Ct. ofApp.] The Young Sid. [Ct. of App.
to say t h a t th e re is a n y r u le b y w h ic h he can be h o u n d .” N o w , as t o t h e supposed ru le la id d o w n b y L o r d P h illim o r e in The C anton (sup .), I desire t o say, first, o f a ll, t h a t I do n o t t h in k he was la y in g d o w n m o re t h a n a s u g g e s tio n w h ic h w o u ld be co n sid e re d b y a n y sub seq ue nt c o u rt w h ic h h a d a s im ila r set o f fa c ts b e fo re i t . S eco nd ly, i f he w as in te n d in g t o la y d o w n such a ru le , he was g o in g c o n tr a r y t o t h e d e c is io n in th e H o u s e o f L o rd s in C am pbell v . P o lia k (sup .), a n d I n o tic e t h a t a lth o u g h he sa t o n t h e ap pe al as t o th e m e r its i n C am pbell v . P o lia k (su p .) he Was n o t one o f th e seven la w lo rd s w h o s a t to co n sid e r th e p r e lim in a r y q u e s tio n o f ju r is d ic tio n a n d th e q u e s tio n o f a p pe al. I t m a y be, th e re fo re , t h a t he h a d n o t in h is m in d so c le a rly as he w o u ld o th e rw is e h a v e h a d w h a t th e H o use o f L o rd s in fa c t d e cid e d in t h e case o f Cam pbell v . P o lia k (su p .) as t o th e u n fe tte re d
to de cid e w h e th e r th e re is a ru le b in d in g th e d is c re tio n o f th e ju d g e t h a t w h e re b o th vessels a re h e ld e q u a lly t o b la m e th e re s h a ll be no costs w h a te v e r success t h e a p p e lla n t has o n th e a p pe al, such a c o n te n tio n is , in m y v ie w , erroneous. S im ila r ly , w i t h g re a t re s p e c t t o th e P re sid e n t, i f I t h o u g h t he was s a y in g : “ T h e re ls a s e ttle d ru le o f t h is c o u r t w h ic h w e are b o u n d to a c t u p o n in t h e D iv is io n a l C o u rt,” I t h in k e q u a lly he is w ro n g . B u t as I re a d th e pre si- [fe n t’ s ju d g m e n t, I t h in k he is n o t d o in g m o re th a n s a y in g th e re is n o t a s e ttle d ru le , because ' L o r d P h illim o r e s a id so in t h a t case, I re fe r to a n o th e r d e c is io n (T he C ito (s u p .), in th e H ouse o f L o rd s , w h ic h s a id th e o p p o s ite , a n d t re fe r t o th e de cisio n (T he T y c n o o rd (su p .) in
■iwabey’ s R e p o rts , w h ic h s a id th e o p p o s ite ; an d we fr e q u e n tly r u le i n th e o p p o s ite d ire c tio n ln t h is c o u rt.
I n m y v ie w , w h a t t h e P re s id e n t has done, P a r tic u la r ly h a v in g re g a rd t o th e la s t sentence
° t h is ju d g m e n t, is th is . H e has s a id : “ I n
° '* r d is c re tio n we t h in k t h a t t h is is a case in W hich th e a p p e lla n t, w h o has p a r t ly succeeded
** h is ap p e a l, s h o u ld h a v e th e costs o f t h a t Par t i a l success, because he h a d t o com e he re t o g e t i t . ”
S p e a k in g o f m y o w n e xp e rie n ce in t h is c o u r t I e'OTnivlon l a w cases (a n d , I a m s o r r y t o say, . . h a v e h a d t h ir t e e n y e a rs ’ e xp e rie n ce he re ), e q u e s tio n is c o n s ta n tly a ris in g . A n a p p e l- nt b rin g s a v e r y w id e -s w e e p in g a p p e a l, a n d
^Ucceeds in p a r t. I t is s a id o n th e one side : Tt ■ 6 ^ o w m u c h th e a p p e lla n t has fa ile d in . ” c sa\d o n th e o th e r side : “ A h , b u t he suc- i t ” Cd *n f ^ ‘ s a n d h e h a d t o com e he re t o g e t
; a n d th e c o u r t a c ts o n n o s e ttle d ru le o f ea i, 1Ce’ h u t considers th e c irc u m s ta n c e s o f D r ' t CaSe ant^ considers w h e th e r th e a p p ro - P la te o rd e r w o u ld be, i n v ie w o f th e fa c t t h a t e aP P e lla n t has fa ile d in a la rg e p a r t o f th e w h t n ’ t 0 m a 'te a special o rd e r as t o costs, o r s , e h e r . h e has succeeded in a s u ffic ie n tly 0rJ t a n t ia l a m o u n t t o ju s t i f y g iv in g h im th e
®ts ° f a p pe al.
to ^ ^ o u ld h k c t o say, as has been p o in te d o u t e b y m y b r o th e r S a n k c y — as n o d o u b t he Vo l. X V I I I . , N . S.
w i l l h im s e lf p o in t o u t— t h a t circ u m s ta n c e s h a v e v e r y m u c h a lte re d since th e M a r itim e C o n v e n tio n s A c t e n a b le d y o u t o d e p a rt fr o m t h e o ld r u s tic r u le o f e q u a l b la m e a n d t o g iv e p ro p o rtio n s o f tw o - th ir d s a n d o n e - th ir d , one- q u a r te r a n d th re e -q u a rte rs — I do n o t k n o w h o w fa r a t p re s e n t in th e m a tte r o f p ro p o rtio n s th e A d m ir a lt y C o u rt has gone. T h e p o w e r o f v a r y in g p ro p o rtio n s o b v io u s ly raises such a lo t o f d iffe re n t c irc u m s ta n c e s t h a t a n u n fe tte re d d is c re tio n is a t h in g w h ic h s h o u ld be le f t t o t h e ju d g e o f th e A d m ir a lt y C o u rt, a n d w h ic h , in m y v ie w , is le f t t o h im b y O rd e r L X V . , r . 1, w h ic h has th e fo rc e o f a s ta tu te .
T h e r e s u lt is t h a t w e decide t h a t th e ques
t io n o f th e p re v io u s p ra c tic e s o f th e c o u r t are im m a te r ia l. I f in t h is case th e P re s id e n t h a d p u r p o r te d t o say, “ I use n o d is c re tio n a n d a c t o n th e p re v io u s p ra c tic e o f th e c o u r t,” w e s h o u ld ha ve sen t i t b a c k to h im in o rd e r t h a t he m ig h t use h is u n fe tte re d d is c re tio n . B u t as, in m y v ie w , th e D iv is io n a l C o u rt h a v e used t h e ir d is c re tio n , i t fo llo w s t h a t th e re is no g ro u n d fo r su g g e stin g t h a t t h e y are b o u n d b y a p re v io u s ru le o f p ra c tic e t o de cide o th e rw is e ; a n d th e a p pe al, th e re fo re , m u s t be dism issed w i t h costs.
Greer, L . J .—I agree. T h e p re s e n t re s p o n d e n t, w h o w as a p p e lla n t in th e c o u r t b e lo w , was c o m p la in in g o f th e fin d in g o f th e le a rn e d C o u n ty C o u rt ju d g e t h a t p u t u p o n h im tw o - th ir d s o f th e dam ages caused b y a c o llis io n . H e asked t h e C o u rt o f A p p e a l t o say t h a t he was n o t re s p o n s ib le f o r a n y o f t h e dam age, a n d s a id he o u g h t t o h a v e h a d ju d g m e n t w i t h costs.
H e also asked th e c o u r t, a n d i t was open t o th e c o u r t, t o say t h a t th e p r o p o r tio n o f th e dam ages p u t u p o n h im w as n o t th e r ig h t p r o p o r tio n , a n d t h a t i t o u g h t t o be s o m e th in g less. T h e D iv is io n a l C o u rt h e ld t h a t i t o u g h t t o be som e
t h in g less, a n d t h a t i t o u g h t to be h a lf-a n d -h a lf.
I t fo llo w s fr o m t h a t t h a t th e ap pe al fr o m th e C o u n ty C o u rt was p a r t ia lly successful a n d a re m e d y was o b ta in e d b y th e a p p e lla n t t h a t he c o u ld n o t h a v e g o t w ith o u t b r in g in g th e m a tte r b e fo re th e D iv is io n a l C o u rt. F o r m y s e lf, I s h o u ld h a v e th o u g h t, a lth o u g h th e re is n o ru le b in d in g th e d is c re tio n o f th e c o u rt, t h a t t h a t w as p r im d fa c ie a reason w h y th e p re s e n t re s p o n d e n t, th e a p p e lla n t b e lo w , s h o u ld h a v e th e ge ne ral costs o f th e a p p e a l. H o w e v e r, i t was a rg u e d b y th o s e w h o a p p e a r f o r th e p re s e n t a p p e lla n t t h a t th e re w as a p ra c tic e o f th e c o u r t t h a t i n th o s e c irc u m s ta n c e s th e re s h o u ld be n o costs o n e ith e r side, a n d t h a t th e p ra c tic e o f th e c o u r t w as so s tro n g as t o a m o u n t t o a r u le o f la w t h a t i n th o se c irc u m s ta n c e s th e c o u r t m u s t o rd e r each p a r t y t o b e a r h is o w n costs.
L e a v e t o ap pe al was asked f o r b y M r . H o lm a n i n the se te rm s : “ I d o n o t w is h t o a p p e a l as t o th e exercise o f d is c re tio n , b u t m y p o in t w i ll be t h a t costs in a case o f t h is s o rt are a m a tte r o f p r in c ip le , a n d t h a t th e p r in c ip le has been la id . d o w n in The C anton (s u p .), a n d t h a t i t is n o t n o w open t o t h is c o u r t t o exercise a d is c re tio n on th e q u e s tio n o f costs in a n a p p e a l w h e re a
E
Ct. of App.] The Young Sid. [Ct. of App.
ju d g m e n t has been v a r ie d so t h a t b o th vessels n re h e ld e q u a lly t o b la m e .” H e w as th e re a s k in g li b e r t y t o raise a p o in t o f la w — th e q u e s tio n as t o w h e th e r th e re w as a n y d is c re tio n s t i l l le f t op en t o th e c o u rt, a n d i t is o n ly u p o n th e p o in t o f la w t h a t he o b ta in e d le ave to a p p e a l ; a n d t h a t is th e o n ly q u e s tio n o f la w w i t h w h ic h w e h a v e t o de al. T h e r u le d e a lin g w i t h th e costs i n a ll pro cee din gs i n t h e S uprem e C o u r t, w h ic h in c lu d e s pro cee din gs b y w a y o f a p p e a l t o th e P ro b a te C o u rt, as w e ll as a n y o th e r pro cee din gs i n th e S up rem e C o u rt, i n c lu d in g , o f course, proceedings b e fo re th e C o u rt o f A p p e a l, is O rd e r L X V . , r . 1. T h a t r u le says t h is : “ S u b je c t t o th e p ro v is io n s o f th e A c ts a n d these ru le s th e costs o f a n d in c id e n t t o a ll pro cee din gs in th e S up rem e C o u rt, i n c lu d in g th e a d m in is tr a tio n o f estates a n d tr u s ts , s h a ll be i n th e d is c re tio n o f th e c o u r t o r ju d g e ; p ro v id e d t h a t n o th in g h e re in c o n ta in e d s h a ll d e p riv e a n e x e c u to r, a d m in is tra to r , tru s te e o r m o rtg a g e e w h o has n o t u n re a s o n a b ly in s t it u t e d o r c a rrie d o n o r re s is te d a n y p r o ceedings, o f a n y r ig h t t o costs o u t o f a p a r tic u la r e s ta te o r fu n d ” — a n d th e n i t goes o n t o deal w i t h w h a t is t o h a p p e n w h e n th e re is a t r i a l b y j u r y — “ p ro v id e d also t h a t , w h e re a n y a c tio n , cause, m a t t e r o r issue is t r ie d w i t h a ju r y , th e costs s h a ll fo llo w th e e v e n t, unless th e ju d g e b y w h o m such a c tio n , cause, m a tte r , o r issue is t r ie d , o r th e c o u rt, s h a ll, f o r go od cause, o th e r w ise o rd e r.” T h e re is a c le a r d is tin c tio n d ra w n b e tw e e n th e d is c re tio n w h ic h is a llo w e d t o a ju d g e w h o tr ie s a case w it h o u t a ju r y , a n d w h a t h is po w e rs are w h e n th e case is t r ie d w i t h a ju r y . W h e n th e case is t r ie d w i t h a ju r y th e costs fo llo w th e e v e n t, unless th e le a rn e d ju d g e c an fin d go od cause f o r o th e rw is e o rd e rin g : a n d th e q u e s tio n as t o w h a t is a go od cause is q u ite c le a r ly a m a t t e r o f la w , a n d th e re ha ve been a n u m b e r o f decisions o n th e q u e s tio n as t o w h a t is o r is n o t go od cause. B u t no such q u e s tio n ca n arise w h e re t h e case is t r ie d w ith o u t a ju r y . T h e re y o u h a v e o n ly t o lo o k t o th e f ir s t p a r t o f th e r u le t o see w h a t th e la w is u p o n th e s u b je c t ; a n d th e la w is t h a t th e ju d g e is t o exercise his d is c re tio n .
N o w , n a t u r a lly , b u t pe rha ps u n fo r tu n a te ly , th e re g re w u p th e h a b it o f ju d g e s w h o w e re t r y in g cases alo n e o f s ta tin g , w h e n t h e y w ere d e a lin g w i t h costs, w h a t w ere th e reasons t h a t in flu e n c e d t h e ir ju d g m e n t in g iv in g th e costs t o t h e p l a in t if f o r th e d e fe n d a n t, as th e case m ig h t be ; a n d g r a d u a lly th o se decisions a p p e a r t o h a v e becom e c o n s id e re d t o be de cisio ns o n q u e s tio n s o f la w , w hereas th e y w e re n o t de cisions o n q u e s tio n s o f la w a t a ll.
I t cam e t o be a lm o s t t h e fa c t t h a t th e re w ere as m a n y de cisions l i m it in g th e d is c re tio n o f t h e ju d g e in a ease w h ic h was t r ie d b y a ju d g e alo n e as th e re w e re in a case w h ic h was t r ie d b y a j u r y w h e re good cause h a d t o be m a d e o u t. T h e p o s itio n so re m a in e d u n t il th e d e c is io n i n th e H o u se o f L o rd s in D o n a ld C am pbell a n d Co. L im ite d v . P o lia k (s u p .), w h e re a t t e n tio n was re d ire c te d b y th e H o u s e » o f L o rd s t o th e w o rd s o f th e ru le , a n d i t was h e ld t h a t n e ith e r t h e ju d g e s o f f ir s t in s ta n c e
n o r th e C o u rt o f A p p e a l c o u ld la y d o w n lim it s as t o w h a t d is c re tio n c o u ld , o r c o u ld n o t, be exe rcise d b y a ju d g e t r y in g a case w ith o u t a ju r y , e x c e p t t o t h e e x te n t t o w h ic h m y L o r d has re fe rre d w h e re t o t a l ly ir r e le v a n t co n s id e ra tio n s h a d a d m itte d ly in flu e n c e d th e ju d g e in g iv in g h is decisio n.
T h e q u e s tio n arises n o w as t o w h e th e r o r n o t th e ju d g e d id exercise h is d is c re tio n . T h e p ra c tic e b e fore th e d e cisio n was g iv e n in t h is case i n t h e A d m ir a lt y C o u rt as t o h o w th e d is c re tio n s h o u ld be exercised was a p p a re n tly n o t u n ifo r m ; a n d t h e ju d g e s b e lo w in th e A d m ir a lt y C o u rt t h o u g h t a p p a re n tly t h a t th e p ra c tic e was i n fa v o u r o f th e v ie w w h ic h th e y to o k , n a m e ly , t h a t th e a p p e lla n t h a v in g succeeded in p a r t s h o u ld h a v e h is costs. B u t I c a n n o t re a d th e ju d g m e n t as m e a n in g t h a t th e y w ere la y in g t h a t d o w n as a m a tte r o f la w . T h e y w ere e n title d t o ta k e in t o c o n s id e ra tio n th e re c e n t p ra c tic e as th e y k n e w i t t o be, a n d I re a d th e la s t p a ra g ra p h o f t h e ir ju d g m e n t as m e a n in g t h a t, ta k in g t h a t in t o a c c o u n t, a n d ta k in g e v e r y th in g else in to a c c o u n t in th e case, th e re w e re s u b s ta n tia l g ro u n d s o f a p pe al, a n d th e a p p e lla n ts succeeded in th e ap pe al o n th o se s u b s ta n tia l g ro u n d s , a n d t h a t , th e re fo re , th e y o u g h t t o h a v e t h e ir costs o f th e ap peal.
F o r th o se reasons I t h in k t h a t t h is ap pe al s h o u ld be dism issed w i t h costs.
Sankey, L . J . — I agree. A s I a m n o t f a m ilia r w i t h t h e A d m ir a lt y p ra c tic e , I h a v e v e n tu re d t o send f o r a n d t o lo o k a t a w e ll-k n o w n tre a tis e o n th e p ra c tic e in th e E n g lis h C o u rts o f A d m ir a lt y , th e t h i r d e d itio n o f W illia m s a n d B ru c e o n A d m ir a lt y P ra c tic e , w h ic h was e d ite d b y t h e la te M r . J u s tic e B ru c e a n d p u b lis h e d in 1902 ; a n d I t h in k th e re m u s t h a v e been some s o rt o f— I w i ll n o t say ru le , because I w a n t t o use t h e v a g u e s t s o rt o f w o rd , b u t som e s o rt o f u n d e rs ta n d in g such as is c o n te n d e d fo r b y M r . D u n lo p . I t is s ta te d on p . 97 : “ W h e re b o th ships are t o b la m e , i t is th e g e n e ra l r u le t h a t each p a r t y s h o u ld be le ft t o p a y h is o w n costs. . . . T h e sam e ru le as t o costs a p p lie s in th e C o u rt o f A p p e a l, a n d i n o rd e r t o en force care a t sea t h e C o u rt o f A p p e a l w i l l n o t, w h e n b o th sh ip s h a v e been t o b la m e , a llo w , unless in som e e x c e p tio n a l case, e ith e r s h ip t o g a in a n y th in g b y th e lit ig a t io n . T h u s w h e re one o f tw o sh ip s has been h e ld alon e t o b la m e in th e c o u r t b e lo w , a n d h e r ow ners h a v e ap pe ale d, a n d i n th e C o u rt o f A p p e a l b o th ships h a v e been h e ld to b la m e , th e successful a p p e lla n t w i l l as a ge ne ral r u le n o t o b ta in h is costs o f th e a p p e a l.” A g re a t m a n y a u th o r itie s are c ite d fo r t h a t p ro p o s i
t io n , a n d o n p . 459 th e re is a lo n g c r itic is m u p o n th e d e cisio n in The Friedeberg (s u p .), a n d i t says : “ T h e a t t e n tio n o f t h e C o u rt o f A p p e a l does n o t a p p e a r fr o m th e r e p o r t o f th e case o f T he F riedeberg (su p .) in th e L a w R e p o rts , to h a v e been c a lle d t o th e n u m e ro u s cases in th e C o u rt o f A d m ir a lt y a n d A d m ir a lt y D iv is io n su b s e q u e n t t o th e case o f The E m press E ugenie L u s h . 138), in w h ic h th e n o tio n t h a t a n y h a rd - a n d -fa s t ru le s e x is te d as t o th e in c id e n c e o f
ASPINALL’S MARITIME LAW CASES.
2 7 App.] Dampselskab Svendborg v. London, Midland, and Scottish Railway. [App.costs i n th e A d m ir a lt y R e g is tr y was exp ressly re p u d ia te d .”
I f th o se are c o rre c t s ta te m e n ts as t o th e p ra c tic e i n th e A d m ir a lt y C o u rt, t h e y d o n o t c o n v e y t o m y m in d t h a t th e re is a h a rd -a n d - fa s t r u le u p o n th e s u b je c t w h ic h can be tr a n s la te d as i f th e re is a ru le o f p ra c tic e . I f th e re w ere I t h in k i t w o u ld be w ro n g . P e rs o n a lly , I ra th e r t h in k i t is a lis t o f in sta nce s in w h ic h th e c o u rt has o r has n o t g iv e n costs i n th e p a r tic u la r case, w h ic h m a y serve as a g u id e t o a c o u r t t r y in g sub seq ue nt cases, b u t w h ic h is n o t b in d in g u p o n such a c o u rt. T o b e g in w ith , i f th e re w ere such a h a rd -a n d -fa s t ru le , I t h in k i t w o u ld c o n tra v e n e O rd e r L X V . , r . 1, as t o costs, w h ic h has s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r ity , a n d w h ic h ex p re s s ly p ro v id e s t h a t t h e costs s h a ll be i n th e d is c re tio n o f th e c o u r t o r ju d g e .
N o w i t m a y h a v e been in th e o ld da ys o f A d m ir a lt y , w h e re y o u s im p ly h a d th e issue, b o th t o b la m e o r one o n ly t o b la m e , t h a t th e ru le w as w o rk a b le . I a m n o t a t a ll sure h o w fa r i t is w o rk a b le h a v in g re g a rd t o th e pa ssing o f th e M a r itim e C o n v e n tio n s A c t 1911, in w h ic h ru le s w e re e sta b lish e d , a g a in s t a t u t o r y ru le s , as to th e a p p o r tio n in g o f b la m e . T h e re fo re , I t h in k t h a t th e fa c t t h a t t h a t A c t was passed does, t o some e x te n t, t h r o w som e d o u b t u p o n th e e a rlie r decisions b e in g o f a b in d in g c h a ra c te r a n d m a k in g a h a rd -a n d -fa s t ru le , as is co n te n d e d .
F u r th e r , I t h in k t h a t since t h e d e cisio n in Donald. C am pbell a n d Co. v . P o lia k (su p .) M r. D u n lo p c a n n o t ta k e u p t h e a t t it u d e w h ic h he w o u ld desire t o ta k e u p . W h a t th e L o r d C h a n c e llo r said in t h a t case w as t h is : “ A successful d e fe n d a n t i n a n o n - ju r y case has no d o u b t in th e absence o f spe cia l c ircu m sta n ce s, a rea son able e x p e c ta tio n o f o b ta in in g a n o rd e r fo r th e p a y m e n t o f h is costs b y th e p l a i n t i f f ; h u t he has no r ig h t t o costs unless a n d u n t il th e c o u r t aw ard s th e m t o h im , a n d t h e c o u rt has a n a b s o lu te d is c re tio n t o a w a rd o r n o t t o aW ard th e m . T h is d is c re tio n , lik e a n y o th e r d is c re tio n , m u s t o f course be exe rcise d ju d ic ia lly a n d th e ju d g e o u g h t n o t t o exercise i t a g a in s t th e successful p a r t y e x c e p t f o r som e reason con ne cte d w i t h th e case. T h u s i f — t o p u t a h y p o th e s is w h ic h i n o u r c o u rts w o u ld n e v e r lr} fa c t be re a lis e d — a ju d g e w e re t o refuse t o g iv e a p a r t y h is costs o n th e g ro u n d o f some m is c o n d u c t w h o lly u n c o n n e c te d w i t h th e cause
° f a c tio n o r o f som e p re ju d ic e due t o h is race
° r r e lig io n o r ( to q u o te a f a m ilia r illu s t r a t io n ) to th e c o lo u r o f h is h a ir, th e n a C o u rt o f A p p e a l m ig h t w e ll fee l it s e lf c o m p e lle d t o in te rv e n e . R u t w h e n a ju d g e , d e lib e ra te ly in te n d in g t o exercise h is d is c re tio n a ry pow ers, has a c te d on ta cts c o n n e cte d w i t h o r le a d in g u p t o th e 'tig a t io n w h ic h h a v e been p ro v e d b e fore h im 0 r w h ic h he has h im s e lf ob serve d d u r in g th e Progress o f th e case (a n d the se are s tro n g tv °rd s ), th e n i t seems t o m e t h a t a C o u rt o f A p p e a l, a lth o u g h i t m a y deem h is reasons
^ s u ff ic ie n t a n d m a y disagree w i t h h is con- 0 usion, is p r o h ib ite d b y th e s ta tu te fro m e n te rta in in g a n a p p e a l fr o m i t . ” T h e h is to r y 0 t h a t case is w e ll k n o w n . F o r som e years
p re v io u s ly th e re h a d been a te n d e n c y i n t h is c o u r t t o in te r fe r e w i t h t h e d is c re tio n o f th e le a rn e d ju d g e s o f fir s t in s ta n c e , a n d a n a tte m p t was m ad e b y A t k in , L . J . (as h e th e n w a s ) in R itte r v . G odfrey (s u p .) t o c o d ify th e cases as t o costs. T h e e ffe c t o f t h a t c o d ific a tio n was t o ta k e a w a y a d is c re tio n w h ic h th e s ta tu te h a d g iv e n t o ju d g e s o f fir s t in s ta n c e , a n d w h ic h b y t h e d e c is io n o f D o n a ld C am pbell a n d Co. v . P o lia k (su p .) was re s to re d t o th e m b y th e H o use o f L o rd s .
T h e re fo re , fo r th o s e reasons t h e w o rd s o f th e o rd e r its e lf, such c o n s id e ra tio n s as m a y be d e riv e d fr o m re m e m b e rin g th e re c e n t pa ssing o f th e M a r itim e C o n v e n tio n s A c t a n d th e d e cisio n in D o n a ld C am pbell a n d Co. v . P o lia k (sup .), I h a v e com e t o th e c o n c lu s io n t h a t th e p o s itio n c o n te n d e d f o r b y t h e a p p e lla n t in t h is case c a n n o t be m a in ta in e d . I n o th e r w o rd s , w h a t i t was s o u g h t to d o was th is . I t was s o u g h t b y a n a lle g e d p ra c tic e o f th e C o u rt o f A d m ir a lt y t o f e tte r th e d is c re tio n o f t h e ju d g e s it t in g i n A d m ir a lt y . A s I h a v e sa id , I h a v e v e r y g re a t d o u b ts w h e th e r t h e ru le e x is te d in th e sense t h a t M r . D u n lo p w o u ld h a v e us t h in k i t e x is te d . A l l I t h in k t h a t to o k place was th is , t h a t a v e r y la rg e n u m b e r o f cases w e re re p o rte d u p o n costs w h ic h n o d o u b t are e x tre m e ly u s e fu l as a g u id e f o r f u tu r e ju dg es as t o h o w t o exercise t h e ir d is c re tio n in p a r tic u la r cases. B u t I d o u b t i f th o se cases e v e r fo r m u la te d a h a rd -a n d -fa s t ru le . I f th e y d id fo r m u la te a h a rd -a n d -fa s t ru le , in m y o p in io n t h a t r u le c a n n o t n o w be m a in ta in e d .
F o r th o se reasons I a m o f o p in io n t h a t t h e c o u r t b e lo w was c o rre c t in it s d e te rm in a tio n , a n d t h a t th e a p p e a l s h o u ld be dism issed.
S o lic ito rs f o r th e a p p e lla n ts , H o lm a n , F e n w ic k , a n d W illa n , agents fo r W ilts h ire , Sons, a n d J o rd a n , L o w e s to ft.
S o lic ito rs f o r th e re s p o n d e n ts B o tte re ll an d Roche, agents f o r C h am b erla in, T a lb o t, a n d B race y, G re a t Y a r m o u th .
J u n e 19 a n d 2 0 ; J u ly 2, 1929.
(B e fo re Scrutton, Greer, a n d Russell, L . J J . ) Dampselskab Svendborg v. London, Mid land, and Scottish Railway Company, (a)
ON APPEAL FROM THE KING’S BENCH DIVISION.
C harter p a r ty — D ischarge o f cargo — Docks owned by r a ilw a y com pany who act as steve
dores— R a ilw a y com pany requested to discharge cargo— A p p o rtio n m e n t o f cost o f discharge—
“ W o rk done by the vessel at the p o r t o f d is charge.”
B y a ch a rte r-p a rty f o r the carriage o f a cargo o f tim b e r fr o m the B a ltic to G arston i t was pro vid e d , in te r a lia , as fo llo w s : Clause 15 :
“ F o r a n y w o rk done by the vessel at the p o rt o f discharge beyond d e liv e rin g cargo at the (a) Reported by Ed w a r d J. M. Ch a p l in, Esq., Barrister-at-
Law.
App.] Dampselskab Svendborgv. London, Midland, and Scottish Railway. [App. s h ip 's r a i l i f delivered by hand, o r w ith in
reach o f the s h ip 's tackle o r o f the shore crane tackle i f thereby discharged, the consignees s h a ll p a y to the s hipo w ne r the cost thereof p lu s 15 p e r c e n t."
H e ld , by S c ru tto n a n d Russell, L . J J . (Greer, L . J . dissen ting), tha t u p o n the true construction o f clause 15 o f the c h a rte r-p a rty the vessel h a d n o t delivered the cargo u n t il i t had lowered i t in to wagons a n d released the attachm ent to the crane w h ic h lowered it .
D e c is io n o f B ra n s o n , J . affirm ed.
Appealfr o m a d e c is io n o f B ra n s o n , J .
T h e p la in tiffs , w h o w e re a fo re ig n c o m p a n y , w e re o w n e rs o f th e ste a m s h ip L a u r a M a e rs k , w h ic h b y a c h a r te r - p a r ty d a te d th e 1 7 th J a n . 1928, was c h a rte re d to c a r r y t im b e r fr o m W in d a u in th e B a ltic , t o E lle s m e re P o r t a n d G a rs to n . T h e firs t-n a m e d d e fe n d a n ts w e re th e ow ne rs o f th e do cks a t G a rs to n , a t w h ic h 180 s ta n d a rd s o f deals, b a tte n s , a n d b o a rd s w e re d is c h a rg e d fr o m th e L a u r a M a e rs k b e tw e e n th e 2n d a n d 4 th F e b . T h e second d e fe n d a n ts w e re th e indorsees o f th re e b ills o f la d in g f o r s e v e n ty s ta n d a rd s o f b a tte n ends.
Besides o w n in g th e do cks, th e f ir s t d e fe n d a n ts h a d fo r m a n y yea rs a c te d as stevedores a n d m a s te r p o rte rs a t G a rs to n D o c k s in c o n n e c tio n w i t h th e d ischa rge o f cargoes, a n d i t w as t h e ir c u s to m t o disch a rg e a s h ip b y m eans o f shore cranes, th e t im b e r b e in g lif t e d th e re b y o u t o f th e ships a n d d e p o s ite d d ir e c t in to w agons a f t e r th e slin g s h a d been loosed. U p o n th e a r r iv a l o f th e L a u r a M a e rs k a t G a rs to n th e p la in tiffs re q u e s te d th e f ir s t d e fe n d a n ts t o u n d e rta k e th e w o r k o f p la c in g th e carg o so t h a t d e liv e r y o f i t c o u ld be ta k e n b y th e c o n signees w it h in re a c h o f th e shore crane. I n a d d itio n , th e r a ilw a y c o m p a n y ch a rg e d th e p la in tiffs w it h th e expenses o f re c e iv in g th e t im b e r fr o m w it h in re a c h o f shore cran e ta c k le , u n s lin g in g a n d s to w in g in wagons.
A c c o rd in g ly , th e p la in tiffs c la im e d a g a in s t th e f ir s t d e fe n d a n ts th e r e tu r n o f 311. 8s. 9d.
as b e in g m o n e y w r o n g ly d e m a n d e d fr o m th e p la in tiffs a n d p a id u n d e r p ro te s t in r e la tio n to th e u n lo a d in g a n d d e liv e r y o f th e carg o o f t im b e r e x th e ste a m s h ip L a u r a M a e rs k . I n th e a lte r n a tiv e , th e y c la im e d a g a in s t th e second d e fe n d a n ts 121. Is . 7d. as m o n e y p a id b y th e p la in tiffs fo r a n d o n b e h a lf o f th e second d e fe n d a n ts an d in r e la tio n t o services w h ic h w e re p e rfo rm e d o r w h ic h b y th e c h a rte r- p a r t y o u g h t t o h a v e been p e rfo rm e d b y a n d fo r th e second d e fe n d a n ts .
as b e in g m o n e y w r o n g ly d e m a n d e d fr o m th e p la in tiffs a n d p a id u n d e r p ro te s t in r e la tio n to th e u n lo a d in g a n d d e liv e r y o f th e carg o o f t im b e r e x th e ste a m s h ip L a u r a M a e rs k . I n th e a lte r n a tiv e , th e y c la im e d a g a in s t th e second d e fe n d a n ts 121. Is . 7d. as m o n e y p a id b y th e p la in tiffs fo r a n d o n b e h a lf o f th e second d e fe n d a n ts an d in r e la tio n t o services w h ic h w e re p e rfo rm e d o r w h ic h b y th e c h a rte r- p a r t y o u g h t t o h a v e been p e rfo rm e d b y a n d fo r th e second d e fe n d a n ts .