Philosophical concepts of values

Stanisław Kowalczyk

Philosophical concepts of values

C o lle c ta n e a T h e o lo g ic a 57 (1987) fa sc. sp e c ia lis

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS OF VALUES

E v ery p h ilo so p h ical tre n d offers d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tio n s of th e n a tu re of b ein g and, in con seq u en ce, v a rio u s v isio n s of re a lity a re p ro p o se d by idealists, p e rso n a lists, m aterialists, p a n th e ists, r e p r e ­ se n ta tiv e s of K o ta rb in sk i's „reism " etc. C lassical p h ilo so p h y fo cu s­ ed its a tte n tio n m ain ly on ontology, th a t is, th e science of being. M o dern an d c o n te m p o ra ry p h ilo so p h y is in cre asin g ly c o n c en tra tin g on axiology, a p p re h e n d in g m an an d his w orld as v a lu e s of a c e rtain k in d 1. R eg ard less of th e o n to log ical in te rp re ta tio n of th e w orld, e v e ry m an d istin g u ish e s a ric h realm of valu es. In p articu la r, tw o ty p e s of v a lu e s a re reco g nized , o b jects and perso n s. The tw o ty p e s of v a lu e s a re n o t re g a rd e d as e q u a l and, for in stance, o n e does n ot g re e t a c h a ir an d p e rso n s a re n o t tre a te d in stru m e n ta lly as chairs.

T he p h iloso ph ical scien ce of v alu es, th a t is, axiology, c o n c ern s m an y a sp ects su ch as ontological, epistem o log ical, a n th ro p o lo g ic a l and th eolo gical. T he c o n sid e ra tio n s p re s e n te d b elo w w ill b e lim ited to ax iolo gical o n to lo g y an d w ill d e a l m ain ly w ith th e p ro b lem of th e in n er n a tu re and s tru c tu re of values. O n ly at th e en d w ill th e p e rso n a list d im ension of th e th e o ry of v a lu e s b e b rie fly outlined.

A x iology co n stitu te s n o t o n ly an in te g ra l p a rt of re a listic m e­ tap h y sic s b ut also a p lan e sh a re d b y se v e ra l h u m an istic sciences, theo lo gical, p h ilo so ph ical, leg a l-e th ic a l a n d th o se co n c ern in g m an 's artistic a c tiv itie s2. Thus, for in stan ce, e th ic s c a n n o t be tre a te d as an a rb itra ry codification of no rm s b ut should be e x p la in ed on th e basis of h ie ra rc h y of v alu es. A x io lo gy c a n n o t be irre le v a n t in p s y ­ chology and so ciology w hich, w h ile a n a ly sin g th e w o rld of m an, can n o t ig n o re th e fu n d am en tal v a lu e s of p erso n a lity .

introductory characterization of values

T he c a te g o ry of „ v a lu e " h a s an an alogo u s c h a ra c te r in bo th su b je c tiv e a n d o b je c tiv e senses. T he v e ry te rm „ v a lu e " (Latin valor) is d e riv e d from th e v e rb „to b e v a lu a b le " (valere). T he co n cep t of

I A. F o r e s t , L e x p é r i e n c e d e la v a le u r , R e v u e N é o s c h o la s tiq u e 43 (1940) 16.

2 L. L a V e 11 e, T r a i té d e s v a le u r s , v o l. ‘1— 2, P aris 1951— 1055; S. K o w a l ­ c z y k , F ilo z o tia w a r t o ś c i (The P h ilo s o p h y of V a lu e s), Z e s z y ty N a u k o w e KUL 3 (1960), no. 4, 71— 84; H . B u c z y ń s k a - G a r e w i c z , U c z u c i a i r o z u m w ś w i e c i e w a r t o ś c i (E m otions and R e a so n in th e W o r ld of V a lu e s ), W r o cla w

v a lu e is used in m athem atics, econom y, eth ics, aesth etics, sociology, relig io n an d philosophy. In th e la tte r d o m ain v a lu e m ay m ean, a m ong o th ers, a specific o b jec t e v a lu a te d b y som ebody, a form al re a so n of v alue, th e id ea of v a lu e or th e e x p e rie n c e of value. T he first tw o m ean ing s of th e co ncep t of v a lu e seem p a rtic u la rly r e le ­ v a n t a t th e m om ent.

T h ere a re tw o m ain rea so n s of th e difficulty in p ro v id in g a d e ­ finition of value. F irst of all, in its scope th e c a te g o ry of v a lu e is as w ide as th e co n cep ts of being, act etc., w hich m akes a d efin itio n im possible in th e classical u n d e rsta n d in g of th e term (with a d e te r ­ m ination of th e k in d an d g e n e ric distinction). M oreo v er, e a c h v a lu e also in v o lv es a n e le m en t of e x p e rien c e and e v a lu a tio n , th u s a d d itio ­ n a lly com p licatin g its descriptio n .

H ow ever, th e difficulties in d ic a te d a b o v e h a v e no t d isco u rag ed sc h o la rs a tte m p tin g to d e sc rib e th e co n cep t of v alu e. Som e of th e m ost c h a ra c te ris tic re su lts m ay e a sily be cited: V alu e consists in o verco m in g th e in d ifferen ce of a su b ject to w a rd s an o bject so th a t in c o n seq u e n c e th e sig n ificance and im p o rtan ce of th e la tte r are p e rc e iv e d ;3 v a lu e is a n y th in g w e se ek an d lo v e 4. T he la tte r s ta ­ tem en t c le a rly refe rs to a d e scrip tio n of th e good as fo rm u lated by A risto tle in th e N icom a ch ea n Ethics w h e re th e good is d efin ed as a n o b jec t of h u m an desire.

D escribing v a lu e one should u n d o u b ted ly in d ic a te th e re la tio n b e tw e e n su b je c t a n d object. T he d e scrip tio n s of p a rtic u la r a u th o rs u n d e rlin e th e ro le of e ith e r th e su b ject o r th e o b jec t w hich leads, re sp e c tiv e ly , to th e su b je c tiv iza tio n or o b jectiv izatio n of th e co n ­ c e p t of v alue. T he form er case c le a rly occu rs in th e d e scrip tio n of v a lu e p ro p o se d b y F ran z B rentano. A c co rd in g to him „w e call th e good on ly th a t th in g w h o se lo v e is ju stified an d v a lid ." 5 Thus, v a lu e is d e te rm in e d b y th e ,,v a lid " lo v e of a subject. A m ore o b jec tiv e c h a ra c te r m ay be found in th e d e scrip tio n s of v a lu e w h ich re fe r to T hom ist philo so p h y. E rich P rz y w a ra u n d e rsto o d v a lu e as th a t w hich belo n g s to th e e sse n c e of b ein g an d w hich, in co n seq u en ce, is an in sp iratio n to actio n 6. A n o th e r d e scrip tio n h a s a sim ilar c h a ra c te r: v a lu e is a b ein g p e rfe c tin g an ob ject w h ich is u su a lly a cau se of an a ctio n 7. Both d e scrip tio n s em p hasize th e ro le of o b ject r a th e r th a t th a t of subject.

Yet, m ost of th e definitio n s a tte m p t to av oid th e ex tre m e s of e ith e r th e reific a tio n or su b je c tiv iza tio n of th e catego ry . Jo h a n n e s B. Lotz re se rv e s th e term v a lu e for su ch a b eing w hich, a lth o u g h in ­

3 L. L a V e 11 e, op. cit., v o l. 1, 3.

4 P, S i w e k , P r o b l e m w a r t o ś c i (The P rob lem of V a lu e s ), P rz eg lą d P o­ w s z e c h n y 41 (1938) 3— 4.

5 F. B r e n t a n o , V o m U r s p r u n g s i t tl i c h e r E r k e n n tn is , L eip zig 1889, 17. 6 E. P r z y w a r a , R e li g i o n s b e g r ü n d u n g , F reib u rg im Br. 1923, 91. 7 E, G u t w e n g e r , W e r fp h iio s o p h ie , In n sb ru ck 1952, 70.

d e p e n d en t of a ctu al h u m an e x p e rien c e , is n e v e rth e le ss a cau se of su b je c t's e x p e rie n c e s8. A n o th e r a u th o r em p loy s th e term v a lu e to nam e th e good whi-ch is p a rtic u la rly usefu l for a su b je c t9. V alu e is also d escrib ed as o b jec tiv e p e rfe c tio n w h ich is an aim of o n e 's a s p ira tio n s10. Som e d e scrip tio n s of v a lu e a re e v id e n tly to o n a rro w as, for ex am p le, th e follow ing statem en t: „V alue is e v e ry th in g w h ich affects th e em o tio n al an d v o litio n a l facu lties of m an and m akes th em te n d to w a rd s th a t w h ich b rin g s p le a su re and joy, s a ­ tisfies th e a e sth e tic ta ste o r relig io u s an d m o ral feelings, or, m ore g en erally , w h ich fulfils som e dem an d s of h um an n a tu r e .''11 It is too su b je c tiv e an u n d e rsta n d in g of v a lu e s sin ce it n eg lects th e ro le of in te lle c t in th e p e rc e p tio n an d e x p e rie n c e of v alues. M uch h a p p ie r is th e follow ing d escrip tio n : „V alu e is a q u a lity of b ein g in so far as th e la tte r is an o b jec t of in te n tio n a l co g n itiv e-v o litio n al a c ts." 12 T he la tte r defin itio n of v a lu e is alm ost lite ra lly ta k e n o v er from the T hom ist th e o ry of th e tra n sc e n d e n ta l a ttrib u te s of being.

E ach of th e q u o ted d efin itio n s of v a lu e s lea v e s som e d issa tis­ factio n b ecau se it im p o v erish es th e rich n ess of m ean in g s of th e co n cep t of v alue. M o reo v er, e v e ry d e scrip tio n is fully u n d e rs ta n ­ d ab le o nly w ithin th e co n tex t of its p hilo so p hical system . U n d oub ­ tedly, v a lu e is a n y k in d of b ein g p e rc e iv e d in re la tio n to th e cogniz­ ing and e x p e rien c in g subject, th a t is, a p e rso n a lity : in som e w ay v a lu e d ev elo p s m an b y o p en ing him up to th e Infinite.

C h a ra cte riz in g v a lu e one should also e x p la in its re la tio n to th e concep t of th e good. T he p ro b le m ac q u ires d ifferen t in te rp re ta tio n s in th e P latonic an d A risto telia n tre n d s in p hilosophy. P lato re g a rd e d th e good as th e h ig h est of ideas, so h e c o n siste n tly ackn o w led g ed th e s u p e rio rity of th e good ov er being. T he in fluen ce of P latonism is ev id en t in this tre n d of p h en o m en o lo g y in w hich b ein g and v a lu e a re d istin g u ish e d as tw o d ifferen t realm s of rea lity . O n to lo g ical dualism w as a c cep ted b y M ax S ch eler and Jo h a n n e s H essen. T he la tte r reco g n ized th e p rim acy of v a lu e o v e r th e good, su g gesting th a t th e good is c o n stitu te d b y v a lu e 13. Such an u n d e rsta n d in g of th e re la tio n b e tw e en v a lu e an d th e good is co n n ected w ith th e ack n o w led g em en t of th e p rio rity of ax io lo g y ov er on to lo g y w hich, in tu rn , re v e a ls an idealistic elem en t in phenom enology.

8 J. B. I о t z, S e in u n d W e r t , Z eitsch rift für k a th o lis c h e T h e o lo g ie , 57 (1933) 800— 805.

9 J. S a n t e l e r , R e z e n s i o n , Z eitsch rift für k a th o lis c h e T h e o lo g ie , 70 (1948) 114.

10 G. F. К 1 e n k, W e r t —· S e in ■— G o tt, R om 1942, 75.

11 W . G r a n a t , P e r s o n a l i z m c h r z e ś c i j a ń s k i . T e o l o g i a o s o b y l u d z k i e j ,

(C h ristian P erso n a lism . T h e T h e o lo g y of H um an P er so n ), P o zn a ń 1985, 380. 12 М. А. К r ą p i e c, F ilo z o iia b y t u a z a g d n i e n i e w a r t o ś c i (The P h ilo s o p h y of B ein g and th e P rob lem of V a lu e s), Znak 17 (1965) 430.

13 J. FI e s s e n, L eh rb u c h d e r P h i lo s o p h i e , v o l. 2: W e r t l e h r e , M ü n ch en 1948, 47— 48.

The p h ilo so p h y in sp ired b y Thom ism d iffe re n tly in te rp re ts th e re la tio n b etw e en v a lu e an d th e good. V alu e is u su a lly iden tified w ith th e w id e ly u n d e rsto o d good, w hile at o th er tim es th e good is defined as one of th e v alues. Both sta te m e n ts n e e d n o t be m u tu a lly e x clu siv e b e c au se th e good can be u n d e rsto o d in tw o aspects, o n to ­ logical an d eth ical. T he on to lo g ical good is a b e in g w hich c o rre s ­ ponds to th e d e s ire 14, p a rtic u la rly to th e m odel id ea of its creator. T hus u n d e rsto o d good is in te rc h a n g e a b le w ith b ein g — en s e t b o ­ num c o n v e rtu n tu r. T he e sse n c e of all good co n tain s an a b ility of a w a k e n in g d e sire s (appetibilitas) w hich, in tu rn , a re d iffe re n tia te d accordin g to th e n a tu re of beings. T he e th ic a l good a p p e ars only in th e rea lm of ra tio n a l beings, a w a re of the a g re e m e n t or d isa g re e ­ m ent b e tw e en th e ir actio n s an d a m o ral norm . As th e s e c o n sid e ra ­ tions indicate, th e o n to lo gical good d o es n o t differ in scope from value, a lth o u g h th e tw o differ in m eaning: th e good em phasizes m ore stro n g ly th e e le m en t of being, th a t is, of object, w hile v a lu e c le a rly im plies th e p a rtic ip a tio n of a subject. T he good is a bein g c o m p reh en d ed in re la tio n to th e v o litio n al dom ain w hile v a lu e s also co v er th e dom ain of h u m an cognition. T h at is w h y it has rig h tly b een n o ted th a t th e co ncep t of v a lu e goes b ey o n d th e dom ain of th e stric tly u n d e rsto o d good. AfteT all, th e re a re m ultiple valu es, cognitive, eth ical, artistic, religious, econom ic etc. T he differen ce b e tw e e n th e con cep ts of v a lu e of th e good b ecom es sh a rp e r w h en w e sp e ak of th e m oral good. T h en it is m ere ly one of se v e ra l c a te ­ go ries of v alues. Still, th e fe a tu re sh a re d by b o th is th e dynam ic aspect, co n n ected w ith th e ir ab ility to p ro v o k e d esire.

The c a te g o ry of v a lu e has sev eral, alm ost synonym ous, term s su ch as aim, idea, p erfectio n , significance, a d v a n ta g e etc. W h en co n stitu tin g an o b jec tiv e an d re a l a ttrib u te of b e in g v a lu e u su a lly becom es so m eb o dy 's aim 15. T he co n c ep ts of v a lu e and aim, th o u g h close in m eaning, can n o t be to ta lly identified. A im is an a ctu al object of o n e's d e sire w h ile v a lu e is only a p o te n tia l object of d e ­ sire. Q u ite fre q u e n tly v a lu e is identified w ith idea. H ow ever, this is n o t fully ju stified since th e c a te g o ry of v a lu e im plies m ore e m p h a ­ tic a lly th e fact of rea lity . Ideas n eed n o t be o b jec tiv e and real, w hile v a lu e s a re estim ed p re c ise ly b ecau se of th e ir o b jec tiv e and re a l c h a ra c te r. A lth o u g h v a lu e s a re n o t alw ay s a c tu a lly real, n e ­ v e rth e le ss th e y h a v e a p o te n tia l reality .

C h a ra cte riz in g v a lu e s one can n o t n e g le c t th e ir stru c tu re . M ost lik ely th e y h a v e no su b sta n tia l c h aracter, th a t is, th e y do n ot ex ist se p a ra te ly from being. T h ey a re o b je c tiv e an d re a l b ec au se th e y a re „em bedded" in th e b ein g >of an object. V a lu e is n o t iso lated from

14 „ C o n v en ie n tia m ergo en tis ad ap p etitu m e xp rim it h o c n o m e n bonum ", St. T h o m a s A q u i n a s , D e V e r i t a t e q. 1, a. 1, c.

being b u t it p e n e tra te s it. In th e ir s tru c tu re v a lu e s a re n o t h om o ­ geneou s an d sim ple; in h e re n t in an o b ject th e y fasc in ate a su b ject and u su a lly h a v e a c re a to r16. E specially th e first tw o elem ents, ob ject and subject, a re o rg an ic ally co n n ected w ith th e c a te g o ry of value. The loss of an o b ject u n a v o id a b ly lead s to th e su b jeetiv iza- tion or re la tiv iz a tio n of v alu es, w h ile th e n eg le c t of th e ro le of a su b je c t p ra c tic a lly n e u tra liz es v a lu e as such. V alu e s e p a ra te d from an o b ject loses its sense. A th in g m ay be of v a lu e only for som ebody. This fact e x p la in s th e in esc a p ab le c h a n g ea b ility of the c rite ria of e stim a tin g v alues, w hich is n o t id en tical w ith th e ir r e ­ lativization. V alu e in d iv id u ally e x p e rie n c e d by m an is a co nfirm a­ tion of his p e rso n a l dim ension. S u b jectiv e e x p e rien c in g of v a lu e s does n o t u n d erm in e th e ir o b jec tiv e c h a ra c te r b e c au se ax iological e x p e rien c e is b ased on re a l foundations.

A g re a t m a jo rity of v a lu e s h a v e a q u a lita tiv e r a th e r th a n q u a n ­ tita tiv e c h a ra c te r. T h at is w h y v a lu e s a re d e sc rib e d as „low er" or „high er" ra th e r th a n „sm aller" or „ g re a te r". V alues h a v e a b ip o lar natu re, th a t is, e ach p o sitiv e v a lu e h as a c o rre sp o n d in g n e g a tiv e value. Thus, w e p e rc e iv e th e opposition b e tw e e n tru th and false ­ hood, good an d evil, b e a u ty an d ugliness, an d so on. T h e o n to lo ­ gical s tru c tu re of an ti-v alu e is u su a lly e x p la in e d in th e co n te x t of its p o sitiv e v alu e, am ong oth ers, b y m eans of a th e o ry ab o u t th e n e g a tiv e n a tu re (privatio) of falseh o o d and evil. T he gen esis of anti- -values is a com plex problem , often ap p ro a c h in g th e b o rd e r of m y ste ry 17.

Subjectivist concepts of value

T he on to lo g ical sta tu s of v a lu e s is an o b ject of e n d le ss c o n tro ­ versies. Indeed, th e v e ry classificatio n of ap p ro a c h e s in th is re sp e c t is a lre a d y difficult enough. J o h a n n e s H essen d istin g u ish ed the follow ing four attitu d e s; p sy ch o lo g ical app ro ach , n a tu ra listic o b je c ­ tivism , lo g ical a p p ro a c h and o n to lo g ical a p p ro a c h 18. Psych olo gical ap p ro a c h to the e x iste n c e of v a lu e s red u c e s h um an e x p e rie n c e to a. p sy ch o lo g ical fact. A risto telia n -sch o la stic ph ilo so p h y reco gn ized th e e x iste n c e of o b jec tiv e v a lu e s b u t c o n n ected th em to o stro n g ly w ith Cosm os w hich re su lte d in th e ir n a tu ra liz atio n . N eo -K antianism ten d e d to logicize v a lu e s an d e n d o w th em w ith th e sta tu s of m erely m ental beings. Finally , N. H a rtm a n n sp eak s for ax iolo gical ontolo- gism w h en re g a rd in g th e e x iste n c e of v a lu e s as id eal beings.

16 L. L a V e 11 e, op. cit., v o l. 1, 185— 246.

17 S. K o w a l c z y k , Zło — p r o b l e m e m c z y t a je m n ic ą ? (in:) S t u d ia z tilo-

z o ł i i B o g a (Is E vil a P rob lem or a M y stery ? in S tu d ies in th e P h ilo s o p h y of God),

ed b y В. В e j z e, W a r sz a w a 1977, v o l. 3, 457— 486.

The classification of th e onto lo gical co ncepts of values, q uoted abo v e b y w a y of exam ple, is n e ith e r e x h a u stiv e n o r v a lid in all its suggestions. P erh ap s it is im possible to d esig n one e x h a u stiv e ty p o ­ logy of axiological ontologies. F or th a t re a so n it is p ro b ab ly b e tte r to d istin g u ish sim ply su ch onto lo gical con cepts of v a lu e s as rela- tivistie and absolute, rea listic and id ealistic, su b jectiv istic and objec- tivistic, Thom istie an d phen om en o lo g ical etc. T h ese c o n sid e ratio n s will be re s tric te d to a brief acco u n t of th e re p re s e n ta tiv e s of su b ­ jec tiv istic and o b jectiv istic tre n d s in axiology.

M o d erate ax iolo g ical subjectivism , re p re s e n te d am ong oth ers by K ant and B rentano, is opposed to skep ticism a n d relativ ism . Im m anuel K ant (T11804) s h a rp ly o b jec ted a g a in st h ed o nistic s u b je c ti­ vism and he reco g n ized th e a b so lu te m o ral v a lu e of m an 's a c ts 19. The p rim a ry v a lu e in h u m an life is n ot p lea su re but th e fulfilm ent of d u ty . K ant w as th e re fo re far from th e axio lo g ical rela tiv ism of Protago ras, th e E p icu rean s or e v e n th e Stoics. In his case s u b je c ti­ vism a p p e a rs as a re s u lt of a sh arp op p o sitio n b e tw e en being (Sein) and v alu e (Wert), th e o re tic a l or p u re re a so n and p ra c tic a l reason. A ccording to him v a lu e is n o t co m p reh en sib le b y m eans of th e o re ­ tical reason , th a t is, b y in te lle c tu a l cognition. V alu e is o nly a p o ­ stu la te of th e will, th a t is, an assum ption. T he in n er re la tio n b e tw e en v alu e and being, q u estio n ed b y K ant, m akes c o n sisten t axiological realism im possible. T he so u rce of v a lu e s is found in th e subject, his resp o nsib ilities, d e sire s and attitu d es. As a c a rrie r of v a lu e s object is p u sh ed dow n into b ack gro u n d. P e rso n a lly reco gn izing the o b je c tiv ity of v alu es K ant h as in itia ted th e su b je c tiv istic tre n d in th e axio lo g y of m o dern tho u g ht. H e u n d e rsto o d v a lu e p rim a rily as an in te n tio n a l c o rre la te of h u m an will. ,,The critical th eo ries w hich refe r to K ant reco g n ize as a so u rce of v a lu e th e req u irem e n ts posed to objects b y th e n a tu re of su b je c ts (for exam ple, a cco rd in g to the K antians th e o b jec tiv e v a lu e of c o g n itiv e acts does no t re su lt from th e ir ag re e m e n t w ith an o b jec t but from su b je c tiv e condition s n e ­ c e ss a ry for an o b ject to becom e for us an ob ject of cognition)."20 M o d erate ax io log ical su b jectiv ism found its co n tin u a to rs in such th in k e rs as Rudolf Lotze (Ï1881) an d H ein rich R ick ert ( Ï 1936). T hey d istin g u ish ed tw o sp h e re s of rea lity , bein gs an d v a lu e s 21. Beings exist, w hile v a lu e s-p o sse ss „sig n ifican ce" (gelten). T h ey are som ehow in te rco n n e c te d , still, it is difficult to sp e ak of th e re a l

19 I. K a n t , K r y t y k a w ł a d z y s ą d z e n i a (The C ritiq u e of J u d g em en t), tr. b y J. G a ł e c k i , W a r sz a w a 1964, 69— 70; a lso h is K r y t y k a p r a k t y c z n e g o ro z u m u (The C ritiq ue of P ra ctica l R ea so n ), tr. b y J. G a ł e c k i , W a r sz a w a 1972, 134— 135.

20 E. В r é h i e r, P r o b l e m y l i l o z o i i c z n e X X w i e k u (The P h ilo s o p h ic a l Pro­ b lem s of th e 20th C en tu ry), W a r sz a w a 1958, 65.

21 Cf. F.-J. R i n t e 1 e n. D i e B e d e u tu n g d e s p h i l o s o p h i s c h e n W e r t p r o b l e m s , (in:) P h i lo s o p h i a p e r e n n i s . A b h a n d l u n g z u ih r e r V e r g a n g e n h e i t u n d G e g e n w a r t , H rsg. v o n F.-J. R i n t e 1 e n, R e g en sb u r g 1930. Bd. 2, 943— 945.

ex isten ce of v a lu e s as such. V a lu e s e n ric h p e rso n a lity , yet, at th e sam e tim e, th e y ,,have sign ifican ce" ex c lu siv ely in re la tio n to it.

F ran z B ren tan o (Î1936) is often classified as a follo w er of o b jec ­ tiv e a x io lo g y 22, bu t it is h a rd to a ccep t th is claim. H e h a s w on fam e, am ong others, th an k s to his th esis th a t th e a sp ira tio n al sp h ere —■ w ill and em otions — h as a co g n itive fu n ctio n in re sp e c t to v alues. In te lle c tu a l cognition m akes it possible to d istin g u ish tru th from falsehood, w hile „valid " em o tio n s a re help ful in id en tify in g th e c a ­ teg o ries of th e good and evil. „W e call som eth ing good w h en the love c o n cern in g it is v a lid .”23 This d e scrip tio n m akes it p ossib le to sta te th a t for B rentano it is not b ein g (Sein) th a t is a so u rce of v alues b ut em o tio n al e x p e rien c e (Erlebnis). T h at is w h y one sh ou ld sp eak of e v a lu a tin g (werten) ra th e r th a n of v a lu e s (Werte). It is n o t th e re a l th in g th at g u a ra n te e s th e good or e v il b ut th e psy chic act and its q uality . At a n y case v a lu e s do n o t ex ist auton om o usly , i.e. r e ­ g ard less of th e subject. T h ey e x ist o n ly su b je c tiv e ly and are e v a ­ lu ate d by m eans of em o tio n s24. The h ie ra rc h y of v a lu e s d e p e n d s on p red ilectio n s an d m an's lo v e ra th e r th a n on th e in n er ric h n e ss of things. N e v e rth e le ss, m an 's em otions h a v e an in te n tio n a l aspect, th a t is, th e y a re d ire c te d to w a rd s th e e x te rn a l w orld. In sp ite of th at, „v alu es c a n n o t be p red ic ate s of things, th e y o n ly b elo ng to acts of consciousness. A nd th is is th e e sse n c e of B ren tan o 's subjectivism : one m ay sp eak of v a lu e s o n ly in th e sp h e re of th e p h en o m e n a of th e c o n scio u sn e ss.''25

B ren tan o 's ax io lo g ical su b je c tiv ism h a d its lim its an d th a t is w hy h e did not q u e stio n th e o b je c tiv e d im en sio n of th e w o rld of values. His o n to lo gical su b jectiv ism is n o t id en tic a l w ith p sy c h o lo ­ gical subjectivism . T he la tte r is c o n n e cte d w ith e x tre m e in d iv id u ­ alism and rela tiv ism in th e e stim a tio n of v alu es. O n to log ical su b ­ jectiv ism m erely claim s th a t em o tio ns d o n o t so m uch identify v a lu e s as co-p ro du ce them . Love is a c a rrie r of th e good an d evil. T herefore, th e re a re no auto n o m o u s v a lu e s b ut th e re is o n ly „valid" or „inv alid " love. Thus, B ren tan o 's ax io lo g y raise s a d istu rb in g question: h o w can an ax io lo g ically n e u tra l w orld (wertfreie W elt) be a basis for sound estim ation?

T he o u tlin ed con cepts of v a lu e b y K ant and B rentano, th oug h d isso ciated from relativ ism , e v id e n tly ex p la in th e s tru c tu re of the good in too su b je c tiv e a w ay. T he a x io lo g y of b o th th in k e rs is based on a p sy ch o lo g ical-ep istem o lo g ical fo u n d atio n w hile lackin g

22 L. L a V e 11 e, op. cit., v o l. 2, 100 ff.

28 F. B r e n t a n o , V o m U r s p r u n g s i t tl i c h e r E r k e n n tn is , op. cit., 17.

24 J. В. L o t z, W e r t p h i l o s o p h i e u n d W e r t p ä d a g o g i k , Z eitsch rift für k a th o ­ lis c h e T h e o lo g ie 57 (1933) 1— 43; S. K o w a l c z y k , P o d s t a w y ś w i a t o p o g l ą d u

c h r z e ś c i j a ń s k i e g o (The F o u n d a tio n s of th e C h ristia n W o r ld v ie w ), W a r sza w a 1979,

195— 198.

25 H. B u c z y ń s k a - G a r e w i c z , U c z u c i a i r o z u m , op, cit., 92; cf. a lso 77— 114.

a sufficient o n to lo g ical basis. In consequ en ce, it e n ta ils a subjecti- vizatio n of th e p h en o m en o n of v a lu e s and in d ire ctly th e re e m e rg es th e d an g er of relativ ism . T he follow ers of su b jectiv ism m ost often qu o te tw o arg u m en ts: (1) v a lu e s do n o t occur b e y o n d m a n ’s psy ch ic ex p erien ces; and (2) v a lu e s do not e n ric h th e factu al d e sc rip tio n of th e ob ject ex am in ed 28. N e ith e r of th e arg u m en ts is e n tire ly c o n v in c ­ ing. N atu rally , sim ilarly to th e w hole e x te rn a l w orld, v a lu e s a re accessib le to su b je c tiv e e x p erien ce. Still, th e fact does not p ro v e th a t th e o b ject of th e se ex p e rien c e s is a p ro d u ct of a cognizing subject. O th erw ise, id ealistic solipsism w ould be u n av o id ab le. T he oth er a rg u m en t of th e follow ers of axio log ical su b jectiv ism do es no t seem valid, eith er. V alu es differ from c a te g o ria l n o tion s of th e ty p e ,,ta li'' or „ ro u n d ”, b u t th a t d o es n o t p ro v e th e ir lack of content. C a te g o rial n o tio ns differ from q u a lita tiv e and tra n s c e n d e n ta l c o n ­ cepts (und erstoo d in th e sp irit of classical philosophy).

S peak ing of th e „ re la tiv ity ” of v alu es, on e should b e a r in m ind th e m ultiple so urces of d iffe re n t ju d g em en ts in th is field. Thus, for instance, Rom an In g ard e n d isting u ish es th re e c a u se s of such a „ re ­ la tiv ity ” , nam ely, epistem ological, o n to log ical and situ a tio n a l27. The lim itatio n of h u m an cognitio n is no t id en tic a l w ith th e rela tiv iz a tio n of v alu es, m uch lik e th e fact of m istak es does no t p ro v e th e falsity of all cognition. Id en tica l v alu es a re d ifferen tly e stim a ted b y m an and by anim al, w hich re su lts of th e ir differen t e x iste n tia l status. Finally, th e flu id ity of m an 's e x iste n tia l situ atio n s lead s to a fac tu al reshufflin g of th e h ie ra rc h y of v alu es b u t d o es not im ply th e ir r e ­ lativ ity . A xiological re la tiv ism is m ost often a c o n seq u e n c e of a re- duction istic co n cept of th e w o rld or man.

T he c o n tro v e rs y b e tw e e n th e a d h e re n ts of su b jectiv ism and o b jectiv ism in th e dom ain of th e scien ce of v a lu e s often springs from sem antic im precision. T he v e ry term s „ o b je c tiv e ” an d „ su ­ b je c tiv e ” h a v e m an y m ean in g s28. H e re a re som e of them : (1) o b je c ­ tiv e — o cc u rrin g in th e object; su b je c tiv e — re a l in th e sub ject; (2) o b jec tiv e — ex istin g autonom ously; su b je c tiv e —■ ex istin g , for instance, as a c o rre la te of an act of co n sciousness (an in te n tio n a l being); (3) o b jec tiv e —■ ex istin g re g a rd le ss of m a n ’s ex p e rien c e s; su b je c tiv e — c o n stitu te d b y such an e x p erien ce. N a tu ra lly , se m a n ­ tic d istin ctio n s of this kind will n o t suffice to o v ercom e axiological su b jectiv ism b u t th e y in d ic a te th e v a g u e n ess of m any of its claims.

26 T. C z e ż o w s k i , C zym s ą w a r t o ś c i ? (W hat are V a lu es? ), Z nak 17 (1965) 408— 410.

27 R. I n g a r d e n , P r z e ż y c i e — d z i e ł o — w a r t o ś ć (E x p erien ce ■— W o r k — V a lu e), K rak ów 1966, 68— 74.

O bjectivistic concepts of values

O b je c tiv istic axiolo g y h as m an y re p re s e n ta tiv e s b u t th e fo llo w ­ ing co n sid e ratio n s w ill be lim ited to tw o tren d s, Thom ism an d p h e ­ nom enology. A lth o u g h in itially Thom ism d id n o t u se th e term „value", o n e m ay n e v e rth e le ss s p e a k of T hom istic axiology. It is b ased on th e th esis abo u t th e m u tu al co n v ersio n of b ein g and th e good. St. T hom as A q u inas (f 1274) w ro te: „Each being, if it is a being, c o n stitu te s th e good. For e a ch bein g as su ch a p p e ars in an act, is p e rfe c t in a sense, b e c au se e a c h а-ct c o n stitu te s p erfectio n . P e rfe c ­ tio n in itself c o n tain s th e n o tio n of d e sira b ility and th e good ... T herefore, e a c h b ein g as su ch is th e good."29 O n th e basis of T h o ­ m ism th e c o n v e rsio n of b ein g an d th e o n to lo g ical good m akes it possible to infer a stric t u n ity of bein g an d v alues. Thus, th e re is no such b ein g w h ich w o u ld c o n stitu te no v a lu e (the good) or such v a lu e th a t w o u ld not c o n stitu te a b e in g 30. V a lu e does not ex ist b ey o n d b ein g b u t w ith in bein g itself. It is sim ply its n ew a p p re h e n ­ sion b y a subject. A x iolo g y is n o t au to n o m o u s b u t it c o n stitu te s an in te g ra l e le m en t of m etap hysics.

In m o dern Thom ism th e p h ilo so p h y of v a lu e s is b a sed on th e th e o ry of th e tra n s c e n d e n ta l p ro p e rtie s of being. A ccordin g to th is in te rp re ta tio n , p a rtic u la r tra n sc e n d e n ta ls — u n ity , tru th , th e good, p ro b ab ly also b e a u ty — a re re a lly id en tic a l w ith being, th o u g h at th e sam e tim e th e y differ from it in m eaning. B etw een being and tra n sc e n d e n ta l a ttrib u te s th e re occu rs a difference in c o n n o ta tio n and n ot in den o tatio n . T ruth, th e good an d b e a u ty add n o th in g new to being, th o u g h th e y a re re a lly id en tical w ith it. T h ey differ from it only m en ta lly an d c o n stitu te b e in g 's refe re n c e s to m an 's faculties, m ind or will. In th e ir c h a ra c te riz a tio n of v a lu e s m o d ern T hom ists distin g u ish tra n s c e n d e n ta l an d c a té g o rie l v a lu e s31. The fo rm er a re n ot „q u alities", th a t is, a c cid en tal fe a tu re s w h ich re a lly differ from su b sta n tia l being. T h ey a re o n ly n ew a sp ects of b ein g d istin g u ish e d in re sp e c t to th e su b je c t's faculties, co g n itive or em o tio n a l-v o litio ­ nal. A m ong oth ers, tra n s c e n d e n ta l v a lu e s in clud e tru th , th e good and b e a u ty . In m o dern u n d e rsta n d in g th e realm of v a lu e s goes b e y o n d th e schem e of tra n s c e n d e n ta l p ro p e rtie s of b ein g as such. T h e T hom ists a re a w a re of th a t an d th e re fo re th e y sp eak of c a te ­ g o rial v alu es. T h e y d escrib e th em e ith e r as a „p a rtic u lariza tio n " of tra n s c e n d e n ta l v a lu e s or as a „ s u p e rs tru c tu re " of content, d istin ct from su b sta n tia l being. T he fo rm er co n cep t is q u e stio n a b le because, for in stan ce, econom ic or life v a lu e s e v id e n tly can n o t be in clu ded in a n y of th e tra n s c e n d e n ta l fe a tu re s of being. T h e y a re re a lly d is ­

29 St. T h o m a s A q u i n a s , S. th., I, q. 5, s. 3, c. 80 J. B. L o t z, W e r t p h i l o s o p h ie . . ., op. cit., 4.

81 М. A. К r ą p i e c, F ilo z o fia b y tu .. , op. cit., 424— 433. Com p. A. S t ę p i e ń ,

tin c t from b ein g itself, in tro d u c in g new , c a te g o ria lly re s tric te d conten t. Thus, th e y a re n o t o nly a p a rtic u la riz a tio n of th e a ttrib u te s of all b e in g b e c au se th e y c re a te n ew o n to lo gical categ ories. T h ese valu es m ay b e d e sig n a ted as a „ su p e rstru c tu re " of being, even, th ou gh th e term is n o t p rec ise enough, eith er.

T hom istie in te rp re ta tio n of v a lu e s p o ssesses an u n d o u b ted ly v a lu a b le e le m en t of realism . T he fo u n d atio n of v a lu e is u n q u e stio ­ n a b ly th e re a l e x iste n c e of an object, esp ec ially its e s se n tia l and ex iste n tia l a c t32. T he su b sta n tia l form of b ein g an d an act of e x is ­ te n c e a re im p o rta n t „ c a rrie rs" of all v a lu e s an d th e re fo re th e se p a ­ ratio n , or e v e n m ore, th e opposition, of b ein g and v a lu e w ould be unjustified. H ow ever, tra d itio n a l o nto lo g y is not y e t an axio log y bec au se it n eg lects th e re la tio n b e tw e e n b ein g and subject. T he on to lo g ical la n g u a g e is n ot id en tical w ith th e axio log ical la n g u a g e w hich re v e a ls th e m u ltip le in te rre la tio n s b e tw e en v a lu e and subject. Being becom es a v a lu e o nly w h en th e su b je c t's a ctiv e a ttitu d e is m anifested as co g n itiv e, asp iratio n al, em o tio n al etc. In T hom istie in te rp re ta tio n v a lu e s a re n o t red u c ib le to facts of b e h a v io u r or su ­ b je c t's attitu d e. T h at is w h y in th is u n d e rsta n d in g of v a lu e s th e e rro r of rela tiv iz a tio n d o es n o t o ccu r33. V alu es a re th e in te n tio n a l c o rre la te of m an 's co gnitio n an d choice, a lth o u g h th e y a re n ot a rb itra rily sh ap ed b y him. T he e sse n c e of v alu es does n ot co n sist in a c tu a lly fulfilling m an 's n eed s b u t in th e ir p o te n tia l co n n e ctio n w ith his m en ta l-a sp iratio n al life. T ra d itio n a l Thom ism p e rfe c tly stre sse s th e rea lism of th e rea lm of v a lu e s b u t it does n o t fully re v e a l th e m u ltip licity of o n tolo g ical and axiolo gical lan gu ages. In m any w rite rs in th is tre n d th e re occurs a te n d e n c y to red u c e th e lan g u a g e of v a lu e s to th a t of being.

A G erm an th ink er, D ietrich von H ild eb ran d , com bines Thom ism w ith elem ents, of ph en om en o lo g y . W h ile b ein g e s se n tia lly a T h o ­ mist, he also reco g n izes th e o b jec tiv e and a b so lu te c h a ra c te r of values, foun din g them on being. T he influ en ce of p h en o m eno log y becom es e v id e n t in th e su b jectiv istic s ta rtin g p o in t in his an aly sis of th e problem of v alues. V alu e is p rim a rily th e „Im p o rtan ce" of b ein g 34. In hu m an cogn ition „im p o rtan ce" is u n d e rsto o d in th re e w ays, as s tric tly su b jectiv e, o b jec tiv e („in tern al", „in itself"), and as „good for a p erso n ." V alu es a re a p p re h e n d e d by d iffe re n t ty p e s of th e co g n itiv e faculties, y e t e sp e c ia lly by th e „ h e a rt" 35. V alu es

32 T h is is e m p h a siz e d b y L. L a v e 11 e, op. cit., v o l. 1, 29.

33 H o w e v e r , th is o b je c tio n w a s r a is e d b y R. I n g a r d e n in a d is c u s s io n o r g a n ize d b y th e e d ito rs of th e m o n th ly Znak: Znak 17 (1965) 466— 467.

34 D. v o n H i l d e b r a n d , C h r is tia n E thics, N e w Y ork 1953, 34— 59; M. H. S z y in e с z к o, K o n c e p c j a w a r t o ś c i u D i e tr ic h a v o n H il d e b r a n d a (The C on cep t of V a lu e in D ie trich v o n H ild eb ran d ), R o c zn ik i F ilo z o fic z n e 12 (1964) v o l. 2, 43— 55.

a re re a l an d c o n c re te p ro p e rtie s of an object, po ssessin g a d efin ite n a tu re (quidditas).36. T h ey a re th e o b jec tiv e „im p o rtan ce" of being, re g a rd le ss of th e fact of h u m an cognition. O ne m ay, th erefo re, infer th a t v a lu e s a re au to n o m o u s in re sp e c t to -man's feelin gs and e x p e rie n c e s in th e sen se th a t th e y can n o t be re d u c e d to them . V alue is th e ,,core of b e in g ."37 It is a p rim o rd ial p h e n o m en o n (ein Urphä-

nomenon), an alo g o u s to esse n c e , b ein g or tru th 38. V a lu e is e v e n

p rio r to th e good b e c au se th e la tte r m ay only be an a lre a d y v a ­ lu able being. M o reo v er, v a lu e is n o t th e v e ry e x p e rie n c e of m an or th e m om ent of cognition.

T he fo u n d atio n of v a lu e is ex iste n ce d u e to w hich it is re a liz ­ ed. T he o n to lo g ical v a lu e of th e h u m an p e rso n re su lts from th e fact of m an 's r e a lity 39. Yet, at th e sam e tim e, v a lu e is n o t to be e q u a te d w ith e x iste n ce alone. V alu e p o ssesses an in n er unity, c o n ­ te n t and a set of a ttrib u tes, and th a t is w h y it itself c o n stitu tes th e v e ry e sse n c e (ec h te W ese n h e it). V alu e e v e n p o ssesses its ow n ex isten ce, nam ely, an id eal e x iste n c e (ideale Existenz)40. T he r e a li­ zation of v a lu e d o e s n o t c h an g e its n a tu re b u t o nly its m ode of being. T he d e p re c ia tio n of th e ro le of ex isten ce, ty p ic a l of H ild e ­ b ran d 's axiology, is c le a rly a co n seq u en ce of th e influen ce of p h e ­ nom en olo gy c o n n ected w ith th e e s se n tia l co n cep t of b e in g 41.

The G erm an ax io lo g ist by no m eans co n tin u es P la to 's idealism and th a t is w h y h e do es n o t ap p ro a c h v a lu e s as p u re possibilities. V alu es sim u ltan eo u sly c o n stitu te p ro to e lem e n ts of r e a lity b ecau se th e y h a v e th e ir u ltim a te re a lity in G od42. W ith o u t God v a lu e s w ould be m ere ly ,,a sh e er k in g d o m of sh a d o w s."43 God is „the h ig h est V alue" and a fu sio n of a ll v a lu e s 44 H e is „the Good itself" and „the good of all th e g o o d ."45

D ietrich v o n H ild eb ran d d istin g u ish es such k in d s of v alu es as form al, of c re a te d being, onto lo g ical q u a lita tiv e 46. F orm al v a lu e s a re co n n ected w ith b ein g itself, w h en ap p reh en d ed , for in stan ce, in

i u c z u c io w o ś c i B o g a - C z l o w i e k a (The H eart. C o n sid e ra tio n s o n H u m an E m otien a- lit y and th e E m o tio n a lity of G od-M an), P o zn a ń 1985, 159 ff.

86 D. v o n H i l d e b r a n d , C h r is tia n E thics, op. cit., 88. 37 Ibid., 72, 78.

38 Ibid., 95.

39 Ibid., 137, 154; com p, a lso h is D ie I d e e d e r s i t tl i c h e n H a n d lu n g , Jahrbu ch für P h ilo s o p h ie u n d p h ä n o m e n o lo g isc h e F o rsch u n g 3 (1916) 194 ff.

40 D. v o n H i l d e b r a n d , D e r S in n p h i l o s o p h is c h e n F ra g e n u n d Erk en-

nens , B onn 1950, 57.

41 M. H . S z y m e c z k o , op. cit., ;51 ff.

42 „But in G od t h e y (v a lu es) h a v e u ltim a te su b sta n tia l rea lity " , D. v o n H i l d e b r a n d , C h r is tia n E thics, op. cit., 160.

48 D. v o n H i l d e b r a n d , D ie M e n s c h h e it a m S c h e i d e w e g , R eg en sb u rg 1955, 45.

44 Ibid., 225— 226; a lso h is C h r i s t ia n E thics, op . cit., 162. 45 Ibid., 160.

opposition to n o th in g n ess; th e s e are, am ong others, th e v a lu e s of esse n c e an d e x isten ce. T h e v a lu e s of c re a te d bein g a re th e effects of G od's o m n ip o ten ce W ho h as en d o w e d His c re a tu re s w ith a c e r­ ta in d ig n ity and significance. The o n to lo g ical v a lu e s a re n o t co n ­ n e c te d w ith th e T hom istic th e o ry of tra n s c e n d e n ta ls b u t th e y re v e a l th e n a tu re of p a rtic u la r beings. Thus, for instan ce, m an 's o n to lo ­ gical v a lu e is th e fact th a t h e is im ago Dei. Fin ally, q u a lita tiv e v a lu e s a re co n n ected w ith h u m an a c tiv ity an d th a t is w h y w e sp eak of cognitive, m oral or a rtistic v a lu e s47.

Thom istic axio lo g y em p h asizes th e u n ity b e tw e en v a lu e a n d being, w hile p h en o m en o lo g y en tails a d u a listic -h e tero g e n eo u s co n ­ c ep tio n of v alues. O ne of th e fo u n d ers of p h en om eno log y, M ax S ch eler (Ï1928), a ccep ted on to lo g ical dualism , w h e n he d istin g u ish ­ ed th in g s an d v alues. T h ey a re in te rre la te d b u t n o t iden tical. V alues a re not th e re la tio n itself or an em o tio n al e x p e rie n c e of a s u b je c t48. This m akes it p o ssib le to sp eak of an o b jec tiv e -ab so lu te c h a ra c te r of v alues. T h ey a re in d ep e n d e n t of th e su b je c t's e v a lu a tio n b e c a u se th e y a re n o t his a rb itra ry creatio n .

S cheler h as n o t offered a d efin itio n of v alues, c h a ra c te riz in g them in a n e g a tiv e r a th e r th a n p o sitiv e m anner. V alu e is n o t a p h y ­ sical a ttrib u te of thin gs, n o r is it a p o w e r or re a l disposition. V alue is an o b ject co m p reh en sib le b y th e in tu itiv e-em o tio n al cognition. V alu e is a k in d of a „ m a terial q u a lity " (materiale Qualität), th a t is, it has an o b jec tiv e an d re a l c h a ra c te r49. V alu es im ply th e o b lig atio n or d u ty of re a liz a tio n b u t th e y can n o t be red u c e d to o b ligatio n alone. „The v e ry e x iste n c e of a p o sitiv e v a lu e is in itself a p o sitiv e value. T he v e ry e x iste n c e of a n e g a tiv e v a lu e is in itself a n e g a tiv e v a lu e ." 50 This m eans th a t p o sitiv e v a lu e s should be realized , w hile n e g a tiv e v a lu e s — reje cte d . T he ab o v e p ro b ab ly does n ot im ply th a t v alu es a re e x c lu siv ely id ea l q u alities. T h erefo re th e id ealistic in ­ te rp re ta tio n of v alues, a ccep ted b y H an n a B uczyńska-G arew icz51, seem s doubtful. A fter all, S cheler did ack n o w led g e th e auto n om y of v alues. H e saw in th em „ in d ep en d en t p h en o m en a" for w hich th in g s a re m e re ly „ c a rrie rs " 52. A m ong v a lu e s th e good assum es th e p red o m in an t p o sitio n since it co n tain s all th e o th er o b je c tiv e ly e x istin g in d iv id u al valu es.

S ch eler's o n to lo g ical dualism w as re la te d to ep istem o lo g ical dualism . T he w orld of th in g s is an o b jec t of in te lle c tu a l cognition,

47 D. v o n H i l d e b r a n d , C h r is tia n Ethics, op. cit., 154 ff, 158— 160.

Comp. W a h r h e i t , W e r t u n d Sein. F e s t g a b e iü r D ie tr ic h v o n H il d e b r a n d z u m 80.

G e b u r s ta g . H rsg. v o n B. S c h w a r z , R e g en sb u r g 1970.

48 M. S c h e l e r , D e r F o r m a lis m u s in d e r E th ik u n d d i e m a t e r i a l e W e r t e t h i k , H a lle 1921, 248— 255.

« Ibid., 12. s» Ibid., 79.

51 H. B u c z y ń s k a - G a r e w i c z , U c z u c i a i rozum ,.., op. cit., 228. 52 H. S c h e l e r , D e r F o rm a lis m u s.., op. cit., 12— 13.

w h ile th e w orld of v alu es is co m p reh en sib le only th ro u g h em o tio n al in tu itio n 53. T he G erm an p h ilo so p h er has a c h ie v e d a „ ra tio n a liz a tio n ” of em otions, th a t is, he end o w ed th em w ith th e c o g n itiv e function, and e v e n ex clu siv en ess, in re sp e c t to v alues. Em otions a re an in ­ tu itiv e „ v ie w ” of v a lu e s and in th is d o m ain th e y rem ain a u to n o ­ m ous in re sp e c t to in te lle c t an d will. T he p rim a ry c a te g o ry of e m o ­ tio n a l e x p e rie n c e s is love, „th e m ost e le m e n ta ry act w hich p ro v id es a basis for all o th er a c ts."54 S ch eler ack n o w led g ed th e p rim a cy of lo ve o v er cogn itio n w h en h e w ro te: „Love is th ere fo re a stim ulus for co g nition and will, e v e n m ore, it is th e m oth er of sp irit and re a so n itself."55 M an is, first of all, ens em ans.

M ax S c h e le r's concept of lo v e c le a rly co ntain s c o n tro v e rsial e le m en ts w hich h a v e b een p o in te d out, am ong others, b y Bishop K arol W o jty ła 56. F or in stan ce, th e a c tu a listic con cept of p e rso n is u n a c ce p tab le since it d im inish es th e c a u sa lity of p e rso n in resp e c t to values. Sch eler also q uestio n s th e norm of th e „d u ty to one's n e ig h b o u r” p e rc e iv in g in it a th re a t to m an's au tonom y. Still, it w ould be h a rd to d e scrib e all lo v e as an irra tio n a l act a n d d e n y it a co g n itiv e fu n ctio n 57. Sch eler c le a rly e n d o w s lo ve w ith an ab ility to „ d isc o v e r” th e w o rld of v alu es. A s h e w ro te, „V alu es can n o t be c re a te d or d e stro y e d . T h e y ex ist q u ite in d e p e n d e n tly of a n y o rg a ­ n ization of c e rta in sp iritu a l b ein g s.”58 His con cep tio n of v a lu e s is n o t id ea listic b u t th eistic, i.e. p e rc e iv in g th e ir u ltim a te ontological basis in God.

A w ell k n o w n co n te m p o ra ry axiologist, th e Rev. Jo h a n n e s H essen, com bines, in tu rn , e lem en ts of A u g u stian ism an d p h e n o m e ­ nology. H e accep ts a tria d ic s tru c tu re of re a lity and d istin g u ish es in it th re e elem en ts, essen ce, e x iste n c e and v a lu e 59. V alues h av e „sig n ifican ce” and th e y co n stitu te id eal beings. R eal being s h av e no n o rm a tiv e c h a ra c te r an d this in d ic a te s th e d ifferen ce b e tw e en bein g and v alue. V alu es alw ay s im ply an obligation, y e t th e y

un-53 S c h e le r d istin g u ish e d u su a l e m o tio n s (G e i ü h l e ) a n d e m o tio n a l e x p e r ie n c e of v a lu e s ( W e r t g e iü h l ) . Cf. О. K r a u s , D i e W e r t t h e o r i e n . G e s c h i c h t e u n d K r i ­

tik, L eip zig n.d., 393 ff.

54 M. S c h e l e r , M o r a lia , L eip zig 1922, 143.

53 M. S c h e l e r , O r d o a m o ris, (in:) G e s a m m e l t e W e r k e , v o l. 10: S ch riften

a u s d e m N a c h l a s s , L eip zig 1923, 356.

“ K. W o j t y ł a , O c e n a m o ż l i w o ś c i z b u d o w a n i a e t y k i c h r z e ś c i j a ń s k i e j p r z y z a ł o ż e n i a c h s y s t e m u M a k s a S c h e l e r a (A n E v a lu a tio n of th e P o ssib ility of

D e v e lo p in g C h ristian E th ics o n th e A ssu m p tio n s of M a x S ch eler's S y stem ) Lu­ b lin 1959, 91— 96.

57 H. B u c z y ń s k a - G a r e w i c z (op. cit., 277) in terp re ts S ch e ler 's c o n ­

cep t of lo v e to o irr a tio n a lly . H er th e s is w o u ld b e hard to r e c o n c ile w ith S ch eler's o w n sta te m en ts q u o ted b y her in her w ork . T h e c o g n itiv e fu n ctio n of lo v e is a c k n o w le d g e d b y J. D u 1 i e u, cf. A k t u a l n o ś ć S c h e l e r a (S ch eler's A c tu a lity ) Z nak 27 (1975) 213 ff.

58 M. S c h e l e r , D e r Form alis mu s. .. , op. cit., 268.

d erg o no ch an g e e v e n if th e ir c a rrie rs a re d e stro y e d 60. H is o n tolo g y of v a lu e s H essen d e scrib es as „red u c e d P lato n ism "61. F ollow ing Scheler h e p e rc e iv e s th e o nly m an ner of reco g n izin g v a lu e s in e m o tio n al in tu itio n w h ich is a k in d of e x p e rie n c e 62. H e does no t sp eak for e x tre m e em o tio nalism since h e in d icates m utu al in te rre ­ latio n s b etw een th re e form s of intuition, nam ely, in tellectu al, v o li­ tio n a l and. em otional. T h eir sy n th e sis is to be found in th e so-called to ta l in tu itio n w hich m ak es it possib le to d iscov er th e p re se n c e of God63.

T he p h ilo so p h ical th o u g h t of a P olish sch o lar, Rom an Ing arden, is also re la te d w ith th e p h en o m en o lo g ical tren d . H e in d icated th e com plexity of th e s tru c tu re of v a lu e s w h ich h a v e an o b jectiv e c h a ra c te r and w h ich a re n o t „factu al" p ro p e rtie s of th in g s61. T h ey a re also a relation , but n o t only,· th e y im ply obligation, b u t can n o t be e x c lu siv e ly red u c e d to it. V alu e is „a k in d of a su p e rstru c tu re ", th o u g h at th e sam e tim e ,,it grow s o ut of its fo u n d atio n s"65. I n ­ g a rd e n s e p a ra te d a e sth e tic an d e th ic a l v alu es: th e fo rm er h a v e an in te n tio n a l c h a ra c te r w h ile th e la tte r a re c re a te d by m an at th e m om ent of realizin g an u n d e rta k e n act. C o nsequ ently , th e Polish p h en o m en o lo g ist w as of th e opinion th a t v a lu e can n o t be u n e q u i­ v o c a lly classified as ,,an id eal being, re a l b ein g or in te n tio n a l b e in g "66. Thus, ag n o sticism w as his last w o rd alth o u g h h e also ack n o w led g ed th a t th e „significance" of v a lu e s p resu p p o se s som e k in d of th e ir ex isten ce.

T he la tte r co n cep ts of v a lu e sh a re a com m on ground, nam ely, th e y accep t th e ir o b jec tiv e c h a ra c te r. Still, th e n a tu re of v alu es is e x p la in ed d ifferen tly in p a rtic u la r tren d s, Thom ism and p h e n o m e n o ­ logy. The com plex p ro b lem of th e o n to lo g ical sta tu s of v a lu e s is m ost often solv ed in tw o w ay s, o n to lo g ically or perso n alistically . T he first w a y w as ta k e n by tra d itio n a l Thom ism , th e la tte r — by D. v o n H ild eb ran d an d som e p h en o m en o lo g ists (including Scheler). In p rin cip le th e tw o ap p ro a c h e s a re n o t m u tu a lly e x c lu siv e and th a t is w h y th e y shou ld be in te g rate d . In o u r opinion, v a lu e s a re n ot m ere ly m an 's su b je c tiv e e x p e rien c e s or e x c lu siv e ly p o ten tia l beings. V alu es h a v e an o b jec tiv e c h a ra c te r, w h ile th e ir re a lity has tw o aspects, o n to lo g ical and p erso n alist. O n to lo gical re a lity is d e ­

60 J. H e s s e n , Im R in g e n u m e in e z e i t n a h e P h ilo s o p h ie , N ü rn b erg 1959, 84 ff.

61 Ibid., 87. Com p. A . N o s s o 1, C o g n i t io D e i eyrperim en talis. N a u k a J a n a

H e s s e n a o r e l i g i j n y m p o z n a n i u B o g a (The T e a ch in g of Jan H e s s e n ab ou t th e R e­

lig io u s C o g n itio n of G od), W a r sz a w a 1974, 23— 33.

62 J. H e s s e n , E r k e n n t n i s t h e o r i e , B on n -B erlin 1926, 90. 63 J. H e s s e n , L eh r b u c h d e r P h i lo s o p h i e , v o l. 1: W i s s e n s c h a l t s l e h r e , M ü n ch en 1947, 249. M R. I n g a r d e n , P r z e ż y c i e .. ., op. cit., 83— 127. « Ib id., 100. 33 Ibid., 108, 112.

p e n d e n t on the act of e x iste n c e of a b ein g as a c a rrie r of values. A t th e sam e tim e, h ow ev er, th e re is an e v id e n t fact of th e c o n n e c ­ tio n of v a lu e s w ith th e w orld of p e rso n s as ra tio n a l and free causes of values. O ne m ay th e re fo re sa y th a t v a lu e s a re re a l th a n k s to p e rso n s — form ally as a resu lt of m an's a c tiv ity and, fun dam entally , due to th e c a u sa tiv e p o w er of God. T he affirm ation of th e re a lity of th e w orld of v alu es is n o t id en tic a l w ith g ran tin g th em a n e x iste n c e of a su b sta n tia l being, th a t is, auto no m ou s in resp e c t to th e „ c a r­ rie rs" . V a lu e s a re an c h o re d in being, th e y in h ere in it, th e y a re its im m anen t „q u ality". A t th e sam e tim e one m ay sp e ak of a new d e g re e of th e re a lity of th e p h e n o m e n o n of v alu es w h en th e y are seen, ap p ro v e d of or rea liz e d b y a person. O n ly in this co n te x t m ay one sp e ak of v a lu e s as such, e sp e c ia lly of h ig h er cognitive, e th ic a l or sacral-relig io u s values. M an 's d e a th or his in fid elity to v a lu e s of th is k in d do n o t m ean th eir a n n ih ila tio n since th e y a re alw ay s fu n ­ d a m e n tally re a l — in th e Prim al C ause, th a t is, in God. T he problem of th e o n to lo gical sta tu s of v a lu e s is v e ry com plex and still poses m any q u estion s. T he a tte m p t to so lv e th is p ro b lem p re s e n te d ab o v e could be d escrib ed as „ p e rso n a list onto lo g y ". O n its basis it seem s possib le to u n d e rta k e a n o th e r difficult pro b lem of th e re la tio n s b etw e en v a lu e and p e rso n b u t it w ould re q u ire a se p a ra te analysis.