n t e g r a ­ t i o n forms ( e ; g. [ 5 ] , [ l O ] , [ ć ] ) n o n i n t e g r a t e d c h a n n e ls h e ld a do­ minant p o s i t i o n in the market of t h i s p e r i o d .

* Dr, a s s i s t a n t p r o f e s s o r , I n s t i t u t e of M a r k e t in g , U n i v e r s i t v of Lúdt ( P o l a n d ) .

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Assumptions of the economic reform and the adopted l e g a l a c t s i n c l u d i n g Act on s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e s from November 25, 1981 o u t l i n e d new p r i n c i p l e s along which economic u n i t s were to f u n c t i o n . These r e g u l a t i o n s r e s t r i c t e d c e n t r a l i z e d management of the economy in fa v o u r of g r e a t e r autonomy g ran ted tp companies in the f i e l d of d i s t r i b u t i o n , p r o d u c t i o n , a n d ' p r i c e s . In the d i s t r i b u t i o n sp he re , t h e re was e n v is a g e d a g r e a t e r freedom in chouaing p a r t n e r s in trade exchange or t i e s between companies. P a r a l l u l l y , a p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g was in tr o d u c e d .

The aim of t h i s paper i s to a n a ly z e changes o c c u r r i n g in i n ­ t e g r a t i o n between ch an nel members in the f i r s t sta g e of the econo­ mic reform . The i n i t i a l h y p o th e s is was t h a t owing to i n t r o d u c t i o n of the economic reform , companies o b ta in e d f a v o u r a b le c o n d i t i o n s f o r accomplishment of t h e i r own s t r a t e g i c and s h o rt- te rm market o b j e c t i v e s . In the a re a o f . d i s t r i b u t i o n , th e se c o n d i t i o n s should le a d to development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n 1. The number of v e r t i ­ c a l l y i n t e g r a t e d m a rk eting c h a n n e ls , p a r t i c u l a r l y o f the c o n t r a ­ c t u a l ones should be growing and t h e i r forms should be more and more d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . S i m i l a r l y , companies should be d i s p l a y i n g t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to embark upon i n n o v a t i o n s " i n the f i e l d of v e r ­ t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n .

2. Research Method

/

The p re s e n te d s t u d i e s on i n t e g r a t i o n p ro c e s s e s were c a r r i e d out w i t h i n a w id e r r e s e a r c h programme c o n c e rn in g o p e r a t i o n o f

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p a n i c s in the f i r s t p e r io d of the economic reform . There were a p p l i e d two r e s e a r c h methods. In the f i r s t p e r i o d , t h e r e were used q u e s t i o n n a i r e s u r v e y s . The q u e s t i o n n a i r e s were f i l l e d in the pro-' sence of the i n t e r v i e w e r , what a llo w e d to reduce the r i s k of misun­ d e r s t a n d in g of q u e s ti o n s and t h a t o f p a s s in g q u e s t i o n n a i r e s to

1 V e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n e n a b le s tne im p lem en tation of long-and s h o rt- te rm o b j e c t i v e s of companies, e . g . improvement of t h e i r po­ s i t i o n on the m a rk et, growth of t h e i r a d a p t a b i l i t y to c o n d i t i o n s of the environm ent or r e d u c t i o n of p r o d u c tio n and d i s t r i b u t i o n c o s t s .

2

These s t u d i e s were c a r r i e d out by the Department of M a rk e tin g a t Łódź U n i v e r s i t y . B e s id e s the d i s t r i b u t i o n s p h e re , tltey c o n c e r ­ ned among o t h e r s fo rm a tio n of p r o d u c e r s ' a s s o c i a t i o n s , autonomy of companies in the f i e l d of p r o d u c tio n and p r i c i n g , f i n a n c i a l system of companies, e t c .

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incompetent person s. In the second p e r i o d , i . e . a f t e r d l l r e s u l t s had been c o l l e c t e d and c o n c lu s i o n s drawn, t h e r e were conducted i n ­ t e r v i e w s w it h management o f companies under s u r v e y ,

The s t u d i e s encompassed 9 companies m a nu fa cturing consumer goods and 4 r e t a i l i n g companies in the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o v in c e of l ó d ž . I he sample in c lu d e d both b ig and s m a l l e r s t a t e p rod uc ers (5

of them have a l a r g e sha re in the dom estic m ark et) r e p r e s e n t i n g the f o l l o w i n g i n d u s t r i e s : t e x t i l e in d u s t r y ( c l o t h i n g , k n i t t e d goods, and c a r p e t s ) ; c h em ical In d u s t r y ( c o s m e t i c s ) ; p h a rm a c e u tic a l i n d u s t r y and food in d u s t r y ( f r o z e n foods and c o n f e c t i o n e r y ) . The r e ­ t a i l e r s were b ig s t a t e owned or c o - o p e r a t i v e companies. They were s p e c i a l i z i n g in the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f : household equipment, t e l e v i ­ s io n and r a d i o s e t s , p h o to g ra p h ic goods, t e x t i l e s , f u r and l e a t h e r p r o d u c ts , s p o r t s equipment, toys and paper p r o d u c ts . A l t o g e t h e r th e re were c o l l e c t e d 27 q u e s t i o n n a i r e s - I I from producers ( J que­ s t i o n n a i r e s were f i l l e d in 3 s e l f - g o v e r n i n g e s t a b lis h m e n t s of a b ig company) and 16 from r e t a i l e r s ( I in the b ig g e s t department store in Łddź and 1 In each of the 15 departments o f 3 l a r g e s t a t e r e ­ t a i l i n g companies o p e r a t i n g autonomously and s p e c i a l i z i n g in the d i s t r i b u t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r p r o d u c t s ) . The same number - 27 i n t e r ­ view s were a ls o ta k e n . Out of 56 q u e s tio n s In c lu d e d in the que­ s t i o n n a i r e fo r p r o d u c e r s , 20 were d i r e c t l y p e r t a i n i n g to v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . For tra d e companies the a p p r o p r i a t e numbers were: 42 and 16. There were used both c lo s e d and open q u e s t i o n s . The i n t e r ­ v iew s were, to a b ig e x t e n t , f o r m a l i z e d , so t h a t the same que­ s t i o n s c o u ld be asked in a l l companies.

As the performed s t u d i e s concerned o n ly one a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o v i n c e of Poland and encompassed a r a t h e r згоа11 number of com­ p a n i e s , they should be t r e a t e d as m ainly p rob in g ones. They g i v e the o u t l i n e of changes, t h a t took p la c e In v e r t i c a l I n t e g r a t i o n In the f i r s t sta g e of the economic reform . Y e t , when we tak e i n t o account the f a c t t h a t o t h e r companies were o p e r a t i n g in s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n s then the r e s u l t s of these ^studies can be a l s o , to some e x t e n t , g e n e r a l i z e d .

3. R e se arch F i n d i ngs

The performed s t u d i e s d id not c o n firm the h y p o th e s is t h a t d u r ­ ing the f i r s t s ta g e o f the economic reform t h e r e were c r e a t e d f a ­ v o u ra b le c o n d i t i o n s f o r development of v e r t i c a l I n t e g r a t i o n . The

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main b a r r i e r s , which had been r e s t r i c t i n g t i e s between companies h i t h e r t o , were not e l i m i n a t e d .- C o n tr a r y to assumptions of the r e ­ form, the d i s t r i b u t i o n s e c t o r c o n tin u e d to be s t i l l , to a l a r g e .e x te n t, r e g u la t e d by the C e n tr e . In the case of p r o d u c e r s , most of them ob ta in e d g r e a t e r autonomy in the sphere of p r i c e s and p r o ­ d u c tio n as w e l l as o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , employment and s a l a ­ r i e s . Y e t , they s t i l l had no or v e ry l i t t l e freedom in d e c id in g about i n t e g r a t i o n w it h o t h e r companies (7 producers out of 1 1 ), es- t a b i s h i n g of t h e i r own companies (8 p r o d u c e r s ) or choosing t h e i r t r a d e p a r t n e r s (4 p r o d u c e r s ) ( s e e e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t 4 and 6 ) . In r e t a i l i n g the s i t u a t i o n was even worse. S t a t e companies were t ę a v e ry b ig e x te n t dependent on d e c i s i o n s of c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 15 out o f 16 r e t a i l e r s s t a t e d t h a t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n of p r o ­ d u cts in tra d e s e c t o r was the same or b ig g e r than in ithe p e rio d b e fo re the reform - ( s e e e n c lo s u r e 2, p o in t 3 ) . They had no or v e ry l i t t l e freedom in d e c i s i o n - t a k i n g co n c e rn in g i n t e g r a t i o n w it h o th e r companies (10 out o f 16 r e t a i l e r s ) , e s t a b lis h m e n t o f t h e i r companies (11 r e t a i l e r s ) and s e l e c t i o n of market t e r r i t o r y (10 r e t a i l e r s ) , market segments (9 r e t a i l e r s ) and t h e i r s u p p l i e r s (6 r e t a i l e r s ) - (s e e e n c lo u s e 2 p o i n t 4 and 5 ) . Some r e a t i l e r s ' had a l s o no or v e ry l i t t l e autonomy in f i x i n g p r i c e s (3 r e t a i l compa­ n i e s ) , choosing p r o d u c t s ' a ssortm ent (5 r e t a i l e r s ) and tte fi n in g t h p i r tra d e a c t i v i t i e s (5 r e t a i l e r s ) - ( s e e e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 4 ) .

L i m i t e d r e s t r i c t i o n of the command-type management of d i s t r i ­ b u tio n s e c t o r was due m a inly to the i n t r o d u c t i o n , in c o n d i t i o n s of deep s h o r t a g e s , of government programmes ( t h e s o - c a l l e d " o p e r a t i o ­ n a l programmes") and c r e a t i o n of economio u n i t s charged w ith fu n ­ c t i o n s o f compulsory middlemen in tra d e in b a s i c raw m a t e r i a l s and i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c ts . P r o d u c e r s in c lu d e d i n t o these programmes were a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y equipped w it h n e c e s s a r y raw m a t e r i a l s and o t h e r p r o d u c ts .

S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , the d i r e c t i o n s of p r o d u c tio n and the d i s t r i b u ­ t i o n of t h e i r p ro d u c ts were determined by the C e n tr e . In such a s i t u a t i o n , companies t h a t were e n t i r e l y encompassed by o p e r a t i o n a l programmes had no o r l i t t l e autonomy in fo rm a tio n of t h e i r own m a rk eting c h a n n e ls . In some ca s es ( e . g . the p r o d u c tio n of c h i l ­ d r e n ' s c l o t h e s ) they got even l e s s freedom than they had in the p r e v i o u s p e r i o d . The C en tre was a l s o d e te rm in in g what sha re of goods turned out by p rod uc ers co u ld be s o ld in t h e i r own s t o r e s .

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Although i n t r o d u c t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n of p ro d u c ts is o f t e n n e c e s s a ry in c o n d i t i o n s of deep c r i s i s - in t h i s way the Cen­ t r e ensured p r o d u c tio n of goods being of p rim a ry im portance for the s o c i e t y and s a feg uard ed the o p e r a tio n of s p e c i a l i z e d tra d e com­ p a n ie s in the market ( t h e output of some prod uc ers was so sm all t h a t they co u ld s e l l i t in t h e i r own s t o r e s ) , these measures produ­ ced a l s o n e g a t i v e consequences. They not o n ly curbed development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n between companies in c lu d e d i n t o o p e r a t i o ­ n al programmes but a l s o between the rem aining market p a r t i c i p a n t s . O p e r a t io n a l programmes in c lu d e d a l l economic u n i t s of c r u c i a l im­ p o rta n c e to the c o u n t r y ' s economy. In the s i t u a t i o n of deep s h o r ­ tages and o t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s imposed by the C e n tr e , the rem ain ing companies had t h e r e f o r e v e r y r e s t r i c t e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s of changing t h e i r m arketing c h a n n e ls .

The next f a c t o r t h a t hampered the development of v e r t i c a l i n ­ t e g r a t i o n was high m o n o p o liz a tio n of market s t r u c t u r e . In the p e rio d under s tu d y , d e s p i t e a g r e a t need f o r d e m o n o p o liz a tio n , no sa fe g u a rd s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l . ( e . g . a n t i t r u s t l e g i s l a t i o n ) or beha­ v i o u r i s t c h a r a c t e r ( e . g . r e d u c t i o n of market d i s e q u i l i b r i u m ) were c r e a t e d th a t cou ld p r o t e c t the market from f u r t h e r m o n o p o liza tio n or ensure c o n d i t i o n s f o r i t s d e m o n o p o liz a tio n 3 . In some c a s e s , due to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of o p e r a t i o n a l programmes and c r e a t i o n of p r o d u c e r s' assoc i a t ions a c c o r d in g to branch d i v i s i o n and fo rm a tio n of o n ly one a s s o c i a t i o n of s t a t e r e t a i l e r s , the m o n o p o liza tio n be­ came even w id e r . As a r e s u l t t h e re were s t i l l s o l e or v e ry few p rod uc ers in some i n d u s t r i e s , e . g . in the p r o d u c tio n of household equipment l i k e r e f r i g e r a t o r s and washing machines or r a d i o and tv s e t s ( t h i s was con firm ed by i n t e r v i e w s ; see a l s o [ l 2 ] ) . R e t a i l e r s which were s p e c i a l i z i n g in the d i s t r i b u t i o n of these p r o d u c ts , o f t e n a c c o rd in g to an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i v i s i o n , had thus v e ry l i t t l e or p r a c t i c a l l y no c h o ic e of s u p p l i e r s ( s e e e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 5 ) . At the same tim e, due to s h o rta g e s in the market a l l r e t a i l e r s h e ld an i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n in r e l a t i o n to p ro d u c ers - in these c o n d i t i o n s p r o d u c e r s , even the s m a l l e s t companies were behaving l i k e monopo­

l i s t s (s e e [в ] and [ 9 ] ) .

M o n o p o liz a tio n of market s t r u c t u r e i s becoming a more and more d i f f i c u l t problem to s o lv e in the p r e s e n t market s i t u a t i o n and i t may cause many d i f f i c u l t i e s in the f u t u r e .

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The f i r s t sta g e in i n t r o d u c t i o n ot the economic reform witness­ ed a l s o the maintenance of u n i f i c a t i o n 'of market s t r u c t u r e and growth of c o n d i t i o n s of u n c e r t a i n t y . J u s t as i t was the case in .the p r e v io u s p e r i o d , d e c i s i o n s co n c e rn in g e s t a b lis h m e n t of new eco­ nomic u n i t s were l e f t w it h the c e n t r e . I n the p e rio d under s u r v e y , th o re was not c r e a t e d a network of in dependent w h o le s a le companies, and thus were m is sin g c o n d i t i o n s t h a t would promote development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n between w h o le s a le and r e t a i l u n i t s . Companies did not o b t a in a f u l l freedom in the a re a of e s t a b l i s h i n g i n t e g r a ­ t i o n between economic u n i t s w ith d i f f e r e n t forms of ownership (state c o o p e r a t i v e and p r i v a t e companies) e i t h e r . As f o r the second problem, b e s id e s newly in tro d u c e d r e g u l a t i o n s , t h e re were in f o r c e many r e g u l a t i o n s from e a r l i e r p e rio d not a d ju s te d y e t to novel c o n d i t i o n s . There was a l s o a l a c k of long-term p r i n c i p l e s of ope­ r a t i o n of companies (s e e e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t 17 and 10). Th is s i t u a ­ t i o n led to a b ig degree of c a u t i o n shown by ch an nel members and caused t h a t they were o f t e n u n w i l l i n g to take a c t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y of a s t r a t e g i c c h a r a c t e r , the consequences of which c o u ld not be f o r e s e e n .

I n such c o n d i t i o n s , no major changes v e r e observed in the fie ld of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . There took p l a c e o n ly an i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e in the number o f c o r p o r a t e c h a n n e ls and a growth of i n t e ­ r e s t of r e t a i l e r s t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t r a r t u a l t i e s w it h p rod uc ers (s e e e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t I and 12). The T t i i d i e s , on the o t h e r hand, did not c o n firm the h y p o t h e s is t h a t i n t r o d u c t i o n of the economic r e ­ form paved the way f o r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n forms or t h a t companies r e v e a l e d t h e i r i n c l i n a t i o n to i n n o v a t i o n s in t h i s f i e l d ( s e e e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t 7 and e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 2 ) . C o r­ p o r a te t i e s c o n tin u e d to assume e form of p r o d u c e r s ' own s t o r e s w it h p r o d u c tio n companies b eing i n t e g r a t o r s of these c h a n n e ls . No new forms of c o r p o r a t e c h a n n e ls were in t r o d u c e d . The main m o t iv a ­ t i o n f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g o f th e se s t r u c t u r e s was the t a k e o v e r of tra d e margin by the p roducer (s e e e n c l o s 'i r e 1 p o i n t 1 0 ). The b a s i c v a r i a ­ b l e t h a t i n f l u e n c e d the development of these c h a n n e ls was thus the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the s e l f - f i n a n c i n g p r i n c i p l e . S i m i l a r l y , in the are a ot c o n t r a c t u a l t i e s t h e re was p r e s e r v e d a form of f r a n c h i s i n g agreem ents. L i k e in the p r e v i o u s p e r i o d , th e se t i e s encompassed o n ly i n t e g r a t i o n between p ro d u c ers and r e t a i l e r s (no new forms of c o n t r a c t u a l i n t e g r a t i o n were in tr o d u c e d - see e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t 7,

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9 and e n c lo s u r e 2, p o i n t 2) and were i n i t i a t e d by the l a t t e r (s e e e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t 6, 13 and e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 8 ) . R e t a i l e r s were a l s o aim ing a t expanding the number of t h e i r s u p p l i e r s ( s e e e n c l o ­ sure 2 p o i n t 1 ). The main reason why r e t a i l companies were i n t e ­ r e s t e d in the e s t a b lis h m e n t of these c h an n e ls was t h e i r wish to ensure own s o u rc e s of supply and reduce r i s k in t h e i r a c t i v i t y (s e e e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 13). However, in the p e r io d under s tu d y , th e re was not recorded any expansion o f these t i e s . In the p r e s e n t con­ d i t i o n s , p r o d u c tio n and tra d e companies found i t d i f f i c u l t to d e­ term ine t h e i r common s h o rt and long-term o b j e c t i v e s . Аз a r e s u l t , even b ig tra d e companies, e . g . department s t o r e s d id not con clu d e new agreements w i t h p r o d u c e r s . They cou ld e x e r t a l s o an i n s i g n i f i ­ c a n t i n f l u e n c e on d e c i s i o n s made in the sphere of p r o d u c t io n , e . g . c o n c e rn in g commodity and assortm ent s t r u c t u r e of goods.

Due to the economic s i t u a t i o n , the scope of e x i s t i n g agreements between p r o d u c tio n and t r a d e companies was q u i t e n arrow . The a g r e e ­ ments covered m a inly the p r o d u c t, i t s p r i c e and the s t r u c t u r e of d e l i v e r i e s in each q u a r t e r o f a y e a r . In some cases the companies d id not n e g o t i a t e a t a l l the tra d e margin (10 out of 16 r e t a i l e r s ) , q u a l i t y (3 r e t a i l e r s ) or even the p r i c e o f p rod u c ts (1 c a s e ) - (see e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 12 end e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t 1 5 ). In choosing t h e i r s u p p l i e r s they o f t e n d id not tak e i n t o account such f a c t o r s as e . g . p r o f i t a b i l i t y (A r e t a i l e r s ) , image of the s u p p l i e r on the market (3 r e t a i l e r s ) and p r e v io u s c o n f l i c t s w it h him (5 r e t a i l e r s ) - (s e e e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 5 ) . Under p r e s s u re of deep market d i s e q u i l i b r i u m , tra d e companies wanted o n ly to r e c e i v e "any p r o d u c t s " . They some­ times even agreed to major c o n c e s s io n s to keep the agreements w it h s u p p l i e r s . For example, some agreements would s t i p u l a t e o n ly the t o t a l v a lu e of goods to be s u p p lie d to s t o r e s w it h o u t any more d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e i r assortm ent s t r u c t u r e or tim e of de­ l i v e r y . In ca s es where they c o u ld not have any fo rm a l agreements w i t h p r o d u c e r s , they o f t e n t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h in fo r m a l c o n t a c t s

t

w it h them. The b e h a v io u r of these companies c o n firm e d , .thus, a t h e s i s , t h a t in c o n d i t i o n s of s e l f - f i n a n c i n g i n t e g r a t i o n t i e s a re u s u a l l y i n i t i a t e d by the companies whose s u r v i v a l in the market or maintenance of t h e i r p o s i t i o n a re t h r e a t e n e d or such which through i n t e g r a t i o n may o b t a in s u b s t a n t i a l f i n a n c i a l b e n e f i t s . J u s t l i k e in the p e r io d p r e c e d in g the refo rm , companies d id not use any j o i n t m a rk eting s t r a t e g y e i t h e r . None o f market, p a r t i c i

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-p a n t s , n e i t h e r -p r o d u c tio n companies h o ld in g a s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n in the s e l l e r ' s market nor tra d e companies performed t y p i c a l fu n ­ c t i o n s of the market channel l e a d e r such as d e te r m in a ti o n of chan­ n e l ’ s aim s, a l l o c a t i o n of t a s k s among p a r t i c i p a n t s and management and c o n t r o l of the c h a n n e l. D e s p ite s tr o n g m o n o p o liza tio n of t r a d e , the phenomenon of backward i n t e g r a t i o n d id not appear in the Po­ l i s h market e it h e r , 4 .

The development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n m a inly f o r f i n a n c i a l reason s arouses a number of doubts. F i r s t of a l l , a q u e s tio n a r i ­ ses whether in the c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n i n t e g r a t i o n promotes b ig g e r a d a p t a b i l i t y o f th e se c h a n n e ls to t h e i r e nviron m en t. The a n s w e r.to t h i s q u e s tio n i s l a r g e l y n e g a t i v e . Consumers' p r e f e r e n c e s and re- qurements e x e r t a weak i n f l u e n c e on t h e i r a c t i v i t y in the m arket. Companies forming these c h a n n e ls d id not c r e a t e any a d d i t i o n a l u t i l i t i e s f o r consumers, e . g . ^ad ju stm en t of asso rtm e n ts 1;o t h e i r needs, d e t a i l e d in f o r m a t io n f o r consumers, e t c . Companies d id not a p p ly e i t h e r any j o i n t s t r a t e g y aiming a t m in im iz a tio n of marke­ t i n g c o s t s and c o n s e q u e n t ly , r e d u c t i o n o f p r i c e s , what was con­ firm ed by i n t r o d u c t i o n of mechanisms c u r b in g e x c e s s i v e growth of p r i c e s , e . g . tax system and p r i c e c o n t r o l . P a r t i c u l a r l y , the f o r ­ mation of c o r p o r a t e c h an n e ls by p ro d u c ers seemed to have a v e ry s m a ll s o c i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n in the an a ly z ed p e r io d and was s t r o n g l y c r i t i c i s e d by r e t a i l e r s ( s e e e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 7 ) . P r o d u c e r s ' own s t o r e s were o f f e r i n g a narrow range of p ro d u c ts w ith a poor c h o ic e of a s s o rtm e n ts , s i z e s and c o l o u r s . They were a l s o p r o v i d i n g l i t ­ t l e in fo r m a tio n f o r p ro d u c ers about changes o c c u r r i n g in demand. Such in fo r m a tio n was o f t e n of an a c c i d e n t a l c h a r a c t e r . These com­ p a n ie s d id not have a q u a l i f i e d p e r s o n n e l, who would be prep ared to conduct market s t u d i e s w it h a p p l i c a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t methods and t e c h n i q u e s , e . g . e x p e rim e n ta l s t u d i e s . R e t a i l e r s o f t e n s t a t e d t h a t t h i s form of i n t e g r a t i o n would f i n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n o n ly under c o n d i t i o n s of b e t t e r supply o f goods in the market (s e e e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 7 and e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t 10). In the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n , i t would be more advantageous f o r consumers and p rod uc ers to open j o i n t s t o r e s , e . g . w i t h i n the framework of an a s s o c i a t i o n or by companies b e lo n g in g to d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i a l bran ch es.

4

In market economy c o u n t r i e s , a l l these v e r t i c a l l y i n t e g r a ­ ted c h a n n e ls a re s t r o n g l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . See e . g . [13] and [1 4 ] .

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Development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n in the c o n d i t i o n s described above may a ls o lead to growth uf market monopul i га t i o n . f h ia r e ­ f e r s e s p e c i a l l y to c o r p o r a t e and c o n t r a c t u a l t i e s e s t a b l i s h e d by companies h o ld in g a monopol i s t i c or s e m i-monopoli s t i c p o s i t i o n in the market. S i m i l a r l y to m a rk e t- o rie n te d economies, form a tion of such c h an n e ls should be r e s t r i c t e d by law through i n t r o d u c t i o n of a c t s r e g u l a t i n g t i e s between in d u s t r y and tra ^ e (s e e a n t i t r u s t r e g u l a t i o n in the U . S . and the E . E . C , c o u n t i e s , e . g . [ 7 ] , [ l ] , f j ] and [ 4 ] ) and through the i n t r o d u c t i o n of o th e r c o r r e c t i v e me­ chanisms. One of them might be an in c r e a s e in the share of sm all and medium-size companies in the market a t t a i n e d through t h e i r f a ­ c i l i t a t e d e n tra n c e i n t o the market, a p p l i c a t i o n of tax r e l i e f s , e a s i e r acce ss to c r e d i t s , p l a c i n g government o rd e rs w ith those com­ p a n ie s ( e . g . [ l l ] ) or development of i n t e g r a t i o n between them. Along w ith r e d u c ti o n of the market d i s e q u i l i b r i u m , d i f f e r e n t s y s ­ tems of i n t e g r a t i o n c r e a t e d by these companies may become an impor­ t a n t form of c o m p e t itio n f o r stron g p r o d u c tio n and t ra d e companies. Development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n between companies i s a l s o dependent upon degree of p r e p a r a t i o n and a d a p ta t io n of the manage­ ment to o p e r a t io n in new c o n d i t i o n s . The system of management through commands which has been in f o r c e t o r a long tim e, has c a u s ­ ed t h a t companies are not alw ays a b le to u t i l i z e t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s in the sphere of d i s t r i b u t i o n as one of elements in the m ark eting s t r a t e g y d e te r m in in g su c c e s s or f a i l u r e of a f i r m . In one of the a n a ly z ed companies in c lu d e d i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l programmes, i t was found, f o r example, t h a t the company d id not see any need, both now and in the f u t u r e to change the h i t h e r t o employed forms of dis­

t r i b u t i o n or i n c r e a s e i t s degree of independence in t h i s f i e l d ( t h i s answer was g iv e n by the manager of the tra d e department in t h i s company and was not caused by any m is u n d ersta n d in g of the q u e s ti o n - see a l s o e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t 5 ) . I t i s worth s t r e s s i n g t h a t not a l l companies were a b le to determine f o r what typ e o f p r o ­ duces the fo rm a tio n o f c o r p o r a t e or c o n t r a c t u a l c h a n n e ls was p r o ­ f i t a b l e f o r them ( s e e e n c lo s u r e 1 p o i n t 10 and e n c lo s u r e 2 p o i n t 7 ) . These c r i t i c a l remarks concern f o r t u n a t e l y o n ly a p a r t of the management. In the m a j o r i t y of a n a ly z ed companies, t h e r e was ob­ serv e d a high a d a p t a b i l i t y of m a n a g e ria l s t a f f to o p e r a te in chan­ ging c o n d i t i o n s . These companies were a l s o aware of b e n e f i t s f o r consumers and economic u n i t s f lo w in g from development of v e r t i c a l

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i n t e g r a t i o n in the f u t u r e when the market d i s e q u i l i b r i u m was r e ­ duced and c o m p e t itio n in the market appeared.

A. C o n clu sio n s

Development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s dependent upon c r e a t i o n of a p p r o p r i a t e system and market c o n d i t i o n s . During the f i r s t stag e in i n t r o d u c t i o n of the economic reform , th e re was s t i l l main­ t a i n e d , to a la r g e e x t a n t , the command-type management of the d is ­ t r i b u t i o n sphere by the C e n tr e , and th e re were not a b o li s h e d o th er b a r r i e r s hampering i n t e g r a t i o n p r o c e s s e s , m a inly market d i s e q u i l i ­ brium , m on op oliza tion and u n i f i c a t i o n of market s t r u c t u r e and un­ c e r t a i n t y . These c o n d i t i o n s d id not a llo w f o r any more pronounced development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . As the d e s c r ib e d b a r r i e r s are c l o s e l y i n t e r r e l a t e d , the s o l e growth of companies' autonomy i s a l s o not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r c r e a t i o n of such s t r u c t u r e s . I t i s n e c e s s a r y to remove a l l the c o n s t r a i n t s . In the p r e s e n t mar­ k e t c o n d i t i o n s u n r e s t r a i n e d development of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n ba­ sed m a in ly on the p r o f i t c r i t e r i o n may l e a d , moreover-, to a f u r ­ t h e r m o n o p o liza tio n of the market and poor a d a p t a b i l i t y of these ch a n n e ls to the e nviron m en t. E n c lo s u r e s E n c l o s u r e 1 R e s u l t s of the Q u e s t io n n a ir e S u rv ey C a r r i e d Out In P r o d u c t io n Companies ( a l t o g e t h e r 11 r e s p o n d e n ts )

1. Has the number o f f ir m s c o o p e r a t in g w it h your company, as compared w ith the p e rio d b e fo r e the refo rm ?

In c re a s e d Decreased Remained the same |

- 2 9

2. I f the number of c o o p e r a t in g f ir m s has d e c re a s e d , p le a s e sta­ te the b a s i c rea son s:

- i n c l u s i o n i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l programmes - 2 - l a c k of raw m a t e r i a l s - 2

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\

3. Assuming t h a t the economic reform i s c o n s i s t e n t l y implemen­ ted do you t h in k t h a t in f u t u r e i t w i l l be j u s t i f i a b l e to in c r e a s e the number of b u y e rs ; Yes No 4 7 a ) reasons i f y e s: - in o rd e r to in c r e a s e tu r n o v e r and p r o f i t s - 2 - i t i s n e c e s s a r y to i n c r e a s e e x p o r ts - 1 - because th e re should be an i n c r e a s e in output - 2 b) reasons i f no:

- to d e c re a s e d i s t r i b u t i o n c o s t s - 6 - the company i s too sm all - 1

4. P l e a s e s t a t e the a c t u a l l e v e l of your company's- autonomy f o r each of the mentioned s p h e re s:

Sphere of de cision -m akin g

L e v e l ol company ' s autonomy very

b ig big medium sm a ll none

S e l e c t i o n of buyers 1 4 2 1 3 Volume of output - 7 2 2 -Assortment - 8 3 - -P r i c e - f i x i n g 6 - 2 3 -I n t e g r a t i o n w it h o t h e r com­ p a n ie s - 1 3 3 4 S e l e c t i o n of market t e r r i t o r y - 4 4 1 2 S e l e c t i o n of market segments - 4 4 2 1 E s t a b li s h m e n t of companies - - 3 2 Ć O r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of company 1 9 1 - -S a l a r i e s and wages - 7 3 1 -Number o f employees - 5 3 3

-5. Do you c o n s id e r i t n e c e s s a r y to in c r e a s e com panies' freedom to s e l e c t t h e i r b u y e r s ? Yes No 5 6 a ) i f y e s , should i t be? s i g n i f i c a n t - 3 moderate - 2

6. Which f a c t o r s p la y e d d e c i s i v e r o l e b e fo re the reform ( 1 ) and a re p l a y i n g now* (2 ) in s e l e c t i n g the b u y e r ?

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19Ü Elżbieta Guzek Rate of i n f l u e n c e F a c t o r s ( 1 ) ■ ( 2 ) very b ig big me­ d i ­ um

smal 1 none very big big me­ d i ­ um smal 1 none 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 В 9 10 11 P r o d u c e r 's i n i t i a t i v e 3 2 2 4 3 1 2 3 2 B u y e r ' s i n i t i a t i v e 1 5 3 1 1 3 6 1 - I D e c i s i o n s of c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 • 5 R e s t r i c t i o n s of companies market t e r ­ r i t o r y impo­ sed by the C en tre 4 1 1 5 2 2 1 2 4 Suggest ions of c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s 3 1 4 2 1 2 3 4 2 Long-term c o o p e r a t io n w it h the buyer 4 5 1 1 4 5 1 1 No c o n f l i c t s w it h the buyer 4 4 3 . 3 4 2 2 F o r t u i t y - - - 4 7 - - - 4 7

7. Does c o o p e r a t io n between p r o d u c tio n and r e t a i l companies take new forms?

Yes No

11 a ) comments:

- i f th e re i s no c o m p e t it io n , n o th in g w i l l change; the produ­ c e r w i l l keep h i s s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n in r e l a t i o n to tra d e companies; - d i r e c t c o o p e r a t io n between p r o d u c tio n and r e t a i l companies i s hampered by o p e r a t i o n a l programmes and d e c i s i o n s of p roducers' a s ­ s o c i a t i o n s .

B. Wnat are the b a s i c forms o f e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n t a c t s w ith b u ye rs and wnat i s t h e i r im p orta n ce ?

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Forms of e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n t a c t s

R ate of im portance v e ry

b ig b ig

me­

dium sm all none

O rganized meetings of buyers

and s e l l e r s , tra d e f a i r s 6 1 - 3 1

W r i t t e n o f f e r s 1 5 1 1 3

P e rs o n a l c o n t a c t s ( i n f o r m a l ) 1 5 2 2 1

9. Are th e re any changes in the forms of e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n t a c t s w ith buyers as compared w ith the p e r io d b e fo re the reform ?

Yes No

2 9

10. I f your company p ossesses i t s own r e t a i l u n i t s , would you l i k e to e n la r g e t h e i r number?

Yes No No answer

6 4 1

a ) i f y e s, what are the rea so n s: - to take o v e r t r a d e margin - 5

- to ri-ctti ve q u ic k in fo r m a tio n about- changes o c c u r r i n g in dem­ and - 2

- fo r «Ml p ro d u c ts - 1

- f o r аыив p r o d u c ts , eg. c o n f e c t i o n a r y , men's wear - 2 b ) o t h e r comments:

- y e s , but under c o n d i t i o n s of f u l l sup p ly w it h raw m a t e r i a l s ; - i t depends on the p o s s i b i l i t y to i n c r e a s e the o u tp u t;

- i t depends on the r e d u c t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s of u n c e r t a i n t y . 11. Do you t h i n k t h a t producer-owned r e t a i l shops c o n s t i t u t e a form of c o m p e t itio n f o r o th e r t ra d e companies now and w i l l con ­ s t i t u t e i t in the f u t u r e ?

I ime Yes No

Now 2 9

In f u t u r e 7 4

12. Are buyers i n t e r e s t e d in e s t a b l i s h i n g f r a n c h i s i n g agreements w it h p r o d u c e rs ?

Yes No

9 2

13. Who i n i t i a t e d the e s t a b lis h m e n t of f r a n c h i s i n g agreem ents? r e t a i l e r - 8

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14. What a re the b e n e f i t s fu r i n d u s t r i a l companies of having f r a n c h i s i n g agreem ents?

- the company r e c e i v e s prompt in fo r m a tio n c o n c e rn in g demand, .consumers' o p in io n about p r o d u c ts , e t c . - 5

- they h e lp to promote company's tra d e mark - 3

- they h elp to i n c r e a s e consum ers' l o y a l t y to company's tra d e

mark - 2 .

- they g iv e the p o s s i b i l i t y to d i v i d e t ra d e margin between the p rod uc er and r e t a i l e r - 2 (e.g. 75 per c e n t of w h o le s a le margin f o r the producer and 25 per c e n t f o r the r e t a i l e r )

15. What a re the b a s i c elements of c o n t r a c t s n e g o tia t e d w ith s u p p l i e r s ( 1 ) and buyers ( 2 ) * Scope of n e g o t i a t i o n s . Elem ents of c o n t r a c t s ( 1 ) ( 2 ) v e ry b ig b ig me­ d i ­ um s m a ll none v e ry b ig big me­ d i ­ um sm all none Assortment 3 7 . 1 - 3 5 2 1 1 -Volume of supply 3 6 1 1 5 4 2 P r o d u c ts q u a l i t y 1 2 7 • 1 5 1 2 1 1 Time o f de­ l i v e r y 3 7 3 • 1 3 6 1 . _ Frequency of d e l i v e r i e s 1 1 6 • 1 2 5 8 2 P r i c e 2 4 1 2 5 1 1 3 -Trade margin 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 2 3

-16. Mention 3 elem ents o f c o n t r a c t s t h a t you c o n s id e r to be the most im p o rta n t;

a ssortm ent - 8 fre q ue nc y o f d e l i v e r i e s - 0

q u a n t i t y - 6 p r i c e - 6 q u a l i t y -

5

t r a d e margin - 0 time of d e l i v e r y - 6 17. What a re the b a s i c c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to in c r e a s e p r o ­ d u c e r s ' i n t e r e s t in e s t a b l i s h i n g f r a n c h i s i n g agreements and o t h e r c o n t r a c t u a l forms o f v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n ? - r e d u c t i o n of market d i s e q u i l i b r i u m - 3 - appearance of c o m p e t itio n on the market - 4

(15)

- long-term p r i n c i p l e s o t o p e f a t i o n of companies - 2

- companies' freedom to e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t s w ith s u p p l i e r s and buyers - 4

E n c l o s u r e 2

» •

R e s u l t s of the Q u e s t io n n a ir e S u rv ey C a r r i e d Out in R e t a i l Companies ( a l t o g e t h e r 16 resp on d e nts)

1. Do you c o n s id e r i t b e n e f i c i a l f o r your company to in c r e a s e the number of your s u p p l i e r s ?

Yes No

15 1

a ) i f y e s, why:

- to broaden the assortment of p rod u c ts - 4

- to improve the q u a l i t y of prod uc ts o f f e r e d to consumers - 3 - to‘ s e l e c t the b e st s u p p l i e r s - 2

- to i n i t i a t e c o m p e t itio n between s u p p l i e r s - 3 2. Does c o o p e r a t io n w ith prod uc ers take new forms?

Yes No

1 15

3. Has a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n of p r o d u c ts , as compared with the p e rio d b e fo re the refo rm ?

C o n s id e r a b ly decreased Decreased Remained the samo In c re a s e d C o n s id e r a b l y in c re a s e d

_

1 9 5 1

4. P l e a s e s t a t e the a c t u a l l e v e l of your company'.s autonomy in each of the mentioned spheres

L e v e l of company's autonomy Sphere ot de cision -m ak in g v e ry b ig b ig medium sm a ll none 1 £ 3 4 ■5 v 6 * S e l e c t i o n of s u p p l i e r s 2 3 5 2 4 S e l e c t i o n of assortm ent 3 2 6 3 2 D e f i n i n g of tra d e a c t i v i t i e s 1 3 7 2 3 P r i c e - f i x i n g 1 6 6 2 1 S e t t i n g of tra d e margin 1 2 2 ' 6 5 I n t e g r a t i o n w ith o th e r companies 3 2 1 3 7

(16)

1 2 3 4 5 6 S e l e c t i o n of market t e r r i t o r y 1 1 4 5 5 S e l e c t i o n of market segments 1 1 5 1 0 E s ta b li s h m e n t of companies 1 2 2 1 10 O r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of company 3 5 4, 3 1 S a l a r i e s and wages . 4 5 3 3 1 Number of employees 4 ■ 0 3 - 1

5. Which f a c t o r s p la y e d d e c i s i v e r o l e b e fo re the reform ( 1 ) and a re p l a y i n g now ( 2 ) in s e l e c t i n g the s u p p l i e r

Rate of i n f l u e n c e

F a c t o r s ( 1 ) ( 2 )

very

b ig bic. me­d i ­ um

sm all none very

b ig big me­d i ­ um s m all none C e n t r a l de­ c i s i o n s , ( a d m in i­

stra tive di­ s t r i b u ­ t i o n of p r o d u c ts ) 7 4 1 2 7 2 1 2 2 R e s t r i c t i o n s of compa­ n i e s ' mar­ k e t t e r r i ­ t o r y im­ posed by the C en tre 1 6 5 1 3 3 4 3 4 P r o fi t a b ilit y 1 2 2 5 4 1 4 1 4 4 Image of the s u p p l i e r on the market 1 5 1 3 4 2 3 2 4 3 No c o n f l i c t s w it h the s u p p l i e r 2 2 5 5 2 3 4 5 T r a d i t i o n 4 6 3 - 1 4 6 3 _ 1 Trade compa­ ny's i n i ­ t i a t i v e 4 5 3 1 1 6 5 2 1 The sup­ p l i e r ' s i n it i a t iv e 3 2 1 4 4 1 1 6 6 F o r t u i t y - - 1 6 7 - - 1 6 7

(17)

6. What are the b a s i c forms of e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n t a c t s w ith sup­ p l i e r s and what i s t h e i r importance f o r the company?

Forms of e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n t a c t s

Rate of importance very

big

b ig medium smal 1 none

1 O rganized meetings of buyers

and s u p p l i e r s , tra d e f a i r s 6 6 4

W i t t e n o f f e r s 1 3 4 5 3

P e r s o n a l c o n t a c t s ( i n f o r m a l ) 11 3 2 -

-7. Oo you c o n s id e r i t j u s t i f i a b l e to develop c o r p o r a t e chan­ n e l s i n t e g r a t e d by p r o d u c e r s ?

Yes No

1 15

a ) comments:

- they have no s o c i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n because they don’ t p r o v id e any b e n e f i t s f o r consumers;

- not in c o n d i t i o n s of deep s h o rta g e s of p r o d u c ts ;

. - a producer should c o n c e n t r a t e on the sphere of p r o d u c tio n and not on d i s t r i b u t i o n ;

- y e s , f o r some p r o d u c ts , e . g . f o o d s t u f f s .

8. Who i n i t i a t e d the e s t a b lis h m e n t of f r a n c h i s i n g agreem ents? p roducer - 2

r e t a i l e r - 11

9. I f f r a n c h i s i n g agreements were i n i t i a t e d by tra d e companies, was i t d i f f i c u l t to persuade p rod uc ers to e s t a b l i s h them?

Rate of d i f f i c u l t y

v e ry b ig b ig medium sm a ll none

4 - 3 . 2 I

10. What i s the c u r r e n t performance of ^asks by p rod uc ers s t i p u l a t e d in f r a n c h i s i n g agreem ents?

Rate of performance

v e ry good s a t i s f a c t o r y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y none

(18)

2П4_________ ___________ _____________Elżbieta G u z e k _______________________________

11. I e f u l f i l m e n t of p r o d u c e r s ' ta s k s s t i p u l a t e d in f r a n c h i s i n g agreements as compared w ith o th e r - sim p le c o n t r a c t s co n c e rn in g the

turchase of p r o d u c ts ?

Much b e t t e r B e t t e r S i m i l a r Small e r Much s m a l l e r

2 2 2 1

-12. What a re the b a s i c ele m e nt? of c o n t r a c t s n e g o t i a t e d w ith p r o d u c e r s ?

Elem ents of c o n t r a c t s

Scope of n e g o t i a t i o n s ve ry

b ig

b ig .medium smal 1• none

Assortment 2 4 5 3 2 Volume of supply 5 3 4 4 -P r o d u c t ' s q u a l i t y - 1 6 6 3 Iim e of d e l i v e r y 1 4 9 2 -Frequency of d e l i v e r i e s 1 3 4 6 2 P r i c e 2 9 - 4 I Trade margin - 1 3 1 10

13. How do you a s se s s r e t a i l e r s ' b e n e f i t s , in the p r e s e n t s i ­ t u a t i o n , of h avin g f r a n c h i s i n g agretements w it h p r o d u c e r s ? R e t a i l e r s ' b e n e f i t s P o s s i b i l i t y to a c h i e v e th e se b e n e fi ts v e ry big b ig medium s m a ll none P r o f i t a b i l i t y - 4 4 1 -C o r f o r m a b i l i t y of supply w i t h o r d e rs p la c e d by r e t a i l e r s 4 2 2 1 Freedom o f choosing a ssortm ent 2 4 1 2 C o n f o r m a b i l i t y of supply w it h consumers' demand - 3 2 3 1 P r e f e r e n t i a l tre a tm e n t by prod uc er 1 4 2 1 1 D i v i s i o n of tra d e r i s k w ith the producer - 2 1 3 2 B ig g e r c h o i c e of a s so rtm e n ts - 1 3 4 1 P r o d u c e r ' s a s s i s t a n c e , e . g . in opening a f r a n c h i s i n g u n i t - 1 1 2 5 R e g u la r t r a i n i n g f o r r e t a i l e r ' s p e rs o n n e l 1 _ Ü

(19)

] с е г з ' С 1]

[

2

]

[ з]

[ А]

С

5] [ 6] С 7]

С 8]

[ »]

[

1 0

]

[11]

[

12

]

4. What are the b a s i c c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to i n c r e a s e produ- i n t e r e s t in e s t a b l i s h i n g f r a n c h i s i n g agreements w ith b u y e r s ? d e c re a s e of market ( d i s e q u i 1ibrium - 5

freedom to s e l e c t s u p p l i e r s and buyers - 4

f u l l supply in raw m a t e r i a l s and o th e r p ro d u c ts - 3

B a l a s s a B . , European Economic I n t e g r a t i o n , North-Hol- land P u b l i s h i n g Co, Amsterdam 1975.

B e k s i a k J . , Rozwój gospodarki s o c j a l i s t y c z n e j a r o z ­ wój rynku [Development of S o c i a l i s t Economy and Development of M a r k e t ] , "Handel Wewnętrzny" 19BQ, nr 4.

C a m p e l l A. , Common Market la w , Longmans Green and C o .Ltd ,Lo nd o n 1969.

Communication r e l a t i v e aux a c c o r d s , d é c l s i o n s e t p r a t i q u e s concerte's c o n c e rn a n t l a c o o p e r a t io n e n t r e e n t e r p r i s e s , Com- munauté Economique Europeene, 25 J u i l l e t 1968,

D i e t ! J . , K anały rynku - s ta n i d e a l n y , r z e c z y w i s t y i o- czekiw any [M arket Channels - T h e ir R e a l , I d e a l and O e sire d S t a t e ] , [ i n : ] J . D i e t l , M a r k e t in g , Warszawa 1981. G u z e k E . , D o m a ń s k i T . , P o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r Ap­ p l i c a t i o n of F r a n c h i s i n g in C e n t r a l l y Planned Economy-Case Study of P o la n d , " A c ta U n i v e r s i t a t i s L o d z i e n s i s " , 1982, F o ­ l i a oeconomica 17.

H o w a r d М. C . , L e g a l Asp ects of M a r k e t in g , Me Graw-Hill Book C o ., Hew York 1964.

K o r n a i J . , A n t i - E q u i l i b r i u m , Warszawa 1973.

K o r n a 1 J . , Economics of S h o r t a g e , N o rth - H o lla n d P u b l i ­ sh in g Company, Amsterdam 1980.

M i s i ą g F . , Dotychczasowe ko n c e p c je d o s k o n a le n ia p ow ią­ zań między przemysłem, i handlem [ P r e v i o u s Concepts of Im pro­ v in g T i e s between I n d u s t r y and T r a d e ] , Towarzystwo Naukowe O r g a n i z a c j i i K i e r o w a n ia , Lódź 1979.

N i e w a d z i C . , Przemysł mały i ś r e d n i w k r a j a c h k a p i ­ t a l i s t y c z n y c h [S m a l l and Medium I n d u s t r i e s in C a p i t a l i s t Coun­ t r i e s ] , Ośrodek I n f o r m a c j i C e n t r a l n e j , "Wybrane I n f o r m a c je Tematyczne" 1981, nr 22.

(20)

dóbr konsumpcyjnych [ R o l e o f Trade in Shaping i P r o d u c tio n of Consumer G o o d s ], Towarzystwo Naukowe O r g a n i z a c j i i K ie ro w a ­

n i a , Łódź 1979.* 40

[13] S i m s J . T . , F o s t e r J . R . , W o o d s i d e A . G . , M a rke tin g Channels: Systems and S t r a t e g i e s , Harper and Row P u b l i s h e r s , New York 1977.

[14] S t e r n L. W. , Ł l - A n . s a r y A . I . , M a rk e tin g Chan­ n e l s , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . Englewood C l i f f s 1977.

E l ż b i e t a Guzek

INTEGRACJA PIONOWA W KANAŁACH RYNKU

W PIERWSZYM ETAPIE WPROWADZANIA REFORMY GOSPODARCZFJ ( w y n i k i badań)

Jedną z cech kanałów rynku w P o l s c e j e s t n i e w i e l k i rozwój i n - ' t e g r a c j i p io n o w e j. Podstawowymi c z yn n ik a m i, k t ó r e o g r a n i c z y ł y te p roce sy w o k r e s i e powojennym b y ł y ; wysoki s t o p ie ń c e n t r a l i z a c j i z a rz ą d z a n ia gospodarką, nierównowaga rynkowa typu s s a n ia oraz zna­ czne u j e d n o l i c e n i e i m on op oliza cja s t r u k t u r rynku. Celem tego a r ­ t y k u ł u j e s t zbadanie czy wprowadzenie reformy g osp o d arczej w P o l ­ sce s tw o r z y ł o warunki d la rozwoju kanałów zintegrow anych pionowo. W y n ik i o p i e r a j ą s i ę g łó w n ie na badaniach em pirycznych. Autorka zwra­ ca uwagę również na konsekw encje, j a k i e może wywołać n i e k o n t r o l o ­ wany wzrost procesów i n t e g r a c y j n y c h w obecnej s y t u a c j i ryn ko w ej.

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