Innovative governance of sustainable urban development: A comparative analysis

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EURA Conference ‘Understanding City Dynamics’ 24.09. – 26.09.2010 in Darmstadt/Germany Track: 3 ‘city choices and strategic planning.’

INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE OF SUSTAINABLE

URBAN DEVELOPMENT

A comparative analysis

Anne Lorène Vernay, Sofie Pandis, Tadeo Baldiri Salcedo Rahola, and

Wim Ravesteijn.

Msc Anne Lorène Vernay, PhD student, Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Technology Policy and Management, The Netherlands, a.b.h.vernay@tudelft.nl Msc Sofie Pandis, PhD student, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Department of Industrial Ecology, Sweden, pandis@kth.se

Ir. Tadeo Baldiri Salcedo Rahola, PhD student, Delft University of Technology , Research Institute for the Built Environment, The Netherlands, t.b.salcedorahola@tudelft.nl Dr. Wim Ravesteijn, Associate Professor, Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Technology Policy and Management, The Netherlands, W.Ravesteijn@tudelft.nl

Abstract:

More than half of the world population lives in urban areas concentrating and increasing the magnitude of social and environmental impacts. The potential role of cities in a transition to a sustainable society started to be widely recognized after the 1992 Rio conference where the Agenda 21 program was signed. Since then, a number of urban developments that aim to be sustainable have been and are being implemented worldwide. Numerous research efforts have been done in order to assess how sustainable these developments are, but too little is understood regarding the process of how they actually came (or come) about.

In fact, sustainable urban developments require innovative governance arrangements in their planning and implementation. However, there is not one best way to go about and different arrangements may emerge in different contexts. In this paper we are going to analyze two innovative governance arrangements: Hammarby Sjöstad, a district in Stockholm and EVA-Lanxmeer in Culemborg (the Netherlands). By doing this analysis, we seek to understand why certain governance arrangements are chosen for and what the implications of these choices are. Conclusions and recommendations will be formulated as to the approach and process of constructing and transforming to eco-cities.

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1. Introduction

Over the centuries, a process of urbanization has been taking place throughout the globe. Nowadays, more than half of the world population lives in urban areas. Cities play a crucial role in economic development. In Europe for instance, it is estimated they are accountable for between 75 and 85% of the European GDP (Euractiv, 2007). However, this comes with a price as dense urban areas concentrate the consumption of natural resources and the production of wastes. Urban areas are also facing important social challenges including problems of unemployment and the need to promote social inclusion. Cities thus have an important role to play in addressing sustainability problems.

In fact, the potential role of cities in a transition to a sustainable society started to be officially recognized after the 1992 Rio conference from which the Agenda 21 program resulted (United Nations, 1992). Since then, many cities have started to embrace this new responsibility and it is not rare nowadays to see cities being more ambitious with their local environmental policies and governance strategies than their own national government. This is the case for the transition town movement for example that was initiated in the United Kingdom but has since then been joined by cities worldwide. They actually claim that “if we wait for the governments, it'll be too little, too late; if we act as individuals, it'll be too little; but if we act as communities, it might just be enough, just in time” (Transition Network, 2010).

Numerous urban developments that aim at sustainability have been and are being implemented worldwide and numerous research efforts have been done in order to assess how sustainable these developments are (Debuyst et al, 2001), but too little is understood regarding the process of how they actually came (or come) about. In this paper we are focusing on the process behind sustainable urban developments. We argue that the type of arrangements chosen by the city when governing urban sustainability projects have a significant influence on the outcome of the project. Not only may it affect which kind of technological solutions are chosen for, but it may also have an impact on what will become of the neighborhood/ district/ city once the people start leaving in it. We would like to add that the goal of this paper is not to define which strategy is best but to analyze the strength and weaknesses of two different approaches in order to be able to draw recommendations for city planners. The first case concerns Hammarby Sjöstad, a district in Stockholm initiated by the city. The second case concerns the District of Lanxmeer (the Netherlands), a private initiative that later received support of the municipality; this resulted in a strong public engagement in the process. Both cases, even though somewhat similar in ambition, are rather different in scale. More than 20,000 people live in Hammarby while they are only about 800 in Lanxmeer. It is thus not surprising that the processes of developing these two districts are different. However, despite that we are confident that projects addressing sustainable urban development still have room to learn from each other.

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In the remaining part of this paper, we will present the governance model used in the paper (section 2), introduce both cases (section 3 and 4) and analyses the kind of governance arrangement they chose for. This will then be followed by an evaluation of the strength and weaknesses of both cases. Finally, we will draw some conclusions and recommendations based on our findings (section 5). However, before continuing any further, we would like to stress that results presented in this paper are still work in progress and should be treated as such.

2. Developing the district: the governance model

Sustainable urban development may vary is scale or in ambitions. However, they all have in common their requirement for innovative governance arrangements in their planning and implementation. There is not one best way to go about and different arrangements may emerge in different contexts. Certain cities may choose for a top-down approach to maintain full control on the targeted development and have the capacity to steer it in the desired direction. Others may prefer more participative decision making processes and seek innovative ways to promote stakeholders participation with, in mind, the idea to empower citizens.

Moreover, these developments are the result of dynamic and often lengthy processes during which a number of decisions regarding the choices for specific technological and organizational solutions have to be taken. These decisions are influenced by the changing environmental, economic, social and political conditions. A given

sustainable urban development will thus most likely not result from a single but from subsequent modes of governance.

In order to support our analysis of the governance phases, we are using what we call a governance model (see figure 1). It is inspired from the transition context approach proposed by Smith et al (2005). It is composed of two axes: the horizontal one shows the forces through which the project developed. These forces may come from the bottom-up, may be top-down or any combination in between. The vertical axis

represents the locus of resources invested in the project. The axis is meant to show the proportion of resources that are invested by the top (municipal, provincial and

national and authorities) and that invested by the bottom (individual, private enterprises). It is important to mention that we understand resources as direct and indirect capital investment. Indirect capital investment includes both the time spend by actors on a voluntary basis and money spent by an organization by dedicating some time from its employee to the project.

In this paper, the process through which Hammarby Sjöstad in Stockholm and EVA-Lanxmeer in Culemborg were developed will be analysed. We will try to identify the various modes of governance that the process went through in order to define the different phases of the process. Regarding the Hammarby case, results presented in the following sections are derived from more than 20 semi-structured in-depth

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interviews and four seminars with the various stakeholders in the project (see). This included representatives from the city and the various corporations involved,

architecture firms, building constructors, etc. A literature studies was also completed where a number of official reports and documents have been analysed bringing additional strength to the information gathered orally. For more detailed information on the Hammarby project, you may also refer to Pandis et al, 2010 as well as Pandis, upcoming. Concerning EVA-Lanxmeer, data presented here are the result of literature review including a number of reports, brochures, business plan and communication documents written from 1993 to 2008 as well as six semi-structured interviews conducted with the initiator of the project and founder of the EVA foundation.; two employees from the municipality of Culemborg, the project leader; an inhabitant as well as a consultant. A more in depth study of the EVA-Lanxmeer development process can also be found in Vernay et al, 2010.

3. Case study 1: Hammarby Sjöstad, Stockholm, Sweden Introduction to the case:

Hammarby Sjöstad literally means the city around the Hammarby Lake. The district covers an area of 200 Ha. It is expected to be finished by 2015. In total about10,000 residential units should be built together with 350,000 m2 of commercial areas. This means that when completed, about 35,000 people would be living and/or working in the area (Hammarby Sjöstad 2007).

In the following text, we will describe the stages that the process went through between 1991, when the first plan for Hammarby Sjöstad was discussed and 2002 when all the decisions regarding environmental performance had been taken and implementation was well under way.

Top down forces Bottom up forces

Bottom resource locus Top resource locus

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Stage 1A: 1991 to end of 1995

In the 1990’s a number of semi-legal or illegal small scale industries and storage facilities were present in the area which came to be known as the Shantytown. Toxic substances were dumped in the ground and the water resulting in heavy pollution (Bodén A. 2002). Over time the desire to redevelop this area grew stronger in the municipality. The area was regarded as attractive for residential purposes since it is a natural continuation of the south of Stockholm’s inner city, allowing thousands of new apartments and several thousand square metres of working space to be built, while at the same time avoiding further exploitation of green spaces (Pandis, upcoming). As a result, already in 1991 the first detailed comprehensive local area development plan for the city district was presented by Stockholm city planners (Stockholm Town Building Office, 1991).

It is only at the end of 1995 however, when the city of Stockholm decided to apply for the Olympic game of 2004 and to propose Hammarby Sjöstad as Olympic Village

(Stockholm Stad 1996b) that the high environmental performance of the district started to gain importance. In fact, this was a result of the

International Olympic Committee calling for an environmental focus in the applications by the different cities. This also increased the political interest in the district (Engberg and Svane 2007; Bodén 2002; Green 2006).

In that same year, a special steering committee comprising of heads of the Stockholm City’s offices and the infrastructure companies was formed. In order to shape and pursue the application for the Olympic Games, the steering committee was directly subordinate to the City of Stockholm’s executive office (Pandis, upcoming).

We can thus state that initially, the development of Hammarby as a sustainable urban district fully resulted from political decisions (top-down forces) (Pandis and Brandt, 2009). Moreover in that period, investments in the project entirely came from the top (time spend by municipal employees on the project).

Top down forces Bottom up

forces

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D

C B

Figure 2: governance model applied to the Hammarby Sjöstad

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Stage 1B: end of 1995 to autumn 1996

In the course of 1996, public officers ofthe City of Stockholm together with officials from the infrastructure companies defined an environmental program specific for Hammarby Sjöstad (Stockholm Stad 1996a). It was officially accepted by the city on the 16th of June 1996 (Stockholm Stad 1996a). The decision was made to close the material and energy cycle

is the district as much as possible. The environmental program was inspired by

Agenda 21 and was meant to act as a guiding tool during the development processand to create consensus on the different objectives for the district. The program

incorporated a guiding vision which stated that“the environmental performance of the city district should be “twice as good” as the state of the art technology available in the present day construction field” (Stockholm Stad, 1996a p4). It created political consensus around the project (Vestbro 2005). Moreover, nine categories of

operational goals were created. They should be of practical use in the development process for Hammarby Sjöstad (Stockholm Stad 1996a). Finally an environmental head for the project was appointed.

In parallel, a negotiation process had been initiated between the City of Stockholm and developers that resulted in the “Ekologiskt byggande i Stockholm”, a program that provided guidelines for and governed the ecological construction of buildings (Stockholm Stad, 1996d).

It is important to mention that the target discussed in this program were not the same as those present in the environmental program for the Hammarby Sjöstad.

In that same year, the first step taken by the city to implement the environmental profile was to contact the different infrastructure companies in Stockholm:

1

Stockholm Energi, the municipal district heating company which would later be sold to the Finnish company Fortum; 2Stockholm Vatten, a municipal company in charge of providing drinking water and wastewater treatment; 3SKAFAB, the city’s waste recycling company. In the environmental program, it is clearly stated that “the technical support system is to be designed jointly, with the goal of achieving synergy effects from environmentally effective solutions with regard to energy supply/usage, water and sewage management, and waste management.” (Stockholm Stad, 1996a p9)Instead of asking the different companies separately to develop a solution for Hammarby within their own domain of expertise, the municipality asked them to come up together with an integrated solution. It is interesting here to mention that the

forces

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focus was put on implementing infrastructural solutions for meeting the environmental targets.

However right from the beginning problems emerged. Indeed, the municipality and the eco-cycle companies had conflicting perspective on what closing the loop should mean for the district. On the one hand the municipality wanted the companies to develop a solution specifically for Hammarby: closing the loop should be done for and restricted to the district. On the other hand for the eco-cycle companies closing the loop made sense only in a somewhat larger perspective, where both the district and its surrounding would be considered. The main rational behind that perspective was that developing a solution specifically for Hammarby would make it impossible to use the existing infrastructure. Börje Berglund, chairman of the working group for the Hammarby Sjöstad, stated that “In the beginning the eco-cycle companies were not particularly interested in the Hammarby Sjöstad project.” “They thought the project was fuzzy and that there already existed a well-functioning infrastructure in Stockholm. Why mess with it?”

The lack of interest was also shown in the first proposition for the district, made by the eco-cycle companies in autumn 1996, a proposition rather “business as usual”. For that very reason it was rejected by the municipality which

was looking for more innovative solutions (Pandis et al, 2010). Börje Berglund, chairman of the working group for the Hammarby Sjöstad, stated that “the first proposition was lacking new ideas and was quite traditional and the politicians said that the eco-cycle companies needed to move their position forward.”

In that period we can thus say that forces mainly come from the top. It is also

important here to mention that the infrastructure companies, being public at the time and thus under the direct influence of the City of Stockholm, are here also considered as the top. However not all actors within the top agree about what should be done for the district.

Stage 1C: autumn 1996 to autumn 1997

After their first proposition was rejected, the companies started to realise that there was a real political interest in the Hammarby Sjöstad project and that they had to come up with more innovative solutions. The different companies begun to mobilise new employees in the project and this is also when they really started trying to work together.

In the late 1996 and early 1997, a number of workshops took place during which employees from the eco-cycle companies met to brainstorm about possibilities for the district. In April 1997 a new proposition was presented to the municipality. This time, the companies suggested a solution partly based on existing infrastructure, but instead of leaving them as such they would be improved or new components would be added in order to better close the material and energy cycles. The municipality accepted the

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proposition and encouraged the companies to continue working in this direction. This marked the birth of what would later become the Hammarby Model (see figure 2). Moreover, at this moment we can say that the vision of the municipality and that of the eco-cycle companies, regarding the scale at which closing the loop should be taking place, found common ground.

However, in September 1997, Athens was preferred by the International Olympic Committee. This created some uncertainties as to what would happen to the

development of Hammarby Sjöstad. Nevertheless, the Hammarby Sjöstad project had raised a lot of interest and it was decided that the area should still be redeveloped, with residential and commercial areas replacing the sport facilities originally planned (Bodén A. 2002, Pandis and Brandt 2009). Moreover, around the same time it was officially decided by the city council to keep the high environmental ambitions.

Hammarby Sjöstad was to become a show case for urban sustainability (Dastur 2005).

Figure 3: The Hammarby Model (Stockholm Municipality, 2007) Top down

forces Bottom up

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D

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In this period, we can thus say that the process still results from a top-down and that some common ground had been found between the various stakeholders in the

project. Regarding the resources, most of them were still invested by the municipality itself, even though the private companies started to invest more and more in the project.

Stage 1D: from autumn 1997 to 2002

In autumn 1997 more workshops and meetings between the municipality and the eco-cycle companies were held during which the Hammarby Model was further discussed. By the end of 1997, the components of the Hammarby Model as we know it today had been, for the large majority, decided upon. It is important to stress that during that stage the process, the municipality, via the environmental head of the project, constantly guarded the ambitions for the district, pushing the companies to develop really innovative solutions (Pandis, upcoming).

Nevertheless, once Athens had been awarded the 2004 Olympic Games, the political interest in the

Hammarby Sjöstad project started to decreased (Green 2006; Bodén 2002; Vestbro 2005). This is exemplified by the fact that in 1998, the project initially placed directly under the execution office was moved back to the real Estate and Traffic

Administration Office (Berndt Björlenius, 2010 and Börje Berglund, 2010). It was thus placed lower in the management in a more business as usual position. Moreover, the constructor did not approve of the environmental target expressed in the

environmental program for the Hammarby Sjöstad as these were different from the ones they had negotiated with the city for the program on ecological building in Stockholm. In order to regain consensus, the phrase “strive for compliance” was added to the development contracts for Hammarby Sjöstad which made the environmental program less authoritative (Engberg and Svane 2007; Green 2006). Moreover, it is also during that period that energy companies started to be privatized. In Stockholm, Stockholm Energi first fused with Gullspångs Kraft and became Birka energy (50% owned by the city and 50% owned by Fortum, a Finnish energy

company). And in 2001 the municipality sold its share to Fortum and the company became fully privatized. However, when selling its share of the company, the

company sold to Fortum both the producing and distributing capacity they processed. This put Fortum in a monopoly situation which became a very powerful actor that was

forces

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difficult to bypass. Moreover, while public, the city could control the decision taken within Stockholm Energi. However, once fully privatized it became hardly possible to influence it.

This period was thus characterized by on the one hand a decrease in political interest in the project and on the other hand an increase of the influence of private companies on the outcome of the project. We can thus say that the forces started to be dominated by bottom-up processes. Regarding the locus of resources, it came both from the top and from the bottom. Indeed, the city provided a lot of financial support under the Local Investment Program (Ministry of the Environment, 2000; Bylund 2006). Moreover, both project developers as well as infrastructure companies invested in the district.

Strength and weaknesses of Hammarby:

The main strength in realising the Hammarby Sjöstad has been the strong political support given to the project due to the application to the Olympic Game. It played an important role in boosting the environmental ambitions for the district. This is partly shown by the money invested in the district via the Local Investment program. Second, the environmental program was based on a holistic approach allowing different environmental issues to be considered in the district. Third, the fact that several solutions built upon existing infrastructure and knowledge can also been one of the strength of the project. Building something entirely new could only have been done on such a large scale if very high amount of resource had been available. This allowed to use more efficiently the existing infrastructure, and to improve it. This has been an important factor in meeting (part of) the environmental targets. Finally, it is also important to mention that since the beginning of its construction, the Hammarby Sjöstad has been getting a lot of attention both nationally and internationally. Local companies such as Envac and Sweco use it as an example for their own business activities and it has inspired number of urban developments worldwide.

Nevertheless, the process also shows a number of weaknesses. First, when the

environmental program was developed, certain stakeholders were not involved in the discussions. This created tensions later on in the project and pushed the politicians to weaken the environmental program. Second, the process has been very much

influenced by top-down forces. As long as political will was there the ambitions for the project could be maintained but as soon as political support faded away the ambitions dropped down. Third, investments also came from private or privatized companies. This can be seen as strength as far as it shows public-private partnership. However, in Hammarby Sjöstad, there has been a lack of proper incentive to push these companies to innovate. Fourth, bottom-up forces played a very weak role during the process and inhabitants were not included at all in the discussions. The

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achieving high environmental performance in the district. In fact we can state that in the Hammarby Sjöstad, the process followed lead to environmental sustainability only be considered from a technological perspective.

4. Case study 2: EVA-Lanxmeer, Culemborg, the Netherlands Introduction to the case

EVA Lanxmeer is a sustainable urban district of about 24 Ha developed in the

municipality of Culemborg in the Netherlands in the mid 1990’s. This municipality is part of the province of Gelderland and counts almost 30,000 inhabitants. Up to now about 300 houses have been built in EVA-Lanxmeer and 100 more are expected. In total about 800 people live in the area. Moreover, a number of office buildings are also present on site, combining living with working.

The district, of which the development process started in 1993, is the result of a private initiative taken by Marleen Kaptein. She was triggered by the momentum that started develop at the time around sustainability, the Bruntland report had just been published, and by the lack of success from the Dutch government to involve citizens in their environmental policy (Kaptein, 2010). Initially, the idea for the district was not bound to any specific and it was for a number of reasons that Culemborg was chosen. First the municipality already had experience in the field of sustainable building, citizen participation, management of green areas and they had the ambition to go further with urban sustainability in general. Moreover, Jean Eigeman, Alderman in Culemborg at the time as well as Jan Goed head of the department of urban

development were both enthusiastic about the project. Finally they also had a very suitable location available near the local train station (Stichting EVA, 2003).

This district has two main specificities: 1when developing the district, the actors did not focus on a single theme like was common at the time, namely energy or water. On the contrary they adopted an integrated and holistic approach and considered energy, water, transport, architecture, building material and agriculture simultaneously. 2The inhabitants played an important role in the design and management of the district. They were given the possibility to influence their future living environment right from the beginning (Stichting EVA, 2010a).

In the text that follows, we will describe the stages that the process went through between 1993 when Marleen Kaptein initiated the project and 2003 when the project was well under way and the EVA-foundation stopped being involved in the

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Stage 2A: From 1993 to 1994

In 1993, M. Kaptein initiates the EVA-Lanxmeer project. Before initiating the project, she had been working for the faculty of architecture of the TU Delft and was a

member of the VIBA association, an influential association for integral ecological architecture in the Netherlands. She had also participated in the organization of an International Forum Man and Architecture that aimed at enhancing the organic architecture and landscape design (Kaptein, 2010). In order to be able to enter in negotiation with a municipality, she created the EVA-foundation (Stichting EVA, 2010c). Moreover, using her personal network she gathered renowned Dutch academics and political figures with direct connection to the ministry of VROM (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment), around the project. In

support for the project, they became member of the EVA. The project has thus entirely been initiated by what we call here the “bottom”.

At that time, the resources use came entirely from the “bottom”. Marleen Kaptein as well as the academic and political members of the foundation were

participating on a voluntary and non-remunerated basis.

Stage 2B: From 1994 to 1996

More experts, not only national but also international, became involved in the project. They came from the field of energy, water management, permaculture, architecture and landscape architecture. Financed by the company ORTA, workshops could be organized during which, with the help of aforementioned experts, the concept for the EVA

foundation could be completed in 1995 (Stichting EVA, 1995). It was stated as follows: ‘People, Planet, Profit, Process’: Integration of social, ecological and economical aspects. The aspects included in the concept were: an architecture in harmony with existing landscape; the integration of functions: living, working,

Figure 1: governance model applied to EVA-Lanxmeer

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A B C D E F Top down forces Bottom up forces

A B C D E F

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recreation (including an urban farm); sustainable water- and energy resource management; reduce use of car; the use of ecological building materials; the

involvement of future inhabitants; education & advice via the EVA center (Stichting EVA, 1995). The EVA-concept would later be used to communicate about the ambition of the project with the interested municipality. In doing so, the involvement of these experts has been very important as it showed the strong scientific basis of the project and gave it credibility.

It is also in that same period that the first contact with the municipality of Culemborg took place. Even though the municipality did not commit to the project yet, it did provide some funding to assess the feasibility of the EVA concept in Culemborg (Goed, 2002). We can thus say that resources mostly came from the bottom

(companies and individual investment) but a small proportion started to come from the top (the municipality). Similarly, in that period most forces still come from the bottom.

Stage 2C: from 1996 to 1997

In 1996, a number of important events took place. First M. Kaptein, again relying on her network, had found 80 families. They signed a document stating that they would like to live in a district developed based on the EVA-concept wherever it would be built (Stichting EVA, 2010c). This marked the beginning of the involvement of the future inhabitants. Moreover, it is also around that time that permits for 200 additional houses were granted by the province. In fact, when EVA-Lanxmeer was initiated, the province was in charge of giving building permit to the municipalities. When M. Kaptein first contacted the municipality of Culemborg, they had already reached their quota for the coming years and no new houses could officially be built. She went to the province to ask for additional building permit (Kaptein, 2010; Goed, 2010; Bonouvrie, 2010). These were granted by the province under the conditions that the district develop should be deep green, as presented by M. Kaptein. If the municipality wanted to use the additional permits to develop the area, they were thus forced to invest in environmental solutions (Goed, 2002).

Over time, the municipality grew more confident about the

feasibility of the project. On the one hand, it had a strong

scientific basis and already had a number of interested future inhabitants. On the other hand, because of the additional building permits granted by the province, the municipality could actually realize the district. As a result, in the spring 1996 the partnership with the

forces

A B C D E F

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municipality of Culemborg was made official. It was agreed that the municipality would be risk-bearing for the project and that the EVA-foundation would be the official guardian of the EVA-concept (Stichting EVA, 2003). The EVA-concept became the official vision for the district.

An extra budget was made available by the municipality (Goed, 2002). This also meant that a project leader could be appointed to the project and that civil servants started to be involved as well. Moreover, additional funding is also made available from the municipality and subsidies are obtained from the government (Goed, 2002). In 1997, together with the already existing network of future inhabitants and experts, additional experts and professionals became involved in the project. Professional and professional workshops and weekends were organized. During the

non-professional workshops, the future inhabitants could express how they would like their future living environment to be. However, the ideas suggested are not reflected in the masterplan first proposed. In a sense, we can say that during that period, there is a risk for the EVA-concept that is leading the discussions not to be actually

implemented.

In September, a master class is organized. The urban plan is rejected on the basis that it does not relate sufficiently to the EVA concept and does not reflect the wishes of the inhabitants (Stichting EVA, 2003). This marks the beginning of a new phase in the project.

Figure 2: Masterplan of EVA-Lanxmeer

To summarize, we can say that during that period, the project is more influenced by top-down forces and even though a lot of events are organized to bring the EVA-concept forward, it is at risk. Regarding the resources, additional funding are made available from the municipality and subsidies are obtained from the government. Still, a lot of time is dedicated to the project by various individuals. The resource locus moves toward a more ‘top’ direction.

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Stage 2D: From 1997 to 1999

After the masterclass is organized, a new urban planner, Joachim Eble, as well as a new landscape architect, Hyco Verhagen, become involve in the project. They will develop a new urban plan in line with the wishes of the different stakeholders (Stichting EVA, 2003). It is interesting to mention that they suggested building small squares around which about 30 houses could be constructed. These squares were meant as common space owned and taken care of by the inhabitants of the houses but that should remain open to the public (Stichting EVA, 2003; Gemeente Culemborg, undated).

In 1998, the inhabitants officially organize themselves around an association called the BEL (association of the inhabitants of Lanxmeer) (Stichting EVA, 2003). From this point onward, they could officially send represents to the municipality and participate in official discussions.

At this point the three pillars of the project, namely the EVA foundation, the future inhabitants and the municipality, were all involved in the project. The project now evolves in a situation of equilibrium between top-down and bottom-up forces. The municipality is risk-bearing and has to make sure that the project gets realised while the future inhabitants are given room to influence the design of the district. In the middle lies the EVA-foundation that both guards the EVA-concepts and facilitates communication between the municipality and the inhabitants. The resource locus moves toward a more ‘top’ direction as more public resources are invested in the project.

Stage 2E: From 1999 to 2000

Between 1999 and 2000 two main events took place. First, the municipality decided to commission the first 100 houses which started to be built in 1999 (Goed, 2002; Stichting EVA, 2003). Additional resources were thus made available by the municipality in that purpose. Moreover, more subsidies were obtained on an individual basis from the national government for specific technological solutions. The future inhabitants of these houses participated in their design and to that of the common gardens. As such each square developed (see explanation previously) is unique and reflects the vision and preference of its surrounding inhabitants (de Vries, 2003).

forces

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Second, first Jan Eigeman,

Alderman and later Jan Goed, head of the department of urban planning both left the municipality. They were both important actors in the process by supporting the project in front of the city council and by collaborating with the

EVA-foundation (Goed, 2002). However, when they left, they did not pass on

their accumulated experience and vision about EVA-Lanxmeer project (Goed, 2010). The persons replacing them neither had same level of commitment and interest for the project, nor the same degree of understanding about it.

At this stage, we can say that the project still resulted from a balance between top-down and bottom-up forces. However, the balance between these two forces started becoming less stable. Moreover, the resources came more from the top than from the bottom.

Stage 2F: from 2000 to 2004

After the departure of the Alderman and a key civil servant, the interest of the municipality for the project diminished. While civil servants were still working on the district, in fact many working hours from civil servants were still spend on EVA-Lanxmeer, the level of higher commitment diminished. The municipality also started thinking that too much time was accorded to this project (Goed, 2010). As a result, over time the connection with the municipality faded and only civil servant with limited political influence were really involved in the project. In other words, one of the pillars of the project slowly disappeared.

It was also during this period that within the BEL (association of inhabitants) emerged the desire to take care themselves of the common green space in the district. This space is commonly maintained by the municipality. They entered in negotiations with the municipality and, after a few years, obtained that right. In 2003 the Terra Bella, association in charge of the maintenance of green space, was created and started to receive (and still does) a little financial compensation from the municipality for that (BEL, 2010). It is also interesting to mention that from that date, as soon as a new area in the district is completed, the maintenance of the green area around it fall under its responsibility.

forces

A B C D E F Top down forces Bottom up forces

A B C D E F

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At this stage, resources still come from the top for the largest part. However, the forces pushing the development become more and more the result of bottom-up forces.

Strength and weaknesses of Lanxmeer:

First, one of the strength of the process has been to involve academic figures, private experts and ministry representative. This has been crucial in giving credibility to the project and obtaining support from local and provincial authorities. Second, in EVA-Lanxmeer, both technological and social sustainability are addressed. This is

particularly interesting especially when considering that many recent initiatives often focus on technological sustainability only. Third, the process really resulted from a combination of top-down and bottom-up forces with in the top the municipality, in the bottom the inhabitants and a number of private experts and in the middle the EVA foundation that made possible the connection between those parties. This balanced situation has been vital in guarding the ambitious vision for the district (the bottom) while keeping things realistic and feasible (the top). Likewise, the inhabitants have been given the possibility to influence their future living environment and to express in it their own interpretation of sustainability. This can be referred to as participative design and has been long promoted as one effective way to reach social and

technological sustainability (Kasemir et al, 2003; Amado et al, 2009). Finally, in EVA-Lanxmeer, it is particularly interesting to point out that participative design led to participative governance as local inhabitants pushed to gain influence and

responsibility on the functioning of their district. In other words, a phenomenon of empowerment has taken place in the district. This has also been made possible because of this combination between top-down and bottom-up forces. Moreover, it has actually opened further possibilities in the district. In fact, in 2008, the inhabitants bought the district heating installation and became owners themselves of their own energy company. One could argue that more of such development may take place in the future.

Nevertheless, the EVA-Lanxmeer process also has a number of weaknesses. First, we can see that developing a district in the way it has been done with EVA-Lanxmeer requires a large time span. The process took 3 years, from 1996 when the municipality officialised its commitment to the district to 1999 when the first construction started and it is only from 2005 that the largest part of the district had been completed. A project developer could most probably have done the same in a much shorter time frame. Second, by involving so many people, one runs the risk to keep talking without realising anything. In this case, the municipality has played an important role to keep that from happening. Third, especially in the very beginning, very few people

received financial compensation for the time they spend on the project. Therefore, the success of the project really depended on the will of a few people to spend time and money on the project and that on a voluntary basis. Fourth, the success of such project also depended on the capacity of the initiating actors to gather momentum around the

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project. A large network of academics and professionals is required to do that. In general, only a limited number of people may claim having such a network. Fifth, the process has been at the mercy of civil servants. As long as they were interested in the project, in could develop further but as soon as the interests decreased, part of the project became seriously compromised. This shows the importance of maintaining political continuity. A high level of communication and interaction must thus be sustained throughout the project and not only at the beginning.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have analyzed the governance model of two different sustainable urban development projects: Hammarby Sjöstad in Stockholm and EVA-Lanxmeer in Culemborg. Both projects were rather different in size and scale. The specific

solutions applied in each of them were also different. However, a number of conclusions and recommendations can still be drawn regarding the process of

development. First in both cases, the governance model changed considerably during the process, alternating between a dominance of either bottom-up or top-down forces or an equilibrium between the too. We would like to argue here that the most optimal situation in found when there is a balance between these two forces. Top-down forces are necessary to bring the project forward and ensure that it is realized. It is also necessary to facilitate the involvement of private companies in the project. Bottom-up forces however, are necessary to include the wishes of the future inhabitants in the project and empower the citizens. To our opinion, sustainable development cannot be reached without the active participation and the commitment of the people.

Second, in both cases, what can be called a “concept keeper” was present. In the case of Hammarby Sjöstad, the municipality played this role while in the case of EVA-Lanxmeer, it was fulfilled by the EVA-foundation. This concept keeper has an

important role in terms of leadership. We would like to add that to facilitate its role, it should have an influence on political decisions taken with regard to the project. Moreover, this should be done consistently throughout the project.

Finally, we would like to add that any process of developing a sustainable urban development takes time. Communication with the various stakeholders should be maintained throughout the project in order to maintain support, identify problematic issues and avoid conflict.

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