O RG AN O N 4(1967)
LE 250e ANNIVERSAIRE DE L A MORT
DE G. W. LEIBNIZ
W aldem ar Voisé (Poland)
LEIBNIZ’S MODEL OF POLITICAL THINKING *
HISTORY AND POLITICS
Although Leibniz had initially pronounced him self for th e m echanistic conception, the dissertation De principio individui (1663) showed th a t he had rem ained faithful to traditional m etaphysics. According to his own words, he had shaped his views during a period of “tw enty years of m editation” . Today we know more or less exactly th e developm ent of the great philosopher’s thoughts on logic, physics, m athem atics and the m any other disciplines he w orked on. Therefore now, on the ocassion of the 250th anniversary of his death, it seems to be w orth w hile re calling his occasionally m entioned b ut very little know n w ork en titled Specimen dem onstrationum politicarum, w hich he w rote at th e end of 1668 and a t the beginning of 1669, a t th e age of tw enty two. We shall be concerned here not only w ith the analysis of a definite stage of the history of political doctrines, b u t also w ith reflections on th e methology of historical and political thinking in a century th a t—by no means accidentally—enjoys th e name of the “great cen tu ry ” of science.
It has alm ost become custom ary to begin a comparison of Descartes w ith Leibniz by stating th a t th e ir respective startin g -po in ts w ere entirely different. Descartes rejected history com pletely as a source of creative inspiration starting from the presupposition th a t a tru e philo
* The first version of this article, which w as considerably shorter, w as read in French as “La M athém atique, politique et l ’histoire raisonnée de Leibniz dans son S pecim en dem on stration u m politicarum ” in Paris, 28 May, 1966, during th e Jour
nées L eibn iz organized by th e Centre International de Synthèse. I w ish to express
m y gratitude to Professor Tadeusz C zezowski for his valuable help in the logical analysis of the Specim en.
The present paper, presented in Novem ber 1966, at H annover, during the Internationaler Leibniz Kongress w ill also be published in German, in th e Congress papers by the G ottfried—W ilhelm —Leibniz— G esellschaft.
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sophy can be created only afte r the rejection of the authorities of the past. This was no t an isolated opinion then: it was shared by Male- branche, and even by Bossuet, who, though he was a historian himself, came la ter to a conclusion sim ilar to th a t of Descartes. Leibniz, how ever, a ttrib u ted great im portance to the heritage of the previous times. In his wish to build a new science he did n o t annul the accomplish m ents of the old one. On the contrary, h e thought the sum of the previous knowledge m ust be preserved in order no t to be forgotten and w ith a view to preventing th in kers from repeating th e old m ista kes. His respect for th e past covered even th e accom plishm ents of centuries w hich at th a t tim e w ere held in contem pt, since he declared th a t “there is hidden gold beneath the dung of Scholasticism .” He des cribed th e position of the enemies of history as a taken of “narro w m indedness” (la petitesse d’esprit). O ut of a deep conviction of the im portance of history grew Leibniz’s in terest in the historical sources of p ast centuries, thence he drew stim ulation to perusal of ancient philosophers’ works, and thence sprung his reflections on a conception of history and of politics.
Leibniz rem ained principally faith fu l to Bacon’s classification of sciences, in which history was th e “field of m em ory.” Hence his lifelong em phasis on the significance of historical erudition, w hich should be based on a possibly exhaustive knowledge of th e sources. A t the same time, however, he wished to transform history into a science of a new type by w ay of linking it to politics. Thus, in Leibniz’s conception the past (the domain of history) and the p resent (the domain of politics) w ere to be bound up into one whole: history w as to be an introduction to political life, and politics was to aim at realizing the principles draw n from the study of history. This view com prised both traditional and novel elements.
The historiography of the 17th century bore a peculiar m ark. Gro- tius (who was also the official historiographer of the D utch states- -general), the “bollandists,” M uratori and m any other historians of th at tim e p u t alm ost exclusively em phasis upon researches of the erudite type. It is to them th a t we owe the priceless editions of sources. To Leibniz, a typical rep resentative of this kind of researcher and auth o r of the Annales Im perii, Codex Diplomaticus and of other erudite and archival works, history was the field of facts in co n trast to the field of reasoning. For instance, in 1671 he w rote: “H istoriae su n t proposi- tiones singulares contingentes, sum ptae a sensu composito seu induc- tione.” On the other hand, however, Leibniz w as perfectly aw are of the insufficiency of th e bare knowledge of facts; he w rote several times th a t “erudition does not illum inate the m ind” (“l’erudition n ’6claire pas l’esp rit”), and stated th a t a m ere registration of facts does not
L e ib n iz’s M odel of P o litic a l Th in k in g 1 8 9
deserve the nam e of history. He tho u g h t th a t although history con ceived of erud itely is not a science, it can nevertheless become a science u n der certain conditions. Thus Leibniz encountered the classical problem which had disturbed (and continues to disturb) whole generations of historians: since the registration of facts does not deserve the nam e of science, one has to decide upon th e m aking of a selection of facts. This diagnosis generates a fu rth e r question: w h at criterion should decide upon the selection of these and not other facts?
M ore than h alf a century ago, as he was considering the essence of Leibniz’s historical methodology, Louis D avillé w rote, among others, th a t the m odernity of this methodology consisted in linking th e past to th e present. 1 U nfortunately, D avillé did not develop this thought and therefore did not pay p ro per atten tio n to th e linkage betw een his tory and politics as the essence of Leibniz’s conception. Leibniz him self m ade m any efforts to prove his thesis. Thus, for instance, in a le tte r to B urnet he w rote, among other things, th a t th ere w ere actu al ly m any good philosophical and historical books, b u t th a t none of them led to “establishm ents” (établissem ents), and added th a t “establishm ent” m eant such kind of reasoning which proved some theses in an in disputable way. “In this consists—he continued—the m ethod employed by m athem aticians, who separate w h at is certain from w h at is u n certain” (certum ab incerto). In other words, to attain general know ledge one has to draw a dividing line betw een w h at is certain and w hat uncertain, betw een w h at is known and w h at is unknow n. To reject uncertain facts and uncertain statem ents in order to attain a general knowledge of the historical process—this is th e task of th e historian who w ants to deserve the nam e of a scientist. In this way, Leibniz w ith full aw areness denied th e possibility of th e existence of an “objective history,” i.e., a history th a t w ould register all th a t happened in the past. Of course, it could be rem arked here th a t in registering facts a historian is not y e t a scientist, w hile in m aking a selection of them he ceases being one.
B ut this would not a lter the essence of Leibniz’s paradox of the historian: eith er he is not a scientist, or else he is not objective.
It deserves in tu rn to be stated th a t a “politics-history” th u s con ceived of was to serve “the m ighty of this w orld,” whose favours Leibniz had alw ays striven after. For it could not be by accident th a t he had been for m any years a t the service of th e H anoverian house, whose im portance in G erm any and Europe was ever grow ing then. In his desire to link history to politics and to transform the science in this sense into an instrum en t of m anaging people from the stan d
1 “R evivre le passé d’après ce qui en su bsiste dans le p résent”—L eibn iz
historien, Paris (Alcan) 1909, p. 355. This book contains a huge system atic m aterial,
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point of th e ru le rs’ needs, Leibniz form ulated th e fundam ental princi ples of the “enlightened absolutism .” This can be w itnessed if only by the high estim ate of Leibniz, several years later, by Frederic the G reat himself. 2
O ut of P lato ’s altern ativ e (to make kings of philosophers or philoso phers of kings) Leibniz chose th e la tte r possibility, which is shown by his attitu d e to the reigning sovereigns and th e ir wives (mainly to Sophia Charlotte), whom he was always ready to serve, w hether asked to or not, w ith advice and help. “Il étoit très profond dans l’histoire, et dans les in térêts des P rinces”—F ontenelle w rote later in his Eloge. This notw ithstanding, Leibniz was deeply convinced th a t the “philosopher- king” ruled not only in his own b u t also in his subjects’ interests, and th e la tte r should be satisfied w ith the existing state of affairs. I t m ust be added, however, th a t he w as one of th e first to und erstand the possibility of a conscious shaping of the fu ture. For, it was Leibniz who authored the freq uently reiterated thought (which was form ulated not only in the Théodicée) th a t “th e present is p reg n an t w ith th e fu tu re .” In this m anner, the past, th e present and th e fu tu re shook hands, plaiting in Leibniz’s historiosophy into one indivisible whole.
Nowadays, as th e problem of a m odem conception of history be comes increasingly pressing, it seems to be w orth w hile recalling Leibniz’s reflections on the subject. G radually, we are realizing th at w hat we term by the nam e of history is often b u t th e product of im agination of a historian or of a historical school. I t seems, therefore, th a t th e dem and to create an objective h isto ry is equivalent to the wish to create a history w ithout a historian. And, since each epoch has th a t kind of history w hich it has deserved itself, should we not attem pt to transform history into a science serving th e present? This demand has been recently brought up w ith increasing frequency; e.g., the 25th Sem aine de la S ynthèse (Paris 1964) was en titled Histoire, science hum aine du tem ps présent.
Three centuries ago, in his Discours sur l’histoire universelle, Bossuet conceived of history as the “realization of th e secret sentences of God’s Providence.” B ossuet’s contem porary Leibniz suggested a different solution; nam ely, contracting a “m arriage of convenience” of politics and history, although he was not always consistent in doing this (e. g.. sometimes he designated history to the role of an im partial umpire, aind trea ted it as a set of exam ples to be followed in everyday life). In this m anner, Leibniz w anted to realize one of his favourite thoughts, i. e.,
2 J. O. Fleckenstein, G. W. Leibniz. B arock und U niversalism us, Thun—Mün chen (Ott Verlag) 1958, pp. 162—163. Besides, th e author excellen tly exposes the “political sense of his m etaphysics” (“politischer Sinn seiner M etaphysik”) in translating into the language of politics the apparently philosophical fragment of Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld from th e 23rd of March 1960 (p. 152).
Le ib n iz’s M odel of P o litic a l Th in k in g 1 9 1
to transform historical w orks from sets of curiosities (simples curiosités) into readings useful to m ankind’s welfare. This th o u g h t fascinated him continuously in various form ulations; only a few m onths before his death he contrasted the history conceived of as the knowledge of the lives of the dead w ith a history th a t would aim at gettin g to know th e living and a t teaching them the principles of th e law of n atu re and of politics. 3 It was to be—as he w rote—a nova ars sciendi, w hich w ould ex tract from history w hat is of greatest usefulness in it. One has—he w rote in his N ouveaux Essais—to “tire r de l’histoire ce q u ’il y a de plus u tile.”
D isregarding the contents of his w ritings (for Leibniz adhered to a decidedly conservative political doctrine), it m u st be stated th a t his general proposition may perhaps prove to be more useful than the incessant expectation of th e realization of an u n attinable ideal. If this is th e case, the concept of history m ust be revised once again, since now adays more th an ever before one perceives a need to indicate the w ay leading to an ever increasing co-responsibility of m ankind for its common future. This demand, however, m ust be addressed to more th a t one p artner, since n ot only historians decide upon th e kind of th e ir science. It seems therefore useful to quote the w ords of Leibniz, w ho— w ith the optimism characteristic of him —w rote in a le tte r to A m auld th a t the approaching epoch would generate a desire of know ledge so great th a t even politicians w ould be infected by it: “Un siècle philo sophique va naître, où le souci de la v érité gagnant au dehors des écoles, se répandra même parm i les politiques.”
THE EARLY POLITICAL-HISTORICAL WORK
Though Leibniz m ade his general reflections on history and politics m ainly in th e la ter years of his life, he w rote a w ork which fulfilled to a wide ex ten t his postulates in this respect already a t th e s ta rt of his philosophical activity. This is a fu rth e r proof of the consistency in de veloping his principal tenets.
The full title of th a t work runs: Specim en dem onstrationum politica- rum pro eligendo rege Polonorum novo scribendi genere exactum . It deals w ith problem s of political theory and practice, i. e., w ith a field in which Leibniz’s all-em bracing genius did not m anifest itself in its fulness. N evertheless, as the first w ork in this field from the chrono
3 L. D aville, op. cit.t p. 341, footnote 4. D avillé regarded this conception as being m istaken, for by lin k ing history to politics Leibniz m ade th e form er arbitrary and deprived of “de cette exactitude scien tifiqu e à laq uelle elle tendait déjà de son tem ps,” pp. 374—375.
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logical point of view it opens the political series in his writings, 4 and recently Em ilienne N aert mentioned it a t the very outset of h er con siderations of Leibniz’s political thought, w riting about th a t singulier Specimen. 5 Leibniz w rote it under the pseudonym of “Georgius Ulicovius L ithu anu s” (it was actually an anagram), inspired by his protector, chancellor baron C hristian von Boineburg, in order to support P alatine Philip W ilhelm, Duke of N euburg’s candidature to the Polish throne. The previous king, Ja n Kazim ierz Waza, afte r his abdication in 1668, w ent to France, w here he died as abbot of Saint-G erm ain-des-Pres in P aris a few years later. In addition to Philip W ilhelm a few others candidated, among them there were Duke Charles of Lorraine, Louis de Conde and Alexei M ikhailovitch, the Russian czar’s son. Moreover, th ere were a considerable num ber of those w ho w anted to elect a “P iast,” a candidate descended from one of the Polish aristocratic families.
On about 350 pages of his work, Leibniz exposed th e m erits of his candidate, taking the opportunity to survey the political history of Poland and to make an analysis of h er position in Europe a t th a t time.
He grouped his argum ents around a few principal theses, among w hich th e tw o favourite ideas of the Polish nobility came to the fore: nam ely, th e aims of Poland (he called h er the “Spain of Eastern Europe”) coincide w ith the goals of all Christendom (“Reipublicae scopus... cum scopo orbis C hristiani coincidit”) and the w elfare of the country is identical w ith th e w elfare of th e ru ling nobility (“bonum Reipublicae cum bono N obilitatis coincidit”). As fa r as th e candidates to the crow n are concerned, at alm ost every place Leibniz exposed the faults of P hilip’s rivals (this constitutes a sort of pars destructiva of th e reasoning) and his client’s m erits (this in tu rn constitutes as if the pars constructiva of his argum entation). Finally Leibniz came to the conclusion (easy to be guessed) th a t n eith er th e Russian or the French, nor P iast should be elected, b u t only Philip.
A part from the introduction, epilogue and conclusions (these con stitu te as if separate wholes), Leibniz’s w ork consists of 60 “tasks” (propositio), some of them being enlarged by more or less abundant “corollaries” (corollarium). The gist of the reasoning is contained in the p a rts of the “tasks” p u t down in a logical order, and the historical
4 S äm tlich e S ch riften und B riefe. P olitisch e Sch riften , Erster Bd (1667—1676), Darm stadt (Otto Reyhl Verlag) 1931, pp. 3—98. In the introduction to this work (pp. x v ii—xx) there are rem arks on the genesis and circum stances of its fabri cation (already after th e election of M ichal Korybut W isniowiecki, because of the delay at th e printer’s office at Königsberg). For bibliographical information cf. vol. II of this book (Berlin 1963, pp. 627—635). About other Polish item s in Leibniz cf. K. Bittner, “S lavica bei G. W. Leibniz,” G erm anoslavica, 1 (1931— 1932), Prague 1932, m ainly pp. 15ff.
5 La pensée p olitiqu e de L eibniz, Paris (Presses U niversitaires de France) 1964, p. 15.
L e ib n iz’s Model o f P o litic a l T h in k in g 1 9 3
m aterial (the editor separates it from the rest by using a d ifferent printing type) serves as illustration to th e successive syllogisms. These “historical notes” were p u t as a ru le at th e end of respective “task s” or “corollaries.” This historical m aterial is p articularly rich in th e two final “tasks” and the fou r final conclusions (conclusio). These final “tasks” were intended to convince th e readers definitively th a t it would be best to call to th e throne either someone from the Jagiellonian dynasty or else someone related to th e Jagiellos (Philip, of course, proved to be akin by blood to them ); the fo u r final conclusions contained a list of the fau lts of the rivals and the m erits of Philip.
Leibniz proved not only to have a good knowledge of th e psychology of the nobiliary electors (for th e book w as intended to perform a p ro pagative function), b u t also a good knowledge of Polish history and wide reading in this respect. A p art from such w riters as G rotius, Bacon, Hobbes and de Thou (who w as also a stu d en t of Polish history), Leibniz m entioned m any Polish w riters, e. g., Długosz, Hozjus, Zamoyski, Starowolski, Ossoliński, Stryjkow ski, Fredro, etc. Because the w ork was intended to pass for one by a “L ith u an ian ” au th o r (“Georgius Ulicovius L ith u anu s”), Leibniz frequ en tly referred to th e Historiae Lithuanae by a Jesu it of Vilna, A dalbert W ijuk Kojałowicz (1609— 1677), au th o r of m any theological and historical w orks on L ithuania and the Jagiellos (Historiae w ere published in Danzig in 1650 and in A ntw erp in 1669 and afterw ards tran slated into German). Leibniz also quoted John Barclay (1582— 1621), whose w orks w ere tran slated into Polish in th e first half of the 17th century (Argenis, Paraenesis, and Icon, sive aescriptio anim orum quinque praecipuarum nationum in Europa, in which he characterized the Spaniards, th e French, th e Italians, the G erm ans and th e Poles).
Though it was to serve im m ediate purposes and, form ally at least, belonged to th e field of political pam phleteering, Leibniz’s w ork bore the m ark of a scientific treatise. He strove afte r m aking his reflections of a general nature, digressing a t any m om ent from the requirem ents of the situation of a country before th e election of th e king. T h at this endeavour was to a great exterfs successful can be w itnessed by the fact th a t the Specim en w as translated into Polish in 1843 and published in P aris w ith the conspicuous intention to serve as a sign-post for the disunited Polish em igrants.
THE CONCEPT OF A POLITICAL “DEMONSTRATION”
Leibniz’s intention in setting out to w rite th e Specimen can be described w ith a high degree of probability as follows: w hile w riting to the order of a pow erful client, the scientific ch aracter of the work 13 — O r g a n o n , N r 4/67
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m ust be possibly striven after, to preserve its value in th e history of political thought. He sym ptom atically linked the general problem (Specimen dem onstrationum politicarum...) w ith the p articu lar question (...pro eligendo rege...) already in th e title, w hile bringing the form er to the fore. The p u ttin g of the word specimen in the first place was in accordance w ith th e p articu lar love of Leibniz and of other w riters of th e epoch to it; it w as to draw th e read er’s atten tio n to the fact th at it was a model, or a sample, of p attern ed thinking in a field, owing to w hich he would be able to m ake him self an opinion on th e whole system of thought of the au th o r and, a t the same time, to find a solution to an interesting question announced in the title. Hence the word specimen is contained in m any a w ork by Leibniz and his contempo raries.
Upon w h at principles was th a t new mode of reasoning to be based? The th in kers of the 17th century w ere in agreem ent in a severe criticism of the traditional syllogism and of logic understood as a system of syllogistic reasoning, in spite of th e differences betw een them. Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Pascal, Weigel and Leibniz regarded it as a com pletely useless instru m en t in searching tru th . They contrasted this “false” logic w ith a new mode of reasoning called “dem onstration,” i. e., a reasoning aiming a t proving the validity of a proposition by help of prem isses recognized to be true. In th eir opinion, th e “tru e ” logic was to consist in linking “dem onstration” to the principles of m athem atical thinking. Hobbes differentiated w ith p articu la r distinctness between these tw o variations of reasoning contrasting th e old logic w ith the new one. The la tte r is recognized to be the only tru e one: “Citiusque m ulto veram logicam discent qui m athem aticorum dem onstrationibus, quam qui logicorum syllogizandi praeceptis legendis tem pus co nteru n t” .6 As usually, it was easier to criticize the predecessors and to announce the construction of a new, unfailing m ethod of reasoning than to realize this intention. As it came to constructing the “new logic,” it proved th a t a fte r all much had to be borrow ed from th e old one. P articularly, the despised syllogism proved to be the “gold” th a t Leibniz—as we know—w anted to look for “beneath th e dung of Scholasticism.” Leib niz’s teacher, a professor a t th e university of Jena, E rh ard Weigel overcame the difficulty by supplying the old concept w ith an adjective and thus introduced the term “real syllogism” (syllogismus realis). In his book entitled Analysis Aristotelica ex Euclide restituta, published in Jena in 1658, he w rote th a t he regarded Euclid and A ristotle as his models (which was already clear from th e title itself). The former, Weigel wrote, reduced science to a few basic assum ptions (axioms),
6 “Computatio siv e logica,” cap. IV, 13, O pera philosophica quae latine scripsit
Le ibn iz’s M odel of P o litic a l Th in k in g 1 9 5
the la tte r showed the m anner in w hich to draw conclusions from these axioms. However, he added im m ediately th a t he did n o t m ean reasoning conceived of form ally (form aliter), b u t utilizing th e syllogism m aterially (materialiter). He saw th e basis of th is new m ethod in th e “de m onstration”: “scire est rem p er dem onstrationum cognoscere.” 7
Leaving to the n e x t section an analysis of th e difference in this respect betw een the thinkers of the 17th century, let us look a t the sense given to the concept of “dem onstration” by Leibniz. It m u st be begun by recalling th a t P hilip of N euburg has not been called a “clien t” by accident here. F or Leibniz had first been inform ed about P h ilip ’s candidature and only afterw ards he set out to w rite th e book. I t can be phrased differently: still before he w rote the book he had believed— or perhaps had been persuaded to believe—th a t only Philip should be elected as king. This kind of “orders,” not too infrequent in the history of political doctrines, acquire an ab stract n atu re in philosophical language, because th ey are separated from economic questions. Before we proceed to showing th e m a tter in th is concrete case le t us quote Louis C outurat in his continuation of the tho u g h t of J. Lechelier, who m aintained th a t dem onstration differs from other form s of deductive thought in th a t it presupposes a tru th alread y know n (“suppose la v érité déjà connue”). I t is—he w rites—a tru th know n only from th e psychol ogical point of view. 8 Thus, Leibniz wished to present to th e reader a tru th , w hich w as know n to him from th e psychological point of view, in such a m anner th a t th e reader could recognize it as logically proved. This sentence n o t only tran slates a description of a fairly prosaic situation into abstract language, b u t it also — w hich is more im p o rtant — contains a corroboration of the prim acy of logic in the Leibnizian political science.9
7 O. F eyl in his B eiträge zu r G eschichte d er slavisch en V erbin du n gen und
in ternationalen K o n ta k te d er U n iversitä t Jena (Jena, VEB Fischer Verlag, 1960)
w rote on the sign ifican ce o f W eigel as th e central personage o f th e Jena centre (m ainly pp. 218ff). From th e standpoint of th e developm ent of th e social sciences, th e m ost accurate analysis o f W eigel’s works, as w ell as o f other authors o f th e 17th century, w as m ade by E. V. Spektorskiy in h is book P roblem a sociyalnoi
fizik i v X V II sto le tiy e (Problems of social physics in th e 17th century), published
in W arsaw in 1910 at th e exp en se of W arsaw U niversity. This valu able book w as, to some extent, m ade u se by G. N. Clark (Science and Social W elfare in
th e A ge of N ew ton , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949), and I ow e to it th e solution
of m any a d ifficulty in th e interpretation of W eigel’s w ork, w hich is com plex and fu ll of contradictions.
8 “D éjà connue au point de vu e psychologique, sans doute m ais non recon n ue comme vérité au point de vu e logique.” A. Lalande, V ocabulaire tech niqu e
e t critiqu e de la ph ilosoph ie, Paris (Presses U niversitaires de France) 1956, p. 215.
9 More than 60 years ago, in opposition to Kuno Fischer and others, B. Rus sell and L. Couturat showed that the starting-point of th e w hole of Leibniz’s system w as his logic rather than his dynam ics. Cf. H. Elzenberg, “Podstaw y m etafizyki Leibniza,” R o zp ra w y h ist.-filozof. AU , LX , K raków 1917.
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In th e introduction to the Specim en Leibniz declares th a t in astonish m ent about the scholars’ ignorance in questions concerning hum an relations he decides to strive a fte r m athem atical exactness in his con siderations, because only m athem aticians can prove th e ir propositions exhaustively and convincingly. Besides A ristotle and Euclid, he mentions Galileo and Descartes as those w ho contributed to progress in m a them atics; w hile in civil philosophy (philosophia civilis) he estim ates Bacon, Hobbes and G rotius m ost highly.10 Following th eir exam ple Leibniz resolved to discover “the invariable law s” governing th e beha viour of people and th us to “en ter the camp of certain ty ” (“im petum sumsi, eo in campo certitudinem hum anam p ericlitandi”). As a “mind desirous of ra tio n ality ” (H. Elzenberg), Leibniz conceives of this “cer ta in ty ” as proof a priori of all tru th s, also factual ones.
In his search for an immovable tru th (it w as also to be the decisive argum ent against scepticism), Leibniz em ployed th e m ethod of m athe m atical thinking in political-legal sciences; in his N ouveaux Essais he spoke w ith the deepest reverence of the Roman legists because they could employ the m ethod of Euclid, Archimedes and Appolonios, i.e., on the basis of axiom s and definitions they b uilt a whole imposing system. Leibniz shared the opinion of m any of his contem poraries th a t reality consists of a num ber of elem ents into which it m ust be de composed in order to be described in full. In this manner, a science was to appear th a t w ould be b u ilt in the same w ay as geometry. Hobbes, whom Leibniz always respected and—as a young m an—even adm ired, regarded society as a sum of individuals, and the individual as a sum of affections; to define these elem entary components m eant to build—Hobbes w ro te—th e science of the motion of “political bodies,” equally certain and immovable as the science of “physical bodies.” Sim ilarly, Spinoza in his Ethics, D em onstrated in a Geometrical Order, tried to give a definition of hum an affections (Pars tertio,: A ffectu m definitiones, A ffe c tu m generalis definitio).
Leibniz term ed dem onstration as a “com bination of definitions,” or else— as h e expressed it in a le tte r to Conring—a “chain of definitions” (catena definitionum ). The Specim en is a classical exam ple of employing polysyllogismus, i.e., a chain of syllogisms, th a t are linked to one another in such a w ay th a t the conclusion of th e preceding is sim ul
10 K. M üller in his article on “G. W. Leibniz und Hugo G rotius” in the collection Forschungen zu S ta a t und V erfassung—Festgabe für F ritz H artung, Berlin (Duncker und Humblot) 1958, pp. 187—203, w rites on the high estim ate of Grotius by Leibniz. M oreover, th e article deals w ith the important problem of L eibniz’s v iew on th e question on th e sovereignty of the state and of th e lim its of th e subjects’ obedience to the ruler. G rotius’ attitude to Galileo is discussed by W. Voise in his article „Grotius, apprenti de G alilee” published in the
P roceedings of th e in tern ation al sym posiu m on G alileo’s 400th a n n iversary
Le ibn iz’s M odel of P o litic a l T h in k in g 1 9 7
taneously a prem iss in th e following one. These syllogisms are given in the enthym em atical form, in which some p a rts of the reasoning are not distinctly given, therefore in analysing this course of reasoning one m ust give them in th eir full form. By w ay of example, here is a proof of a proposition, w hich Leibniz repeated twice: once in the introduction, th e other tim e as “ta sk ” XIV:
Omne turpe periculosum est; Omne turpe honorem m inuit; Honor est opinio potentiae;
Qui m inorem potentiae opinionem habet, laedi facilior habetur; Quod facilius habetur, id m inus m olestum fa ctu habetur; Ergo libentius fit.
Esse vero, qui libenter nos laedat, periculosum est; Ergo omne turpe periculosum est.
The first syllogism in its full form ru n s as follows: Honor est opinio potentiae;
Omne turpe honorem m inuit;
Omne turpe opinionem potentiae m inuit.
This is a categorical syllogism of th e B arbara mood, b u t in the untypical shape of the so-called syllogism us obliquus, because th e term s honor and opinio potentiae in th e m inor prem iss and in the conclusion do not occur directly b u t in a case dependent on m m u it. The rem aining syllogisms have the same form.
H ere is ano th er example, concerning the analysis of the situation in the nobiliary Republic:
Propositio:
Bonum Reipublicae cum bono Nobilitatis in Polcmia jure coincidit. 1. In Comitiis Poloniae, suffragia jure in Nobilitatis potestatae su nt
[here Leibniz gave the exam ple: M agistratus urbani: Cracaviensis, Vilnensis et Dantiscanus, Nobilibus comparantur],
2. Ergo et Comitia.
3. Comitia Rem publicam repraesentant.
4. Ergo et Respublica jure in Nobilitatis potestate est.
5. In quorum potestate jure est respublica, in eorum potestatem. translatum est Jus Reipublicae.
6. In jure reipublicae persona eius civilis seu moralis continetur. 7. Ergo persona Reipublicae in nobilitatis personam translata est. 8. Quorum persona coincidit, eorum et bonum coincidit.
Conclusio: Ergo bonum Reipublicae cum N obilitatis in Polonia co incidit.
The first syllogism ru n s as follows:
Si suffragia in Comitiis Poloniae su n t in potestate Nobilitatis; E t Comitia sunt in potestate Nobilitatis;
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Suffragia in Comitiis Poloniae sunt in potestate Nobilitatis; Ergo: Comitia su n t in potestate Nobilitatis.
This is a hypothetical syllogism modo ponendo-ponente, and the re maining syllogisms are—in th e ir fu ll form s—identical w ith it.
The passage from point 6 to 7 jum ps over from the conclusion of syllogism 5 to an identification of the personality of Reipublicae and of th e Nobilitatis. To fill in this gap, Leibniz needed a premiss, which he had om itted and w hich is a t least dubious, nam ely:
Si in alicuius potestate persona continentur, cum eo coincidit In Nobilitatis potestate persona Reipublicae continentur; Ergo: cum ea coincidit.
This is a hypothetical syllogism modo ponendo-ponens; the next one has the following form:
Quorum persona coincidit, eorum et bonum coincidit, Persona Reipublicae et Nobilitatis coincidit,
Ergo: B onum Reipublicae et N obilitatis coincidit.
In this way, Leibniz proved one proposition afte r another throughout his work to arrive a t the end to the conclusion we know already. In the forew ord he w rote th a t “we have exact com putations and proofs concerning the motion of the clock, and only declam ations concerning the w elfare of th e people” (“de horologio aliquo dem onstrationes, de salute tot populorum declamationes habem us”). A fter th e completion of th e w ork he m ust have certainly been convinced th a t he had been able to prove in w h at consisted the w elfare of the country w here Philip ought to reign. Moreover, on th e exam ple of Poland (which he also called, in the foreword, th e “bulw ark of C hristendom ”) Leibniz tried to show how the m achine of th e state should be constructed to attain the precision of the clock, which w as th e classical symbol of perfection in physics to the scientists of th e 17th century. 11 In this manner, Leibniz desired to realize the ideal of a universal science, which was to comprise all th e globus intellectualis of m ankind in order to explain in full both th e w orld of n a tu re and th e w orld of m an (both, in his opinion, being subject to invariable though different laws). Three years later, in 1672, the same thought was brought forw ard by M olière in one of his most philosophical plays (Les fem m es savantes), as he made A rm ande say sym ptom atically:
Nous approfondirons, ainsi que la physique, Grammaire, histoire, vers, morale et politique.
In the conclusion to the foreword, Leibniz assured th e read er that he had resolved to en ter th e camp of certain ty in which “no m an’s foot ever stood” (“quem nulla pedum vestigia signât”). Was it actually
11 J. O. Fleckenstein, “D ie Einheit von Technik, Forschung und Philosophie in der W issenschaft des Barock,” Techn ikgesch ich te, 32, D üsseldorf (VDI Verlag) 1965, No. 1.
Le ibn iz’s M odel of P o litic a l Th in k in g 1 9 9
so? Did th e Specim en rep resen t a “new kind of w ritin g ” (“novus genus scribendi”), as it was announced by the title, and w ere th e first words of the forew ord tru e in declaring th a t th erew ith the readers w ere given a work introducing a m ethod of scientific reasoning th a t had previously been unusual (“Raram , novaque scribendi rationem affero, Lectores”)?
A NEW OR AN OLD METHOD?
The answ er to a question p u t in th is w ay could not be unequivocal. This is not exceptional as fa r as an evaluation of Leibniz’s w ork is concerned. In one sense, th e Specim en actually did represent a new kind of w riting, in an oth er it did not.
The “nov elty ” of this kind of publication consisted in draw ing all consequences from the theoretical assum ptions of the deductive m ethod and in publishing a work th a t constituted a classical exam ple of ratio nalistic thinking in political science. The “novelty” also consisted in the conscious binding up of politics and history into a cohesive whole and in showing th a t as soon as one assumes the basic presuppositions of “dem onstration” the problem cannot be solved in any other w ay. 12 Leibniz could regard his w ork as new, in spite of th e fact th a t he had had predecessors and—as we saw—not all stages of his reasoning w ere faultless. But, on the other hand, this w ord w as gradually devalua ting since it started to appear in the titles of an ever increasing num ber of works. A t the tu rn of the century, K epler published his Nova A stro nomia (1609) and Bacon was then w riting his N o vu m O rganum and The N ew Atlantis. Leibniz him self publishes successively, to m ention b u t th e most im portant titles, Nova m ethodus discendae docendae juris- prudentiae (1667), H ypothesis physica nova (1670), Nova m ethodus pro m axim is et m inim is (1684), S ystem e nouveau de la nature (1695) and N ouveaux Essais (1704). As almost all epochs, this one was also con vinced of the novelty of the discoveries it made, an d this conviction was m anifested w ith great ostentatiousness.
Fascinated by th e pow er of deduction, Leibniz did not notice the appearance of the possibility of another, really new method of th in king on m atters associated w ith politics conceived of as the science of managing the affairs of the state and of its subjects. This m ethod started to be employed prim arily by inhabitants of cities, i.e., those who had th e greatest chances to be transform ed into “citizens” from “subjects.” Thus, already tow ards th e end of th e 16th century in
12 “Le fruit de la dém onstration est la science. Tout ce qui est dém ontré ne peut pas être autrem ent qu’il est dém ontré” w rote Bossuet in T raité de la Con
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London yearly m ortality rolls were being elaborated, and since 1603 they started being printed. In his excellent H istory of the Royal Society of London, published in London in 1667, Thomas S p rat w rote much on th e subject, as w ell as on th e revolutionary book by John G rau n t w ith a lengthy b ut w ell-inform ing title: Natural and Political Observa tions ... upon the Bills of M orality w ith Reference to the G overnm ent, Religion, Trade, G rowth, A yre, Diseases, and the Several Changes of the Said C ity (i.e., London, w here th e book w as published in 1662).
Leibniz, a Fellow of the Royal Society, w ho in his youth had been enthusiastic about Bacon (he adm ired the la tte r’s postulate to base science upon experience) and about Hobbes, and who was an eager reader of all “novelties,” could no t have not know n about that. Al ready in 1669 he projected th e elaboration of a history of medicine connected w ith a postulate addressed to scientific societies to publish annualls of births, m ortality, epidemics, etc. in various population con centrations (Dresden, A ustria, Prussia). His Consilium A egyptiacum addressed to Louis XIV in 1672 (he advised to conquer Egypt and to transform France into a colonial power) contained plenty of unusually accurate economic, statistical, and dem ographic advice. Several years later, Leibniz brought up a project of founding “economic faculties” a t some G erm an universities. D emography was h is p articu lar passion, because he was convinced th a t the n u m b er of population constituted the pow er of a country: he associated the decline of Spain w ith the depopulation of this country, and the diagnosis of th e m alady of France was th a t “P aris flourishes, the provinces become desolate.”
Leibniz cherished this kind of in terest since early youth down to the last years of his life. However, he k ep t them as if on the side-track of his thought. P erhaps the immense richness of his ideas, the incessant abandoning of one subject for another made it impossible to reflect more deeply on these m atters. A characteristic exam ple is provided by his rem arks on Weigel and P etty. E rh ard Weigel, an odd m ind full of m etaphysical-sym bolic speculations (e.g., he held u p the geocentric view, propagated the P ythagorean mysticism of num bers, etc.) had occasionally strikingly novel ideas. Thus, his A rithm etische Beschrei- bung der M oral-W eisheit (Jena 1674) dedicated to the m unicipal council of N urem berg, contained a project for handling social phenom ena ex clusively from the num erical point of view; w hat he m eant was no less th an the creation of a kind of statistics covering th e whole of city life. And Leibniz in his Rem arques sur W eigel observes th a t Weigel om itted the most im portant p a r t of m athem atics, i.e., th e infinitesim al calculus, and therefore brought th e doctrine as if to half-w ay its com pleteness. 13
13 “... la science de la quantité en général ou de l’estim ation (calcul), comme l’appelle notre célèbre W eigel, n e m e paraît être traité qu’à m oitié”, N ouvelles
ftLeibniz’s M odel o f P o litic a l T h in k in g 2 0 1
Sim ilar rem arks w ere made by Leibniz on the tw o w orks by W illiam P etty , Two Essays in Political A rithm etic and Five Essays in Political A rithm etic, published in 1691 b ut w ritten earlier. A t th e very outset Leibniz w rites th a t “studies of this kind m ay be of g reat im portance to politics: eith er in the evaluation of the pow er of th e state (in relation to th e n um b er of population), or in determ ining th e lenght of hum an life.” A fter this he sets out to m ake tables aim ing a t the dee pening of the m athem atical analysis of phenom ena (of m ortality, longe vity, etc.). In both cases he is interested p rim arily in th e m athem atical aspects of the problem . A t th a t tim e he w rites a n essay of a few pages, which was n ever extended, on Questiones calculi politici circa hom inum vitam , et cognatae, in which he outlines a program m e for scientific researches in th e population num ber, th e ratio of w om en to men, th e nu m ber of u n m arried people, th e ag ricu ltural lan d area, n a tu ra l resources etc. 14
Thus, Leibniz was b u t one step from the re-building of statistics into a general science bound up, in addition, w ith politics. H e did not, however, m ake th a t step. This is the m ore stran ge th a t he always m aintained th a t all branches of hum an ab ility tend to perfection, and he saw—b etter than any o th er of his contem poraries—th e relationship betw een th e pow er of a state and the efficiency of m anaging its re sources. 15 But, on th e other hand, he shared th e conviction of many of his contem poraries th a t “p u re ” th ought excels in q u ality “p ractical” thought, and th a t “g eneral” thinking is b e tte r than “p a rtic u la r” th in king. Leibniz alw ays used to contrast decidedly these tw o kinds of thinking, in p articu la r w here th e transiency of individual sensory p e r ceptions w as concerned: “Philosophia est com plexus doctrinarum u n i- versalium , opponitur historia quae est singularium .” 16 I t is thought w hich can give a general (i.e., scientific) character to our perceptions, and nothing b u t thought can prev en t us from sensory illusions. This contained th e rig h t conviction about the im portance of thought as a co-factor in th e creation of th e m ost im p ortan t systems; the disco veries of Copernicus and G alileo consisted in a negation of th e validity of our uncontrolled sensory perceptions (we perceive “w ith o u r own eyes” th a t the sun is moving in the sky, th a t a feath er falls less fast th an a stone, etc.). B ut this rig h t reflection led Leibniz to th e false
14 Both tex ts w ere published in th e w ork edited by O. Klopp, D ie W e rk e von
L eibniz. Hannover 1866, E rste Reihe: H istorisch -politisch e u nd sta a tsw issen sch a ft- liche S ch riften , V, pp. 326—337 and 337—340.
15 During h is life, th e great Dutch statesm an, John de W itt in his struggle w ith Louis XIV, took resort to statistics in tryin g to calcu late accurately th e natural resources of th e country. D e Witt h im self w as a student of m athem atics and published a book on this subject; cf. G. W. Clark, op. cit, p. 136.
16 L. D aville, op. cit., p. 340. Leibniz em phasized at alm ost any place that the senses are exclu sively a source of particular truths, because they provide indi vid ual exam ples only.
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proposition th a t one can construct a science in no dependence on ex perience (later this m istake was repeated by th e positivists).
The conviction about the prevalence of “p u re” tho u g h t w as also rooted deeply in the belief, universally shared in th a t epoch, in the superiority of m etaphysical problem s; for this reason, one w anted to find a rational solution to all existential questions of m ankind in the language of metaphysics. 17 In this respect, Leibniz pronounced himself clearly and unam biguously, as he w rote, e.g., in a le tte r to A m auld in 1686, th a t although the laws of n a tu re should be explained m athe m atically and mechanistically, it m ust not be forgotten th a t these laws have th e ir m etaphysical reasons. 18 He employed the same principle in “hum an affairs.” In his dispute w ith Pufendorf and Thom asius he ex plained th a t any doctrine th a t bases itself on the tem porary is insuf ficient and incom plete, 19 and in his rem arks on W eigel’s works he stated th a t “the tru th s of m etaphysics are certainly the most im portant for... a tru e science of m orals.” 20
Leibniz’s teacher, Weigel, declared m athem atics to be the basis of the science of the world. However, in the forew ord to the A rith - m etische Beschreibung der M oral-W eisheit he m aintained th a t out of the two p arts of th a t science (i.e., arithm etics and geometry) a rith m etics is the more im portant one (vielm ehr die A rith m etik) because God, th e “eternal calculator” (der ewige Rechenm eister) created the ru lers (Regenten) in order to m ake them his deputies (Vicerechenm ei- stem ) and to allow them to serve his glory in m anaging the affairs of the m ajority of people, who had not y et learned the a rt of calculation and therefore w ere still apprentices in this field (Rechenschüler). T hirty years later, John A rbuthnot, a physician and a friend of S w ift’s, publi shed in Oxford A n Essay on the Usefulness of M athematical Learning (1701), in which he em phasized th e significance of m athem atics for a “clear, dem onstrative and m ethodical reasoning,” but, a t th e same time, he stressed th a t it should be tau g h t for its usefulness “in civil affairs”; arithm etics is necessary—he w rote—prim arily for m erchants and politicians and geom etry is useful in m easuring land, distances betw een towns, th e sizes of pieces of cloth in selling etc. 21
17 “Dem Barock war die M etaphysik die Sprache, in w elcher es rational sein E xistential auszudrücken versuchte.” J. O. F leckenstein, G. W. L eibniz, p. 41.
18 “Il faut toujours expliquer la nature m athém atiquem ent et m écaniquem ent, pourvu qu’on sache que les principes m êm es ou les lois de m écanique ou de la force n e dépendent pas de la seule étendue m athém atique, m ais de quelques raisons m étaphysiques.” L ettre s de L eibn iz à A rn au ld (ed. G. Lewis), Paris (Presses U niversitaires de France) 1952, p. 45.
19 M. Barillari, “La dottrina de diritto di Leibniz.” A tti délia Reale Accadem ia
di Scienze M orali e P olitice, XLIII, 1915, parte 2, p. 140.
20 “La découverte des vérités de la m étaphysique, qui sont assurém ent les plus im portantes et qui servant le plus à la vraie science des m oeurs.” N ouvelles
le ttre s e t opuscules in édits, p. 149.
21 G. A. A itken, The L ife and W orks of John A rbuth not, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1892, pp. 410f.
Le ib n iz’s M odel of P o litic a l T h in k in g 2 0 3
F ar from th a t sort of practicalism , Leibniz alw ays a ttrib u te d p rim a cy to geometry, of which he conceived, as a m a tter of fact, as a p urely ab stract science. T here was nothing odd about it: the inductive m ethod had n ot yet been developed, w hereas geom etry w as the m ost axiom a- tized science in accordance w ith th e most severe requirem ents of deductive and a pritori thinking. Therefore, w ithout much risk we can assume th a t if Leibniz had w ritten his Specim en several years later, he would have elaborated it in an either identical or v ery sim ilar m anner, employing the “geom etrical” m anner of reasoning. I t is very characteristic, th a t even in connection w ith th e statistical considerations he thought of constructing a priori th e calculus of probability, and only m uch la te r (after 1700) he was shown the possibility of constructing this calculus on the basis of a posteriori reasoning by Jacques B ernoulli (though he acknowledged th e la tte r to be rig h t not before 1714). 22 This is one more proof—perhaps a too blatan t one—of how deeply Leibniz w as fascinated by the thinking more geometrico.
This kind of thinking has, however, other consequences, a p a rt from the stric tly scientific one. Namely, it seems to be w orth w hile com paring it w ith the reflections of some ancients on th e fam ous P latonian concept of the “G od-G eom etrician”. In his book on th e relationships betw een science and politics in antiquity. B. F arrington 23 analyses, among others, the eighth chapter of P lu ta rc h ’s D inner-table Discussions. One of the interlocutors recalls th a t Lycurgus prohibited th e S p artans to study arithm etics and introduced instead the teaching of geom etry, for num bers induced them to distribute goods equally, w hereas th e principles of geom etry suggested a distribution according to m erits. A nother in te r locutor brought up a sim ilar problem in draw ing attention to th e fact th a t P lato in calling God a “G eom etrician” w ished to em phasize th a t only geom etry was able to set in order th e w orld of m atter, w hich alw ays proved to be a source of conflicts and disorder.
T w enty centuries afterw ards the P latonian G od-Geom etrician took on th e shape of th e Leibnizian G od-Architect. In Leibniz’s opinion, it w as th e G od-A rchitect (frequently called also a God-M onarch by him self) w ho in his rule over th e best of all possible w orlds institu ted in it th e best of all possible orders. Those whom th e existing order does n o t su it do not deserve the nam e of tru ly pious people. 24 The “republic
22 L eibnizens m ath em atisch e S ch riften , hrsg. von C. I. Gerhardt. E rste A b -
teilung. B d III: B riefw ech sel zw isch en L eibniz, Jacob B ernoulli, Johann Bernoulli und Nicolaus B ernoulli, H alle 1855. M ainly the letter of Jacques Bernoulli from
Basies, w ritten on 30th Oct. 1703, in w hich h e exposes that possibility—p. 78. Cf. L. Couturat, La logique de L eibn iz d ’après des docu m ents in éd its, Paris (Alcan) 1901, pp. 274f.
23 At th e beginning the author w rites: “In this Chapter it appears that arithm etic is dem ocratic, geom etry oligarchic and that God prefers th e latter.”
Science and P olitics in th e A ncient W orld, London (Allen and Unwin) 1946, p. 26.
24 This is a paraphrase of one of th e sentences from Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld (23rd March 1960): “Que ceux qui n e sont pas contents de l’ordre des choses
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of noble m inds” instituted by th e Suprem e God is ru led by divine Governors, w ho are as if L ittle Gods. 25 Some of th e subjects comply w ith the w ill of these G overnors in a hope of obtaining favours or in fear of punishm ent, b u t th e re are m any who are loyal to them out of delight or patriotism ; and, if one adds to this th e wish of these subjects to live in peace, it can be stated th a t public peace is the source of th e subjects’ d u ties. 26 Thanks to this, everybody can be happy, since to be happy in this vale of tears m eans to be satisfied and quiet. 27
This is an outline of Leibniz’s political doctrine comprising, eviden tly, also p a rt of th e science of m orality. In other words, his doctrine can be summed up as follows: one has to p u t up w ith the fact th a t the w orld is as it is, b u t one has also to realize clearly th a t it should be as it is. Therefore, the model political thinking consists not so much in explaining w hy it is thus, as in explaining th a t it should be just as it is.
The social history of the last three hundred years appended a com m entary to this reflection. And the fact th a t it w as born in the mind of a genial scholar and a g reat philosopher, w ho in his desire to satisfy everybody satisfied no one, once m ore proves th a t it is most difficult for hum an thought to pave its way in th e knowledge of m an’s place in society.
*
Instead of th e custom ary full-stop, w e m ust p u t an interrogation m ark at the end of our considerations. For, Leibniz w as not only an unusual personality b u t also an enigmatic one. F or a fairly long period ne sauraient se vanter d’aimer D ieu com m e il faut.” L e ttre s de L eibn iz à Arnauld, p. 103.
25 This is a paraphrase of one of th e sentences from Leibniz’s letters to A rnauld (9th Sept. 1687): “Et c’est cette société ou république générale des esprits sous ce souverain m onarque qui est la plus noble partie de l ’univers, com posée d’autant de p etits dieux sous ce grand Dieu.” Ibid., p. 92. The expression esprit has been translated into “noble m ind”, which is not too great a licence if it is recalled that J. Fleckenstein, in h is w ish to render the Leibnizian m etaphysical term s into th e language of current politics, has translated Leibniz’s expression “les in telligences ou âm es capables de réflexion s” sim ply into “princes and m onarchs.” Cf. op. cit., p. 152.
26 The original tex t runs thus: “L’on veu t qu’elle n’est que l ’espérance des
b ien faits ou la crainte des supplices. Il m e sem ble qu’on a tort de faire ce reproche aux peuples. Il y en a beaucoup qui sont fidèles par l’affection qu’ils ont pour leur prince et pour leur patrie. Si le désir de se conserver en repos s’y m êle, il n’y a rien à rédire, la sécurité publique est le principe de l ’obliga tion des sujets.” It is a fragm ent of th e chapter entitled “D e la fidélité des sujets envers les princes” taken from R éflexion sur l’a rt de con n aître les hom m es; Leibniz w rote th ese reflections for Madame l ’E lectrice de Brunsvic-L uneburg about 1702: L e ttre s e t opuscules in éd its de L eibniz, p. 144.
27 “La v ie heureuse icy bas consiste dans une âm e to u t-à -fa it contente et tranquille,” ibid., p. 241.
Le ib n iz’s M odel of P o litic a l Th in k in g 2 0 5
of time, it has been known th a t he published only one version of his philosophical conception, i.e., th e indeterm inistic one, w hile leaving in hiding the other version, the determ inistic one, in which th ere w as no room for freedom because th e re was exclusively necessity. Several years ago, in his book on L eibniz et Spinoza (2nd ed. 1962), G. F ried m ann analysed precisely Leibniz’s in terest in th e doctrine of th e “ana- themized ath eist.” He corroborated th e opinion (which had already appeared during Leibniz’s life, and was la te r p ersisten tly reiterated ) th a t Leibniz had actually been a Spinozist in disguise. His le tters show th a t he endeavoured to hide his respect for Spinoza, whose view s he proclaim ed publicly to be “m onstrous.” Sim ilarly, Leibniz’s a ttitu d e to another “m onstrous” conception, i.e., to Hobbes’ doctrine, w as also ambiguous: he criticized th e la tte r publicly b u t did not get w eary of seeking p rivate contact w ith th a t philosopher.
This kind of “double-facedness” w as n o t exceptional a t th a t time: it is sufficient to recall th e known fact of th e existence of two versions of Galileo’s views, or the enigmatic “larv atu s prodeo” (“I w alk on and m ask m yself”) of Descartes. The m ilieu in w hich Leibniz lived could only accept the doctrine he proclaim ed publicly (although the ostenta tiousness of some pronouncem ents is a t tim es astonishing). Fontenelle, as we have already pointed out, was rig h t in saying th a t Leibniz “had well understood th e interests of princes.” On th e o th er hand, Leibniz knew th a t wisdom persuades one to ad ju st him self to his m ilieu (la sagesse v eu t q u ’on s’accomode aux gens et aux choses”). I t w as a v arian t of the famous device Caute, w hich Spinoza h ad had carved on his signet-ring w ith a view to rem em ber alw ays to act w ith extrem e caution in relationships w ith his environm ent. In th e light of th at, the known statem en t by Leibniz: “he w ho knows me only by w h a t I have published does not know m e” takes on a specific sense. It is difficult to exclude th e possibility of a surprise which may be hidden in E uro pean archives, m ainly in the renow ned archives of the H anoverian Landesbibliothek.
