O R G A N O N 24 : 1988 A U T E U R S ET PR O B L È M E S
Antoni Krawczyk (Poland)
B A R TH O LO M Ä U S K E C K E R M A N N ’S C O N C E PT O F H IST O R Y
B artholom aus Keckerm ann (1572— 1609) was one of the scholars who raised the prestige o f the G dansk Academic G ym nasium in the early B aroque.1 The speed at which he churned out treatises in different disciplines, e.g. in logic, ethics, rhetoric, politics, jurisprudence, metaphysics o r history is indeed astounding. In his short lifetime Keckerm ann produced m ore than 25 w o rk s2 o f different scholarly quality, which, in their m ethod, m ostly em ulated medieval dialectics and erudite Renaissance works. In this contribution, I am looking at Kecker- m ann’s ideas on history. His historical studies were actually by-products of studies in various other disciplines as can be guessed from w orks such as System a
ethicae tribus libris (H annover, 1608), System a disciplinae politicae (H annover,
1608), or Synopsis disciplinae oeconomicae (H annover, 1610).
The m ost im portant work o f all o f K eckerm ann’s historical considerations is the study De natura etproprietatibus historiae commentariusprivatim in Gymnasio
Dantiscano propositus, which appeared posthum ously in H annover in 1610,
preceding D escartes’s treatise on m ethod by 27 years. I am pointing out th at to indicate th at K eckerm ann’s reasoning is being conducted evidently at odds with requirem ents set up by the architect o f the m odern concept o f inquiry. K eckerm ann’s De natura is somewhat difficult to study because o f the involved narrative. A t different places, Keckerm ann presented m utually contradictory views o f different scientists on the m eaning o f history w ithout however saying clearly which o f them he endorsed and which he refuted. T hat can be seen if only from the proposition th at history is a scientific discipline along with the opposite assertion th at it is n o t.3
1 B. N ad olski, “Życie i działalność naukow a Bartłomieja K eckerm anna” [“ Bartholom ew K eckerm ann’s Life and W orks”], Studia z D ziejów Odrodzenia na Pom orzu, Toruń, 1961, p. 125.
2 Ibid., p. 5.
3 D e natura et proprientatibus historiae com m entarius privatim in Gymnasio Dantiscano propositu, H annoviae, 1610; F. W ujtewicz in a collection o f studies in p h ilosophy and social doctrines ed. by Z. O gonow ski (W arsaw, 1979, vol. 2) translated this title as The Q ualities o f H istory.
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K eckerm ann’s eclectic type o f narrative has induced scholars studying his works to draw conclusions which are exactly opposite to each other. E. M enke-Gliickert and B. N adolski, for instance, acknowledge K eckerm ann’s historical reflections as being o f scholarly value. On the other hand, E. Spektorski, W. Voise and Z. Ogonowski argue K eckerm ann’s reflections on history lack all scholarly value.4
K eckerm ann considered history at a time when the foundations of m odern science were being laid. One specific process at that time was the emergence of new disciplines o f science from the total body o f philosophy. According to m odern science, each new discipline should have its own subject-m atter as well as its specific m ethod. M odern science was opposed to A rtistotelian ideas of cognition. H istorians o f science agree5 th at history as a discipline was trailing other specific disciplines. T h at Keckerm ann cannot be recognized as a m odern scholar can be seen from his stubborn clinging to Aristotle. The G dańsk scholar criticized the views o f the Ram ists, who opposed A ristotle dem anding the recognition o f history as a separate discipline.6
This alone would suffice to discard K eckerm ann’s concept o f history as expounded in his De natura were it not for the fact that work gained some renown in Pom erania as well as in E n g lan d 7 in the 17th century, and th at Szymon Starowolski referred to it in P oland.8
K eckerm ann devised an original concept o f historical inquiry. Its m ost im portant element is the requirem ent th at historians should refer to scholarly accom plishments o f form er and contem porary researchers alike. Above all, he recom mended for study the two-volume anthology called Artis historicae penus which was published in Basle in 1579. Bodin was the a u th o r whom Keckerm ann m entioned m ore often than anyone else o f those to be found in th at collection.
4 E. M enke-G liickert, Geschichtsschreibung der Reform ation und Gegenreformation. Bodin und die Begründung der G eschichtsm ethodologie durch B artholom äus Keckerm ann, O sterwich/H arz, 1912; B. N ad olski, op. cit., and his “ Poglądy na historię uczonego gdańskiego Bartłomieja K eckerm anna” [“ K eckerm ann’s Idea o f H istory”], Rocznik Gdański, vol. 17/18 ; E. Spektorski, P roblem a sotsialnoi f iz ik i v 17 stoletie, part II, K iev, 1917, p. 599; Z. O gonow ski, op. cit., pp. 10— 12.
5 R. C olin gw ood , The Idea o f H istory, London, 1960, p. 60 f . ; L. Krieger, “ H istory and Law in the 17th Century ; Puffendorf, Journal o f the H isto ry o f Ideas, vol. 21, N o . 2 ; W. V oise, M y ś l społeczna X V II wieku [Social Thought o f the 17th Century], W arsaw, 1970, pp. 171— 173.
6 E. Spektorski, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 599.
7 L. M okrzecki, “ M yśl o historii D egory W heare w naw iązaniu do p ogląd ów Bartłomieja K eckerm anna” [“ D egorah W heare’s Idea o f H istory in Reference to Bartholom ew K eckerm ann’s V iew s”], Z e s z y ty N aukowe W ydziału H um anistycznego U niw ersytetu Gdańskiego. P edagogika, H istoria, W ychowanie, 1982. M okrzecki m entions the English authors w ho studied K eckerm ann but m ainly for his observations concerning theological and geographical matters.
8 S etnik pisarzów polskich albo pochw ały i ży w o ty stu najznakom itszych pisarzów polskich [Eulogies and L ives o f One H undred Eminent Polish W riters], translated with a com m entary by J. Starnawski, Cracow , 1970 ; J. Starnawski, “ Szym ona Starow olskiego H ekatontas i początki bibliografii polskiej” [“ Szym on Starow olski’s E ulogies and Lives o f One Hunderd Polish Writers and the Beginnings o f Bibliography in Poland”], R oczniki H um anistyczne, Filologia P olska, vol. 12, Lublin, 1964, p. 136.
Bartholomäus Keckerm ann 197
The following works were m entioned, in this order : M ethodus ad facilerri
historiarum cognitionem by J. Bodin ; De historia by F. Patricius ; Dialogi by I.
Pontana ; De institutione historiae universae at eius cum iurisprudentia coniunc-
tione by F. Baldwinus ; De historiae institutione by F. S. M orzilla ; De scribenda historia by J. A. Viperan ; a treatise w ithout a title written by F. R obertellus on
the m ode o f recording history ; rem arks by Dionysius o f H alicarnassus on Thucydides’s way o f writing historical texts, in A. D udycz’s L atin translation; De
scribenda univeristatis rerum historia by G. M yliaeus ; De artione scribenda historiae by U. Fogliet; De lectione historiarum by D. C hytraeus ; De scribende historiae by Lucian o f Sam osata ; De utilitate legende historiae by S. G rinaeus,
along with Coelius’s com m entary to G rinaeus’s t e x t ; Oratori de argumentatio
historiarum et fru ctu ex eorum lectione petendo by C. Pezel ; De historia by T.
Zwinger; Sam bucus’s introduction to Bonsinius’s History ; and De historia et ea
veterum fragm enta rerum audiecta by A. Ricobonus.
O f the host o f m atters raised in the above studies, let me point out above all the emphasis laid by Bodin, M yliaeus, b u t especially Zwinger, on scholarly accom plishments o f the ancient students o f w orld history and C hurch history in different countries, and also historiosophical reflections by Bodin, Baldwinus, M orzill and Myliaeus, and questions o f chronology discussed by C hytraeus and Zwinger.
A p art from the Artis historicae penus, w ithout even a m ention o f the contents o f the anthology, K eckerm ann also referred to other authors, namely R. Reinecius: M ethodus cognoscendi et legensi scriptores, A. Franckerberger : De
dignitate historiae prophetica, as well as Institutio antiquitatis et historiarum,
A. Possewin : De histórica et historiéis, J. Bauer : Synopsis historiaae, Tilem ann :
Discursus philologicus de historicum debitu, S. Foxius: De historiae institutione liber, C. Curion: De historiae legenda sententia, A. Ricobon: De historia liber.9
This m ost im p ortan t collection o f works concerning historical m atters can be viewed as an attem pt to compile som ething like a bibliography o f sub- ject-m atters.
K eckerm ann pointed out th a t the style o f historical narrative changed with the centuries, and he also recom mended the relevant reading to th a t m atter. As far as Babylonian or Jewish historical writing was concerned, K eckerm ann m entioned a book by the Persian historian M egathenes o f the 4th century B. C. in Latin translation: De judica temporum et annalibus persorum .10 To see how R om an priests used to write historical chronicles, he recom m ends the study o f M acrobius: Saturnaliorum conviviorum libri V I I,11 and Cicero : On the Orator. 12 He also m entioned Photius’s Library as a source o f intelligence on how the
9 B. N ad olsk i, “ Życie i działalność...” , p 255 f. 10 B. K eckerm ann, op. cit., p. 134.
11 Ibid., p. 128. 12 Ibid., p. 137.
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historical accounts used to be w ritten.13 O f m odern historians, K eckerm ann recom m ended the study o f Procatius’s treatise on the 1574 edition o f the works of G uicciardini,14 P. Eber: Calendarium historiarum,15 M ichael Beuterus w ithout m entioning the title,16 and E. von Dem etrius again w ithout m entioning the title.17
The listing o f m any different works was not only a result o f keeping to rules of Renaissance erudition. K eckerm ann had at least two goals in m ind, namely to collect the pertinent literature, and to w ork out an appropriate research m ethod. He did n ot succeed in doing this last thing, as will be seen in w hat follows. K eckerm ann was thw arted in th at respect by his lack o f a clear vision o f the subject-m atter o f historical research, and his excessive faith in the om nipotence o f the logical m ethod in the study o f h istory.18
O f all o f K eckerm ann’s argum ents in De natura et proprietatibus historiae, the best probably is his presentation o f history’s practical function and the concept o f historical source. The G dansk scholar attributed several different functions to history. H istory, first, should preserve the record o f unusual facts for posterity.19 In addition to that, history has a duty to present m ain events (generalia) and fundam ental events (principalia). Keckerm ann drew those ideas from his perusals o f H erodotus, Polybius, Plato, J. Tovinus, and Paul o f C orbesia.20
K eckerm ann said history has a duty to derive universally valid conclusions in the form of theorem s and cannons.21 In this case, Keckerm ann quotes Andreas F r anckenberger.2 2
Such a specific view o f history, intended to provide a classification of past events and to forecast the future, m ust bring to m ind the conclusion th at history is a discipline o f science. However, such a conclusion is at odds with K eckerm ann’s refusal elsewhere o f scientific status to history.
On the practical level, Keckerm ann attributed to history the job of supporting other disciplines. As he argued, history was to be p art o f economic, political, scholastic prudence as well as o f jurisprudence.23 W ithin moral prudence, history should perform a m oral function. Its purpose was to indicate examples to follow which should deserve rewards and also bad examples which deserved punishm ent. H istory should also help m an to m ake his choices when dealing with difficult things.24
13 Ibid., p. 149. 14 Ibid., p. 149. 15 Ibid., p. 137. 16 Ibid., p. 129. 11 Ibid., p. 133. 18 Ibid., p. 40. 19 Ibid., p. 48. 20 Ibid., p. 48. 21 Ibid., p. 48. 22 Ibid., p. 65. 23 Ibid., p. 90 f. 24 Ibid., p. 51.
B artholom äus Keckermann 199
H istory’s m oralizing function, according to K eckerm ann, am ounted mainly to indicating the road o f virtuous conduct. K eckerm ann borrow ed that particular idea from the Stoic philosopher Zeno o f K ition.25Thus conceived of, history should help m an m end his ways. Keckerm an referred in th a t to Plutarch, Dionysius o f H alicarnassus and S trabo.26He m entioned th at some historians, as Probus, for example, were fond o f listing edifying examples, while others, like M achiavelli, had a taste for producing abom inable exam ples.27
It is rem arkable th at if Keckerm ann m entions evil deeds, then he is thinking not only abo ut effects o f hum an actions but also takes account o f supernatural events which happened in the past due to supernatural forces, say because o f the devil’s actions. K eckerm ann drew those stories from early C hristian writers such as Ireneus, Epiphanius, N ikephoros and St. A ugustine.28 His religious o r thodoxy undoubtedly m ade him take th a t particular attitude ; it was basically opposed to Renaissance currents in culture, concentrating as it was on the supernatural, on satanism , witchcraft, etc.29T h at particular fram e o f m ind m ade Keckerm ann refer him self repeatedly to the above-m entioned religious au thorities as well as to Paul the Apostle, Tertullian, L uther or M elanchthon. It was under their influence that he dem anded th at the knowledge o f the history of supernatural events should be in line with the teachings o f the G ospel.30
In K eckerm ann’s reflection a reader will find another m atter o f truly revolutionary significance for m odern historiography, namely historical sources. K eckerm ann argued th at not all past events are based on sources. Events referring to G o d ’s works described in the Scriptures have such sources, and events involving great men also have historical sources. But ordinary people’s actions are recorded in no historical sources and for this reason ordinary people cannot become the subject-m atter o f historical research.31 A ccording to K eckerm ann, history has its sources in acts, diplom as, docum ents and agree ments. He also recom mended official letters, contracts and deals as possible sources. In his reflections on sources, Keckerm ann nowhere specified exactly the menings o f terms he was using. But since he preached th at a historian can use acts, we can perhaps assume he was referring to archives. A historian has a duty to describe great events as well as those which are recorded in archives. But K eckerm ann appealed to historians not to copy docum ents, for th at w ould m ake them lawyers, but only to list the gist o f w hat docum ents are saying.32 He recom mended C aspar Schutz’s history o f Prussia as an example to follow.
25 Ibid., p. 52. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., p. 36. 28 Ibid., p. 66.
29 H. Becker, H. E. Barnes, R ozw ój m yśli społecznej o d w iedzy ludowej do sociologii [Social Thought fro m Love to Science], part one, W arsaw, 1964, p. 424.
30 B. Keckerm ann, op. cit., p. 65. 31 Ibid., p. 19 f.
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A p art from acts as sources, K eckerm ann recom mended to use descriptive source, m entioning the Bible, writings of the F athers o f the C hurch, biographies o f priests, writings by reformers o f the C hurch, m ostly Luther, M elanchthon and Sleiden.33
K eckerm ann was a follower o f a critical study o f historical sources. He was som ew hat biased as he indicated w hat were genuine accom plishments o f the R eform ation in th at area while ignoring, or indeed discrediting, even m ore significant accom plishments o f the C ounter-R eform ation. While he justly acknowledged the influence Flacius Illyricius, the originator o f the M agdeburg
Centuriae, had on historiography, K eckerm ann was perhaps too critical o f the Lives o f the Saints by Piotr Skarga, translated from Baronius, whom K ecker
m ann did n ot spare either.34 Baronius, at the time when K eckerm ann was working, m ade perhaps the greatest contribution to the developm ent o f the h istorian’s techniques o f work. The G dańsk scholar, however, blinded by his religious orthodoxy, refused to acknowledge th at m an ’s merits.
But it should be said to K eckerm ann’s credit th at he was aware o f the im portance o f written sources for the developm ent o f history. He shared Bodin’s view th at w ritten m aterials were o f great im portance for students o f history. W ritten docum ents enabled historians to collect intelligence ab o u t past events in libraries, whereas a lack o f w ritten docum ents impoverished the historian’s stock of evidence as history is being reduced to oral sources alone.35 This is why he spoke with a lot o f respect abo u t notes by Egyptian priests which were preserved in libraries.36 K eckerm ann argued th at for w ritten docum ents to perform the function o f historical source they should be available to historians. He disapproved o f the practice o f refusing access to sources kept at the V atican and in archives kept at m onasteries. On account o f that, K eckerm ann charged the C hurch of being inclined to forge history.37
W hereas K eckerm ann’s reflections on historical literature, on the practical function of history and the role o f historical sources are generally acceptable, his rem arks on the subject-m atter o f historical research or on research m ethods are m ore debatable.
K eckerm ann did not consider the m eaning o f subject-m atter o f historical research as a historian who had definite historical studies in his record but as a philosopher engaged in speculations. He argued that the historian had a duty to describe changing individual events as rem ote in the past as hum an memory reaches back.38Historical research had its subject-m atter both in hum an actions
33 Ibid., p. 114 f.
34 B. N ad olsk i, Poglądy..., p. 260. 35 B. K eckerm ann, op. cit., p. 138. 36 Ibid., p. 136.
37 Ibid., p. 151. 38 Ibid., p. 7.
Bartholomäus Keckerm ann 201
and divine actions, as well as events occurring in n atu re.39T hat particular vision o f historical research led K eckerm ann to depriving history o f its status o f a discipline o f social science and obscured m an ’s role in the historical process.
K eckerm ann presented positions taken by different scholars on the question o f the subject-m atter o f historical research. In A ristotle, K eckerm ann noticed a tendency to consider history in term s o f m atter versus form. M atter, in th at view, was represented by “ objects,” which I think can be reduced to historical fact, while form was represented by the specific kind o f narrative which was interpreted by K eckerm ann as m eaning the presentation o f individual events in the aspects o f veracity, accuracy o f description and m ethod.40
Reiner Reinecius took a different view o f the subject-m atter o f historical research. H e divided the subject-m atter o f historical research on the ground o f its content using certain criteria, namely those o f place, time and historical m atters— this, to judge by the context, was w hat in m odern historiography is referred to as the criterion o f subject. N ext Reinecius m entioned the generic criterion, which, again to judge by the context, was m eant to refer to activities o f individual people,41 th a t is, biographies were to be studied.
In Bodin, Keckerm ann noticed a distinction between things divine, things natural and things hum an.42
In Bauer, in turn, the subject-m atter o f history referred to events concerning G od and divine acts. W ithin divine acts, he distinguished the history o f the universe and special history am ounting to hum an actions.43 H istory in the contem porary sense o f the w ord, accordingly, accounted only for a small p a rt of K eckerm ann’s interests.
In keeping with his P rotestant Weltanschauung, K eckerm ann distinguished between religious and secular history. He argued th a t religious history, concerning as it did divine m atters, should be integrated with religious instruction, while secular history, as concerning hum an history, should be integrated with prudence.44
K eckerm ann also speculated on the subject-m atter o f historical inquiry, as can be seen from his argum ents abo ut universal history concerning general m atters and particular history concerning individual m atters.45 He also spoke abo ut absolute history, such as th at which concerns the history o f “ absolute m en.” 46
K eckerm ann reduced historical inquiry to the study o f w hat he called objects. He went to excessive lengths to discuss those objects. He m entioned essential
39 Ibid., p. 11 f. 40 Ibid., p. 7. 41 Ibid., p. 24. 42 Ibid., p. 14. 43 Ibid., p. 97. 44 Ibid., p. 94. 45 Ibid., p. 98. 46 Ibid., p. 101.
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objects, say G od, soul separated from body, or angels ; mixed objects, th at is, physical objects endowed with souls, say m an ; and physical objects endowed with spirit, such as stones o r m inerals.47
T hat particular concept o f historical inquiry, accordingly, turns out to be entirely medieval in spirit. K eckerm ann extends the subject-m atter of hum an cognition beyond the field o f hum an activity and, proceeding along the road of speculations, slips into hypostasizing. K eckerm ann, if only on account o f that, cannot be regarded as a representative o f m odern scholarship. M odern scholarship and science sees its principal jo b in moving away from hypostases, and so in rejecting essential entities such as forms, archetypes or spirits, and to deal instead with physical beings.48K eckerm ann’s proneness tow ards hypostases would have been described by his contem porary Bacon as idola theatri.
Yet despite ou r reservations against K eckerm ann’s meticulous reflections on the subject-m atter o f historical inquiry, we can perhaps find in the G dansk scholar’s considerations traces of the nowadays cardinal concept o f historical fact, albeit presented in inchoate form. W hen Keckerm ann speaks about m inor objects,49 it does seem he m eans simple historical facts, and as he speaks about m ajor collective objects, he probably w ants to draw the reader’s attention to complex historical facts.
A contem porary historian may find K eckerm ann’s classification of objects by their m atter interesting. He m entions ethical, economic, political, scholastic and ecclesiastic objects. He w ants to present the history o f m ores, economic history, political history, as well as C hurch history.50This way we can assume th at Keckerm ann dem anded th at definite sections should be distinguished in historical research.
K eckerm ann ascribed a great role in historical research to the historian’s inquisitive fram e o f mind. He spoke o f th at in connection with urging historians to study exclusively individual objects, because history, facing the huge multiplicity o f facts it does, is not a science no r does it apply a scientific research m ethod. Scientific disciplines, on the other hand, do have their m ethods.51 N o t being a science, history is distributed am ong other disciplines. It also embraces the histories o f other disciplines. But historians cannot study the past o f other disciplines for that would be at odds with the logical order of procedure. A historian, for example, m ust not study the history of physics o r theology. T hat would violate the logical order, for then the historian would have to trespass upon the subject-m atter of those other disciplines.52
41 Ibid., p. 11 f.
48 E. Spektorski, N om inalizm i realizm v obshchestvennykh naukakh, M oscow , 1915, p. 32 ; A. Krawczyk, “ Evegni Spektorski, a Student o f Science,” Organon, 1979, N o . 15, p. 306.
49 B. Keckerm ann, op. cit., p. 13. 50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 9. 52 Ibid., p. 95.
Bartholomäus Keckermann 203
As he believed th at there were clear boundaries o f the subject-m atter between different disciplines, Keckerm ann did not accept w hat other contem porary historians hold as true (as does Tykociner, for example), namely th at different disciplines m ay be w orking in the same field o f inquiry.53 Keckerm ann charged other scholars with employing m ethods from other disciplines to explain away historical events. Thus, for instance, he criticized Bodin, a follower o f a naturalis tic interpretation o f history, for introducing m ethods typical o f physics in the realm o f historical inquiry.54 He further disapproved o f Bodin’s psychological approach tow ards hum an actions. Such a m ethod was out o f place in the realm of historical research. Keckerm ann believed theology, or penum atology, were the proper disciplines to study hum an actions, but n ot history, for th at was violating the logical order o f things.55
Telling the difference between truth and u n truth, K eckerm ann argued, was the principal purpose o f historical inquiry. In th at requirem ent, he toed the Renaissance. Keckerm ann called on historians to reject legends and to rely on facts alone. But for th at historians needed historical sources.56N o t all events are being m entioned in sources. Some events have been presented in m eticulous detail on the ground of available historical sources, and so future historians will not be able to add a lot to those descriptions. F o r example, few new things can be revealed ab o u t antiquity beyond w hat can be found in Livius, Sallust, Tacitus or T ro g .57
K eckerm ann was skeptical abou t the chance to get to know all th at happened in the past. N o t all events have been recorded in sources, and those which are, are sometimes recorded inexactly, in an incom plete way, or they are plainly false. All m an-m ade sources are unreliable, and it is the Bible alone, as a source com piled under the inspiration o f the Holy G host, th a t can be regarded as a reliable source.58
Yet despite th at skepticism o f his K eckerm ann believed historians should seek to enrich their knowledge. H istorians should be fam iliar with earlier studies o f a given fact and they should be critical o f the historical sources they would be using.59But the historian m ust have ano th er skill which is even m ore im portant, namely a power o f logical reasoning, which will enable him to tell tru th from u ntruth and m ake his argum ent clear enough. K eckerm ann even argued th at a student o f the past is a logician m ore than a historian. But if his concept o f logic was applied by students o f the past, not only new results could be produced bu t the requirem ent o f logic itself could ham per historical inquiry. K eckerm ann was
53 J. T. T ykociner, Research and Science, quoted after Z. K ow alew ski, N au ki społeczne a rozw ój społeczny [Social Science and Social D evelopment], W arsaw, 1971, p. 48.
54 B. Keckerm ann, op. cit., p. 97. 55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 98. 57 Ibid., p. 24. 58 Ibid. 5Q Ibid., p. 40.
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fond o f m aking m eticulous logical distinctions. F o r instance, he called for the study o f the history o f m an as a m ature being and at child age. He was angry with Bodin for instance, for shunning logical distinctions.60 A p art from logical knowledge, a historian should also be fam iliar with theological m atters so th at his argum ents should be in line with religious interpretations.61 This shows that K eckerm ann never rid him self from the burden o f religious orthodoxy, the dom inance o f which also began to show in the G dańsk com m unity.62
Keckerm ann also dem anded th at historical events should be considered from the causal point o f view. Students should be aware o f factors, principal and subsidiary alike, which caused processes to happen.63To this end, they needed to know historical sources.64 A t the same time, he recom mended students to pay attention to teleological causes.65 E xplanations should include references to the first cause.66 This requirem ent was at odds with requirem ents o f m odern scholarship. As he m ade this dem and, K eckerm ann wanted his historical knowledge not to contradict Revelation.67
The concept o f the subject-m atter o f historical inquiry m ade K eckerm ann form ulate outdated directives as for m ethod for use by historians. A part from the correct requirem ent to study events which happened between people, Kecker m ann also recom mended the study o f events taking place between G od and man o r between G od and angels.68 He w anted historians to consider general events, a jo b which general history should do, and particular events which he thought particular history should take u p .69 Each o f these histories should apply its own specific m ethod.
F o n d as he was o f all kinds o f logical distinctions, K eckerm ann was sure the studied reality could be understood better when th a t particular m ethod was applied.70 But he greatly exaggerated in his love o f distinctions. There are perhaps a couple o f sensible points in K eckerm ann’s argum ent th at each kind o f history should use its own specific m ethod, for this is being accepted as self-evident even today th at different m ethods should be applied to study the history o f the C hurch, o f the economy, o f politics or education.71 But on the whole K eckerm ann’s speculations about research m ethods, however correct they
60 Ibid., p. 101. 61 Ibid., pp. 15, 21, 75.
62 Z. O gonow ski, Filizofia szkolna w Polsce X V II wieku [School Philosophy in 17th-century Poland], W arsaw, 1985, p. 47 f.
63 B. Keckerm ann, op. cit., p. 19. 64 Ibid., p. 20. 65 Ibid., p. 13. 66 Ibid., p. 21. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid., p. 102. 69 Ibid., p. 98. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., p. 17.
B artholom äus Keckermann 205
may be, will not always be o f help to the historian. Indeed, they m ay occasionally be even a hindrance, because he is quite m uddle-headed at times. W hat strikes the reader m ost o f all are his easy form ulation o f logical distinctions, his am biguous notions and his inclination to produce hypostases. Twenty-seven years after K eckerm ann’s De natura... appeared in print, Descartes published his Discours
de la methode... which is a denunciation precisely o f th a t kind o f argum ent.
W hat historians m ay perhaps find m ore useful in K eckerm ann’s reflections are his suggestions to consider historical events w ith a view to their territorial extent, the period which they cover, the substantive range o f the events studied, and also acts o f eminent individuals. It can be said K eckerm ann enjoined historians to study events in their tem poral, spatial and substantive aspects. But when he called on historians to study lives o f em inent people, he introduced readers into the realm o f biographical literature. In th a t connection, he argued th at other disciplines should play a subsidiary role tow ards history, specifically chronology, topography along with geography, and genealogy.72 C hronology and topography were his favourite subsidiary disciplines, and he even called them history’s eyes. He recom m ended the study o f publications concerning chronologies o f Chytraeus, Reinecius and H enning.73 H e attrib uted less im portance to genealogy because genealogy could only concern h um an events,74 and, as pointed out before, K eckerm ann believed history also happens beyond the sphere o f h um an activity.
In K eckerm ann’s argum ents on the essential m eaning o f chronology you are unlikely to find any rem arks against the M iddle Ages, which were quite com m on already during the Renaissance. K eckerm ann clung to the medieval concept o f historical periods envisaging four m onarchies from the creation o f the w orld through to. his own times. To prop his argum ent he quoted K. Paucer an d E. Reufner, two P rotestant scholars. Regarding the m onarchy as a historical epoch, K eckerm ann distinguished different kinds o f polity in it such as kingdom , duchy, tetrarchy, tyranny, republic or polyarchy. H e says the states o f medieval E urope were founded in the fourth m onarchy. He m akes the baffling statem ent th a t the Polish state was created as early as in A .D . 800, whereas the Czech state only in the year 1086.7 5
Keckerm ann was inclined even to study the history o f the C hurch against the pattern o f the four m onarchies, setting the beginning o f the fourth one in the period o f the R eform ation.76T h at was a step backw ard com pared with concepts o f historical research circulating during the Renaissance, when scholars drew a distinction between times which were antiqua and nova, the latter o f the two
72 Ibid., p. 92. 73 Ibid., p. 18. 74 Ibid., p. 22. 75 Ibid., p. 112. 76 Ibid., pp. 114— 116.
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being described as D ark Ages.77 In Polish historiography, a similar classification was employed a short time thereafter by Szymon Starowolski, who used the terms antiqua and barbara.18
Keckerm ann also studied the style o f discourse to be found in historical works. He opposed the idea o f giving authors m arks for their style. A historian’s task was to present individual events but w ithout any sign o f sympathy or an tipath y.79 He should avoid ornam ental expressions80 so com m on in Renais sance historical studies which often reduced historical studies to rhetorical exploits.8 N a rra tiv e s m ust neither be sweeping nor high-strung in style, but they should conform to w hat he called the average A ttic style, which was adequate to the substance and did n o t incite readers’ em otions.82
Calling for a full presentation o f historical events, K eckerm ann opposed the Renaissance kind o f historiosophy in the form o f abridgem ents called epitomes. F o r this reason, he criticized historical studies he knew by their abridgem ents.83 But Renaissance scholars appreciated th a t specific style o f writings because o f their succinctness, clarity and usefulness for teaching purposes. Scaliger, Stadius, Lipsius, Puteanus and Salmasius were am ong those who recom mended th at kind o f w ritings.84
The above-presented considerations on K eckerm ann’s concept of history justify the following conclusions : the G dańsk scholar was aware o f the im portance for the historian to be fam iliar with the literature o f the subject and with historical sources. A t the same time, referring to A ristotle he was unable to define clearly the subject-m atter of historical inquiry. He did not present history as a social discipline but as a collection o f individual facts. Thus conceived of, history as a discipline lacking scholarly status could not be regarded in terms of historicism even in its religious aspect, which some historians in the C o u n ter-R eform ation attem pted to do already in the 17th century.
If different scholars took an interest in K eckerm ann, then not because o f an account o f the m ain train o f his thought b ut because o f his subsidiary interests. Starowolski in his concept of bibliography emphasized it was necessary to append the literature o f the subject to historical studies. British scholars
77 V. F erguson, The Renaissance o f H istorical Thought. Five Centuries o f Interpretation, Cambridge, M ass., 1948, p. 4 ; G iannotti, Libro de ¡a republica veneziana, Venice, 1548, p. 7 ; G . Logan, “The R elation o f M ontaigne to Renaissance H um anism ,” Journal o f the H istory o f Ideas, 1975, p. 624.
78 F. Bielak, “ D ziałalność naukow a Szym ona Starow olskiego” [“ Szym on Starow olski’s Scholarly U ndertakings”], Studia i M ateriały do D ziejów N au ki Polskiej. H istoria N auk Społecznych, N o . 1, W arsaw, 1957, p. 251 f.
79 B. Keckerm ann, op. cit., p. 37. 80 Ibid.
81 D . H ay, “ Flavio Biondo and the M iddle A g es,” Proceedings o f the British Academ y, 1959, p. 98.
82 B. Keckerm ann, op. cit., p. 44 f. 83 Ibid., p. 150 f.
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acknowledged the significance o f De natura et proprietatibus for the developm ent o f geographic studies, and were less interested in the m eaning o f th at study for history. Since m odern science sought to sever its ties to A ristotle, it justifies the view th at K eckerm ann cannot be classed with the category o f m odern scholars. Despite his interesting argum ents on the practical function o f history, despite his ideas ab o u t reliance on the literature o f the subject and the im portance o f historical sources for historians, K eckerm ann’s reputation as a theoretician o f history is dam aged by his antiquated concept o f historical inquiry, his propensity to hypostasizing, his practice o f invoking ideological causes, and his su b o r dination o f historical considerations to the spirit o f religious orthodoxy.
