Racism and Trauma

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Reviewer

Prof. Polina Golovátina-Mora Technical editor and DTP

Michał Janczewski Cover and title pages design

Filip Sendal

Th e book was fi nanced from the statutory funds of the Faculty of Languages and the Institute of Polish Philology

at the University of Gdańsk

ISBN 978-83-7865-692-0

Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego / Gdańsk University Press ul. Armii Krajowej 119/121, 81-824 Sopot

tel./fax 58 523 11 37, tel. 725 991 206 e-mail: wydawnictwo@ug.edu.pl

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction (Marta Maciejewska, Wojciech Owczarski) . . . 7 SOCIAL SCIENCES

Katarzyna Guillon

A Brief Introduction to Contemporary Chinese Nationalism . . . 11 Paweł Zygadło

Sources and the Nature of Chinese Nationalism . . . 23 José Carlos Nussbaumer Ayala

Violence by Omission as a Source of International Social Crisis . . . 39 Panagiotis Kimourtzis, Giorgos Kokkinos,

Polykarpos Karamouzis, Ioannis V. Papageorgiou

Embedded Diversity and the New Others: Th e Case of Rhodes Island . . . 47 Niyati Asthana, Surya Rajappan

Th e Indian Curry Pot. Examining Racism and Xenophobia

as a Phenomenon of the Indian Society . . . 61 LITERATURE, ART, FILM

Aleksandra Kozłowska

Untying the Bonds between Best Friends.

Traumatic Experience in Toni Morrison’s Love . . . 77 Emilia Leszczyńska

Th e Surfacing Trauma . . . 83 Irina Novikova

Wartime Traumas and “Domestic Recoveries” in Chang-rae Lee’s Novels . . . 89 Jasna Poljak Rehlicki, Tina Varga Oswald

Memory, Trauma, and the (Im)Possibility of Recovery

in Ludwig Bauer’s Novel Homeland, Oblivion . . . 99 Adrianna Jakóbczyk

Th e Teutonic Knight Stereotype and Its Impact on Polish Collective Identity.

On the Mythopoeic Capabilities of Art . . . 117 Patrycja Rojek

Demonic Trauma and Unwilling Recovery in Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors . . . 129

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Table of Contents 6

VARIA Magdalena Hodalska, Catalin Ghita

Visual Metaphors of Dismay: Representations of Migrants

in Recent Culture and the Mass Media . . . 139 Dagna Skrzypińska, Barbara Szmigielska

Cognitive-Behavioural Treatment for Nightmare Disorders in Adults . . . 149 Nzhdeh Hovsepyan

Issues of Nationalism and Anti-Semitism

in Armenian Presidential Election in 2008 . . . 159 Mateusz Pietryka

Modern Terror and Prejudices. Does Terrorism Have a Religion? . . . 171 Pedro Querido

“Our Old Friend across the Hill Yonder”:

Perceptions of the Enemy in the First World War . . . 183 List of Authors . . . 192

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INTRODUCTION

Although humanity has already experienced trauma of wars, genocide and national- isms, currently we sadly observe that various environments do not draw conclusions from history. Ideologies based on hatred towards other human beings—such as racism, or xenophobia—spread all over the world. Politicians and governments of so many countries cynically fuel these feelings, and still greater and greater parts of the contemporary societies become attracted by the crazy rhetoric of fear and hatred.

For many people terms such as human rights or respect, unfortunately, seem to be less and less important. Needless to say, this situation is really very dangerous.

Nowadays it is easy to comment some social media post, to laugh at someone, or to off end her/him—some people think that writing an off ensive sentence cannot be racist. However, we need to remember that being racist does not mean only be- ing a member of a certain organization. Some of us may not be aware of this fact, but racism is among us—we may meet it at various public places, schools, universi- ties, churches, in the street, etc. It may be tricky and enigmatic, and have a face of someone we know (or we thought we knew) very well. And, what is important, it still causes trauma.

What should we do to work against racism and traumas it causes? Is it even possible? Of course, it is hard to give a clear solution—history shows that stereotypes concerning race or ethnicity are diffi cult to weed out. However, by this volume we try to give examples of certain situations or worlds that could cause deep refl ection.

A group of scholars from all over the world, from countries with various historical and sociological backgrounds, decided to share with us their valuable thoughts. Our book includes articles from diff erent fi elds—e.g., social sciences, literature, art, fi lm, or psychology. We hope they will be useful in discussing widely understood topic of racism and trauma.

Marta Maciejewska and Wojciech Owczarski Department of Languages, University of Gdańsk

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SOCIAL SCIENCES

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Katarzyna Guillon

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION

TO CONTEMPORARY CHINESE NATIONALISM

Known as a M i d d l e K i n g d o m, China has a long history of perceiving itself as the centre of the world and believing itself to be more important than other countries. At the dusk of the Qing empire and after the founding of the Republic of China in 1911, nationalism was a consequence of an inferiority complex towards Western powers. China’s Civil War between Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party was eventually won by the communists in 1949, and was followed by a bloody campaign against the r i g h t i s t s, with the destruc- tion of a big part of China’s heritage during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) in the following decades. However, despite considerable ideological changes, it would be wrong to think that during the Mao period (1949–1976) China abandoned a nationalist attitude and entirely adopted communist universalism.

Nationalism was an important part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) policy in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, as well as in the 1990s. Patriotic education, introduced after the Tian’anmen Square incident in June 1989, helped to create a new society that fully supports Chinese politics and, in some particular cases, happens to be more radical than the Party itself. Confucianism played a crucial role in this creation of modern China—a country proud of its unique heritage and long history.

Th is paper, based on contemporary academic literature, presents the evolution of Chinese nationalism as well as its basic components. It will discuss the role of the CCP, traditional culture, Confucianism, and Japan and Western countries in current Chinese ideology. It will also present results of analysis of the way patriotism or nationalism are present in the Chinese media, particularly on the patriotic channel available through the WeChat mobile application—Ài guó Ʌ⡧ളɆ.¹

1 Th e last update on the channel was made on January 4^th 2017.

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Katarzyna Guillon 12

Chinese Nationalism before Deng Xiaoping

Origins

Th e Oxford English Dictionary online gives three defi nitions of the word n a - t i o n a l i s m. Th e fi rst refers to “patriotic feelings, principles and eff orts,” the sec- ond to a radical form of patriotism combined with a sense of “superiority over other countries,” and the third to “advocacy of political independence for a particular country” (www 1). In the case of China, the fi rst two meanings are relevant. It is worth mentioning, however, that the idea of the Chinese nation is quite recent.

As some scholars, such as Selig S. Harrison, write, nationalism, considered as an imported Western concept, appeared in China only in the 20^th century, replacing so-called c u l t u r a l i s m (Townsend 1992: 101). In other words, “the traditional Chinese self-image has generally been defi ned as culturalism, based on a common historical heritage and acceptance of shared beliefs, not as nationalism, based on the modern concept of the nation-state” (Townsend 1992: 98).

Th e sense of “superiority over other countries” is based on China’s dominant position in the region throughout its history, until the sino-british war of 1840 (known as the O p i u m Wa r), which the Qing Empire lost (Cabestan 2005: 3).

Th e traditional way of perceiving the country is expressed in the Chinese name for China, Zhōngguó ѣള, which literally translates as the c e n t r a l c o u n t r y or M i d d l e K i n g d o m. Th erefore, the victory of Western empires in the nineteenth century and their supremacy in technological development was both unex- pected and traumatising for China. Unlike the Mongols (Yuan dynasty) and Man- chus (Qing dynasty), who eventually became to some extent Chinese by adopting local culture after the conquest, Westerners called the whole of Chinese civilisation into question (Meissner 2006: 48).

Th e Chinese had to develop a response to this crisis. Th is was the beginning of a long debate which continues, in various forms, up to today. Some preferred to neglect or even fi ght against Western culture, whilst others defended an approach of modernisation through Westernisation (Cabestan 2005: 4). Many Chinese intellectuals and political leaders before and after the Revolution of 1911 expressed views on this question.²

Before becoming focused on the struggle against the CCP, the KMT, whilst ac- cepting some modern Western ideals, was also engaged in the fi ght against Western imperialists. Th e Chinese people themselves also expressed their dissatisfaction towards the West. Th e May Fourth Movement (1919) or the strike-cum-boycott in

2 See for exemple: “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture” by Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai and Tang Junyi (Mou et al. 1962) or Lu Xun’s “Father’s Illness” (Lu 1926).

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A Brief Introduction to Contemporary Chinese Nationalism 13 Hong Kong (1925–1926) (Tsang 2004: 93–101) are two of many examples of anti- imperialist social movements that took place during the Republic era.

Th e Maoist Era

Th e 1940’s civil war in China is frequently said to have been a confl ict between nationalists (the KMT) and communists (the CCP). However, this can lead to a certain misunderstanding. As Jean-Pierre Cabestan remarks, for many Chinese, especially the elites, the communists were the true nationalists. Th is opinion is based on the fact that during the Japanese occupation (1937–1945), it was the CCP who developed the resistance movement as the KMT were busy with other issues. Th e conservative, xenophobic nationalism which the CCP represented suited the cir- cumstances. Hence, the anti-Japanese war helped the communists in the forthcom- ing civil war against their political rivals (Cabestan 2005: 6).

As Benedict Anderson points out in his “Imagined Communities,” Mao Zedong understood that while establishing a new power in 1949, the symbols of the old regime played a key role. Th e new capital was actually the old Manchu capital of Beijing, and the communists chose to congregate in the Forbidden City of the sons of Heaven (Anderson 2006: 160). Th e choice of Beijing, instead of maintaining continuity, with Chiang Kai-shek’s choice of Nanjing, or another ancient capital, Xi’an, is particularly interesting. It is probable that the decision was motivated by the fact that Beijing was still present in people’s collective memory as the imperial capital. Symbolically, moving into the Forbidden City was the fi nal act of the Revo- lution of 1911 and the end of the Manchu era.

At the same time, the anti-rightist campaign and the rejection of the basis of Chinese pride—traditional culture—during the Cultural Revolution cannot be ne- glected. Confucius himself (whose philosophy forms a crucial part of the traditional culture) became a public enemy, hand in hand with the contemporary traitor Lin Biao, a close collaborator of Mao, accused of organising a coup (Pollack 2011). Even though diplomatic and technological isolation encouraged the nationalist mood in society (Jia 2005: 18), for political and ideological reasons, the phenomenon was known by a diff erent name.

Th e Chinese equivalent for the word n a t i o n a l i s m is mínzúzh^ǔyì ≇ᰅѱѿ. Th e Chinese character mín was part of the KMT’s name and mínzúzh^ǔyì itself was part of Sun Yat-sen’s Th ree Principles of the People (along with democracy and peo- ple’s welfare). Th erefore, the communists decided to use the word àiguózh^ǔzhì ⡧ള ѱѿ, literally the ideology of loving one’s country, the equivalent of p a t r i o t i s m, to denote the same concept (Cabestan 2005: 7). People who love their country, in contrast to those who praise the nation, are more vigilant towards enemies who come from the inside. Class struggle was, naturally, a very important issue and the CCP portrayed itself as China’s unique saviour (Hughes 2006).

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Diverse Aspects of Contemporary Nationalism

One Nation—the Chinese Nation

Socialist egalitarianism passed away with the Reform and Opening-Up policy launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. So did the notion of class struggle, replaced by devotion to the nation (Hughes 2006). As a result, a redefi nition of the nation, in this multinational state recovering from a diffi cult period in terms of national identity, was inevitable.

James Townsend enumerates several strategies for this n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g process: “creation of a new Chinese nation that incorporates all of its nationalities;

concentration of political loyalty on the state; and repudiation of the idea that Chi- nese history and culture are purely a Han aff air” (Townsend 1992: 22).

Th e last issue was treated in a particular way. Th e CCP advocated the theory of common ancestors for the Chinese nation as a whole (Han majority and ethnic minorities). Th ese ancestors, although two-thirds of them were explicitly legendary,³ were clearly defi ned: a dragon, the Yellow Emperor and Peking Man (homo erectus pekinensis) (Sautman 1997: 83–85).

Barry Sautman, in his article on Chinese racial nationalism, pays much attention to the case of the Tibetans. Not only were they said to be the descendants of Peking Man, but their culture was considered to be originally identical to that of the Yellow River region. Research on blood composition has shown similarities between the Tibetans and the Hans⁴ (Sautman 1997: 86). It is worth noting that, as in many other cultures, for native Chinese speakers, the notion of kinship is expressed in terms of blood. Th e classic example of this is the expression xuè nóng yú shu^ǐ㹶⎉

ӄ≪: b l o o d i s t h i c k e r t h a n w a t e r.

Werner Meissner remarks that this kind of policy often results in the rediscovery of local ethnic identities. Th ese identities manifest themselves in contrast to the national identity—seen as an enemy (Meissner 2006: 58). Th is phenomenon can be seen among Tibetans, Uighurs and, in civic form, in Hong Kong.

Revival of Traditional Culture

Th e Chinese have always placed their Golden Age in the past. Even in the “Analects of Confucius,” one fi nds nostalgia for the times of the ancient kings, the virtuous sages (Yao 2009: 167). Under Deng Xiaoping, the CCP started to stress Chinese

3 As Sautman writes: the Yellow Emperor “is treated in popular works as undoubtly historical”

(Sautman 1997: 83).

4 As both groups are genetically heterogeneous, the study does not seem to have a great scien- tifi c value (Sautman 1997: 86).

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A Brief Introduction to Contemporary Chinese Nationalism 15 cultural heritage in order to build national pride. History is one aspect of this, still very present in offi cial discourse.

Th is can be seen in Chinese diplomacy, where a statement of the fi ve-thousand- year history, which evidently, in most cases, puts the interlocutor in an inferior position, is mandatory. Th e idea of the New Silk Road makes reference to a glorious period, and places China in the centre of an enormous international economical project. China also aims to display its heritage through promotional displays (such as the opening ceremony at the 2008 Beijing Olympics) and videos.

Marketing executives often make use of traditional symbols, art, calligraphy and texts. Historical dramas are always among the most-watched off erings on Chinese websites, such as Youku. Teahouses, and tea culture in general, are another example of the combination of economic development and the will to restore bygone glories.

Some teahouses aim to create an ambience of a particular epoch in Chinese history through their interior design (Ruan 2009: 58–60).

Another important phenomenon is the promotion of the Chinese language abroad (for example through Confucius Institutes), research on Chinese characters (judged by some native linguists as superior to other writing systems) and, for the purposes of better integration with Taiwan and Hong Kong, the rehabilitation of traditional characters, although the simplifi ed versions remain offi cial in mainland China (Meissner 2006: 53).

Before analysing the role of Confucianism, which is indubitably an important part of Chinese tradition as resurrected in the 1980s, we will discuss the problem of perceptions of former enemies. We will explain to some degree, why pride in national history and traditional culture plays such an important role in the creation of a Chinese national identity.

Th e Chinese Vision of the West and Japan

Th e issue of Chinese nationalism came to light as an important topic in Western media after several big protests. In 1995 and 1996 anti-American demonstrations were held in response to the Taiwan question (Jia 2005: 21). In 1999 the Chinese expressed their anger against, as they believed, a deliberate bomb attack made by the Americans on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (Jia 2005: 14). In 2005 and 2012 anti-Japanese protests took place. Th e central government acted to stop the protests when they turned out to be too violent (Cabestan 2005: 10–11). According to Jes- sica Chen Weiss, “over the past three decades, China’s government has selectively allowed or repressed nationalist protests in order to achieve certain diplomatic aims”

(Fish 2014). What, then, was the ideological background to these events?

Th e CCP’s educational policy and propaganda policy was undoubtedly an important factor in creation of nationalist sentiment. Following the crisis of 1989, the CCP launched a Patriotic education campaign with the concept of t h e C e n t u r y

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o f H u m i l i a t i o n (from the Opium Wars until the establishment of the PRC) as a central point (Fish 2014). Hence, Chinese identity was being created on the basis of a conviction that for one hundred years, Western countries and Japan tried to humiliate China and dethrone it from its legitimate position as world leader.

Chinese relations with Japan are extremely complex. China no longer has a strong infl uence on Japanese culture, as it used to have in the past. Meiji’s reforms in nineteenth century are widely compared with the failure of Qing modernisation.

Th e defeat of the fi rst Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895) and the atrocities of Japanese occupation (for which no formal apology has ever been made) are important mo- ments in the Century of Humiliation. Territorial disputes are still in the headlines.

For all these reasons, the Japanese became the fi rst xenophobic target of the patri- otic education (He 2013: 13). Hatred against Rìběn gu^ǐzi ᰛᵢ兲ᆆ (J a p a n e s e d e v i l s) is widely discussed on the Chinese internet.

Th e idea of a glorious past, as discussed previously, was a kind of cure for this sense of inferiority towards not only fast-developing Japan, but also the Western world. A new target emerged: to become an economic superpower and surpass the USA in order to overcome humiliation (Cabestan 2005: 15). Chinese successes in sports and science can also be a source of national pride (Guang 2005: 501). Un- fl attering comments about China’s actions in the foreign press are interpreted as intentional acts against Chinese supremacy (Cabestan 2005: 9). Th e recent idea of the Chinese dream, Zhōngguó mèng ѣളỜ, promoted by the CCP is just another leg in the race against the United States.

Chinese policies of Internet censorship and high taxes on foreign goods (especially luxury products) encourage the creation of domestic brands and services.

Th ere is no need for a campaign along the lines of B u y A m e r i c a n, mentioned by Jia Qingguo in his article on the external origins of Chinese nationalism (Jia 2005: 14). Chinese consumers often have no choice but to buy Chinese products, giving huge fi nancial support to domestic producers. Th is, however, does not im- ply much creativity and originality. Western and Japanese technologies are often simply copied.

Economic competition, based on the free market economy, seems contradictory to the socialist nature of the Chinese state. Th is has led to the creation of specifi c expressions, such as s o c i a l i s m w i t h C h i n e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and the oxymoronic s o c i a l i s t m a r k e t e c o n o m y (Hughes 2006). Th ey are promoted as original Chinese concepts, related somehow to the duality expressed in ancient philosophy and discussed by intellectuals since the fi rst half of the nine- teenth century between t^ǐ։—essence and yòng ⭞—function. All kinds of Western heritage—pragmatic but simple—have always been interpreted as yòng (Meissner 2006: 48). In this case, the market economy plays this role.

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A Brief Introduction to Contemporary Chinese Nationalism 17 Confucius in Red

However, the dangers of letting Westernisation go too far, especially in politics, required a strong response. Th e CCP chose to make use of Confucianism, a philosophy originating in China, which citizens could be proud of (Meissner 2006:

52). Confucianism or neo-Confucianism was also identifi ed as a means of fi lling the ideological gap left by the weakening of Marxism-Maoism, becoming an East Asian equivalent of the Weberian protestant ethic (Wang 1996: 64, 66).

Renewal started in 1986 and was expressed by intense research and promotion work in this fi eld. By the end of 1989, over 300 articles on neo-Confucianism had been published. In 1989 three international seminars on Confucianism were held in China (Meissner 2006: 51–52).

June 1989 was a turning point in the Chinese march towards Westernisation.

In response to student protests in Beijing, the central government took measures to show that the supremacy of the CCP was indisputable. In other words, the country is the Party. Confucianism was used to restore its legitimacy (Meissner 2006: 52).

As Meissner comments,

Confucianism implies order, obedience to one’s superior, devotion to the state, and the protection of the family. It puts the interests of the group above the interests of the individual, and thus helps to promote social harmony and stability. Its authoritar- ian aspects can be used to build a s o c i a l i s t s p i r i t u a l c i v i l i s a t i o n and to promote social harmony (Meissner 2006: 52).

Promotion of this kind of anti-rebellion ideology is safe for the central government. Following government directives becomes a veritable virtue. Th e leading role in Confucianism is reserved for elder generations, which might help prevent young people (also within the party) with avant-garde ideas from attempting to exert infl uence. Mao might even be seen as an ancestor of the whole Chinese family who everyone should venerate. However, even this veneration is controlled by t h e e l d e r s. In January 2016, a golden statue of the Chairman, constructed by Henan province villagers hit headlines all over the world. Just a few days later, it was demolished—most probably due to a lack of government endorsement (McKirdy and Lu 2016).

Started in 2006, the Harmonious Society Héxié Shèhuì ૂ䉆⽴Ր campaign, which aims to deal with social diff erences⁵ (Fan 2006), refers to the Confucian idea of harmony (hé ૂ). Th e very same character played a key role during the opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games. A worldwide network of Chinese language and culture centres, the Confucius Institutes, has been named after the philosopher.

Confucius and his thought have become a Chinese export brand.

5 Later, the campaign concentrated on other issues, such as politeness or ecology.

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Ài guó Channel Analysis

Th e aim of this part of the paper is to show how nationalist ideas are spread among ordinary people through new media. Th e analysis concerns a selection of article headlines published on the Ài guó (literally Patriotism) channel on the WeChat application between February and May 2016, and is therefore partial. A more precise analysis is not possible within the context of this article. A further, separate survey is needed.

WeChat (Chinese Wēixìn ᗤؗ), produced by Tencent (Téngxùn 㞴䇥) is a mobile communication application. According to a March 2016 survey by Quest Mobile, it was the most popular application in China, with over 700 million monthly active users (Custer 2016). It is a domestic equivalent to both Facebook and WhatsApp. It gives the possibility to call, send text messages and leave short vocal messages for friends, whilst f o l l o w i n g them in a way similar to that of- fered by Facebook. Th ere are also offi cial accounts, which users can subscribe to, in order to receive notifi cations of updates to the chosen channel. Ài guó is one of these channels.

Th ere is no information about the author of the channel. Th e articles are copied from diff erent Chinese websites.⁶ Th e profi le is described as follows:

Love your country, your family, love China. News from the country, the family, the world. Th e sons and daughters of China are all one family which resists foreign inva- sion in perfect unity! A platform followed by all loving children of China. Have you subscribed? Do it now, it’s absolutely free!⁷ (www 2).

Some of the features of Chinese nationalism we have described above are present in this passage: the Confucian vision of a country-family, a conspiracy theory relating to the outside world and the unity of the nation.

Th e texts published on the channel are, in many cases, t a b l o i d style. Numer- ous articles relate, to some extent, to patriotism or to the country. We have chosen to analyse the headlines (and partly articles in their entirety) of the texts which may be seen as being patriotic or nationalistic. We can distinguish three main categories and several sub-categories, according to their themes.

6 Th e specifi city of the Chinese internet and the attitude towards copyright in China makes it diffi cult to fi nd out where an article originated. Texts are copied deliberately. In order to make the sources we cite in the current paper available to all internet users without needing to create WeChat account, we found the analyzed articles on other websites—referred to in the references.

7 Ài guó, ài jiā, ài Zhōnghuá! Guó shì, jiā shì, tiānxià shì! Zhōnghuá érn^ǚ yī jiā qín, tuánjiéyīzhì kàng wài qīn! Zhōnghuá érn^ǚ guānzhù de píngtái, nín guānzhù ma? Kuàikuai guānzhù ba, juéduì mi^ǎnfèi guānzhù! ⡧ള, ⡧ᇬ, ⡧ѣ঄! ളӁ, ᇬӁ, ཟсӁ! ѣ঄ݵྩжᇬӨ, ഘ㔉ж㠪ᣍཌ

׫! ѣ঄⡧ളݵྩ䜳ީ⌞Ⲻᒩਦ, ᛞީ⌞Ҽ੍? ᘡᘡީ⌞੝, 㔓ሯރ䍯ީ⌞!

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A Brief Introduction to Contemporary Chinese Nationalism 19 1. In honor of a leader. Th is kind of article and headline appears with great

regularity. Th e most frequent are those evoking Mao Zedong—for example,

“if chairman Mao Zedong was still alive…”⁸ (www 3), a nostalgic article highlighting contemporary Chinese problems and venerating Mao as an ideal leader. Th ere are also some articles about other leaders, including the current president, Xi Jinping. His popularity (or veneration for him) has been noted by the Western press.⁹ Examples: “Who still remembers March 5^th is PM Zhou En’lai’s birthday? Use 0.5 kb of your data allowance to give him a like!”¹⁰ (www 5) “Finally, a song for chairman Xi has been released. For you, for the fi rst time!”¹¹ (www 6).

2. Poor international relations, including imagined battlefi elds (on disputed territories), enemies and other conspiracy theories, persecutions. Examples:

“Southern war theatre commander: if anything happens on the South China Sea, we won’t hesitate to fi ght back!”¹² (www 7). Th e commander’s title implies to readers that a war is actually ongoing in the South China Sea. “Th e Indians have written an article which insults China. It’s so shocking you’ll break out in a cold sweat—a must-read!”¹³ (Liao 2016) Th e title forms a good background for creating a xenophobic attitude. In fact, the “cold-sweat shocking” article criticises Chinese people for not reading enough books and using their smartphones abusively instead.

3. Chinese pride, international successes. Examples: “China and Russia join hands in complete cooperation”¹⁴ (www 8). “Crowds watched the scene in Beijing. It astonished the whole country”¹⁵ (www 9). Th is is actually a video of a traditional Chinese music performance in a shopping centre. A comment underneath the video expressed national pride in culture with a signifi cant

8 Ji^ǎrú Mao Zedong zh^ǔxí huó dào jīntiān… ٽྸ∑⌳ђѱᑣ⍱ࡦԀཟ···

9 See for exemple: “Th e song Dynasty. Melodious love-off erings for Xi Jinping,” Th e Econo- mist, 12^th March 2016 (www 4) or Casey Hall’s “Is Xi Jinping Cultivating a Personality Cult? Or Just a Personality?” in Forbes (Hall 2016).

10 Hái y^ǒu duōshao rén zhīdao, 3 yuè 5 rì shī Zhou En’lai z^ǒngl^ǐ de shēngrì! Huā 0.5kb de liúliàng wèi tā zàn yīxià ba! 䘎ᴿཐቇӰ⸛䚉, 3ᴾ5ᰛᱥઞ᚟ᶛᙱ⨼Ⲻ⭕ᰛ! 㣧0.5kbⲺ⍷䠅ѰԌ䎔 жс੝! (In references: same article under a slightly diff erent title).

11 Xi zh^ǔxí zhī gē zhōngyú lái le, dì yī shíjiān sòng géi n^ǐ! Җѱᑣҁↂ㓾ӄ࠰ᶛҼ, ㅢжᰬ䰪䘷㔏֖! (www 6).

12 Nánbù zhànqū sīlìngyuán: Nán H^ǎi yīdàn y^ǒu shì juéduì g^ǎn zhàn ঍䜞ᡎ॰ਮԚ઎: ঍⎭

жᰜᴿӁ㔓ሯᮘᡎ

13 Yìndùrén xiě le piān mà Zhōngguórén de wénzhāng, jīng chū yī shēn lěnghàn, n^ǐ wùbì kànkan!

দᓜӰߏҼㇽ傸ѣളӰⲺᮽㄖ, ᜀ࠰ж䓡߭⊍, ֖ࣗᗻⵁⵁ!

14 Zhōng É y^ǐjīng quánmiàn liánsh^ǒu ѣ׺ᐨ㔅ޞ䶘㚊ᢁ

15 Běijīng fāshēng de zhè yī mù, wàn rén wéiguān, ch^ǎngmiàn zhènjīng quánguó!! ्Ӣਇ⭕Ⲻ䘏 жᒋ, нӰപ㿸, ൰䶘䴽ᜀޞള!!

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introduction: “even the foreigners were watching, mouths agape” (www 9), which reveals a kind of inferiority complex and a demand for recognition.

Th e analyzed headlines focus mostly on widely understood political issues, with rare references to Chinese culture. Th ey show China in relation to other countries, whether to demonstrate its strength or to raise the alarm concerning a kind of conspiracy against the PRC. Authority and the myth of Mao Zedong play an important role, but other leaders such as Deng Xiaoping or Xi Jinping also feature on a regular basis.

Th e sensationalist tone of the headlines refl ects the popular (non-elitist) character of the channel.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese nationalism has evolved from pure c u l t u r a l i s m, through a negation of traditional culture and a vision of na- tionhood built on class-struggle to a renaissance of classical values adapted to a new political context alongside a redefi nition of the nation.

Confucianism is an important feature of contemporary Chinese nationalism, because it helps the CCP to execute its power and create authority. Stimulation of pride for native philosophy aims to keep the Chinese population from considering new foreign ideologies or beliefs—which are dangerous to the CCP’s position.

In economics and international relations, nationalism is expressed through the quest to become the world’s number one superpower. Th is relates to an inferiority complex following t h e C e n t u r y o f H u m i l i a t i o n. Over-interpretation of acts by other countries (seen as deliberately anti-Chinese) is quite common.

Th e Chinese internet is an extremely rich resource in investigating nationalism in the PRC. Th e analysis of selected headlines from À i guó , a patriotic channel on WeChat, reveals some interesting patterns in popular versions of the ideology.

References

Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities: Refl exions on the Origins and Spread of Nation- alism. London-New York: Verso.

Cabestan, J-P. (2005). Les multiples facettes du nationalisme chinois. Perspectives chinoises, 88. Available online at: https://perspectiveschinoises.revues.org/739#text (accessed 30 June 2016).

Custer, C. (2016). WeChat Blasts Past 700 Million Monthly Active Users, Tops China’s Most Popular Apps. TechInAsia. Available online at: https://www.techinasia.com/we- chat-blasts-700-million-monthly-active-users-tops-chinas-popular-apps (accessed 30 June 2016).

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Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego

Racism and

TRauma

Racism and TRauma

ISBN 978-83-7865-692-0 What should we do to work against racism and traumas it causes? Is it even possible? Of course, it is hard to give a clear solution—history shows that stereotypes concerning race or ethnicity are difficult to weed out. However, by this volume we try to give examples of certain situations or worlds that could cause deep reflection. A group of scholars from all over the world, from countries with various historical and sociological backgrounds, decided to share with us their valuable thoughts. Our book includes articles from different fields—e.g., social sciences, literature, art, film, or psychology.

We hope they will be useful in discussing widely understood topic of racism and trauma.