Although the impacts in Table 1 differ in magnitude, it is hard to quantify all of them. Still, it can be argued that in terms of dynamics most costs precede the benefi ts. This is true for current EaP association processes, and it was also true for earlier accession processes. Of these accession processes, those that led to the most recent EU enlargements (of 2004 and 2007) are obviously the most relevant to compare with the current EaP association processes.
Campos, Coricelli, Moretti (2014) argue that, compared to earlier enlargements, accession processes in Eastern enlargement took much longer. Still, the end-point was clear: EU membership. They show that in most cases this led to an anticipation effect, i.e. additional GDP growth in the run-up to EU membership, or put differently: a positive growth dividend from anticipated EU membership before actual accession. This growth dividend indicates that in the case of accession some medium- and long-term effects are pushed forward in anticipation of actual EU membership.
Given the absence of such an end-point in the case of association, it is not likely that such a growth dividend arises with association.
Figure 1. The dynamics of costs and benefi ts of association and accession
Benefits Costs
Benefits accession
Cost accession
Time
1 2
Benefits AA/DC-FTA
Costs AA/DC-FTA Benefits accession with
anticipation effect
Figure 1 visualizes the development of the costs and benefi ts of association, compared to those of accession, over time. Behind this graph are several assumptions. First, the costs of association are generally higher
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than the costs of accession, as we expect the EaP countries to be currently farther removed from the acquis than (most of) the CEE countries were in the run-up to EU membership; building on the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1993, Association Agreements were established with these countries in the period of 1994–1999 (Poland, Hungary: 1994; Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia: 1995; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania:
1998; Slovenia: 1999). Secondly, the benefi ts of association are expected to be lower than the benefi ts of accession, as accession involved full EU membership, whereas association is about (limited) access to the SEM only.
Thirdly, in both cases, the benefi ts are expected to develop proportionally over time, whereas the costs increase and later decrease. However, if we include the anticipation effect of EU membership (in the case of accession), the benefi ts curve follow a slightly progressive trajectory.
The grey-shaded area in Figure 1 shows how, in the case of association, over a longer period of time costs exceed benefi ts, i.e. the so-called frontloading. Only at time-point 2 do the benefi ts start to exceed the costs. In the case of accession, with the anticipation effect, the grey/dotted area is the area of frontloading. This area is smaller than in the case of association, and benefi ts start exceeding costs at an earlier point of time (time-point 1).
One can imagine that such heavy frontloading has an impact on support for integration into the EU. How about the development of popular support for the EU in the three EaP countries? Two time-series on popular support for the EU, based on different barometers, are available. The fi rst one is available for Georgia only, within the framework of the Caucasus Barometer of the Caucasus Research Resource Centre (CRRC), which focuses on EaP countries in the Southern Caucasus only. Tables 2 and 3 therefore only show data on Georgia.
Table 2. Support of Georgia’s membership of the EU
Don’t support Neutral Support Don’t know, refused to answer
2011 5% 13% 69% 12%
2012 3% 13% 72% 12%
2013 8% 17% 65% 10%
2015 16% 27% 42% 15%
Data from Caucasus Barometer time-series dataset on Georgia, Caucasus Research Resource Centre (no data on 2014)
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Part III: EU Trade & Investment Policy: Engine for Growth and Job Creation?…Table 3. Trust towards the EU in Georgia
Distrust Neutral Trust Don’t know, refused to answer
2008 10% 20% 54% 17%
2009 9% 27% 43% 22%
2010 10% 25% 44% 21%
2011 10% 23% 45% 22%
2012 6% 28% 42% 24%
2013 13% 38% 33% 16%
2015 20% 36% 27% 18%
Data from Caucasus Barometer time-series dataset on Georgia, Caucasus Research Resource Centre (no data on 2014)
These data suggest a slight decrease of support for and trust in the EU in recent years in Georgia.
Similar data, on all three EaP countries, have been gathered as part of the ENPI East barometer, which ran up till 2014, and which has recently (2016) been replaced by a similar barometer, i.e. the annual EU Neighbours East survey. Tables 4 and 5 show information on the general perception of the EU, as well as trust in EU institutions, for the three EaP countries.
Table 4. Perception of EU in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova
Positive Neutral Negative Don’t know Georgia
Spring 2013 44% 46% 7% 3%
Autumn 2014 40% 49% 7% 4%
Spring 2016 52% 31% 8% 9%
Ukraine
Spring 2013 46% 38% 11% 6%
Autumn 2014 50% 29% 17% 4%
Spring 2016 49% 32% 14% 5%
Moldova
Spring 2013 41% 33% 15% 10%
Autumn 2014 45% 31% 21% 3%
Spring 2016 52% 30% 17% 2%
Data from EU Neighbourhood Barometer ENPI East (wave 3, wave 6) and EU Neighbours East Annual Survey Report – Regional Overview Eastern Partnership Countries (1st wave; Ecorys 2016)
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Table 5. Trust in EU, in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova
Trust Don’t trust
Georgia
Spring 2013 57% 26%
Autumn 2014 58% 25%
Spring 2016 69% n/a
Ukraine
Spring 2013 57% 24%
Autumn 2014 56% 31%
Spring 2016 61% n/a
Moldova
Spring 2013 58% 29%
Autumn 2014 50% 38%
Spring 2016 59% n/a
Data from EU Neighbourhood Barometer ENPI East (wave 3, wave 6) and EU Neighbours East Annual Survey Report – Regional Overview Eastern Partnership Countries (1st wave; Ecorys 2016)
The data from Tables 4 and 5 do not indicate a loss of support of or trust in the EU; they rather point towards an increase of support and trust.
Interestingly, and confusingly, the data on Georgia from the CCRC show much lower levels of support of and trust in the EU than the data from ENPI/EU Neighbours Annual Survey.
Conclusions
The use of AAs/DC-FTAs in the EaP is to a large extent path-dependent, and builds on earlier accession practices. However, compared to these accession processes, association is more costly for the countries involved, entails lower benefi ts, and misses out on the ultimate bonus of EU membership.
The 2015 review of the ENP has made it clear that more differentiation and a more tailor-made approach are needed. The current EaP DC-FTAs (including the last one, with Ukraine) have however been developed and drafted prior to this review. As Dreyer (2012) and Van der Loo (2015) argue, the EaP DC-FTAs involve the approximation of parts of the EU acquis which are currently very diffi cult (i.e. very costly) to implement for the countries involved, but are not really necessary from the perspective of SEM access as such. More prioritization and fl exibility can reduce the costs of DC-FTA implementation, without having signifi cant impacts on the scope for SEM access or gradual economic reform. If EU membership is not
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Part III: EU Trade & Investment Policy: Engine for Growth and Job Creation?…the end-point of association, then the acquis should not necessarily be the yardstick of association.
Moreover, in addition to the rules, actual implementation practices and EU fi nancial and technical assistance projects should increasingly take into account domestic constraints and particularities. DC-FTAs should come with deep and comprehensive implementation strategies.
This call for more prioritization, more fl exibility and more tailor-made implementation strategies echoes the call for more gradualism by Adarov, Havlik (2016) based on their analysis of the dynamics of costs and benefi ts of the implementation of DC-FTAs. As they argue, such gradualism is not only important for reducing the costs of association and for smoothing out costs and benefi ts over time, it is also essential in order to avoid risks of essential reforms being stalled or reversed due to falling support for the EU and increasing populism.
Alternatively and more fundamentally, as argued by Hoekman (2016: 13), if EU accession is not on the table, deep and comprehensive convergence with EU law and regulation may not be the most effective mechanism anyway for EaP countries to support their economic and social development objectives. More targeted approaches, which focus primarily on policy areas where there are clear payoffs to offset costs, may be more effective.
Depending on the area concerned, adoption of international standards (and involvement of other international organizations than the EU) may then be more appropriate than an overriding focus on EU law and practice, as laid down in the EU acquis.
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