A C T A U N I V E R S l T A T t S L O D Z I E N S I S
FOLIA IURIDICA 24, 1986
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M i c h e l e Та ги! to
JU D ICIA L R E A SO N IN G A N D THE E V A LU A T IO N O F PROOFS*
I
T h e p ro b lem of ju d icia l r e a so n in g w ith re f e re n c e to th e e v a lu a tio n of p ro ofs is e v id e n tly im p o r ta n t fro m s e v e r a l p o in ts of v iew . In fact, it is a k e y p ro b le m for th e g e n e ra l t h e o ry of d ec isio n -m ak in g , fo r th e th e o ry of th e sta te m e n t of re a so n s in th e ju d g m e n t, for th e le g a l th e o ry of e v id e n c e an d proof, an d for th e p r o c ed u ra l th e o ry of th e ro le of th e ju d g e as to th e se a r c h of ju d ic ia l tru th .
N e v e r th e les s, an d in sp ite of its g r e a t im p o rtan c e, it is e a sy to se e th a t su c h a p ro b lem h as b ee n stu d ied m u ch less th a n n e ce ssa ry .
T h e g e n e r a l th e o r y of d ec isio n m ak in g h a s stu d ie d b ro a d ly a n d d e e -p ly th e in te r -p r e ta tio n of th e ru le of la w (w r itte n ru le o r -p re ce d e n t, ac c o rd in g to th e se v e ra l system s), p a y in g a tte n tio n to th e lo g ic of p r e s -c r ip tiv e sta te m e n ts, to th e sem an ti-cs of le g al n orm s, to th e f e a tu r e s of le g al re a so n in g ab o u t no rm s, an d so on. T his th e o r y h a s y e t stu d ied v e r y little th e str u c tu re of th e ju d g m e n t on th e fa cts in issu e an d th e e v a lu a tio n of proofs. T h e old a n d tra d itio n a l o p in io n is still w id e -sp re ad , ac c o rd in g to w h ic h th e „fact" is „p o sed " as a m in or p re m ise in th e ju d icial sy llo gism , a n d th e lo g ical f e a tu re s of su ch a „p osin g th e p r e m ise of fa c t" a r e left o u t1.
A s far as I kn o w , th e re a r e o n ly few e x c e p tio n s to th e g e n e ra l lac k
* L ecture g iv e n at th e F ac u lty of Law and A dm in istratio n of the U n iv er s ity of Łódź, o n O ctob cr 6, 1982.
1 I do no t c o ns id er her e the a pp ro a ch e s that, d ep e nd ing on par ticula r p h ilo so p h -ic a l v ie w s , r ule out the. p o s s ib ility of a lo g -ic a l r e a so n ing about th e fa c ts in iss ue , and l e a v e the ju dg em e nt on th e facts to a „hunch" or „intuition" or „m oral c e rttude" of th e jud ge . M ov in g from th e as su m p tio n that it is u s u a lly a scr ibe d to intu i-tio n w h a t is not e x p la in e d r a i-tion a lly , I c o ns id er all „intu itive " a cc ou nts of the pro-blem as n on -ex p lan a tio ns .
of a tte n tio n to w ar d s th is p ro b lem 2. A m o ng th ese, I m u st re m e m b er som e e ssa y s by W r ó b lew sk i, w h e re c le a r p o in ts a r e fix ed for a c o r r e c t a n a ly -sis of th e p ro b lem 3.
T h e le g al th e o ry of ev id e n c e a n d p roo f h a s stu d ied b ro a d ly (even if n o t a lw a y s d eep ly ) th e ru le s of ev id en c e , th e m e an s a n d th e p ro c e e -d in g s of p ro o f4, b u t it h a s stu -d ie -d v e r y little th e e v a lu a tio n of p ro o fs5. T ak e fo r in s ta n c e th e p rin c ip le of fr ee e v a lu a tio n , w h ich is still m ore w id e sp re a d in E u ro p ea n le g a l sy stem s. It is a k e y p o in t in th e h isto ry of civ il a n d cr im in a l p ro c e d u re 0, b u t still n o w it w o r k s n e g a tiv e ly (i.e.: to ru le o u t th e sy ste m of leg al ru le s ab o u t proofs), r a th e r th a n p o siti-v ely .
F u rth e rm o r e , to th e e x te n t th a t it g o t rid of le g a l (or form al) r u le s for th e e v a lu a tio n of p ro ofs, y e t w ith o u t re p la c in g the m w ith lo g ical or co g n itiv e ru les, it h a s le ft roo m fo r irra tio n a l, em o tio n al o r in tu itiv e id ea s of th e ju d g m en t o n th e facts.
1 c a n n o t sh o w it in d e tail, b u t m o st of co m m o n p la ces ab o u t th e i n t i m e c o n v i c t i o n , t he c e r t e z z a m o r a l e , t he f r e i e B e -w e i s -w ü r d i g u n g , t he s a n a c r i t i c a, a n d so on, a r e lack in g in a „ p o sitiv e" r a tio n a l co n ten t. In sh o rt, a lm o st all th e a n a ly s is a b o u t th e p rin cip le of f re e e v a lu a tio n en d u p b y g iv in g th e ju d g e a d isc re tio -n a r y a -n d u -n lim ite d p o w e r to e v a lu a te p ro of s fre ely , w ith o u t re q u iri-n g him th e u se of log ical an d o b je c tiv e c r ite r ia in su ch a n e v a lu a tio n 7.
2 S e e e.g. J. R o e d i g, Die T he o r ie d e r g e r ic ht lic h en E r ke nn tn is v e r fa hr e n, B erlin— — H e id e lb e rg — N e w Y ork 1973, p. 158; K. E n g i s c h , L o g is che S tu di e n zu r G e s e t -z e s a n w e n d u n g , H e id e lb e rg 1960, p. 89. S ee a ls o M. T a r u f l o , C e r t e -z -z a e p r o b a b il i tà n ei le p re s u nz io n i, „Foro ita lia n o ” 1973, 5, p. 95 and i d e m , La m o t i v a z i o n e d e lla s e n le n z a c i v il e , P adov a 1975, p. 238.
3 S e e c h ie fly J. W r ó b l e w s k i , F ac ts in L aw , „ A r chiv (uer R echts- und So- zia lp h ilo so p hie" 1973, 59, p. 171 (now pu blis hed in I d e m , M e a ni ng an d T ruth in J ud ic ia l De cis io n, H els in k i 1979, p. 113) and i d e m , T h e P r ob l em ol t he So -c al le d J ud ic ia l T ruth ([in:] i b id e m , p. 166)
4 A b out th e European s y s tem s s e e th e g en e ra l o utline b y H. N a g e l , D ie Grund- z u e g e d e s B e w e i s r e c h t s im e u r o p ä is c h e n Z i v i lp r o z e s s , B a d e n -B a d e n 1967. S e e a lso G. A. M i c h e l i — M. T a r u f f o, L 'a dm ini st ra ti on d e la p r e u v e en dr o it j ud ic ia i r e, [in:] T o w a r d s a J us t ic e w i t h a H um a n Face, A n tw er p en — D e v en ter 1978, p. 105. For s o c ia -list s y s tem s s e e W . B r o n i e w i c z , O s s e r v a z i o n i sui m e z z i di p r o v a ne l p r o c e s s o c iv i l e d e i p a e s i s o ci alis ti , [in:] St ud i in o nor e di E. T. L iebm an, vo l. 2, M ilan o 1979, p. 951.
5 T he c la s s ic a l w o rk on th e s ub je ct is F. G o r p h e , L 'ap pr éc at io n d e s p r e u v e s en jus tic e, P aris 1947, but it is by n o w rather old and m e th o d o lo g ica lly un so und.
8 S e e c h ie fly M. N o b i l i , U pr i nc i pio d e l lib e r o c o n v in c i m e n t o d e l g iud ic e, M i-la no 1974, and G. W a l t e r , Fre ie B e w e i s w ü r d i g u n g , T ü b in ge n 1979.
7 S ee N o b i l i , op. cit., p. 3, 8; M. T a r u f f o, P r o v e a ti pi c h e e c o n v in c i m e n t o d e l giudi ce, „R ivista di diritto pro ce ss ua le" 1973, p. 399. G e ner ally, th e attem p ts to shape rules for the e v a lu a tio n of proofs dra w ing th em from th e id ea of „ sc ie n tific pr oo f”
T his tr e n d is co n firm e d also in th e th e o r y of th e sta te m e n t of r e a -son s in th e ju d g m en t, sin ce th e co m m on a p p r o ac h is n o t in th e sen se of re q u ir in g an a n a ly tic a n d lo g ica lly v a lid a r g u m e n t as a ch ec k a b le basis of th e ju d g m e n t on th e fa c ts 8. It d e p e n d s on m an y rea so n s, am on g w h ich an im p o rtan t o n e is th e la ck of a c le a r a n d ra tio n a l a n a ly s is ab o u t th e c r ite r ia a n d th e m e th o d of th e e v a lu a tio n of proofs.
F in ally , th e g e n e r a l th e o r y of p r o c e ss h a s stu d ied th e ro le of p a r tie s a n d of th e ju d g e in th e p ro c e e d in g as to th e c o llec tio n of ev id en c e, b u t it did n o t stu d y w h a t h a p p e n s in th e d ecisio n-m a kin g .
In p a r tic u la r, it did n o t stu d y if a n d ho w th e str u c tu r e of th e p r o ceed in g , an d th e w a y in w h ic h th e p a r tie s an d th e ju d g e p la y th e ir r e -sp ec tiv e ro le s as to th e co llec tio n of ev id en c e , h a v e a n in flu e n c e on th e ju d g e 's re a so n in g w h e n h e e v a lu a te s th e p ro o fs a t th e m o m en t of de- cisio n -m ak in g 9.
E ven if th e im p o rtan ce of th e se p ro b lem s is e v id en t n o t o n ly in th e g e n e ra l th e o ry of law a n d of p ro c ess, b u t also for th e d aily a d m in istr a -tion of ju stice , of co u r se I c a n n o t a p p r o a c h h e r e all its fe atu re s, n o t ev e n su m m arily . T h e n I sh a ll lim it m yself to a n a ly sin g o n e poin t, w hich in m y o pin io n is v e r y im p o rtan t, b u t to w h ic h n o b o d y — as fa r as I k n o w — h a s e v e r p a id e n o u g h a tten tio n . II T h e p o in t is if th e r e is a c o n n ectio n , a n d w h a t so r t of c o n n e ctio n it m ay be, b e tw e e n th e s tr u c tu r e of th e p ro ce e d in g a n d th e e v a lu a tio n of p ro o fs in th e d ecision -m ak ing .
I n tu itiv e ly , it seem s t h a t su ch a c o n n e ctio n sh o u ld ex ist, if o n ly w e
h a v e not g iv e n c lea r ou tco m e s: s e e V. D e n t i, Sc ientilicitd, d e lla p r o v a e lib e r a v a l u ta z io n e d e l g iud ic e , „R iv ista di diritto pr oc ess uale" 1972, p. 414. In so c ia lis t c ou n -tries, th e problem is p os e d in a rather differ ent w a y, s in c e th e pr inc iple of the „m a-terial or „ o b je c tiv e truth" se e m s to be a m ore s o lid re fe re nc e point, at le a s t for th o s e w ho sh are the m a r xist-len in ist id ea of ju d icial truth. Se e . L. J. G i n s b u r g, O b j e c t i v e T ruth a nd the J udi cia l P r o c es s in P ost -Sta li nis t S o v ie t J ur is p r u d en c e, „A m e-rican Journal of C o m pa rativ e L aw ” 1961, 10, p. 53; A. J. T r o u s s o v , I ntr o d uc tion à la th é o ri e d e la p r e u v e judi cia ir e, french tra nsla tion , M osc ou 1965, p. 13; J. G w i a z d o m о r s к i, M. C i e ś l a k , La p r e u v e j ud ic i ai r e d a ns l e s p a y s s o c i a li s t e s à l 'é po -q u e c o nt e m p or a i ne , „R ecu eil de la S o c ié té J ea n Bodin" [B r uxe lle s] 1963, v o l. 19, La p r e uv e , p. 68.
8 Se e T a r u f f о, La m oti v az i one .. ., p. 437.
• Som e s u g g e s tio n s m ay be foun d in J. T h i b a u t , L. W a l k e r , P r oc e dur a l Jus tic e. A P s y c h o lo g i c a l A n a l y s i s , H ills da le, N. J., 1975, th o u g h th e w h o le w o rk is b ia se d in fa vor of the A m e ric an ad v e rs ar y sys tem .
th in k o v er th e fa ct th a t th e p ro c es s is o rie n te d to w ar d s th e ju d g m en t, a n d th a t e v id e n c e c o lle cte d in th e c o u r se of th e p ro c ess is in ten d e d to be th e b asis of th e ju d g m e n t on th e fa cts in issue.
F ro m th is p o in t of v iew , w e c a n n o t b elie v e th a t th e e v a lu a tio n of p ro o fs is co m p letely in d e p en d e n t of the f e a tu r e s of th e p ro c eed in g , n ot o n ly b e c a u se ru le s of ev id e n c e h a v e an in flu en c e u p o n th e ju d g m en t (w hich is ob viou s, f.i., w h e n a n item of e v id e n c e is le g a lly in adm issible), b u t also b e c au se th e m odel of th e p ro cess, a n d th e w a y in w h ich th e p a r tie s a n d th e ju d g e p la y th e ir r o le in it, d e te r m in e „ d iff er en t d e ci-sio n -m a king p ro b lem s" in th e se v e r al cases.
T h e c o m p a ra tiv e a n a ly sis co n firm s it: f.i., th e d e fin itio n of „ju d icial tru th " c h a n g es d e e p ly if w e c o n sid e r th e a d v e rs a r y sy stem -m astere d b y p a rtie s- or th e in q u isito rial sy ste m , o rie n te d to w a rd s th e se a rc h of m ate r ia l tru th , ch iefly b y m ea n s of th e ju d g e 's p o w e r s10.
To c le a r u p m y th o u g h t, th e a n a ly s is of so m e ty p ic a l ,,d ecision-m a- k in g p ro b lem s" m ay b e u sefu l, d istin g u ish in g th em a c co rd in g to th e p ro c e d u ra l situ atio n s fro m w h ich th e y follow .
T hen, I sh all c o n sid er tw o p r o c e d u ra l fa cto rs w h ich h a v e a n in flu e n -ce in sh ap in g th ese situ a tio n s.
M y aim is to sh o w how , w h e n th e ty p e of p ro c e ed in g a n d th e m eth o d of co llectin g e v id e n ce a r e d ifferen t, also eth e d e cisio n m ak in g p r o b -lem th a t th e ju d g e h as to so lv e c h a n g es c o rresp o n d in g ly .
1. W e h a v e a first ty p e - situ a tio n w h en th e r e is o n ly o n e item of e v id en c e o n th e fa c t th a t m u st b e p ro v e d . If th e p roo f h a s a p o sitiv e o utco m e, it m ay seem th a t th e r e a r e no p a r tic u la r p ro b lem s of e v a lu a tio n: th e ju d g e d ete rm in e s its p ro b a tiv e v a lu e and, if su ch a v a lu e r e a -ch e s a su fficien t d e g re e of p r o b a b ility 11, th e f ac t is „ ju d ic ia lly tru e " .
A s a m a tte r of fact, th in g s a r e n o t so sim ple, b e c a u se th e d ecisio n - -m a kin g p ro b lem h a s d iffe re n t f e a tu r e s in th e se v e ra l cases.
F irst of all, w e m u st d istin g u ish if th e e v id e n c e w a s p r o p o s ed b y a p a r ty o r it w as o rd e r ed b y th e ju d g e o n h is o w n m o tion.
10 A b out th e ide a of ju dic ial truth in the a dv e rs ar y s y s te m s se e , a lso for a bi-bliograp hy, M. T a r u f f о, II p i o c e s s o c iv i l e „ a d v e r s a r y " ne l l' e s pe r i e nz a am er ic ana , P adova 1979, p. 44.
11 S tr ictly sp ea k in g, th e pr ob ative v a lu e is the de g r e e of lo g ic a l or sta tistic a l pr obab ility as cr ibed by the ju dg e to the s tatem en t of fact that is th e o u tc o m e of the proof. So ch a d efin itio n as su m e s a r a tio n a lisa tio n of th e e v a lu a tio n o f pro ofs that fo llo w s the lo g ic a l m ode l of in d uc tiv e in fe re n ce ba se d on p ro bab ility standards. On th is top ic s e e A. S t e n i n g, B e v i s v ä r d e , U pps ala 1975, M. T a r u f f o , Sl ud i s ulla r i le v a nz a de l la p r ov a , P a dov a 1970, p. 231; V. C. B a l l , T he M om e n t of T r u t h : P ro -b a -b i l i ty T h e o r y and S ta nd ar d ol Proof, „V a nde r-bild t Law R e view " 1961, 14, p. 807.
la ) In th e fo rm e r ca se, sin ce th e p a r ty aim s at p r o v in g th e a cc o u n t of th e fa ct th a t is f a v o r a b le to h e r s e 1 f12, e v id e n c e is ,,p a r ty - o r ie n te d ” . It m e an s th a t e v id e n c e d o es n o t aim a t sh o w in g th e „ o b je c tiv e ” or „m a-te ria l tr u t h ” of th e fact, b u t a t p ro v in g th e a c c o u n t of th e fact w h ic h th e p a r ty sta te s in o r d e r to m a ke h e r claim fo un ded .
In this case, if th e ju d g e lim its h im self to d e ter m in in g th e p ro b a tiv e v alu e of th e p ro o f (f.i. b e c a u se h e is b o u n d to b ase his ju d g m en t on ev id e n c e o ffered b y p a rtie s: see art. 115 of th e ita lia n co d e of civ il p ro c e d u re ), a n d h e fo un d s th e „ ju d icial t r u th ” on th is v alu e , th e c o n se q u e n ce is th a t w e h a v e n o t a n „ o b jec tiv e tr u th " , b u t a „ p a rty o rie n -te d ” tr u t h th a t is c o n sid er ed as it w e r e a „ m a -te r ia l tru th " .
A s a rule, ac c o rd in g to th e p rin c ip le of fr e e ev a lu a tio n , th e ju d g e is th o u g h t to b e a llo w e d to d ra w o n h is o w n m o tio n so m e e le m en ts of p r o o f from o th e r so u rces, a n d it co u ld m ak e th e ju d g m e n t o n th e fac ts „m o re o b je ctiv e " . N e v e rth e le ss, it is o fte n im p ossible (i.e. w h e n e -v er e-v id e n c e o ffered b y a p a r ty is th e o n ly so u rc e of co n -victio n ), and th e ju d g e o ften d o es n o t w o r r y o v er se a r ch in g th e o b je c tiv e tru th , an d h e lim its h im self to ju d g in g ac c o rd in g to th e „ p a rty - tru th " .
lb ) In th e la t te r case, e v id en c e is „ n e u tr a l”, sin c e th e ju d g e aim s a t sea r ch in g th e o b je c tiv e tru th of th e fact. H e re th e d ef in itio n of th e p r o b a tiv e v a lu e m ay b e su ffic ien t to d e te r m in e th e ju d ic ia l t r u th 13.
N e v e rth e le ss , th e r e is th e d an g e r th at, sin ce e v id e n c e is „co m ing from th e ju d g e ", h e te n d s to o v e r e stim a te its p r o b a tiv e v a lu e 14.
T hen, a n im p o r tan t v a r ia b le in su ch a ju d g m e n t is w e th e r th e p a r -tie s had, o r not, th e o p p o rtu n ity to k n o w an d to d isc u ss p re v io u sly th e e v id en c e a n d its p ro b a tiv e o utco m e, a n d th e n to g iv e th e ju d g e cr itic al elem e n ts for its e v a lu a tio n . H e re th e le g al p r in c ip le of th e c o n tr a d ic to r y
15 It is pa rticu larly e vid e n t w h e n the party w ho pr opo se s an item of e v id e n c e m ust a lso state p r e c is e ly its „object" (se e e.g. art. 244 of th e ita lian c o de of c iv il procedure). It m e ans, in fact, that th e pu rpos e of e v id e n c e is not — qu ite g ene ri- c a lly — to p ro v e „a fact" , but to pr o v e th e truth of a sta te m e nt of fact w h ic h is iix e d by th e par ly w h o offers th e e v id e n c e : suc h a sta te m ent is o b v io u s ly fa vo ra b le to th e par ty's in tere st.
11 H er e the as su m p tio n is that th e ju d ge d o es not s ta te in a d v an c e a n ac cou nt of the fac t as „object" of th e e v id e n c e , or, if h e do es it, the statem en t of th e fact is not par ty-orie nted, but aim s at be ing „neutral" or „ob je ctiv e" .
14 It sh o uld n ot ha ppe n if the ju dg e a p plie s str ictly the r u les o l in d uc tiv e lo g ic and p ro bab ility standards. T he dan ger a ris es from th e fact that the e v a lu a tio n of proo fs is often lo o s e and op en to s u b je c tiv e attitud es.
b e tw e en p a r ti e s 13 a p p e a r s as a r a tio n a l p rin c ip le for th e p ro p e r e v a lu -a tio n of proofs.
W e m u st n ow in tr o d u c e th e k ey d istin c tio n -m ad e ch iefly b y W ró b lew sk i- b etw e en „facts d e sc r ip tiv e ly d ete rm in e d " a n d „facts e v a lu a tiv e ly d e te r m in e d " ie. W h a t w e h a v e said till n ow is v a lid fo r th e first k in d of facts, b u t if th e m a tte r is of p ro v in g a fa ct e v a lu a tiv e ly d ete rm in e d th in g s tu rn m uch m ore co m p licated .
T ak e f.i. ev id e n c e of „facts th a t m a k e th e co h a b ita tio n of h u sb a n d an d w ife u n b e a ra b le " as a g r o u n d fo r ju d ic ia l se p a ra tio n (see a rt. 151 of th e ita lia n civ il code).
A s to e v id e n c e of „facts" in a str ic t se n s e th e r e is n o p ro b lem , an d w h a t w e said b ef o re is v alid . T h e p ro b le m c o n ce rn s th e im p o ssib ility of th e co h a b ita tio n , w h ich d e p e n d s e v id e n tly on a v a lu e ju d g m e n t ab o u t „facts".
In th e ca se (la ) of e v id e n c e offered b y a p ar ty , the p a r ty aim s at p ro v in g n o t o n ly h e r o w n a c co u n t of th e „ fa c ts” in a s tric t se nse, b u t ch ie fly a t fo u nd ing h er o w n v a lu e ju d g m e n t a b o u t th e se rio u sn e ss of th e facts an d th eir in c o m p atib ility w ith th e c o h a b ita tio n of h u sb an d a n d wife.
In this case, if th e ju d g e is o r th in k s to b e b o u n d to e v id e n c e co m -ing fro m th e p a rty , h e w ill c o n sid er as „ju d icia l t r u th ” b o th th e p a rty - -o r ie n te d a c c o u n t of th e facts, a n d th e p a r ty - o r ie n te d v a lu e ju d g m e n t
ab o u t th e facts.
N e v e rth e le ss , h e m igh t a g re e w ith th e „ tr u th of th e p a r ty " ab o u t th e d es c rip tiv e ele m e n t of th e „facts", b u t n o t w ith th e v a lu e ju d g m en t of th e p a r ty ab o u t them . T h e refo r e, h e m ig h t m ak e a v a lu e ju d g m en t b y h im self, on th e b asis of h is o w n v a lu es, a b o u t th e im p ossib ility of th e co h ab itatio n .
F u rth er m o re , if th e o th e r p a r ty h a d th e o p p o rtu n ity to d isc u ss th e e v id en c e an d th e n to m ak e h e r o w n v a lu e ju d g m en t a b o u t th e facts,
15 S ee g e n e r a lly M. C a p p e l l c t t i , F un d a m e n ta l G u a r an te es ol t he P a r ti es In C i v i l P r o c e e d in gs , [in:] F un da m e nta l G ua r a n te e s ol t he P a r ti es in C i v il L it ig atio n, M ilan o— N e w York 1973, p. 746
16 S e e W r ó b l e w s k i , Facts... W rô b le w s ki's c la s s ific a tio n of fa cts is m ore co m plex , s in c e fa cts c an be de te rm ine d in th re e e s s e n tia l m anners: d e s c rip tiv e or e v a lu a -tiv e ; p o s i-tiv e or n e g a -tiv e ; s im p le or r ela tio n a l. For m y p urp os es the v e r y e s s e n tia l o p po s itio n is the first o ne; th e s e c o n d o ne , in fact, m a y b e le s s r ele v a n t from th e point of v ie w of th e e v a lu a tio n of proofs, or it m a y be a bsor bed b y th e fa ct that w h en the re are tw o o p p o site proofs, th e o u tc om e of o n e of th em is a p o s itiv e sta-te m e nt of th e fact, and the o u tco m e of th e o the r is a n e g a tiv e sta sta-tem en t of th e sam e fact. B eside s, I m ay l e a v e out th e third o p p o sition both for th e s ak e of p la inn e ss , and p articu lar ly b e ca u s e th e problem s of fac ts d ete rm ine d „in a r elation a l w ay " c o n -ce rn c h ie fly th e in ter pr eta tio n of th e ru le of la w (or of s e v e ra l r ules), rather than the d ete rm in ation of th e truth or fa ls e n e ss of a fact.
th e ju d g e h as to ch o o se b etw e en o p p o site v alu e ju d g m en ts m a d e by p ar tie s.
In th e ca se (1b) of e v id e n c e o r d e re d by th e ju d g e, n o t o n ly th e „ d e sc rip tiv e k n o w led g e " of th e facts, b u t also th e v a lu e ju d g m en t a b o u t th em a r e te n d e n tia lly „ n e u tr a l" . It m ean s th a t th e ju d g e is in cli-n ed to s e a r c h th e o b je c tiv e tr u th of fa cts icli-n th e s tr ic t secli-n se, acli-n d also to m a k e a n e u tr a l e v a lu a tio n of them . It also m ean s th a t th e v alu e s of th e ju d g e b ec om e c rite ria of ą v a lu e ju d g m en t t h a t is n e u tr a l b y d e
fi-nition.
N e v e rth e le ss , if p a r tie s h ad th e o p p o rtu n ity to d iscu ss th e e v id e n -ce, a n d th e n to m ak e th e ir o w n v a lu e ju d g m en ts ab o u t th e facts, the ju d g e m igh t ch o o se b e tw e e n o p p o site p a rty - o r ie n te d v a lu e ju d g m e n ts, in o p p o sitio n w ith his o w n v a lu e jud g m en t. In sh o rt, th e r e m ay b e a ch o ic e am on g th r e e v a lu e ju d g m en ts (tw o m ad e b y p a rtie s, a n d th e th ird o n e b y th e ju d ge) a b o u t th e sam e facts.
Ill
2. T h e se co n d ty p e - situ a tio n is w h e n o n th e fa ct th e r e a r e o p p o site ite m s of e v id e n c e : th e form er, p ro p o se d b y th e plain tiff, w h ic h aim s a t p ro v in g th e tr u th of th e fact; th e la tte r , p ro p o se d b y th e d e fen d a n t, w h ich aim s a t p ro v in g its f alsen e ss. S uch a s itu a tio n is ty p ic a l of th e p ro c e d u r a l sy stem s th at follow th e „ a d v e r sa r y p r in c ip le ”17.
S in ce th e item s of e v id e n c e a r e „ p a rty -o rie n te d " , th e y g iv e p a r tisa n a n d o p p o site a c c o u n ts of th e fact. C o n se q u e n tly , th e d e cisio n -m a k in g p ro b lem is to ch o o se b e tw e e n th e „ tr u th of th e p lain tiff" an d th e „ tru th of th e d e fe n d a n t” . H e re th e lo gic of th e ju d g m e n t is n o t o n ly th e log ic of p ro b a b ility of th e sta te m e n ts of fact, b u t th e lo gic of th e ch o ice b e tw e en tw o sta tem e n ts of th e sam e fact, th a t a r e o p p o site in th e ir c o n te n t18.
S u ch a ch o ice m ay b e p u t a t d iffe ren t lev els, t h a t is:
a) at th e le v el of th e re lia b ility of pro o fs ta k e n o n e b y one. It re q u ir e s a c o m p a ra tiv e e v a lu a tio n of th e d e g re e of p ro b a b ility of th e sta tem e n t of tru th of th e fact, an d of th e d e g r e e of p ro b a b ility of th e s ta te m e n t of its falsen e ss. T h e s tate m e n t w ith a h ig h e r d e g r e e of lo g ical o r s ta tistic a l p ro b a b ility is „ ju d icia lly tru e " .
17 S e e supra n. 10, and T h i b a u t , W a l k e r , op. cit., p. 28.
18 In g e n er a l s e e G. G o t t l e i b , T he Logic o l C ho ic e, L ondon 1968; S ee a lso R о e d i g, op. cit. , p. 112, 148, and i d e m , Die D c nk lo r m d e r A l t e r n a t i v e in de r Ju r is p r u de nz , B r ün— H e ide lb e rg — N e w York 1969.
b) a t th e lev e l of th e c r ite r ia of e v a lu a tio n . T h e ch o ice of th e ju d g e m ay c o n c e rn n o t d ir e c tly th e c re d ib ility of th e p ro o f (f.i. of th e w itn ess), b u t th e c r ite r ia of in d u ctiv e k n o w led g e of th e facts. A c-co rd in g to w e th e r th e ju d g e th in k s v a lid o n e or a n o th e r r u le of co m m on sen se or of in d u ctiv e logic, th e o u tco m e of th e ju d g m en t of fact m ay c h a n g e 1”. T his is p a r ti c u la r ly th e ca se w h e n ev id en ce is n o t d ire c t o r „m ate ria l" , b u t in d ire ct or „ c irc u m stan tial" . In th e la tte r case, w h a t co u n ts m o re is th e in d u c tiv e in f er en ce from th e fac t d ire c tly p ro v e d to th e fact th a t m u st b e in d ire c tly (ind u ctiv ely) k n o w n b y th e ju d g e as „ m a te rial" for th e ca se 20.
If th e m a tte r co n c e rn s facts e v a lu a t iv e ly d eter m in e d , th e o p p o si-tion m ay b e n o t a t th e le v el of th e tru th or fa lse n e ss of th e fa c t d e s-c r ip tiv e ly d e ter m in e d , b u t p ro p e rly a t th e le v el of its ev alu a tio n .
In th e e x a m p le of „facts w h ich m ak e th e c o h a b ita tio n u n b ea r a b le " , it m ay h ap p e n th a t:
a) th e o p p o sitio n is b etw e en tr u th an d fa lse n ess of th e „facts" d es c rip -tiv e ly d eterm ine d , or
b) th e re is no o p p o sitio n ab o u t th e tru th of th e facts, b u t th e o p p o si-tio n is ab o u t th e ir c a p a c ity to m a k e th e co h a b ita si-tio n u n b e a ra b le . In th e c ase b), th e p ro b le m th a t th e ju d g e h as to so lv e is n o t c o g n i-tiv e, sin c e th e p a r tie s a g r e e on th e tr u t h of th e fact, b u t e v a lu a i-tiv e in a p r o p e r sen se . It m eans th a t th e ju dg e m ust ch o o se b e tw e e n th e v a lu e ju d g m e n t of th e p lain tiff and th e v a lu e ju d g m en t of th e d e fe n d a n t
ab o u t the sam e „facts".
In th is ca se th e re is no p ro b lem of d eter m in in g th e h ig h e r p r o b a b i-lity of a s tate m e n t of fact, an d th e p ro blem is of ch oo sing th e p re v a ilin g v a lu e to ta k e as a g ro u n d for th e ev a lu a tio n .
T h e fu n d a m e n tal p r in cip le of th e a d v e r s a r y sy stem com p els th e ju d -g e to ch o o se o n ly b e tw e en th e o p p o site ac co u n ts of th e fac t -g iv e n b y p a rtie s, assu m in g th a t th e „ tru th " of on e of th e m m ust b e ta k e n as j u -d icial tr u th 21. It m ean s th a t for fa cts -d e s c rip tiv e ly -d eterm in e -d th e ju -d g e ca n n o t ch o o se a „th ird " a cc o u n t of th e facts, an d also th a t for facts e v a lu a tiv e ly d e te rm in e d h e c an n o t ch o o se a „ th ird an d n e u tr a l” e v a
-lu atio n of th e m 22.
19 A b out tho problem of r u les or c riter ia of in d uc tiv e e v a lu a tio n of fa c ts s e e g e n e r a lly T a r u f f o , C e r t e z z a e pr o ba bi lity ..,, p. 89; i d e m , La m oti v az i on e .. ., p. 243; M. N o b i l i , N u o v e p o le m ic h e su lle c o s i d e tt e „m a s s im e d'es p er ienz a" , „R ivis ta ita- li'ina di diritto p r o c e s s ib l e péna le" 1969, p. 123; J. L o e b e r , Die V e r w e r t u n g v o n Er/ ahrungs sä'.z en dur c h d e n R ic h te r im Z iv i lp r o z e s s , K iel 1972.
20 S e e g e n e r a lly T a r u f f o , Slud i su 11a r ilev anz a... 21 S ee n. 10.
22 T he point is clea r in th e „c la ss ic al" ac cou nt of th e a dv e r sa ry s ys te m : s e e e.g. P. W e i l e r , T w o M o d e ls o l Ju dic ia l D e ci s io n -M a ki n g, „The C an adia n Bar R eview "
3. T h e th ird ty p e situ a tio n is w hen, b e sid es o p p o site e v id e n c e s c o -m in g fro-m th e p a rtie s, th e r e is on th e fact so -m e e v id e n c e o rd e r e d b y th e ju d ge. S u ch a situ a tio n is ty p ic al of th e so ca lle d „m ix ed ” o r „ in -q u is ito r ia l” sy ste m s, w h e re th e ju d g e m ay o r m u st w ield p ro b a tiv e p o w e rs on his o w n m o tio n 23.
S in ce th e d e cisio n -m ak in g p ro b lem is to ju d g e on th e b a sis of dif-f e re n t e v id e n c es, it is a p ro b le m odif-f c ho ice am o ng d idif-fdif-f er en t a c c o u n ts odif-f
th e fact. Y et w e h a v e h e r e a fu rth e r e le m e n t in c o m p ar iso n w ith th e a d v e r s a ry situ atio n . It is g iv e n by th e e x is te n c e of e v id e n c e th a t is „ n e u tr a l” b y d ef in itio n (or „ n o n -p a rtisa n ” ), a n d th a t, c o n se q u e n tly , sh o u ld b e clo se to th e „ o b jec tiv e tr u th ” of th e f ac t m o re th a n „ p a rtis a n ” e v id e n c e m ay be. M o re o v e r, th e re irtis th e p o rtisrtisib ility th a t th e ju d -g e c ho o se s a „ th ir d ” so lutio n, d iffe re n t b o th of th e p lain tiff's an d th e d ef e n d an t's o n es24.
A b o u t e v id e n c e com ing from th e ju d g e, w e m ay h a v e tw o b asic ca ses:
a) e v id e n c e fro m th e ju d g e a g r e e s in its o u tc o m e w ith e v id e n ce fro m a p a rty ;
b) e v id e n c e from th e ju d g e d o es n o t a g r e e in its o u tco m e n e ith e r w ith the p lain tiff 's one, n o r w ith th e d e fe n d a n t's one.
In th e ca se a), ev id e n c e com ing from th e ju d g e stre n g th e n s e v id e n -tly th e p ro b a tiv e v a lu e of th e p a r ty ev id e n c e w ith w h ich it ag r ees, b e c a u s e th e r e a r e tw o item s of ev id e n c e for an a cc o u n t of th e fa ct an d o n ly o n e item for th e o p po site on e, an d b ec au se th e „ n e u tr a l ity ” of th e ju d g e 's ev id e n c e d e ter m in e s th e ch o ice of th e ju d g e ab o u t th e ju d icial tru th of th e facts.
In th e c ase b), e v id e n c e com in g fro m th e ju d g e g iv e s th e th ir d c h a n -ce of ju d g m e n t. H e r e th e s tr u c t u r e of th e d ec isio n -m ak in g p ro b lem
ch an ges, b e c a u se th e ch o ice is no m o re b e tw e e n tr u t h an d fa lse n ess of th e fact, b u t am o ng th r e e d iffer en t ac co u n ts of it. F u rth e rm o r e , th ese
1968, 46, p. 412. N e v e r th e le s s , it turns u nc er tain and de b atab le w h en th e ju d ge is c o n sid e r ed a s a la w -fin de r or as a p ro b le m -s olv er w ho m ust be a c tiv e in th e search of a just and inform ed d ec is io n : s e e T a r u f f o , II p r o c e s s o c i v i l e „ad ve rs ar y " ... , p. 138.
23 S ee g e n e r a lly D. B r u o g g e m a n n , J u d e x s l a t u t o r u nd j u d e x i n v e s ti g a to r , B ielefeld 1968; B. C a v a l l o n e , I p o t e r i di i ni z ia l iv a is t r ul to r ia d e l g iu d ic e c i v ile , M ilano 1968; V. D e n t i, L ' ev o lu z io ne d e l di r it to d e li e p r o v e ne i p r o c e s s i c i v i li con- le m p o r an e i, „R ivista di diritto pr oc es su ale" 1965, p. 46.
14 H er e and in the follo w in g, th e ide a of ju dge's „ne utr ality " is c lo s e ly r e la tiv e and fun ctio na l, s in c e it m ea ns o n ly „n on-partisanship" of th e ju dg e in th e se arch of e v id e n c e and in m aking judg m ents, c o g n itiv e of e v a lu a tiv e , about the fa cts in issu e. C on s e q u en tly , I do not as su m e a n y g e n er a l id e a or id e o lo g ic a l d e lin itio n of the ne u-tra lity of th e judgg in th e le g a l s y s tem or in th e so c ial order.
th re e ac co u n ts a r e n o t h o m o g en eo u s, b e c a u se tw o of th e m a r e ty p i-ca lly „ p a r ti sa n ”, w h ile th e th ird o n e is „ n o n p a r tis a n ” .
A lso in th is situ atio n , th e p ro b lem is d iffere n t for facts d e sc r ip tiv e ly d eter m in e d an d for fa cts e v a lu a tiv e ly d eterm in ed .
F o r th e first on es, th e ca se a) in c re a se s th e p ro b a b ility of th e tru th o r of th e fa lse n e ss of th e fact, w h ile th e ca se b) re q u ir es to d e te rm in e w h ich am o ng th e th r e e a c co u n ts of th e fac t h a s th e h ig h e st d e g re e of
p ro b ab ility .
F or th e sec o n d ones, in th e ca se a) ev id e n c e co m ing from th e ju d g e stre n g th e n s th e e v a lu a tio n p r o p o se d b y o ne of th e p ar ties, and, ad d in g a „ n o n - p a r tisa n ” e v a lu a tio n , so lv es the e v a lu a tio n p ro b lem . In the c ase b), e v id e n c e com in g from th e ju d g e in tro d u ce s a „ th ird ” an d ,,n on -p ar- tisan " v alu e ju d g m en t: so it w id e n s th e ra n g e of th e e v a lu a tiv e ch o i-ces of th e jud g e, a n d it m ak es p o ssible a v a l u e ju d g m e n t th a t d oes n ot
a g re e e ith e r w ith th e p lain tiff's o n e or w ith th e d e fe n d a n t's one.
IV
A fte r h a v in g see n th e m ain ty p es of d e cisio n -m ak in g situ a tio n s, w e m u st n ow u n d e rlin e th a t ju d ic ia l r e a so n in g in th e e v a lu a tio n of p ro o fs do es n o t d e p e n d o n ly on th e k ind of th e d e cisio n -m ak in g p ro blem , b u t also on th e fe a tu re s of th e e v id e n tia r y m a te rial su b m itte d to th e ju d -g e's e v a lu a tio n . S uch f e a tu r e s d epe nd , in th e ir tu rn , on th e tech n iq u e
of ev id e n c e collectio n , an d chiefly:
a) on th e e x a m in a tio n m eth o d u se d in th e trial, and b) on w h a t is a c tu a lly a p p r a ise d b y th e jud ge.
E x am in atio n m eth o d s m ay b e ro u g h ly d iv id e d in to tw o k in d s: 1) e x a m in a tio n of w itn e sse s b y th e ju d g e (free o r b o u n d to facts sta te d b y th e p a rties);
2) d ire c t e x a m in a tio n b y a p a r ty 's la w y e r, p o ssib ly follo w ed by a c ro ss-e x am in a tio n .
T h e first m eth o d m ay b e d ef in ed as n o n -p a r tisa n b ec au se , e v e n if e v id e n c e is o ffered b y a p a r ty ab o u t facts s tate d b y h erself, th e ju d g e te n ds to o b ta in from th e w itn ess a n o b je c tiv e ac c o u n t of th e facts. S uch a p o ssib ility in cr e a se s if th e ju d g e can e x a m in e fr e e ly th e w itn ess, b e c a u se in su ch a ca se th e e x a m in e r is n o t b o u n d to fa cts sta te d b y
a n in te re s te d p ar ty .
T his m eth od lessen s th e „ p a rtisa n sh ip ” of th e p a rty o rie n te d e v id e n -ce, a n d in c re a se s th e „ n e u tr a l ity ” of th e e v id e n c e o rd e re d b y th e ju d- ne. T h e c o n tra in d ic a tio n is th a t th e c o llec tio n of th e item s of e v id e n c e m ay b e in co m p lete if th e ju d g e is n o t „ a c tiv e ” in th e e x a m in a tio n
(be-c a u se h e do es n o t k n o w th e fa(be-cts, or b e(be-c a u se h e is n o t in te r e ste d in a ca re fu l se a rc h of tru th).
T h ere fo re , this m eth od e n su r e s a g o od d e g r e e of n e u tr a lity of th e proof, b u t it d o es n o t a lw a y s e n s u r e its „ co m p le te n ess" from th e p o in t of v iew of th e o b je ctiv e tr u th a b o u t th e fa cts in issue.
T h e se co n d m e th o d is ty p ic a lly „ p a r tisa n ” , b e c a u se th e la w y e r w h o e x a m in e s th e w itn ess aim s o b v io u sly at o b tain in g a co n fir m a tio n of his ow n a c co u n t of th e facts.
C o n se q u en tly , th is m eth o d in c re a se s th e p a r tis a n sh ip of th e p ar ty - -o r ie n te d e v id e n c e , an d less en s th e n e u tr a lity of th e e v id e n c e com in g from th e ju d g e. G en erally , it h as a d irec t in flu e n c e in sh ap in g th e de- cisio n -m ak in g p ro blem , sin ce it a l w a y s g iv es th e ju d g e a n o n e-sid ed a c co u n t of th e o u tco m e of the proof.
T h is o n e-sid ed n ess is c o u n te rb a la n c e d b y th e c ro ss-e x a m in atio n , w h ic h aim s a t w e ak en in g th e r e lia b ility of th e w itn ess, or a t g iv in g th e jud ge an o p p o site o n e-side d a c c o u n t of th e facts, d ra w in g it fro m th e sam e w itn e ss25.
T h e d e cisio n m ak in g p ro b le m is also in flu en ced , b e c a u se th e o u tc o -m e of th e -m ac h in e r y ex a -m in a tio n /c ro ss-e x a-m in atio n is g iv in g th e ju d g e tw o o p p o site an d o n e-sid ed se rie s of e v a lu a tio n e le m e n ts (d e sc rip tiv e a n d /o r e v a lu a tiv e ) , d raw in g th em from th e sam e item of e v id e n c e . T h en th e e v a lu a tio n of th e p ro o f c a n n o t be re d u c e d m e re ly to d e te rm in in g th e p ro b a b ility of a sta te m e n t of fact, b u t it im p lies th e ch o ice b e tw e en
tw o o p p o site an d o n e-sid ed se rie s of sta tem e n ts a b o u t th e fact.
T h e a d v a n ta g e of th is m etho d m ay b e th e m o re th o r o u g h and com -p le te d isc o v e ry of tr u th (b eca use m ad e b y th e in te r e s te d -p a rtie s)28, e v e n if th e ju d g e m u st ch o o se o n ly b e tw e e n tw o p a r ty - o r ie n te d tru th s.
V
T h e o th e r v a r ia n t th a t h as an in flu en c e on th e w a y in w h ich proo fs a r e e v a lu a te d is th e specific an d m ate ria l o b jec t of th e ju d g e 's a p p r a i-sal, th a t m ay b e d iffe ren t acco rd in g to th e p ro c e d u ra l fe atu re s of th e co n n e ctio n b e tw e e n p roo f an d ju d gm en t.
25 In pr actice, th e real ou tco m e of c ro s s-ex am in a tio n de pe n ds both on its le g a l r eg u la tio n (which m a y v a ry c on s id e r a b ly in the s e v e ra l s y s te m s ), and o n th e attitude s ol la w y e r s in i!s us e or m isu se . S ee g e n e ra lly , and for r e fe re n ce s T a r u f f o , II p r o c e s s o c iv i l e „ad ve r s ar y" ... , p. 29.
26 At le a s t, th is is the m ost popular and tr ad itio na l o pinion about th e sc o p e of c ro ss ex am ina tio n : s e e e.g. H. W i g m o r e , A T r e a ti s e on th e A n g lo A m e r ic a n S y s -t e m ol E vide nc e in T ri als a-t C o m m o n Law, v ol. 5, B os -ton 1940, p. 29.
If th e ju d g m e n t fo llo w s im m ed iately th e co llec tio n of e v id e n c e (i.e.: facts a r e ju d g ed ju st a t th e e n d of th e tria l h ea rin g d ev o te d to th e e x a -m in atio n of w itn e sses), th e o b je c t of the e v a lu a tio n is th e d ire ct and co m p lete p e r c e p tio n of th e e v id en c e, sin c e th e ju d g e a p p ra ise s all w h at h e h as h e a r d an d see n a t th e h e ar in g . S uch an a p p r a isa l is m ad e b oth o n th e s ta te m e n ts an d on th e b e h a v io r of th e w itn ess d u rin g h is e x a -m inatio n.
A s a m a tte r of e v alu a tio n , in th is c ase th e s ta te m e n ts m ad e b y th e w itn e ss on th e fac t a r e ac co m p a n ie d by tw o g ro u p s of c o n te x tu a l d e m e n ts th a t a r e u sefu l to a p p r a ise p ro p e r ly th e re lia b ility of su ch s ta te -m en ts:
a) „ te x tu a l" e le m e n ts g iv e n by th e la n g u a g e u se d b y th e w itn ess, b y th e lo gical an d sem an tic n a tu r e of his s ta te m e n ts (f.i.: c o n tra d ic to ry sta te m en ts, am b igu itie s, an d so on);
b) „ b e h a v io ra l" e le m en ts as e m b a rr assm e n t, re tic en ce , p sy c h o lo g ica l re a c tio n s (blush), an d so on.
In th is c ase th e e v a lu a tio n of p ro o fs m ay b e v e r y co m plicated , b e -c a u se it m ay im ply s ev e r a l elem e n ts a n d se v e r al -c r ite ria , b u t it h as th e a d v a n ta g e of b ein g c o m p l e t e , b e c a u se th e ju d g e ca n r e a lly u se all
w h a t m ay b e r e le v a n t for th e p ro p e r a p p r a isa l of th e proof.
If, on th e c o n tr a r y , th e ju d g m e n t d oes n o t fo llow im m e diate ly th e tria l h ea rin g , th e e v a lu a tio n of p ro o fs c a n b e m ade o n ly on th e w ritte n r e c o r d of th e h e arin g . S o m etim es ta p e - re c o rd in g s a r e u sed , an d in th e U n ited S ta tes th e u se of v id e o ta p e s h as b ee n p ro p o se d 27, b u t th e n o rm al fo rm of re c o r d in g is still th e w ritte n one.
T h e m ain c o n seq u e n ce is th a t in th is w a y th e „ b e h a v io ra l" e le m e n ts of a p p r ais al ab o u t th e c re d ib ility of th e w itn ess a r e lost. E v en if th e ju dge m ay o rd e r th a t su ch e le m e n ts a r e rec o rd e d , th e ir d ire c t p e r c e p tion is lost all the sam e, an d th e re co rd is in co m p le te a ll th e sam e, b e -c a u s e it -c a n n o t r e p r o d u -c e all th e b eh a v io r of th e w itn ess.
A s to th e „ te x tu a l" e le m en ts, th e e v a lu a tio n of p roo fs d e p e n d s on th e r e g u la tio n of th e re co rd . C o n seq u e n tly :
a) if th e re c o rd re p ro d u c e s all w h a t w as said in th e co u rse of th e e x a -m in ation , all th e se e le -m e n ts a r e r e ta in e d an d ca n be u sed for th e e v a lu a tio n of p roofs.
b) if, on th e c o n tr a r y (as it h ap p e n s f.i. in Italy ), th e re c o rd is a su m m ar y of w h a t w as said in th e c o u rse of th e ex a m in a tio n , tw o im -p o r ta n t c o n se q u e n c e s follow.
T h e fo rm er o n e is th a t m an y te x tu al e le m e n ts a r e lost, an d th e la tte r o n e is th a t th e e v a lu a tio n is n o t m ad e d ire c tly on th e sta tem e n ts of th e
17 Se>:: T. D о г с t, T rial b y V i d e o t a p e . C an J u s ti ce Be S e e n t o Be Done? „T em ple Law Q uar terly" 1975, 47, p. 25*>.
W itness, b u t o n an a c c o u n t of th em th a t is su m m arized , r e o r g a n ize d a n d h a n d led b y th e ju d g e of th e h ea rin g .
T h ere fo re , th e e v a lu a tio n of p roo fs is sim pler, b u t m u ch m o re s c a n -ty, failin g m an y of th e co n te x tu a l elem e n ts, a n d it is la r g e ly lim ited and p re d e te rm in e d by th e ju d g e th a t d r ew up th e rec o rd . If, fu r th e rm o re, th e ju d g e of th e re co rd is n ot th e sa m e w ho d ec id e s th e case, or h e do es n o t d ec id e im m e d iately (as it is o ften in Italy ), th e g ap b etw e e n th e r e a lity of th e p r o o f an d th e m ean s fo r its e v a lu a tio n b ec o m es alm o st
im p ossible to fill.
A s I h o p e to h a v e sh o w n , a th e o r y of ju d icial re a so n in g in th e e v a -lu a tio n of p ro o fs c a n n o t le a v e o u t of c o n s id e r atio n th e fa ct th a t th e fe a tu r e s of th e de cisio n -m a k in g p ro b lem s as to th e facts in issu e d ep e n d on s e v e r a l fa cto rs. S uch factors, in th eir tu rn , d e p en d on th e g e n e r a l c h a r a c te rs of th e se v e ra l p ro c e d u ra l system s, on th e k in d of th e fa cts w h ic h m u st b e p r o v e d in th e se v e ra l situ a tio n s, a n d o n th e leg a l r e g u
-latio n of th e tria l h e a rin g and of th e reco rd .
Being of co u rse im po ssib le h e r e a co m p lete e x a m in a tio n of all the v a r ia b le s th a t m ay h a v e a d ire c t or in d ire c t in flu e n c e in sh ap in g th e d ec isio n m a k in g p ro b lem in th e r e a lity of th e ju d g m en t, I w as co m
-p elle d to lim it m y self to sin g le o u t th e m o st im -p o rta n t am o ng th e se facto rs, u n d er lin in g th e m ain co n se q u en c e s th a t m ay fo llo w fro m th e ir v a r ia tio n .
F rom a m o re g e n e r a l p o in t of v iew , tw o m ain su g g estio n s m a y b e d ra w n form w h at I h a v e tr ie d to ex p lain.
T h e fo rm e r is th a t e a c h th e o r y of d e cisio n -m a k in g on th e fa c ts in issu e is p ro b a b ly u n so u n d , if it d oes n o t c o n sid e r th a t th e r e is n o t a sim -p le an d u n ifo r m situ a tio n as to th e ju d g m e n t on th e facts, b u t th e r e
is a n u m b er of d iffe ren t situ a tio n s in th e s e v e r a l le g a l sy stem s, or e v e n in th e sam e le g al sy stem , ac co rd in g to th e k in d s of facts th a t m ust be p ro v e d an d to th e k in d s of ev id e n c e u se d b y th e p a rtie s an d /o r b y th e ju dg e. It do es n o t m ean, of co u rse, th a t a g e n e r a l th e o r y of d ec isio n m a -k in g w ith re f e re n c e to th e e v a lu a tio n of p ro o fs is im po ssib le, b u t th a t su ch a th e o ry m u st c o n sid er p ro p e rly all th e d iffe ren t s itu atio n s in w h ich such an e v a lu a tio n m ay occur.
T h e la tte r su g g e stio n is th at ra tio n a lity in th e e v a lu a tio n of proofs, fa r fro m b ein g a „ p u r e ” id ea, g e n e ra lly v a lid in all sy stem s an d in all situ atio n s, is a v a lu e th at n e e d s to b e re alize d and ch e ck ed b y se v e ra l m e an s in th e s e v e r a l cases, in a close c o n n e c tio n w ith th e a ctu a l f e a tu -re s of th e v a rio u s de cisio n -m a k in g p ro b lem s. H e -re ag ain , it do es n o t m e an th a t a g e n e ra l id ea of r a tio n a lity ca n n o t b e defin ed, b u t o n ly th at su ch an id ea m u st b e def in ed on th e b asis of a p ro p e r a n a ly sis of th e
d iffe re n t d ec isio n m ak in g situ atio n s. O th er w ise , the d a n g e r is of s p e a -k in g a b str a c tly of ra tio n a lity in th e e v a lu a tio n of proofs, y e t le av in g a c tu a lly ro o m for su b je c tiv e an d in tu itiv e e v a lu a tio n s , fr ee fro m a n y ra tio n a l co n trol,
U n iv e r s ity of P av ia (Italy) Chair o f C ivil P r ocedu re, F ac u lty of Law
M i c h e le T ar uflo
R O Z U M O W A N IA PRAW NICZ E I O C EN A D O W O D Ó W
A utor r oz w aż a z a ga d n ie n ie z w ią zku m ię d z y d o w o d o w ym i r ozum ow aniam i praw -nic zy m i i w ła ś c iw o ś c ia m i proc esu. J e go an aliz a ma u m o żliw ić n ie u pr a sz cz ają ce p o-d e jś c ie o-do w ła ś c iw o ś c i ty c h roz um ow ań oraz o-do po stula tu ich r ac jon a ln oś ci.
P r zepis y r eg u lu jąc e pr oc es do w o dz en ia oraz o k re ś lają ce p o z y c ję s ę d z ie g o m ają w p ły w na rozu m ow an ia d o w o d o w e. A utor w y r óż n ia trzy ty p y s y tu a c ji w p ły w a ją c e na in te re s u ją c e go rozum ow ania : (1) gd y p o w o ła n y je st je de n dow o d, (2) g d y str ony po w o łu ją d o w o d y pr z eciw n e, (3) g d y poza dow od am i pr z eciw ny m i stron sąd p o w o łu -je s w o -je d ow od y .
W pier w szy m ty p ie sy tu a cji istn ie ją d w ie m o ż liw oś c i, a m ian o w ic ie po w o ła n ie dow odu przez str onę lub przez s ęd z ie go : pie rw sz ą je st n as taw ion a na in te res str ony, druga zaś je st z z ało ż en ia neutralna. W drugim ty p ie sy tu a c ji str o ny pr ze dstaw iają d o w o d y pr zec iw ne. Jest to ce ch a proces u ko n tr ad yk tor yjne g o: pra w dę po z w a n eg o p r ze c iw s taw ia s ię pr aw d zie po w o da; sę dz ia ro zs tr zy g ając w sp o só b n eu tra ln y przec iw s ta w n e d o w o dy , u w z ględ n ia zar ów n o is tn ie n ie d o w o d z o ne g o faktu , jak i — w o d -n ie s ie-n iu do fa k tó w w y z-n a c z o -n y c h w s p o só b o c e -n ia ją c y — kr yte ria o c e-n y . W tr ze cie j s ytu a cji, w ła ś c iw e j proc esom typu in k w iz y c y jn e g o , do p r z ec iw staw n yc h do w o d ó w str on d oc ho dzą d o w o d y pow ołane, przez s ęd z ie g o.
I stn ie je z w ią ze k m ię dzy ro zu m o w an iem s ę d z ie g o a sam ym pr ze prow ad zaniem d o -w od ó -w z pr ze słu cha nia . W y stę p u je kon trast m ięd z y pr zes łuch aniem przez s ęd z ieg o i p rz es łu ch iw an ie m przez str ony , w klór ym kr z y ż o w e py ta nia m ają dać ró w n e sz an se każ dej ze str on w d ow o dz en iu „ sw o jej" pra w dy.
Na rozu m ow ania s ę d zie g o w p ły w a r ów nie ż to, c zy sę dz ia o ce n ia d o w o d y z prze-słuc h an ia be zpo śr ed nio po ich pr z ed staw ie n iu , o pie ra jąc s ię na tr eśc i w y p o w ie d zi i na z ac h o w an iu p r ze s łu ch iw a ne g o , c zy też z ap o zn a je s ię z m a ter iałe m d o w o d o w y m na p od s taw ie p is e m n eg o zapisu w lor m ie pe łn e j lub w po s ta c i stre s zc ze n ia protokola nta.
A utor po dkr eśla , ż e o c en a d o w o d ó w z a le ż y r ó w nie ż od s po sob u zb ieran ia tyc h d o w o d ó w w p r oc e s ie oraz od rodzaju ich p er cep cji przez s ęd z ieg o . A u tor z jed ne j s tro ny ro zgr anicz a s y s te m y in k w iz y c y jn e i s y s te m y k on tra dy k to ry jn e , z dr ugie j za ś — s y tu a c je , w któ ryc h sę d z ia o c en ia b ez po śr ed nio d o w o d y u s tn e oraz ta k ie , w któ ry ch op ier a s ię na p is em n y ch pr otoko łac h.
W ko n klu zji autor po dkr eśla , ż e d o w o d y o c en ia s ię z g od n ie z od m ienn ym i m o d e -lam i w r óż n yc h sy tu ac ja c h, w z a le ż n o ś ci od w ła ś c iw o ś c i pro cesu s ą d o w e g o oraz od c ec h w y s tę p u ją c y c h w nim sy tu ac ji d ow od o w y ch . N ie m ożna w ię c m y ś le ć o „c z ys tej idei" o c en y d ow o dó w , o g ó ln ie w a żn ej dla w s z e lk ic h s y s te m ó w d o w o d o w y c h i w s z y s t-kich sy tu ac ji. M ożna z d eiin io w ać o g ólną id e ę r a cjo n a ln o śc i d o w o dó w , le c z d efinicja ta ka m us i u w z g lę d n ia ć to, że w p ra kty ce s ą d o w ej w y s tę p u je w ie le r óż ny ch s ytu a cji.
