Ttaa Mechanisms of Power (Katowice, 1S»J) P race N aukow e U n iw ersy tetu Śląskiego nr 1337
T A D E U SZ SŁAW EK
n r in w .: BFWn - 1280
BFW N/1280
“More than Marriage"
The Mechanisms of Heterogeneity and Interpretation in Blake
and Nietzsche
Le reel n e doit pas se u le m e n t etre d eterm in e dans son o b je c tiv ite h isto riq u e, m ais a u ssi a p artir du secret, qui in - terrom p t la co n tin u ity du tem p s h isto riq u e, a p artir des in ten sio n s in terieu res. Le p lu ra lism e de la so c ie te n'est p o ssib le qu'a partir de ce secret.
E m m a n u e l L e v in a s, T o ta liti et iit/in i
1. And
The title of Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1793) suggests a celebration of a certain unity inscribed in a dense netw ork of the erotic, the societal (all the connotations of the concept of “ m arriage” ) and the theological and religious (the significance of “ H eaven” and
“ Hell” ). At the same time, however, the m arriage in question (like any other) m ust reiterate the principle of difference. There would be no m arriage possible were there no strenuously emphasized distinctions between the m arrying parties. The “ and” is a third body entering the liaison preventing a complete dissolution of one m arriage participant in the other.
T he " m arriage” o f H e a v en and H ell in d ica tes at o n ce th e eq u a lizin g reco n ci
lia tio n and th e d iffe r e n tia l ir re co n cila b ility o f th e opposed s t a t e s .1
1 S. S h aviro, “ ‘S tr iv in g w ith S y s t e m s ’: B lak e and th e P o litic s o f D iffe r e n c e ,”
in E ssentia l A r ti c le s fo r th e S t u d y o f W i ll ia m B la ke, 1970— 1984, ed. N. H ilton (H am den, Conn.: A rchon B ooks, 1986), p. 275.
By introducing “ an d ” betw een the two nouns Blake lets in a shadow of necessary infidelity or unloyalty which m ust accompany each m arria
ge: the two parties can be loyal to each other only w hen they rem ain loyal to the “ and” which operates betw een them. The nearness and intim acy of m arriage is founded upon the distance which constitutes its basic mechanism. The power of m arriage as the power of AND implies th a t the stru ctu re of this institution does not have to be closed and suffocating (“ the M arriage hearse” which Blake invokes in his “ Lon
don” poem from Songs of Experience). AND is an inviting gesture extended tow ards the O ther (“ The most sublim e act is to set another before you” , claims Blake in one of the Proverbs of Hell) on the stren g th of one’s incompleteness (‘this’ AND ‘th a t’), or the acknowledg
ed im possibility to recognize one’s description of anything as ‘closed’
or ‘com pleted’ (‘this’ and ‘th a t’ AND [also] ‘th a t’). AND (literally) spells tentativeness of END (w ithout AND m arriage inevitably must become a figure of ‘ending’ like in a quoted passage from “ London” ).
W hat opposes the mechanism of AND is the operation of the techni
cally and m etaphysically interp reted virginity as a figure of closure and repression. In “ The Golden N et” three virgins “ cloth’d in flam es of fire,” “ iron w ire,” and “ tears and sighs” deprecate desire by imposing upon it “ a N et of Golden tw ine” 2 (K, 424). As a result the joyful scene of m arriage is transform ed (in a m ovem ent opposing th a t of The Marriage) into a scene of to rtu re and infernal sufferring:
P ity in g I w e p t to see th e w oe T h at L ove & B e a u ty undergo, To be co n su m ’d in b u rn in g F ires A nd in u n g ra tified d esires... (K, 424)
Due to the power of AND (open-endedness and uncompleteness) hell is transform ed into a creative place, w hereas the absence of this mecha
nism gives room to ‘virginity’ or the force of END (closure, a removal of differences, a trium ph of the same) which initiates hell.
Happiness opened by m arriage is, due to the operation of AND, perceived as a promise of a still g reater bliss: m arriage does not exhaust itself in the closure of the two, ju st the opposite — it under
mines such a closure by constant rediscovering of the distance which reveals m arriage as ‘m ore than m arriage.’ Thus, through the mecha
nism of AND m arriage becomes a m etaphor of a yet greater bliss, and
* A ll q u o ta tio n s from B la k e com e from G eorge K e y n e s’ e d itio n of B la k e’s C o m p l e t e W r iti n g s (O xford U n iv e r sity P ress, 1969) and w ill b e m ark ed by a letter K fo llo w e d by a p a g e n u m b er or, in case o f a lon g poem , a p la te or can to num ber a n d th e lin e referen ce.
the philosophy of m atrim ony m ust become a m editation on the HOPE which is not to be achieved in /b y the illocutionary speech acts of the
‘I proclaim thee m an and wife’ type, bu t which m u st be looked for in the ineradicable feature of distance renew ing itself at th e v ery h eart of the institution. All these elem ents (m arriage as AND, as ‘m ore than m arriage,’ as a p ursuit of a ‘higher bliss’) are to be found not only in Blake but also in Nietzsche. In the “ Of the Three Evils” chapter o!
Zarathustra we read in a long invocation to “ delight” (Wollust):
W o llu st: d a s g r o s s e G le ic h n is-G lu c k fu r h o h eres G liick und h S ch ste H o ffn u n g . V ie le m n a m lich is t E he verheis-sen und m eh r a ls E he, ■—
— V ielem , das frem d er sich ist, a ls M an und W eib:
— und w e r b e g r iff es ganz, w ie frem d sich M an und W eib s in d ! » (Z, 209)
Pleasure (W ollust) is a m etaphor of still higher happiness and the highest hope, of more th an m arriage, b u t it can be so because it functions only in a being which is divided and estranged from itself.
In other words, the law of m arriage th a t Blake seems to be form ulating extends not only over the two sexes but, first of all, is applicable to each man who can actualize his/her potential for being only w hen he/she discovers a rift, a fissure inside h is/her own stru ctu re, the fissure which can be bridged, or ‘m arried,’ the fissure of the distance opened by the mechanism of AND. Nietzsche claims th a t although the distance and estrangem ent of man and woman is beyond comprehension, the one who is promised “ more than m arriage” (m ehr als Ehre) m ust be even stran ger to him self/herself {fremder sich ist, als Man und Weib) than man and woman.
2. Desire FROM/OYER
a. FROM For the first tim e in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell desire appears as “ D elight,” and is appropriately delivered in “ the voice of the devil.” The philosophy of desire connects it w ith th e Body and Energy and, consequently, w ith the senses. N evertheless, these concepts do not form straight-forw ard dychotomies w ith either Soul or Reason.
8 A ll q u otation s from N ietzsch e are tak en from A lfred K ron er’s ed ition (L eipzig, 1921). T he fo llo w in g sy ste m o f a b b rev ia tio n s has b een used: W M — W i ll e z u r M ach t, Z — A ls o S p r a c h Z a r a th u s tr a . A n u m ber th at fo llo w s r efers to the pagination^
Such classic antinomies of philosophy are not treated by Blake in a sta
tic way; ju st the opposite — Blake’s logic is based upon the dynamic mechanism of AND. Hence
A ttra ctio n and R ep u lsion , R eason and E nergy, L ove and H ate, are n ecessa ry to H u m an e x is te n c e . (PI. 3)
The necessity of such pairings is, however, founded less on the signifi
cance of each of the term s and more on the sphere which combines them not allowing them to m elt into homogeneity. Blake clearly m ain
tains th a t the tendency of all repressive system making (“ All Bibles or sacred codes” ) tow ards domination is based precisely on such a sharp differentiation which is a m ajor cause of mistakes:
A ll B ib les or sacred codes h a v e b een th e ca u ses o f th e fo llo w in g E rrors: 1.
T h at M an h as tw o real e x is tin g p rin cip les: V iz, a B ody & a Sou l. (PI. 4)
If Blake speaks of Energy as a fundam ental force of his version of creation (“ As a new heaven is begun...,” PI. 3) then w hat this Energy is is overlapping of the term s and phenom ena in such a way th a t they m aintain their character (and names) b u t lose the restrictive homoge
neity which made them conceivable for us before. Energy, i.e. Delight, is nothing else but the power of the heterogenuous. The first of the th ree points correcting the “ E rro rs” of “ sacred codes” reads:
M an h as no B ody d istin ct fro m h is Soul; for th a t c a ll’d B ody is a p ortion o f S o u l discern'd by th e fiv e S en ses, th e c h ie f in le ts of S o u l in th is age.
(PI. 4)
We can trace the mechanism of heterogeneity in the constant play of cancelling and affirm ation. The opening sentence is p articularly inte
resting in this respect: first, it cancels th e body (“ Man has no Body” ), second, it brings it back as a certain variety (man does not have only such a body which would be “ distinct from his Soul,” i.e. he m ay have some other type of body), third, it makes another move tow ards can
celling of the body by claiming th a t there holds a seeming synonym ity betw een body and soul. I call this synonym ity “ seem ing” because, as we learn soon, body does exist and in, at least, double sense. There is some en tity w hich can be only v ery vaguely referred to as “ th a t” and it is precisely this “ th a t” th a t is called “ Body.” Body reappears then first as a distant, and recognized only w ith difficulty (“ th a t” ) phenom enon w hich is then identified (as a body) on the level of language (“ th a t call’d Body” ). We can see th a t w hat Blake apparently promised to remove (“ Man has no Body” ) not only comes back b u t does it with
all the force of som ething which loses its fam iliarity and becomes a “ something else,” an uneasy intervention of an only vaguely perceived power.
B ut having returned, it refuses to be stabilized (if it did, it would definitely have ‘come back’ to the dychotomic pairs Blake was trying to erase from his philosophy): in an oscillating movement the “ th a t”
(which was “ call’d Body” ) becomes now a “ portion of Soul” which de
velopm ent is interesting as it both again blurs the dividing line betw een the body and soul and leaves aside (or behind, in darkness) some other part of soul by suggesting th a t the defam iliarized “ th a t” is only a p art of soul. There is a territo ry of soul which may not be “ called body,”
and thus both body and soul refuse to be nam ed com pletely and fully.
The nam e only grasps some area which im m ediately produces or grows its own other (“ th a t” ), a fuzzy and unclear, indistinct and threatening margin. We see this endless production of m argins in the fact th a t the body which now has become a p art of the soul (i.e. has lost its m aterial substantiality) acquires again the physical status: it is “ discern’d by the five Senses.”
Blake’s promise is impossible to keep. His claim is th at he will make it clearly seen, w ithout leaving any room for m isunderstanding, that body is not different from soul, and yet w ith each move he acts against him self by showing the fractu rin g of each of the term s which remain distinct (i.e. clearly understood as different) and, at the same time, indistinct (erroneously identified, m istakenly understood).
This heterogeneity m anifested by the refusal to be nam ed and thus categorized (although n eith er a nam e nor category are made invalid, rath er we m ay more appropriately speak of a nam e w hich can only refer to a m argin, to a “ th a t” but never to a “ this” ) is described by a double denom ination of Energy and Delight. It is essential to rem em ber th at Blake locates it in th e body (“ Energy is the only life and it is from the Body” ) as such a qualification (no m atter w hether we read
“ from ” as a preposition of exteriorization ‘out of the body,’ or of sub
stance ‘made of the body’) enables us to see clearly th a t Energy/De
light/D esire represent the power of th e O ther who/which has to rem ain only p artly nam ed and known. We m ay rew rite Blake’s statem ent using his previous form ulations and say th a t Energy is from th a t sphere of heterogeneity w here body and soul fluctuate into each other w ithout being totally identified w ith one’s opposite, i.e. Desire is a product of a “ th a t,” the “ th a t” which is “ call’d Body.”
Desire is w hat flows out of the “ th a t” , from the O ther th a t is already in me. If then in several places Blake insists on th e irresistible n atu re of desire it is because of the neccesity to keep the flow going.
Energy, to be w hat it is, m ust be “ E ternal,” i.e. m ust be always pro
ductive and flowing out of or “ from ” th e body. The previously descri
bed mechanism of AND is now com pleted w ith another pow erful ope
ration, th a t of FROM. If AND creates an open-ended series of differen
ces w ithin an apparently homogenuous structu re, FROM is a guarantor of freedom through a denial of restriction and boundary. We read then th a t
T h ose w h o restra in d esire do so b eca u se th e ir s is w e a k en o u g h to be restrained...
A nd b ein g restrain 'd , it b y d eg rees b eco m es p a ssiv e , till it is o n ly th e sh ad ow o f desire. (PI. 5—6)
A restrictive and repressive system puts an end to a productive force of FROM and thus m ust, inevitably, be a dram atic th re a t to the body.
If a restrained desire (which is “ from the Body” ) becomes a “ shadow of desire” then the body also becomes sick and waning. Hence a stri
king th erapy which we find in th e Proverbs instructing us th a t it is b e tte r “ to m urder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires.”
Repression means a blockage which stops the m echanism of FROM w hich is representable in acquatic m etaphors of a flow, fountains, and rivers. Interestingly enough such a com bination of Energy and the liquid elem ent belongs to a common paradigm of health. The first line of thinking combines Energy, change, rivers, and health, the other leads through passivity tow ards pollution, disease, and plague. We see both of them operate in statem ents like
T h e m a n w h o n e v e r a lters h is o p in io n is lik e sta n d in g w a ter, & breed s r e p tile s o f th e m in d . (PI. 17— 20)
E x p ect p o iso n fr o m th e sta n d in g w ater. (PI. 9) T he c is te r n con tain s: th e fo u n ta in o v e r flo w s. (PI. 8)
The operation of the pow er of FROM not only emphasizes change but also a v ery special type of flow, one which refuses to be contained w ithin stric t limits. The opposition is then not so m uch betw een activity and passivity but, rather, betw een restrictiveness and transgression, betw een to “ contain” and to “ overflow.”
b. OVER
As we have seen, desire — if contained (“ restrain ’d ” ) — w ithdraw s from th e sphere of light tow ards darkness and becomes “ the shadow of desire.” E nergy/E ternal Delight, on the other hand, attem pts at bringing
to light, or making available to our perception. W hat we should rem em ber, however, is a processual character of this operation which refers not to a state bu t to a dynam ic process. The power of the fountain to
“ overflow” is precisely this ability to ‘go beyond,’ ‘over’ the limit, i.e.
to bring a thing to the open.
The status of the body as the m arginal O ther, as som e/thing which is only “ call’d ” body, as an area of fuzziness and indistinctness m akes this bringing to the open even less static. If Energy is FROM the body, and if it brings to light (“ Energy is E ternal D e-light” ), then it illum ina
tes w hat cannot be fully and totally illum inated. The body is w hat refuses to be brought to the open and, yet, brought to the open it must be. In other words, the body is a flow which, at the sam e time, does and does not have an outlet, an expenditure (e.g. of blood) w ithout a loss (as if blood was pouring out of a body w ithout any wound).
Such a definition of the body accounts, on the one hand, for its relative permanence (it is seem ingly the sam e body w hich is ‘m e’ over the years) and, on the other hand, for its m ortality, waning, and suscepti
bility to diseases. The v ulnerability of the body, the trau m a of its grad
ual decline, the dram a of a disease, are founded upon this paradox:
the body rem ains app arently a whole, seem ingly in one healthy piece and yet Energy/D elight are being constantly drained. In other words, the basic wound of the body, which makes it a body, is the absence of any visible wound; the body is incomplete because it is wounded by the absence of a wound, it is opened by the non-presence of any opening.
Such a conclusion can be arrived at if one reads Blake sim ulta
neously w ith Bataille. If, as the French philosopher claims
E v ery th in g rea l fra ctu res, cracks... T he w o u n d o f in c o m p le te n e ss op en s in d iv id u a l b ein gs. T h rou gh w h a t cou ld be ca lled in c o m p le te n e ss, or a n im a l n a k ed n ess, or th e w o u n d , d iv e r se sep a ra te b ein g s co m m u n ica te. 4
then the basic incompleteness of the body is the herm etic closure, ho
mogeneity of form and substance in the m ovem ent against w hich the body organizes itself. The body aims a t wounding itself, or at finding an opening, through which heterogeneity could enter. For Baudelaire the body is precisely this m ovem ent OVER its lim its m atched by total uncertainty as to the location of th e opening o r wounding (la blessure) which makes this agitation possible (in the dynam ism of going OVER the actual place of this activity gets blu rred OVER). In “ La Fontaine
4 G. B a ta ille, O e u v r e s c o m p l e te s , ed. J. L educ, vol. 5 (Paris: G allim ard, 1973), p. 262.
de sang” the body is represented as an impossible fountain w ithout an outlet which still keeps its incessant movement:
II m e sem b le p a rfo is que m on sa n g co u le a flo ts, A in si q u ’u n e fo n ta in e a u x ry th m iq u e s san glots.
Je l ’en ten d s b ien q u i co u le a v e c un lo n g m urm ure, M ais je m e ta te e n v a in pour tro u v er la b lessu re.
A tra v ers la cite, com m e dans un ch am p clos,
II s ’e n va, tra n sfo rm a n t le s p a v e s e n ilots; D esa ltera n t la so if de ch aq u e creature,
Et p artou t co lo ra n t en rou ge la n atu re. 5
Energy/desire describes this never ending, and never accomplished, pro
cess in which body articulates itself, comes to light and gets darkened again because a body fixed in light, determ ined by causes and effects, ceases to be body (i.e. “ a portion of Soul discern’d by five Senses” ) and becomes a m ere object. In Blake’s term inology: body is w hat is a n ever discovered source of desire (Energy) which is FROM the body and this ultim ate darkening of the body is described by the preposition OVER. Desire recognizes the body (it is FROM it), b u t it w ithdraw s from a full cognition of the body, distances itself from such a knowlegde (by going OVER it). In Heidegger’s words, desire/Energy is an uncon- -cealm ent of the thingly (bodily) n atu re of its source which, in the u lti
m ate analysis, m ust rem ain hidden. In the essay “ On the Origin of the Work of A rt” we read th a t
T he w o rk in g o f th e w ork does n ot co n sist in th e ta k in g e ffe c t of a cause.
It lie s in a ch an ge, h a p p en in g from ou t o f th e w ork , o f th e u n co n cea led n ess o f w h a t is, and th is m ean s, o f B ein g. •
It should not come to us a surprise th a t this m ovem ent of going over lim its and restraints is for Heidegger, as for Blake, exem plified by a fountain which, in the words of a poem by C. F. M eyers quoted by the philosopher, is a m ovem ent of w ater “ veiling itself over.” In the same way, Blake’s fountain “ overflow s” th a t is to say, flows on and, by doing so, it masks itself, blurs its contours, flows OVER itself, or
“ veils itself OVER.” This escape from the domain of lucidity and clarity as a necessary condition of tru th , which is a fundam ental feature of the mechanism of OVER, tu rn s it into a Dionysian force. Nietzsche’s
* Ch. B a u d ela ire, L es F leu rs d u m a l , ed. J. D elab roy (Paris: M agnard, 1990), p. 338.
• M. H eid egger, “On th e O rigin o f th e W ork o f A rt,” in M. H eid egger, P o e tr y , L anguage, T h o u g h t, tran s. A. H o fsta d ter (N ew Y ork: H arper, 1971), p. 72.
world is dem onstrated to have, first of all, the inconclusive stru ctu re of AND (“ Die Welt: ein U ngeheuer von K raft, ohne Anfang, ohne Ende...,”
WM, 375) and, ultim ately, the ever undeterm ined consistency of OVER which, in the same gesture, brings forth and conceals. The Dionysian world is one which perform s a pow erful and never completed act of flowing out of certain plenitude (“ aus der Fulle,” WM, 376), w hich is an act of autocreation and autodestruction:
...diese m ein e d io n y sisc h e W elt d es E w ig -sic h -se lb e r -S c h a ffe n s, des E w ig - -sic h -se lb e r -Z e r sto r e n s, d ie se G e h e im n isw e lt der d o p p elten W ollu ste, d ies m ein J e n se its v o n G ut und B o se’ oh n e Ziel... (WM, 376).
3. The Abyss. INTO
There are at least three chasms in Blake’s poem. The first is only looked at, b u t it appears in an uncanny rift opened in the everyday.
Whereas the m arginal and prohibited are viewed as a domain of plea
sure (“ delighted w ith th e enjoym ents of Genius,” PI. 6— 7), th e ev
eryday and fam iliar is transform ed into a land of suspense and terror.
W hat occurs in the M emorable Fancy engraved on plates 6 and 7 is a fam iliarization and desublim ization of the transgressive (the protago
nist takes a leisurely w alk am idst the places associated in the orthodox theology w ith ‘torm ent and in san ity ’: “ As I was w alking among the fires of hell, delighted w ith th e enjoym ents of Genius...” ), and sublim i- zation of the quotidien. i O ne’s home now tu rn s out to be a landscape of the sublime:
W hen I ca m e hom e: o n th e a b y ss o f th e fiv e sen ses, w h e r e a fla t sided ste e p fr o w n s o v e r th e p resen t w orld , I sa w a m ig h ty D e v il fo ld ed in black clouds, h o v erin g on th e sid es o f th e rock...
The implication present in the statem ent concerning the abyss of the five senses is not so much an allusion to the postlapsarian state of man but, rather, a shattering of w hat has always w orried Blake’s philosophy
— the solidity and closure of perception. The abyss is then a m etaphor of desire/delight not because of the dangers of a fall but, ju st the
7 For a d iscu ssio n o f an im p ortan t rela tio n sh ip b e tw e e n B lak e and the p o etics o f th e su b lim e see V. A. de L uca “A W all of W ords: T he S u b lim e as T e x t”, in:
U n n a m ’d Form s. B la k e a n d T e x t u a l i t y , ed. N. H ilton and T. V ogler (B erk eley: U n i
v ersity o f C aliforn ia P ress, 1986). T w o k in d s o f the su b lim e, th at o f ob scu rity and terror and, on th e other hand, o f d eterm in a te in te lle c tu a l d esig n are d iscu ssed by th e sam e au th or in h is book W o r d s of E te r n i ty . B la k e a n d th e P o e ti c s o f t h e S u b li m e (P rin ceton U n iv e r sity P ress, 1991).
opposite, because of a removal of the rigid determ inations of the sense of direction th a t the fall implies. The abyss of the senses belies the stability of spatial descriptions of our routine sense perception which impose th eir restrictions upon hum an will. Thus Blake’s m etaphore reads here as a version of a certain ‘will to see.* For instance, in the second p a rt of The Four Zoas we learn th a t Los and Enitharm on w alk
ed on the “ dew y E arth ”
C on tractin g or e x p a n d in g th e ir a ll fle x ib le sen ses
A t w ill to m u rm u r in th e flo w e r s sm a ll as th e h o n ey bee,
A t w ill to stretch across th e h e a v e n s & step from sta r to star... (II, 297— 9)
The abyss is a figure of the recovery of pleasure. In the Third Night of the same poem “ the spirits of life”
...d ive into th e deep To b rin g th e th r illin g jo y s o f sen se... ( I ll, 119— 120).
But w ith the “ into” we already approach another abyss or, rath er, another attitu d e tow ards it. In A M emorable Fancy engraved on Plates 17— 20 an Angel initiates the protagonist into the m ysteries of his fu tu re fate which are determ ined by his impious, if not overtly sacrilegious concern w ith methods used in “ a P rin tin g house in H ell” as “ the hot burning dungeon.” The abyss, the second chasm of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, is not a fracture w ithin the everyday b u t a configu
ration underlying the everyday. The access to it is opened through a ‘journey to the center of the e a rth ’ (“ down into the church vault...
[we] came to a cave: down the winding cavern we groped our tedious way...” ), and w hat appears at the end of the expedition is a grotesque w orld ‘turned upside dow n’: “ a void boundless as a n eth er sky appear’d beneath us, & we held by the roots of trees and hung over this immensity... .” The impression of grotesqueness is enhanced even fu rth e r by the image of the angel suspended upside down “ in a fungus”
“ which hung w ith the head dow nw ard into the deep.”
The im portance of this abyss consists in the fact th a t it helps to p en etrate the veil of perception and reveal false m etaphysics imposed upon m an by the alienated senses. The test of th e abyss is th a t of a leap or com m itm ent: the false m etaphysics of the Angel is founded upon a denial of the participation in the abyss, in a rejection of the tem ptation of a leap. The A ngel’s response to the hum an project of com miting oneself to the void is strictly defensive: “ do not presum e, O young man, b u t as we rem ain here, behold th y lot... .” The Angelic, or falsely m etaphysical attitude, is then m arked by the negation of
courage to take liberty to appropriate reali/ty in one’s own nam e (“ do not presum e” ), reinforcing of the statu s quo (“ we rem ain h ere” ), and voyeristic pleasure of observation of one’s life being shaped by extrinsic powers beyond one’s control (“ behold th y lo t” ) instead of responsibility for constructing one’s own existence. The horrifying visions of “ the infinite Abyss” are show n to be impositions of a certain ideological form ation (“ All th a t we saw was owing to your m etaphysics” ) which turns a m an into a passive observer of reality whose conventions are elevated to be taken for th e ‘thing in itself.’ The alternative vis-a-vis the abyss is then either to “ rem ain” (the Angelic position signifying restrain t and slavery) or to “ commit oneself” (the hum an choice: “ if you please, we will commit ourselves to this void” ). The verb “ com mit”
describes the mode of m an’s attitu d e tow ards th e abyss as a peculiar com bination of perform ative dynam ism (to ‘com m it’ as to ‘perform ’) and entrusting subjugation (to ‘com m it’ as to ‘give up, hand over, for safe keeping and tre a tm e n t’). In term s of Nietzsche’s philosophy the Angelic denial of the leap is the very mechanism of oppression, as it imposes upon m an the inauthentic existence of a donkey or a pig (the animalistic m etaphors will featu re as well in Blake’s Marriage) which accept and affirm as th e ir own w hat has been superadded to cover up their genuine identity.
A lle s a b er k a eu n und v e r d a u e n — d as ist e in e rech te sc h w e in e -A r t! Im m er I-A sa g en — das le r n te a lle in der E sel, und w e r se in e s G eist ist. (Z, 215)
Blake’s and Nietzsche’s attack on the false m etaphysics m ust then inevitably aim at destroying the old code of m orality or, at least, at emphasizing m om m ents of sovereignty over it. Blake’s “ son of fire”
from “ A Song of L iberty ” closing The Marriage “ stam ps the stony law to dust, loosing the eternal horses from the dens of night... .” Nietzsche calls for a destruction of old preaching pulpits (alten Lehrstuhle, Z, 218) and instructs us to laugh at th e old m asters of v irtu e (grossen Tugend- meister, Z, 218) and repetitively w arns us not to miss a chance to break the old tablets (Zerbrecht mir... diese alte Tafel der Frommen, Z, 227).
Blake’s philosophy of transgression rejecting a m ere passive accep
tance of th e norm and reversing the approved relationship betw een th e conscious and th e unconscious according to w hich the form er is con
sidered the locus of hum an distinctive features and given absolute priority over the la tte r produces a rein terpretation of Jesus C hrist who in The Marriage appears as a cham pion of desire. Thus, from the theoretical claim th a t "n o v irtu e can exist w ithout breaking these ten commiandemenits” it follows th a t the v irtu e of C hrist was founded uipon
His p articular mode of acting “ from impulse, not from ru les” (PI.
22—24). Only m arginally can we note here th a t also in this respect Blake again precedes Nietzsche whose philosophy of Vbermensch is founded upon a sim ilar principle of the reversal of roles betw een the conscious and unconscious and, consequently, upon a fundam entally revised model of relationships betw een good and evil (for instance, in Nietzsche’s notes we read th a t “ das V erbrecher zur Grosse gehort”
which is accompanied by a brief listing of rules to be infringed upon, the rules which are not to be removed and done aw ay w ith b u t which have to be tested, the rules which no longer guarantee security but which — ju st the opposite — m ust be viewed as opening the unm apped te rrito ry of the dangerous to be explored by transgression: “ Die ‘Vogel- freiheit’ von der Herkommen, dem Gewissen, der Pflicht- jeder grosse Mensch kennt diese seine G efahr. Aber er will sie auch...,” WM, 261).
In both Blake and Nietzsche the essential thing is to ‘desire’ or
‘w ill’ and be able, or courageous enough, to leap into the abyss of
“ im pulse.” It is B lake’s third chasm which brings about the notion of a “ leap.” If the first abyss was w ithin the everyday and the second underneath it, the third one is placed sym m etrically above, and can be described in cosmic term s: its topography is located “ above the ea rth ’s shadow,” on “ the body of the sun,” the planet Saturn. This scenario involves not only the necessity of a leap (“ I...leap’d into the void” ) but, first of all, a series of transgressions. First, it reverses a theologically traditional p attern of the suprem acy of angels over men and presents us w ith a scene of a m an’s struggle w ith an angel (“ I by force suddenly caught him [the angel] in m y arm s” ). Second, it overcomes the restra
ints of the laws of physics (“ we were elevated above th e ea rth ’s shadow ” ). Third, the solar system is not the only location of the action, since the hum an protagonist leaps into the void separating “ satu rn
& the fixed stars,” hence translating the abyss from the term s of astronom ical knowledge into the suppositions of w hat was astronom ically vague and beyond observation. Such a placing definitely radicalizes the leap and presents it as a necessary plunge into w hat defies hum an knowledge and its categories: “ Here...is your lot, in this space, if space it may be call’d.”
N evertheless, the real dram a of the abyss does not consist in the phantasm agoric spaces b ut in a w ay in which it presents itself as a question of pow er and dom ination through the imposition of certain perceptive models of reality. In the cosmic, saturnian, landscape we soon discover a fundam ental circularity of the fam iliar sights: “ Soon we saw the stable and the church... .” If in th e previous episode the descent was “ down the winding cavern,” now it takes place in “ a deep
p it” of the Bible which opens another type of abyss, th a t of in terp re
tation. The vision of reality revealed now is to show it as a construct of dom ination and power. In the picture of the “ seven houses of brick”
we get a Sw iftian image of a beastly hum anity imprisoned physically (“ chained by the m iddle” ), but predom inantly enslaved by a fundam en
tal lack of aw areness of their predicam ent (“ the w eak were caught by the strong, and w ith a grinning aspect, first coupled with, & then devour’d, by plucking off first one limb then another, till the body was left a helpless trunk; this, after grinning & kissing it w ith seeming fondness, they devour’d too...” ).
A leap into “ the void” is now not only a blend of dynam ism and care (“ com m it” of the previous episode) b ut also an act of social criti
cism: only through such a leap can we p enetrate the veil of pretence covering the institutions of hum an society and culture. It is the perspective of the abyss which reveals the system atic enslavem ent (“ w ithheld by the shortness of th eir chains” ), ruthless competitiveness (“ the weak w ere caught by the strong” ), and suicidal consummerism (“ I saw one savourily picking the flesh off of his own ta il” ) of the society. It is not a coincidence th a t a location of this vision is m eticu
lously arranged as an epitome of confinm ent w here the principle of isolation is m atched by the rule of concentration. The ’’seven brick houses” is w here the beastly Other(s) is rounded up, isolated, and made to mix and breed among them selves w ithout interfering w ith the respectable center of the society. The Angelic police state is based on the ban placed on vagabondage, presum ption, and independence of the m ain conventions of the society. It is a state which elim inates contra
vention, and the “ monkeys and baboons” of the “ seven houses of brick”
is the condition of a society which, on principle, rejects such over
stepping to replace it w ith passive obedience and uniform ity.
Nietzsche’s philosophy of the leap also reveals an inherent link w ith transgression. One of the main points of the philosopher’s m editation on the “ spirit of the heavy” is th a t a bird-like jum p into the void necessarily shifts all the dem arcation lines and thus calls for a new naming of the world. The lightness (Leicht) sung by Nietzsche consists in these tw o essential aspects: a dem and for a new nam e, and a shift
ing of boundaries, i.e. in a sudden reaw akening of th e transgressive already announced in the 124 aphorism of The Joyful Wisdom w here the death of God is announced by the madman.
W er die M en sch en e in s t flie g e n leh rt, der h at a lle G ren zstein e verriick t; a lle G ren zstein e selb er w e r d e n ih m in die L u ft fle g e n , d ie Erde w ir er n e u ta u fe n
— als ‘die Leichte.’ (Z, 213)
Blake’s fear of the Angelic superstate as th e ultim ate paralysis of the excessive and exuberant is well founded as in the 18th century it was precisely the vagabond, one who refuses to, or cannot, dw ell perm a
nently th a t is considered a hot bed of corruption threatening the society.
Foucault quotes Le Trosne’s m em orandum from 1764 in which he
“ w anted the m ounted constabulary to h u n t them [vagabonds] w ith the help of the population...these useless and dangerous people should ‘be acquired by the sta te and th a t they should belong to it as slaves to th e ir m asters.’ ” 8
It is a saltation into the void th a t allows us to see w hat becomes of the society which by a constant m arginalization of the O ther turned itself into its own O ther: the excess of repressive tendencies (“ One Law for th e Lion & Ox is O ppression” ) privileges the center but, sim ulta
neously tu rn s it into a caricature, its own beastly parody. Hence, Blake’s claim th a t “ no virtu e can exist w ithout breaking these ten com m andm ents” functions as a w arning not only for an individual but, firsit of all, for the society.
The Escher-like circularity of vision (the stable and the church of the episode w here th e Angel dom inates tu rn out to be the sam e build
ings in the cosmic abyss w hen th e man overcomes th e Angel) presents reality as a conglom erate of world views com peting w ith one another bu t sharing one feature : for all of them th e w orld is an arrangem ent of interpretations which are imposed “ by force” and thus cannot pre
tend to the role of an ‘objective’ reality obligatory for everybody (even th e “ seven houses of brick” incident, though definitely closer to Blake’s im age of his contem porary society, is also a certain mode of its pre
sentation; as the Angel says: “ thy phantasy has imposed upon m e” ).
B M. F o u ca u lt ^ D i s c i p l i n e a n d Punish. T h e B ir t h o j the Prison, trans. A. S h e r i
dan (N ew B ooks, 1979), p. 88.
T ad eu sz
“C O S W IĘCEJ N IŻ M A Ł Ż E Ń ST W O ”
M E C H A N IZM Y H E T ER O G EN IC ZN O ŚC I I IN T ER PR E T A C JI W M YSLJ W IL L IA M A B L A K E ’A I FR Y D E R Y K A N IETZSC H EG O
S t r e s z c z e n i e
A rty k u ł p o d ejm u je p ro b lem a ty k ę w y z w o le n ia c zło w ie k a , sta n o w ią cą zasad n iczy e le m e n t filo z o fii ob y d w ó ch m y ś lic ie li. W y zw o len ie jed n o stk i z o sta je p rzed sta w io n e jak o fu n d a m en ta ln a o tw a rto ść i n iek o m p letn o ść c zło w ie k a . W olność to — ja k p isze
BataiLle — “rana n iek o m p letn o ści,” którą zarów no B lak e, ja k i N ietzsch e sta w ia ją w cen tru m sw o jej an trop ologii. O b ja w ien ie zran ien ia czło w ie k a u m o żliw ia p o w sta n ie sw o istej filo z o fii cia ła , k tórej n a jw a żn iejszy m e le m e n te m jest p o jęcie " en ergii”
rozu m ian ej jako siła teg o , co h etero g en iczn e.
A tak n a “a n ie lsk ą ” m e ta fizy k ę, tra d y cy jn ą filo z o fię Z achodu, która n a rzu ciła d y ch o to m iczn y w izeru n ek św ia ta jako d om en y dobra i zła, z o sta je p rzep row ad zon y w im ię in n ego obrazu św ia ta , św ia ta n iesta b iln eg o , w k tórym sy ste m id eo lo g iczn y czy filo zo ficzn y n ie sp ra w u je już p a ra liżu ją cej w ła d z y n ad jed n ostk ą jako ab so lu tn a i w szech o b o w ią zu ją ca zasada, lecz zo sta je ob n ażon y jako p ostać gry fig u r in terp re
ta cy jn y ch .
F ilo zo ficzn ą m eta fo rą teg o św ia ta jest “o tc h ła ń ” p o ja w ia ją ca się jako n aczeln a figu ra m y śli B la k e ’a i N ietzsch eg o , a sk u p iająca w sobie ró w n ież o d zysk an ą a u te n tyczn ość n a m iętn o ści (d e s i r e ).
T ad eu sz S ła w e k
“QU ELQ U E C HOSE DE P L U S QUE LE M A R IA G E ”
M fiC H A N ISM E S DE L ’H E T fiR O G ENEITE ET DE ^ IN T E R P R E T A T IO N D A N S LA P E N S fiE DE W IL L IA M B L A K E ET FR ED ER IC N IETZSC H E
L ’article aborde la p ro b lem a tiq u e de lib era tio n de l ’h om m e, c e lle -c i co n stitu a n t l ’e l6 m e n t m a jeu r de la p h ilo so p h ic des d eu x philosophies. L a lib era tio n de l ’in d iv id u e st d 6 fin ie an ta n t q u ’o u v ertu re fo n d a m en ta le et l ’im p e r fe c tio n de l’h om m e. La li
b erty c ’e s t — d’ap res B a ta ille — “u n e p la ie d’im p e r fe c tio n ” q u ’a u ssi b ien B lak e q u e N ietzsch e p la c e n t au cen tre de leu r an th ro p o lo g ie. La m a n ife sta tio n de la b lessu re d e l ’h o m m e ren d p o ssib le la crea tio n d ’u n e p h ilo so p h ic d u corps sp ecifiq u e, dont l ’616ment fo n d a m e n ta l e s t la n o tio n de “l ’e n e r g ie ” con sid £r£e com m e la force de ce q u i e s t h£terog£n e.
L’a tta q u e con tre u n e m eta p h y siq u e “a n g £ liq u e”, p h ilo so p h ie tr a d itio n n e lle de l ’O u est q u i a im p o se l ’im a g e dichoitom ique du m on d e en ta n t que d om ain e du b ien e t du m al, e st la n c£ e au n om d ’u n e a u tre v is io n du m onde, du m on d e in sta b le , ou le sy ste m e id eo lo g iq u es ou p h ilo so p h iq u e n ’e x e r c e p lu s de son p o u v o ir p a ra ly sa n t su r l’in d iv id u en ta n t q u e p rin cip e ab solu et o m n ip resen t, m ais ou il e s t dfrm ystifte com m e l ’a sp ect du jeu d es fig u r e s d ’in terp r6tation .
“L’a im e ” a p p a ra issa n t co m m e u n e fig u re fo n d a m en ta le de la p en s£e d e B la k e e t c e lle de N ietzsch e, a ccu m u la n t a u ss i l’a u th en ticitg retro u v £ e du d feir c o n stitu e la m eta p h o re p h ilo so p h iq u e de ce m onde.
R e s u m 6
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