1.1. Geopolitical and Demographic Factor
Turkey is located in an important place on the world map from the geostrategic point of view, so it can, or indeed must, pursue a multi-directional policy. Turkey
169 Turkey – A Rising Power Between Europe and Asia
can be described in a multi-dimensional way: it is a European and an Asian country, it is a Mediterranean and a Black Sea state, it is also a country that is Caucasian, Middle-Eastern, as well as Balkan at the same time. Th e Turkish Straits are the only waterway linking the Mediterranean Sea with the Black Sea and other sea transport routes. At the same time, the Turkish Straits constitute the border of two continents, Europe and Asia, therefore Turkey can be assigned neither to the East nor to the West with regard to cultural, ideological or political matters. In its relations with the countries of “the Orient”, Turkey reiterates its Eastern and Muslim attributes. However, in its relations with the western countries it emphasises its European values. Turkish politicians have taken advantage of the country’s location by calling it a “bridge”
between Europe and Asia or a passage between the East and the West. Turkey also belongs to a number of international organisations, such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, as well as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Also, Turkey is a member of the Group of Twenty (G-20), which associates the richest countries of the world.
In terms of geographical potential, Turkey is a medium-size country worldwide, but in the region it is among large countries. Its total area is smaller than that of other Middle-Eastern countries with ambitions to be regional powers, such as Iran or Saudi Arabia (Table 1). Th e diff erence, however, is not so signifi cant and meaningful as to prevent Turkey’s strong infl uence in the region. An important advantage for Turkey is the fact that, compared to Iran or Saudi Arabia, Turkey supports better conditions for human existence; especially crucial are potable water resources, which are far larger than in other Middle-Eastern countries.
Table 1. Basic Geographical Determinants of Turkey’s International Potential
Area Turkey Iran Saudi Arabia
In mln km² 783 562 1 628 771 2 149 690
Place in the world 37 18 13
% of world area 0.53 1.1 1.4
Source: own work based on Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat); Saudi Arabia Central Department of Statistics, and Information and Statistical Centre of Iran.
In world-population terms, the Turkish population is steadily growing. In terms of population, Turkey (almost 78 mln) occupies 18th position on the list of the world’s most populated countries. Th e population is comparable to Iran (over 78 mln), though it is far greater than in Saudi Arabia. Th e high ratio of average annual population growth is characteristic for the Middle East, which indicates that
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the population of all the countries in the region will steadily increase. According to Turkstat forecasts, the population of Turkey in 2025 will have reached almost 87 million (respectively in Saudi Arabia 37.5 million people, Iran – no data), however in 2075 it will be approximately 119.5 million. Th e forecast naturally does not account for Turkish emigration, which is signifi cant, but even in that case the demographic ratio is still impressive (Table 2).
Table 2. Basic Demographic Determinants of Turkey’s International Potential (data for 2014)
Population Turkey Iran Saudi Arabia
Population 77 695 904 78 285 000 31 521 418
Place in the world 18 17 40
% of world population 1.07 1.08 0.43
Population density(persons/km²) 101.00 48.00 13.34
Total fertility rate 2.13 1.87 2.26
Source: own work based on Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat); Saudi Arabia Central Department of Statistics, and Information and Statistical Centre of Iran.
Table 3. Turkey’s Population Growth Forecast by 2075
Year Population Year Population
2020 82 535 851 2050 104 309 596
2025 86 854 339 2055 107 452 196
2030 90 874 077 2060 110 458 050
2035 94 585 203 2065 113 346 937
2040 97 964 644 2070 116 251 718
2045 101 149 183 2075 119 344 690
Source: own work based Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat).
Th e demographic factor is crucial in shaping the position and the international role of states, since it is directly related to their volume and workforce potential. In this respect Turkey has enormous potential, since its society is very young (people of working age account for almost 70% of the society). Demographic determinants also indicate the state’s military position because it manifests how great the power of a country is under threat, when there is need to introduce general mobilisation.
1.2. Military Capability
In recent years the Turkish army has been reduced from 510,000 to approx. 410,000 soldiers. Th e reduction resulted from the fact that Turkish military forces were to be based on effi ciency, experience and modernity rather than the actual number of
171 Turkey – A Rising Power Between Europe and Asia
soldiers. Th e Turkish army is modern and features the latest military technologies and weapons in their armed forces, irrespective of whether on land, at sea or in the air.
Due to the ongoing precarious situation in its immediate vicinity (the dispute with Greece over the delimitation of the continental shelf, the lack of diplomatic relations with Armenia), and especially in the Middle East (the civil war in Syria, the evolution of the Islamic State), Turkey maintains compulsory military service which ranges from 6 to 15 months in length. In the event of a threat Turkey has the possibility to mobilise 41 mln people compared to Iran’s 46 mln, and Saudi Arabia’s approx. 15 mln (Table 4).
Turkey is also one of the 20 countries that spend the most on armament.
Table 4. Turkey’s Military Capability
Category Turkey Iran Saudi Arabia
Available manpower (2014) 41 637 773 46 247 556 15 246 507
Active frontline personnel (2014) 410 500 + 100 000
paramilitary troops 545 000 505 868
Military spending in mln US $ (2012) 26 000 15 705 80 762
Military expenditure, percentage of GDP (2012) 2.7 2.67 7.7
Source: own work based on Global Fire Power and Military Spendings; Arms Sales In the Gulf; Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
1.3. Turkey’s Economic Position
Turkey’s economic situation has changed signifi cantly over the last three decades. In the early 1980s Turkey was still an agro-industrial state with limited exchange with the outside world. Th e beginning of the 1990s brought signifi cant economic changes resulting from the process of economic liberalisation. Th e free market regulations that were introduced in Turkey increased its possibility to participate in the international economic cycle. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries there have been vital changes in the structure of Turkey’s GDP, which was manifested by a signifi cant decline of the share of agriculture in GDP and a rapid growth of the share of services and industrial development in GDP. “Th e structure of Turkey’s GDP is similar to that in other middle-income countries, but it is gradually approaching the services-based economy model characteristic of well-developed countries (where services account for at least 70% of total business activity)” (Zajączkowski 2012: 66). Turkey’s economic success is particularly evident following the year 2002, when Turkey was governed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). It was the leaders of this party who decided to strengthen Turkey’s economic position by taking advantage of its strategic location
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and opened the state to foreign trade with its proximal and distal neighbours. Th e development of economic contacts was to enable the country from the Bosphorus to build its soft power. As a result of the economic changes, such as market liberalisation and deregulation, as well as intensifi cation of international relations, Turkey made its name as the most important economic partner in the Middle East and became a member of G-20.
Th e eff orts of the Turkish government and society to curtail infl ation, along with the implementation of restrictive fi scal and monetary policy, resulted in steady economic growth. Th is economic growth, however, decelerated due to the worldwide fi nancial crisis in the years 2008–2009, but the Turkish economic growth rate is still visible. Th e current economic growth accounts for almost 3% of GDP and, according to the World Bank’s forecasts, it is to reach 4% in the following years (Table 6).
For the sake of comparison, according to the same sources, Iran’s GDP growth was 3.7 % in 2014, but in subsequent years it should fl uctuate around a mere 2%. In Saudi Arabia, the GDP growth was 4.3% in 2014 and it should maintain this level over the next three years.
Table 5. Turkey’s Basic Macroeconomic Rates
Rate 2002 2012 2013
GDP (at current prices, mld USD) 233 789 822
GDP per capita (USD) 3 576 10 661 10 972
Export (%PKB) 25.2 26.3 25.6
Import (% PKB) 23.6 31.5 32.3
Agriculture (% PKB) 11.7 9.0 8.5
Industry (% PKB) 28.6 27.1 27.1
Services (% PKB) 59.7 63.9 64.4
Unemployment (%) 10.4 9.2 10.0
Source: own work based on the World Bank.
Table 6. GDP Growth in Turkey (%)
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016f 2017f
GDP
growth 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 –4.8 9.2 8.8 2.1 4.1 2.9 3 3.9 3.7
Source: own work based on the World Bank.
Th e opening of the Turkish economy to the world contributed to the increase of direct investment in the country. Th e biggest investors in Turkey were the Netherlands, Great Britain, Russia, Azerbaijan, Germany, Italy, the US, France and Kuwait.
Investment was mostly in production, fi nancial and insurance services, gas and electricity sectors and mining.
173 Turkey – A Rising Power Between Europe and Asia
Table 7. Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey
FDI Inward Flow (million US $) 2011 2012 2013
Turkey 16.17 13.22 12.87
Saudi Arabia 16.31 12.18 9.3
Iran NA NA NA
Source: own work based on Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat).
As a result of globalisation and economic interdependence, the volume of Turkish import and export has increased. In 2014 Turkey’s main export partners were Germany, Iraq, Great Britain, Italy, France, Russia, Spain, Iran and the Netherlands.
Th e main suppliers of imported goods were Russia, China, Germany, Italy, Iran, France, India and South Korea (Turkstat). Turkey’s export is dominated by motor vehicles, machinery and equipment, as well as steel and iron.
According to a World Bank ranking, in 2013 Turkey was number 18 in the world in terms of GDP measured by purchasing power parity (World Bank). Economists forecast that in approx. 2050 Turkish economy will be ranked 10–12th in the world, which will certainly increase Ankara’s international position in the Middle East.
1.4. Access to Energy Resources
It has to be remembered that Turkey’s rapid economic growth entails enormous demand for energy resources, which are scarce in Turkey. Th e state’s dependence on crude oil and natural gas imports amounts to 90%, therefore Turkey seeks to diversify the suppliers of energy resources in order to avoid dependence on only one supplier and to negotiate the lowest prices. Fortunately for Turkey, the neighbouring regions hold massive hydrogen deposits. In that respect the Turkish government perfectly exploits the benefi ts of its location. A vast number of energy resource exporters and producers are located in Turkey’s vicinity, in the Middle East and the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Russia, Turkmenistan). Th e main recipients of the resources (besides Turkey itself) are highly-developed European countries. Due to the situation of correlation and interdependence, the Anatolian Peninsula (Asia Minor) became the major transit area for energy resources from Russia, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea to Europe (Ulchenko 2015). As a result, Turkey is the main centre of energy resource redistribution and the focus of attention for both importers and exporters of natural gas and crude oil. Th e situation in the “raw material transport system” further strengthens Turkey’s position as a strong regional player that may infl uence other Middle-Eastern states.
174 Artur Adamczyk