Eastern Partnership
3. The Role of Poland in Shaping the EU’s Eastern Policy
As already mentioned, there is no question that amongst all Central European countries that strive for participation in the structures of the Euro-Atlantic integration, Poland was and is the most interested in the formation and implementation of an eff ective EU policy towards its eastern neighbours. Th e reasons for this include both Poland’s historical experience (showing Poles the signifi cance of the relations with the East, in particular Russia) and the contemporary perception of vital national interests in the areas of politics, economy and security. Th erefore, what is of key importance for ensuring the fulfi lment of these interests is formation behind the Polish eastern border of a group of friendly and allied countries, which would be connected by close ties to the European Union and constitute a counterbalance to Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions (Adamczyk 2014; Barburska 2013; Gil, Kapuśniak 2009).
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3.1. Poland as an Initiator of the EU’s Eastern Policy
Aft er 1989, Polish involvement was apparent at all developmental stages of the EU policy towards Eastern Europe. On the outset, this involvement took the form of producing various ideas pertaining to the initial principal concept of the EU’s Eastern Dimension, which was treated as an expression of the EU commitment to Central and Eastern Europe. Th e very concept was formulated by Polish diplomacy and Polish think-tanks and was presented for the fi rst time in 1998, during the opening of Polish accession negotiations. Th e concept envisaged the formation of the Eastern Dimension to European integration, which was understood as providing the possibility of extending the cooperation to the future new Member States from the Central and Eastern Europe.
In 2001, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Aff airs published a special report which contained recommendations on the need to tighten cooperation with the EU’s eastern neighbours and the post-Soviet countries (MSZ 2001). Not only did Warsaw issue political statements, but also undertook concrete actions, such as abolishing visa fees for citizens of Ukraine. In 2002, Poland submitted the so-called Riga Initiative, which provided for the establishment of broad regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. Such cooperation was to encompass 17 states, with the aim to support transformation processes and the common battle against organised international crime. A detailed presentation of the Polish ideas on Eastern policy can be found in the document, presented by Poland in 2002. It contained a proposition for the development of a new strategy which would allow for a better coordination of assistance endeavours allocated to Eastern Europe. Th e strategy considered diff erentiating EU relations with the countries of this region, depending on the degree of their interest in cooperation with the European Union.
Once again, Polish diplomacy presented the concept of the EU’s Eastern Dimension in February 2003. (Th e European Commission’s communiqué, initiating the European Neighbourhood Policy, was published a month later). Warsaw postulated that the Eastern Dimension concept served as an instrument of the EU’s foreign policy towards its eastern neighbours. It was to take the form of a coherent policy, suffi ciently fl exible to provide for an individual nature of relations with singular Eastern European countries, including not only political and economic, but also human and social aspects. Simultaneously, Poland professed willingness to share its unique know-how and experience in pursuit of a policy towards Eastern European countries, for which it could have become a “bridge to Europe”, and an advocate of the interests of the entire region.
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But at that time, Polish diplomacy’s propositions failed to gain the European Union’s acceptance. Th e concept of the European Neighbourhood Policy, offi cially adopted in 2004, was based on diff erent assumptions and dealt primarily with the geographic extent (a region much larger than the Eastern European region alone), relatively small diff erentiations in policies towards individual partner countries and fi nally, a very important issue, the lack of EU membership perspectives for partner countries.
Poland did, however, not resign from promoting its concepts of establishing closer ties with Eastern European countries, and aft er gaining formal EU membership, the opportunities of giving its concept a voice, undoubtedly increased. Th e noticeable
‘centre of gravity’ move of the European integration processes closer to the East meant that the entire EU Eastern policy underwent an evolution in this new political confi guration. It ceased to focus on relations with Russia and became increasingly more open towards other countries in this region. Taking advantage of this new attitude, Warsaw supported Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 with full determination. It was the fi rst time that Poland achieved signifi cant success in the role of an important – and perhaps even key – initiator of the EU policy towards the East. It must be acknowledged that the consistent and determined stance of Warsaw, supported by some EU partners, in particular the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Scandinavian countries, contributed to the consolidation of the EU policy towards the Ukrainian question (Nowak, Milczarek 2007; Barburska 2007).
Th e Polish support was to send a clear signal that Warsaw wanted to help its eastern neighbours in implementing reforms necessary to bring them closer to European standards, regardless of the ongoing debate on a further eastward enlargement of the EU. Poland was concerned that remaining inactive in this respect may lead to a division of Europe into privileged countries and those that would have to cope with their own problems. For these reasons Poland, as pointed out above, put forward an initiative to establish the Eastern Partnership.
3.2. The Eastern Partnership – a Polish Initiative
In order to achieve this ambitious goal, Polish diplomacy started its endeavours to gain the support of the EU Members in 2007. First it managed to involve Sweden, who became the offi cial co-author of the entire concept; consultation with the European Commission was carried out at the same time. An important issue was to attract support from other Member States, especially Germany and France. In the case of Berlin, who had become more and more aware of the importance of relations with the East, the mission was a success. As to Paris, the acceptance of the French
159 The Eastern Policy of the European Union – a Challenge for Poland’s Foreign Policy
idea to establish the so-called Union for the Mediterranean was an important issue and prevented all objections on the French part (having gained support for its own initiative, it was diffi cult for France to block analogous actions of other countries).
Finally, Polish and Swedish diplomats managed to gain wide support for their project. Among some of the countries were Great Britain, the Baltic states and the Visegrad Group countries, especially the Czech Republic, who made the Partnership concept one of the priorities of its Presidency in the fi rst half of 2009. Th e Eastern Partnership concept started to be promoted in spring 2008 as a result, and was offi cially launched by Poland at the Brussels meeting of the European Council in June 2008.
(As already mentioned, the offi cial inauguration of the EaP took place in May 2009 in Prague.)
From then onwards, Poland was strongly engaged in the implementation of the Partnership, while at the same time working on expanding and enriching the initiative with new schemes. On the initiative of the Polish government in 2010, for example, the Group of Friends of the Eastern Partnership (now known as the Information and Cooperation Group) was established with the aim of gaining support for the Partnership from non-EU Members. Another step in this direction was the decision on the establishment of the Eastern Partnership Academy of Public Administration in Warsaw, which provides a multiannual training programme for civil servants from EaP partner countries. Th ere is also an EU institution, the SALTO EECA Resource Centre, supporting youth cooperation within the framework of the Eastern Partnership Youth Programme, in the Polish capital.
One of the priorities of the Polish Presidency in the second half of 2011 was to ensure further development of the EaP. During that time the second Eastern Partnership summit took place in Warsaw in September. Th e Warsaw Declaration, adopted at the summit, constituted a clear political gesture that indicated readiness to deepen the integration between the European Union and its eastern partners.
In pursuit of this aim, Poland consistently supported the establishment of new cooperation mechanism and the strengthening of sectorial cooperation within the framework of already existing EU programmes and institutions.
Warsaw supported the establishment of new vehicles that would facilitate the functioning of civil society in EaP countries, like the abovementioned European Endowment for Democracy and the Civil Society Facility, which may serve as an example of Polish involvement. Moreover, Poland initiated the formation of the Eastern Partnership Business Forum, and in 2011 helped organise the third Civil Society Forum. It also hosted inaugural meetings of EaP institutions, such as the Conference of Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership, the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly, and the Eastern Partnership Culture Congress.
160 Dariusz Milczarek, Olga Barburska
Th e fi rst Eastern Partnership Culture Congress took place in Poland in 2011, where several innovative cultural programmes were initiated.
Aimed at deepening the sectorial collaboration under the Polish Presidency, a range of meetings with the participation of various levels of offi cials and experts was organised. Th ese included conferences of the ministers of economy, transport and agriculture; a debate of the ministers of higher education of the Eastern Partnership;
meetings of the heads of customs services on subjects such as fi ghting corruption, environmental protection, energy, etc. One of the results of these activities was the development of a “road map” for the implementation of individual measures in the period preceding the next Eastern Partnership summit.
Apart from being involved in EU activities, Poland also realises its own projects.
Th e Polish government allocates a signifi cant part of foreign aid funds to strengthening the Eastern Partnership. Hundreds of various projects involving joint undertakings in the fi elds of, among others, science and education, were implemented in the EaP partner countries. For example, in 2012 Poland established a new scholarship programme for citizens of EaP partner countries who undertook doctoral studies in the areas of Humanities and Social Sciences in Poland. Moreover, several cultural projects, such as the East European Performing Arts Platform in Lublin or the Culture Orchestra formed by musicians from Poland and EaP countries, emerged during the Polish Presidency.
3.3. Poland and the Ukrainian Crisis
Poland’s stance with respect to the crisis which hit Ukraine in the end of 2013 was most signifi cant (Hud’ 2013). Th e direct cause of this crisis was the fact that Ukraine failed to sign the EU Association Agreement, which was supposed to take place at the November Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. Th is situation elicited a strong reaction from the Ukrainian pro-European opposition, supported by a signifi cant part of society, particularly in the western part of the country. At the news of the Vilnius summit fi asco, anti-government protests broke out in several cities, taking the form of demonstrations or occupation of public buildings; their best known symbol was the formation of a protest city called Maidan or Euromaidan in Kiev’s central square. Attempts to suppress the demonstrations by force did not succeed.
Th e scale of public discontent reached an unprecedented high, surpassing even that of the Orange Revolution in 2004 and giving an insight into the extent of Ukrainian pro-Union sympathies.
Even the conclusion of the agreement between the opposition and the president which ended the bloody repressions against protestors did not calm the situation.
161 The Eastern Policy of the European Union – a Challenge for Poland’s Foreign Policy
President Yanukovych left the country, while the opposition forces that came to power faced the enormous problems of a rapid increase in separatist tendencies in the eastern regions of Ukraine, actively supported by Russia. Finally, in 2014 the Crimea was annexed by Russia and fi erce fi ghts broke out between pro-Russian separatists and the army, loyal to the government in Kiev. (One of the tragic events of this confl ict, which has led to its internationalisation, was the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines plane by separatists in July 2014.) It is worth stressing that in this situation, President Poroshenko, democratically elected in May of the same year, decisively continued a clearly pro-European course of foreign policy, which was evidenced by the conclusion of the Association Agreement with the EU.
During the crisis, Polish diplomacy, the political class and the broad majority of society supported the activities of the Ukrainian opposition and the new government.
What was most important, apart from manifestations of sympathy and material assistance, was active political support: some Polish politicians openly associated with the protestors and appeared at Maidan. But above all, it was the government in Warsaw that initiated a wide diplomatic action aimed at mobilising the European Union to take a decisive position. Th ere are many more examples of such activities, but it is suffi cient to say that Polish diplomacy initiatives contributed crucially to the attempts at solving the Ukrainian crisis. On the other hand, it must also be pointed out that there were some failures – undoubtedly one of them was the fact that Poland failed to create a united front with the countries of the Central European Visegrad Group, as some of them even supported Russia’s stance, in particular Hungary under the governance of its Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán.