O R G A N O N 20/21 : 1984/1985 A U T E U R S ET P R O B L È M E S
M arek Styczyński (Poland)
“TH E SCIEN CE O F TH E F U T U R E ”- A L EK SA N D ER B O G D A N O V ’S TEC TO LO G Y
“Philosophy is nearing its end. Em piriom onism is no longer a genuine philosophy but only a transitional form, for it knows where it is heading and to what it should give its place”. 1 These are the concluding words Aleksander Bogdanov’s Philosphy o f Living Experience, a popular study concluded in 1911 and published two years later. A t that time, i.e. in 1913, Bogdanov published the first volume of his Tectology, or “universal science of organization”. (Volume II came out in 1917.) The two volumes were translated abroad and reprinted at home. The whole work, along with its third volume, appeared in 1922 as the second edition (according to a bibliography drawn up by D. Grille). It is rem arkable that this work o f B ogdanov’s life remained virtually unknown, apart from the 1920s. Bogdanov is still remembered prim arily as an empiriom onist, a follower o f Ernst Mach, a continuator o f idealism, of George Berkeley’s philosophy, etc. In an earlier article on the Russian philosopher’s ideas I have tried to show that none o f these affiliations suffices to characterize him adequately.2 I pointed out th at since he followed in the footsteps o f M arx and Mach, thereby modernizing Marxism, Bogdanov relinquished the philosophy o f subjectiveness. I also pointed out that in his gnosiological analyses he probed not what it is the cognizing subject—a collective, a class, a social group—experiences while assimilating the world, but how the substance o f this process o f cognition is articulated in interpersonal comm unication, or in practical production. Em piriom onism was one stage, or, more precisely, a gnosiological level o f the m ain interpretation of B ogdanov’s ideas, upon which he also based his sociocreational social philosophy. This interpretation was a generalized
1 A. B ogd an o v , Filosofia zhivogo opyta, M o sk v a 1920, p . 255.
2 M. Styczyński, “ F ilozofia fizjologii: e m p irio m o n ism A le k sa n d ra B o g d a n o w a ” [“ T he P h ilo so p h y o f P h y sio lo g y : A le k sa n d r B o g d a n o v ’s E m p irio m o n ism ”]. S tu d ia Filozoficzne 1980, N o . 11, pp. 39-57.
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exposition o f the uniformity o f all nature (including man), o f the unity o f mechanisms and actions, and thus o f their homogeneity against the background o f the harm onious, organizational-executive division o f labor inside the proletarian collective. Viewed in this way, tectology may be regarded less as yet another philosophical product (in the sense o f solution to a classical problem ) than as the record o f a systemic concept o f interaction (the occurrence o f some relations and events in the world) along with possibilities and conditions for operating in this world on the ground o f fundamental laws and dependences. Tectology, then, would be a “science o f m ethod”, probably the first ever Russian methodology to have been expressly pragmatic as well as very democratic in application, as can be seen from its simple language and com m on sense examples. After all, tectology was intended for a mass-scale working-class audience. N obody can fail to notice that tectology has its own philosophical rationale— as will be evident from what follows— b u t it was not philosophy Bogdanov wanted (as he still did when plunging himself into his empiriomonistic considerations) but its liquidation, a liqui dation via a theory o f action. B ogdanov’s own philosophy implied that with the ascent o f the proletariat and o f the machine, the time o f philosophy was over and th at a proper m om ent has come for it to go. If, reasoned Bogdanov, existence and thinking are essentially one (what this oneness actually was was to be dem onstrated by empiriomonism), then a collective in an industrial society can draw its best lesson—the “science o f the future”— from a praxiological system which is derivable from mechanisms o f nature and which safeguards the possibly most efficient utilization o f nature. However, from his system alone Bogdanov could not deduce how naive this belief was in reality.
T E C T O L O G Y A S A N E X P R E S S IO N O F P R O L E T A R IA N C U L T U R E
Tectology (from Greek, the science o f building), designed as a “critique of the practical reason” o f Marxism, is (a) a general theory o f the world of n ature’s dynamics, and (b) a general concept o f purposeful and efficient action owing to the fact th at man, or m ore exactly, worker collectives, imitate mechanisms inherent in the world around them. “The possibility itself of imitation is in fact best evidence o f there being no essential difference between nature’s own uncontrolled work and m an’s planned activities. This is sufficient evidence o f the basic homogeneity of organizational functions o f man and n atu re” (italics added).3 M an engages in dialogue with nature through his tools, a dialogue which is the more intensive the more efficacious and efficient are these tools. To be true, capitalism had made this possible, but it had not abolished the centuries-long division o f labor, and hence the desired “homogeneity o f organizational functions o f man and
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nature” could not be fulfilled because while nature, on account o f its internal mechanisms, was uniform in organization and perform ance (it controlled itself), society was at the same time disintegrating in its organization aiid performance. But the situation changed with the p ro letariat’s appearance in the arena o f nature, as the proletariat concentrated both the control and actual perform ance o f production in its hands. It was also then that tectology could first appear as a general praxiology which is actually a self- -awareness o f the producing proletariat. Tectology becomes possible because for the first time in centuries m an succeeded in depicting n ature’s unity and dynamics in its full dimension and did this not in a “passive” theory or knowledge but in action, that is, in the deepest core o f the universe. The proletariat learns in the process o f production, and nature also produces; and so, Bogdanov argues, tectology should collect and order the most general dependences o f what is already the com m on m otion o f nature and the proletariat.
There are definite reasons, says Bogdanov, for which the classic works o f M arxism could not play the p a rt o f a new, proletarian science, even though, as Bogdanov never denied, M arxism came closest to defining the role the proletariat was to play in culture. Above all, it was M arxism that pointed out the economic factor which is all-decisive in social development. Also, it revealed the struggle o f the classes. M arxism further disclosed the secondary, derivative character o f all dom ains o f hum an spiritual culture along with their gnosiological distortions. However, M arxism retained too m any theoretical relics o f the bourgeois era, especially Hegel’s “formal dialectics”, which I am going to return to later. M arxism, claimed Bogdanov, had furnished a one-way clarification o f the relationship between production relations and ideology, but failed to account for ideology’s objective role in society, its unavoidable necessity. For, “in an organized system, every p art complements the rem aining p arts and in this sense is necessary for them as one p a rt o f the whole which has its own significance. In particular cases, M arxism resolved this m atter by pointing out th at this or other ideology serves the interests o f this or other class, consolidates its conditions for rule, or is an instrum ent o f struggle against the other classes. But it [Marxism] never posed this problem in a general meaning, and for num erous significant cases it adopted uncritically old pre-scientific form ulations; e.g., it regarded the arts merely as ^dornm ents o f life, the m athem atical and natural sciences as being o f supra-class significance [sic!], and the m ore general truths of science as pure truths independent o f social relations.” 4 In other words, M arx discovered the class determ inants o f culture, especially o f ideology, bu t was not consistent enough in interpreting the phenom ena of culture, which after all are also social phenom ena (such as production relations), in terms o f class interests. This is to say, M arx regarded some
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dom ains o f social processes as being—yes!—o f supra-class significance. So, there comes Tectology in order to bridge this gap in the realm of science, ju st as Proletarian Culture (the title o f another Bogdanov’s work) was to do in
the realm o f artistic phenomena.
The idea that m athematical and natural sciences are o f class character, which today is quite shocking an idea, was, on the one hand, both a consequence o f B ogdanov’s own philosophy, and, on the other, o f an endeavor to work out a consistent interpretation o f M arxism itself. M arxist doctrine interpreted the social world in history. It moved about the plane of sociological and economic analyses, while not touching upon the methodological problems o f labor itself, even less so o f labor which has been liberated both as concerns its organization and performance. But, “the point is, to change the w orld”. So, it is necessary to create pragm atic m ethods o f purposeful changes o f the world on he basis o f natural actions. “In tectology—even though it ‘explains’ how various elements can combine with one another in nature, work and tho u g ht—the purpose is primarily to master practically such com binations in all possible ways. Tectology all boils down to practice, and even the process o f cognition itself is, in tectology, just a special case o f organizational practice, a kind o f coordination o f a special type of complexes” 5 (italics added).
Tectology’s m ethodological pragm atism was an expression o f Bogdanov’s belief in j n a n ’s “integration”. As he looked at the stages o f hum an culture (primitive, authoritarian, individualistic) from the angle o f division of labor in organization and performance, the Russian philosopher observed th at never before had m an been able to achieve a fulfillment, a completion of his hum anity. M an ’s “fragm entation” which dismembered his consciousness, paralyzed his will, and brought about moral and material distress, resulted from the inherent deficiency o f life-sustaining production structures, from the particular place occupied by the given member of the community, from his awareness o f inadequacy o f his endeavors, from a sense o f a fatalistic dependence on others. People did not feel happy because, production relations being as they were, people were not self-complementary, that is, their coope ration was enforced by hostile or inscrutable circumstances.
In primitive culture, man lived in a horde-type collectivism; while he was admittedly immersed in his community, in the group’s collective experience, his awareness o f inadequacy o f his endeavors, from a sense of a fatalistic o f nature rendered his collective safety illusory and fragile. “Simplicity and elementarily did not make life harm onius” .6 In turn, authoritarianism , whether as patriarchy o f feudalism, dissociated community into “spirit” and “flesh”, th at is, into a ruling center and impassive order-takers, into an active will and a passive force. Thinking ceased to be totalitarian in
5 Ibid., p. 10.
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character, as it had been in primitive culture, but became divided according to the place people occupied on the social ladder. An authoritarian dualism appeared, which is “a historically prior form o f world outlook”.7 It was there that, as Bogdanov argued, what we call cognition emerged, the faculty which enables hum ans to distinguish an active and a passive element in the reality around them. So, causality in thinking about the world arose, which was a reflection of social causality in production. All hum an emotions, desires and values were directed centrifugally to an authoritarian (patriarchalism) or transcendental (feudalism) frame o f reference. Fragm ented in the production process, people were always left face to face with something or somebody alien, and often also hostile. Complete stagnation in primitive culture was forestalled by crises such as overpopulation or famine which goaded people into seeking more efficacious tools and more rewarding production techniques. A new type o f social references, and thus a new type of culture (authoritarianism), developed. It was in this culture that, through the gradual takeover o f individual specific production lines in fewer and fewer hands, production was becoming increasingly specialized and commercial. Individualism began to constitute crystalline centers o f social 'activeness. Thenceforward, “the collective whole cannot be held together and regulated • by just one will; it splits and falls apart into independent groups” .8
Anarchy o f society (capitalism) reaches its apex. People are tow ard one another like separate m onads linked only by anonymous productive ties. The hum an “se lf’ is developing, while “the hamm er of social antagonism s is forging individual consciousness”.9 There is no “s e lf’ in prim itive or authoritarian society, in which a person cannot envisage him self without another, though not necessarily equal person.
In individualistic culture, the absolute “s e lf’ hails its trium ph, and it is governed by uncontrolled mechanisms o f socio-economic life. The fragmented, individual consciousness does not, Bogdanov goes on to say, com prise the total body o f problems life presents people with. All those “dam ned problem s” o f philosophy — such a s : W ho am I? W hat is the world? How did it come about? Why is there so much evil in it? —arise due to the insufficiency o f what is a particular, individual perception o f the world. The bourgeois world, the circle o f egoistic individuals clawing to their vested interests, genrates all those “torm ents o f creation” known if only from literary works. But it is also this world that, owing to the huge growth o f technology and production power, gives birth to what will be both its end and its continuatio n— the proletariat. “The fragmented hum an being is overwhelmed by an uncontrol lable desire to become again a whole. This desire condemns m an to inner qualms o f discontent but it also pushes him onto the road o f struggle
i Ibid., p. 22. 8 Ibid., p. 27. « Ibid., p. 30.
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for fulfillment. On this road, m an gets integrated”. 10 The “new world” of collectivist culture is precisely th at much-desired integration o f man, which is based upon the unity o f his practical experience— the unity of the w orker’s organizational and executive functions. He himself operates a machine, controls it, and hence his consciousness is o f the same type as earlier authority o f the bourgeois production organizer. Thereby, all factors causing the collective’s stratification will disappear, and a “brotherly equality” o f the working people will set in while egoistic interest will be eliminated. The fundamental homogeneity o f hum an experience, coupled with full m utual understanding, will emerge as “a com m unity o f people, with full equality o f their m utual situation” . 11
This is an outline o f a program Bogdanov released in 1904-05 and published in book form as The New World (1905) and reprinted in
Proletarian Culture (1924). This earliest social program advanced by the
Bolshevik Bogdanov was composed o f the following studies— The Integration
o f Man, Norms and Goals o f Life, Philosophy’s Damned Problems. Several
years later, when he no longer was member o f the Bolshevik party, this program was given a scientific form. Tasarski is undoubtedly right when he says; “The m ost general science that is going to integrate ‘experience’, to integrate m an and society, will be the ‘universal science o f organization’ called ‘tectology’. This science will be created by proletariat from big industrial establishments as a transform ation and summary o f its ‘experience’. So, it will be a proletarian science, a m anifestation o f proletarian culture”. 12
T H E B A S IC C A T E G O R IE S O F T E C T O L O G Y
Complex, or organization, form, that is, “the total body o f relationships between elements”, is the central category o f Bogdanov’s science o f organiza tion. 13 Every complex which is distinguished as such out of natu re’s continuum for research or pragm atic purposes is composed o f elements. “Elements o f all organization, of any complex studied from the vantage point of organization, reduce to activenesses— resistances” . 14 For, the creation o f a complex from elements would not have come about if the latter had had no specific propensities for this, th at is, if they had not had the activeness that constituted the given complex; at the same time, various resistances o f elements which m ake organization impossible or more difficult are also at play. This is a consequence o f the existence of environment, for every structural organization o f a complex is in every case a function
10 Ibid., p. 34. 11 Ibid., p. 49.
12 J. T asarsk i, “D ro g i i m an o w ce 'P ro le tk u ltu ry ’” [“T h e P ro le ta ria n C u ltu re M ovem ent. Its P ro g ress an d V ag aries”], P rzegląd H u m a n isty czn y 1969, N o. 5, p. 77.
13 A. B ogdanov, Tektologia, vol. 3, p. 452. 14 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 73.
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of the environm ent in which it occurs. Following D. Grille, let us p ut this in the following way:
U /F {E\ , E i, £3);
where U stands for environm ent, F for a complex, or form, E \, £2, £3. . . for elem ents.15
Owing to the existence o f activenesses-resistances we never have to do with a full organization o f a complex. O rganization is always accompanied by processes o f disorganization, the aggregate result being a relative neutrality of the complex, a relative status o f equilibrium. It should be strongly stressed here that, like anywhere else in Bogdanov’s reasoning, here too environm ent, which works through mechanisms o f selection, plays a pivotal part in channelling the com plex’s structuralization in a definite direction. “Every event, every hange can be considered from the standpoint o f selection as the preservation, respectively m ultiplication o f some activenesses, the consoli dation and strengthening of some relations, the elimination, reduction, weakening or decomposition o f others— in this or other complex, in one or another system. ‘Environm ent’ in the most general sense is always the factor o f selection. For study, we usually isolate, separate some complex from among others, thus assuming that its preservation or decomposition, its growth or fall, depend on its relations with those other ones, on the extent to which their activenesses are balanced or outweighed by activenesses o f the given complex, or conversely— on the extent to which they prevail and damage their ties”. 16
Considering the three-element relationship o f environm ent-com plex- elements (“activenesses-resistances”) we can now define tectology’s three principal problem areas:
— the emergence and form ation o f complexes;
— the viability o f a complex (the system’s internal dynamics); — the decomposition o f the complex (the crisis).
Before we proceed to a discussion o f these three problem s let us recall that the fundam ental categories o f B ogdanov’s philosophy such as complex, organization, elements, selection, had been known already in empiriomonism. But there they were used to describe social perceptions o f the world. In tectology, they acquire an ontological m eaning in the pragm aticist sense we learned about before. Tectology also gives account o f experience, insofar as experience here involves all nature and the practical interaction with it—the sum o f energetic activenesses along with the resulting prosperity o f hum an society. Designed by Bogdanov as the crowning as well as the extension o f the knowledge accumulated so far, tectology selectively uses the detailed sciences, yet beyond its specific objects o f research it seeks the
15 D . G rille, L enins Rivale. Bogdanov und seine Philosophie, K o ln 1966, p. 191. 16 A. B o g d an o v , Tektologia, vol. 2, p. 386.
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m ost general regularities which are com m on not only to the sciences but to all nature. Nature, as a domain o f actions, is irrational. Tectology, for its part, is to be an attem pt at its empirical rationalization.
1 M ECH AN ISM S O F FO R M A TIO N O F C O M P L l XF.S
Com plex-constituting elements are diverse or differently directed activenesses- -resistances. A situation in which activenesses have the same direction, that is, in which they “overlap” and so tend to generate a structure, is called the “chain linkage” (tsepnaia sviaz) by Bogdanov. It occurs not only in nature where it enables such or other wholes to appear. All human activity is also based on it, and it is at all possible precisely owing to the existence of com m on links, connections or dependences which channel human effort in a definite direction. If no chain linkage exists—o r if none is perceived at first glance— we invent it, thus form ulating hypotheses which are subsequently tested by sience.
The process of tectological form ation o f com ponents into larger complexes is pivotally governed by the process of ingression. Rotighly, ingression means the activation, conjugation, m oulding or updating of elements— the perception o f their common “overlapping” aspects or properties owing to which they will join into complexes. A trivial example o f this is the ingressive function o f glue uniting two pieces o f wood or the work o f a translator who brings two different languages close to one another. W ithout ingression no fusion o f com ponents for the purpose o f ensuring a “chain linkage” would come about. “Ingression is a general form o f a chain linkage” 17 (italics added). Ingression is by no means identical with the organization of complexes. The latter can also organize themselves via other mechanisms, such as what Bogdanov calls disingression, that is, decomposition, separation o f elements along lines o f their previous activenesses. If in the course of ingression the sum of activenesses o f elements is larger than their arithmetical whole, then disingression decreases the activeness o f the elements of the whole leading in an extreme case to a full neutrality o f the activenesses, to a full disorganization, to a decomposition (crisis) o f the complex. Disingression is always the first phase o f its decomposition but not always is it identical with disorganization. Its effect on the complex, which is closely dependent on the environm ent, proceeds by a stabilization o f the structure through the elim ination o f unstable or useless elements which were previously conjugated with one another, M oreover disingression is p ro o f o f the noncontinuity, the separateness of elements, in the continuum of nature. To be true, there is no discontinuity in nature “itself’ where everything is linked up with everything else. However, people, determined as they are by practical interests, isolate artificially, by means o f disingression, some complexes from others
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(e.g., the artificial division o f the globe into two hemispheres). The continuity o f the world was noticed, already by Bergson, but his concept o f a stratifying action o f the hum an m ind is, says Bogdanov, entirely wrong, because no such thing as an individual mind does exist. M an is m arked by the brand of his class origin, that is, consciously or unwittingly, m an voices its views. Bergson’s concept o f m ind takes the form o f collective class interest. Owing to technology and p roduction— at different development levels— nature undergoes stratification and disingression, as complexes serving the survival o f communities reproduce themselves. Cognitive complexes are a function o f the former, and so talking o f m ind in isolation from actual social practice makes no sense.
Depending on new ingressions and disingressions, the com plex’s structure undergoes changes—deform ations or crises, developm ent or decomposition. In order to get into contact with one another, activenesses-resistances must carry certain tensions, a difference o f potentials, o r at least the simplest ability to react. Equal tensions are always identical with full disingression. A shift o f tension for instance in a two-element relation, say in conjugation, may lead to a new ingression or disingression, depending on the com plex’s endurance and its relation to its environm ent. Science enables us to classify and measure these processes o f internal energetization. “F or m odern science, ‘energy’ is a source o f changes as well as their quantitative m easure:
activeness which is perceived with the senses or intellectually [...] As far as
its ‘tension’ 4 concerned (temperature, potential, gravity degree, etc.), it is a relative magnitude o f changes which are possible depending on the given
energy com plex"18 (italics added).
As they act alternately in the form ation and consolidation o f the com plex’s structure, mechanisms o f ingression and disingression are also an expression o f the universal effect o f selection. It is this mechanism, in the form o f the environm ent’s resistance, th at creates countless “experiences”, i.e. organizations o f complexes in their dynamic equilibrium. From the tectological point o f View, natural selection in the world o f nature differs in no significant m anner from class struggle or contests for posts, for in either case the purpose is the liquidation (the crisis)— through the disingression o f organism s—of groups o f interests or individuals to m ake room for new, better organized (better adapted) structures. In the object o f selection there is always a foundation, that is, a place in which the factor o f selection will always effect a change. Through the mechanism o f selection the complex always tends tow ard equilibrium with its surrounding (environment) which is impossible to achieve in absolute form owing to the never-ending parallel changes in this environment. W hat the complex then faces is a loss of viability and a subsequent decomposition. W hat guarantees its persistence in a dynamic equilibrium with its environm ent is the growth in sum o f its activenesses,
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the predom inance o f energy assimilation over energy loss, o f assimilation over dissimilation at the expense o f the environm ent. We then are facing a case o f positive selection. The opposite mechanism, which manifests itself in the release of energy into the environment, the predom inance o f losses over gains, is defined by Bogdanov as negative selection. Those “m ost elementary acts of selection occur in diverse processes o f conjugation and disingression”, 19 which is the chief mechanism at play in the form ation o f structures.
2. TH E VIABILITY O F COM PLEXES. TH E SYSTEM 'S IN TER N A L D YN A M ICS
The greater, the complex’s viability is, the more successful the activenesses- -resistances in it are in resisting the influence o f environment. However, a com plex’s perm anence depends not only on the num ber o f elements but also on the type o f their organization, the way they are connected to one another, etc. You can say, following Bogdanov, that apart from quantitative viability it is possible to distinguish within a complex its system-specific viability and so, as usual, internal tensions are generated by multi-directed choices. A positive choice enhances quantitative viability, a negative choice curtails it, but a choice’s positive effect is by no means rigorously equivalent to the system’s specific viability. Some positive choices are basically conservative choices, and as a result they lead to a disintegration o f the structure. Capitalism, for example, says the Russian philosopher, algyig with its economic growth (quantitative increment o f viability) complicates and differen tiates the social environm ent while technological progress itself does not reform society’s structure. The gaps in it which arise from ownership forms are widening. This leads to a decrease in proportionality in assimilating external energy by society as a whole and so weakens its viability. The negative choice done by a m ajority o f society begins to prevail over the positive choice of the capitalist class. This manifests itself in pauperization on the one hand, and in overproduction on the other. Structure becomes increasingly vague, especially since its points o f contact with the extrenal world (environ ment) have many ramifications. “Fluidity can be characterized generally as irregular connections in different parts of the complex or as different conditions; the higher their regularity, the greater its ‘coherence’”, says Boganov.20 W hen negative choice predom inates, a coherent structure has greater chances of survival; when positive choice predom inates, it is fluid, but for instance under capitalism the balance o f choices is deepening with a predominance of negative choice and the structure’s fluidity leads it to disintegration (the crisis). To be true, the effect of external environm ent differs from country to c o u n try : czarist Russia, a structure more coherent than the federal type o f American capitalism, could survive, encircled as it was by enemies and waging wars, precisely owing to its “tough” change-resistant structure.
19 Ibid., p. 166. 20 Ibid., p. 209.
" T h e Science o f the F u tu re" 159 On the other hand, American capitalism with its fluid, open, and dynamic structure has a greater chance o f survival, although nothing in the general message of Bogdanov’s philosophy implies that this brand o f capitalism should last forever.
Progressive choice, which enhances activeness but curtails the system ’s specific viability, along with regressive choice, which has the reverse effect (petrification o f the system), although they are closely interconnected and m utually supplementary, are not fully symmetrical. This can best be seen in n atu re’s trem endous waste in that it creates an enorm ous num ber of viable individuals but gives genuine survival chances only to few o f them. The latter alone enhance the sum total o f organizational processes. Organisms which perished constitute a necessary sum total o f disorganization processes— a price needed to couple conjugation with disingressive processes.
“The viablity o f a whole depends on the smallest relative resistances of all parts at any m om ent”.21 Because an elem ent’s resistance is also its activeness (a switchover in standpoint here, depending on the mode of research: from environm ent to element, or conversely), the law on smallest relative resistances is also a law on smallest relative activenesses. But the relative character o f the complex’s activenesses-resistances derives from their relational linkage to the complex’s other activenesses-resistances. Let us cite Bogdanov’s own example of this— a squadron o f warships including one ironclad (cruising at 30 km/h), a destroyer (50 km /h), and a cruiser (40 km/h). This com plex’s lowest activity is 30 km/h. Their respective draught depths are 10 m for the ironclad, 8 m for the cruiser and 5 m for the destroyer. Lowest relative resistance is 10 m, below which the squadron disintegrates. Generally, according to Bogdanov, a complex’s systematic viability can be defined by the law o f least favorable conditions or the law o f minimum. If one wants to strengthen a system’s viability one should protect its weakest element, because under unfavorable conditions this element may become a source of the system’s disintegration as a whole. The system itself tends to protect its own internal stability. Bogdanov cites the Le Chatelie principle, saying that a system in equilibrium undergoes an action which weakens any of the conditions o f equilibrium, then processes resisting that action and tending to restore the state o f equilibrium are generated in this system. The striving for what is but a theoretical condition o f equilibrium, which is never attained in practice, turns out to be a function o f the external pressure of environm ent (selection o f + and —).
The law o f minimum defines conditions needed to preserve the complex which, however, never lasts forever. U nder the pressure of external conditions in the course o f development the com plex’s internal structure may differentiate, its constituent parts becoming increasingly isolated from one another. In extreme cases, the complex even disintegrates. One safeguard against this
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is the development o f supplem entary reactions. Thus, for instance, division o f labor spurred the process o f production, but at the same time the given form of social organization disintegrated more and more into individual households linked to each other solely by trade. The hardening competition in the m arket along with the division o f organizational and executive competences, in turn, resulted in class struggle, that is, in a sharp disingression o f society. But, says Bogdanov, society cannot disintegrate entirely as it is embraced by the world (the natural) ingression. M arxism, along with the ascending worker movement, both o f which thrive on class struggle, also have a beneficial effect. These are powerful counter-differentiating factors which offset social tensions by the elimination solely of the class o f organizers, that is, capitalists.
“The deeper the original differences of a system’s complexes, the quicker should be its subsequent disintegration, especially the growth of contradictions, o f disingresion between them ”. 22 The danger resulting from the system’s internal differentiation is eliminated by its reconstruction (counterdifferentia tion). This comes about most often due to the conjugation o f the system’s different parts. A t the expense o f forfeiting some activenesses, and spurred on by regressive choice, a regrouping o f elements takes place, and a new whole begins to develop in result o f this. Naturally, differentiation and counterdifferen tiation are processes all the universe is subject to, and it is in this way the universe is continuously developing, and although it is constantly exposed to the danger o f crises and indeed does undergo crises, it none the less does survive owing to built-in self-correcting mechanisms.
Let us look for a while at an interesting case of tectological self- -correction, namely that of Ham let. The young prince, with his noble record o f m artial gallantry, grew up in the spirit o f knightly ideals, was trained in the soldier’s trade (as an outstanding fencer, for example) as well as in the art o f leadership. On the other hand, he was a sophisticated connoisseur, a subtle aesthete enjoying the arts and spending his time with books. Under the impact o f external developments (his father’s murder) Ham let undergoes a vehement negative choice leading up to volitional disingression: elements constituting his personality, or, more properly, his dual nature, dissociate. On the one hand (his soldier’s attitude), he wants to kill his stepfather. But this is prevented by the spiritual ideal o f love (the aesthetic attitude) directed toward Ophelia and Gertrude, who „objectively” are among his enemies. The dissociation o f H am let’s personality manifests itself as madness. It would probably end in a catastrophe, were it not for the mechanism o f counterdifferentiation. H am let’s two natures mix with one another (conjugation), in result o f which a new spiritual quality— th at o f a fighter for values, for ideals— arises. Ham let dies because of external conditions, but this
“T h e Science o f the F u tu re" 161
will be o f no importance any more because his work will be undertaken by his successor (Fortinbras).
The development o f complexes by way o f systematic differentiation is possible owing to two particularly im portant mechanisms. While ingression and disingression work in the area o f statics, the other two are clearly developmental in character. Egression and degression are m eant here. Egression (from the Latin word meaning “to step out o f ra n k ”) is essentially a concen tration o f definite activenesses, causing a centralization o f the system around its most active part (e.g., the nervous system and the rest o f the body). Naturally, when we are facing a system one p art o f which is dom inant over the others, then there m ust be m ost diverse relations between them, while relations with the environm ent are irregular throughout the system.
Via a balancing o f all choices, this leads to a dynamic transform ation
o f the original complex; internal differentiation may even lead up to the emergence o f two m utually competitive centers. But since the rest o f the complex cannot possibly service all o f them simultaneously, the whole affair ends in a crisis. Needless to say, Bogdanov considers machines to be powerful egressions. Owing to the machine, m an “rallied” all nature around himself thereby overcoming the biological limited character o f his body. The whole world thus became a “h um an” world; while this aspect o f the world had an epistemological meaning in empiriomonism, tectological egression is an expression of a technologically oriented anthropocentrism . Machines perm it highly productive egressions, while the p ro letariat’s spirit o f brotherly co operation forestalls an unjust distribution o f products which are results of a planned “distribution” of nature in acts o f its appropriation.
The opposite mechanism, degression (from the Latin word m eaning “to step down”), petrifies the system, providing it with a skeleton. W hat is it needed for? Tectological progress, argued Bogdanov, which relies on versatile plasticity, leads to a growing com plication o f organizational forms. This, of course, has a positive effect on the num ber o f possible com binations. However, there is also an undersirable side to it—degression enhances the whole structure’s fragility, m aking the system m ore vulnerable. This causes an intrinsic contradiction, because growth o f organization in one direction weakens this process in all other directions. A stabilizing m echanism is needed. The degressive p art, which is the stabilizing element, sort o f separates itself from the com plex’s internal dynamics, while m aking it at all possible. Thus, for instance, “symbols record and protect against disintegration the vivid plastic fabric o f mental pictures, in full analogy to the skeleton which petrifies the vivid plastic tissue o f colloidal proteins o f our b o d y ”.23 Language, which records and channels hum an experience, has a special part to play in this, being the ideological expression o f productive activeness. But it should be remembered, the Russian philosopher goes on to say, th at as
23 Ibid., p. 363.
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forms o f degression, “ideological forms [...] in the process o f development are m ore conservative than their socio-productive foundation— which is the m ore plastic of the two parts o f the social system; ideological forms persist even when that p art has long outgrown it”.24 W ith this very simple proposition Bogdanov “resolved” the difficult problem of what are the mutual relations between the historical production by people o f opportunities for the preservation of hum an lives and the universal validity o f their symbolic behaviors, a question Marxists have never been able to resolve. Bogdanov’s philosophy itself strongly implies th at all forms o f what is called ideology, especially language, are closely determ ined by the level o f production, and so it makes little sense to talk, say, about any natural continuity o f some language in time. If at all, we ought to speak o f “several” languages depending on the level o f m aterial production any given nationality has reached. This comes close to the notorious theory o f N. M arr, and is in fact untenable. On the other hand, the belief that degressive ideological forms, above all language, always lag behind the level o f production is obviously in contradiction with Bogdanov’s own statem ent that „existence and thinking are essentially the same thing”. It is a case o f either-or, then; either existence, in the Bogdanov sense we are already familiar with, “precedes” the forms (complexes) of com m unication between people, in which case it is surprising that people should make their lives unnecessarily difficult using an “obsolete” code, or else production engineering generates comm uni cation codes while natural languages gradually cease to be different from m an-m ade languages; it is to be surmised, by the way, th at with time language in proletarian culture, too, will be different. It should be observed that Bogdanov drew his linguistic knowledge chiefly from Louis N oiré.25 Egression and degression are not just mutually contradictory. Often enough a structure’s centre is less plastic than its peripheries. Either the two mechanisms operate parallelly or else they refer to different activenesses which then should be identified and distinguished from each other. “Worldwide egression is progressing, gradually subordinating nature to m ankind; worldwide degression records every step in this process, circumscribing and stabilizing it in space and tim e”.26
3. T H E D ISIN TE G R A TIO N O F COM PLEXES (CRISIS)
A systematic or abrupt deform ation o f a complex’s internal equilibrium may ultimately result in violating its tectological boundary, that is, in disinte gration. Bogdanov described such a state o f things as crisis. Most generally, a crisis occurs wherever a new form appears in lieu o f a previously existing one. Like all notions used in tectology, this latter too is relative,
2* Ibid., p. 377.
25 Cf. D . G rille, L e n in s R iv a le ..., p p . 79ff. 26 A. B ogd an o v , T eklologia, vol. 2, p. 383.
" T h e Science o f the F uture" 163
dependent on the studied—and hence artificially isolated—environm ent. To Bogdanov, all the dynamics o f nature, the richness o f its energy transform a tions are a perm anent string o f crises; owing to continual disintegrations, ever new forms arise giving way to subsequent ones, and so on. “The notion o f crisis is of universal validity for tectology. It is a vantage point applied to whatever occurs in experience; changes take place, and every one o f them can be interpreted as a difference o f form between the initial and the term inal states”.27 It follows th at the mechanisms o f development and dynamics o f forms (ingression, disingression, etc.) we considered up to now were forces acting in a homogeneous natural dom ain. T hat dom ain is the crisis o f continually organizing forms o f experience—o f the world. So, we can safely say th at in its most profound m ethodological reflection tectology wants to point at the crisis as a fundam ental mechanism of development in n atu re’s energetic metabolism. However, although he was not very reticent about the particular tectological mechanisms he envisaged, Bogdanov spoke about the tectology o f the “base” rather m odestly; both “crisis” and “experience” are nowhere to be found in any accurate explorative description. There are two crises, then. One is called the C crisis (for conjugation). It takes place when full disingression o f form is either halted or abolished; what happens is simply the halting o f differentiation as a new complex is being created. The other type o f crisis is called D crisis (for disjunction), which consists in the creation o f full disingressions and new boundaries o f complexes. The two mechanisms are separated from each other only in theory, for in reality they always go along each other. Always, too, C is the starting point, while D is the final phase. All hum an work, for example, is in the view o f Bogdanov nothing b u t a never-ending string o f C crises. Its outcom e (human activeness + complexes o f nature) is a certain condition o f equilibrium (new form = product), including the concluding D crisis corresponding in type. It is difficult to withstand the tem ptation to quip at this point th at tectology liberally sheds assurances and sweeping generalizations in which breadth o f vision often vies for the better with epistemological futility.
T E C T O L O G Y A N D D IA L E C T IC S
The above presentation o f the m ain ideas o f tectology which, in B ogdanov’s own exposition, makes rather dull reading as he supplies it with a host o f meticulous and all-too-obvious examples, gives readers an idea o f what Bogdanov thought about dialectics. He granted it a certain value on account o f its resusciation— as he p u t it— o f the “contradictions” which are inherent in notions as well as objects; albeit we have already pointed out that Bogdanov criticized precisely M arx for using the formalistic Hegelian m ethod. It should be pointed out in this connection that although the R ussian’s philosophical
164 M a re k S tyc zy ń sk i
scope was basically different from Hegel’s in that he subscribed to diametrically different intellectual orientations, Bogdanov had an exceptionally low opinion o f Hegel, an attitude he seems to have borrow ed mainly from Engels. So, Bogdanov shared all positivists’ typical aversion to Hegelian speculation.
Tectological dialectics— a term coined by Bogdanov himself— views its subject inseparably from the environment, which is unlike formal tectology. The often-quoted three phases o f Hegelian dialectics, simplified into the Engelsian grain or boiling water (cf. the Anty-Diihring), are reinterpreted by Bogdanov through what we already know as a cycle o f crises. In phase one, an organizational act is determined by the C crisis (conjugation). Phase 2 is the D crisis (disjunction) along with the derivative and subsidiary C-type crises. Phase 3, finally» ends in the form ation o f the system as a whole on the basis o f the C crisis with derivative and subsidiary Z)-type crises. In the first, conjugative phase, then, some external factors are incorporated into the system; in the second phase the system begins to differentiate along with concom itant “contradictions” (a disorganizing moment). In the third and final phase, the system again consolidates and the given phase o f development ends. The resulting complex then undergoes a new cycle o f crises.
Sickness, for instance, is described in this way by Bogdanov: * C crisis— bacteria invade the body,
* D crisis— sickness develops,
* C crisis—recovery or death.
“One thing should be regarded as a real contradiction, namely the struggle o f concrete forces, o f opposite activenesses”,28 Bogdanov underlines. So, when Engels wrote about the dialectics o f m otion (a body, at any given m oment, is in one place and in another, that is, it is, and is not, at the given place), then this classic o f M arxism essentially differs in no sense from Zeno o f Elea. W hat both Engels and Zeno in fact did was to lay bare the self-contradiction o f two notions: “to be there” and “not to be there”. They did not touch upon the contradiction or opposition o f real forces. But w hat does the contradiction between notions really mean if not idealism at its purest? This is, says Bogdanov, what comes of translating the realness of physical experience into the confusing vocabulary o f Hegelian terminology.
T H E T E L E O L O G Y O F T E C T O L O G Y
In his energetistic mechanicism Bogdanov reconstructs, in a sense, the position o f Aristotle, to whom the form o f things simply am ounted to energy. Form, as the essence o f being, was so precisely on account o f energetizing potential o f m atter. Only the materia prim a is truly pure, but we do not know it. In B ogdanov’s theory, too, there is no “m atter” at all, because, to
28 A. B ogdanov, Filosofia. . . , op. c it., p. 190. See a lso : K . M . Jensen, B eyo n d M a rx and M ach, A leksander Bogdanov's P hilosophy o f Living E xperience, D o rd re c h t 1987.
"T h e Science o f the F uture" 165 use Heidegger’s words, “the essence o f m aterialism is not in the proposition
that everything is m atter alone but rather in the metaphysical definition o f it which implies th at every being manifests itself as the m aterial which is the object o f w ork”.29 M atter which manifests itself in the process o f work is, in B ogdanov’s philosophy, a series o f successive energy levels which, as L. K o łakowski pertinently observed, result “from a reduction o f hum an beings to animal forms o f the assimilating w orld” 30 Energy viewed not as substance but as incessant natural change involving people and observable and measurable by scientific m ethods, is basically the indestructible eidos o f the universe by virtue o f the law o f its preservation. No wonder, then, th a t “the mechanistic point o f view is the only organizing point of view in victories in the bid to overcome science’s diversity” .31 This proposition involves a certain awkward implication Bogdanov never seems to have fully realized. Viewing the universe as a single huge mechanism, Bogdanov actually does n o t—despite what a cursory survey o f tectology may suggest—study the mechanism o f individual natural complexes but the dynamics o f change behind it. Energy, according to Bogdanov, is n ot substance. W hat he is really interested in are not parts o f mechanisms but their m utual cooperation in their full uncountable variety, along with his desire to reduce it to a few fundam ental laws. While mechanicism is his point o f departure, the dynamism of energy complexes is his real subject-matter. N aturally, the best m ethodo logy he could think o f for this purpose was physicalism, which Bogdanov interpreted as “abstract analytical induction”. “It is the abstract m ethod alone that can yield true and universal tectological laws”, whereas “tectology in its m ethods combines the abstract symbolics of m athematics with the experimental character o f the natural siences”.32
This, o f course, is a greatly exaggerated claim, because no rigorous, m ethodologist of the natural sciences would endorse tectology’s com m on sense assertions. On the other hand, though, it should be acknowledged that the Russian philosopher’s science o f organization was an attem pt to update M arxism, to bring it closer to latest findings o f science.
Stephen Cohen says that “by the early 1900s m echanical equilibrium models (especially dynamic ones) had spread from physics and biology to the social sciences [...] and then, as today, equilibrium theory was an im portant part o f Western sociological and economic though t”.33 The
29 M. H eidegger, Building, L iving, T h inking [Polish tran s la tio n ], W arsa w 1977, p. 102. E nglish tra n s la tio n : The A lienation o f Reason.
-,0 L. K o łak o w sk i. Filozofia p o zy tyw isty c zn a (od H u m e ’a do Kola W iedeńskiego) [Positivist P hilosophy, fr o m H u m e to the Vienna Circle], W arsaw 1966, p . 299. E nglish tra n s la tio n : The A lienation o f Reason.
31 A. B ogdanov, T ektologia, vol. 1, p. 51. ?2 Ibid., pp. 88, 89.
S. C o h en , B ukharin and the B olshevik R evolution, N ew Y o rk 1975, p. 118. See a lso : T. S u silu o to , The O rigins and D evelopm ent o f S y stem s Thinking in the S oviet Union. P olitical and P hilosophical C ontroversies fr o m B ogdanov a n d B ukharin to P resent-D ay R e-E valuations, H elsinki 1982.
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“Bogdanov term inology” used by Bukharin in his Theory o f Historical
Materialism is, according to Cohen, similar in m any aspects to P areto ’s
form ulations from his Trattato di sociologia generale. This terminology is also close to the vocabulary o f m odern sociological theories.34
Above all, however, tectology, Aristotelian in spirit as it is, had to have its entelechy. This was “the organization o f productive forces and means o f
production into a planned and functional system: it is the organization o f people and things into a purposeful whole",35 said Bogdanov (italics added).
N a tu re ’s energy potentials are realized when people take them into their hands. The from -creating social activeness incessantly produces new configu rations o f energy complexes which prom ptly become involved in an evolutio nary interplay with the environm ent o f their makers, whereby the environment itself is incessantly undergoing internal stratification, strengthening its progressive elements and eliminating weaker, regressive ones. The adaptive functionality o f the entire social structure and its productive creativity is thus constantly in a state o f dynamic transform ations, finding its most conspicuous expression during the past century in the deepening class differen tiation along with the struggle o f classes for the products o f the division o f labor. The anarchy (disingression) o f society’s class structure, in the light o f tectology, will give way to the only conceivable outcome of the social process o f labor, namely to “the centralized planned distribution of products in accordance with production organization” . This, too, is “the
true tectological solution o f the problem set by the epoch”36 (italics added).
But, does tectology indeed stand up to this task? If we forget Bogdanov’s social visions for a while, we m ay find we should above all agree with one praxiologist today who says “the inventory o f generalizations furnished by the Tectology is rather p o o r— they are almost exclusively platitudes”.37 In their fundam ental presentation, the m ain ideas o f Bogdanov’s science of organization are trivially simple: the given whole (complex, problem , etc.) m ust be considered in relation to its environm ent; com ponents o f this whole join together o r fall ap art under a necessary mediating function; the whole usually comes into conflict with its environm ent which modifies its viability and directions o f transform ation; the system will begin to lose its viability in its weakest link; some centers inside the system “harden it u p ” or activate it; every system is inevitably doom ed to change, becoming increasingly “geared” to its environm ent; as a result o f one system’s crisis (disintegration) a new system emerges, and so on. These are all generalities which are both true and accepted in good faith by Bogdanov, because the desired “organization o f people and things into a purposeful whole” does look quite suspicious in their light. Tectology will not tell us how the
organizer-execu-34 Ibid., p . 119.
35 A. B o g d an o v , Tektologia, vol. 1, p. 20. 36 Ibid., vol. 2, p . 306.
“T h e Science o f the F u tu re" 167
tor, or worker, is able to control production thanks to the machine in a “planned and functional” manner. Even if we accepted the ridiculous contention that the entire proletariat, endowed with socialist teaching (tecto- logy), is the general planner, we still would not know which lines o f p ro duction should be chosen, which hum an needs should be m et before others, or which should be recognized as second-rate problems. W hat should be done if the production o f some goods is incompatible with the production o f other goods? Should all produce everything or should there be productive specialization, which would be conducive to divisions inside the collective? W hat should be done to prevent the emergence of leading elites either due to better education or because they concentrated initiative and com petences? In one o f his novels (The Red Star), Bogdanov presents a perfectly organized society on M ars whose rhythm o f work, place and time of existence are determined by a “central statistical m echanism ” . W orking people are supplied by it with inform ation about who is to work where, for how many hours, and what jobs will have to be filled in the future. Bogdanov thus presumes the existence o f some kind o f super-brain. W ho is to become such a super-brain under conditions existing on E arth? And, does not this proposal, instead of the desired liberation o f labor, m ean its totalitarian enslavement? It is o f course risky to draw examples from literary fiction, from a book Bogdanov himself called a utopia. But the vision o f an ideal M arsian society can certainly be recognized as the a u th o r’s porte-parole when, in his time, he failed to see any possibility o f getting his views to materialize on Earth. Was it not utopias which for centuries used to be treated as an expression o f hope and faith in the desired social order? In his Encounters with Utopias (in Polish), Jerzy Szacki gives an eloquent account o f the p art utopias played in endeavors to make the existing world a better place to live. But in that otherwise excellent book you will findt no discussion o f Bogdanov, a philosopher whose ideas often might vie for the better with Fourier’s. W hat else if not this is the proposal for a “tectological struggle against ageing” by way o f transfusions o f fresh blood which, as Kołakowski put it, “was for Bogdanov one o f the techniques proving m ankind’s biological community and fitted well into his ‘collectivist’ view o f the w orld” ?38 Transfusion, incidentally, was the cause o f Bogdanov’s own death.
Equally debatable is the internal differentiation o f a new social com plex— the collective comm unity o f workers. In Empiriomonism the whole thing was summed up by the single statem ent that “one society will rem ain, with one ideology”.39 But from the Tectology you will learn that “collective society is a highly differentiated system and between its com ponents or different
38 L. K o łak o w sk i, Główne n urty m arksizm u [The M ain C urrents o f M a rx ism ], vol. 2, P a ris 1977, pp. 445f.
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areas of life new and new differences will keep arising. Just what differences those will be we are at this stage unable to say in a scientific sense; all we can say is, they will not be differences o f legal status, or o f class, or o f economic status, because all these are precluded on account o f the above- -given explanations. For new tasks, there will always be new m ethods”.40 We thus learn nothing about the collectivist com m unity’s internal dynamics, which should probably be governed by the same kind o f fundam ental laws as previous social structures incorporated into the circulation o f tectological dependences. Were this untrue, tectology would be valid only for precol lectivist communities, but nowhere in Bogdanov’s texts will you find the reservation that the “universal science o f organization” is limited in this sense. In particular, we will not be told why an all-embracing collectivist and productive organization which abolishes all existing antagonisms and social divisions and leads to a new friendly and comradely equality o f labor
(tovarishcheskoie ravenstvo truda) should result in the disappearance of egoistic
desires on the part o f the collective com m unity’s members? After all, internal tensions and differences in activenesses-resistances of social existence in its relation to the surrounding nature were up to then a stim ulator of development, especially o f the means o f production so dear to Bogdanov. Driven by selfish interests, people admittedly exploited each other mercilessly, b u t— in keeping with the mechanisms o f natural selection, as Bogdanov never tires o f emphasizing— this only reinforced processes o f internal differentia tion and complication (through crises) of m ankind’s energy potential, leading production engineering to higher and higher levels. W ould, then, “machinism” m ark the end to the social structure’s internal dynamics as members of the collectivist culture were melting into a perfectly anonymous mass, which could be distinguished only depending on the instrum ent which is applied? Bogdanov, incidentally, was aware o f the danger o f unification of workers, pointing out that ties inside a collective strengthen on the ground of homogeneous type of work but th at individuals count in this not as anonymous factors but as “individualities” (not, of course, in the sense o f capitalist, anarchistic individualism). This m atter then surfaced in B ogdanov’s polemic with A. Gastev, a top member o f the Prolekult.
As said before, tectology regards every part o f m atter—m an included— in the effigy o f energy, though in different forms. Apparently, then, the direction o f change o f m atter— since it is impossible to grasp all the factors which take part in shaping m atter—is in fact fortuitous, or no definite purpose can be detected in the interaction between nature and society. Their dialogue, mediated by the developing tools and also generating a secondary internal societal stratification, which Bogdanov calls culture, is not the implem entation o f any universal plan o f history whereby society moves necessarily from prim ordial culture to collectivism. Such fatalism would be
" T h e Science o f the F u tu re" 169 essentially alien to the activist orientation o f Bogdanov’s philosophy the polemical point o f which, as will be remembered, was directed against Plekhanov’s objectivist and deterministic brand o f M arxism. M an is a homo
faber in his energetic forms. He transform s nature and perfects his tools
whereas the successive forms o f the culture he produces exist “side by side” with one another, as a better-adjusted organ supersedes a worse- -adapted one. Having said this one might conclude, then, that nature itself, as the dom ain of hum an activity, would be “fortuitous”, a perfect kind of evidence o f this is the discontinuity o f hum an culture, the absence o f "perpetual and universal tru th s”, the derivability o f products of the hum an mind (science, the arts) from the level o f technical instrum ents o f production. The point, however, is that Bogdanov right from the beginning o f his argument, and also voicing what were certainly his desires— a fact rather incompatible with scientific description— consistently reduced n atu re’s energy dynamics to indicating its purpose. This also vindicates the basically Aristotelian interpretation o f his work. Tectology is not only a science o f changes o f the universe. These changes have their terminal point, which is a point of maximum organization. “There is an objective purpose in nature. This is a result o f the world-wide struggle o f organizational forms in which ‘purpose- -less’ or ‘less purposeful’ forms disintegrate and perish, while ‘m ore purposeful’ ones endure; this is what natural selection actually is” 41 (italics added). These words were written by an author who prom ptly added that the notion o f “purposefulness” was just a m etaphor. But this did not change the fact that Bogdanov “im parted sense” to n ature’s energy dynamics in that he gave it a teleological interpretation. Let us ju st point out here that this was by no means a new idea. The entire Aristotelian form ation of A rab philosophers (Avicenna, Averroes), and, before them, Strato, Alexander o f Aphrodisia, later David o f D inant, and finally G iordano Bruno, all “enter tained the notion o f m atter-in-process, m atter which itself has different forms and is constantly capable o f further development; whatever new arises in the world, does not arise due to the action o f any force outside the world but is a disclosure o f potentials inherent in m atter itself. There is no distinction, then, between m atter and form, bu t forms are overt or hidden qualities o f one substrate, the natura natur ans”. 42 This, too, is the fundam ental message o f tectology in which every experience is some organization which supersedes a worse-organized experience; this is construed to m ean that the existing state of m atter must, in virtue of its built-in necessity, move tow ard a condition closer to the ideal, i.e. to the full organization o f this m atter, into a state o f ideal harm ony, o f fulfillment.43 From the observation that
41 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 66f.
42 L. K o łak o w sk i, Główne n u r ty ..., vol. 3, P a ris 1978, p. 435.
43 “T he c h ie f sense o f the n o tio n o f pro g ress is th e sa m e: the g ro w in g fullness an d h a rm o n y o f conscio u sn ess [...] . Since social life is re d u cib le to the in n er life o f m em b ers o f society, the idea o f p ro g ress in its essence is th e sam e in this respect t o o — in creasin g the
