In the second half of the 20th century the main objective of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle-Eastern countries was to maintain the status quo in the region.
Th e government in Ankara sought to maintain the areas of infl uence and state borders as they were established in the fi rst years following the end of World War II. Th e main principle to maintain the status quo in the Middle East was the respect for the states’
territorial integrity and non-interference in their internal matters (Altunişik 2007:
69). In view of the government in Ankara the maintenance of the status quo in the region overlapped with the distribution of the areas of infl uence between two global political blocks. Turkey, as a member of NATO, sought the infl uence of the western states in the Middle East.
Th e second main principle that Turkey applied in their foreign policy in the Middle East was non-involvement in the aff airs of the region, which was – and still is – confl ict-ridden. Following the World War II, Turkish politicians’ resentment to engage in the middle-eastern aff airs was noticeable, which was connected with the fact that Turkey perceived itself as a western, rather than eastern state. Th erefore, any Turkish activity in the region during the Cold War was the result – more or less – of coordinated actions of the western block, rather than its individuals’ actions (Altunişik 2007: 70).
Th e situation in the region changed radically following the fall of the bipolar system. Th e implementation of Turkish policy geared towards the maintenance of the status quo became extremely diffi cult aft er the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990–1991. As a result of the US intervention and the weakening of Iraq’s position in the Middle East, the geopolitical situation has changed signifi cantly in that part of the world. From the point of view of the government in Ankara, the depreciation of Iraq’s political role was linked to the intensifi cation of Iraqi Kurdish aspirations to independence and the growth of Iran and Syria’s magnitude in the region. In the 1990s Turkey redefi ned its foreign policy. During the Cold War the threat to Turkey was mostly in the North – from the Soviet Union. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the greatest threat was then perceived to be in the South, where the situation became precarious and unpredictable (Ergűven 1998: 32–40). Turkish politicians saw the greatest threat to Turkey’s security in the Kurdish separatism, which endangered the territorial integrity of the state.
It was in the 1990s when the Turkish political elite started a discussion on the future of the state, its foreign policy and security. Th e debate was also related to the political identity of the country – to what extent Turkey was a European state and to
175 Turkey – A Rising Power Between Europe and Asia
what extent an Asian one. Due to the new geopolitical situation the Turkish people realized that it was not enough to be a member of NATO in order to belong to the European circle. It became even more apparent when the discrepancies between the US and Turkey’s interests in the Middle East became increasingly prominent. What is more, Turkish attempts at accession to the European Community were successively rejected by western countries, which forced the Turkish elite to redefi ne its foreign policy objectives. Th e fi rst fundamental attempts to change Turkish foreign policy were undertaken by president Turgut Özal. His vision of foreign policy involved close cooperation with the US and European countries, but at the same time Ankara was to strengthen its role in the regions of the Middle East, the Black Sea and the Caucasus.
Özal’s aim was to strengthen Turkey’s position in the world as a regional political leader who bases its relations with neighbouring countries on economic cooperation (Flanagan, Brannen 2008: 8).
Following the 2002 elections, which were won by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), subsequent changes in Turkey’s foreign policy were introduced. A new doctrine in Ankara’s diplomatic relations called “strategic depth” arose, the basis of which was to exploit Turkey’s geostrategic position in order to implement a multi-directional and multi-sectorial foreign policy. According to the doctrine, Turkey would pursue a multilateral policy based on establishing good relations with all partners from the proximal and distal neighbourhood, both the West, i.e. the EU and the US, and other regions such as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, the South Caucasus along with countries located by the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Th e main component of the doctrine, devised by Ahmet Davutoğlu, future Minister of Foreign Aff airs and Turkish Prime Minister, was the “zero problems”
principle – “a good neighbourhood policy” which, when implemented, would improve the image of Turkey as a stable, predictable and attractive country to both its neighbours and distal partners (Adamczyk, Dubel 2014: 421). To achieve this, Turkey intended to use its soft policy attributes, i.e. to take advantage of its economic and cultural contacts so as to gain as much infl uence as possible in its environment.
Th e “strategic depth” doctrine was based on the neo-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism concepts, which involved greater engagement of the Turkish government in the aff airs of countries formed in the territories of the former Ottoman Empire inhabited by Turkish-speaking people (Flanagan, Brannen 2008: 8). Even though the concept is present in Turkey’s foreign policy to this day, the diplomats from Ankara were reluctant to admit it, fearing accusations of “imperial ambitions”.
Aft er several years of AKP government one could see that the policy of “zero problems with neighbours” brought Turkey only success. As a result of the improvement of bilateral relations in the region combined with an outstanding economic situation,
176 Artur Adamczyk
Turkey’s international position increased signifi cantly and it began to be perceived as a regional power. Th e government in Ankara strengthened its relations with Syria and developed both economic and military relations. Furthermore, relations with Iran were normalised, which resulted in Turkey signing a number of contracts for the supply of hydrogen from there. Iraq, or rather the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq, where Turkey located a number of its direct investments, became Turkey’s most important trade partner in the region.
Th e thaw in the relations between the countries of the region resulted in the idea of regional integration based on the European model. Turkey suggested establishing a free trade area and visa liberalisation for Syria, Jordan and Lebanon (Cirlig 2013).
Work on the project, however, was suspended due to the Arab Spring. Turkey was also engaged in mediation to resolve regional problems. It acted as a mediator in negotiations between Israel and the US, Syria and Israel, and Israel and Hamas. Turkish politicians were also actively involved in the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organisation of Islamic States. Unfortunately, the close relations of Turkey with Syria and Iran aggravated relations between Ankara and Israel. Th e climax of strained relations between Turkey and Israel took place in 2010 following the Mavi Marmara incident.
Th e phenomenon of the Arab Spring at the turn of 2010 and 2011 initially strengthened Turkey’s international image. Prime Minister Erdoğan was engaged in resolving political confl icts in Northern Africa and the Middle East, which were touched by the revolutionary wave. His activity was visible in Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt, where he acted as a leader of a democratic, modern, but at the same time Muslim state that was to constitute a model for constitutional foundations in those countries. Turkey’s involvement, however, led to deterioration in relations with Iran, which claimed its right to infl uence these processes. Tehran construed the social riots as the awakening of Islam. Th e dispute on the infl uence in the region initially concerned Iran, but later Syria as well. Turkey expressed its negative attitude towards Iran’s involvement in Iraqi aff airs, where the Ayatollah regime supported Shiite Prime Minister Maliki, who lead a political and religious purge there. Turkey began to act as a leader of Sunni Islam, which threatened the interests of Shiite Tehran (Gurzel 2014).
Th e greatest problem however concerned Syria, where both neighbours were on the opposite sides. Th e government in Ankara supported the anti-government opposition while Iran expressed its support for Bashar al Asad’s regime. It appeared that Turkish foreign policy based on “zero problems with neighbours” could not be implemented due to unstable international climate in the Middle East. Ironically, it can be said that Turkey has zero neighbours without problems (Wódka 2013).
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It appears that the international aff airs in the region overwhelmed the possibilities of the Turkish foreign policy. Turkey overestimated its position and possibilities to act as a regional leader. In 2009 Turkey was hit by the economic crisis, its macroeconomic rate deteriorated and its economic growth decelerated. As it turned out, the Arab Spring countries are uninterested in the Turkish model since Turkey is by far too secular a country for them (Quilliam Fundation 2013: 10). Arab countries were more interested in the reasons behind Turkey’s earlier economic boom and quality of life improvement rather than emulating their political model. Ironically, for certain Arab countries Turkey is too secular to constitute an example but for others the government of Islamic AKP party demonstrates the islamisation of the country. Th is is the reason why Turkey’s excessive involvement and support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt resulted in deterioration of its relations with the military junta in Cairo once president Mohamed Morsi was overthrown in 2013.
Unexpectedly, in 2014 a new piece in the Middle-Eastern jigsaw appeared which greatly complicated the situation in the region and caused further problems to Turkish diplomacy. In June 2014 fi ghters from a terrorist organisation – the Islamist State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) began their attacks. Th ey seized the north-western part of Iraq and western Syria. Political crisis in those counties and Jihadist activities naturally constitute a great threat to Turkey as well as other Middle-Eastern states: Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan and Lebanon. Due to Islamic State activity Saudi Arabia (supported by the US) also became involved in Middle-Eastern aff airs in an attempt to gain interests in the region. Th e political situation is in statu nascendi but Turkey still gives the impression of a country that cannot recover from the shock caused by the emergence of the Islamic State and lacks a new foreign policy doctrine.
Conclusions
Turkey has a number of attributes that predestine it to play the role of a regional power in the Middle East. It has an excellent geopolitical location between three continents:
Europe, Asia and Africa, which enables the country to constitute an economic, political and raw material bridge between these parts of the world. Notwithstanding the economic crisis, Turkey pursues constant economic development and within a few years will become one of the richest states in the world. Compared to other countries in the region, Turkey has a vast, well-trained, modern army. Its location facilitates supplies of energy resources from neighbouring countries indispensable for its development. What is more, Turkey has no strong competitor with regards
178 Artur Adamczyk
to regional infl uence. Iran, Turkey’s main competitor, is weakened by international sanctions. Th e second growing competitor is Saudi Arabia which is still developing its position. Turkey’s only real opponent is the specifi city of the Middle East, particularly the precarious, unexpected and unforeseeable international situation which prevents the Turkish diplomacy from “spreading their wings”. Turkey’s attempts to build a new order in the Middle East without the US were to no avail. Th e emergence of the Islamic State completely destroyed the existing balance of power. Turkey seems to lack reliable partners in its environment. Th e main tendency in current relations between the Middle-Eastern countries is the growth of distrust and such political climate makes it diffi cult for Turkey to build its position as a regional power.
Turkey, however, still plays a vital role in the European security system. Having Turkey as a signifi cant ally in such an unstable region is an extremely important feature in shaping the foreign policy of European countries, the majority of which belong to the European Union. Being aware of that, Turkey has sought membership in this organisation for a number of years. In 1999 Turkey acquired the status of an EU candidate and in 2005 accession negotiations began. Turkey’s ties with the
“powerful and rich” European Union constituted also one of the attributes of building its infl uence among the societies in the Arab states.
Paradoxically, the signifi cant geostrategic location of Turkey became its “curse”
on the way to become a member of the European Union. Th e Member States fear that the accession of Turkey, which has threatening and unstable neighbours, and which borders with Middle East marked with permanent confl icts, illegal immigration and terrorism, may involve them in a number of international problems. Th erefore, the attitude of the Member States towards Turkey’s European aspirations is ambiguous. Th e European states need Turkey as a strategic partner, but at the same time they attempt to delay its integration processes. When in 1993 the Member States offi cially defi ned membership criteria in Copenhagen (the so-called Copenhagen criteria) they also defi ned unoffi cial criteria that must be fulfi lled by a candidate state. One prerequisite is that a state must not burden the European Union with its problems which may cause deterioration in the relations between the EU and the Member States.
In addition to the abovementioned international problems related to its location, Turkey also has unsettled disputes with some Member States. It concerns Greek and Turkish relations with regard to unregulated borders on the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus issue with regard to northern Cyprus still being occupied by the Turkish army. Th e violation of the territorial integrity of Cyprus is symbolically identifi ed with an occupation of a part of the European Union. What is more, Turkey does not internationally recognise the Republic of Cyprus. It is therefore diffi cult to imagine Turkey’s EU membership without resolving the Cyprus dispute.
179 Turkey – A Rising Power Between Europe and Asia
Turkey’s political elites have indicated explicitly that Turkey and its society are tired of always knocking on the EU’s door. Erdoğan has even proposed the date of Turkey’s accession to the EU – the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, namely in 2023. He has even threatened that if the European Union fails to accelerate the process, Turkey would no longer strive to approach Europe.
It seems however that the Turkish President’s stance resulting from temporary Turkish success was far too unequivocal. Th e Middle-Eastern direction is neither a political nor economic alternative for Turkey, mainly due to the instability of the region. One may have the impression that the only international stable and foreseeable group among Turkey’s partners is the European Union, i.e. the proverbial West.
Th erefore, one may struggle to comprehend that the government in Ankara would abandon the pro-European direction, especially while the EU remains the most signifi cant trade partner for Turkey.
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