Wanda Zagórska
Self-transcendence and its ludic
substitutes : a cultural developmental
Approach
Studia Psychologica nr 7, 231-248
a r t y k u ł y t e o r e t y c z n e i p r z e g l ą d o w e Studia Psychologica UKSW 7 (2007) s. 231-248 WANDA ZAGÓRSKA W arsaw U niversity S E L F-T R A N S C E N D E N C E A N D IT S L U D IC S U B S T IT U T E S A CULTURAL-developmental Approach1 Abstract
The category of self-transcendence has many different meanings in psycholo gical theory. It is used in reference to changes in the highest stages of develop ment of the human person (an existential-personalistic approach), as also to overcoming oneself in thefour hierarchically ordered levels of consciousness (the stance of transcendental-epistemological realism). The paper aims to show that self-transcendence is an inherent human need which is also being satisfied in contemporary times in a substitutive, ludic way. Analogies were drawn, ackno wledging the cultural-developmental approach, between the transcending of conditio humana by the man of traditional cultures who participated in the so- called living myth, and the quasi-overcoming oneself of contemporary man par ticipating in a secondary reality created by cultural phenomena and ludic in na ture. The common foundation for such distant phenomena is mythos - a specific way of thinking and approaching the surrounding world. The paper analyses the ludic substitutes of transcending oneself in chosen areas of young adults' ludic activity on the basis of the presented psychological approaches to the category of self-transcendence and its archaic counterparts, as well as the author's own empirical findings.
„If we take a closer look at the m y th of S u perm an it w ill tu r n out th a t it w ill unveil the h id d en desires o f co n tem p o rary m an who,
seeing h im self as a fallen an d lim ited being,
d ream s o f one day b ecom ing an »exceptional individual«, a »hero«” M ircea Eliade „You can be som ebody com pletely d iffe ren t...,
[in techno] everyone changes in to a su p erm a n for th e ir ow n ends” Rave p a rty goer
1 The article was prepared with financial aid from the statutory research programme 986/46 (Faculty of Psychology, Warsaw University).
1. MYTHOS AS A SPHERE OF OVERCOMING ONESELF
The so called „overcom ing oneself” category, if it arises in psychological theory, is usually referred to in psychological th eo ry as „self-transcendence” (Latin trans cendence - overcom ing) an d referred to the changes tak in g place in the highest stages o f h u m an developm ent (cf. Frankl, 1984; O poczyńska, 1996b; Straś-R om a- now ska, 1992, 1995a a n d 1995b). The presented text aim s to show th a t this self tran scendence has its substitute form s in the sphere of ludic behaviour. The au th o r refers to these substitutes as pseudo- or quasi-overcoming oneself.
The fu n d a m e n tal assu m ptio n in the problem s presen ted is th a t th e sphere of lu dic behaviou r often enables psychological tran sfer an d p artic ip a tio n in a seconda ry, pseudo-reality, usually m edia created an d narrativ e in character. The n o tio n o f seco n d ary reality in Polish developm ental psychology (cf. e.g. P rzetacznik G ier kowska an d Tyszkowa, 1996) is attrib u ted to th e pedagogue W in cen ty O koń. He writes: „H u m an playing occurs in a different reality w hich can be called the reality of playing or, quite simply, a seco n d ary reality (1995, p. 4). However, according to K azim ierz Żygulski (1998), O koń, by in tro d u cin g th is term into th e th eo ry o f m u l tiple realities form ulated by Leon Chwistek, 'is referring to th e theory, the Polish philosopher o f the inter-w ar p erio d (cf. Leon C hw istek „Philosophical an d
Logic W orks”, ed. Pasenkiew icz, 1961). Also th e em in en t French sociologist R o ger Caillois (1967) uses th e term seco n d ary reality w hen defining playing an d ga mes. H e describes them , am ong others, as fictional activities w hich are accom pa nied by a specific feeling o f a secondary reality o r a com plete d etach m ent from everyday life.
The term secondary reality is used in this text in a b ro ad er sense an d enco m p as ses all the p hen o m en a o f sym bolic cu ltu re in w hich psychological tran sfer into an alternative reality like th a t o f a literary depicted reality, th eatrical reality, film re a lity, v irtu a l reality, rave p a rty reality, narrative gam e reality2 etc. takes place. From a cu ltu ral-d evelop m ental perspective, p artic ip a tio n in this form o f secon dary rea lity created by th e m ass m edia is the fu n d a m e n tal tra it th a t m akes th e ludic activi ty o f co n tem p o rary m an resem ble th e p artic ip a tio n in the ‘living m yth’ o f a m em b er o f th e archaic cultures (traditional, tribal). The living m y th in these cu ltures is an authentic h isto ry th a t belongs to the sacrum sphere, instru ctive an d full o f m e anings m odels to follow. It is m ade o f the sym bolic m atter th a t is cu rren tly being experienced, the reality by w hich a set society lives an d w hich reflects the specific s tru c tu re o f a p erso n ’s aw areness an d attitu d e tow ards the w orld (cf. K rappe, 1952; Pâques, 1964; Eliade, 1984 an d 1998a; M alinow ski, 1990).
P articipation in seco n d ary reality created by co n tem p o rary c u ltu ra l phenom ena can be treated as one o f th e cu ltu ra l equivalents o f th e sphere o f social life th a t was once m arked by the living m y th in trad itio n al societies. Hence, th is p articip atio n entails elem ents characteristic o f the so-called „con tem p o rary m y thical b eh av io u r” (cf. Elidae, 1989; 1996; 1998a an d 1998b; C am pbell, 1959 an d 1987; Keen, 1969; M o
2 The author is referring to Role Playing Games (RPGs). This interactive form of spending ones time is popular mainly among secondary school pupils and students. It arose in 1973 in the Unites States. It became widespread in Poland in the last few decades, becoming an element of popular culture (cf. e.g. Dawidowicz, 2001; Zagórska, 2002).
reno, 1970). O ne o f these elem ents is the symbolic overcoming o f one’s own con ditio hum ana, satisfying the need to be „somebody m ore” (cf. Zagórska, 2001, 2003 an d 2004).
The com m on base for p hen o m en a such d istan t an d different in n atu re as archaic p artic ip a tio n in th e living m y th as well as the ludic activity o f c o n tem p o rary m an is the m ythos - a specific way o f relating to the su rro u n d in g w orld w hich is con nec ted w ith visual, im aginative-affective „m y th ical” th in k in g . The c u ltu ra l equivalent o f mythos in archaic societies (where there was no division in to religion an d c u ltu re) was the living m y th, w hereas in co n tem p o rary desacralized societies (apart from the sphere o f religious experience) it is the sphere of c u ltu ra l phenom ena, lu dic in nature, th a t enables psychological tran sfer into another, beyond th e real, re ality. Table 1 illustrates these analogies.
Table 1. O vercom ing oneself in the archaic and contem porary sphere of m ythos type behaviour
m y th o s ty p e th in k in g ▼
sphere o f m y th o s ty p e b ehaviour T
in archaic societies in c o n tem p o rary societies ▼
sphere o f th e liv in g m y th
▼ ludic sphere (as a frag m en tary su bstitute o f th e sphere o f living m yth) ▼
tra n sc e n d in g c o n d itio h u m an a in a m y th ical reality:
T
quasi-overcom ing oneself in a c u ltu re created seco n d ary reality:
«to be som eone m ore» «to experience a different self = alter ego» M ythos is th e living w ord w hich is being m ade p resen t in speech; logos is a deno- tational, stabilizing an d o rderin g w ord. W hile m ythos serves expression, the fu n ction o f logos is explaining. The m ythos way o f th in k in g , also referred to as m y th i cal, is based on the subjective im ages form ed in an intu itive way. Its value does no t depend on w hether it conform s w ith reality bu t on th e stren g th o f the em otional charge an d aesthetic experiences. It is, above all, m ade up o f personal intu itio n , fantasies an d feelings an d is m uch m ore „personal” th a n logos, it is a subjective experience o f the w orld (cf. Labouvie-Vief, 1990 a n d 1994; G urba, 1993; M irski, 2000; Zagórska, 2003 an d 2004).
M ythos is also th e „word th a t happens in n a rra tio n ” an d th e m ythos em bo died in the form of a living m y th is a sacred history, a sym bolic narrative. As Paul Valéry pu t it, „a «m yth» is the nam e for ev e ry th in g th a t exists o r lasts to the extent th a t it is caused by a statem en t” (cf. N iżnik, 1978, p. 164).
The m ythos sphere, i.e. the p hen o m en a d eterm in e d by m yth ical th in k in g , en com passes every th in g th a t belongs to th e w orld o f feelings an d is „organic”, p erso nal an d subjective, im aginative a n d intuitive, „clearly m anifests itself in th e la n
guage o f dream s, poetry, m yths as well as sym bols, m etaphors an d fantasy” (M ir ski, 2000, p. 80). It includes every th in g th a t stem s from narrativ e an d dialogue, from a d irec t verbal account sta rtin g from m y th ical narrative.
From the cultu ral-developm en tal perspective, ludic activity o f m an belongs to th e field o f mythos. This activity - increasing in th e phylogenetic ord er as th e m y th is degraded - was always closely related to the narrative. T h ro ug hou t th e centuries an d up to the present day m an, by way o f the narrativ e, has always derived pleasu re from ludic activity - s ta rtin g from The Iliad and the Odyssey up to com pu ter an d n arrativ e games. It is notable th a t th is pleasure is derived from o n e’s contact w ith the seco n d ary world, narrativ e in character, p artic u la rly from th e possibility o f playing a ce rtain role in it (tem porarily „being som ebody else”). We can safely say th a t „the need to p en etrate o th er worlds an d follow the events of a ce rtain «story»”, a need w hich, according to Eliade, „seem s an integral, co n stan t co m pon ent o f the h u m a n condition, an d is therefore resilient to an y attem p ts of eradicating it” (1998a, p. 188), also includes the ability to particip ate in the shaping o f events th ro u g h one’s im agin ation an d to take p a rt in th a t very „story”.
Therefore, looking from the cultural-developm en tal perspective at the strenuous attem pts of m an to satisfy th is desire, it is evident th a t he cu rren tly is behaving to a ce rtain extent sim ilarly to the m an o f archaic cultures p artic ip a tin g in th e living m yth. This p artic ip a tio n is inseparably co n n ected to going beyond the lim its o f th e h u m a n condition.
2. SYMBOLIC T R A NSC END IN G OF C OND IT IO H U M A N A BY THE M A N OF TRA DITIO N AL CULTURES
In archaic societies the sphere o f mythos was filled w ith th e living m y th th a t belonged to the d o m ain o f sacrum. This has rem ain ed only in a few c u ltu ra l circles today. The m ythical in those re m a in in g c u ltu ra l circles w here m ythos is alive m eans th at, w hich is sacral an d therefore that, w hich is real. In trad itio n al cultures, the m y th is a holy story, a narrativ e telling o f events th a t to ok place in the tim e o f „the b eg in n in g s”. It is a „m odel story, w hose p rim a ry fu n c tio n is revealing the m odels an d archetypes o f religious rites as well as all o th er m ean in g fu l activity th a t is not autom atic b u t defined by custom s an d tra d itio n s” (Dajczer, 1993, p. 327). The story is the source of p attern s o f behaviour, giving m ean in g an d value to h u m a n existen ce thus ensuring, am ong others, a feeling o f security.
The m y th ical narrative is a reality th a t is experienced an d n o t ju st a theory, a discursive p ro d u c t of the m in d or an abstract explanation. The m y th exists only w hen it is being told. O nce w ritten dow n a n d analysed it becom es lifeless. It is a n a r rative tran slate d into a form of sym bol, a living expression o f m an w hich is th en passed on to others to recognise a n d „re-en act”. M ythical w ords an d gestures are no t so m uch an im age to contem plate as an experience th a t is u n d ersto o d an d ad opted as action. It is alive in th e people p resent w hen it is in the form o f a narrative an d w hen it is being told. It is the way th a t the m y th exists, th e m yth, w hich is „life” an d action. P articipation in the m ythical narrativ e is connected w ith experiencing the presence o f a p erso n elim in atin g th e subjective-objective distance. The tru th of the m y th is an existential tru th o f the subjective relation th a t expresses m a n ’s situ ation in the world. However, because th a t situ atio n is always a living an d dyn am ic
experience, it goes beyond th e conceptual level. It is for th is reason th a t m y thical m odels w ork on th e level of th e „I - You” subject relation, w hich is w hy they are capable o f provo kin g a person al reply (cf. e.g. A lexander, 1953; Paqûes, 1964, Daj- czer, 1984).
The m ost im p o rta n t elem ents o f the s tru c tu re o f th e living m y th are, a p a rt from the so-called „paradise scenery” an d presence o f m ythical heroes, an overcoming of chronological tim e (the tim e o f profanum ) an d en terin g into a qualitatively d if ferent m ythical tim e. It is sacrum tim e - a p rim o rd ial an d infinitely renewable tim e. The overcom ing o f tim e occurs by tran sferrin g into th e reality th a t is being m ade-present at th a t very tim e, into the tim e o f th e b eginn in gs (Latin illo tempore). This tran sfer is psychological in nature, im aginative-affective, substitutive in rela tion to the real presence in the reality o f m y th w hich is w hy it should be rath er called sym bolic (cf. Zagórska, 2001 an d 2004). It is im p o rta n t to th e m an o f tr a ditional cu ltures to „transfer to an o th er d im ension th a t involved «becom ing open to that, w hich is above»” (Eliade, 1996, p. 74). This is an expression o f his „yearning after p arad ise”, his y earn in g for the lost tim e o f th e beg in ning s th a t is cu rren tly being regained by contin u ally m ak in g it present. It deals w ith the second ary layer and therefore an existentially necessary one because th is is where all th e sh o rtc o m ings of the h u m a n co ndition can be replenished.
A m em ber o f tra d itio n a l societies treated the sphere of m y th as being ex isten tial ly the m ost im p o rta n t because it referred to the highest o f values. H e acknow ledged th at he is a tru ly a p erson to th e extent th a t he im itates th e gods, th e cu ltu re-created heroes or m yth ical ancestors. As a p ar excellence religious person, „he w ould take on h u m a n existence having a su p erh u m a n an d tran sc en d en tal m o d el”. He wanted to be somebody different to w hom he was in his secular existence; he w anted to be som ething „m ore th a n he w as”. He w ould create his im age in the likeness o f the divine m odels th ro u g h p artic ip a tio n in the living m y th (cf. Eliade, 1996, p. 82; - em phasis in bold by W.Z.)
T hrou gh the very fact o f telling the m yth, the individual, „h isto rical” tim e beca m e sym bolically in validated an d the n a rra to r an d the listeners tran sferre d into the Great T im e (holy, m ythical), into an „unfathom able m om ent, im possible to m easu re because it is beyond all b eg in n in g an d all e n d ”. W h e n listen ing to m y th a p erson w ould, in a sense, com pletely forget about his h u m a n con dition, about his „h isto ri cal situ atio n ” co n d itio n ed by a set system of b eh avio ur an d w ould be tran sferre d to an o th er world, w hich no longer was his „sm all, m u n d an e W orld ” (cf. Eliade, 1998b, pp. 66-67). O ne could say th a t he tran sc en d ed h im self by projecting his ow n Self into a different reality. In the H eideggerian u n d e rsta n d in g o f the term transcenden ce (cf. Podsiad, 2000, p. 900), he would go beyond the level he currently found him self on, he went beyond himself.
A ccording to Eliade, c o n te m p o ra ry societies have no t com pletely rid d e n th e m selves o f th e m y th ic al ty p e o f b eh a v io u r b u t sim ply ch ang ed th e ir scope o f action. For m ost people w ho are n o t engaged in an y au th en tic religious ex p erien ce3,
3 Eliade uses the category of authentic religious experience in a different sense to the widespread u n derstanding. He uses it in reference to societies where a unity between culture and religion exists. Authen tic religious experience - present in a social scale in traditional, living a cosmocentric religion cultures - is almost non-existent in Western desacralized cultures..
m ythical behaviour can be observed, a p a rt from th e activ ity o f th e su b co n sc io us psyche (e.g. d ream s, fantasies, y earn in g s etc.) in their entertainment. It is these form s o f b eh a v io u r th at, in c o n te m p o ra ry tim es, play the m y th ic al fu n c tio n o f en ab lin g a p erso n to „b reak away from m u n d a n e ex istan c e” an d „go beyond h isto rical tim e ”. W h a t w ith th e d esacralisatio n o f w ork, c o n tra ry to tra d itio n a l c u ltu re s th a t m an ag e d to „go bey o n d T im e ” th ro u g h an y fo rm o f w orth w h ile w ork, c o n te m p o ra ry m an c a n n o t „ k ill” his tim e d u rin g w o rk in g h o u rs an d feels a p riso n e r o f his ow n profession. H e tries to „go beyo nd T im e” an d re ality in his leisure tim e, th u s creatin g for h im se lf an incred ible m u ltitu d e o f p astim es (cf Eliade, 1989, pp. 27-28).
As a result, he seeks a substitute form of living m y th in th e sphere o f ludic b eh a v io u r above all because it is here that symbolic transfer into another reality can take place even th o u g h it belongs to the profanum . In ludic activity, th e presence of m echanism s th a t are th e desacralised an d frag m en tary equivalent o f th ose th at governed the m y thical b eh av iour o f the m an o f trad itio n al cu ltures are, therefore, clearly evident (cf. Zagórska, 2001; Zagórska, 2004; Z agórska a n d Kopeć, 2004). Hence, the ludic sphere w ill also entail som e form o f overcom ing oneself th a t b e longs to the very core o f p artic ip a tio n in th e living m yth.
At the c u rre n t stage o f the au th o r’s th eoretical analysis an d research in th is field prove th a t the category o f overcoming oneself in the sphere o f ludic behaviour concerns the symbolic overcoming o f one’s own lim itations (including the time and space lim itation) and one’s own finiteness, satisfying the need to be som e body different (at least for a certain period o f time), „somebody more” (also by possessing som ething more), right up to the „Impossible-Self”, i.e. a Self com pletely impossible to realise in authentic reality.
O ne could ask about th e concrete form s th a t overcom ing oneself, th u s u n d e r stood, takes on in th e sphere o f ludic activity. In ord er to answ er th is question, this category needs to be placed in th e context o f th e c u rre n t psychological theory.
3. SELF-TRANSCENDENCE AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORY
M uch research was conducted in Polish psychology on the question o f overco m ing o n e’s lim itation s („the lim its o f o n e’s ow n Self”), by Józef Kozielecki who cam e to develop the transgressive concept o f m an (cf. 1983, 1987, 1997 an d 2001). He u n d ersta n d s transgression as a phen o m en o n o f conscious overcom ing eve ry th in g th a t a p erson is a n d has. A ccording to Kozielecki, the term homo transgres sivus entails the conviction th a t overcom ing one’s ow n lim itation s is the strongest h u m a n need an d therefore an innate ch aracteristic o f a h u m a n being. „L im ita tio n s” are u n d ersto o d by the A utho r in a very bro ad sense: th ey refer to b o th the physical lim itations as well as th e social an d sym bolic. From a transgressive p o in t o f view, the phen o m en a exam in ed in th is p aper w ould all fit into the bro ad field of „indiv idu al tran sgressions” th a t refer to th e „interio r w orld” o f an individual. The se transgressions concern th e perso n ality an d its field o f action; „creating oneself according to o n e’s ow n p lan ” (Kozielecki, 1987, p. 11).
It seems all th e m ore p e rtin e n t for fu rth e r analysis, p artic u la rly because o f th eir m ythological reference, to refer to th e objectivistic concepts o f overcom ing oneself w here it is u n d ersto o d as self-transcendence. Transcendence is „an existence out
side o f the subject (the mind), particularly the existence o f the object o f cogni tion outside o f the know ing m ind or reality” (Szymczak, 1989, p. 523). Thus, the process of authentic self-transcendence always involves tu rn in g to a tran sc en d en tal subject, i.e. one existing outside o f th e subject, surp assin g th e b o u n d a ry o f his ex perience an d cognisance. The process o f self-transcendence, th e ludic substitutes of w hich are being analysed in th is paper, does n o t belong to the typical individual transgressions in the subjectivistic-transgressive concept o f m a n above.
3.1. SELF-TRANSCENDENCE IN AN EX ISTEN TIA L-PH EN O M EN O LO G ICA L APPROACH
The term self-transcendence is used in Polish psychology above all by the represen tatives o f the existential-phenom enological hum anistic psychology (cf. O poczyńska,
1996b). In their approach to this term they continue the th ou gh t o f the intern atio nal ly renow ned psychiatrist, neurologist and psychotherapist an d existentially inclined scientist, Victor E. Frankl. „То be a h u m an being m eans to go beyond oneself. The essence of h u m an existence lies [...] in its self-transcendence” (1984, pp. 147-148). F rankl’s concept is know n th ro u g h o u t as the concept of self-transcendence. Its foun dations have direct references to the philosophy of M ax Scheler.
Self-transcendence m eans going beyond that, w hat a perso n cu rren tly is, to w ar ds that, w hich should be; it m eans going beyond lower values th a t are at th e service of the needs o f th e psychophysical organism o f m an (hedonistic, u tilitaria n , an d vital) an d in ten tion ally aim in g tow ards objectively existing hig her values, the „transcendentals”4. „In discovering the values an d th en living th e m ”, com m ents M aria S traś-R om anow ska, „a [person] brings about a tran scen den ce o f o n e’s ow n Self; overcom es oneself tow ards the transcenden tals. This self tran scend ence is n o th in g o th er th a n acting as if against o n e’s personal, w hether rational, p rag m atic or hedonistic way o f existing n atu ra lly serving as a defence o f o ne’s ow n vital in te rest - th a t o f life, adaptation, au tono m y” (1995b, p. 49).
In th e approach of Straś-R om anow ska (1992 an d 1995a) th e term overcom ing oneself, alongside th e renunciation o f Self, h u m ility an d a feeling o f a greater m e aning, is one of th e effects o f m etaphysical developm ent. This developm ent is based on experiencing absolute values an d a sense o f perso n al duty. Self-transcendence is, therefore, a category th a t belongs to the highest stages o f personal developm ent (auto-transcendental). It is so m eth in g m ore th a n self-realisation w hich is refered to the developm ental changes in the subject sphere. It arises in co nnection w ith c a r rying out one’s duty, experiencing „noetic tension”5 as a result of ex periencing v a lues. By tran sc en d in g tow ards these values an d actualising th em m an overcom es em pirical reality. Fie uses his abilities an d even gives up satisfying the needs co n nected w ith o th er dim ensions o f the being if necessary a n d it is as if he „loses h im self”. He develops by rejecting the form o f life he h ad up u n til now an d by
actuali-4 Transcendentals (from the Latin transcedere - to overcome) are understood in metaphysics as the universal properties of existence that are vested in that being as a being. The Classical philosophy tradition distinguishes the following transcendantals: the being (ens); the one (unum ); the true (verum); the good (bonum); the thing (res) - as a certain aspect of being; the something (aliquid) - as an aspect of oneness; the beautiful (pulchrum) - as a unique synthesis of truth and good (cf. Herbut, 1997)..
5 According to Franki, the principle that a person is motivated by as a spiritual person is the law of noodynamics’ that states that being in a constant state of tension between that which is and that which should be is a characteristic trait of the hum an being (1975, cf. Opoczyńska, 1996, p. 19).
sing values. This very developm ent in w hich tran scen d en tals play a crucial role can be deem ed after F ran k l as au to-transcendence.
3.2. SELF-TRANSCENDENCE IN T H E A PPROACH OF DANIEL H EL M IN IA K
The category o f self-transcendence is also present in A m erican psychology. Daniel A. H elm iniak, psychologist an d philosopher o f the University o f A ustin in Texas and o f the Oblate School of Theology in San A ntonio, elaborates this notion in his con cepts. He is creating his ow n concept o f spiritual developm ent try in g to analyse it from a purely psychological perspective w ithout any relation to religious, theological and philosophical aspects. This developm ent is, according to H elm iniak, „the ongo ing integration th at results in the self-responsible subject from openness to an in trin sic principle of authentic self-transcendence” (H elm iniak, 1987, p. 41).
This „in trinsic principle of authentic self-transcendence” is a key term for H el m iniak. He claim s th a t self-transcendence is a characteristic o f h u m a n conscious ness - sim ilarly to openness, dynam ic, open-en ded ness as well as intentionality. Self-transcendence is in n ate as it is connected w ith the actu alisatio n o f the d y n a m ic in n atu re consciousness. It is an integral p a rt o f h u m a n behaviour, in -b u ilt into the very essence o f being h u m an . It is present everyw here w henever we are dealing w ith a h u m a n person th a t has an aw areness o f an y th in g , th a t u n d ersta n d s any th in g , th a t m akes judgem ents or decisions. The very fact th a t consciousness is in ten tio nal in character signifies th a t it is n o th in g o th er th a n in trin s ic self-tran sce n d en ce . H elm in iak supp o rts th e epistem ological tran sc en d en tal realism approach here.
A subject’s overcom ing oneself, w hich the A uth or identifies as self-overcom ing o ne’s consciousness, is discussed by h im on four h ierarchically ordered levels6. He identifies th e specific function, tran sc en d en tal precept an d specific form o f self tran scend ence on each of the levels. Table 2 presents th e au th o r’s arran g em en t of H e lm in ia k ’s argum ents.
Table 2. Self-transcendence on the four levels of awareness according to Daniel H elm iniak (1996, pp. 117-119; edited by W.Z.)
LEVEL OF
CONSCIOUSNESS TASK
TRA N SCEN DENTA L PRECEPT
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE FORM
1. E m pirical Receiving data Be attentive! A w areness o f data
2. Intellectual
U n d erstan d in g W h a t is it?
H ow is it?
Be intelligent! H av in g in sig h t and fo rm u latin g ideas
3. R ational Judgem ent o f fact
Is it tru ly so? Be reasonable!
D iscovering th e objective tr u th b e h in d th e fact 4. Responsible E valuating values W h a t do I in ten d to do w ith this?
Be responsible! M aking a responsible choice
6 Helminiak bases his differentiation on that introduced by Bernard Lonergan, an outstanding Cana dian philosopher, theologian and economist (1904-1984), the masterm ind of, what he came to call, the „generalized empirical m ethod” (cf. 1997).
O n the first, empirical level o f consciousness, according to H elm iniak, the very fact of becom ing aware o f inform ation m ean s to move beyond oneself. By b eco m ing aw are o f any k in d of new in form atio n, a person, in a sense, is already som e body different th a n he was before. H e w ent beyond him self. Therefore, receiving in fo rm atio n changes him .
O n the second, intellectual level o f consciousness, th e level o f receiving in sight and form ulating opinions is once again a m ove bey o n d oneself. H av ing gain ed a new experience, h av in g a new idea, a p erso n now finds them selves in „a new p lace”. O ne is n o t th e sam e as one used to be. Even th e sim plest u n d e r s ta n d in g an y in fo rm a tio n received, answ erin g th e question: „W hat is it?”, m eans self-transcendence because it overcom es th e state th a t was a m o m en t ago w h en it was still u n k n o w n .
O vercom ing o n eself o n the third, rational level o ccu rs in a som ew h at definite m a n n e r by attaining knowledge. The ju d g em en t o f a fact, disco verin g its objec tive tr u th engages a p erso n in tru th , reality, existence - u n d e rsto o d as u niversals, as tra n sc e n d e n ta ls (cf. footn ote 4). A p erso n is now m ore co nv in ced o f w hat tru ly exists th a n to sim ply k n o w th a t it exists, w hat could exist o r w hat he w ould like to exist.
O n the fourth level o f responsibility, m aking a responsible decision w hich is im peratively co n n ected w ith the evaluation of values causes a m oving beyond o n e self. This is self-transcendence in the strict sense o f the word. A p erso n can th en perceive w hat is good an d right. He gives up w hat could m erely have given h im satisfaction, pleasure or w hat could m erely have been to his liking. By m ak in g re sponsible choices he affirm s h im self in his ability o f being responsible. A n d he is, once again, in a sense, a new person. He is no t the p erso n he was a m o m en t ago. He w ent beyond him self.
O n the highest level, H elm in iak s u n d e rsta n d in g o f self-transcendence is closest to personalistic tho ug ht. O nly on th is level can one talk o f „genuine self-transcen dence” w hich is co nnected w ith free w ill an d responsibility for o n e’s actions. The th ree levels preceding it m erely act as preparation. H e lm in iak assum es, as do the personalists, th a t acts o f decision m ak in g are the m ost im p o rtan t. „C hoosing” m e ans „encom passing into o neself” th e object o f one’s choice. Therefore, every choice m akes th e th in g th a t was chosen as if a p a rt o f th e p erson choosing; it m akes th em the person m ak in g these k in d s o f decisions.
A person is therefore self-determ ined by his choices. A responsible choice, co n sequently a choice directed at tru th an d good, m akes it easier to behave in the sam e way in the future. A nd the opposite is also true: every choice against tru th an d good is no t only a way o f draw ing evil closer to oneself b u t m akes it easier to choose evil in the fu tu re because every such choice w eakens the conscience.
A fu n d a m e n tal novelty of the app roach presented seems to be the statem ent th a t every act o f consciousness is co nnected w ith self-transcendence. Seeing th a t the tru e d ynam ism of consciousness is d irected tow ards th a t w hich exists an d th a t w hich is good, every form o f m ak in g it present gives rise, according to H elm iniak, to over com ing oneself, an d an overcom ing tow ards the objective reality an d good.
The above th eoretical approaches to self-transcendence w ill serve as a p o in t o f reference for the o u tline o f selected form s o f overcom ing oneself in th e ludic sphere.
Results o f em pirical research ca rried out u n d e r directio n of the au th o r o n the ex periences o f th eatre audiences, p artic ip a n ts o f th e rave p a rty su bcu lture an d co m p u ter gam e players have also been u sed in form ulatin g th e characteristics presented fu rth e r in the paper.
4. SYMBOLIC OVERCOMING ONESELF IN THE LUDIC SPHERE
A ccording to Eliade, co n tem p o rary irreligious m a n „defends h im se lf fro m eve ry th in g th a t is tran sc en d en tal. In o th er w ords [...] he d oesn ’t agree th a t th ere exists a different form o f h u m a n ity o th er th a n th e way o f being h u m a n revealed in vario u s h isto rical situations, [...] he shapes him self, b u t he can tru ly shape h im self to th e ex tent th a t he désacralisés h im se lf a n d the w o rld ” (1996, p. 168). W h a t th en becom es o f self-transcendence w hen one denies th e existence o f transcendence? W h a t is th e sym bolic overcom ing o f conditio hum ana reduced dow n to th e sphere o f th e profane, no longer based on a tu rn in g tow ards th e tran sc en d en tal b u t to w ards oneself?
In th e light o f the lite ratu re on th is subject as well as the results o f th e research m en tio n ed above it is possible to say th a t th e form s th a t ludic sub stitu tes o f over co m ing oneself take on are d ep en d en t on th e traits of th e seco n d ary reality th ey co n cern in th a t instance. C o n sid erin g the m anifold possibilities th a t c o n tem p o ra ry m an has to his d ispo sal w ith regards to shaping th is „second layer” it seems obvious th a t the p h en o m en a dealt w ith in th is p ap e r can take on a vast array o f form s. It is en o u g h to take into acco u n t the ch a rac te r o f th e m ed iu m th a t tran sfers into th e different reality along w ith th e place it has in sym bolic cu ltu re (the close ness to the arts, m ass c u ltu re o r subculture) as well as tak e into acco un t the m eans u sed in shaping an d co m m u n icatin g it (verbal, visual, soun d, digital, etc.), th e m odel o f the process o f c o m m u n icatio n used by th em or w heth er th ey belong to th e „old o r new m ed ia”. The very form of p a rtic ip a tio n also plays an im p o rta n t role therein, w h eth er it is com pletely su b stitu to ry (per procura) as in th e instance o f tra n sfe rrin g oneself in to th e w orld of lite rary fiction by m eans o f o n e’s im ag in a tion o r a m ore d irec t form as, for instance, in an o u t-d o o r version o f a RPG (LARP - Live A ction Role Play) ta k in g place in specific k in d s o f locations w ith th e use o f p rops an d costum es.
4.1. SELF-TRANSCENDENCE OF A FILM SPECTATOR
In film studies an d the th eo ry o f m ass m edia there is p leth ora o f th eoretical re flection co ncerning the „transfers o f th e spectator onto th e film screen” a n d the psychological p artic ip a tio n in the show, resulting from it. There are m an y such p h en o m en a here th a t can be qualified into the category of sym bolic overcom ing oneself.
As an exam ple, the concept o f a spectator u n d ersto o d as a tra n s c e n d e n ta l s u b ject was a key concept in p o st-m o d ern ist French th eo ry o f cinem a, first coined by Jean-Louis B audry an d later ex p o u n d ed on by C h ristia n M etz. B audry writes: „If the eye [...] is no longer a p riso n er o f the body, o f m atter an d tim e laws, if there are no boun d aries stopping it from m oving, the w orld is no t only co n stitu ted by th at eye, b u t even constitu ted for it. The m obility of the cam era fulfils the necessary conditio ns for the «transcendental subject» to arise. It is b o th [...] an objective
rea-lity, w hich, reducing the forces th a t lim it it, seems to au gm en t the possibilities an d the pow er o f the subject” (Baudry, 1970, cit. after: H elm an, 1985, pp. 8-9; em phasis in bold by W.Z.).
In Polish th eo ry o f m ass m edia W ojciech Chyła developed the concept o f th e show as a factor o f symbolic change. He form ulated such theories th a t can be d ire ctly applied to co n tem p o rary m ythical behavio ur an d to overcom ing th e h u m a n co nd ition analysed herein. For instance: „The n on-existen t subject th a t was m ade present by the show controls m e [...]. A nd, for th is very m om ent, it is m y new «God» [...]. A nd ju st like in religion: I d o n ’t have m y ow n iden tity w ith o u t a G od ru lin g over me. A n d ju st like in religion I become ‘not m y se lf an d m y th o u g h ts do no t define the object I have before m y eyes. I overcome myself, I move beyond myself, m y sensory an d rational capacities w ith th e help of the show ” (Chyła, 1999, p. 37; em phasis in bold by W.Z.).
The film narrative is w ith o u t do u b t a co n tem p o rary su bstitu te for m yth ical n a r rative. The p artic ip a tio n o f the psyche in it gives a substitute experience o f o n e’s ow n change an d p artic u la rly the illusion o f „being som ebody m o re”.
4.2. O V ERCO M IN G ONESELF OF T H E TH EA TRE SPECTATOR
It is also possible to speak o f sym bolic overcom ing oneself in th e case o f a th e a trical show. In the research co ndu cted by A n n a M ączyńska (2001) on the ex p erien ce o f the „active th eatrical sp ectato r”, overcom ing oneself tu rn e d o u t to be the m ost im p o rtan t elem ent o f this experience. The spectators interview ed referred to the following phenom ena:
- tran sc en d in g th e borders of everyday experiences, cognizance an d em otions, lim itatio ns o f th e ir ow n perso n ality an d lim its of know ledge about them selves an d reality;
- perceiving som ething „new ” in them selves and in th e world; an openness, sensitivity, the diversity o f th e w orld an d the spiritu al d im ension o f reality;
- self-cognizance an d en rich in g th e ir ow n psychological life, enabling th em to feel a bo n d an d sense o f co m m u n ity w ith th e world, psyche developm ent, self-rea lisation;
- tran sfo rm atio n m ost often u n d ersto o d as a change in th e psychological sphere, in th eir ow n traits an d ways o f functioning.
The m ost d o m in a n t here was the overcom ing o f barriers defined by th e viewers precisely as „overcom ing o neself”, also in the context o f „the co nd itio n o f h u m a n existence”. The following are a few exam ples o f how th ey explained it:
[Thanks to the theatre] I overcome certain lim its in m yself7. There is so m eth in g beyond, beyond th is b o u n d ary ; so rational, so m aterial, it’s contact w ith som e form of energy [...], I d o n ’t know if you can call th em values because this is th e m ore rational, intellectual sphere, perhaps som e em otions, p rim a ry em otions, needs as well, the need of a c o m m u n ity an d a c o m m u n ity no t only w ith people, b u t w ith that, w hich lies beyond th a t b o u n d a ry ” (female, aged 23).
[T hanks to th e a tre shows] I overcome myself, I forget ab o u t th e sadness o f m y existence, I forget, th a t I am always an d everyw here alone [...]. This is a trag ic
feeling because it is fleeting a n d because o f th is it m akes you m uch m ore p a in fu l ly aw are o f c e rta in th in g s [...]. It’s not about m ediocrity but about the condition o f hum an existence [...]. Som etim es the th e a tre helps m e to see all th is ” (male, aged 24).
The presen ce o f th e e x isten tial th em e in th e re sp o n d e n ts’ statem en ts allows th e a ssu m p tio n th a t o v erco m in g o n ese lf in th e a tric a l n a rra tiv e show s also e n ta ils a c e rta in elem ent o f escapism for th e view ers. It enables a p e rso n to te m p o ra rily p u ll them selves aw ay fro m th e „p ain o f th e ir ex isten c e” (cf. M ączyńska, 2001, pp. 81-82).
4.3. O V ERCO M IN G ONESELF OF A RAVE PARTY GOER
A n em pirical exploration o f th is category in th e experiences o f th e p articip an ts o f th e techno m usic su b cu ltu re has bro u g h t p artic u la rly interesting results (Kopeć, 2001; Zagórska, 2003 an d 2004; Zagórska an d Kopeć, 2004). It tu rn e d out th a t in the case o f a rave p a rty goer sym bolic overcom ing oneself m ainly takes on th e form o f h aving experiences relating to the Self an d going beyond the m u n d an e everyday experiences. It also clearly m anifests itself in the desire to create oneself as „som e body com pletely different”, im possible to achieve in reality: the „Im possible-Self”. The feeling of overcom ing one’s ow n lim its w hich th e rave p a rty goers talked about referred m ainly to ce rtain tem p o ra ry experiences, im aginings or feelings o f being a different Self.
[...] at th is rave I com pletely d istan ced m yself to w hat was on the outside or I even d istan ced m yself to myself, I m ean, I im agined that I was different, mysterious, better, th a t a person, w hen you go into th is trance, w hen you get into th e rh y th m [...] you see yourself to be better, th a t every th in g is [...], th a t they’re someone prettier, or ... you sim ply feel better, that you’re funkier, more sure o f yourself - yeah, that’s it! (female, aged 28).
[...] I d id n ’t have any qualm s about g etting up th ere on stage an d having a laugh w ith those people. It’s so m eth in g w hich I suppose I’m n o t ready for in every day life, to stan d out, I m ean, in fact I w ould never do th is in a n o rm al situ ation but w hen I’m there, I sim ply get the urge to get up there, I didn’t have such barriers like I can’t, that I don’t look right or I shouldn’t [...]. It’s also different because I’m the ty p e o f person w ho generally cares about w hat people th in k of m e [...], I gene rally like being liked by others, w hereas w hen I’m at a rave I couldn’t care less whether they like me or not (female, aged 26).
Yes. I could do m y h a ir like a p u n k a n d [...] b u t I w ould never do th a t in real life. But I could actually do th a t th en, even th o u g h I’m so terrib ly self-conscious [...]. I co uld do som ething like th a t ... th a t you can be somebody completely different, th a t everyone changes into a superman for their own ends, you do n’t really do th a t for the sake o f the people aro u n d you. [...] I w ould [do it] only to feel b e tte r... yeah, th a t I’m here, th ere you go, th a t I’m a different person (female, aged 27).
This p a rtic u la r su b -cu ltu re clearly reveals how very m uch sym bolic overcom ing oneself does no t have an self-transcendent character w hich is con nected w ith a tu r n in g tow ards h igh er values bu t is ra th e r a form o f pseudo-self-transcendence: ex periencing a different Self bro u g h t about by tu rn in g tow ards oneself a n d directed tow ards realising hedonistic values. Hence, we are n o t dealing w ith an aspiration
tow ards hig h er values, w ith the literal self-transcendence bu t w ith experiencing oneself as som ebody different. It is all about creating oneself w ith a different set o f traits, a different face, about a different, im possible to realise in th e real world, ver sion of oneself.
W ith respects to rave cu ltu re we are even dealing w ith a d irec t escape from va lues and, along w ith it, from responsibility an d duty, from th a t w hich is d e m a n ding, from the effort o f being yourself. Using M ax Scheler’s h ierarch y o f values (1967), it can be said th a t the rave cu ltu re-created reality m ainly serves th e lower values as it is aim ed at satisfying hedonistic needs8. It is a consequence o f a consu- m erist way of life. N evertheless, one can also find in it the y earn in g o f co n tem p o ra ry m an for the experience o f the transcen d en t. People go about satisfying th is need by seeking concrete pseudo- or quasi-tran scen d en tal experiences by try in g to change th eir ow n consciousness.
4.4. O VERCO M IN G ONESELF OF A N N A RRA TIV E C O M PU TER G AM E PLAYER
The narrative o f a narrative com puter gam e is yet ano th er contem porary substitu te o f m ythical narrative. Psychological p articipation in such a gam e gives a substitute experience of one’s ow n change, the illusion o f being „som ebody m ore”, o f „going beyond” oneself, one’s ow n sensory an d m ental capabilities. The possibility o f sym bolic overcom ing the borders o f one’s ow n Self, tem porarily taking on an im ag in ary identity, checking out roles th at are impossible to realise in real life seems to be the deciding factor about the popularity of these games. It is a highly m otivating factor of becom ing intensely involved in these them . It is w o rth noticing th at the process o f identifying w ith the fictional character an d thus broadening the symbolic
lim its o f one’s ow n Self, belongs to the oldest ways kn o w n to m a n k in d o f d eri ving pleasure. It is enough to look at th e sym bolism o f a m ask. M an fred Lurker, an em inen t an th ro p o lo g ist an d h isto rian o f religions, a fellow w orker o f Eliade, writes: „m an [...] is h id in g his helplessness ben eath it w hile n u rtu rin g the hope th at, th an k s to it, he w ill be able to grow beyond himself. The w earer of a m ask m anages to get out «beyond himself»; liberates h im self from h im self an d thu s gives into the charm of the unforeseeable a n d w orking u n d e r th e surface” (1994, p. 292).
In com puter adventure gam es (e.g. M ulti-U ser D ungeons, C om p uter Role-Play ing Games) w here one can create one’s ow n avatar in cyberspace, sym bolic overco m ing oneself takes the form o f experim en tin g w ith th e created identities. Shaping oneself as som ebody different w ho is im possible to b rin g about on the level o f real life probably refers, as it does in rave culture, to ce rtain substitute experiences an d tem p o rary feelings of a different Self (cf. Table 1).
These feelings definitely do no t have a n y th in g in co m m o n w ith th e m ean in g o f self-transcendence defined in existential-phenom enological psychology, as they are not caused by th e desire to go by high er values, o f losing oneself a n d overcom ing one’s ow n p a tte rn o f existence for the sake of actualisin g these values. They are n o t the effect of overcom ing set schem es th a t n a tu ra lly serve to defend a p erson ’s vital interest: th a t o f life, adjustm ent, autonom y (cf. Straś-R om anow ska, 1995b).
8 According to Scheler, vital, utilitarian and hedonistic values make up the group of lower values, while the sacral and spiritual values - the higher values (cf. 1967).
These experiences are caused by tu rn in g tow ards oneself, a characteristic o f ludic activity aim ed at satisfying o n e’s hedon istic needs. The player is interested in a te m porary, sym bolic change of his ow n Self. He does n o t w an t to find so m uch a fa ith ful copy o f his Self bu t a different Self in the avatar he takes on. This can be b ro u g h t about by releasing o n e’s ow n phan tasm s into the v irtu a l space. The statem ents of C -R PG players un ivocally confirm th is:... I th in k th a t these gam es liberate me from everyday life an d transfer me into a w orld o f fantasy [...] w here I can en c o u n ter great an d fam ous heroes, [...] w ith the avatar I play I w ant to equal their fame, to p u t m y n am e dow n in the books o f h isto ry as the one who saved the world from [...]. It’s a w onderful feeling for m e to see m y avatar develop, to m aster new an d m ore refined techniques, you can cast so many, ever more powerful, spells. [...] It’s w on derful to becom e one w ith the ch aracter o f a m agician who, as th e action develops, becom es more and more powerful right up to the m o m ent w hen n o th in g can stan d in his way, w hen nobody can go against his power, the pow er he uses to spread justice, to fight for the rights of the helpless... (male, aged 23).
You becom e som ebody k n o w n a n d liked for th e th in g s th a t you do bu t no t b e cause o f being rich or a n y th in g like that, b u t because o f your desire to help others. [...] The gam e m akes you somebody exceptional and no longer an average person w ho th ere are m illions an d billions o f in the w orld (male, aged 24).
The avatar can be w eak bu t the strength o f his charisma compensates for his w eak points. K now ing the strengths an d w eaknesses o f m y avatar m akes m e ca pable o f solving almost any problem if I use the rig h t tactic (male, aged 25).
This is m erely a substitute o f overcom ing oneself also because the in teraction betw een th e players takes places in a dim ensio n th a t is beyond responsibility, w hi le every authentic self-transcendence is inseparably con nected w ith responsibility (cf. e.g. H elm iniak, 1997; Frankl, 1984). The very fact o f th e direct absence o f the interactive players, replacing th e circle of concrete players th at are present an d sit tin g aro u n d the sam e table (as is the case in a typical RPG situation) w ith an in ta n gible circle o f in su b stan tial players in fro n t of th e ir m onitors an d keyboards, m akes the whole procedure of shaping one’s ow n im age safer an d also less responsible. „The quest to find new, fictitious identities th a t com pel you to play on b u t by no m eans lead to cultivate m u tu al responsibility”, w rites th e Polish cu lturolo gist W oj ciech Chyła, com m enting on in tern e t co m m un ication , „You don’t even have to know who you’re playing with but sim ply concen trate on playing out your new Self w ho is being u nleashed into cyberspace so th a t reality w ill do w hat it w ants w ith th is p ure identity tra in in g [...]. W ith o u t responsibility. [...]. These are identity gam es instead o f m orality w hich like present identities. [...] m y ludic equivalent o f a lack of genuine responsibility for th a t w hich isn’t presen t” (1999, pp. 206-208; em phasis in bold by W.Z.).
5. CONCLUSIONS
In light o f H e lm in ia k ’s concept it is possible to risk statin g th a t by using th e n a tu ra l attrib u te of the self-overcom ing consciousness, m an creates an illusion of transcending him self w ith o u t actually m oving beyond the lowest (i.e. em pirical an d intellectual) levels o f self-transcendence. O vercom ing oneself in th e ludic sphe re fulfils a substitutive fu n c tio n tow ards au to -transcend ence u n d ersto o d in the exi
stential-phenom enological sense or self-transcendence from the fo u rth level of consciousness in H e lm in ia k ’s concept. It therefore seems justified to apply such term s to the accom panying p h en om ena o f th e category analysed in this paper as: pseudo-overcom ing oneself (resem bling or im itating), o r quasi-overcoming one self (seemingly, ap parently bu t not really overcom ing oneself). Thus, lo a n d behold, in the context o f liberating oneself from the b u rd e n of responsibility, from m ak in g existentially significant choices an d from tru ly going against yourself in strivin g tow ards th e tran scen d en tals, the m an o f today has found ways o f effortlessly „over com ing h im se lf” an d „com pensating” for his shortcom ings.
A ccording to Edgar M orin (1956), the phenom enon o f film reality (i.e. one o f the m any versions o f secondary realities) depends on finding not so m uch a tru e to life copy of oneself, not so m uch an alter ego, but som ething even m ore im portant: the ego alter - a different Self. This ingenious statem ent o f the esteem ed film expert seems to be tru e not only in relation to the perception of film or photography but also regarding those ludic form s o f behaviour in w hich participation in a sim ulated reali ty plays a fundam ental role. The „overcom ing of oneself” which is inseparably con nected to these processes is often rooted in seeking to experience this very ego alter (cf. Table 1). P araphrasing the words o f K irsten H astru p (cf. W yka, 1993, p. 145) ab o ut the unreal becom ing em pirical th ro u g h personal experience, it is possible to state that the impossible becomes reality thanks to personal experience.
There is a com pelling need in the hu m an being for m ythical narrative which is linked w ith this very w ant of recreating oneself in a different reality. The need to be „as if” som ebody different at least for a m om ent. To be able to self-realise in a different way and in a different tim e-space continuum , even if the only th in g it serves is to create illusions. To overcome yourself - remaining yourself. To find the ego alter.
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